Academic literature on the topic 'Netherlands – Foreign relations – 1948-'

Successful development of mutual trade and economic ties between Russia and the Netherlands has been lasting for centuries. In ancient times, when both states were actively developing, vessels loaded with various goods were already cruising between their shores; while national leaders were building bilateral trade policy. The development of cooperation reached its peak during the time of Peter the Great, when the Russian Empire carried out industrialization by entering into a full-scale international industrial cooperation with its historical partner. Participation of the Russian state in the development of trade and economic relations with the Netherlands took different shapes depending on the current needs and capabilities of the country. However, specially authorized envoys who carried out their functions on the territory of the Netherlands played exclusively important role in it, whether they were representatives of the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Tsarist Russia in Rotterdam or the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade in the pre-war years. October 1945, when the Trade Representation opened its doors in Amsterdam, marked the new chapter in the history of trade relations between two countries. Historical review of the activities conducted by the Trade Mission in one of the world's TOP economically developed countries of the world over the 75-year period is demanded for providing advice in respect to setting up of strategic plans for the development of foreign trade in terms of exports, deepening international industrial cooperation and faster adaptation to the requirements by foreign markets.

The 1944–1945 Yearbook of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences in Amsterdam includes a commemorative article written byjohan Huizinga in honour of the French historian Gabriel Hanotaux, who was a foreign member of the Academy from 1913 to 1944. Hanotaux was born on November 19, 1853, and died on April 11, 1944, a few months after his ninetieth birthday. In his commemoration of Hanotaux, Huizinga briefly sketched the life, work and achievements of Hanotaux who was, at that time, a wellknown French historian and politician. Huizinga was very impressed, as becomes apparent from his words: ‘Truly, it is almost unbelievable what this representative of all that is noble and pure in the French has created.’ He concluded his commemoration with a brief consideration of what he called his ‘temporary personal relationship with Hanotaux’.

The computer is rapidly gaining ground in the history of European overseas expansion. Vast amounts of systematic data are being processed with the aid of a whole host of automatic routines and programming devices. Use of modern computer technology may allow expansion historians to tackle problems on a larger scale and to furnish arguments with a more solid empirical foundation than was possible in previous days. Yet the road towards computerization is one full of pitfalls. The variety of available software options is truly bewildering and the accumulated knowhow in the field is not easily accessible. On the level of the individual researcher, there is a constant trade-off between investments in new skills and the actual processing of data and reporting of results. There is no single optimal path leading to maximal sophistication with a minimum of effort.

Het Nationaal Bureau voor Documentatie over Nederland, opgericht in 1918 door invloedrijke figuren uit het bedrijfsleven en het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken, verzamelde informatie in het buitenland over Nederland. De neutraliteit van Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog had met name bij de Entente mogendheden negatieve gevoelens opgewekt. Dit gold zeker voor België, waar zelfs aan annexatie van delen van Nederland gedacht werd. Het Bureau wenste door eigen informatie de positie van Nederland te verbeteren.Twee vertegenwoordigers berichtten regelmatig over de politieke verhoudingen in België. In die berichtgeving was er ook grote aandacht voor de positie van Vlaanderen en de plaats van de Nederlandse taal in België. Er leefden in radicale Vlaams- nationalistische kringen gedachten over een verandering van de unitaire staatsstructuur en zelfs aansluiting van Vlaanderen bij Nederland (Groot-Nederland). Pieter Geyl, formeel vertegenwoordiger van het Bureau in Londen, had contacten met de radicale groepen in Vlaanderen en wilde ook wel een politiek Groot-Nederland. Uit de berichtgeving van beide correspondenten blijkt de betrekkelijke zwakte van de radicale stromingen in Vlaanderen.________Two representatives (Pieter Geyl and Hendrik van der Wal) of the National Bureau for Documentatio about the Netherlands report in June 1922 about the Belgian-Flemish political relationsThe National Bureau for Documentation about the Netherlands founded in 1918 by influential individuals from the business community and the department of Foreign Affairs, collected information abroad about the Netherlands. The neutrality of the Netherlands during the First World War had provoked negative feedback particularly among the Entente Powers. This was certainly true for Belgium, which even considered the annexation of parts of the Netherlands. The Bureau wished to improve the position of the Netherlands by means of its own information. Two representatives provided regular reports about the political relations in Belgium. In their reports they paid a great deal of attention to the position of Flanders and the place of the Dutch language in Belgium. Radical Flemish-Nationalistic groups were thinking about a change in the unitary structure of the state and even about the unification of Flanders and the Netherlands (Greater Netherlands). Pieter Geyl, formal representative of the Bureau in London had contacts with the radical groups in Flanders and was also in favour of a political Greater Netherlands. The reports of both these correspondents demonstrate the relative weakness of the radical movements in Flanders.

