Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Neurophenomenology'

The aim of this work is to lay the basis of a post-Cartesian cognitive science of music. Traditional psychology of music often adopts a theoretical framework in line with the dualistic stance characterising the Cartesian approach, which implies a separation between mind and matter or, in its materialistic version, a separation between brain and body. I criticize such a paradigm on the basis of theoretical and empirical evidence, showing that alternative models of human musicality offer more plausible explanations without any dichotomy between objective/subjective and internal/external. The thesis that I will defend throughout this work holds that musical cognition is not something that occurs in our head. Rather, it is a process that extends beyond the boundaries of skull and skin, being constituted by the dynamic interplay between embodied agents and the environment in which they are embedded. I will defend such a claim through an interdisciplinary approach that lies at the intersection of different fields of research (cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, phenomenology) and by providing an original interpretation of the enactive paradigm that emerged during the last decade of the Twentieth Century in the realm of cognitive science.

The purpose of this research study was to propose a new learning theory for career and technical education with a foundation in philosophy and neuroscience. It purports to combine constructivism, phenomenology and neuroscience into a proposed learning theory entitled ‘constructivist neurophenomenology embedded in embodied cognition, that is, the formative role that the environment plays in the development of cognitive processes. The theory represents a trinity of constructivism’s genetic epistemology manifesting itself in (a) accommodation, (b) phenomenology’ intentionality, that is there is always something there for consciousness, and (c) neuroscience cell assembly. These three actions of the brain construct consciousness, memory, and learning via metaphorical thinking.

Psychedelics can enable a broad and paradoxical spectrum of linguistic phenomena from the unspeakability of mystical experience to the eloquence of the songs of the shaman or curandera. Interior dialogues with the Other, whether framed as the voice of the Logos, an alien download, or communion with ancestors and spirits, are relatively common. Sentient visual languages are encountered, their forms unrelated to the representation of speech in natural language writing systems. This thesis constructs a theoretical model of linguistic phenomena encountered in the psychedelic sphere for the field of altered states of consciousness research (ASCR). The model is developed from a neurophenomenological perspective, especially the work of Francisco Varela, and Michael Winkelman’s work in shamanistic ASC, which in turn builds on the biogenetic structuralism of Charles Laughlin, John McManus, and Eugene d’Aquili. Neurophenomenology relates the physical and functional organization of the brain to the subjective reports of lived experience in altered states as mutually informative, without reducing consciousness to one or the other. Consciousness is seen as a dynamic multistate process of the recursive interaction of biology and culture, thereby navigating the traditional dichotomies of objective/subjective, body/mind, and inner/outer realities that problematically characterize much of the discourse in consciousness studies. The theoretical work of Renaissance scholar Stephen Farmer on the evolution of syncretic and correlative systems and their relation to neurobiological structures provides a further framework for the exegesis of the descriptions of linguistic phenomena in first-person texts of long-term psychedelic selfexploration. Since the classification of most psychedelics as Schedule I drugs, legal research came to a halt; self-experimentation as research did not. Scientists such as Timothy Leary and John Lilly became outlaw scientists, a social aspect of the “unspeakability” of these experiences. Academic ASCR has largely side-stepped examination of the extensive literature of psychedelic selfexploration. This thesis examines aspects of both form and content from these works, focusing on those that treat linguistic phenomena, and asking what these linguistic experiences can tell us about how the psychedelic landscape is constructed, how it can be navigated, interpreted, and communicated within its own experiential field, and communicated about to make the data accessible to inter-subjective comparison and validation. The methodological core of this practice-based research is a technoetic practice as defined by artist and theoretician Roy Ascott: the exploration of consciousness through interactive, artistic, and psychoactive technologies. The iterative process of psychedelic self-exploration and creation of interactive software defines my own technoetic practice and is the means by which I examine my states of consciousness employing the multidimensional visual language Glide.

