Academic literature on the topic 'New Zealand Foreign relations France'

At the end of the Second World War, the islands of Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia were all under foreign control. The Netherlands retained West New Guinea even while control of the rest of the Dutch East Indies slipped away, while on the other side of the South Pacific, Chile held Easter Island. Pitcairn, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Fiji and the Solomon Islands comprised Britain's Oceanic empire, in addition to informal overlordship of Tonga. France claimed New Caledonia, the French Establishments in Oceania (soon renamed French Polynesia) and Wallis and Futuna. The New Hebrides remained an Anglo-French condominium; Britain, Australia and New Zealand jointly administered Nauru. The United States' territories included older possessions – the Hawaiian islands, American Samoa and Guam – and the former Japanese colonies of the Northern Marianas, Mar-shall Islands and Caroline Islands administered as a United Nations trust territory. Australia controlled Papua and New Guinea (PNG), as well as islands in the Torres Strait and Norfolk Island; New Zealand had Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. No island group in Oceania, other than New Zealand, was independent.

The aim of this article is to study the influence of social communications on the formation of relations between students in the intercultural space on the example of the State Higher Educational Institution "Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University" and Kyiv University named after Borys Hrinchenko. Methods: analysis, synthesis, abstraction, modeling, description, observation, comparison, tabular and graphical representation, questionnaires and generalizations. Results: It is determined that countries such as Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, France and the Netherlands have the highest rates of attracting foreign students to study in higher education institutions. The most international universities in the world are the University of Hong Kong, ETH Zurich, Chinese University of Hong Kong, University of Oxford and Imperial College London, which occupy the first five positions in the World University Rankings 2021. It was found that most often social communication between students belonging to different socio-cultural groups occurs using social media.

Cross-border surrogacy is a global industry that offers intended parents options for family formation by providing foreign surrogate mothers remuneration, directly or via an intermediary, in excess of their actual out-of-pocket expenses. It is a multi-million-dollar business with no international regulation.1 In most countries, limited domestic regulation or oversight is in place. Many countries − such as Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, Hong Kong and South Africa − only permit altruistic surrogacy, while Germany and France ban surrogacy entirely.2 Fully legalized commercial surrogacy is the model followed in some states in the United States of America (USA), as well as Georgia and Ukraine.3 This unregulated cross-border market has produced a lucrative business, with surrogacy arrangements growing by nearly 1,000 per cent between 2006 and 2010.4 The for-profit surrogacy sector has expanded and fertility not-for-profit organizations have also entered the market.5

Introduction. The distribution and receipt of design and construction orders is a most important element in the construction life cycle. It is of considerable interest to study the rules governing the distribution of state orders and the practice of their application in various countries. This article examines the experience of the leading world economies accumulated in the bidding for construction projects. Materials and methods. The authors studied original legal documents on the organization of tenders for construction works in several countries, as well as in international organizations. The tender rules of the USA, France, Germany, New Zealand, Japan, China are considered. Materials of reviews and scientific researches, conducted by other scientists, are also used and summarized. Results. The principal methods for organizing tenders for construction and design works were identified as a result of analysis of regulatory documents. The authors have found many common approaches and methods used to assure equal and responsible relations between the state customer and the construction contractor. Conclusions. It has been established that a number of methods, widely used abroad, are practically not used in Russia, for example, competitive negotiations and two stage tendering. On the contrary, a foreign reader may think that some provisions of the Russian legislation are strange, for example, initial contract price setting by the customer or electronic document management rules in the federal law.

In the 1980s, due to the anti-nuclear policy, New Zealand withdrew from the ANZUS military-political bloc and began to pursue an independent foreign policy based on international law, principles and the UN Charter. However, at the beginning of the XXI century, the situation began to change. New Zealand and the USA signed the Washington Declaration, which confirmed close ties and strategic partnership and served as the basis for the formation of future practical cooperation and political dialogue. Military contacts between the two countries have been restored. New Zealand has also joined the anti-Chinese policy of the United States.