Abstract Faithful to Foreign Affairs. Margaret van Kleffens, Anne van Roijen, the Embassy in Washington, and the Significance of the Diplomatic Partnership for Post-War Dutch Foreign Relations This article argues that more attention for the role of diplomats’ partners, who in the studied period were almost exclusively female, offers new insights into the daily practices of Dutch twentieth-century diplomacy. It begins with a short overview of research on diplomats’ wives from other countries. The authors then examine the state of our knowledge about Dutch diplomats’ wives, discussing why there is so little attention for this subject in the Netherlands. Finally, a case study highlights the activities of the wives of two central figures in Dutch diplomacy at the Washington embassy in 1947-1964: Margaret van Kleffens-Horstmann and Anne van Roijen-Snouck Hurgronje. The study shows that daily diplomatic work was in practice a job for two people, with tasks divided along gendered lines. Wives made women’s networks available to male diplomats and did representative, social, and informal work that was considered crucial to diplomatic success.

The article highlights the specific features of implementing the new economic policy in the seaports of the USSR. The general laws of economic development of the commercial sea ports during the NEP period have been formulated. Statistical data on port capacity from the UK, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the USA, and France were used for the first time, and an assessment of the economic development of domestic sea ports was made in comparison with the above countries. It was stated that the drop in cargo turnover of the Soviet ports in relation to 1913 was the most significant, and the post-war restoration was slower in comparison with European ports, with the railway and inland water transport of the USSR. It was proved that the decrease in port turnover in the USSR was a consequence of a decrease in the foreign trade volume and short sea shipping. Maintaining the state monopoly of foreign trade, which in the NEP period transformed into the state capitalism, negatively affected outward and inward trade. The intensity of coastal shipping service grew slowly due to the low specialization of the regions. The seaport management system was studied; its centralization and similarity with the port management system of the Russian Empire were stated. There have been presented the study results of property relations in seaports. It was determined that the landowners in the ports were state departments represented by central ministries (people's commissariats), the owners of other property were state and sectorial governmental bodies, joint-stock companies with a predominance of state ownership. Sea trade ports were funded from the budget of the People's Commissariat of Communication Means. Port financing was ten times less than financing of railways and several times less than inland water transport financing

ARTISTIC VERSUS POLITICAL AVANT-GARDISM: THE VISUAL ARTS IN AND AROUND THE MAGAZINE ‘NIEUW RUSLAND’/‘CULTUUR DER U.D.S.S.R.’ (NEW RUSSIA/CULTURE OF THE USSR), 1928-1934 This article concentrates on the position of the visual arts in Russia as presented in Nieuw Rusland (New Russia), organ of the Netherlands – New Russia Society. This Society was initiated by VOKS, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, established to coordinate international cultural contacts with artists and intellectuals in other countries in order to help lending the Soviet Union a positive and civilised image. The Netherlands – New Russia Society was suspected to be a communist umbrella organization, and indeed some of its members were moles. At the time, visual arts in Russia were in transition: the abstract avant-gardism of the first years after the Revolution was making way for moderately modern, figurative, and politically engaged painting. Easel painting in general had to yield to the graphic arts, photography and composite picture, especially as applied in posters, children’s books and magazines. Dutch editors of Nieuw Rusland had to communicate and explain or soften the often staunch political art theories of their Russian authors. From around 1932, Nieuw Rusland made a change of course from cultural information towards explicit political propaganda. In combination with a ban on membership of left-wing organizations for all public servants, this meant the end of the magazine.

