Journal articles: 'Neoclassical and the economics of property rights'

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Misiński, Wojciech. "Why does mainstream economy not explain the causes of contemporary negative socio-economic phenomena?" WSB Journal of Business and Finance 53, no. 1 (February 1, 2019): 92–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/wsbjbf-2019-0010.

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Abstract This article is a continuation and extension of the lecture ‘Causes and effects of incompleteness and non-inclusion of ownership structures of contemporary capital companies’ delivered at the conference in Wrocław in 2017 and published in the Scientific Notebooks of the University of Economics (No. 493). The aim of the article is to answer the question: why the Neoclassical Theory of Markets (Main Current Economics) does not explain the causes of a number of contemporary socio-economic phenomena, in particular, huge price fluctuations, breakdowns of individual markets and as a consequence of economic crises on a global scale? This required a new, different from the neoclassical view of the series of processes and market phenomena occurring in contemporary economies as well as the verification of the Neoclassical Market Theory paradigm constituting the main core of the Mainstream Economics. These include, in particular: 1) theoretical (classical) and real ‘object (s)’ analysis of market transactions; 2) rejection of one-dimensional, neoclassical analysis of exchange processes (transactions), accepting two or even three-dimensional analysis of the exchange process (transaction); 3) analysis of exchange processes (transactions), the ‘subject’ of which are complete, incomplete or partial (and their bundles) property rights; 4) analysis of exchange processes (transactions) by complete and exclusive and incomplete and non-exclusive decision-makers; 5) analysis of exchange processes (transactions), whose ‘subject’ are partial (and their bundles) property rights in relation to virtual (non-material) ‘goods’. Taking into account that the above verification (acceptance of a different from the neoclassical paradigm of market theory) allows to break out of the circle of elegant and logical neoclassical analysis of theoretical, never and nowhere existing markets (exchange processes), and more importantly, the explanatory reasons for a series of negative, contemporary socio-economic phenomena.

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Jankovic, Ivan, and Walter Block. "Private Property Rights, Government Interventionism and Welfare Economics." Review of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 4 (December 1, 2019): 365–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/revecp-2019-0019.

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Abstract We develop a critique of government interventionism based on the Misesian calculation argument against socialism. If private property rights and relative prices based on supply and demand are necessary for successful economic coordination, then conventional market failure theories cannot be sustained. Government interventionism based on the idea of correcting “market failures” is analytically just a milder form of socialist central planning. Between the two, there are only differences in degree, not in kind. We criticize several public choice and law and economics scholars for disregarding this Misesian angle in their market failure theories. In our view they are reducible to arguments based on a fallacious political economy while perpetuating false neoclassical economic analysis of market failure theorists. We claim that government interventionism is just a milder form of socialist central planning. Therefore, the traditional arguments against the efficiency of central planning also apply to government interventions aiming at fixing market failures. In particular, we maintain that governments face the “knowledge problem”, which means that they cannot determine the optimal allocation of resources. In section two of this paper we discuss market failure and economic calculation. Section three is given over to our claim that the “Nirvana fallacy” is itself fallacious. The burden of section four is to address Coase and consequences. We conclude in section five.

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Firmin-Sellers, Kathryn. "The Politics of Property Rights." American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (December 1995): 867–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2082514.

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The study of land tenure polarizes the field of development. Neoclassical scholars lobby for a move toward private property rights, while other economists and historians defend the maintenance of customary land tenure. I argue that the development scholars' focus on the structure of property rights obscures a more fundamental problem of land reform—that of enforcement. Property rights will not inspire individual investment and economic growth unless political institutions give the ruler of a local community or nation-state sufficient coercive authority to silence those who advocate an alternative, more distributionally favorable property rights system. At the same time, political institutions must force the ruler to establish a credible commitment to that property rights system. I illustrate this theoretical argument through an analysis of property rights institutions in Akyem Abuakwa, a traditional state in colonial Ghana.

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Riker, William H., and David L. Weimer. "The Economic and Political Liberalization of Socialism: The Fundamental Problem of Property Rights." Social Philosophy and Policy 10, no. 2 (1993): 79–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500004155.

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All our previous political experience, and especially, of course, the experience of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, offers little hope that democracy can coexist with the centralized allocation of economic resources. Indeed, simple observation suggests that a market economy with private property rights is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the existence of a democratic political regime. And this accords fully with the political theory of liberalism, which emphasizes that private rights, both civil and economic, be protected and secure. At the same time, our previous experience also indicates that market economies are more successful than centrally planned economies not only in producing, but also in distributing, both private and collective goods. This economic experienee is supported by neoclassical economic theory, which treats clearly defined and secure rights to private property as essential to a market economy.

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Mukhin, А. А. "THE USE OF COBB-DOUGLAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION IN MODELING PRODUCTION PROCESSES." Bulletin of Udmurt University. Series Economics and Law 30, no. 6 (December 28, 2020): 822–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.35634/2412-9593-2020-30-6-822-829.

