Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Neo-conservatism'

British Columbia has long been viewed by social scientists as a laboratory for social and political experimentation. The appearance in the province in the 1980s of what Premier William Bennett termed the 'new reality' and the subsequent Social Credit government's bold new policy directives has led to close scrutiny by the academic community. A debate has begun concerning the nature and meaning of the Social Credit governments' legislative agenda, as well as the character and significance of the forces which have arisen to resist this new political direction. The importance of understanding the changing political climate in British Columbia is evident because, as past practice illustrates, what transpires in B.C. may have bearing upon political developments in other parts of Canada. This dissertation advances the argument that B.C. politics after July 1983 entered a new era. Social Credit governments, as of this date, departed from the practices of the previous Keynesian consensus, targetting the welfare state and its defenders for attack. The provincial government embraced a neo-conservative solution to the crisis of capitalism. Neo-conservatism abandons pan-class resolutions to 'political' problems, adopting instead a radical and confrontational approach. It attempts to redefine the role of the state in society, seeking the transformation of 'political’ questions into private or economic Issues capable of resolution In the market place. The province's July 1983 Budget and the 1987 Bill 19, considered herein, are the two prime examples of this rightward shift. Social Credit's conversion to neo-conservative public policy / has met with vigorous extra-parliamentary opposition which arose in both 1983 and 1987 to resist its formative legislation. While the province has long had a polarized political culture, in this 'new era’ politics has breached the confines of parliamentary-based struggle and asserted itself in the streets and workplaces. This extra-parliamentary struggle has been marked by shifting strategies and tactics and, I argue, can be best understood as 'defensive defiance' to neo-conservatism.
Arts, Faculty of
Political Science, Department of
Graduate

This research addresses the establishment of the 'Jiang Zemin Era' whereby Jiang Zemin, and the Chinese Communist Party, have attempted to relegitimise the Party and have attempted to make the Party meaningful to the Chinese populace. What is fundamental to this research is how Jiang Zemin, as the ‘core leader’ of the third generational leadership, incorporated the political thought of neo-conservatism (xin baoshouzhuyi) into the framework of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought (MLM) ideology in order to re-legitimise the CCP. The timeframe within the research is from Jiang’s appointment as the General Secretary of the CCP in 1989 until 1995. It is important that this was a time period whereby Jiang had to consolidate, and therefore legitimise, his ‘core leadership’, and provide a theoretical platform in order to bring forth his own ‘era’. The research is predominantly a historiographical narrative, utilising both primary and secondary sources, that examines the mechanisms Jiang utilised in order to create a strong government, with himself as the ‘core’, which pursued increased levels of marketisation. Indeed, after being appointed General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 1989, Jiang Zemin had to achieve two goals in order to sustain and legitimate his position as ‘the core of the third generational leadership’. First, he had to secure his position as ‘the core’ through the creation of secured networks and alliances as well as legitimise of his ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ positions in the CCP hierarchy. In order to achieve this, Jiang had to first create a sustainable power base in order to retain, and therefore legitimise, his formalized positions as General Secretary of the CCP, Chairman of the Chinese Military Commission and the Presidency. In addition, he needed to be able to create alliances with both allies and protégés as well as differing power factions, be they conservative/elder or reformist, and with other leading figures like Li Peng and Zhu Rongji. Second, in order to further reinforce and legitimize his position as ‘the core’, Jiang had to develop his own ‘theoretical framework’ for governing the country – much as Mao and Deng had done previously. Therefore, the research also examines Jiang’s usage of the neoconservatism as a means of not only legitimising the CCP’s ideological framework but also as a means of providing his own ‘guiding thought’, thus enabling him to establish his own ‘era’. Indeed, after establishing himself as the ‘core’ through the aforementioned processes, Jiang had to develop such a theoretical framework that complimented Deng’s economic reforms, especially as he was designated by Deng, yet one that retained a smattering of Mao Zedong’s ‘Thoughts’ that could be applied pragmatically during the 1990s. It can be seen that Jiang Zemin successfully incorporated the political thought of ‘neo-conservatism’ within his platform in order to achieve these ends – including the establishment of a ‘Jiang Zemin Era’. This political thought, a successor to the political theory of ‘neo-authoritarianism’, already had several adherents within the higher echelons of the CCP. Indeed, it would be Jiang’s 1995 speech, entitled ‘Stressing Politics’, that would signify the incorporation of neo-conservatism within Jiang’s platform of (self) legitimation that would initiate the successful implementation of a ‘Jiang Zemin Era’.