This study discusses the role of Iceland -which declared its independence from Denmark in 1944- in the international system and the causes that led the country to withdraw its European Union candidacy in 2015. This country, considered as one of the Scandinavian countries, has in fact its own unique structure. This unique structure has its roots in Iceland’s history, its determination about protecting the elements of national identity, geographical-climatic characteristics and economic factors such as the fishing industry. Iceland, which is the only NATO member without an army, has been through Cod Fish crisis’ with England, and the Ice-Save crisis with England and the Netherlands. The country, which had an important economic crisis in 2008, has shown a more positive attitude about EU as the government has also changed, however with the end of the crisis and another change of government, it has once again opted for a self-sufficient strategy. The country, which became member of the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994 and of European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1970, aims to conduct political and economic relations through territorialisation or bilateral relations instead of participating to a big integration model or developing multilateral relations. Iceland’s primary foreign policy objectives throughout the new century seem to secure full control over its territory (land and waters), improve market access for its fisheries products and guarantee its defense. Although the governments varied from time to time, all political parties subscribed to the same goals though they differ on how to achieve them. Arctic issue seems to gain importance also for this country in 2010s

British private investors were not inclined to view the leaders of newly independent Indonesia with much confidence. In 1949, when the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the Republic of Indonesia was imminent, the chairman of the United Serdang (Sumatra) Rubber Plantations disclosed the following opinion to the firm's shareholders at a gathering in London's Great Tower Street: “The Republican leaders are mainly ambitious men, whose records are well known, striving for personal aggrandizement. The measure of their interest in the welfare of the country is to be gauged by their policy of wanton destruction of life and physical assets, such as estate factories and ancillary buildings, which are essential for the restoration of the economy of the country once the political problem has been settled.” This article is about how a British enterprise dealt with the significant uncertainties prevailing in the business environment of Indonesia during the early independence period, in particular the 1950s.The economic situation in newly independent Indonesia was a peculiar one. As a major exporter of primary products in high demand such as oil and rubber, prospects were generally bright for the Indonesian economy during and after the Korean War. Just as under colonialism, a modern, large-scale sector accounting for almost 25 per cent of GDP (gross domestic product) was still dominated by Dutch firms and British and American multinationals. Eight large Dutch trading companies handled 60 per cent of consumer goods imports. Nevertheless, the business climate had changed dramatically for foreign firms operating in Indonesia. The 1950s saw a gradual shift away from moderate policy-makers towards an increasingly vocal economic nationalism. The former were acutely aware of the country's dependence on foreign capital and know-how, whereas the latter relentlessly pushed for full decolonisation, that is not only in political but in economic terms. Nationalist sentiments gained the upper hand during the first cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo (July 1953–July 1955), culminating with the takeover of virtually all remaining Dutch-owned enterprises in Indonesia from December 1957 onwards, eventually followed by formal nationalisation in 1959. Although economic nationalism in the 1950s primarily targeted Dutch enterprises, British foreign firms were affected as well. At a later stage, in the context of the Indonesian military confrontation with Malaysia (1963–6), they were also seized, albeit not nationalised.

This thesis examines the interplay of public opinion, national identity and foreign policy during the period 1785-1815, focusing on three consistently interconnected countries: the Netherlands, France and Great Britain. The Netherlands provides the centrepiece to the study, which considers how the Dutch were perceived as a nation, a people and as a political entity, at both governmental and popular levels, in the three countries throughout the period. Public opinion is theorised as a two-part phenomenon. Active public opinion represents the collated thoughts and responses of a certain public to an event or set of circumstances. Latent public opinion represents the sum of generally-accepted underlying social norms, stereotypes or preconceptions; the perceptions and representations latently present in unconscious mentalités. The thesis examines how perceptions and representations of the Netherlands in all three countries fed into public opinion and, ultimately, into national identity either of the self or the ‘other’. It then investigates the extent to which the triangular policies of Britain, France and the various incarnations of the Dutch state were shaped by popular perceptions, identities and opinion. While active opinion is shown to have generally been of negligible importance to the policy-making process, it is argued that the underlying themes of latent opinion often provided the conceptual background that politicians from all three countries used to make policy. The influence of latent opinion was often as much unconscious as deliberate. Latent opinion was rarely the inspiration for foreign policy, but it frequently provided the boundaries of expectation within which policy was formed.

This thesis is concerned with determining the effect of the establishment of a Jewish state on Anglo-American relations and the policies of their governments. This work covers the period from the awarding of the Palestine Mandate to Great Britain, through World War II, and concentrates on the post-war events up to the foundation of the state of Israel. It uses major governmental documents, as well as those of the United Nations, the archival materials at the Harry S. Truman Library, and the memoirs of the major participants in the Palestine drama. This study concludes that, while the Palestine problem presented ample opportunities for disunity, the Anglo-American relationship suffered no permanently damaging effects.