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Several alternative economic approaches to the study of organization are discussed in the literature: the neoclassical theory, the theory of transaction costs (the theory of specific assets), the theory of incomplete contracts (the theory of property rights), and the Agency theory (the theory of incentives). Recently, there have been approaches at the intersection of Economics and management: resource theory, knowledge theory, strategic theory, entrepreneurial theory; in the framework of sociology: network theory, the theory of resource dependence, the theory of institutional isomorphism, the theory of situational choice, the theory of strategic choice. The article deals with the basic model of neoclassical theory. The advantage of the neoclassical theory is that it emphasizes the role of technology in General and economies of scale in particular as factors that influence the size of production, turnover of organizations. Within the framework of the considered approach, a certain macrostructure is determined that carries out the costs of economic resources: fixed assets, the number of employees that affect the turnover of organizations. The task of rational economic management, which meets the Udmurt Republic, is to determine the forecast of turnover of organizations with the given resources and to calculate the necessary for its value of fixed assets, the number of employees.

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Heijdra, Ben J., and Anton D. Lowenberg. "Towards A Theory of Colonial Growth: The Case of the Dutch in Southern Africa." Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 1, no. 4 (January 1987): 249–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/02601079x8700100405.

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This paper develops an economic explanation of the Dutch colonization of southern Africa. The changing attitudes of the Dutch to colonial growth are seen as a rational response to shifting economic constraints rather than as a function of changing tastes. The model emphasizes the importance of defence and administration costs to the structure of property rights and the determination of the optimal size of the colony. This neoclassical approach may be applied to other historical instances of European colonization. A formalization of the model is provided in an Appendix.

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Lueck, Dean. "The Comparative Institutions Approach to Wildlife Governance." Texas A&M Law Review 6, no. 1 (October 2018): 147–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.37419/lr.v6.i1.6.

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This Article develops a comparative institutions approach to wildlife governance by examining the property rights to the habitat and the stocks of wild populations. The approach is based on the transaction cost and property rights approach and lies primarily in the traditions of Coase, Barzel, Ostrom, and Williamson. The approach recognizes the often-extreme costs of delineation and enforcement of property rights to wild populations and their habitats; thus, all systems are notably imperfect compared to the typical neoclassical economics approach. These costs arise because wildlife habitat and wildlife populations are part of the land which has many attributes and uses—most notably, residential and agricultural uses. In turn, the optimal ownership sizes (and shapes) vary across land uses (e.g., farming, urban, ranching, wildlife, parks). The organizations that govern wildlife tend to be ridden with transaction costs and imperfect property rights, and the most efficient system is one that maximizes the total value of the package less the enforcement and administrative costs. This Article develops a framework for considering different governance regimes for both the wild stocks and the habitats they require. A series of cases—focused especially on bison and caribou—show the range of governance regimes that have been used and how those governance regimes depend on history and on law.

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Pantić, Rade. "Robni fetišizam, pravni fetišizam, preobraženi oblici i estetski fetišizam." Život umjetnosti, no. 104 (July 2019): 52–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.31664/10.31664/zu.2019.104.03.

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In this paper, we analyse two recent contributions to the Marxist critique of the political economy of art: the article “Artistic Labor and the Production of Value: An Attempt at a Marxist Interpretation” by José María Durán and the book Art and Value: Art’s Economic Exceptionalism in Classical, Neoclassical and Marxist Economics by Dave Beech. While Durán emphasizes the emergence of the legal category of intellectual property rights as crucial for value production in art, Beech has reached the contrary conclusion that artistic labour does not produce value and that artistic production is therefore excepted from capitalist commodity production. In our paper, we criticize both conclusions. While agreeing with Beech that artistic labour does not produce value and is thus excepted from the ideology of commodity fetishism, we believe that through the ideology of converted forms it nevertheless becomes part of capitalist commodity production. We would argue that the sector of artistic production, through the converted form of monopoly rent, establishes a production relation with other, competitive, sectors of capitalist economy. This production relation is enabled by the ideology of aesthetic fetishism, supported by the ideology of legal fetishism through the category of intellectual property rights. Contrary to Durán, we thus conclude that intellectual property rights allow for a hidden transfer of surplus value produced by the workers in the competitive sectors of the capitalist economy.

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Pantić, Rade. "Robni fetišizam, pravni fetišizam, preobraženi oblici i estetski fetišizam." Život umjetnosti, no. 104 (July 2019): 52–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.31664/zu.2019.104.03.

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In this paper, we analyse two recent contributions to the Marxist critique of the political economy of art: the article “Artistic Labor and the Production of Value: An Attempt at a Marxist Interpretation” by José María Durán and the book Art and Value: Art’s Economic Exceptionalism in Classical, Neoclassical and Marxist Economics by Dave Beech. While Durán emphasizes the emergence of the legal category of intellectual property rights as crucial for value production in art, Beech has reached the contrary conclusion that artistic labour does not produce value and that artistic production is therefore excepted from capitalist commodity production. In our paper, we criticize both conclusions. While agreeing with Beech that artistic labour does not produce value and is thus excepted from the ideology of commodity fetishism, we believe that through the ideology of converted forms it nevertheless becomes part of capitalist commodity production. We would argue that the sector of artistic production, through the converted form of monopoly rent, establishes a production relation with other, competitive, sectors of capitalist economy. This production relation is enabled by the ideology of aesthetic fetishism, supported by the ideology of legal fetishism through the category of intellectual property rights. Contrary to Durán, we thus conclude that intellectual property rights allow for a hidden transfer of surplus value produced by the workers in the competitive sectors of the capitalist economy.