Small size, remoteness from the major world economies, scarce natural resources, dependence on the world market conditions, heavy foreign debts formed historically – these are the weaknesses of New Zealand. But its strengths are – productive, highly mechanized agriculture, skilled labor workforce, democratic legislation and order, lack of corruption, good investment opportunities – enable the country to overcome the ramifications of the global financial and economic crisis effectively enough.

New Zealand claims for the return of preserved tattooed Maori heads held by foreign institutions have revisited complex legal, ethical, and cultural questions surrounding human remains in museum and other institutional collections worldwide. Recent legislation in France that facilitates the return of Maori heads in French museums represents a further stage in this ongoing story.

Last year, for the second time in a little over 20 years, New Zealand asked the International Court of Justice to adjudicate the legality of French nuclear testing. This followed the announcement by the new President of France to the effect that the moratorium that his predecessor had put in place three years earlier, and had promised that France would continue to observe, would be terminated. The action by the New Zealand government was based on a unanimous decision by all political parties in New Zealand. This action reflected the anger of the countries in the South Pacific at the fact that a nuclear-weapon state was still prepared, in 1996, to explode nuclear devices in fragile marine environments on the other side of the world. In short, New Zealand wanted to utilize all available opportunities to persuade France not to proceed.

Until recent years it was common for commentators on either side of the Tasman to speak of the congruence of the security outlooks of Australia and New Zealand. This view was founded not just on geostrategic considerations, or on the formal alliance dating from 1944, but on a range of perceived similarities between the two countries, historical, ethnic, cultural, economic, political. It was cemented by a tradition of intimate military co-operation, and the associated Anzac mythology. Nevertheless, Australia and New Zealand have never had identical security outlooks, as has lately become better appreciated. The catalyst has been the policy of the Lange and Palmer Governments in New Zealand towards nuclear defence, and specifically towards visits of nuclear armed or powered ships and aircraft in New Zealand. However, this is only the clearest expression of the dissimilarities between Australia and New Zealand which have existed as a counterpoint to the trans- Tasman security relationship. The relationship endures, but its shape is changing as the two nations develop in sometimes divergent directions.

It is now two and a half years since the United States suspended military co­-operation with the Armed Forces of New Zealand (AFNZ) following the Labour Government's refusal to grant port-access to the USS Buchanan in January 1985. In this thesis I propose to study the consequences of the breakdown for the AFNZ with a view to establishing exactly what areas of co-operation have been affected and the significance this has for the professionalism and capability of the Services. Thus far, very few public studies have been made of the direct military costs of the ANZUS rift. Most attention has been focused on the state of political relations between the ANZUS powers. It is however, impossible to make a fully informed judgement about the merits of the Government's present defence policy of developing closer relations with Australia in the context of what it claims is a more self-reliant defence posture without some understanding of the problems that policy seeks to remedy. Accordingly, I hope to present that necessary background, and from this point will go on to discuss the extent to which the Government's defence policy addresses itself to the problems generated by the rift with the United States.

The background to this study lies in the discrepancy between the special economic and foreign-political importance of the EU for New Zealand and New Zealand’s low foreignpolitical interaction and visibility in the 12 new EU Member States. This explorative study is the first of its kind to investigate from New Zealand’s viewpoint whether any potential connection points or areas of common interest may exist between New Zealand and Hungary as one of the new EU Member States which might foster directly or indirectly New Zealand’s national interests in the European Union (EU). Owing to the broad nature of such an inquiry, the study encompasses the political, diplomatic, commercial, scientific, and cultural interactions of the two countries from the 1970s until 2007. The theoretical framework of the study builds on Small State Theory, its limitations for the special setting of the thesis topic, however, suggested a necessity to incorporate the Theory on the Role of Ethnic Networks in International Trade. The explorative nature of the research topic required a qualitative research design, based on interviews, questionnaires, and case studies in New Zealand and Hungary in the years 2005 and 2007. Research results were compared with macro-level statistics and official analyses where available to support and enhance analytic validity. The thesis concludes that a solely trade focused foreign policy would not bring the advantages desired by New Zealand. Instead, the research suggests various alternative areas and ways to serve cost effectively New Zealand’s foreign political goals not just in Hungary but also in the Central and Eastern European region in general.

