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Journal articles on the topic 'Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC)'

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Author: Grafiati

Published: 11 March 2023

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1

Northoff, Georg, Naotsugu Tsuchiya, and Hayato Saigo. "Mathematics and the Brain: A Category Theoretical Approach to Go Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness." Entropy 21, no. 12 (December 17, 2019): 1234. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e21121234.

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Consciousness is a central issue in neuroscience, however, we still lack a formal framework that can address the nature of the relationship between consciousness and its physical substrates. In this review, we provide a novel mathematical framework of category theory (CT), in which we can define and study the sameness between different domains of phenomena such as consciousness and its neural substrates. CT was designed and developed to deal with the relationships between various domains of phenomena. We introduce three concepts of CT which include (i) category; (ii) inclusion functor and expansion functor; and, most importantly, (iii) natural transformation between the functors. Each of these mathematical concepts is related to specific features in the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). In this novel framework, we will examine two of the major theories of consciousness, integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness and temporospatial theory of consciousness (TTC). We conclude that CT, especially the application of the notion of natural transformation, highlights that we need to go beyond NCC and unravels questions that need to be addressed by any future neuroscientific theory of consciousness.

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2

Degn Pedersen, Anders. "HJERNEN, BEVIDSTHEDEN OG ZENONS PARADOKS." Psyke & Logos 25, no. 2 (December 31, 2004): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/pl.v25i2.8697.

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I neurovidenskaberne forstås bevidsthedsbegrebet almindeligvis inden for paradigmet ”Neural Correlates of Consciousness” (NCC). Denne artikel kritiserer NCC-paradigmets grundlæggende antagelser om forholdet mellem organismen, dens mentale tilstande og omverdenen. Bestræbelsen på at finde minimale neurale strukturer tilstrækkelige for bevidsthed, er sammenlignelig med at løse paradokset om Akilleus og skildpadden på Zenons betingelser; hvilket som bekendt er udsigtsløst. Som alternativ til NCC-paradigmet foreslås det, at den neurovidenskabelige bevidsthedsforskning lader sig styre af spørgsmål om, hvordan hjernen og forskellige hjerneområder er involveret i realiseringen af hele organismens mangeartede aktiviteter i miljøet. Bevidsthed er knyttet til disse fuldblodede aktiviteter, og ikke alene til processer i minimale neurale strukturer.

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3

Miller, Steven M. "On the correlation/constitution distinction problem (and other hard problems) in the scientific study of consciousness." Acta Neuropsychiatrica 19, no. 3 (June 2007): 159–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1601-5215.2007.00207.x.

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Objective:In the past decade, much has been written about ‘the hard problem’ of consciousness in the philosophy of mind. However, a separate hard problem faces the scientific study of consciousness. The problem arises when distinguishing the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and the neural constitution of consciousness. Here, I explain this correlation/constitution distinction and the problem it poses for a science of phenomenal consciousness. I also discuss potential objections to the problem, outline further hard problems in the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness and consider the ontological implications of these epistemological issues.Methods:Scientific and philosophic analysis and discussion are presented.Results:The correlation/constitution distinction does indeed present a hard problem in the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness. Refinement of the ‘NCC’ acronym is proposed so that this distinction may at least be acknowledged in the literature. Furthermore, in addition to the problem posed by this distinction and to ‘the hard problem’, the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness also faces several other hard problems.Conclusion:In light of the multiple hard problems, it is concluded that scientists and philosophers of consciousness ought to (i) address, analyze and discuss the problems in the hope of discovering their solution or dissolution and (ii) consider the implications of some or all of them being intractable. With respect to the latter, it is argued that ultimate epistemic limits in the study of phenomenal consciousness pose no threat to physicalist or materialist ontologies but do inform our understanding of consciousness and its place in nature.

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4

Sattin, Davide, Francesca Giulia Magnani, Laura Bartesaghi, Milena Caputo, Andrea Veronica Fittipaldo, Martina Cacciatore, Mario Picozzi, and Matilde Leonardi. "Theoretical Models of Consciousness: A Scoping Review." Brain Sciences 11, no. 5 (April 24, 2021): 535. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/brainsci11050535.