My main argument in this dissertation is that popular nationalism in post-war South Korea, unlike the conventional claim to it among many South Korean critical intellectuals and unification policy-makers, cannot serve as an antidote to anti-North Koreanism. On the contrary, it is problematic that the cultural politics of national identification, prescribed as an authentic critical tool of challenging anti-North Koreanism, helps program hierarchical inter-Korea relationships by exposing the South Korean public to anomalous cultural-political characteristics of North Koreans. It also does so by creating popular discourses that have reinforced unification policy agendas that frame the development of North Korea in terms that would make it amenable to the needs of transnational capitalism and the legitimacy of liberal human rights discourse. This critical endeavor claims that the critique of anti-North Koreanism cannot be successful without problematizing the idea of discontinuity that stresses there is a rupture between cold war and post-cold war forms of anti-North Koreanism. This is because any un-scrutinized presumption of the historical transition can only confuse critical interpretations of the role of national identification while thereby reinforcing policy-driven resolutions for inter-Korea sociability. Thus, I locate the significance of my work in a democratic call for South Korean critical communication and cultural studies as well as the public to effectively deconstruct the contingent discursive collaboration of national identification and anti-North Koreanism that complies with transnational globalization.

Neoconservatism has long had a tenuous relationship with International Relations theory. Despite an abundance of explanatory material and its influence in US foreign policy, few works in IR have attempted to build a stand-alone theory out of it. Furthermore, previous work on the topic has resulted in an under-developed and poor understanding of the movement’s core ideas. The thesis redefines neoconservatism as a trifecta of i) a set of explanatory ideas on world politics, ii) an approach to foreign policy, and iii) an ideology that stems from the European Enlightenment, all the way to the present day. Using this expanded conceptualization, the thesis builds a theory out of what can broadly be considered an ideology. The theory takes the form of an ideal-type construct and emphasizes hegemony in the international system. It offers an explanation for the causes of alliances, as well as regional and systemic conflicts. The theory also adopts a prescriptive function and offers an account of foreign policy analysis. It is highly recommended that the assumptions of the theory that are laid out here be tested in future work.

The central aim of the thesis is to investigate the myriad ideological 'thought-practices' of Cameronism by placing the composition and content of Cameronism in the context of the problem of Thatcherism's legacy. This problem is namely a problem of the gap between intentions and outcomes. The thesis identifies three discreet, but also overlapping, ideological developments that take root in the late 1980s/early 1990s: (1) the steadfast commitment to reducing the size and scope of the central state; (2) the recognition that neo-liberal economics is a necessary but insufficient precondition for the delivery of wider Conservative outcomes; and (3) the rediscovery and commitment to the renewal of civil society as an alternative to state intervention in response to the perceived failures of neo-liberalism. The thesis examines the application of these ideological developments in Cameronism, both in theory and practice. Furthermore, it examines the political-thought practices of Cameronism in the context of the Coalition Government. Finally, the thesis analyses a serious Conservative ideological threat to Cameronite Conservatism, concluding that Cameronism is a distinct, decodable and distinctive Conservatism, which has been quickly eclipsed by other Conservatisms, namely the Conservatism of the New New Right, which is much closer to the Thatcherism that Cameronism was resolutely trying to adjust. British Conservatism has thus come full circle: the market society vision of Thatcherism, which Cameronism was trying to ideologically supplement, has been restored as the best and surest way to achieve the Conservative aim of a limited conception of politics.