Music Therapy
Ph.D.
The Bonny Method of Guided Imagery and Music (GIM) is an individual form of music psychotherapy known for facilitating profound and embodied music and imagery experiences. GIM theorists have argued that the use of music and imagery can facilitate a mind-body interaction, leading to powerful experiences that affect all facets of a person's being. But this interaction has not been directly examined in GIM, despite the need to understand its nature and risks. This gap in research is due to the inherent limitations of the two major paradigms used in this field: quantitative research cannot account for unique individual responses to phenomena, while qualitative research is not predictive in the same way as quantitative, positivistic research. This study used a new research approach, neurophenomenology, in order to link participants' descriptions of qualitative music and imagery experiences with electroencephalographic (EEG) data, providing context for the brain data while also illuminating the neurological effect of imagery experiences. The music and imagery session used a guided imagery script which focused on six different kinds of imagery experiences (Affect, Body, Interaction, Kinesthetic, Memories, Visual) and was pre-recorded over two different classical musical pieces selected from the GIM literature. Four participants each underwent individual music and imagery sessions using the pre-recorded script and music while having simultaneous EEG data collected. Afterward, participants viewed a video of their sessions with the researcher and described their imagery experiences during a phenomenological interview. The contents of the transcribed interviews were coded into phenomenological categories concerning the congruence of image with guiding cue, imagery modality, stability of imagery, awareness of guiding and music, and awareness of altered state of consciousness (ASC). Meanwhile, consultants performed coherence analyses on the EEG data, examining relationships between major regions of the brain according to both guiding condition and frequency ranges of brain waves. The researcher integrated the phenomenological and EEG data for each participant, and then across cases to determine patterns of subjective experience and brain response. Each participant demonstrated distinctive styles of reported imagery experience with brain responses, ranging from minimal emotional involvement with alertness, to drowsy, disjointed body sensory imagery, to drowsy, disconnected emotional imagery, to a deeper exploration of consciousness with a consistent ASC. Cross-case comparisons of the integrated data showed that 1) the ASC involves both physical relaxation and ongoing focus on the imagery experience; 2) imagery generates brain activity in the same regions that would process information from similar real-life experiences; 3) beta and gamma frequencies played a significant role in how participants maintained an ASC and made meaning out of the imagery. Implications of these and other conclusions from the separate examination of EEG and phenomenological data are discussed.
Temple University--Theses

The present paper critically examines the epistemic status of first-person accounts and first-person methods in Francisco Varela’s research program neurophenomenology, which integrates a phenomenological perspective in cognitive science. The paper also questions Varela’s description of neurophenomenology as an ontological recategorization of nature and a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.