This study examines human rights in the North-South relations of three internationalist countries: Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway. It pays special attention to the integration of human rights in development aid policy, particularly the use of political conditionality. The theoretical framework examines the explanatory power of political Realism. A hypothesis linking policy assertiveness with the perceived costs to other national interests is tested by selecting Western states most likely to disprove Realist assumptions, and by choosing at least two Third World cases for each aid donor: one where economic, political and strategic interests are high, and another where the same interests are minimal or low. Three frameworks to (1) document human rights abuses; (2) evaluate national human rights performance; and (3) gauge foreign policy assertiveness serve as the methodological lenses to analyze Western statecraft and test the hypothesis.
Each donor's search for moral opportunity is visible in an emerging agenda to promote human rights and democratic development. However, if the resolve to defend human rights beyond national borders is gauged by a state's willingness to incur harm to other important national interests, then Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway are seldom disposed to let human rights trump more self-serving national interests. The potential for consistent and principled human rights statecraft is frequently undermined by Realism's cost-benefit rationality.

Abstract Perceptions of Finland and Finns held by Canadian government decision-makers underscore the relations between the two countries. The individuals involved had definite views of what Finland and Finns were like and these images were at times openly expressed or inferred from the archived government departmental files. Using an analysis of images, the evolving bilateral relations between Canada and Finland from the recognition of Finnish independence in 1919 until the early Cold War in 1948 can be understood from the Canadian perspective. The images are analyzed on a scale in terms of their positive or negative connotations. Positive images regarded Finland as a friendly, Northern, country, a borderland, cultured, Western, modern, progressive, liberal, and democratic. When these images were applied to Finns they were seen as honest, hardworking, reliable and the payers of debts. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Finland was an enemy and a trade competitor. The Finnish people could also be seen with negative images as dangerous and radical. These images existed before the establishment of diplomatic relations and carried over to interactions involving immigration, the League of Nations, trade, and scientific exchanges. They are also evident in relations between the two countries during the Winter War, in the decision to declare war against Finland during the Continuation War, during the armistice period, the peace process, and the during the early Cold War when normalized relations were established. The findings suggest that relations between Canada and Finland were most often impacted by events in Europe. The images of Finland and Finns did not directly impact relations as such, since the policies and actions taken were based on what decision-makers considered realistic assessments of the situation, as well as Canada’s national interests and capabilities. However, the images appear frequently as a means to narrow the range of acceptable options, rationalizations for specific polices, and justification for particular actions
Tiivistelmä Kanadan hallituksen päätöksentekijöiden näkemykset Suomesta ja suomalaisista korostavat maiden välisiä suhteita. Hallituksen arkistot paljastavat, että päättäjillä oli selvä näkökuva Suomesta ja suomalaisista, ja siihen viitattiin joko avoimesti tai peitetysti. Kanadan ja Suomen suhteet Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustamisesta vuonna 1919 aina kylmän sodan alkuun saakka vuonna 1948 ovat ymmärrettävissä Kanadan näkökulmasta käyttämällä näkökuva-analyysia. Näkökuvat analysoidaan joko positiivisella tai negatiivisella asteikolla. Positiiviset näkökuvat Suomesta kuvaavat sitä ystävällisenä, pohjoisena rajamaana, joka oli sivistynyt, länsimainen, nykyaikainen, edistynyt, suvaitsevainen ja demokraattinen. Suomalaiset nähtiin rehellisinä, ahkerina, luotettavina ja velkansa maksajina. Asteikon toisessa päässä Suomi nähtiin vihollisena ja kauppakilpailijana. Suomalaiset voitiin myös nähdä negatiivisesti vaarallisina ja radikaaleina. Nämä näkökuvat olivat läsnä ennen maitten välisten diplomaattisuhteiden perustamista, ja jatkuivat vuorovaikutuksissa koskien siirtolaisuutta, Kansojen liittoa, kauppaa ja tieteellistä vaihtoa. Ne ovat myös nähtävissä suhteissa talvisodan aikana, päätöksessä julistaa sota Suomea vastaan jatkosodan aikana, aserauhan aikana, rauhanteon aikana sekä paluussa normaaleihin suhteisiin kylmän sodan alussa. Euroopan tapahtumilla näytti olevan myös suuri vaikutus Suomen ja Kanadan suhteisiin. Näkökuvat Suomesta ja suomalaisista eivät suoranaisesti vaikuttaneet maitten suhteisiin, koska käytännöt ja toiminnat perustuivat päättäjien mielestä realistiseen arvioon tilanteista sekä Kanadan kansallisista eduista ja kyvyistä. Tästä huolimatta näitä näkökuvia käytettiin usein rajoittamaan hyväksyttävien vaihtoehtojen valikoimaa, järkeistämään tiettyjä käytäntöjä sekä oikeuttamaan joitakin toimintoja

When Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, the Western Powers (Britain, the USA, France) were taking action to counter a perceived Soviet threat. This included the policy of liberating Eastern Europe from Communist domination. Tito's expulsion was misinterpreted by the Western Powers: assuming that Tito had initiated it, the Western Powers hoped for similar "defections" by other Communis regimes. The sowing of discord between the Satellite leaders (including Mao) and Stalin became a new facet of the Liberation policy. Yugoslavia was treated as show-case to demonstrate to Satellite leaders that they could obtain aid from the West if they ceased to support Stalin. In the case of the European Satellite leaders, this policy was a miscalculation: they had no intention of breaking with Stalin and the alternative of obtaining help from the Western Powers had little credibility in view of their anti-Communist propaganda and subversive secret operations. The Americans for other reasons failed to encourage existing emancipatory trends among the Chinese Communist leaders. British recognition of Mao's regime was not enough to draw Mao away from Stalin. Yugoslavia's other role was strategic and it gained particular importance for the West in the context of increased defensive measures after the outbreak of the Korean War. The Western Powers gave Yugoslavia arms and economic aid to strengthen her as a shield for the defence of NATO territory. Yet Yugoslavia was discouraged from committing herself to the West by Western reluctance to give away NATO information. Italo- Yugoslav defence co-ordination would have been necessary but was made impossible by disagreements about Trieste, also involving the Western Powers. The Trieste crisis of late 1953 set back Western-Yugoslav relations significantly, perhaps irretrievably. The ephemeral Balkan defence pact of 1954 between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey was no substitute, and with the waning of the Soviet threat for Yugoslavia after Stalin's death in 1953 Tito became less interested in defence-cooperation with the Western Powers.

This study has presented an overview of the significant impact the Balkan Federation attempts had upon the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav split. Furthermore, this thesis argues that Yugoslav Communist leader Josip Broz-Tito's intentions to create a federation of Balkan countries and East European bloc states challenged Joseph Stalin's monolithic dominance. United under Tito, this federation could have provided resistance to Stalin's plans to subjugate Communist Europe under his command. Furthermore, for Tito, the Balkan Federation represented the opportunity to maintain control over Yugoslavian affairs while enhancing his influence in the region. Such a demonstration of independence by Tito could cause other Soviet dominated areas to question Stalin's authority. It is this scenario of a Balkan Federation inside Stalin's Communist realm that became the immediate factor in the Moscow-Belgrade break.
Department of History

This thesis concentrates on two discrete contexts in which Jewish and imperial concerns converged: the Boer War and the British Mandate for Palestine. For Britain's Jews, the Boer War represented a rare and uncomfortable moment in which the Jewish Question achieved relative prominence. However the war also generated a different set of 'Jewish questions', leading the Anglo-Jewish establishment to refine its own understanding of patriotic and imperial duty. The case of Palestine, by contrast produced less straightforward and predictable outcomes. Ottoman entry into World War I, which prompted both British and Zionist considerations into the merits of a Jewish homeland as part of the imperial system, created an acute conflict for British Jewry's communal leadership. Although not negating the advantages of a British-Jewish Palestine either to the Empire or to Jews in need of refuge, its decision to oppose the Balfour Declaration privileged at some cost a distinctive reading of Jewish interests over a more obvious synthesis of national and sectarian goals. Despite continued objections to Zionism's ideological outlook and its pursuit of statehood, the Anglo-Jewish establishment located in the interwar development of a British-Jewish Palestine a means to advance both Jewish communal and imperial agendas. As the alliance between the Zionists and Britain unravelled in the final decade of the Mandate, British Jews eager to safeguard their position as well as their vision of Palestine's future would persist in defending this relationship. In its exploration of the evolution of Anglo-Jewish attitudes towards Britain, the Empire and Mandatory Palestine, this thesis aims to address both thematic and chronological gaps in the historiography of Anglo-Jewry. By drawing attention to the uniqueness of Anglo-Jewry's imperial connection to Palestine and to the domestic impact of British involvement, my work also contributes to scholarship on Zionism and the Mandate Finally, it offers a framework for considering the impact of, and relationship to, Empire of minority groups residing in Britain.