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Seidl, Irmi, Clement A. Tisdell, and Steve Harrison. "Environmental Regulation of Land Use and Public Compensation: Principles, and Swiss and Australian Examples." Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 20, no. 5 (October 2002): 699–716. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/c01103s.

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The authors discuss the regulation of rural land use and compensation for property-rights restrictions, both of which appear to have become more commonplace in recent years but also more contested. The implications of contemporary theories in relation to this matter are examined, including: the applicability of new welfare economics; the relevance of the neoclassical theory of politics; and the implications of contemporary theories of social conflict resolution and communication. Examination of examples of Swiss and Australian regulation of the use of rural properties, and the ensuing conflicts, reveals that many decisions reflect a mixture of these elements. Rarely, if ever, are social decisions in this area made solely on the basis of welfare economics, for instance social cost-benefit analysis. Only some aspects of such decisions can be explained by the neoclassical theory of politics. Theories of social conflict resolution suggest why, and in what way, approaches of discourse and participation may resolve conflicts regarding regulation and compensation. These theories and their practical application seem to gain in importance as opposition to government decisions increases. The high degree of complexity of most conflicts concerning regulation and compensation cannot be tackled with narrow economic theories. Moreover, the Swiss and Australian examples show that approaches involving conflict resolution may favour environmental standards.

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HARPER, DAVID A. "Innovation and institutions from the bottom up: an introduction." Journal of Institutional Economics 14, no. 6 (July 2, 2018): 975–1001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s174413741800019x.

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AbstractThis introduction canvasses broad themes relating to the nexus of innovation and institutions. It first examines the notion of a “new combination” – a core analytical concept in economic theories of innovation and explanations of emergent novelty through bottom-up processes. Following Schumpeter, different theorists have made different claims about the composition and structure of new combinations. Possible constituent elements include factors of production, capital goods, routines, information, ideas, technologies, and property rights. The article then looks synoptically at the institutional dimensions of innovation from alternative perspectives that focus upon different kinds of institutional rules and policy solutions to innovation problems. Neoclassical and evolutionary approaches tend to emphasize specific policy interventions in markets to channel behavior toward particular desired outcomes, whereas institutional and Austrian approaches tend to focus upon general institutional rules (e.g. property and contract) that frame markets and innovation processes. Finally, this article summarizes the papers in the special issue.

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Doner, Richard F. "The Rise of “The Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies. By Alice H. Amsden. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 416p. $35.00." American Political Science Review 96, no. 4 (December 2002): 839–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055402640468.

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Alice Amsden is one of the founders of the “statist” or “revisionist” school of East Asian economic development. Her earlier book, Asia's Next Giant (1989), refuted claims that growth in South Korea and other Newly Industrialized Countries was simply a function of high investment rates and correct prices, based in turn on the small-government fundamentals of stable, private property rights, macroeconomic stability, and trade liberalization. Amsden, along with others, emphasized the benefits of sector-specific state interventions distinctly at odds with neoclassical prescriptions.

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Prieto, Manuel. "Equity vs. Efficiency and the Human Right to Water." Water 13, no. 3 (January 24, 2021): 278. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/w13030278.

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One of the most crucial discussions within water resource management is the debate between those who defend the concept of economic efficiency and those who privilege notions of social equity. This tension is located at the core of binary categories that currently constitute the public debate within comparative water law and policy. These categories are commodity/human right, private property/common property, free-market/state regulation, and market value/community value. This paper explores this tension by studying how neoclassical economics understands efficiency and tracing its rise as a key hegemonic principle for water resource management. I also present equity as a conceptual opposition to efficiency and describe its institutionalization through the human-right-to-water frame. A problematization of both the equity approach and the human-right-to-water frame follows. Finally, I propose a political ecology approach to better understand the tension between efficiency and equity and offer recommendations for informing the water research agenda on efficiency/equity.

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Orekhova, Svetlana V., and Marina V. Evseeva. "Technological Systems and Economy: a Heterodox Approach and Institutional Framework." Journal of Institutional Studies 12, no. 4 (December 25, 2020): 034–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.17835/2076-6297.2020.12.4.034-053.

