Journal articles on the topic 'Non-blind image restoration'

Image restoration is a branch of image processing that involves a mathematical deterioration and restoration model to restore an original image from a degraded image. This research aims to restore blurred images that have been corrupted by a known or unknown degradation function. Image restoration approaches can be classified into 2 groups based on degradation feature knowledge: blind and non-blind techniques. In our research, we adopt the type of blind algorithm. A deep learning method (SR) has been proposed for single image super-resolution. This approach can directly learn an end-to-end mapping between low-resolution images and high-resolution images. The mapping is expressed by a deep convolutional neural network (CNN). The proposed restoration system must overcome and deal with the challenges that the degraded images have unknown kernel blur, to deblur degraded images as an estimation from original images with a minimum rate of error.

Blurring image caused by a number of factors such as de focus, motion, and limited sensor resolution. Most of existing blind deconvolution research concentrates at recovering a single blurring kernel for the entire image. We proposed adaptive blind- non reference image quality assessment method for estimation the blur function (i.e. point spread function PSF) from the image acquired under low-lighting conditions and defocus images using Bayesian Blind Deconvolution. It is based on predicting a sharp version of a blurry inter image and uses the two images to solve a PSF. The estimation down by trial and error experimentation, until an acceptable restored image quality is obtained. Assessments the qualities of images have done through the applications of a set of quality metrics. Our method is fast and produces accurate results.

Blind image deblurring, also known as blind image deconvolution, is a long-standing challenge in the field of image processing and low-level vision. To restore a clear version of a severely degraded image, this paper proposes a blind deblurring algorithm based on the sigmoid function, which constructs novel blind deblurring estimators for both the original image and the degradation process by exploring the excellent property of sigmoid function and considering image derivative constraints. Owing to these symmetric and non-linear estimators of low computation complexity, high-quality images can be obtained by the algorithm. The algorithm is also extended to image sequences. The sigmoid function enables the proposed algorithm to achieve state-of-the-art performance in various scenarios, including natural, text, face, and low-illumination images. Furthermore, the method can be extended naturally to non-uniform deblurring. Quantitative and qualitative experimental evaluations indicate that the algorithm can remove the blur effect and improve the image quality of actual and simulated images. Finally, the use of sigmoid function provides a new approach to algorithm performance optimization in the field of image restoration.

The remote sensing imaging environment is complex, in which many factors cause image blur. Thus, without prior knowledge, the restoration model established to obtain clear images can only rely on the observed blurry images. We still build the prior with extreme pixels but no longer traverse all pixels, such as the extreme channels. The features are extracted in units of patches, which are segmented from an image and partially overlap with each other. In this paper, we design a new prior, i.e., overlapped patches’ non-linear (OPNL) prior, derived from the ratio of extreme pixels affected by blurring in patches. The analysis of more than 5000 remote sensing images confirms that OPNL prior prefers clear images rather than blurry images in the restoration process. The complexity of the optimization problem is increased due to the introduction of OPNL prior, which makes it impossible to solve it directly. A related solving algorithm is established based on the projected alternating minimization (PAM) algorithm combined with the half-quadratic splitting method, the fast iterative shrinkage-thresholding algorithm (FISTA), fast Fourier transform (FFT), etc. Numerous experiments prove that this algorithm has excellent stability and effectiveness and has obtained competitive processing results in restoring remote sensing images.

Images of non-crystalline biological specimens embedded in vitreous ice or carbohydrates have to be recorded at rather high defocus to obtain sufficient contrast. Therefore resolution is normally rather limited. Though it is well-known that image restoration from focus series can provide more complete information, this or related techniques have only rarely been used. However, the recent facilities of external TEM control and electronic image recording suggest the restoration technique should be revived and adapted to the needs of biological structure investigation. As autofocus methods have been shown to work rather accurately and focus steps can be calibrated in advance, it can be expected that the restoration can, in principle, be carried out on line and quasi blind. An additional advantage of image restoration from focus series is that it can be used, particularly in case of rather thick ice layers, to separate the phase part of the image function from most of the background due to multiple scattering by combining under- and overfocus images.

Image deconvolution is an important pre-processing step in image analysis which may be combined with denoising, also an important image restoration technique, and prepares the image to facilitate diagnosis in the case of medical images and further processing such as segmentation and registration. Considering the variational approach to this problem, regularisation is a vital component for reconstructing meaningful information and the problem of defining appropriate regularisation is an active research area. An important question in image deconvolution is how to obtain a restored image which has sharp edges where required but also allows smooth regions. Many of the existing regularisation methods allow for one or the other but struggle to obtain good results with both. Consequently, there has been much work in the area of variational image reconstruction in finding regularisation techniques which can provide good quality restoration for images which have both smooth regions and sharp edges. In this paper, we propose a new regularisation technique for image reconstruction in the blind and non-blind deconvolution problems where the precise cause of blur may or may not be known. We present experimental results which demonstrate that this method of regularisation is beneficial for restoring images and blur functions which contain both jumps in intensity and smooth regions.