Le travail de thèse entreprend une reconstruction critique de la philosophie politique de Leo Strauss (1899-1973) en partant de ses écrits de jeunesse allemands, replacés dans leur contexte politique et philosophique d’émergence et particulièrement dans les mouvements de la « renaissance juive » des années 1920. Au lieu de comparer son œuvre à celle d’autres grands classiques de la philosophie politique du XXe siècle ou d’analyser ces textes de jeunesse à la lumière de sa réception aux États-Unis, où lui et ses disciples sont souvent associés au mouvement néoconservateur américain, il s’agit ici de voir comment son positionnement politico-philosophique spécifique se construit dans la confrontation au « dilemme théologico-politique » dans lequel la pensée juive-allemande est prise face à la radicalisation de l’antisémitisme allemand pendant et après la Première Guerre Mondiale : judaïsme national ou judaïsme religieux ? Dans ses premiers écrits des années 1920, Strauss transforme cette opposition en celle entre Lumières et orthodoxie, entre athéisme et théisme, opposition qu’il ne cessera de vouloir dépasser à travers la construction d’un « athéisme biblique ». Nous montrons que ce n’est cependant que dans les années 1930, après son « tournant platonicien », que Strauss trouvera, par l’intermédiaire d’une nouvelle interprétation de Maïmonide, sa solution au « dilemme théologico-politique », sur des bases philosophiques pré-modernes. Avec le retour à ces Lumières platoniciennes, Strauss tente d’harmoniser Lumières et anti-Lumières, la défense du rationalisme et la justification d’un ordre théologico-politique autoritaire, projet paradoxal qui forme le cœur de son néoconservatisme philosophique
My thesis undertakes a critical reconstruction of the political philosophy of Leo Strauss (1899-1973) on the basis of his early writings, which I contextualize in the political and philosophical frame of the Weimar Republic and the “German-Jewish Renaissance” of the 1920s. My main hypothesis is that his concept of ”political philosophy” emerges from a confrontation with the “theological-political dilemma” that German-Jewish thought faced after the First World War, the radicalization of German Anti-Semitism and the problem of being torn between national and religious Judaism. I argue that in his early writings of the 1920s, Strauss transforms this dilemma into the opposition between Enlightenment and orthodoxy, atheism and theism that he tries to overcome in the form of an “biblical atheism”. In the 1930s, after his “Platonic turn”, Strauss finds another solution to the “dilemma”, now on pre-modern philosophical grounds, through a new interpretation of Maimonides. With the return to this “platonic” Enlightenment, Strauss tries to harmonize anti-Enlightenment and Enlightenment, pre-modern rationalism and the justification of authoritarian theological-political order. My argument ist that this paradoxical project is the core of his philosophical neo-conservatism

碩士
中國文化大學
美國研究所
96
After the Cold War, in a period of rapid growth for Asia-Pacific economies, several threats to both regional security and U.S. national interests arose. These threats included China’s rapid transformation into a regional power, North Korea’s continuing development of nuclear weapons and unanswered questions over the sovereignty of Taiwan. In response to this newly unpredictable situation the Bush administration adjusted its policies in the Asia-Pacific region with the goal of retaining its predominant role in that region. The Bush administration’s foreign policy was heavily influenced by Neoconservative principles which emphasize a strong military, the safeguarding of American hegemony, and other interests, alongside impeding the rise of any political or military competitors that may potentially challenge U.S. dominance of the Asia-Pacific region. This thesis examines both Neoconservative principles and the “The Bush Doctrine” as factors in the molding of Bush administration foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region. This thesis concludes that policies utilized by the Bush administration including: the “Friends of the system” tactic; the use of Six-Party talks in response to the North Korean nuclear crisis; the expansion of the US-Japan alliance, and U.S. cooperation with the Japanese in dealing with the Taiwan strait issue all demonstrate the effect of Neoconservative philosophies on the Bush administration’s policies in the region.