Le travail présenté dans cette thèse vise à nous amener à une meilleure compréhension des relations fines entre ce que nous expérimentons phénoménologiquement sous la forme d'états mentaux, et les effets sous-jacents et potentiellement causaux sur l'activité neuronale. Afin d'étendre notre compréhension scientifique de l'expérience consciente, nous avons d'abord mis l'accent sur un phénomène appelé la pensée spontanée ou vagabondage de l'esprit. Notre paysage intérieur est un aspect essentiel et complexe de notre expérience humaine, avec des recherches suggérant que les gens sont engagés dans une forme de dialogue intérieur sans rapport avec leur environnement immédiat 50% de leur temps de veille. De plus, le vagabondage de l'esprit a constamment été associé à un affect négatif, même lorsque son contenu est positif. Il est alors intéressant de noter que les fondements de la plupart des pratiques méditatives et contemplatives sont la formation de l'observation flexible et continue des états mentaux et de l'expérience sensorielle, le développement d'une attention soutenue et la culture de la conscience métacognitive. Étant donné que nous ne sommes généralement pas au courant de la fluctuation temporelle de ces états mentaux dans le temps (vagabondage de l'esprit), les méditants sont des sujets idéaux pour obtenir de manière précise des rapports phénoménologiques et des descriptions des états à la première personne. Ainsi, nous avons conçu un paradigme nouveau basé sur présentation de sondage d'expérience aux méditants afin de mieux comprendre les mesures dynamiques de l'EEG (Electroencéphalographie) pendant la méditation. Nos résultats suggèrent que la pratique experte de méditation est associée à une fréquence atténuée de la pensée spontanée et que l'entraînement à la méditation réduit par la suite la susceptibilité de l'esprit à errer, menant à des périodes d'absorption méditative rapportées comme étant plus longues. Les augmentations de l'activité thêta (4-7 Hz) sur les régions thêta frontales médianes ainsi que l'activité alpha (9-12 Hz), principalement focalisée sur le cortex somatosensoriel, semblent être des marqueurs d'états méditatifs soutenus par rapport au vagabondage mental. Sur la base de la robustesse de l'activité thêta de la ligne médiane frontale chez les méditants avancés, ainsi qu'une multitude de résultats démontrant que l'activité thêta frontale serait le pilier du contrôle cognitif via l'intégration et l'échange d'informations de longue portée, nous avons développé un protocole de neurofeedback méthodologiquement nouveau et exhaustif dans le but d'entraîner l'activité thêta (3.5-6.5 Hz) de la ligne médiane frontale Fz, en donnant comme instruction à nos sujets de s'engager dans des techniques de respiration et de relaxation similaires à la méditation. Nous avons constaté que les sujets qui ont reçu le vrai neurofeedback ont été capables de moduler significativement leur activité thêta Fz (3-7 Hz) à travers huit séances de neurofeedback par rapport aux sujets contrôles qui ont reçu un feedback apparié. Nous avons également observé des modulations significatives dans les bandes de fréquences alpha (9-11 Hz) et bêta (13-20 Hz) chez les sujets qui ont reçu l'entraînement réel de neurofeedback, ainsi que des améliorations sur plusieurs mesures des fonctions exécutives. Nos résultats réduisent davantage l'écart explicatif en reliant caractéristique neurophysiologique et données à la nature phénoménologique de notre experience
The work presented in this thesis aims to extend our scientific understanding of the subtle relationships between our phenomenological experience of specific states of consciousness, and the corresponding and potentially causal effects on neural activity. In our first experiment, we focused on a phenomenon referred to as spontaneous thought or mind wandering. Our vastly complex inner landscape is an essential aspect of our conscious experience, with research suggesting that people are engaged in some form of inner dialogue unrelated to their surroundings 50% of waking hours. These ongoing trains of thought have been consistently linked to reports of negative affect, even when the specific content is positive. Interestingly, the cornerstones of most meditation and contemplative practices are; a) training the continuous and flexible monitoring of mind wandering and sensory experience, b) the cultivation of sustained attention, and c) enhanced metacognitive awareness. Given that we are generally unaware of mind wandering when it occurs, meditation practitioners may provide more accurate first person phenomenological reports and descriptions of these temporally fluctuating states given their respective training. Thus, we designed a novel paradigm based on experience sampling probe presentations to gain insight into the dynamic measures of mental activity and EEG during meditation. Our findings suggest that meditation expertise is associated with an attenuated frequency of mind wandering, and that meditation training reduces the susceptibility of the mind to wander subsequently leading to longer periods of reported meditative absorption. Increases in theta activity (4-7 Hz) over frontal midline regions of the cortex, and alpha activity (9-12 Hz) primarily focused over the somatosensory cortex, appear to be markers of sustained meditative states when compared to mind wandering. Based on the robustness of the frontal midline theta in advanced meditators, alongside a multitude of findings demonstrating that frontal theta may serve as the backbone for cognitive control via long range information integration in neural networks throughout the brain, we then developed a methodologically novel and exhaustive neurofeedback protocol with the aim of training frontal midline theta (3.5-6.5 Hz at electrode site Fz) by means of instructing our subjects to engage in focused breathing and other techniques similar to meditation. After eight training sessions, we found that subjects who received real neurofeedback were able to significantly modulate and increase theta activity (3-7 Hz) over frontal regions, whereas subject's receiving age and gender matched sham (pseudo) feedback were not. We additionally observed significant modulations in both the alpha (9-11 Hz) and beta bands (13-20 Hz) in subjects who received real neurofeedback training. Together, these findings provide evidence that we can successfully connect neurophysiological features and data to the phenomenological nature of our subjective experience

The present study explores the nature and structure of spiritual and aesthetic experiences through the interdisciplinary application of neurophenomenology (NP). This approach merges aspects of psychology, neurophysiology, and phenomenology into a unified methodology. The study is nested within a larger project, Space, Science, and Spirituality, and as such, it carries a common goal to use simulation to evoke spiritual and aesthetic responses similar to those expressed by astronauts and cosmonauts. Careful analysis of previous work in NP provided methodological “lessons learned”, which guided the experimental design, execution, and analysis of the present study. The data collected provides support for experience as a phenomenon that can be studied through empirical means. Further, the articulation of spiritual and aesthetic experiences akin to astronaut experiences corresponds to specific neurological and psychological indicators. Among those indicators are differences in EEG measures during simulation time relative to expressions of spiritual experience following the simulation and changes in visual processing across theta, alpha, and beta signals as correlated with self-identification. These findings support an embodied theory of experience that incorporates memory, executive function, perception, and consciousness. In addition to its academic contribution, this research holds implications for commercial space flight, long-term space missions, post-traumatic stress disorder therapies, and the entertainment industry.
Ph.D.
Doctorate
Psychology
Sciences
Modeling and Simulation