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The amount of knowledge on human consciousness has created a multitude of viewpoints and it is difficult to compare and synthesize all the recent scientific perspectives. Indeed, there are many definitions of consciousness and multiple approaches to study the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Therefore, the main aim of this article is to collect data on the various theories of consciousness published between 2007–2017 and to synthesize them to provide a general overview of this topic. To describe each theory, we developed a thematic grid called the dimensional model, which qualitatively and quantitatively analyzes how each article, related to one specific theory, debates/analyzes a specific issue. Among the 1130 articles assessed, 85 full texts were included in the prefinal step. Finally, this scoping review analyzed 68 articles that described 29 theories of consciousness. We found heterogeneous perspectives in the theories analyzed. Those with the highest grade of variability are as follows: subjectivity, NCC, and the consciousness/cognitive function. Among sub-cortical structures, thalamus, basal ganglia, and the hippocampus were the most indicated, whereas the cingulate, prefrontal, and temporal areas were the most reported for cortical ones also including the thalamo-cortical system. Moreover, we found several definitions of consciousness and 21 new sub-classifications.

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5

MOVSHON, J. ANTHONY. "Three comments on Teller’s “bridge locus”." Visual Neuroscience 30, no. 5-6 (November 2013): 219–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0952523813000527.

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AbstractThe notion of a set of neurons that form a “bridge locus” serving as the immediate substrate of visual perception is examined in the light of evidence on the architecture of the visual pathway, of current thinking about perceptual representations, and of the basis of perceptual awareness. The bridge locus is likely to be part of a tangled web of representations, and this complexity raises the question of whether another scheme that relies less on geography might offer a better framework. The bridge locus bears a close relationship to the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC), and like the NCC may be a concept which is no longer precise enough to provide a useful basis for reasoning about the relationship between brain activity and perceptual experience.

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6

Mallatt, Jon. "A Traditional Scientific Perspective on the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness." Entropy 23, no. 6 (May 22, 2021): 650. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e23060650.

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This paper assesses two different theories for explaining consciousness, a phenomenon that is widely considered amenable to scientific investigation despite its puzzling subjective aspects. I focus on Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which says that consciousness is integrated information (as ϕMax) and says even simple systems with interacting parts possess some consciousness. First, I evaluate IIT on its own merits. Second, I compare it to a more traditionally derived theory called Neurobiological Naturalism (NN), which says consciousness is an evolved, emergent feature of complex brains. Comparing these theories is informative because it reveals strengths and weaknesses of each, thereby suggesting better ways to study consciousness in the future. IIT’s strengths are the reasonable axioms at its core; its strong logic and mathematical formalism; its creative “experience-first” approach to studying consciousness; the way it avoids the mind-body (“hard”) problem; its consistency with evolutionary theory; and its many scientifically testable predictions. The potential weakness of IIT is that it contains stretches of logic-based reasoning that were not checked against hard evidence when the theory was being constructed, whereas scientific arguments require such supporting evidence to keep the reasoning on course. This is less of a concern for the other theory, NN, because it incorporated evidence much earlier in its construction process. NN is a less mature theory than IIT, less formalized and quantitative, and less well tested. However, it has identified its own neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and offers a roadmap through which these NNCs may answer the questions of consciousness using the hypothesize-test-hypothesize-test steps of the scientific method.

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7

Metzger, Brian A., Kyle E. Mathewson, Evelina Tapia, Monica Fabiani, Gabriele Gratton, and Diane M. Beck. "Regulating the Access to Awareness: Brain Activity Related to Probe-related and Spontaneous Reversals in Binocular Rivalry." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 29, no. 6 (June 2017): 1089–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_01104.

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Research on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) has implicated an assortment of brain regions, ERP components, and network properties associated with visual awareness. Recently, the P3b ERP component has emerged as a leading NCC candidate. However, typical P3b paradigms depend on the detection of some stimulus change, making it difficult to separate brain processes elicited by the stimulus itself from those associated with updates or changes in visual awareness. Here we used binocular rivalry to ask whether the P3b is associated with changes in awareness even in the absence of changes in the object of awareness. We recorded ERPs during a probe-mediated binocular rivalry paradigm in which brief probes were presented over the image in either the suppressed or dominant eye to determine whether the elicited P3b activity is probe or reversal related. We found that the timing of P3b (but not its amplitude) was closely related to the timing of the report of a perceptual change rather than to the onset of the probe. This is consistent with the proposal that P3b indexes updates in conscious awareness, rather than being related to stimulus processing per se. Conversely, the probe-related P1 amplitude (but not its latency) was associated with reversal latency, suggesting that the degree to which the probe is processed increases the likelihood of a fast perceptual reversal. Finally, the response-locked P3b amplitude (but not its latency) was associated with the duration of an intermediate stage between reversals in which parts of both percepts coexist (piecemeal period). Together, the data suggest that the P3b reflects an update in consciousness and that the intensity of that process (as indexed by P3b amplitude) predicts how immediate that update is.