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Technologies determine the level of innovative development and economic growth. The article studies a methodological platform for a new unit of analysis in economic science such technological system. This phenomenon involves the research program, the study of the specifics and features this mesolevel pattern. The methodological basis of the research includes Neoclassical and Neoinstitutional Economic theories, Strategic Management and Complexity Economic. The research program we apply a Heterodox approach as a set of the Contract theory, Evolutionary theory, Complexity Economic and Platform ecosystems. The authors define a technological system as an economic meso-level pattern that coordinate actions and knowledge about system and component technologies and functioning through the quasi-self-enforcing contracts based on standards and independent of property rights. Any meso-level pattern that has technological and institutional identity is a technological system. The types of technological systems in the economy are highlighted on the basis of the consolidated classification “blurring of the bundle of property rights to technology – the degree of technology decentralization”. The results create the basis for further research of identifying boundaries and analyzing the competitiveness of technological systems, as well as assessing public administration strategies in this area.

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Marangos, John. "Preventive Therapy: The Neoclassical Gradualist Model of Transition from Central Administration to Market Relations." Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, no. 1604 (January 1, 2002): 55. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/cbp.2002.119.

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The fundamental basis of the neoclassical gradualist approach to transition in Russia and Eastern Europe was to establish economic, institutional, political, and ideological structures before attempting liberalization. Without this minimum foundation, radical reforms would have inhibited the development of a competitive market capitalist system. This was because "privatization, marketization, and the introduction of competition cannot be contemplated in an economy reduced to barter" (Carrington 1992, 24). Also, implementation of the reform program required minimum standards ofliving; otherwise the social fabric of the whole society would have been at risk. The reform had to foster a social consensus that endorsed a system of secure private property rights (Murrell, 1995, 171) and had to be guided by the principles of voluntariness and free choice (Kornai, 1992b, 17).

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Birch, Kean. "Technoscience Rent: Toward a Theory of Rentiership for Technoscientific Capitalism." Science, Technology, & Human Values 45, no. 1 (February 6, 2019): 3–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0162243919829567.

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Contemporary, technoscientific capitalism is characterized by the (re)configuration of a range of “things” (e.g., infrastructure, data, knowledge, bodies) as assets or capitalized property. Accumulation strategies have changed as a result of this assetization process. Rather than entrepreneurial strategies based on commodity production, technoscientific capitalism is increasingly underpinned by rentiership or the appropriation of value through ownership and control rights (e.g., intellectual property [IP]), monopoly conditions, and regulatory or market devices and practices (e.g., investment dispute courts, exclusivity agreements). While rentiership is often presented as a negative phenomenon (e.g., distorting markets, unearned income) in both neoclassical and Marxist political economy literatures—and much in between—in this paper, I conceptualize rentiership as a technoeconomic practice and process framed by insights from science and technology studies (STS). So, rather than a problematic “side effect” of capitalism, the concept of rentiership enables us to understand how different forms of value extraction constitute, and are constituted by, different forms of technoscience. This allows STS to contribute a distinctive analytical approach to ongoing debates in political economy about economic rents and rent-seeking.

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Graczyk, Andrzej. "Rozwój zrównoważony w gospodarce rynkowej." Kwartalnik Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społecznego. Studia i Prace, no. 1 (November 29, 2018): 13–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.33119/kkessip.2018.1.1.

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The aim of the article is to assess the possibilities and ways to implement the idea of sustainable development in a market economy. Economic and social development encounters limitations due to weaknesses and market failures. The concept of sustainable development indicates mainly development goals. Their achievement, however, requires paying attention to the conditions and methods of operation of the entities. Sustainable development will take place under market economy conditions.From the point of view of the neoclassical economics, the basic direction of activities should be creating conditions for the market implementation of sustainable development goals. Institutional economics indicates the need to build a system of norms and values that are appropriate to the idea of sustainable development. Only their dissemination creates conditions for the creation of formal institutions which are the part of the market system. However, it is advisable to combine these methods.The implementation of sustainable development in the management of environmental resources and environmental protection requires increasing the scope of defining property rights and assigning them to specific entities. On this basis, one can create the market mechanisms and expand the scope of market instruments for an environmental protection. Such solutions are consistent with the logic of the market economy and will be understandable as well as acceptable to entities.

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Mitov, Emil, and Albena Vutsova. "PRINCIPLES OF INTERACTION IN INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRINCIPAL – AGENT ISSUE." Knowledge International Journal 26, no. 6 (March 18, 2019): 1619–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.35120/kij26061619m.