Rhythmicity and synchronization are fundamental mechanisms employed by countless natural phenomena to communicate. Previous research has found evidence for synchronization in patients and therapists during clinical activity, for instance in their body movements (Ramseyer & Tschacher, 2011) and physiological activations (e.g. Marci et al, 2007; Kleinbub et al., 2012; Messina et al., 2013). While this phenomenon has been found associated with different important aspects of clinical relationship, such as empathy, rapport, and outcome, and many authors suggested that it may describe crucial dimensions of the therapeutic dyad interaction and change, a clear explanation of its meaning is still lacking. The goals of the present work were to: 1) Provide a solid theoretical and epistemological background, in which to inscribe the phenomenon. This was pursued by crossing neurophenomenology’s sophisticated ideas on mind-body integration (Varela, 1996) and Infant Research’s detailed observations on development of infants’ Self through their relationships. The common ground for this connection was the complex systems theory (von Bertalanffy, 1968; Haken, 2006). 2) Contribute to literature through two replications of existing studies (Kleinbub et al., 2012; Messina et al., 2013) on skin conductance (SC) synchronization. In addition to the original designs, secure attachment priming (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007) was introduced to explore if observed SC linkage was susceptible to manipulation, accordingly to the developmental premises defined in the theoretical chapters. Study 1 focused on synchrony between students and psychotherapists in simulated clinical sessions; Study 2 reprised the same methodology with two principal changes: first the clinician’s role was played by psychologists without further clinical trainings, and second, each psychologist was involved in two distinct interviews, in order to assess the impact of individual characteristics on SC synchrony. 3) Provide an ideographical exploration of the psychotherapy processes linked to matched SC activity. In study 3 the highest and lowest synchrony sequences of 6 sessions of psychodynamic psychotherapy were subject of a detailed phenomenological content analysis. These micro-categories were synthetized in more abstract ones, in order to attempt the recognizing of regularities that could shed light on the phenomenon. 4) To explore the pertinence of employing mathematical properties derived from the application of system theory in psychological contexts. In study 4, Shannon’s entropy and order equations (1948) were applied on the transcribed verbal content of 12 depression psychotherapies, to assess both intra-personal and inter-personal (dyad) order in verbal categories. Results from these studies provided further evidence for the existence of a synchronization mechanism in the clinical dyads. Furthermore the various findings were generally supporting the dyad system theoretical model, and its description of regulatory dynamics as a good explanation of the synchronization phenomena. Discrepancies with previous literature highlighted the need for further studies to embrace more methodological sophistication (such as employing lag analysis), and cautiousness in the interpretation of results.
Ritmo e sincronia sono meccanismi fondamentali alla base dello scambio di informazione in innumerevoli fenomeni naturali. Ricerche precedenti hanno evidenziato la presenza di meccanismi di sincronizzazione in pazienti e terapeuti durante la pratica clinica, ad esempio nei loro movimenti corporei (Ramseyer & Tschacher, 2011) e nelle attivazioni fisiologiche (es. Marci et al, 2007; Kleinbub et al., 2012; Messina et al., 2013). Nonostante tale fenomeno sia stato associato a diversi importanti aspetti della relazione terapeutica, quali l’empatia, il rapport, l’esito del percorso clinico, e nonostante molti di tali autori siano concordi nel suggerire che tale meccanismo possa descrivere dimensioni cruciali della relazione terapeutica e dei suoi processi di cambiamento, una chiara spiegazione e comprensione del suo significato è ancora assente. Pertanto gli obiettivi del presente lavoro sono: 1) Fornire un solido background teorico ed epistemologico nel quale inscrivere tale fenomeno. Tale obiettivo è stato perseguito tracciando un ideale filo rosso fra la sofisticata integrazione fra corpo e mente ad opera del pensiero neurofenomenologico (Varela, 1966), e le dettagliate osservazioni sull’evoluzione del Se nei bambini attraverso le loro relazioni primarie ad opera del movimento dell’Infant Research. Il terreno comune per operare tale connessione è stato fornito dalla teoria dei modelli complessi (von Bertalanffy, 1968; Haken, 2006). 2) Contribuire alla letteratura attraverso due replicazioni di studi precedenti (Kleinbub et al., 2012; Messina et al., 2013) sulla sincronizzazione della conduttanza cutanea (CC). In aggiunta ai disegni originali, è stata introdotta una tecnica di priming della sicurezza di attaccamento (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007), per osservare se e come la coordinazione nella CC nella diade terapeutica fosse soggetta a manipolazione, e coerente col modello di sviluppo scelto per interpretare il fenomeno. Lo studio 1 si focalizza sulla sincronia fra studenti e psicoterapeuti durante simulazioni di colloqui clinici; lo studio 2 riprende tale metodo con due differenze significative: il ruolo di clinico è stato ricoperto da psicologi senza ulteriore formazione, ed ogni psicologo ha condotto due colloqui, al fine di investigare l’impatto delle caratteristiche individuali sulla sincronia. 3) Fornire una esplorazione ideografica dei processi terapeutici connessi all’attivazione CC simultanea. Nello studio 3 le sequenze di maggiore e minore sincronia di 6 sessioni di psicoterapia psicodinamica sono state analizzate attraverso una dettagliata analisi del contenuto fenomenologica. Le micro-categorie da essa ottenute sono poi state sintetizzate in categorie più astratte al fine di cercare di riconoscere la presenza di regolarità che potessero gettare luce sul fenomeno. 4) Esplorare la pertinenza dell’utilizzo di proprietà matematiche derivate dall’applicazione della teoria sistemica nei contesti psicologici. Nello studio 4, le formule di entropia e ordine di Shannon (1948), sono state applicate sui trascritti del contenuto verbale di 12 psicoterapie di pazienti depressi, per investigare la presenza di ordine nelle categorie verbali sia intra-personali, che inter-personali (diade). Gli esiti di tali studi hanno rivelato ulteriore evidenza rispetto all’esistenza di meccanismi di sincronizzazione nella diade clinica. Inoltre i vari risultati erano generalmente in supporto al modello sistemico diadico e la sua descrizione delle dinamiche di regolazione si è rivelata una buona spiegazione dei processi di sincronizzazione. Discrepanze minori rispetto alla letteratura sottolineano il bisogno di proseguire la ricerca in questo settore attraverso una maggiore accortezza metodologica (ad esempio tramite lag-analysis), e cautela nell’interpretazione dei risultati.