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8

Rees, Geraint. "Neural correlates of consciousness." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1296, no. 1 (August 2013): 4–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nyas.12257.

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9

Mormann, Florian, and Christof Koch. "Neural correlates of consciousness." Scholarpedia 2, no. 12 (2007): 1740. http://dx.doi.org/10.4249/scholarpedia.1740.

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10

de Graaf, Tom A., Po-Jang Hsieh, and Alexander T. Sack. "The ‘correlates’ in neural correlates of consciousness." Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 36, no. 1 (January 2012): 191–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.05.012.

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11

Wessel, Jan R. "From “Neural correlates of consciousness” to “Neural causes of consciousness”." Physics of Life Reviews 9, no. 3 (September 2012): 299–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2012.07.003.

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12

Tononi, Giulio, and Christof Koch. "The Neural Correlates of Consciousness." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1124, no. 1 (March 2008): 239–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1196/annals.1440.004.

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13

Block, Ned. "Two neural correlates of consciousness." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9, no. 2 (February 2005): 46–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.006.

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14

Neisser, Joseph. "Neural correlates of consciousness reconsidered." Consciousness and Cognition 21, no. 2 (June 2012): 681–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.03.012.

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15

Rees, Geraint, Gabriel Kreiman, and Christof Koch. "Neural correlates of consciousness in humans." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 3, no. 4 (April 2002): 261–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn783.

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16

Weil, Rimona S., and Geraint Rees. "Decoding the neural correlates of consciousness." Current Opinion in Neurology 23, no. 6 (December 2010): 649–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/wco.0b013e32834028c7.

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17

Aru, Jaan, Talis Bachmann, Wolf Singer, and Lucia Melloni. "Distilling the neural correlates of consciousness." Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 36, no. 2 (February 2012): 737–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.12.003.

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18

Koch, Christof, Marcello Massimini, Melanie Boly, and Giulio Tononi. "Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 17, no. 5 (April 20, 2016): 307–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn.2016.22.

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19

Hohwy, Jakob. "The Search for Neural Correlates of Consciousness." Philosophy Compass 2, no. 3 (May 2007): 461–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00086.x.

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20

ffytche, Dominic H., and Delphine Pins. "Are neural correlates of visual consciousness retinotopic?" NeuroReport 14, no. 16 (November 2003): 2011–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00001756-200311140-00001.

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21

Owen, Matthew. "Aristotelian Causation and Neural Correlates of Consciousness." Topoi 39, no. 5 (October 20, 2018): 1113–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9606-9.

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22

Baars, Bernard J., and Steven Laureys. "One, not two, neural correlates of consciousness." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9, no. 6 (June 2005): 269. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.04.008.

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23

Rees, Geraint, and Chris Frith. "Neural correlates of consciousness are not pictorial representations." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, no. 5 (October 2001): 999–1000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x01520117.

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O'Regan & Noë (O&N) are pessimistic about the prospects for discovering the neural correlates of consciousness. They argue that there can be no one-to-one correspondence between awareness and patterns of neural activity in the brain, so a project attempting to identify the neural correlates of consciousness is doomed to failure. We believe that this degree of pessimism may be overstated; recent empirical data show some convergence in describing consistent patterns of neural activity associated with visual consciousness.

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24

Hulme, Oliver J., Karl F. Friston, and Semir Zeki. "Neural Correlates of Stimulus Reportability." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 21, no. 8 (August 2009): 1602–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2009.21119.

