Relevant bibliographies by topics / Non-executive directors

Academic literature on the topic 'Non-executive directors'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 5 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Non-executive directors"

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Walther, Axel, Hannah Möltner, and Michèle Morner. "Non-executive director’s motivation to continue serving on boards: a self-determination theory perspective." Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 17, no. 1 (February 6, 2017): 64–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-05-2016-0120.

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Purpose This paper aims to identify distinct motivation profiles among non-executive directors and explores the reasons why non-executive directors continue to serve on boards of directors. Design/methodology/approach The analysis is based on a multiple case study in the context of German supervisory boards. The authors develop their primary insights from semi-structured interviews with 53 non-executive directors. Findings The findings indicate that non-executive director motivation revolves around material incentives, reputation, meaningfulness, congruence with firm goals and enjoyment. Three distinct motivation profiles emerge from the analysis, with each profile exhibiting a set of unique reasons to continue serving on boards. Research limitations/implications Future research needs to test for the statistical representativeness of the findings and their performance implications, preferably in a shareholder-oriented governance context. Originality/value The study introduces a psychological angle to the debate about non-executive director motivation. The contributions include going beyond a bi-polar distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and draw attention to how motivation profiles relate to non-executive director’s intention to continue serving on boards.
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Lee, Kha Loon, and Angela Pica. "Independent Non-Executive Directors in Asia." CFA Institute Magazine 21, no. 2 (March 2010): 15–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/cfm.v21.n2.9.

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Oh, Sung-Keun. "Non-executive directors’ Duty to Monitor." BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 31, no. 2 (June 30, 2017): 119–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.24886/blr.2017.06.31.2.119.

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Wheeler, Sally. "Non-executive directors and corporate governance." Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 60, no. 1 (March 12, 2020): 51–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v60i1.474.

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Abdoli, Mohammad Reza, and Mahmoud Abolghasemi. "Relation of non-executive directors and ownership concentration with discretionary accrual accounting." International Academic Journal of Economics 06, no. 01 (June 25, 2019): 141–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.9756/iaje/v6i1/1910010.

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Acero, Isabel, and Nuria Alcalde. "DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION. WHAT REALLY MATTERS?" Journal of Business Economics and Management 21, no. 1 (January 28, 2020): 180–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/jbem.2020.11788.

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In the current scenario of increasing social inequality, the debate over the compensation received by directors and executives of large listed companies, and its justification, has intensified. Drawing on Agency Theory and Human Capital Theory, a multilevel analytical technique is used in this paper to examine the influence of firm-level variables and director-level variables on the individual compensation of the members of the board. The results obtained for the continental European context (Spain in particular) partially support the Human Capital Theory. Nevertheless, there is no evidence supportive of Agency Theory, as corporate governance mechanisms do not contribute to moderate the compensation of directors and there is no relationship between corporate performance and the compensation of directors. The analyses by subsamples (categories of directors) reveal that non-executive director’s compensation seems to be set for a group of individuals as a whole, depending mainly on firm-level characteristics, whereas executive director compensation is more based on the unique characteristics that a particular executive brings to the board.
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Brennan, Niamh M., Collette E. Kirwan, and John Redmond. "Accountability processes in boardrooms." Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 29, no. 1 (January 18, 2016): 135–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/aaaj-10-2013-1505.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to understand the influence of information and knowledge exchange and sharing between managers and non-executive directors is important in assessing the dynamic processes of accountability in boardrooms. By analysing information/knowledge at multiple levels, invoking the literature on implicit/tacit and explicit information/knowledge, the authors show that information asymmetry is a necessary condition for effective boards. The authors introduce a conceptual model of manager-non-executive director information asymmetry as an outcome of the interpretation of information/knowledge-sharing processes amongst board members. The model provides a more nuanced agenda of the management-board information asymmetry problem to enable a better understanding of the role of different types of information in practice. Design/methodology/approach – The analysis of information/knowledge exchange, sharing and creation and the resultant conceptual model are based on the following elements: manager-non-executive director information/knowledge, management-board information/knowledge and board dynamics and reciprocal processes converting implicit/tacit into explicit information/knowledge. Findings – The paper provides new insights into the dynamics of information/knowledge exchange, sharing and creation between managers and non-executive directors (individual level)/between management and boards (group level). The authors characterise this as a two-way process, back-and-forth between managers/executive directors and non-executive directors. The importance of relative/experienced “ignorance” of non-executive directors is revealed, which the authors term the “information asymmetry paradox”. Research limitations/implications – The authors set out key opportunities for developing a research agenda from the model based on prior research of knowledge conversion processes and how these may be applied in a boardroom setting. Practical implications – The model may assist directors in better understanding their roles and the division of labour between managers and non-executive directors from an information/knowledge perspective. Originality/value – The authors apply Ikujiro Nonaka’s knowledge conversion framework to consider the transitioning from individual implicit personal to explicit shared information/knowledge, to understand the subtle processes at play in boardrooms influencing information/knowledge exchange, sharing and creation between managers and non-executive directors.
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Van Schalkwyk, Linda, and Rudie Nel. "Non-executive directors: Employees or independent contractors for both income tax and employees’ tax purposes?" Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences 6, no. 2 (July 31, 2013): 401–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/jef.v6i2.267.