British accession to the European Union (EU) had far reaching economic, political and social consequences for New Zealand, forcing New Zealand to transform itself from a dependent subsidiary of Britain to acting as an independent small state for the first time. Although still in its infancy, the contemporary relationship New Zealand has formed with the EU is quite different to that it first established in the 1970s. It has increasing become more institutionalised, with a slowly developing structural framework that facilitates the narrow areas of cooperation. Dominated by the important economic relationship, the main challenges faced are of an economic nature. But the relationship also encompasses areas of political and social cooperation including people-to-people links, the environment, educational linkages, mutual support for multilateral institutions and development in the Pacific. As a small state, New Zealand is expected to display certain foreign policy behaviours in its interaction with bilateral partners. Small state theory forms the theoretical framework that explains New Zealand's behaviour in its foreign policy interaction with the EU. The theory was chosen for both its perceived usefulness in explaining and understanding the foreign policy behaviour of small states and for the apparent weaknesses of the theory, which is revealed in the case study of New Zealand-EU relations. This demonstrates how the theory is useful for its explanation of small state foreign policy behaviour, but also providing an insightful revelation of the theories flaws. This thesis proposes modifications to small state theory in order to strengthen it, and make it more encompassing of the contemporary realities of small state foreign policy, demonstrating that size does matter when exercising a foreign policy.

This thesis set out to ascertain the position of recent Australian Governments on the latest instalments of Asian regionalism in the context of an assessment of whether there has been a redefinition of Asia and thus a redefinition of Australia???s engagement with Asia. It will concentrate on the broad themes of politico-strategic and economic engagement. Whilst there has been extensive research and documentation on the Asian economic crisis there has been less work on the issue of a new Asian regionalism and the implications for Australia???s complex and variable engagement with the region. This is the basis for the claim to originality of this thesis, a claim supported by its focus on the practical and policy implications of Australia???s engagement, or lack of it, with regional institutions. The process of regional integration has been extremely slow, thus supporting the conclusion that there is no evidence of a major redefinition of Asia. Efforts at Asian regionalism are meeting obstacles that pose immense challenges. Asian regionalism remains nascent and poorly defined. This reflects the diversity and enormous disparities in cultures, political systems and the levels of economic development and differences over economic philosophies within East Asia. What is discernible is that the regionalism is proceeding more rapidly on financial issues than on trade, and in the security area it is conspicuously absent. This research highlights the fact that the question of Asian engagement remains a sensitive issue in Australia and continues to grow more complex. Australia???s engagement with Asia since 1996 has been variable because of the Howard Government???s broader balance of priorities between global and regional issues, and because of the changing nature of the Asian region. The perception gleaned from sources is that, for the Australian Government, regionalism initiatives are characterised by much discussion but lack substance. Consequently, this appears to have led the Government to the position that exclusion from some manifestations of regionalism is not so important. Australia is excluded from some of the regional architectures being constructed. In its efforts to seek inclusion in ASEAN + 3 and ASEM, Australia is facing the same barriers that have stood in the way of an AFTA-CER agreement. Exclusion would be important if the performance of regional groupings was not so indifferent. Exclusion from ASEAN + 3 and ASEM, however, does not equate to Australia???s exclusion from the region.

This thesis explores the relationship between development, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the military in order to determine both the nature and effects of that relationship, and how the involvement of the military within ODA can be conducted in the most appropriate manner to support development. This study was conducted with regard to the current links between security and development within international relations and concerns that ODA is being drawn from a primarily development role to one that more explicitly supports national foreign and security policy ends instead. This issue is explored by defining development, ODA and the military as separate variables and then employing a grounded theory approach to develop an understanding of the relationship between them. The results of the study show that the involvement of the military within ODA and development may occur throughout the full range of operational contexts in which the military may be employed and can encompass activities throughout the scope of the functions of development. This involvement can in turn create a range of positive and negative impacts upon the conduct of ODA and development as the military serves to moderate the direction and strength of the relationship between the two. From this, the role of the military within ODA is identified as potentially an enabling, implementing and coordinating agency – primarily during times of crisis and conflict. The study then relates this role back to the wider context through considering the management of the military’s role and identifying the policies, parameters and procedures that may help to ensure that this role is conducted in the most appropriate manner for development.