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In the development process of the economic theory, the focus is shifted from the market, being the only form of coordination of economic activity, to the personal behavior and its impact on economic processes. This reveals the importance of human habits and how they shape the socio-economic behavior. Social relations and interaction become more and more important and are seen as a factor influencing not only the daily decisions, but also the economic behavior of the personality. "Economics is seen by them as an open evolutionary system, experiencing a constant impact by the external environment through culture, political environment, nature, etc."In the development process of the economic theory, the focus is shifted from the market, being the only form of coordination of economic activity, to the personal behavior and its impact on economic processes. This reveals the importance of human habits and how they shape the socio-economic behavior. Social relations and interaction become more and more important and are seen as a factor influencing not only the daily decisions, but also the economic behavior of the personality. "Economics is seen by them as an open evolutionary system, experiencing a constant impact by the external environment through culture, political environment, nature, etc."Neoclassical theory assumes that fully rational, decision-making individuals, through their absolute awareness and using the exchange of goods on the market, strive for equilibrium and actually achieve it. New institutional economy rejects one of the most important postulates of neoclassical theory - the economy's quest for equilibrium, accepting it only as short-term (if at all possible) and uncharacteristic state. The public interest seeks to build more efficient structures/institutions, and by better defining property rights and maximizing the usefulness of each individual, to achieve greater public welfare. The most important concepts of the new institutional economy are the theory of transaction costs, the theory of property rights and the principal-agent problem theory.The problematic area of the present study is the conflicts, arising from the interaction and cooperation between different business partners, united in inter-organizational networks. The subject of this research is the theory and practice of these inter-organizational networks, reflected through the prism of "principal-agent".The expansion of the markets by counterparties and traded goods, as well as by geographic scope, leads to a de-personalization of the exchange, thus an increase in the uncertainty for the participants and consequently the cost of limiting it. The possibility of long-term reiteration of deals with the same contractor is negligible, while at the same time partners become increasingly distanced, virtual and abstract. This stimulates market participants to look for mechanisms to curb the negative effects of expanding markets - commercial contracts, bank guarantees, warranties, betting and trade codes. Their introduction is aimed at reducing the cost of obtaining information about the counterparty, the traded commodities, as well as providing guarantees to prevent opportunistic behavior after the conclusion of the agreement.

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PAGANO, UGO. "Interlocking complementarities and institutional change." Journal of Institutional Economics 7, no. 3 (December 21, 2010): 373–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137410000433.

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Abstract:In biology, the laws that regulate the structuring and change of complex organisms, characterised by interlocking complementarities, are different from those that shape the evolution of simple organisms. Only the latter share mechanisms of competitive selection of the fittest analogous to those envisaged by the standard neoclassical model in economics. The biological counterparts of protectionism, subsidies and conflicts enable complex organisms to exit from long periods of stasis and to increase their capacity to adapt efficiently to the environment. Because of their interlocking complementarities, most institutions share the laws governing the structure and change of complex organisms. We concentrate on the complementarities between technology and property rights and consider historical cases in which organisational stasis has been overcome by mechanisms different from (and sometimes acting in spite of) competitive pressure. The evolution of institutions cannot be taken for granted; but even when institutions seem frozen forever by their interlocking complementarities, their potential for change can be discovered by analysis of those interactions.

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Mukhin, Alexei А., Elena A. Konina, Natalia V. Gorbushina, and Anna I. Latysheva. "Modeling of production processes in rural areas: management and development effectiveness." Revista Amazonia Investiga 9, no. 29 (May 18, 2020): 179–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.34069/ai/2020.29.05.21.

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In the modern economy, the process of studying independent and alternative approaches to studying a business (organization) is happening more and more. Such alternative approaches of today include: “neoclassical theory”, “theory of transaction costs” (theory of specific assets), “theory of incomplete contracts” (theory of property rights), and also “agent theory” (theory of incentives). Such integrated systems and approaches of economics and management as “resource theory”, “knowledge theory”, “strategic theory”, “entrepreneurial theory”, “network theory”, “theory of resource dependence”, “theory of institutional isomorphism”, “theory of situational choice", "The theory of strategic choice" is currently promising and relevant. The article discusses the basic model of neoclassical theory. The main superiority of this theory is expressed in the fact that it predetermines the technological component as a whole as an economy in the broad sense of the understanding and depends on the scale of activity of the economic entity. Moreover, this theory provides for the reflection of savings in the activities of an economic entity, taking into account the scale of activity and business processes (factors) that characterize the volume of production and turnover of organizations. In the framework of the approach under consideration, a certain macrostructure is determined that incurs costs of economic resources: fixed assets, the number of employees that affect the turnover of organizations. The rational management task that the Udmurt Republic encounters is to determine the forecast for the turnover of organizations for given resources and in calculating the fixed assets necessary for its value and the number of employees. It was revealed that the rural economy of Udmurtia has a negligible effect on the scale of resources, since with a simultaneous increase in labor and capital by 1%, the turnover of organizations increases by 1.82%, and the final product is most dependent on the state of the workforce, as the current state the equipment used is in critical condition in terms of wear and efficiency.

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Li, Ting, and Jing-Ya Li. "Is farmland financial innovation narrowing the urban-rural income gap? A cross-regional study of China." PLOS ONE 17, no. 6 (June 3, 2022): e0269503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0269503.

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Over the past four decades, China’s economy has experienced tremendous economic growth but also a widening urban-rural income gap. Given the dilemma of the urban-rural income gap in China explained by neoclassical equilibrium theory, this paper attempts to provide a new theoretical explanation for the large-income gap between urban and rural areas in China. We select data from 30 provinces(cities) in China over the period from 2006 to 2017 as a sample to investigate whether and how the degree of farmland financial innovation narrows the urban-rural income gap. The results show that the coefficient for farmland financial innovation is significantly negative at the 1% level, signifying that financial innovation can narrow the urban-rural income gap in China. The mediation effect test provides evidence that farmland financial innovation narrows the urban-rural income gap by promoting the permanent migration of the labor force and upgrading the industrial structure. Our results indicate that the government should promote various forms of farmland financial innovation, establish rural property rights transaction system and free farmers from deep farmer-land attachment to realize permanent labor migration.