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The concept ‘independent contractor’ is one of the more contentious concepts contained in the Fourth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, as amended. The classification of a person rendering services as either an ‘employee’ or an ‘independent contractor’ is relevant for both income tax and employees’ tax purposes. The objective of this article is to determine whether non-executive directors (both resident and non-resident) are employees or independent contractors for both purposes, respectively. A comprehensive literature review was done in which the meaning of the concepts ‘non-executive director’ and ‘independent contractor’ was discussed in order to gather information needed for the classification. The statutory and common law tests were then applied to determine the classification of non-executive directors as independent contractors. The conclusion reached is that resident non-executive directors could qualify as ‘independent contractors’ for employees’ tax and income tax purposes. Non-resident non-executive directors of companies are ‘employees’ for employees’ tax purposes and ‘independent contractors’ for income tax purposes.
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Kakabadse, Andrew, Keith Ward, Nada Korac‐Kakabadse, and Cliff Bowman. "Role and Contribution of Non‐Executive Directors." Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society 1, no. 1 (March 2001): 4–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eum0000000005455.

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Clifford, Peter, and Robert Evans. "Non-Executive Directors: A Question of Independence." Corporate Governance 5, no. 4 (October 1997): 224–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00064.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Non-executive directors"

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Lipman, Trevor. "The role of the independent non-executive director in Australia." Doctoral thesis, Australia : Macquarie University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.14/28880.

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Thesis (DBA)--Macquarie University, Graduate School of Management, 2008.
Bibliography: p. 275-289.
Company directors have been in existence for more than four hundred years. In the past, they were considered to be a necessary part of corporate existence, and were usually appointed to a board by the CEO or chairman. However, they were usually mates from the 'boys club' and gained their position from whom they knew, and not from what they were capable of contributing. The appointment of independent directors became more normal, as shareholders looked for a way to wrest control back from management. But what independent directors really do and why they are there is not widely understood. A review of the literature relative to independent directors has identified a gap in the knowledge. This gap is the role of the independent director when considered from a commercial aspect; that is, those who observe or write about independent directors. --This thesis has attempted to generate a theory of the role of the independent director through a review of the literature and a subsequent series of interviews. Grounded theory was the chosen methodology for analysing the data and formulating a theory of the role because it allows the researcher to ground the theory in the data instead of establishing a hypothesis and testing it. --The resulting theory is more complex than it first appears. It was found that the primary role of the independent director is to improve the performance of the board and the company. This role is impacted by a number of factors, the two most influential being the information that is available to the independent directors, and the position of the company. This second factor is defined as the size of the company, where it is in its life cycle, and whether it is experiencing any significant change. --These findings enable a number of recommendations to be made to improve policy and practice, recognising the impact of information and company position on the ability of independent directors to contribute positively. It also raises several areas of further study to continue to refine the understanding of the role of the independent nonexecutive director in Australia. These include, among others, investigating the role from other viewpoints such as the board chair or company secretary, or researching the link between company position and information available to independent directors.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
xiii, 303 p. ill
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Leon, Chung Monica. "Non-executive directors| environmental scanning in an enacted world." Thesis, Pepperdine University, 2016. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10133151.