In order to improve the effect of turbulence degraded image restoration, aiming at the problem that the fuzzy solution is easy to be obtained by using the prior information constraint of gradient distribution under the framework of maximum a posteriori probability of blind restoration algorithm, this paper proposes a dark channel constraint and alternated direction multiplier optimization of turbulence degraded image blind restoration method.First, based on the idea of multi-scale, a dark channel prior constraint is imposed on the image and non-negative constraints and energy constraints are imposed on the point spread function at each level.Then, the kernel and image of the current scale are estimated by alternating iterations of coordinate descent method. When the maximum scale is reached, the final estimated blur kernel is obtained.Last, combined with the total variational model, the image details are quickly restored using the alternate direction optimization method. The experimental results show that the prior information constraint used in the proposed algorithm is advantageous to obtain a clear solution, and can converge to the global optimal solution in the total variational model, which can effectively suppress the artifacts produced in the image restoration process and recover a better target image detail.

By using non-negativity and support constraints recursive inverse filtering ,blind image restoration can be realized. But it’s difficult to resolve the proplem of sensitive to noise,so there has been no practical application. In this paper,according to the characteristic of NAS-RIF algorithm and the question of fuzzy by fabric defects images moving at a high-speed line, methods have been introduced, firstly, Adopt boundary keep smoothing filter as the de-noising pretreatment was carried out for image signal; Secondly, in each iteration of restoration,add the low-pass filter link。Thus,the problem of NAS-RIF algorithm is solved well.The simulation results show that this method has a satisfactory outcome both in visual impression and quantitative analysis.

Blind image deconvolution/deblurring (BID) is a challenging task due to lack of prior information about the blurring process and image. Noise and ringing artefacts resulted during the restoration process further deter fine restoration of the pristine image. These artefacts mainly arise from using a poorly estimated point spread function (PSF) combined with an ineffective restoration filter. This paper presents a BID scheme based on the steepest descent in kurtosis maximization. Assuming uniform blur, the PSF can be modelled by a parametric form. The scheme tries to estimate the blur parameters by maximizing kurtosis of the deblurred image. The scheme is devised to handle any type of blur that can be framed into a parametric form such as Gaussian, motion and out-of-focus. Gradients for the blur parameters are computed and optimized in the direction of increasing kurtosis value using a steepest descent scheme. The algorithms for several common blurs are derived and the effectiveness has been corroborated through a set of experiments. Validation has also been carried out on various real examples. It is shown that the scheme optimizes on the parameters in a close vicinity of the true parameters. Results of both benchmark and real images are presented. Both full-reference and non-reference image quality measures have been used in quantifying the deblurring performance. The results show that the proposed method offers marked improvements over the existing methods.

ABSTRACT Astronomical images allow people to explore the Universe and monitor space; however, due to the long distances involved, such images are generally collected using telescopic equipment. The equipment optical characteristics and the imaging environment cause image degradation, such as blurring, lost details, and sometimes serious losses of object structures and contours, thus limiting the applications of these images. Unfortunately, improving the equipment to acquire much sharper images is expensive. Therefore, we propose a post-processing structure learning method to restore astronomical images that is low in cost but has exciting effects. The proposed method uses single backbone neural networks or their simple combinations to solve a series of image restoration problems, including point spread function (PSF) estimation, non-blind deconvolution, and blind deconvolution. In tests on simulated and real astronomical images, the proposed method achieves dramatic improvements compared to other state-of-the-art methods. Although this work concentrates on astronomical images, the proposed framework is applicable to a wide range of fields.

<p>Deblurring of motion images is a part of the field of image restoration. The deblurring of motion images is not only difficult to estimate the motion parameters, but also contains complex factors such as noise, which makes the deblurring algorithm more difficult. Image deblurring can be divided into two categories: one is the non-blind image deblurring with known fuzzy kernel, and the other is the blind image deblurring with unknown fuzzy kernel. The traditional motion image deblurring networks ignore the non-uniformity of motion blurred images and cannot effectively recover the high frequency details and remove artifacts. In this paper, we propose a new generative adversarial network based on multi-feature fusion strategy for motion image deblurring. An adaptive residual module composed of deformation convolution module and channel attention module is constructed in the generative network. Where, the deformation convolution module learns the shape variables of motion blurred image features, and can dynamically adjust the shape and size of the convolution kernel according to the deformation information of the image, thus improving the ability of the network to adapt to image deformation. The channel attention module adjusts the extracted deformation features to obtain more high-frequency features and enhance the texture details of the restored image. Experimental results on public available GOPRO dataset show that the proposed algorithm improves the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) and is able to reconstruct high quality images with rich texture details compared to other motion image deblurring methods.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p>