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Vydobora, Volodymyr. "FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY." Socio-Economic Research Bulletin, no. 3-4(78-79) (November 30, 2021): 9–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.33987/vsed.3-4(78-79).2021.9-18.

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The theoretical and practical aspects of fundamental concepts of economic growth in institutional theory are investigated in the article. The aim of article is to study the fundamental concepts of economic growth, which formed by representatives of the institutional direction of economic theory, in the context of the possibility of their application in shaping the country’s economic growth policy in modern economic conditions. The research was carried out with using the historical-genetic method, ascent from the abstract to the concrete, as well as methods of deduction and induction, generalization method. An analysis of the genesis of economic growth institutional theories, which were aimed at explaining socio-economic phenomena that could not be grasped by the methods of classical, Keynesian and neoclassical theory are made. The general ideological principles of institutionalism, which consist in the fact that economic growth is determined by a set of rules that form the conditions of social production, are revealed. It was clarified that the institutional theory of economic growth involves the analysis of economic phenomena through the prism of non-economic factors – rules, norms, procedures, that regulate the processes of economic change and affect the behavior of economic entities. It is determined that modern concepts of institutionalism in the abstract sense converge on the need for effective political and legal institutions forming, in particular, the establishment and protection of property rights, state policy of protectionism and industrialization, social influence, etc., which are in synthesis with capitalist base, market and state regulation are form the basis of state’s economic growth. The practical value is the substantiation of rationale for the feasibility of applying institutional concepts of economic growth in the process of forming the state economic policy, given that they determine the general principles of economic systems, taking into account multiple socio-economic and ideological factors.

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Seniuk, N. U., and Zachary De Groot. "Motivations, Preferences, and Barriers to Going Abroad: Russian High-tech Start-ups and Small Innovative Enterprises." Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 12, no. 6 (December 30, 2019): 94–129. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2019-12-6-5.

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This article is devoted to studying the motives, preferences, and market entry barriers for Russian high-tech start-ups and small innovative enterprises (SIE) that took part in the “Startup Village” event held at Skolkovo Innovation Centre in May 2019. Due to limitations in neoclassical theories, corporate motivation at the micro-level cannot be accurately quantified. Thus, this work uses survey and interview methods to gather primary data directly from top representatives of participating enterprises. In total, about 100 participants were interviewed. Every respondent expressed intentions to engaged in for eign economic activity; half of them already have experience operating outside of Russia. Further, 44% intend to sell their business or intellectual property rights outright, with only 12% ready to cooperate in a join venture. Based on the analysis of the results, the corporate motives of Russian startups and SIEs going abroad is in seeking: new markets (17.3%), improved efficiency (20.0%), resources (40.0%), and strategic assets (22.7%). This is diverges significantly from the average estimates made by UNCTAD in 2005/2006, where they found motivation from foreign companies in developing and transition economies to be 51%/22%/13%/14%. Against this background, Russian innovative enterprises appear far more resource-oriented and more interested in finding strategic assets. However, they are notably less interested in acquiring new markets or efficiency gains. Additionally, the preferences in foreign partners by Russian enterprises exhi bit some variety. Many choose the CIS countries (mainly Belarus and Kazakhstan) and BRICS nations (primarily China) as desirable partners. Most also express interest in developed economies in the EU (namely Germany). Among the main barriers to establishing foreign relations is the lack of personal finances and other key resources, as well as a lack of state support in promoting Russian companies abroad. Based on the obtained results, impactful recommendations are offered to the government of the Russian Federation to strengthen the investment motivation of Russian innovative enterprises. Also, recommendations are given to advance the international cooperation of BRICS in the form of joint global value chains (GVCs) using their own innovative capability.

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Stamate-Ștefan, Andreas, Matei-Alexandru Apăvăloaei, Vlad I. Roşca, Mihaela Iacob, and Octavian-Dragomir Jora. "“The Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing!?” – What Cultural Capitalism Is and What It Cannot Be Accused of Being." Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence 15, no. 1 (December 1, 2021): 861–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/picbe-2021-0079.

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Abstract The present paper is a defense of the free-market economy/capitalism as a proper institutional setting for both producing and preserving cultural goods. We argue that culture is best served by a framework in which economic agents can evaluate their cultural consumption and production in a market order based on private property rights and monetary prices. In this vein, we first put, in contrast, two important lines of thought on the subject of value and capital in cultural matters. On the one hand, the mainstream approach upholds both that “cultural value” is intrinsic (and measurable) and that a fourth type of capital (namely “cultural capital”) can be introduced in the capital theory. On the other hand, by using a qualitative research methodology, based on deductive reasoning and historical analysis, we contrast the mainstream/neoclassic view with the praxeological approach of the Austrian School of economics. We conclude that neither “cultural value” is an objective fact, nor that the very concept of “cultural capital” can be integrated coherently in the economic theory. Yet, we claim that private management of cultural goods is superior to their public administration, due to (1) a genuine interest of private owners to rationally exploit cultural goods according to the subjective preferences of cultural consumers, (2) the inbuilt sustainability of the free-market economy as concerns the efficient exploitation of the cultural goods.