碩士
國立臺灣大學
政治學研究所
97
This paper surveys and investigates the ideas and impact on U.S. foreign policy directed toward the Taiwan Strait of a small but influential group of liberals who became known as the Neo-conservatives. The focus of this research is on the transformation of the Neo-conservatives from liberal Democrats to conservative Republicans, and how they have viewed and influenced the strategic debate over cross-strait issues since the Cold War. The thesis contains three main points. First, that the Neo-conservatives’ steadfast ant-communism was based on their historical experience and accompanied by a belief in the superiority of American democratic values; second, that the Neo-conservatives saw Europe as the main venue of superpower rivalry—the strategic center of gravity—during the Cold War, and now perceive that the new strategic center of concern is shifting to East Asia; and therefore thirdly, that Neo-conservatives have asserted a policy of strategic containment rather than engagement regarding China. They have sought to strengthen defensive relationships with key Asian democratic alliances instead of adopting a more “Sino-centric” approach and abandoning strategic ambiguity for the more current concept of strategic clarity. These assertions have had considerable influence on the triangle relationship between the U.S., Taiwan and China.

碩士
輔仁大學
日本語文學系
95
Neo-conservatism of Japan was prospering in seventieth age of twentieth century. After the Cold War, with the change of the global and national circumstances, Neo-conservatism grew up rapidly to be main stream of the political circles.Neo-conservatism would chase after the national benefits. It advocated to enhance Japan’s international position and sought for political leadership which was proportioned to its economical power.The international security had significantly changed after the Cold War. Under the nuclear threat from North Korea and the challenge from progressive China, it was inevitable for these two countries, America and Japan, to reshape their alliance.After 9/11 terrorist attacks, Japan realigned the role of Self-Defense Forces to obtain a more independent defense-policy in order to ordinate the US anti-terrorist operations.Japan had strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance and close military cooperation with U.S. forces realignment, and enhanced Japan’s national power, including the military power to cater for the adjustment of safety in Asia. As Japan proposed a U.N. orientation for the world in 1957, rejoining the international community was the ultimate aim.Japan optimistically strove to become a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. It supplied appropriate contributions to win the leading position in the international area and fought to be the Ordinary Country. However, Japan’s diplomatic policy and defense-policy adjustment will certainly influence the regional condition. My research from individual level, domestic level and international level deeply analyzes the rise of Neo-conservatism of Japan, national politics, representation of national act and influence, then further explore conservative obviously national policy which affects the regional condition.The directions of Japan’s politics is heading for security of Northeast Asia and it affects the diplomacy relationship among Asia-Pacific countries; therefore, it is the very important issue for Taiwan.

碩士
輔仁大學
日本語文學系
97
In Japan the Neo-conservatism rose in the 1970’s, prevailed over political affairs in the 1990’s, and reached to the summit after the assuming office of Junichiro Koizumi. In the international situation, the Neo-conservatism was also on the peak at the same time, especially the time after the 911 Terrorist Attacks. But people began to review the Neo-conservatism because of US invaded Iraq and the Bush’s attitudes of the office and it made the influence of Neo-conservatism weaker. In Japan the Neo-conservatives changed their methods of work after Koizumi, for instance Abe Shinzo, Fukuda Yasuo, Aso Taro, they began to fix their guidelines and methods of diplomacy and lead to a new diplomatic guidelines. After Abe Shinzo, environmental diplomatic policy turned to postive and the successors were engaged constructively in environmental diplomatic policy. Hence, from the construction of environmental diplomatic route we can observe the new diplomatic ideological trends of Japan under the weakness of Neo-conservatism. From personal, national and intenational I analyze the contents of environmental diplomatic policy in all previous prime ministers and the developmental statuses and results under the inner and onter influences. After that I determine the advantage and the grounds of environmental diplomatic policy and results of Japan’s environmental diplomatic policy in the world and how it helps Japan to promote influence overe the world. Under the change of inner and outer concerns, the dreams of becoming major power seem hard to come true. With the environmental diplomatic policy, becoming a middle power and stabilizing the development of Japan become one of the choices and display the new face of Japan’s diplomatic policy. In addition, the environmental diplomatic policy of Japan also could be a module for Taiwan’s Soft Power diplomatic policy. We could use our environment and natural resources well, and develop well relationships with other countries in the world.