In order to improve the quality of blind image restoration, we propose an algorithm which combines Non-negativity and Support constraint Recursive Inverse Filtering (NAS-RIF) and adaptive total variation regularization. In the proposed algorithm, the total variation regularization constraint term is added in the NAS-RIF algorithm cost function. The majorization-minimization approach and conjugate gradient iterative algorithm are adopted to improve the convergence speed. We do the simulation experiments for the blurred classic test image which is added additive random noise. Experimental results show that the restoration effect of our algorithm is better than the spatially adaptive Tikhonov regularization method and the NAS-RIF spatially adaptive regularization algorithm, while the value of improvement of signal to noise ratio (ISNR) has improved.

Caries, the world’s most common chronic disease, remains a major cause of invasive restorative dental treatment. To take advantage of the diagnostic potential of optical coherence tomography (OCT) in contemporary dental prevention and treatment, an intraorally applicable spectral-domain OCT probe has been developed based on an OCT hand-held scanner equipped with a rigid 90°-optics endoscope. The probe was verified in vitro. In vivo, all tooth surfaces could be imaged with the OCT probe, except the vestibular surfaces of third molars and the proximal surface sections of molars within a "blind spot" at a distance greater than 2.5 mm from the tooth surface. Proximal surfaces of 64 posterior teeth of four volunteers were assessed by intraoral OCT, visual-tactile inspection, bitewing radiography and fiber-optic transillumination. The agreement in detecting healthy and carious surfaces varied greatly between OCT and established methods (18.2–94.7%), whereby the established methods could always be supplemented by OCT. Direct and indirect composite and ceramic restorations with inherent imperfections and failures of the tooth-restoration bond were imaged and qualitatively evaluated. The intraoral OCT probe proved to be a powerful technological approach for the non-invasive imaging of healthy and carious hard tooth tissues and gingiva as well as tooth-colored restorations.

Camera captured image is a set of three-dimensional picture frame. This picture frame is a set of different characteristics and parameters. Captured picture suffers from image blurring parameters. These blurring parameters are created by camera misfocus, motion, atmospheric causes, camera sensor noise etc. Thus, captured picture is represents the blurry image format due to lot of interferences occurs in the surrounding background and picture captured device. Hence, some information is corrupted i.e. degradation occurs in the camera captured picture. Therefore, it needs to reconstruct the original picture using image restoration process. Restoration operation includes different image deblurring algorithms such as Non-blind deconvolution and Blind deconvolution algorithms. Non-blind deconvolution algorithms are more effective when blurring parameters of captured picture is known but Blind deconvolution algorithm recover the blurry image without prior knowledge about blurring parameters.

Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) is an essential clinical tool for detecting the abnormalities such as tumors and clots in the human brain. The brain MR images are contaminated by artifacts and noise that follow Rician distribution during the acquisition process. It causes the loss of fine details information, distortion, and a blurred vision of the image. A reshaped Gabor filter-based denoising technique is proposed to overcome these issues. To develop the reshaped Gabor filter, the range of reshaping parameters of the filter is initially obtained by a random search method. Further, to evaluate the better performance of the proposed filter, a manual search is used to find the optimal parametric values and tested on T1, T2, and PD weighted MR data sets one by one. Also, the proposed technique is compared with the existing state of the art filtering methods such as Wiener, Median, Partial differential equation (PDE), Anisotropic diffusion filter (ADF), Non-local means filter (NLM), Modified complex diffusion filter (MCD), Multichannel residual learning of CNN (MRL), Maximum a posteriori (MAP), Adaptive non-local means algorithm (ADNLM), and Advance NLM filtering with non-sub sampled (AVNLMNS) on the basic reference and no reference parameter. The parameters such as mean square error (MSE), peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR), structural similarity index metric (SSIM), perception-based image quality evaluator (PIQE), and blind/referenceless image spatial quality evaluator (BRISQE) are evaluated on T1, T2, and PD weighted MR images with different noise variances such as 1%, 3%, 5%, 7%, and 9%. The proposed method may be used as a better denoising scheme for Rician distributed noise, edge preservation, fine details restoration, and enhancement of abnormalities.