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Most experiments on the “neural correlates of consciousness” employ stimulus reportability as an operational definition of what is consciously perceived. The interpretation of such experiments therefore depends critically on understanding the neural basis of stimulus reportability. Using a high volume of fMRI data, we investigated the neural correlates of stimulus reportability using a partial report object detection paradigm. Subjects were presented with a random array of circularly arranged disc-stimuli and were cued, after variable delays (following stimulus offset), to report the presence or absence of a disc at the cued location, using variable motor actions. By uncoupling stimulus processing, decision, and motor response, we were able to use signal detection theory to deconstruct the neural basis of stimulus reportability. We show that retinotopically specific responses in the early visual cortex correlate with stimulus processing but not decision or report; a network of parietal/temporal regions correlates with decisions but not stimulus presence, whereas classical motor regions correlate with report. These findings provide a basic framework for understanding the neural basis of stimulus reportability without the theoretical burden of presupposing a relationship between reportability and consciousness.

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25

Koch, Christof, Marcello Massimini, Melanie Boly, and Giulio Tononi. "Erratum: Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 17, no. 6 (May 6, 2016): 395. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn.2016.61.

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26

Fell, Juergen, Christian E. Elger, and Martin Kurthen. "Do neural correlates of consciousness cause conscious states?" Medical Hypotheses 63, no. 2 (January 2004): 367–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mehy.2003.12.048.

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27

Blake, Randolph, Jan Brascamp, and David J. Heeger. "Can binocular rivalry reveal neural correlates of consciousness?" Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 369, no. 1641 (May 5, 2014): 20130211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2013.0211.

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This essay critically examines the extent to which binocular rivalry can provide important clues about the neural correlates of conscious visual perception. Our ideas are presented within the framework of four questions about the use of rivalry for this purpose: (i) what constitutes an adequate comparison condition for gauging rivalry's impact on awareness, (ii) how can one distinguish abolished awareness from inattention, (iii) when one obtains unequivocal evidence for a causal link between a fluctuating measure of neural activity and fluctuating perceptual states during rivalry, will it generalize to other stimulus conditions and perceptual phenomena and (iv) does such evidence necessarily indicate that this neural activity constitutes a neural correlate of consciousness? While arriving at sceptical answers to these four questions, the essay nonetheless offers some ideas about how a more nuanced utilization of binocular rivalry may still provide fundamental insights about neural dynamics, and glimpses of at least some of the ingredients comprising neural correlates of consciousness, including those involved in perceptual decision-making.

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28

Very, E., D. Pins, and P. Thomas. "217 – Neural correlates of visual consciousness in schizophrenia." Schizophrenia Research 98 (February 2008): 123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2007.12.284.

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29

Williford, Kenneth. "Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions." Minds and Machines 15, no. 1 (February 2005): 106–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf03210003.

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30

Barkasi, Michael. "What Blindsight Means for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness." Journal of Consciousness Studies 28, no. 11 (November 20, 2021): 7–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.53765/20512201.28.11.007.

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Do perceptual experiences always inherit the content of their neural correlates? Most scientists and philosophers working on perception say 'yes'. They hold the view that an experience's content just is (i.e.is identical to) the content of its neural correlate. This paper presses back against this view, while trying to retain as much of its spirit as possible. The paper argues that type-2 blindsight experiences are plausible cases of experiences which lack the content of their neural correlates. They are not experiences of the stimuli or stimulus properties prompting them, but their neural correlates represent these stimulus properties. The argument doesn't depend on any special view of what it is for an experience to be of a stimulus or stimulus property. The upshot is that, even assuming there is a deep relationship between experiential content and neural content, that relationship is more complex than simple identity.

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31

Egan, G., T. Silk, F. Zamarripa, J. Williams, P. Federico, R. Cunnington, L. Carabott, et al. "Neural correlates of the emergence of consciousness of thirst." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100, no. 25 (December 1, 2003): 15241–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2136650100.

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32

Sandberg, Kristian, Stefan Frässle, and Michael Pitts. "Future directions for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 17, no. 10 (July 28, 2016): 666. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn.2016.104.

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33

Lau, Hakwan. "Theoretical motivations for investigating the neural correlates of consciousness." Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 2, no. 1 (June 14, 2010): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wcs.93.

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34

Fell, Juergen. "Identifying neural correlates of consciousness: The state space approach." Consciousness and Cognition 13, no. 4 (December 2004): 709–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2004.07.001.

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35

Hohwy, Jakob. "The neural correlates of consciousness: New experimental approaches needed?" Consciousness and Cognition 18, no. 2 (June 2009): 428–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2009.02.006.