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Volkonsky, Viktor A. "“The End of Capitalism” and Power Structures: Economics and Politics." Economics of Contemporary Russia, no. 2 (June 25, 2022): 22–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.33293/1609-1442-2022-2(97)-22-37.

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Intellectuals have been predicting a near historical turning point, a sharp change in the entire world life since the beginning of the XXI century, often linking it with the end of capitalism. During the era of capitalism, processes took place that made modern society and the economy fundamentally different from the usual picture of the capitalist structure of society. This familiar picture emerges in the theories of mainstream economics, i.e. in the theories of neoclassics. The need for security and the need to identify oneself with a large stable community and its value-sense attitude came to the fore. Political and ideological factors become no less significant engines of history than financial and industrial ones. As the main factor demonstrating the difference between one socio-economic formation and another, it is proposed to use the method of realizing the power of the ruling class (stratum), the way it affects society. Under capitalism, this factor is realized through the accumulation of capital provided by private property rights and free market rules. With the monopolization of control over the media and social networks, the creation of a network of “think tanks” and the development of information and psychological technologies among the ruling elite of Western countries, along with the main capitalist way of realizing power, a “new” way appeared and became comparable to it in importance – the impact on consciousness, priorities and behavior (in particular, and direct impact) both large populations and organized communities. This method can become dominant for the post-capitalist formation. The sense attitudes and institutional mechanisms of capitalism will not disappear, but they will cease to be dominant. For the coming decades, the main contradiction of the historical process remains the confrontation of civilizations. An important factor is the strengthening of the second, invisible, “shadow” center of power (except for official states). The advantage of Russia and China is to consolidate in the “code of civilization” the idea of the state as a representative of the people, responsible for the fate of the people as a whole and each member of society.

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26

Agboola, Alirat Olayinka. "Neoclassical economics and new institutional economics." Property Management 33, no. 5 (October 19, 2015): 412–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/pm-12-2014-0055.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the provisions of both the neoclassical economics and new institutional economics theses and assesses the implications of their methodologies for property market analysis. Design/methodology/approach – This research is based on secondary literature review and desk-based study. Findings – It is argued that new institutional economics, grounded on firmer foundations of human behaviour, offers an analytical approach to the study of the property market which emphasizes the institutionally contingent nature of real estate exchange, thus placing real estate within its socio-economic context. Originality/value – In-depth examination and juxtaposition of the provisions, assumptions, philosophical orientations and limitations of these main traditions of economic thought towards the achievement of a representative study of the workings of the property market.

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27

HODGSON, GEOFFREY M. "Much of the ‘economics of property rights’ devalues property and legal rights." Journal of Institutional Economics 11, no. 4 (February 9, 2015): 683–709. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137414000630.

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AbstractLegal theorists and other commentators have long established a distinction between property and possession. According to this usage adopted here, possession refers to control of a resource, but property involves legally sanctioned rights. Strikingly, prominent foundational accounts of the ‘economics of property rights’ concentrate on possession, downplaying the issue of legitimate legal rights (Alchian, 1965, 1977; Barzel, 1994, 1997, 2002; von Mises, 1981). Some authors in this genre make a distinction between ‘economic rights’ and ‘legal rights’ where the former are more to do with possession or the capacity to control. They argue that ‘economic rights’ are primary and more relevant for understanding behaviour. But it is argued here that legal factors – involving recognition of authority and perceived justice or morality – have also to be brought into the picture to understand human motivation in modern societies, even in the economic sphere. As other authors including Hernando De Soto (2000) have pointed out, the neglect of the legal infrastructure that buttresses property has deleterious implications, including a failure to understand the role of property in supporting collateralized loans for innovation and economic development.

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28

FOSS, KIRSTEN, and NICOLAI FOSS. "Coasian and modern property rights economics." Journal of Institutional Economics 11, no. 2 (September 30, 2014): 391–411. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137414000484.

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Abstract:Laying the foundations of property rights economics stands out among Ronald Coase's many seminal contributions. This approach had an impact on a number of fields in economics in, particularly, the 1960s and 1970s. The modern body of property rights economics mainly originates in the work Oliver Hart and is quite different in style, scope, and implications from the original property rights economics of Coase, Demsetz, Alchian, Cheung, Umbeck, Barzel, etc. Based on our earlier work on the subject (Foss and Foss, 2001), we argue that the change from Mark I to Mark II property rights economics led to a substantial narrowing of the scope of property rights economics, somewhat akin to a Kuhnian loss of content. In particular, Mark II property rights economics make strong assumptions concerning the definition and enforcement of ownership rights made which lead to many real life institutions and governance arrangements being excluded from consideration, and a much more narrow focus than that of the rich institutional research program initiated by Coase and his followers.