IntroductionNegative affective states contribute to the chronic-relapsing nature of addiction. Mesolimbic dopamine D3 receptors are well placed to modulate emotion and are dysregulated in substance dependence. Selective antagonists might restore dopaminergic hypofunction, thus representing a potential treatment target. We investigated the effects of selective D3 antagonist, GSK598809, on the neural response to negative emotional processing in substance dependent individuals and healthy controls.MethodologyFunctional MRI BOLD response was assessed during an evocative image task, 2 h following acute administration of GSK598809 (60 mg) or placebo in a multi-site, double-blind, pseudo-randomised, cross-over design. Abstinent drug dependent individuals (DD, n = 36) comprising alcohol-only (AO, n = 19) and cocaine-alcohol polydrug (PD, n = 17) groups, and matched controls (n = 32) were presented with aversive and neutral images in a block design (contrast of interest: aversive &gt; neutral). Whole-brain mixed-effects and a priori ROI analyses tested for group and drug effects, with identical models exploring subgroup effects.ResultsNo group differences in task-related BOLD signal were identified between DD and controls. However, subgroup analysis revealed greater amygdala/insular BOLD signal in PD compared with AO groups. Following drug administration, GSK598809 increased BOLD response across HC and DD groups in thalamus, caudate, putamen, and pallidum, and reduced BOLD response in insular and opercular cortices relative to placebo. Multivariate analyses in a priori ROIs revealed differential effects of D3 antagonism according to subgroup in substantia nigra; GSK598809 increased BOLD response in AO and decreased response in PD groups.ConclusionAcute GSK598809 modulates the BOLD response to aversive image processing, providing evidence that D3 antagonism may impact emotional regulation. Enhanced BOLD response within D3-rich mesolimbic regions is consistent with its pharmacology and with attenuation of substance-related hypodopaminergic function. However, the lack of group differences in task-related BOLD response and the non-specific effect of GSK598809 between groups makes it difficult to ascertain whether D3 antagonism is likely to be normalising or restorative in our abstinent populations. The suggestion of differential D3 modulation between AO and PD subgroups is intriguing, raising the possibility of divergent treatment responses. Further study is needed to determine whether D3 antagonism should be recommended as a treatment target in substance dependence.