The present work deals with one of the most fascinating aspect of consciousness, the awareness of the bodily-self, and in particular with the notion of body ownership. The goal of this thesis is to combine the phenomenological conception of the bodily-self, mainly grounded on the concept of embodiment, with the scientific investigation of the physiological bases of the sense of body ownership. Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical subject and its experimental investigation in both pathological and healthy brain, arguing that the very core of the self, as claimed by neuro-phenomenology, is determined by the dynamic relationship between body representation and motor system, which enables human beings to properly act in the world and to build a coherent sense of self. In this view, body representation and the possibility to move are conceived as the two main factors allowing human beings to reach a conscious experience of the self. Can this theoretical insight meet scientific evidence? In other words, are we able to measure the contribution of the sensory-motor system in generating body ownership? This aspect of human experience was investigated using two experimental approaches. In Chapter 2, given that the fundamental characteristics of subjectivity can sometimes be illuminated through the study of their pathological distortions, we experimentally tested how body metric representation can be susceptible to plastic remapping after tool-use training, in healthy subjects (Experiment 1) and in a particular sample of patients in which an ischemic episode in the right hemisphere caused a disruption of body ownership, along with primary sensory-motor dysfunction (Experiment 2). These patients show a sort of complementary disease to the well-described symptoms of patients in classical somatoparaphrenia (delusion of dis-ownership), by showing a pathological embodiment of someone else’s limb (delusion of ownership). As is often the case with neuropsychological syndromes, a large amount of theoretical questions arises from the observation of this condition. First of all, which is the phenomenal experience involved? Is that condition just a confabulatory manifestation? Does this subjective and sometimes illusory sense of body ownership influence objective measures of the sensory-motor system? Which is the relationship between sensory-motor impairment and body ownership disruption? Chapter 2 addresses these questions by demonstrating that the intentional motor processing which underlines the action execution with an alien limb experienced as own, induces body representation remapping, even in absence of actual proprioceptive feedback. Chapter 3 investigates how a multisensory illusion that alters the sense of body ownership, the rubber hand illusion (RHI), affects the activity of the motor system in a sample of healthy subjects. During this experimental manipulation, subjects report a feeling of ownership over an artificial, rubber hand and a concurrent feeling of dis-ownership over their real hand. What is the mechanism underlying the self-attribution of the rubber hand to one’s own body? And again, which relationship is there between the functionality of the sensory-motor system and the feeling of body ownership? Are the qualia of ownership/dis-ownership reflected at the level of the motor system? We found that the sensation for the hand disappearing is reflected in a lower excitability of the motor pathways that govern the movement of the same hand, providing the first neurophysiological evidence that our conscious experience to have or not a body has a fundamental counterpart in the activity of the sensory-motor system. In conclusion, even if usually taken for granted, our conscious belief to own a body has a very multi-level nature. Both in presence of brain injuries and experimental manipulation, the sense of body ownership can be altered; only in these cases we are able to realize the complexity of its structure and how the brain plays an essential part in its generation. The results reported here are discussed in the context of phenomenological and cognitive literatures in an effort to understand the role of both body awareness and of sensory-motor activity as the building stones of the human conscious experience of being in the world.