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Non-executive directors (NEDs) are external members of an organization’s board of directors. These directors’ most significant contribution arguably is found in the quality of their strategic insights, as they ostensibly bring a fresh perspective and set of experiences to acts of strategy and sense making. This study examined NEDs’ contribution to the environmental scanning phase of an organization’s strategic planning process. Data were gathered from a convenience sample of seven current NEDs. Findings indicated that the framing process used during the environmental scanning phase directly influenced how NEDs make sense of the environment. Additionally, NEDs were found to prefer an “objective” environment that is externally located. Finally, NEDs consciously appraise each other’s contribution to the overall discussion. Study findings were incorporated into a conceptual model. Future studies should use a larger sample of NEDs, including peers from the same boards and those from across multiple industries.

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Siladi, Biserka. "The role of non-executive directors in corporate governance an evaluation /." Swinburne Research Bank, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.3/25900.

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Thesis (MBus) - Faculty of Business and Enterprise, Swinburne University of Technology, 2006.
This thesis is submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business in the Faculty of Business and Enterprise, Swinburne University of Technology - 2006. Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (p. 113-125).
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Omobolaji-Epoyun, Jennifer. "The role of non-executive directors in Nigerian listed companies." Thesis, University of Huddersfield, 2016. http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/30248/.

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The literature on corporate governance reveals an emphasis on board characteristics and firm performance. The role of the NED is examined under board roles. The concept NED effectiveness is considered as part of board effectiveness revealing a lack of clarity of what distinguishes NED roles from board roles. The literature suggests that a consideration of board roles and effectiveness ultimately covers the purpose of NEDs. The research examined the roles of NEDs in listed companies in Nigeria. The research method utilised in this study was the semi structured interview method. Forty directors and company secretaries were interviewed for the research. The findings of the research revolves around five constructs namely board effectiveness, convergence or divergence with corporate governance principles, NED effectiveness, NED roles and power. The NED requires power to perform their roles, as a result their effectiveness as individuals and a group is restricted to, the weight of influence they carry and exhibit in board room deliberations. The NED is thus hindered by challenges such as information asymmetry. The findings also reveal that, collaboration and team work is crucial for NED and board effectiveness. The different director functions may create hierarchy in the board room. However, a board climate which encourages organisational, rather than performance hierarchy may increase cohesiveness in the board room. The findings reveal that understanding and team work are crucial for successful completion of board tasks. This is because NED roles are not independent of board functions. The findings reveal that Nigerian NEDs in listed companies apply corporate governance best practices. The Nigerian listed companies have separated the roles of the CEO from that of the chairman. This suggests that listed company boards are most likely independent. However, Nigerian NED’s are faced with the challenge of not having adequate company information, through which they can perform their roles. Interestingly, majority of the participants in this research seemed to agree that information asymmetry was the greatest challenge faced by Nigerian NEDs. However, the EXEC participants did not agree with the idea that, Nigerian NED’s do not receive adequate information to perform their roles. As a result, the research indicates that NED’s play more of a supervisory and supportive role in the board room. Furthermore, it reveals that Nigerian listed companies may comply with local and international best practices. However, the notion of board room independence is not enshrined in listed companies in Nigeria. The research findings also indicate that, the Nigerian institutional environment restricts the practice of good corporate governance. Furthermore, the control and monitoring role of Nigerian NEDs has been restated by the EXECs and the corporate environment. The findings indicate that Nigerian listed boards use private and public company meetings to create a front and influence shareholders and stakeholders’ perceptions of directors and the company. Furthermore Nigerian directors use impression management strategies to influence the different actors in the company. There are rare occasions where, stakeholders control the impression management process and this leads a break in the frame and director accountability. The overall key finding of this research is that the findings five constructs are intertwined and are necessary ingredients for NED and board effectiveness.
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Gibbs, David. "Non-executive directors' self-interest : fiduciary duties and corporate governance." Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2014. https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/49712/.