Anyone contemplating the role of a “hermeneutics of suspicion” in literary and cultural studies must concede that the phrase is rarely used—even by its most devout practitioners, who usually think of themselves engaged in something called “critique.” What, then, are the terminological differences between “critique” and “the hermeneutics of suspicion”? What intellectual worlds do these specific terms conjure up, and how do these worlds converge or diverge? And what is the rationale for preferring one term over the other?The “hermeneutics of suspicion” is a phrase coined by Paul Ricoeur to capture a common spirit that pervades the writings of Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche. In spite of their obvious differences, he argued, these thinkers jointly constitute a “school of suspicion.” That is to say, they share a commitment to unmasking “the lies and illusions of consciousness;” they are the architects of a distinctively modern style of interpretation that circumvents obvious or self-evident meanings in order to draw out less visible and less flattering truths (Ricoeur 356). Ricoeur’s term has sustained an energetic after-life within religious studies, as well as in philosophy, intellectual history, and related fields, yet it never really took hold in literary studies. Why has a field that has devoted so much of its intellectual energy to interrogating, subverting, and defamiliarising found so little use for Ricoeur’s phrase?In general, we can note that hermeneutics remains a path not taken in Anglo-American literary theory. The tradition of hermeneutical thinking is rarely acknowledged (how often do you see Gadamer or Ricoeur taught in a theory survey?), let alone addressed, assimilated, or argued over. Thanks to a lingering aura of teutonic stodginess, not to mention its long-standing links with a tradition of biblical interpretation, hermeneutics was never able to muster the intellectual edginess and high-wattage excitement generated by various forms of poststructuralism. Even the work of Gianni Vattimo, one of the most innovative and prolific of contemporary hermeneutical thinkers, has barely registered in the mainstream of literary and cultural studies. On occasion, to be sure, hermeneutics crops up as a synonym for a discredited model of “depth” interpretation—the dogged pursuit of a hidden true meaning—that has supposedly been superseded by more sophisticated forms of thinking. Thus the ascent of poststructuralism, it is sometimes claimed, signaled a turn away from hermeneutics to deconstruction and genealogy—leading to a focus on surface rather than depth, on structure rather than meaning, on analysis rather than interpretation. The idea of suspicion has fared little better. While Ricoeur’s account of a hermeneutics of suspicion is respectful, even admiring, critics are understandably leery of having their lines of argument reduced to their putative state of mind. The idea of a suspicious hermeneutics can look like an unwarranted personalisation of scholarly work, one that veers uncomfortably close to Harold Bloom’s tirades against the “School of Resentment” and other conservative complaints about literary studies as a hot-bed of paranoia, kill-joy puritanism, petty-minded pique, and defensive scorn. Moreover, the anti-humanist rhetoric of much literary theory—its resolute focus on transpersonal and usually linguistic structures of determination—proved inhospitable to any serious reflections on attitude, disposition, or affective stance.The concept of critique, by contrast, turns out to be marred by none of these disadvantages. An unusually powerful, flexible and charismatic idea, it has rendered itself ubiquitous and indispensable in literary and cultural studies. Critique is widely seen as synonymous with intellectual rigor, theoretical sophistication, and intransigent opposition to the status quo. Drawing a sense of intellectual weightiness from its connections to the canonical tradition of Kant and Marx, it has managed, nonetheless, to retain a cutting-edge sensibility, retooling itself to fit the needs of new fields ranging from postcolonial theory to disability studies. Critique is contagious and charismatic, drawing everything around it into its field of force, marking the boundaries of what counts as serious thought. For many scholars in the humanities, it is not just one good thing but the only conceivable thing. Who would want to be associated with the bad smell of the uncritical? There are five facets of critique (enumerated and briefly discussed below) that characterise its current role in literary and cultural studies and that have rendered critique an exceptionally successful rhetorical-cultural actor. Critique, that is to say, inspires intense attachments, serves as a mediator in numerous networks, permeates disciplines and institutional structures, spawns conferences, essays, courses, and book proposals, and triggers countless imitations, translations, reflections, revisions, and rebuttals (including the present essay). While nurturing a sense of its own marginality, iconoclasm, and outsiderdom, it is also exceptionally effective at attracting disciples, forging alliances, inspiring mimicry, and ensuring its own survival. In “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” Bruno Latour remarks that critique has been so successful because it assures us that we are always right—unlike those naïve believers whose fetishes we strive to expose (225–48). At the same time, thanks to its self-reflexivity, the rhetoric of critique is more tormented and self-divided than such a description would suggest; it broods constantly over the shame of its own success, striving to detect signs of its own complicity and to root out all possible evidence of collusion with the status quo.Critique is negative. Critique retains the adversarial force of a suspicious hermeneutics, while purifying it of affective associations by treating negativity as an essentially philosophical or political matter. To engage in critique is to grapple with the oversights, omissions, contradictions, insufficiencies, or evasions in the object one is analysing. Robert Koch writes that “critical discourse, as critical discourse, must never formulate positive statements: it is always ‘negative’ in relation to its object” (531). Critique is characterised by its “againstness,” by its desire to take a hammer, as Latour would say, to the beliefs of others. Faith is to be countered with vigilant skepticism, illusion yields to a sobering disenchantment, the fetish must be defetishised, the dream world stripped of its befuddling powers. However, the negativity of critique is