This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy)
This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

Cette thèse vise à décrire la conception, la mise en œuvre et la validation des interfaces cerveau-machine cognitives (ICMc). Le chapitre 1 introduit les ICMc et la métastabilité cérébrale. Dans le chapitre 2, une fonction cognitive spécifique (la mémoire de travail) est sélectionnée pour construire une ICMc. Dans le chapitre 3, nous explorons l'utilisation des propriétés spatio-temporelles de la dynamique cérébrale pour construire des biomarqueurs pour les ICMc, et nous abordons des questions scientifiques concernant la métastabilité cérébrale induite par la cognition. L’ICMc décrite au chapitre 2 surveille la charge de la mémoire de travail (MT) en temps réel et de façon continue. Les applications peuvent aller de l’apprentissage à la sécurité dans des environnements industriels. À notre connaissance, il s'agit de la première recherche sur les ICMc dans laquelle différents éléments clés sont simultanément inclus: des tests en temps réel, une tâche croisée, un démêlage des facteurs de confusion moteurs et cognitifs, et une validation neurophénoménologique. Dans le chapitre 3, nous développons un cadre empirique pour étudier la structure spatio-temporelle des changements d'états cérébraux issus de la cognition, avec deux objectifs spécifiques. Premièrement, d’identifier et d’utiliser des patrons d’activité cérébrale induits par la cognition comme descripteurs dans les ICMc. Deuxièmement, d’investiguer comment le cerveau s'auto-organise pour permettre à différentes régions de s'engager et de se désengager dans le cadre de la cognition. Nous proposons et validons comme biomarqueurs un ensemble de variables affectées spatialement et temporellement par des états cognitifs
This thesis aims at describing in detail the design, implementation and validation of cognitive brain-computer interfaces (cBCI). Chapter 1 introduces cBCI design and brain metastability. In Chapter 2, a specific cognitive function (Working Memory) is selected for the construction of a cBCI. In Chapter 3, we explore the use of spatio temporal properties of brain dynamics as biomarkers for cBCIs, and we address scientific questions concerning cognition-driven brain metastability. The BCI described in Chapter 2 continuously monitors Working Memory (WM) load in real-time. It relies on spectral properties of EEG as biomarkers. The applications may range from improved learning to security in industrial environments. To our knowledge, this represents the first cBCI research in which different key elements are included simultaneously: real-time tests, a cross-task, disentanglement of motor and cognitive confounders and neurophenomenological validation. In Chapter 3, we develop a data-driven framework for studying the spatio temporal structure of brain state switches under cognition, with two specific objectives. First, to identify and utilise patterns of brain activity elicited by cognition as descriptors in cBCIs. Second, to investigate how the brain self-organizes allowing different regions to engage and disengage in joint activity in a manner driven by cognition. Assuming brain metastability (in the context of statistical physics), we propose a set of local variables that are expected to be spatially and temporarily affected by cognitive states. We correlate these variables with cognitive conditions, such as high-WM load, Alzheimer disease, and positive emotional valence

This thesis presents an analysis of Piaroa shamanic practices that combines elements of symbolic, psychobiological and phenomenological approaches. Theories from, and clinical findings in, neuroscience, pharmacology, psychology and psychoneuroimmunology are integrated with extended participant observation field study involving basic shamanic training to demonstrate how Piaroa shamans learn to understand and effect biopsychosocial adaptation and promote health. It is argued that Piaroa shamanism is a sophisticated means of interpreting ecological forces and emotional processes in the interests of minimising stress across related systems: self, society, ecosystem, and cosmos. Piaroa shamans should be cadres in the promotion of an ethos, the good life of tranquillity, which serves as the basis for low-stress social relations. Piaroa mythology is predicated upon human-animal-god reciprocity and provides the shaman with a series of informationprocessing templates, designed to be invoked with the use of hallucinogens, which assist him to understand inter-systemic relations. I analyse how Piaroa shamans develop the psychic skills to divine and regulate ecological relationships and emotional processes, while highlighting possible relationships among native symbolism, neurology, consciousness and the emotions. It is argued that Piaroa shamanic practices involve conditioning the mind to achieve optimal perceptive capacities that, in association with sensitive biopsychosocial study, facilitate accurate prediction and successful psychosocial prescription. A cultural neurophenomenological approach enables articulation of the psychocultural logic of ethos, epistemology, divination, sorcery, and curing, and a fuller picture of a South American indigenous society’s shamanic practices than less integrative approaches have afforded