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The board of directors at a company usually comprises both executive and non-executive directors. Their role is to run and direct the company for its benefit since it is incapable of acting by itself. Where there is a separation of ownership and control it is recognised that there is a risk that those in control may use their power for self-interested means. Attention is often focused on the executive directors and how legal controls and governance mechanisms can reduce the possibility of self-interest in the performance of their functions. However, seldom are non-executives the focus of this problem yet they are playing an increasingly important role in the running and governance of the company. This thesis is an investigation in to whether the legal rules and governance mechanisms are suitable in reducing the possibility of self-interest amongst non-executive directors. The study uses multiple directorships as a proxy for non-executive self-interest to demonstrate whether the controls and incentives are suitable. It begins by examining the nature of a nonexecutive’s fiduciary liability to the company focusing on the nature and purpose of the duty to identify when and why the duty is owed. Identifying the nature and purpose of the duty will allow the thesis to demonstrate that existing authority and academic literature on the scope of a non-executive’s fiduciary duty is an unsuitable interpretation based on the company’s current objects and reanalyses it from the perspective of the non-executive’s undertaking on the board. Whilst the analysis concludes that this interpretation would offer a suitable scope in deterring self-interest the thesis continues by examining the enforcement of fiduciary duties by considering the new statutory derivative claim. This analysis reveals that enforcement is low and may reduce the deterrence the fiduciary duties themselves might have. With low levels of enforcement the thesis turns its attention to ex ante incentives, particularly corporate governance mechanisms, which can “nudge” the non-executive in to acting for the benefit of the firm. This analysis contains a review of the corporate governance theories and an empirical study to identify the ways non-executive self-interest may be reduced. The theoretical analysis considers the ways boards may be structured to reduce the potential for self-interested behaviour. Using multiple directorships as a proxy for self-interest the empirical analysis provides evidence as to whether they are in fact perquisite consumption and identifies possible means of control. It is considered herein that there are insufficient controls and incentives on non-executive behaviour, which may lead to increased self-interest to the detriment of the company.
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Lewchalermwongse, Niruncha. "The role of independent non-executive directors in Thailand : their own perception." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2010. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=131547.

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This research offers the perceptions of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) in Thailand of their roles and the way they cope with constraints such as family-concentrated ownership structures and asymmetric information problems. There has been scant prior research in this area. The researcher applied qualitative research techniques to understand what was in the interviewees’ minds. The semi-structured interview was employed because it allowed some flexibility while also providing some guidelines. The fieldwork data reveals that interviewed INEDs were aware of a board’s control role which, in theory, can be realised by nominating and remunerating top management; however, in practice they had no authority to do so due to the family-concentrated ownership of Thai firms. Ensuring compliance with laws and regulations was the actual controlling activity which they undertook. Another role perceived was a service role concerned with giving advice and counsel to management. Although the interviewees rarely got involved with planning and directing, they contributed their expertise to the board. Their service function also helped them to better fulfil a control role because an INED’s service role builds his credibility in the eyes of management. This allows them to gain access to better information about a company – a critical input of a control role. Therefore, a good relationship between executives and non-executives is an essential factor for INED’s effectiveness. i A proportion of outside directors on the board and a director’s independent background were not considered guarantees of board independence. Only an INED’s independence of mind matters. Such independence can be exercised by resigning in order to send a signal to the market and protect minority shareholders. The competencies and personal characteristics of INEDs and their motivations are other elements contributing to their effectiveness.
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Siladi, Biserka, and n/a. "The role of non-executive directors in corporate governance : an evaluation." Swinburne University of Technology, 2006. http://adt.lib.swin.edu.au./public/adt-VSWT20060907.120343.

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Corporate governance has become an increasingly topical issue in recent years. This has been fuelled by such corporate collapses as Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat, One.Tel and HIH. The role and responsibility of the board and directors has emerged as an important issue in examining the cause of these collapses. This has created much debate on what the role of the directors is in 'directing', 'monitoring' or 'advising' a company. Research indicates that investors are prepared to a pay a premium for good governance. This raises a number of questions. What is governance? How do we determine what is good governance? What role do directors have in this? Does the company's performance improve by adopting good governance practices? There are numerous approaches to examining what makes a good board. Quantitative techniques have included the use of such measurable concepts as the number of executive and non-executive directors, directors' skill base (for example, accountancy, marketing etc) and frequency of meetings attended. Researchers have also attempted to measure board performance and effectiveness by using indicators such as share values and shareholder returns. There is a lack of qualitative research in board behaviour and effectiveness. This exploratory study adopts a qualitative approach in order to provide richer data. It uses interviews to evaluate directors' views on some aspects of corporate governance, specifically in relation to the executive and non-executive director debate. The interviews were conducted with 11 directors from a variety of organizations in the forprofit and not-for-profit sectors. Two major themes have emerged from the analysis of the interviews. Firstly, directors are traditionally considered to be responsible for maximising shareholder wealth. However, directors are now expected to broaden their responsibilities to include other stakeholders and to consider social and environmental issues in making their decisions. The findings indicate that it is now more demanding to be a director due to increased workloads arising from the regulatory and legal requirements. This has also impacted on director and board evaluations, multiple directorships and directors remuneration levels. The second major theme that emerged from this study is that directors' personal experiences did not necessarily concur with governance principles and guidelines. For example, the widely recommended method of achieving 'best practice' by having a majority of non-executive directors on a board is considered too simplistic. Further studies are required on the behavioural and personality traits, technical skills of the directors, board structure, composition and type of organization which make the best contribution to achieving boardroom effectiveness.
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Daoud, Omar Fakhri Iskandar. "A model for the role and effectiveness of the non-executive directors." Thesis, University of Leicester, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2381/28634.