Przedmiotem rozprawy był przegląd oraz ocena metod, przy pomocy których systemy prawne regulują spółki zagraniczne. Przez spółkę zagraniczną rozumiano spółkę, która została utworzona przez obcy porządek prawny i do której taki obcy porządek prawny się przyznaje. W pracy przeprowadzono badania porównawcze, analizując systemy prawne wybranych państw angielskiego, niemieckiego oraz francuskiego kręgu językowego, jak również rozwiązania polskie oraz holenderskie.Kluczowe znaczenie w rozprawie odegrał podział na metodę kolizyjną oraz metodę merytoryczną, a zasadnicza teza rozprawy mówiła, że metoda kolizyjna jest nadużywana i powinna w niektórych przypadkach ustąpić miejsca metodzie merytorycznej.Wśród współczesnych kolizyjnych regulacji spółek zagranicznych można wyróżnić trzy grupy. Po pierwsze, rozwiązania, które poddają wszystkie zdarzenia i stosunki spółki rządom prawa, które niekoniecznie spółkę utworzyło. Najważniejszy przypadek tego typu regulacji stanowi teoria siedziby rzeczywistej. Potencjalnie usuwa ona spod rządów prawa inkorporacji również zdarzenia z udziałem aktów publicznych oraz stosunki organizacyjne - dla regulacji których nadaje się tylko porządek inkorporacji. Jedynie w tym systemie prawnym zostały wydane odpowiednie akty publicznego i wyłącznie do niego zostały dostosowane stosunki organizacyjne. Druga kategoria to rozwiązania kolizyjne, które zawsze kierują do porządku macierzystego spółki, w tym przede wszystkim teoria inkorporacji. Faktycznie powstrzymują się one od regulacji stosunków korporacyjnych zagranicznych spółek. Trzecią grupę stanowią ograniczone rozwiązania kolizyjne, które poddają własnemu prawu tylko niektóre stosunki spółek zagranicznych blisko związanych z własnym obszarem. Są one zorientowane praktycznie i zazwyczaj obejmują stosunki, które nadają się do skutecznej regulacji kolizyjnej.Dwie najważniejsze kategorie merytorycznych regulacji spółek zagranicznych to uznanie oraz przepisy nakładające dodatkowe obowiązki na podmioty stosunków korporacyjnych. Uznanie polega na rozciągnięciu na system uznający skutków prawnych powstałych pod rządami systemu obcego. Należy je stosować wobec zdarzeń prawnych, których elementem jest akt publiczny o charakterze konstytutywnym oraz do stosunków organizacyjnych. Przepisy nakładające dodatkowe obowiązki na spółkę zagraniczną lub podmioty w nią zaangażowane nie regulują bezpośrednio stosunków korporacyjnych. Przede wszystkim wymagają one od spółek zagranicznych ujawnienia określonych informacji w rejestrze państwa przyjmującego oraz ustanowienia na miejscu przedstawiciela i wskazania adresu. Mogą one jednak również nakładać na osoby zaangażowane w spółkę obowiązek określonego ułożenia jej stosunków korporacyjnych i w ten sposób pośrednio je normować. Sankcje za naruszenie tych przepisów mogą przypominać faktyczne konsekwencje zastosowania rozwiązań kolizyjnych, jednak ich wykorzystanie nie prowadzi do niedogodności, z jakimi wiąże się regulacja kolizyjna.Najważniejsze zagadnienie na tle polskiej ustawy o prawie prywatnym międzynarodowym to wykładnia pojęcia siedziby, którym posługuje się ona dla wyznaczenia prawa właściwego dla osób prawnych. Owa siedziba powinna być rozumiana jako siedziba statutowa, a nie jako siedziba rzeczywista. Taka konieczność wynika z orzecznictwa Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej, które nakazuje, by spółka, która przeniosła siedzibę rzeczywistą w ramach Europejskiej Wspólnoty Gospodarczej, była uznawana jako spółka państwa swojej inkorporacji. Polska ustawa stanowi co prawda, że przeniesienie siedziby w ramach EOG nie prowadzi do utraty podmiotowości prawnej, ale wyjątek wprowadzony przez ten przepis jest zbyt wąski, aby uczynić zadość wymogom prawa europejskiego. Za teorią siedziby statutowej przemawiają również liczne względy funkcjonalne.