This research into Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) presents the results of 60 first-person psycho-phenomenological interviews with 30 New Zealand women. The participants were recruited from the Canterbury and Wellington regions, 10 had recovered. Taking a non-dual, non-reductive embodied approach, the phenomenological data was analysed semiotically, using a graph-theoretical cluster analysis to elucidate the large number of resulting categories, and interpreted through the enactive approach to cognitive science. The initial result of the analysis is a comprehensive exploration of the experience of CFS which develops subject-specific categories of experience and explores the relation of the illness to universal categories of experience, including self, ‘energy’, action, and being-able-to-do. Transformations of the self surrounding being-able-to-do and not-being-able-to-do were shown to elucidate the illness process. It is proposed that the concept ‘energy’ in the participants’ discourse is equivalent to the Mahayana Buddhist concept of ‘contact’. This characterises CFS as a breakdown of contact. Narrative content from the recovered interviewees reflects a reestablishment of contact. The hypothesis that CFS is a disorder of action is investigated in detail. A general model for the phenomenology and functional architecture of action is proposed. This model is a recursive loop involving felt meaning, contact, action, and perception and appears to be phenomenologically supported. It is proposed that the CFS illness process is a dynamical decompensation of the subject’s action loop caused by a breakdown in the process of contact. On this basis, a new interpretation of neurological findings in relation to CFS becomes possible. A neurological phenomenon that correlates with the illness and involves a brain region that has a similar structure to the action model’s recursive loop is identified in previous research results and compared with the action model and the results of this research. This correspondence may identify the brain regions involved in the illness process, which may provide an objective diagnostic test for the condition and approaches to treatment. The implications of this model for cognitive science and CFS should be investigated through neurophenomenological research since the model stands to shed considerable light on the nature of consciousness, contact and agency. Phenomenologically based treatments are proposed, along with suggestions for future research on CFS. The research may clarify the diagnostic criteria for CFS and guide management and treatment programmes, particularly multidimensional and interdisciplinary approaches. Category theory is proposed as a foundation for a mathematisation of phenomenology.

The essential benefit of neurophenomenological investigations in architecture is to be found in the capacity to provide us with the closest currently available approximation of the human being in its biological and cultural complexity, which can be used in architectural design and thinking. The prevailing praxis of creating abstract, conceptual designs, which favor reflexive and intellectualized over existential, perceptually based experience of architecture, is being increasingly recognized in architectural circles as contradictory and inadequate interpretation of our involvement with architectural spaces. This renewed interest in rethinking the experiential dimension of architecture coincides with the neurophenomenological understanding of recent interdisciplinary findings, which unequivocally confirm that the experiencing – architectural – subject is a profoundly embodied, enactive and situated human being. Neurophenomenological analysis of architectural experience is aimed at understanding the conditions of our embodiment, how we relate with architectural environment and essentially, what it is about architecture that has the capacity to sustain and nourish a meaningful human existence. By emphasizing the pre-reflective dimension of experience, intention is to raise architects’ awareness that our engagement and understanding of architectural spaces is to a large extent determined by profoundly embodied and preconscious processes. Importantly, neurophenomenology has the potential to articulate the implicit architects’ knowledge: there is neurophenomenologically valid evidence that the workings of dynamically intertwined brain and bodily mechanisms have been intuitively used by architects throughout architectural history as a pre-reflective architecture-body communication, in order to shape the overall embodied experience and atmosphere of an architectural setting. Architectural theories like late-nineteenth century idea of empathy (Einfühlung), Le Corbusier’s promenade architecturale, Steven Holl’s “enmeshed experience”, Juhani Pallasmaa’s “architecture as a verb”, Jan Gehl’s “life between buildings”, have neurophenomenological correlates in sensorimotor theory of perception, mirror neurons, hard-wired emotional responses, brain plasticity and the concept of enriched environments, to name but a few. In this sense, a crucial advantage of a dialogue between architecture and neurophenomenology lies in the compatibility of ideas already present in architectural discourse and the theoretical background of neurophenomenological approach. Establishing a common ground facilitates more accurate definition and overlapping of investigative goals, while the phenomenologically enriched scientific hypotheses allow for the exploration and protection of the intrinsic poetic nature of architecture.