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The subject of this thesis is the role and the effectiveness of the role of non-executive directors. The main objective of the thesis is to create a legal model that applies to the nonexecutive directors and enhances their role, in order to achieve the corporate governance goals including controlling the management of the company, reducing agency costs and mitigating the problems arising from the separation of ownership and control. The thesis critically analyses the role of non-executive directors by using the different ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’ sources applicable to the non-executive directors, and by referring to major corporate governance theories related, such as the separation of ownership and control, and the agency costs. The analysis found that the corporate governance reforms do not enhance the role and the effectiveness of the role of the non-executive directors, as the reforms focus on the structure of the board directors and the appointment of independent non-executive directors, but do not deal efficiently with the actual performance of the non-executive directors. The thesis proposes a legal model to apply to non-executive directors which ensures the quality of the actual work of the non-executive directors. The proposed legal model takes in consideration that modern corporate governance role of the non-executive directors and provides an enforcement method through a panel specialized in the cases regarding the non-executive directors.
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Wahlsten, Joakim, and Anish Hindocha. "Non-executive directors : a case study of four UK banks from 2005-2009." Thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Högskolan i Jönköping, IHH, Företagsekonomi, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-15082.

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Ng, Johnny Sai Chun. "Independent non-executive directors in family-controlled listed companies in Hong Kong : a qualitative study." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2018. https://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_oa/578.

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Following the growing emphasis on the monitoring role of independent directors in the board of directors in the stock exchanges of Western developed countries, companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are required to appoint independent non-executive directors (INEDs) representing at least one-third of their boards under the Listing Rules. Unlike those Western developed capital markets where listed companies are widely held, most listed companies in Hong Kong are controlled and managed by families. This means realistically, INEDs of those family-controlled listed companies can only be appointed to the boards with the support from the controlling owners. Under such circumstances, the INEDs' ability to monitor the performance of the management of those companies independently is put in doubt. This thesis intends to conduct a qualitative study using phenomenological approach to explore and understand the role and effectiveness of INEDs in family-controlled listed companies in Hong Kong based on the INEDs' lived experiences. The study is the first of its kind in the Hong Kong corporate governance research arena, as research studies on corporate boards and directors have often adopted a quantitative approach, using only publicly available archival data without in-depth discussions with the subjects on their real experience and views on their jobs. Accordingly, issues related to directors in family-controlled listed companies that require in-depth discussions with these directors are impossible to be addressed by such research approach. Through semi-structured interviews with INEDs of companies listed in Hong Kong, this thesis has contributed to the existing knowledge and literature in the research on INEDs and corporate governance in family businesses and provide useful hints and ideas to practitioners, listed companies, investors, regulators and policy-makers.
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Books on the topic "Non-executive directors"

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Elizabeth, Buckley, ed. Accounting principles for non-executive directors. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

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Mitton, A. E. Non-executive directors in growing businesses. Burnley: Business International Research Company Ltd, 1998.

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Holgate, Peter. Accounting principles for non-executive directors. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

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NED, PRO. A practical guide for non-executive directors. London: Promotion of Non-Executive Directors, 1991.

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NED, PRO. Code of recommended practice on non-executive directors. London: PRO NED, 1987.

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Jack, Andrew. Audit committees: A guide for non-executive directors. London: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales, 1993.