not just a matter of fault-finding, scolding, and censuring. The nay-saying critic all too easily calls to mind the Victorian patriarch, the thin-lipped schoolmarm, the glaring policeman. Negating is tangled up with a long history of legislation, prohibition and interdiction—it can come across as punitive, arrogant, authoritarian, or vitriolic. In consequence, defenders of critique often downplay its associations with outright condemnation. It is less a matter of refuting particular truths than of scrutinising the presumptions and procedures through which truths are established. A preferred idiom is that of “problematising,” of demonstrating the ungroundedness of beliefs rather than denouncing errors. The role of critique is not to castigate, but to complicate, not to engage in ideas’ destruction but to expose their cultural construction. Barbara Johnson, for example, contends that a critique of a theoretical system “is not an examination of its flaws and imperfections” (xv). Rather, “the critique reads backwards from what seems natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal in order to show that these things have their history” and to show that the “start point is not a (natural) given, but a (cultural) construct, usually blind to itself” (Johnson xv–xvi). Yet it seems a tad disingenuous to describe such critique as free of negative judgment and the examination of flaws. Isn’t an implicit criticism being transmitted in Johnson’s claim that a cultural construct is “usually blind to itself”? And the adjectival chain “natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal” strings together some of the most negatively weighted words in contemporary criticism. A posture of detachment, in other words, can readily convey a tacit or implicit judgment, especially when it is used to probe the deep-seated convictions, primordial passions, and heart-felt attachments of others. In this respect, the ongoing skirmishes between ideology critique and poststructuralist critique do not over-ride their commitment to a common ethos: a sharply honed suspicion that goes behind the backs of its interlocutors to retrieve counter-intuitive and uncomplimentary meanings. “You do not know that you are ideologically-driven, historically determined, or culturally constructed,” declares the subject of critique to the object of critique, “but I do!” As Marcelo Dascal points out, the supposedly non-evaluative stance of historical or genealogical argument nevertheless retains a negative or demystifying force in tracing ideas back to causes invisible to the actors themselves (39–62).Critique is secondary. A critique is always a critique of something, a commentary on another argument, idea, or object. Critique does not vaunt its self-sufficiency, independence, and autotelic splendor; it makes no pretense of standing alone. It could not function without something to critique, without another entity to which it reacts. Critique is symbiotic; it does its thinking by responding to the thinking of others. But while secondary, critique is far from subservient. It seeks to wrest from a text a different account than it gives of itself. In doing so, it assumes that it will meet with, and overcome, a resistance. If there were no resistance, if the truth were self-evident and available for all to see, the act of critique would be superfluous. Its goal is not the slavish reconstruction of an original or true meaning but a counter-reading that brings previously unfathomed insights to light. The secondariness of critique is not just a logical matter—critique presumes the existence of a prior object—but also a temporal one. Critique comes after another text; it follows or succeeds another piece of writing. Critique, then, looks backward and, in doing so, it presumes to understand the past better than the past understands itself. Hindsight becomes insight; from our later vantage point, we feel ourselves primed to see better, deeper, further. The belatedness of critique is transformed into a source of iconoclastic strength. Scholars of Greek tragedy or Romantic poetry may mourn their inability to inhabit a vanished world, yet this historical distance is also felt as a productive estrangement that allows critical knowledge to unfold. Whatever the limitations of our perspective, how can we not know more than those who have come before? We moderns leave behind us a trail of errors, finally corrected, like a cloud of ink from a squid, remarks Michel Serres (48). There is, in short, a quality of historical chauvinism built into critique, making it difficult to relinquish a sense of in-built advantage over those lost souls stranded in the past. Critique likes to have the last word. Critique is intellectual. Critique often insists on its difference from everyday practices of criticism and judgment. While criticism evaluates a specific object, according to one definition, “critique is concerned to identify the conditions of possibility under which a domain of objects appears” (Butler 109). Critique is interested in big pictures, cultural frameworks, underlying schema. It is a mode of thought well matched to the library and seminar room, to a rhythm of painstaking inquiry rather than short-term problem-solving. It “slows matters down, requires analysis and reflection, and often raises questions rather than providing answers” (Ruitenberg 348). Critique is thus irresistibly drawn toward self-reflexive thinking. Its domain is that of second-level observation, in which we reflect on the frames, paradigms, and perspectives that form and inform our understanding. Even if objectivity is an illusion, how can critical self-consciousness not trump the available alternatives? This questioning of common sense is also a questioning of common language: self-reflexivity is a matter of form as well as content, requiring the deployment of what Jonathan Culler and Kevin Lamb call “difficult language” that can undermine or “un-write” the discourses that make up our world (1–14). Along similar lines, Paul Bove allies himself with a “tradition that insists upon difficulty, slowness, complex, often dialectical and highly ironic styles,” as an essential antidote to the “prejudices of the current regime of truth: speed, slogans, transparency, and reproducibility” (167). Critique, in short, demands an arduous working over of language, a stoic refusal of the facile phrase and ready-made formula. Yet such programmatic divisions between critique and common sense have the effect of relegating ordinary language to a state of automatic servitude, while condescending to those unschooled in the patois of literary and critical theory. Perhaps it