The subject of the thesis was the assessment of methods with which legal systems regulate foreign companies. Foreign company was understood as a company which has been incorporated by a foreign legal system and which is recognized by this system as its own. A comparative research was carried out in the dissertation, covering legal systems of selected English, German and French speaking countries, as well as Polish and Dutch law.Crucial for the dissertation was the distinction between the conflict-of-laws and substantive methods and its main thesis was that the conflict-of-laws method is used too often and should yield precedence to the substantive method in some cases.Among modern conflict-of-laws regulations of foreign companies three groups can be distinguished. First, solutions which subject all legal events and legal relations of a company to substantial law which did not necessarily create the company. The most important instance of the regulations of this kind is the real seat theory. Potentially it removes from authority of the law of incorporation, among others, legal events which include public acts and organizational legal relations – whereas those can effectively be governed only by the law of incorporation. Only within the law of incorporation relevant public acts have been issued and only to this law organizational legal relations have been adjusted. The second category of the conflict-of-laws regulations consists in solutions which always indicate parent law of a company as applicable. They include especially the theory of incorporation. In fact, these solutions refrain from regulation of corporate relations of foreign companies. The third group consists in limited conflict-of-laws regulations which subject to their own substantive law only selected relations of foreign companies closely connected with their country. They are practically oriented and usually cover relations which are suitable for effective conflict-of-laws regulation.Two most important categories of substantive regulations of foreign companies are the recognition and provisions imposing additional obligations on parties of corporate relations. The recognition consists in extension of legal effects which arose under a foreign legal system to the recognizing system. It should be applied to legal events which include constitutive public acts and to organizational relations. Provisions imposing additional obligations on foreign companies or persons involved in them do not regulate directly corporate relations. Above all, they require from foreign companies disclosure of certain information in the register of the admitting country and appointment of a representative and indication of an address there. They may, however, impose on persons involved in a company an obligation to specifically arrange its corporate relations and in this manner indirectly regulate these relations. Legal sanctions for breach of these provisions may resemble actual consequences of use of the real seat theory, but their application does not result in problems associated with the conflict-of-laws regulation.The most important question with respect to the Polish Act on the Private International Law is interpretation of the term “seat”, which the Act uses to designate law applicable to legal entities. It should be understood as the seat set in articles of association and not as the real seat. This results from the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which mandates that a company transferring its real seat within the European Economic Area be recognized as the company of the country of its incorporation. Although the Polish Act provides that transfer of the seat within the EEA does not result in loss of legal personality of the company, nevertheless this exception is not broad enough to satisfy requirements of the European law. Many functional arguments also speak in favour of the statutory seat theory.