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29

Kay, John. "The economics of intellectual property rights." International Review of Law and Economics 13, no. 4 (December 1993): 337–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(93)90028-4.

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30

Mihályi, Péter. "Property Rights and Privatization." Eastern European Economics 31, no. 2 (December 1992): 05–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00128775.1992.11648500.

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31

Johnson, Simon, John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff. "Property Rights and Finance." American Economic Review 92, no. 5 (November 1, 2002): 1335–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282802762024539.

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Which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment: weak property rights or limited access to external finance? From a survey of new firms in post-communist countries, we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings.

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32

Frech, H. E. "Contracting for property rights." Journal of Comparative Economics 15, no. 3 (September 1991): 536–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0147-5967(91)90043-s.

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33

Frey, Bruno S., and Heinz Buhofer. "Prisoners and Property Rights." Journal of Law and Economics 31, no. 1 (April 1988): 19–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467148.

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34

Ouattara, B., and S. Standaert. "Property rights revisited." European Journal of Political Economy 64 (September 2020): 101895. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101895.

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35

Lueck, Dean, and Gustavo Torrens. "Property rights and domestication." Journal of Institutional Economics 16, no. 2 (September 12, 2019): 199–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137419000390.

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AbstractThis paper combines the property rights approach of Barzel with models from renewable resource and evolutionary economics to examine the domestication of wild animals. Wild animals are governed by weak property rights to stocks and individuals while domesticated animals are governed by private ownership of stocks and individuals. The complex evolutionary process of domestication can be viewed as a conversion of wild populations into private property, as well as a transition from natural selection to economic selection controlled by owners of populations and individuals. In our framework domestication is not the explicit goal of any economic agent, but it emerges as a long-run outcome of an innovation in hunting strategies in a hunter–gatherer society. Our formal model also suggests that the domestication process moves slowly at first but then proceeds rapidly, and is aligned with the archeological evidence on domestication events.

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36

Kretz, Claudio. "Consistent rights on property spaces." Journal of Economic Theory 197 (October 2021): 105323. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105323.

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37

Li, Xiang. "Market Correlation and Property Rights." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 166, no. 3 (2010): 426. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245610793102143.

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38

Swanson, Timothy M., Yoram Barzel, and Gary D. Libecap. "Economic Analysis of Property Rights." Economic Journal 102, no. 410 (January 1992): 169. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2234867.

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39

Levine, Ross. "Law, Endowments and Property Rights." Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 3 (August 1, 2005): 61–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533005774357842.

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While scholars have hypothesized about the sources of variation in property rights for over 2500 years, it is only very recently that researchers have begun to test these theories empirically. This paper reviews both the theory and empirical evidence supporting and refuting the law and endowment views of property rights. The law view holds that historically determined differences in national legal traditions continue to shape cross-country differences in property rights. The endowment view argues that during European colonization, differences in climate, crops, the indigenous population, and the disease environment influenced long-run property rights.

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40

Río, Fernando. "Property Rights, Predation, and Productivity*." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 121, no. 3 (March 21, 2019): 1154–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12294.

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41

Bel, Roland. "Productivity, Focus and Property Rights." International Advances in Economic Research 14, no. 3 (July 18, 2008): 352. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11294-008-9159-6.

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42

Fulton, Murray. "The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights: Discussion." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79, no. 5 (December 1997): 1592–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1244386.

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Richardson, Martin. "Intellectual property rights: An international economics perspective." Review of Industrial Organization 6, no. 3 (1991): 247–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00378125.

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Salomon, Margot E., and Colin Arnott. "Better Development Decision-making: Applying International Human Rights Law to Neoclassical Economics." Nordic Journal of Human Rights 32, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 44–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/18918131.2013.878892.

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Djankov, Simeon, Edward Glaeser, Valeria Perotti, and Andrei Shleifer. "Property Rights and Urban Form." Journal of Law and Economics 65, S1 (February 2, 2022): S35—S64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/718854.

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46

Anderson, Terry L., and Peter J. Hill. "The Race for Property Rights." Journal of Law and Economics 33, no. 1 (April 1990): 177–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467203.

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Wein, Sheldon. "Security and Global Property Rights." Humanomics 16, no. 2 (February 2000): 41–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eb018852.

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48

Chu, Angus C., Guido Cozzi, and Silvia Galli. "Stage-dependent intellectual property rights." Journal of Development Economics 106 (January 2014): 239–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.10.005.

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Udry, Christopher. "Introduction: Land and property rights." Journal of Development Economics 110 (September 2014): 170. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.06.002.

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Livingston, Marie Leigh. "Contracting for Property Rights." Journal of Economic Issues 25, no. 1 (March 1991): 283–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1991.11505162.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Neoclassical and the economics of property rights'

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