This paper will rather seek to uncover and emphasize Cold War imperatives that served as significant guiding factors in shaping the Canadian response to the Suez Crisis. The success of Canadian diplomacy in the 1956 Suez Crisis was in the ability of Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson and his Canadian colleagues to protect Western interests in the context of the Cold War. Suez threatened Anglo-American unity, and the future of the North Atlantic alliance. It also presented the Soviets an opportunity to gain influence in the Middle East. The United Nations Emergency Force ensured that Britain and France had a means to extricate themselves from the Crisis. Canada wished to further protect Western credibility in the eyes of the non-white Commonwealth and Afro-Asian bloc. It was, therefore, important to focus international attention on Soviet aggression in Hungary, and not Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.

An analysis of American Presbyterian (Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, PCUSA) missionary activities in Korea from 1931 to 1948 allows a better understanding of critical shifts in Korean-American relations. As the largest Protestant missionary denomination in Korea under the Japanese colonial rule (1910-45), the Presbyterian Chosen (Korea) Mission maintained eight mission stations. Four of the eight maintained eight secondary schools. By the mid-1930’s, the colonial government had granted "designated schools" status to the seven schools, thus making them equivalent to government schools. In collaboration with other missionary groups, the Chosen Mission even managed institutions of higher education such as Union Christian (Soongsil) College, Pyungyang Theological Seminary, Chosen Christian (Yeonhi) College, and Severance Medical College. As Protestant missionaries had been active in the areas of education and medical care since the 1880’s, the Japanese Government-General of Korea was inclined to acknowledge their special roles. The fact that the United States, as well as the United Kingdom, had condoned the Japanese take-over of Korea also assured that the colonial regime had no issues with the missionaries. The 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria had an adverse effect on their relations. Not only was Japan unable to enlist Western support for its action, worshipping at Shinto shrines was to become a key feature of wartime mobilization, both in mind and body. The Government-General increasingly enforced the worship to commemorate the war dead and to pacify unstable Korean peninsula. Adjacent to Manchuria, the initial target region was none other than Korea’s northwest, the Protestant stronghold where conservative missionaries had already prohibited ancestor worship as an idolatry and viewed the government’s Shinto-related policy with suspicion. All the same, even after beginning to formally require schools to comply, the colonial government did not seek immediate enforcement, though Japanese veteran associations agitated pro-worship demonstrations. In fact, in an effort to maintain good relations with the Chosen Mission, the Government-General did not force any mission school to obey. Seeing no serious problem, the U. S. State Department did not intervene. As the Japanese consolidation of the emperor system shaped colonial policies in the 1930’s in Taiwan and Korea, tension escalated over the worship issue. In November 1935 when the principals of Presbyterian schools in Pyungyang—George S. McCune of Soongsil Boy’s Academy and College and Velma L. Snook of Soongeui Girl’s Academy—refused to comply with the provincial governor’s order concerning the worship, they suffered eviction. The incident effectively marked the end of good relations between the colonial government and the Chosen Mission. At this juncture, the Pyungyang mission station decided to withdraw from educational ministry as the Shinto shrine worship requirement applied to the overall education system in colonial Korea. The 1936 annual meeting of the Chosen Mission backed the decision, but holding on to school properties aroused criticism among Korean Presbyterians. To them, rejecting the Shinto shrine worship was one thing, not offering education to Koreans another. Forming the committees for taking over mission schools from the missionaries, they rushed to effect the transfer, and what resulted was a conflict between Koreans and the Chosen Mission. Similar committees sprang up in Cheolla and South Kyeongsang regions where, respectively, Southern Presbyterians and Australian Presbyterians maintained a mission. Southern Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions even dispatched its Secretary to Korea to resolve the matter, and this precipitated the withdrawal of missionaries in spite of vehement Korean protests. In contrast, Methodists and Canadian Presbyterians obeyed the Government-General on the Shinto shrine worship issue, and no serious trouble arose. While the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions concurred with the 1936 decision by the Chosen Mission, educational missionaries in Seoul, Daegu, and Seoncheon dissented. To be sure, they and other missionaries who advocated continuing missionary schools were in the minority in the Chosen Mission. Led by Horace H. Underwood and