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Aris, Stephen. Non-executive directors: Their changing role on UK boards. London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986.

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Corporate governance: Non-executive directors' independence : fact or fiction? Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 2008.

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Higgs, Derek. Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. London: Department of Trade and Industry, 2003.

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Lindon-Travers, Ken. Non-executive directors: A guide to their role, responsibilities and appointment. Cambridge: Director Books in association with the Institute of Directors, 1990.

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Book chapters on the topic "Non-executive directors"

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García-Ramos, Rebeca, and Belén Díaz Díaz. "Non-executive Director (NED)." In Encyclopedia of Sustainable Management, 1–5. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02006-4_486-1.

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Wade, Robert H. "Muddy Waters: Inside the World Bank as It Struggled with the Narmada Irrigation and Resettlement Projects, Western India." In Social Development in the World Bank, 265–313. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57426-0_17.

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AbstractThe period since the Second World War has witnessed three global power shifts: one, from sovereign states relating to each other through balances of power, to inter-state organizations which pool some sovereignty and enact collective preferences; two, from states to non-state organizations, including NGOs, enormously facilitated by the internet; and three, from West to East. The World Bank has been a microcosm of these shifts. This chapter describes the interplay between some of the agents: World Bank staff; World Bank top management; World Bank Executive Directors (representatives of member governments, who formally govern the Bank); Government of India and governments of states; Indian and international (mainly UK, US, Japanese) NGOs; and the US Congress. The context is the Narmada irrigation and resettlement projects in western India from the 1970s to the 1990s. The first of the projects (Sardar Sarovar) became the subject of a large-scale opposition movement, Indian and international, which ended up forcing the World Bank to take serious responsibility for resettlement and environmental sustainability in its projects world-wide, and to create an independent inspection facility to which people who consider their welfare net harmed by a World Bank-supported project can bring complaints direct to the Bank by-passing their national government.
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Kakabadse, Andrew P., Nada K. Kakabadse, and Ruth Barratt. "CSR in the Boardroom: Contribution of the Non Executive Director (NED)." In Corporate Social Responsibility, 284–99. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230599574_18.

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Kakabadse, Nada, Oleg Yu Tsvetkov, Vlad Udaltsov, and Andrew Kakabadse. "Boards of Steel: The Role and Contribution of the Non-executive Director (NED)." In Global Boards, 170–96. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230250512_8.

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Morris, Glynis D., and Patrick Dunne. "Directors' Duties and Liabilities." In Non-Executive Director's Handbook, 237–65. Elsevier, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b978-075068419-4.50013-9.

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Morris, Glynis D., and Patrick Dunne. "Directors' Remuneration and Benefits." In Non-Executive Director's Handbook, 269–93. Elsevier, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b978-075068419-4.50014-0.

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French, Derek. "15. Directors." In Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198797234.003.0015.

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This chapter explores the role of directors in corporate governance, beginning with a discussion of the principles of corporate governance as set out in the UK Corporate Governance Code. Rules on appointment and removal of a company’s directors are considered next, followed by public disclosure of the names of directors and their work as a board, their remuneration and their powers of management. The chapter also considers the legal categorisation of directors, whether as fiduciaries, agents or trustees; the distinction between executive directors and non-executive directors; the relationship between directors and shareholders of public companies; the issue of the separation of ownership and the control of a company; transparency; and general legal principles regarding the board of directors. Relevant legislation such as the Companies Act 2006 and the UK Corporate Governance Code, as well as particularly significant court cases, are mentioned.
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"9. Kapitel: Non-executive directors nach englischem Recht." In Die Haftung von Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern und nicht geschäftsführenden Direktoren. Berlin, Boston: DE GRUYTER, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110261035.156.

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"13. Kapitel: Non-executive directors nach englischem Recht." In Die Haftung von Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern und nicht geschäftsführenden Direktoren. Berlin, Boston: DE GRUYTER, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110261035.194.

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"17. Kapitel: Non-executive directors nach englischem Recht." In Die Haftung von Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern und nicht geschäftsführenden Direktoren. Berlin, Boston: DE GRUYTER, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110261035.213.

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Reports on the topic "Non-executive directors"

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Morck, Randall. Behavioral Finance in Corporate Governance - Independent Directors, Non-Executive Chairs, and the Importance of the Devil's Advocate. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10644.

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