is time to reassess the dog-in-the-manger attitude of a certain style of academic argument—one that assigns to scholars the vantage point of the lucid and vigilant thinker, while refusing to extend this same capacity to those naïve and unreflecting souls of whom they speak.Critique comes from below. Politics and critique are often equated and conflated in literary studies and elsewhere. Critique is iconoclastic in spirit; it rails against authority; it seeks to lay bare the injustices of the law. It is, writes Foucault, the “art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected intractability” (194). This vision of critique can be traced back to Marx and is cemented in the tradition of critical theory associated with the Frankfurt School. Critique conceives of itself as coming from below, or being situated at the margins; it is the natural ally of excluded groups and subjugated knowledges; it is not just a form of knowledge but a call to action. But who gets to claim the mantle of opposition, and on what grounds? In a well-known essay, Nancy Fraser remarks that critical theory possesses a “partisan though not uncritical identification” with oppositional social movements (97). As underscored by Fraser’s judicious insertion of the phrase “not uncritical,” critique guards its independence and reserves the right to query the actions and attitudes of the oppressed as well as the oppressors. Thus the intellectual’s affiliation with a larger community may collide with a commitment to the ethos of critique, as the object of a more heartfelt attachment. A separation occurs, as Francois Cusset puts it, “between academics questioning the very methods of questioning” and the more immediate concerns of the minority groups with which they are allied (157). One possible strategy for negotiating this tension is to flag one’s solidarity with a general principle of otherness or alterity—often identified with the utopian or disruptive energies of the literary text. This strategy gives critique a shot in the arm, infusing it with a dose of positive energy and ethical substance, yet without being pinned down to the ordinariness of a real-world referent. This deliberate vagueness permits critique to nurture its mistrust of the routines and practices through which the everyday business of the world is conducted, while remaining open to the possibility of a radically different future. Critique in its positive aspects thus remains effectively without content, gesturing toward a horizon that must remain unspecified if it is not to lapse into the same fallen state as the modes of thought that surround it (Fish 446).Critique does not tolerate rivals. Declaring itself uniquely equipped to diagnose the perils and pitfalls of representation, critique often chafes at the presence of other forms of thought. Ruling out the possibility of peaceful co-existence or even mutual indifference, it insists that those who do not embrace its tenets must be denying or disavowing them. In this manner, whatever is different from critique is turned into the photographic negative of critique—evidence of an irrefutable lack or culpable absence. To refuse to be critical is to be uncritical; a judgment whose overtones of naiveté, apathy, complacency, submissiveness, and sheer stupidity seem impossible to shrug off. In short, critique thinks of itself as exceptional. It is not one path, but the only conceivable path. Drew Milne pulls no punches in his programmatic riff on Kant: “to be postcritical is to be uncritical: the critical path alone remains open” (18).The exceptionalist aura of critique often thwarts attempts to get outside its orbit. Sociologist Michael Billig, for example, notes that critique thinks of itself as battling orthodoxy, yet is now the reigning orthodoxy—no longer oppositional, but obligatory, not defamiliarising, but oppressively familiar: “For an increasing number of younger academics,” he remarks, “the critical paradigm is the major paradigm in their academic world” (Billig 292). And in a hard-hitting argument, Talal Asad points out that critique is now a quasi-automatic stance for Western intellectuals, promoting a smugness of tone that can be cruelly dismissive of the deeply felt beliefs and attachments of others. Yet both scholars conclude their arguments by calling for a critique of critique, reinstating the very concept they have so meticulously dismantled. Critique, it seems, is not to be abandoned but intensified; critique is to be replaced by critique squared. The problem with critique, it turns out, is that it is not yet critical enough. The objections to critique are still very much part and parcel of the critique-world; the value of the critical is questioned only to be emphatically reinstated.Why do these protestations against critique end up worshipping at the altar of critique? Why does it seem so exceptionally difficult to conceive of other ways of arguing, reading, and thinking? We may be reminded of Eve Sedgwick’s comments on the mimetic aspect of critical interpretation: its remarkable ability to encourage imitation, repetition, and mimicry, thereby ensuring its own reproduction. It is an efficiently running form of intellectual machinery, modeling a style of thought that is immediately recognisable, widely applicable, and easily teachable. Casting the work of the scholar as a never-ending labour of distancing, deflating, and diagnosing, it rules out the possibility of a different relationship to one’s object. It seems to grow, as Sedgwick puts it, “like a crystal in a hypersaturated solution, blotting out any sense of the possibility of alternative ways of understanding or things to understand” (131).In this context, a change in vocabulary—a redescription, if you will—may turn out to be therapeutic. It will come as no great surprise if I urge a second look at the hermeneutics of suspicion. Ricoeur’s phrase, I suggest, can help guide us through the interpretative tangle of contemporary literary studies. It seizes on two crucial parts of critical argument—its sensibility and its interpretative method—that deserve more careful scrutiny. At the same time, it offers a much-needed antidote to the charisma of critique: the aura of ethical and political exemplarity that burnishes its negativity with a normative glow. Thanks to this halo effect, I’ve suggested, we are encouraged to assume that the only alternative to critique is a full-scale surrender to complacency, quietism, and—in literary studies—the intellectual fluff of aesthetic appreciation. Critique, moreover, presents itself as an essentially disembodied intellectual exercise, an austere, even abstemious practice of