This chapter analyses the implications of Brexit for the UK and the issues facing the EU without the UK. It assesses the costs to the UK in terms of economics and loss of influence on decisions affecting key UK interests. It concludes that the UK is bound to be diminished, but that the EU will also feel the loss of UK influence on economic liberalization, in overseas aid and in foreign policy. The Eurozone will survive but its difficulty in making progress towards a fiscal union will also make it harder for a core grouping to emerge. In seeking to set a common vision for the EU, President Macron of France is so far a lonely voice. For the author, the EU offers a means of managing the relations between potentially querulous neighbours and of entrenching and sharing democratic values. There will be tangible, and less immediately obvious, losses to the UK.

This chapter discusses relations between France and the United States under the Nixon administration. When Nixon took office as president in early 1969, he and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger wanted to put America's relationship with France on an entirely new footing. Relations between the two countries in the 1960s, and especially from early 1963 on, had been far from ideal. Nixon and Kissinger tried to develop a close relationship with the Pompidou government and in the early Nixon–Pompidou period the two governments were on very good terms. Both governments were also interested in developing a certain relationship in the nuclear area. However, by 1973 relations between the two countries took a sharp turn for the worse. The chapter considers what went wrong and why the attempt to develop a close relationship failed.

This chapter investigates the influence of the 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors on Muslim–Jewish relations in France. This conflict, which ended with Israel's occupation of significant Arab lands including the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, had little impact on daily interactions more fundamentally shaped by the colonial North African past and the French present than the Middle East. Nevertheless, the unprecedented mobilization of Jewish organizational life around Israel and efforts to create parallel affinities in the Muslim North African population around Palestine continued to shape political discourse in binary terms. The result was that while conflict between France's large Muslim and Jewish populations was rare, the story of two polarized ethno-religious political units hardened as new political actors, particularly university students, began to use French campuses as spaces in which to engage in discussions of foreign policy.

Information and communications technologies (ICTs) are playing an increasingly vital role in the daily lives of all communities by revolutionizing their working procedures and rules of governance. ICTs offer a unique opportunity for governing elite to overcome the crisis of representative democracy, as ICT and the Internet empower civil society to play its role more effectively and facilitate the performance of governments’ main function-serving the people who elect them (Misnikov, 2003). In the realm of government, ICT applications are promising to enhance the delivery of public goods and services to common people not only by improving the process and management of government, but also by redefining the age-old traditional concepts. Community networking groups and local government authorities are well placed to campaign for greater inclusion for all members of the community in the information society. Possible areas to target include the provision of technology at low or no cost to groups through community technology centres or out of hours school access. There are many possibilities and local government must take a significant role in these activities (Young, 2000). Information society is based on the effective use and easy access of information and knowledge, while ICT for development (or ICTD) is not restricted to technology itself but focusing on manifold development and diverse manifestations for the people to improve their well-being. ICTD has deep roots in governance, is part of governance and has effects on governance patters and practices at both central and local level. By recognizing these facts, UNDP focuses on technologies to end poverty at WSIS Cyber Summit 2003, and emphasizes on ways that new technologies can help lift more than one billion people out of extreme poverty (UNDP, 2003). Apart from the four Asian IT giants (Korea, Rep., Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, China, and Japan), most of the Asian countries have fallen under the “low access” category of the Digital Access Index. This has also been referred in the WSIS Cyber Summit 2003, until now, limited infrastructure has often been regarded as the main barrier to bridging the digital divide (ITU, 2003). Among the countries with ICT spending as share of their GDP, Sweden, UK, The Netherlands, Denmark, and France (8.63, 7.97, 7.39, 7.19, and 6.57% respectively during 1992-2001) remain at the top (Daveri, 2002, p. 9), while countries like Bangladesh, Greece, Mexico, Niger, and many more remain at the bottom (EC, 2001; ITU, 2003b; Miller, 2001; Piatkowski, 2002). In a similar research it has been found that in terms of average share of ICT spending GDP, New Zealand, Sweden, Australia, USA, and UK (9.3, 8.4, 8.1, 8.1, and 7.8% respectively during 1992-1999) were among the highest (Pohjola, 2002, p. 7), though most of the countries in the Asian and African regions remain below the average of 5%. The disadvantaged communities in the countries staying below average in ICT spending seem to be lagging in forming appropriate information-based economy and eventually fall behind in achieving proper e-government system. The e-government system in those countries need to enhance access to and delivery of government services to benefit people, help strengthen government’s drive toward effective governance and increased transparency, and better management of the country’s social and economic resources for development. The key to e-government is the establishment of a long-term dynamic strategy to fulfill the citizen needs by transforming internal operations. E-government should result in the efficiency and swift delivery and services to citizens, business, government employees and agencies. For citizens and businesses, e-government seems the simplification of procedures and streamlining of different approval processes, while for government employees and agencies, it means the facilitation of cross-agency coordination and collaboration to ensure appropriate and timely decision-making. Thus, e-government demands transformation of government procedures and redefining the process of working with people and activities relating to people. The outcome would be a societal, organizational, and technological change for the government and to its people, with IT as an enabling factor. E-government should concentrate on more efficient delivery of public services, better management of financial, human and public resources and goods at all levels of government, in particular at local level, under conditions of sustainability, participation, interoperability, increased effectiveness and transparency (EU, 2002). ICT brings pertinent sides more closely by prioritizing partnerships between the state, business and civil society. A few East European countries have became economically liberal with the high level of foreign direct investment per capita and at the same time became ICT-advanced regional leaders in terms of economic reform. These countries also present the region’s most vivid examples of partnerships and collaboration. They have clearly manifested the importance of the public-private partnerships, transparent bottom-up strategies, involvement of all stakeholders, total governmental support, capturing economic opportunities, and enabling electronic mediated businesses, responding to the challenges of globalization.