This dissertation models the relationship between symptoms of heart rhythm fluctuations and cardiac measurements in order to better identify the probabilities of either a primarily organic or psychosomatic cause, and to better understand cognition of the internal body. The medical system needs to distinguish patients with actual cardiac problems from those who are misperceiving benign heart rhythms due to psychosomatic conditions. Cognitive neuroscience needs models showing how the brain processes sensations of palpitations. Psychologists and philosophers want data and analyses that address longstanding controversies about the validity of introspective methods. I therefore undertake a series of measurements to model how well patient descriptions of heartbeat fluctuations correspond to cardiac arrhythmias. First, I employ a formula for Bayesian inference and an initial probability for disease. The presence of particular phrases in symptom reports is shown to modify the probability that a patient has a clinically significant heart rhythm disorder. A second measure of body knowledge accuracy uses a corpus of one hundred symptom reports to estimate the positive predictive value for arrhythmias contained in language about palpitations. This produces a metric representing average predictivity for cardiac arrhythmias in a population. A third effort investigates the percentage of patients with palpitations report actually diagnosed with arrhythmias by examining data from a series of studies. The major finding suggests that phenomenological reports about heartbeats are as or are more predictive of clinically significant arrhythmias than non-introspection-based data sources. This calculation can help clinicians who must diagnose an organic or psychosomatic etiology. Secondly, examining a corpus of reports for how well they predict the presence of cardiac rhythm disorders yielded a mean positive predictive value of 0.491. Thirdly, I reviewed studies of palpitations reporters, half of which showed between 15% and 26% of patients had significant or serious arrhythmias. In addition, evidence is presented that psychosomatic-based palpitation reports are likely due to cognitive filtering and processing of cardiac afferents by brainstem, thalamic, and cortical neurons. A framework is proposed to model these results, integrating neurophysiological, cognitive, and clinical levels of explanation. Strategies for developing therapies for patients suffering from identifiably psychosomatic-based palpitations are outlined.
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Bc. Rostislav Ježek Diploma thesis - Husserl and neurofenomenology: Epoché, interview, practice Abstract The theme of this work is conception of practical usage of epoché in phenomenology, where epoché is carried out by philosopher in his lone meditation, and in the project of neurophenomenology, where epoché is to be found in the situation of interview. The aim of this work is, on the base of reflexion of the general practical framework of epoché, to put a question of the nature of epoché in phenomenology and of possibilities of its usage in neurophenomenology. These question will be anwered during the elaboration of progressive carrying out of epoché of experience of the one, who carries it out. We will see its natural affinity with the common attitude and with neurophenomenological epoché, which otherwise may seem naiv. Then, we will try to show, that Husserl's late theory of transcendental idealismus may be grasped as a conception of the influence, which the epoché exerts upon the experience of the one, who carries it out. At the end, we will try to show, that neurophenomenological research and research of neurophenomenology give phenomenology an oportunity to think deeper about its own methods. We will show, that the conception of dependence of the situation of the practical carrying out of epoché can...

Emergent change is a pervasive force in modern organisations. However, the subjective experiences of emergent change for frontline individuals and teams have not been explored in organisational change literature. The integrative field of applied neurosciences offers valuable insights into the underlying neural mechanisms that shape these experiences and drive responses in order to meet basic psychological needs. Using interactive qualitative analysis (IQA), this study involved a focus group and follow-up interviews with nine participants at a South African software development company to explore the experiences of emergent change at work. System dynamics reflected that these experiences are significantly more complex than literature and practice currently account for, and that individuals and teams find their experiences of emergent change to threaten their sense of safety and basic psychological needs. The physiological and emotional experiences were found to be driving elements. Peak performance state and the relational environment were found to be salient outcomes. Findings present the opportunity for the reconceptualisation of emergent change, a shift in focus from change itself to the human experiences thereof and the importance of embracing new possibilities, tools and practices for meeting needs and thriving in an ever-changing world.
Industrial and Organisational Psychology
M. Com. (Industrial and Organisational Psychology)