Edwin W. Koons, the minority group appealed to the Board of Foreign Missions and argued for the necessity of missionary-managed secondary schools and institutions of higher education in Korea. The American missionaries and diplomats in Japan supported this position, according to which the Shinto shrine worship requirement was a matter of patriotic obligation. After several conferences, the Board of Foreign Missions decided to transfer the mission schools in Korea to Koreans except the schools in Pyungyang—a concession to the minority view. The Chosen Mission’s majority dissented, and some left the denomination for a more "conservative" one. After Korea’s liberation in 1945, some of them would support Koryeo Theological seminary in South Kyeongsang Province. Eventually, Presbyterian mission schools in Pyungyang were closed, and those in other regions were taken by Korean Presbyteries and school boards. Upon commencing its attack on mainland China in 1937, Japan began mobilizing Korea for war. The Government-General found that increasing the Korean people’s access to basic education will be good for securing Korean cooperation. In this milieu, it allowed Koreans to continue running the mission schools as well as even allowing Japanese schools to absorb them. Thus even before the commencement of the Pacific War (1941-45) with the U. S., American missionaries had withdrawn from the area of education in colonial Korea. With bitterness and anger, they returned to America except for a small number that remained in Korea. The latter eventually suffered internment upon the outbreak of the war, but in June 1942 Japan returned them to the U. S. in exchange for interned Japanese nationals. Repatriated Americans produced vivid reports on the conditions in wartime Korea. During the early stage of the war when the Japanese advancement continued and the Republic of Korea Provisional Government (ROKPG) in China sought recognition by Allied powers, Korea-related information from the returning Americans was invaluable to the U. S. government. In spite of the reports stressing Korean zeal for independence, however, returned Americans generally deemed mobilizing Koreans for anti-Japanese activity virtually impossible. And pessimism expressed in the reports about Korean independence and descriptions of divisions among Korean independence activists further strengthened the State Department’s skepticism. Most repatriated missionaries actively cooperated with the American government, and some worked for intelligence agencies. Among them, a new generation of Americans wanted the U. S. government to support the ROKPG and various Korean coalitions in the U. S.—a stance different from that of old Asia hand’s. Even among the older missionaries that had spent decades in Korea, some formed an organization to help the Korean independence movement under Syngman Rhee. The Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions recognized that the post-war missionary activity in Korea will require Korean cooperation, and the Board’s stance foreshadowed power shift in the Protestant leadership in post-liberation Korea. Horace. H. Underwood in particular wielded strong influence on the Board’s post-war plans for Korea. Upon the end of the war and Korea’s liberation, many missionaries joined the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK, 1945-48) which, otherwise without adequate information on Korea, found their service valuable. The missionaries returning to Korea collaborated with the USAMGIK in various ways. As exemplified by Underwood who served as a special advisor to the American Military Governor and the Minister of Education, most missionaries did not differentiate "democracy" and Christianity. Throughout this period, the Board of Foreign Missions considered the missionaries’ participation in the USAMGIK as a part of their normal work. Most missionaries did not explicitly criticize the American occupation authority and the U. S. policy toward Korea, but a small number were outspoken advocates of political and economic reforms necessary for turning Korea into a strong bulwark against Communism. They were to lose ground, however, with the emergence of rival regimes on the peninsula and ensuing hostility between the two. After Korea’s liberation from Japan, missionaries gradually returned to Korea and by 1947 most missions were reestablished. Missions again managed schools and hospitals where Koreans served as principals. Missionaries secured their position of influence by providing increasingly large financial support. Not only did they expand their activity sphere to include radio broadcasting and vocational education, their cooperation with the American occupation authority also facilitated Protestant Korean participation in the governing process, wherein the graduates of mission schools and American universities became especially conspicuous. Unlike the colonial era, now the Protestant elite of Korea enthusiastically welcomed the opportunity to increase their presence in the government, be it the American military government or the succeeding Republic of Korea (1948-present) government. With its Protestant elite regarding government service as an important mission for Christians, Korea faced a new challenge: defining proper relationship between the state and religion.