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36

Schacter, D. L., R. L. Buckner, and W. Koutstaal. "Memory, consciousness and neuroimaging." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences 353, no. 1377 (November 29, 1998): 1861–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1998.0338.

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Neuroimaging techniques that allow the assessment of memory performance in healthy human volunteers while simultaneously obtaining measurements of brain activity in vivo may offer new information on the neural correlates of particular forms of memory retrieval and their association with consciousness and intention. We consider evidence from studies with positron emission tomography and functional magnetic resonance imaging indicating that priming, a form of implicit retrieval, is associated with decreased activity in various cortical regions. We also consider evidence concerning the question of whether two components of explicit retrieval—intentional or effortful search and successful conscious recollection— are preferentially associated with increased activity in prefrontal and medial temporal regions, respectively. Last, we consider recent efforts to probe the relation between the phenomenological character of remembering and neural activity. In this instance we broaden our scope to include studies employing event–related potentials and consider evidence concerning the neural correlates of qualitatively different forms of memory, including memory that is specifically associated with a sense of self, and the recollection of particular temporal or perceptual features that might contribute to a rich and vivid experience of the past.

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37

Block, Ned. "How to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 (March 1998): 23–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004288.

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There are two concepts of consciousness that are easy to confuse with one another, access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. However, just as the concepts of water and H2O are different concepts of the same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle's reasoning about the function of consciousness goes wrong because he conflates the two senses. And Francis Crick and Christof Koch fall afoul of the ambiguity in arguing that visual area V1 is not part of the neural correlate of consciousness. Crick and Koch's work raises issues that suggest that these two concepts of consciousness may have different (though overlapping) neural correlates – despite Crick and Koch's implicit rejection of this idea.

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38

Jin, Seung-Hyun, and Chun Kee Chung. "Messages from the Brain Connectivity Regarding Neural Correlates of Consciousness." Experimental Neurobiology 21, no. 3 (September 30, 2012): 113–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5607/en.2012.21.3.113.

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39

Bisenius, Sandrine, Sabrina Trapp, Jane Neumann, and Matthias L. Schroeter. "Identifying neural correlates of visual consciousness with ALE meta-analyses." NeuroImage 122 (November 2015): 177–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.07.070.

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40

Bartolomeo, Paolo, Nikola Zieren, René Vohn, Bruno Dubois, and Walter Sturm. "Neural correlates of primary and reflective consciousness of spatial orienting." Neuropsychologia 46, no. 1 (January 2008): 348–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.07.005.

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41

Tsuchiya, Naotsugu, Melanie Wilke, Stefan Frässle, and Victor A. F. Lamme. "No-Report Paradigms: Extracting the True Neural Correlates of Consciousness." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19, no. 12 (December 2015): 757–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.002.

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42

Nigri, Anna, Eleonora Catricalà, Stefania Ferraro, Maria Grazia Bruzzone, Ludovico D’Incerti, Davide Sattin, Davide Rossi Sebastiano, et al. "The neural correlates of lexical processing in disorders of consciousness." Brain Imaging and Behavior 11, no. 5 (October 13, 2016): 1526–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11682-016-9613-7.

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43

Amting, J. M., S. G. Greening, and D. G. V. Mitchell. "Multiple Mechanisms of Consciousness: The Neural Correlates of Emotional Awareness." Journal of Neuroscience 30, no. 30 (July 28, 2010): 10039–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.6434-09.2010.

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44

Plourde, Gilles. "Identifying the Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Strategies with General Anesthetics." Consciousness and Cognition 10, no. 2 (June 2001): 241–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/ccog.2001.0515.

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45

Rees, Geraint. "Neural correlates of the contents of visual awareness in humans." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 362, no. 1481 (March 29, 2007): 877–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2007.2094.

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The immediacy and directness of our subjective visual experience belies the complexity of the neural mechanisms involved, which remain incompletely understood. This review focuses on how the subjective contents of human visual awareness are encoded in neural activity. Empirical evidence to date suggests that no single brain area is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness. Instead, necessary and sufficient conditions appear to involve both activation of a distributed representation of the visual scene in primary visual cortex and ventral visual areas, plus parietal and frontal activity. The key empirical focus is now on characterizing qualitative differences in the type of neural activity in these areas underlying conscious and unconscious processing. To this end, recent progress in developing novel approaches to accurately decoding the contents of consciousness from brief samples of neural activity show great promise.