In 1920, the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs created a special section within its propaganda services in the aims of fighting the image of a postwar exhausted France, utilizing soccer within its efforts. This section created a soccer diplomacy and contributed to spreading French influence despite the weakness of French football and French decline in the 1930s. This chapter exposes and explains the contradiction and the paradox of this kind of soccer diplomacy. French diplomats began to understand that soccer matches and competitions were a new and sometimes efficient way to spread propaganda or to analyze the evolution of international relations in the interwar period. Yet, despite the dynamism of the sport and tourism service at its beginning, the government gave little financial help to the French Football Federation, especially when France organized the World Cup in 1938. The French state’s support of football within international relations in the 1930s demonstrates the challenges of soccer diplomacy. Even with the creation of a specific branch of the foreign ministry that focused on sport, international matches and major events such as the 1938 FIFA World Cup reveal the limits of the ambitions of this kind of soccer diplomacy.

The final chapter brings the book’s strands together in a re-examination of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1911 and its political aftermath. Friction over China, immigration, and naval security, had by this point, cast significant doubts over the viability of Britain’s partnership with Japan, and revealed the difficulties of maintaining a unified foreign policy within an increasingly decentralized imperial system. In turn, this forced London to develop new forms of managing its relations with the white dominions, seeking their endorsement for the renewal of the Japanese alliance at the 1911 imperial conference. Yet London’s hopes that it might settle the ‘Japanese question’ as an imperial issue quickly proved misplaced. In the years that followed, Canada was further tightened its restrictions on Japanese immigration, while Australia and New Zealand became embroiled with London over the Pacific naval policies of the new First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. Once again, British ties to Japan became a point of divergence between metropolitan and colonial perspectives on empire, race, and the future of global politics.

Across European and Western liberal market democracies, China’s rise exposes friction between economic interests and political values and challenge common foreign and security policy in the European Union. From positions of economic weakness, Greece, Hungary, and Portugal have blocked or watered down common security, human rights, and economic positions in the regional body. Beijing’s formation of a formal group with Central and Eastern European countries, the so-called 17+1, is similarly seen in Brussels as a “divide and rule” tactic. Yet while European governments receive ample criticism for neglecting their political values in order to advance economic relations with China, the economic importance of China to the EU is rarely scrutinized. For large member states like Germany and France, and smaller ones such as Denmark and Norway, trade and investment with China does not produce a relationship of economic dependency for the EU as commonly perceived, particularly as China’s state capitalist system produces new competition for European companies. Beijing’s infringements on European democratic values and competitive economic pressures are changing the public discourse on China, but without a collective response, economic relations with China will only become more asymmetric than they are today.