The deterioration of relations between the West and the Soviet Union highlighted the salience of a perceived transnational communist threat to the security of Western Europe. Together with the emergence of novel destructive technologies, this development constituted a major change in the security environment that policymakers grappled with in the wake of the war. It helped catalyze the transformation of foreign US military presences tied to temporary conditions into longer-term arrangements. This development played out across a number of host countries in largely simultaneous and interlinked processes. Central to the emergence of what became recognized as a distinct practice of foreign military basing was a change in the understanding of sovereignty in terms of the nature of territoriality. Recalling the theoretical emphasis on process, the states that emerged from these developments were significantly changed, with different capabilities and the ability to take advantage of new strategies.

This chapter examines the Yom Kippur War of 1973 from a foreign policy perspective. It first provides a background on the Arab–Israeli Conflict that began in 1948 with the War of Independence, followed by the Suez Conflict in 1956 and the Six-Day War in 1967, and culminated in the Yom Kippur War. It then considers the Egyptian build-up to war in 1973 and why Egypt attacked Israel, as well as the peace process that eventually settled the conflict between the two countries via the Camp David Accords. It also analyses the relative normalization of the Egyptian–Israeli relations and the effective breaking of Egypt’s alliance with other Arab states opposed to the existence of Israel. It concludes with an assessment of the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and the rapprochement between Egypt and Israel.

This chapter focuses on the European Union as a subsystem of international relations. It examines the following questions, taking into account the historical context in which EU foreign policy has developed as well as the theoretical pluralism that has characterized its study. First, how has the EU dealt with its own international relations internally? Second, what are the ideas and principles underlying EU foreign policy? Third, what is the EU's collective action capacity in relation to the rest of the world? The chapter illustrates interstate dynamics as a result of European integration by focusing on the cases of France, Germany, and Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). It also considers the EU's international identity and its role as a collective actor.

Just days after the Slovak state was created, it signed with Nazi Germany a ‘treaty of protection’ and a protocol on co-operation in financial and economic matters. As a result of these measures, Slovakia would be labelled a German vassal state and the government a puppet regime. This chapter examines the nature of the wartime Slovak state and reconsiders the concept of a puppet regime and a native version of fascism (so-called ‘clerical fascism’). It examines the ways in which Germany tried to influence the Slovak government, who the German protagonists were, and how and according to what guidelines Slovak politicians reacted to these manoeuvres. It first outlines how Slovak nationalists demanded autonomy during the later years of the First Czechoslovak Republic, and then assesses the Slovak-German relations from March 1939 to the summer of 1940. By this time, the German minister of foreign affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, had labelled the Slovak case an example of ‘revolutionary foreign politics’.

This chapter is dominated by John Foster Dulles, who navigated America’s foreign relations. His main idea was to prevent the Middle East from becoming a third cold war front, in addition to the Far East and western Europe. Israel, however, rejecting Dulles demand for border concessions, continued to press the US for a security guarantee, although its chances for implementation were nil. Israel’s retaliatory acts against Jordan reduced US confidence in Israel’s strategic requirements. Anderson’s mission to Israel ended in failure, since Israel could not concede its basic interests. Israel’s attack on Egypt in cooperation with France and Britain rook the US bu surprise, but America acted immediately punish Israel by imposing financial sanctions. The failure of the Suez campaign left Israel with more isolated, and in danger that the Soviet-Arab combination, along with American apathy, might threaten its very existence.

This chapter begins by detailing the rise of multiple new initiatives in the realm of political action during the early twentieth century in the Netherlands East Indies. It explores how the deepening incorporation of the Indonesian archipelago within the world economy over the course of the nineteenth century entailed advanced forms of exploitation in commercial agriculture, commodity processing, natural resource exploitation, and the elaboration of a modern transportation network. The chapter then discusses the internationalization of the Indonesian archipelago's economy in the increasing prominence and problematic position of diverse diasporic immigrant communities, most notably the so-called Chinese. It further analyses how the commercialization of agriculture and extension of market relations in the hinterlands of Java and other islands of the Indies during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries unfolded through the intermediation of local compradors — immigrant Hokkien-speaking merchants, moneylenders, and rice millers — who were discouraged from assimilation into native society and designated as “foreign orientals.” Ultimately, the chapter highlights the broadening of transregional and transoceanic networks of diasporic and religious circulation, the deepening incorporation of the Indonesian archipelago within the world economy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and its impact on the intensifying immersion of the Netherlands East Indies within diverse currents of cosmopolitanism.