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46

Provolovich, T. O. "Theory of global neuronal workspace by S. Dehaene." Philosophy of Science and Technology 25, no. 2 (2020): 90–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2021-25-2-90-102.

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The article deals with a methodological analysis of S. Dehaene’s theory of the global neural workspace. The French neuroscientist criticizes philosophical theories of consciousness because they do not use experimentally confirmed data. Also, he rejects such concepts of consciousness as wakefulness and attention, since they primarily describe the work of the unconscious, and not consciousness. Therefore, he suggests a way to study consciousness that would be solely based on empirical methods and provide univocal neural correlates that could be used to track the transition of a stimulus received in the brain from the unconscious to the conscious area. S. Dehaene’s research team offers four such correlates, or “signature” of consciousness, the last of which demonstrates the transition of activity from different, specialized parts of the brain to the entire neural network. Also, he believes that due to the development of neuroscientific methods of consciousness research and technologies for reading and decrypting neuroactivity in the near future, it will be possible to “read minds”, which means the reproduction of both individual conscious states and consciousness as a whole on artificial systems. This theory is not a fundamentally new way of studying consciousness, since it develops the ideas put forward by B. Baars at the end of the XX century. Based on the theory of the global neural workspace, the article attempts to identify the main misconceptions of neurobiological theories of consciousness, outlining the direction of research programs of consciousness and the brain as interrelated parts, and determining their prospects in solving the problem of consciousness.

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47

Cavanna, Andrea E. "The Precuneus and Consciousness." CNS Spectrums 12, no. 7 (July 2007): 545–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1092852900021295.

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ABSTRACTThis article reviews the rapidly growing literature on the functional anatomy and behavioral correlates of the precuneus, with special reference to imaging neuroscience studies using hamodynamic techniques. The precuneus, along with adjacent areas within the posteromedial parietal cortex, is among the most active cortical regions according to the “default mode” of brain function during the conscious resting state, whereas it selectively deactivates in a number of pathophysiological conditions (ie, sleep, vegetative state, drug-induced anesthesia), and neuropsychiatric disorders (ie, epilepsy, Alzheimer's disease, and schizophrenia) characterized by impaired consciousness. These findings, along with the widespread connectivity pattern, suggest that the precuneus may play a central role in the neural network correlates of consciousness. Specifically, its activity seems to correlate with self-reflection processes, possibly involving mental imagery and episodic/autobiographical memory retrieval.

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König, Richard. "Is Consciousness Dissectible? Acute Slice Electrophysiology and a Bayesian Interpretation of Neural Correlates of Consciousness." Journal of Advanced Neuroscience Research, Special (May 13, 2017): 37–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.15379/2409-3564.2017.05.

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Noguchi, Yasuki, Takemasa Yokoyama, Megumi Suzuki, Shinichi Kita, and Ryusuke Kakigi. "Temporal Dynamics of Neural Activity at the Moment of Emergence of Conscious Percept." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 24, no. 10 (October 2012): 1983–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00262.

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From which regions of the brain do conscious representations of visual stimuli emerge? This is an important but controversial issue in neuroscience because some studies have reported a major role of the higher visual regions of the ventral pathway in conscious perception, whereas others have found neural correlates of consciousness as early as in the primary visual areas and in the thalamus. One reason for this controversy has been the difficulty in focusing on neural activity at the moment when conscious percepts are generated in the brain, excluding any bottom–up responses (not directly related to consciousness) that are induced by stimuli. In this study, we address this issue with a new approach that can induce a rapid change in conscious perception with little influence from bottom–up responses. Our results reveal that the first consciousness-related activity emerges from the higher visual region of the ventral pathway. However, this activity is rapidly diffused to the entire brain, including the early visual cortex. These results thus integrate previous “higher” and “lower” views on the emergence of neural correlates of consciousness, providing a new perspective for the temporal dynamics of consciousness.

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Mann, Jake P., and Andrea E. Cavanna. "What Does Epilepsy Tell Us About the Neural Correlates of Consciousness?" Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 23, no. 4 (January 2011): 375–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/jnp.23.4.jnp375.

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