This concluding chapter outlines the considerable achievements of Henry III's personal rule. Within England, Henry's personal rule was a period of domestic peace. That created favourable conditions for the building of churches, the work of the friars and pastoral-minded bishops, the explosion of the money supply, and the development of a new network of markets and fairs. It provided the conditions too for the expansion of the common law. If Henry had achievements to his credit, he had also clearly failed. He had not recovered the continental empire and acknowledged his condition would be ‘worsened’ by the forthcoming peace with France. Within England itself, Henry faced vehement criticisms of his rule in parliament and demands for reforms which would virtually strip him of power. The feeling that Henry was handing England over to grasping and lawless foreigners was a major factor separating him from his people. Up to a point Henry here, in his generous way, was simply trying to do his best for his foreign relations without any wider strategic purpose. To set in the balance against his failings, Henry had one golden weight; it was, of course, his piety.

Between 1950 and 1965, foreign aid played a crucial role within the Indonesian economy. With the Cold War as a backdrop, this aid came from both Western and Eastern blocs with the intention of drawing Indonesia into their spheres of influence. The aid also played a crucial role in the development of architecture in the archipelago. A major endeavour within this period was the construction of buildings and venues for the Fourth Asian Games to be held in Jakarta in 1962 which involved a new stadium, an international-standard hotel and a large by-pass road around part of the city. Financial and technical aid from the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States was obtained to realise these projects. All the while, the Asian Games, along with the modern structures constructed for the event, provided Indonesia an opportunity to advance its own agenda, which was to construct a sense of self-confidence and national pride and to situate itself as a leader among decolonised nations. Nevertheless, foreign financial and technical aid played an important role in the realisation of these projects. The availability of foreign aid was intrinsically tied to President Ahmad Sukarno’s ability to play the interests of all sides. This paper examines plans and preparations for the Fourth Asian Games as a case of engagement between the two Cold War blocs with Indonesia in the middle. By focusing on the key building projects for the Games, the paper reveals the role of foreign aid in the development of architecture in Indonesia during a critical period in its post-war and post-independence formation. This development took place through the interaction of different interests—those of the Western Bloc, the Eastern Bloc, and Indonesia—in the midst of the Cold War and decolonisation period. A glimpse into the interaction may suggest a case of competition. However, examination of the three projects indicates that it was a case of multipolar collaboration instead.

Geographically Mongolia has two neighbors. Mongolia’s existence today depends largely on mutually friendly relationships with two big neighbors. The main pillars of Mongolia’s new international strategy were incorporated in Mongolia’s National Security Concept adopted on June 30, 1994. This document, approved by the Mongolian Parliament, emphasizes a balanced policy towards the country’s two giant neighbors, underlines the importance of economic security in protecting Mongolia’s national integrity, and warns about too much dependence on any one country for trade. In today’s world of globalization and interdependence, Mongolia has to engage with other countries beyond these two neighbors, Russia and China. This is fundamental thing of the Mongolia’s searching third neighbor. Mongolia needs more friends to ensure its national security interests and achieve economic prosperity its ‘Third Neighbor Policy’1 is a policy of extending its friends all around the world. Two immediate neighbors of Mongolia, Russia and China, remain the foreign policy priority and this priority is not contradictory to the policy of having more friends. Mongolia is becoming an arena of clashes of economic interests of developed countries, multinational corporations due its rich mining deposits. Mongolia's Third Neighbor Policy is aimed to leverage the influence of neighboring countries in the national security issues of Mongolia. In contrast with other satellite states of the former Soviet Union, Mongolia concurrently instituted a democratic political system, a market-driven economy, and a foreign policy based on balancing relations with Russia and China while expanding relations with the West and East. Mongolia is now pursuing a foreign policy that will facilitate global engagement, allow the nation to maintain its sovereignty, and provide diplomatic freedom of maneuver through a “third neighbor” policy. 2 This policy is very much alive today but there is no reason to claim that its implementation is satisfactory. Mongolia has major investors from the US, Japan, Germany and France from the EU, for example. There are many universal conventions related to landlocked country. For Mongolia, access to sea via our two neighbors, means promoting economic ties with the third neighbors, as an important factor conducive to reinforcing the material foundations of Mongolia’s third neighbor policy.