unsettling, unmaking, and undermining. Yet contemporary styles of critical argument are affective as well as analytical, conjuring up distinctive dispositions and relations to their object. As Amanda Anderson has pointed out in The Way We Argue Now, literary and cultural theory is saturated with what rhetoricians call ethos—that is to say, imputations of motive, character, or attitude. We need only think of the insouciance associated with Rortyan pragmatism, the bad-boy iconoclasm embraced by some queer theorists, or the fastidious aestheticism that characterises a certain kind of deconstructive reading. Critical languages, in other words, are also orientations, encouraging readers to adopt an affectively tinged stance toward their object. Acknowledging the role of such orientations in critical debate does not invalidate its intellectual components, nor does it presume to peer into, or diagnose, an individual scholar’s state of mind.In a related essay, I scrutinise some of the qualities of a suspicious or critical reading practice: distance rather than closeness; guardedness rather than openness; aggression rather than submission; superiority rather than reverence; attentiveness rather than distraction; exposure rather than tact (215–34). Suspicion, in this sense, constitutes a muted affective state—a curiously non-emotional emotion of morally inflected mistrust—that overlaps with, and builds upon, the stance of detachment that characterises the stance of the professional or expert. That this style of reading proves so alluring has much to do with the gratifications and satisfactions that it offers. Beyond the usual political or philosophical justifications of critique, it also promises the engrossing pleasure of a game-like sparring with the text in which critics deploy inventive skills and innovative strategies to test their wits, best their opponents, and become sharper, shrewder, and more sophisticated players. In this context, the claim that contemporary criticism has moved “beyond” hermeneutics should be treated with a grain of salt, given that, as Stanley Fish points out, “interpretation is the only game in town” (446). To be sure, some critics have backed away from the model of what they call “depth interpretation” associated with Marx and Freud, in which reading is conceived as an act of digging and the critic, like a valiant archaeologist, excavates a resistant terrain in order to retrieve the treasure of hidden meaning. In this model, the text is envisaged as possessing qualities of interiority, concealment, penetrability, and depth; it is an object to be plundered, a puzzle to be solved, a secret message to be deciphered. Instead, poststructuralist critics are drawn to the language of defamiliarising rather than discovery. The text is no longer composed of strata and the critic does not burrow down but stands back. Instead of brushing past surface meanings in pursuit of hidden truth, she dwells in ironic wonder on these surface meanings, seeking to “denaturalise” them through the mercilessness of her gaze. Insight, we might say, is achieved by distancing rather than by digging. Recent surveys of criticism often highlight the rift between these camps, underscoring the differences between the diligent seeker after buried truth and the surface-dwelling ironist. From a Ricoeur-inflected point of view, however, it is their shared investment in a particular ethos—a stance of knowingness, guardedness, suspicion and vigilance—that turns out to be more salient and more striking. Moreover, these approaches are variously engaged in the dance of interpretation, seeking to go beyond the backs of texts or fellow-actors in order to articulate non-obvious and often counter-intuitive truths. In the case of poststructuralism, we can speak of a second-order hermeneutics that is less interested in probing the individual object than the larger frameworks and conditions in which it is embedded. What the critic interprets is no longer a self-contained poem or novel, but a broader logic of discursive structures, reading formations, or power relations. Ricoeur’s phrase, moreover, has the singular advantage of allowing us to by-pass the exceptionalist tendencies of critique: its presumption that whatever is not critique can only be assigned to the ignominious state of the uncritical. As a less prejudicial term, it opens up a larger history of suspicious reading, including traditions of religious questioning and self-scrutiny that bear on current forms of interpretation, but that are occluded by the aggressively secular connotations of critique (Hunter). In this context, Ricoeur’s own account needs to be supplemented and modified to acknowledge this larger cultural history; the hermeneutics of suspicion is not just the brain-child of a few exceptional thinkers, as his argument implies, but a widespread practice of interpretation embedded in more mundane, diffuse and variegated forms of life (Felski 220).Finally, the idea of a suspicious hermeneutics does not invalidate or rule out other interpretative possibilities—ranging from Ricoeur’s own notion of a hermeneutics of trust to more recent coinages such as Sedgwick’s “restorative reading,” Sharon Marcus’s “just reading” or Timothy Bewes’s “generous reading.” Literary studies in France, for example, is currently experiencing a new surge of interest in hermeneutics (redefined as a practice of reinvention rather than exhumation) as well as a reinvigorated phenomenology of reading that elucidates, in rich and fascinating detail, its immersive and affective dimensions (see Citton; Macé). This growing interest in the ethos, aesthetics, and ethics of reading is long overdue. Such an orientation by no means rules out attention to the sociopolitical resonances of texts and their interpretations. It is, however, no longer willing to subordinate such attention to the seductive but sterile dichotomy of the critical versus the uncritical.ReferencesAnderson, Amanda. The Way We Argue Now: A Study in the Cultures of Theory. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005.Asad, Talal. “Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism.” Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech. Ed. Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood. Berkeley: Townsend Center for the Humanities, 2009. 20–63. Bewes, Timothy. “Reading with the Grain: A New World in Literary Studies.” Differences 21.3 (2010): 1–33.Billig, Michael. “Towards a Critique of the Critical.” Discourse and Society 11.3 (2000): 291–92. Bloom, Harold. The Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages. 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