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Journal articles on the topic 'Neither peace nor war'
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1
Pavel Dulman. "NEITHER PEACE NOR WAR." Current Digest of the Russian Press, The 71, no. 046 (November 11, 2019): 18. http://dx.doi.org/10.21557/dsp.56404504.
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Davis, Lance, and Stanley Engerman. "History Lessons Sanctions: Neither War nor Peace." Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 2 (May 1, 2003): 187–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533003765888502.
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This paper surveys the increasing international use of sanctions over the past century. Sanctions are a form of action taken by one state or by collective action to influence another state to change its behavior, as a substitute for welfare. They generally involve restrictions on foreign trade, either of all goods or of specific commodities. Sanctions have generally been imposed by larger countries on smaller countries. Sanctions have had a mixed success rate, depending on the costs imposed on the targeted nation, their response to these costs, and the impact on the economy and public opinion in other nations.
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Chimnyi, Roman. "Neither War Nor Peace, But Disband the CCU!" Statutes and Decisions 46, no. 3 (May 1, 2011): 16–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/rsd1061-0014460303.
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Zahavi, Hadas. "Toward a literary genre of ‘neither peace nor war’." European Journal of Life Writing 11 (April 21, 2022): AN50—AN74. http://dx.doi.org/10.21827/ejlw.11.38658.
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While numerous studies have attempted to define forms of communication for the experience of eye witnessing the atrocities of war, little has been written on the inverse experience: how can one bear witness to not seeing warfare? I propose that this question has a profound ethical and political importance in the present, as the elimination of war’s demolition from the European horizon is essential to understanding the political situation that contemporary authors are witnessing. Retracing recent adaptations of the constructions of peace and war in the field of international studies may serve as a point of departure for determining a literary genre of ‘neither peace nor war’ related to contemporary French life-writings of writers such as Jean Rouaud and Jean-Yves Jouannais. Without being physically present for the events of extreme violence their writing describes in a first-person narrative, this genre creates a space for a reappearance of the war through the reconstructed European horizon of the present and opens a window toward a mode of resistance to the adverse political situation of ‘neither peace nor war’.
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Banta, Benjamin R. "Grasping neither war nor peace: the folly of cosmopolitan preventive war." Journal of Global Ethics 16, no. 1 (October 11, 2018): 7–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2018.1502203.
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Bulyk, Maxim, and Irina Gridina. "Shades of Gray in the War in Eastern Ukraine: ‘Neither War nor Peace’ Existence Zones, ‘Neither Truth nor Lie’ Silence Zones." Baltic Journal of European Studies 9, no. 3 (September 1, 2019): 166–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bjes-2019-0028.
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Abstract The concepts of ‘gray zone conflict’, as one of the new phenomena in the theory of international relations, are given considerable attention in modern strategic researches of analysts, in particular American ones (Hel Brands, Adam Elkus, etc.). The definition of ‘gray zone conflict’ by American political scientists coincides with the definitions of domestic scholars in outlining the hybrid war in general, and Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine in particular. At the same time, qualifying the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the war in Eastern Ukraine as the sole concept of ‘gray zone’ shall be considered not to be entirely correct, since the scales tend to favor the definition of civil war, which is so advantageous to Vladimir Putin. On the other hand, the war in Eastern Ukraine has many shades of gray, which gives grounds to the use of the concept of ‘gray zone conflict’ on specific examples of the existence of real and imaginary gray zones (realities of existence and zones of silence) and to investigate their quantitative and qualitative characteristics, to determine the degree of the viral use of the gray zone of conflict by the state (as an object of aggression), which complicates its establishment. The possibilities/unacceptability of solving gray zone conflicts by “gray” methods are being outlined as well.
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Bloch, Avital H. "Neither Peace nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America." Journal of American History 104, no. 1 (June 2017): 248–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jax110.
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Knight, Alan. "Neither Peace nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America." Hispanic American Historical Review 97, no. 1 (January 25, 2017): 173–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182168-3727707.
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Dowdney, Luke. "Neither war nor peace: children and youth in organised armed violence." International Psychiatry 1, no. 2 (October 2003): 8–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/s1749367600006433.
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The international community has been slow to appreciate the growing problem of the participation of armed children and youths in non-political disputes, encountered in both developed and developing countries, from Haiti to Northern Ireland. While there is widespread recognition of the issue of ‘child soldiers’ (e.g. www.childsoldiers.org/) there are also many children who participate in organised armed groups that function outside traditionally defined war zones. Nowhere is this issue more acute than in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. There may be more people (and specifically children) dying from small-arms fire in Rio de Janeiro than in many armed conflicts elsewhere. Most are bound up in the relentless conflicts involving factions of drugs traffickers fighting within and between Rio's favelas, or shanty towns, and their burgeoning drugs trade.
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Kelly, Patrick William. "Neither peace nor freedom: the cultural Cold War in Latin America." Politics, Religion & Ideology 18, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 126–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2017.1298313.
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Terrill, Robert E. "An Uneasy Peace: Barack Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize Lecture." Rhetoric and Public Affairs 14, no. 4 (December 1, 2011): 761–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/41935245.
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Abstract An unexpected Nobel Peace Prize placed Barack Obama in a difficult position. He was, after all, commander-in-chief of a military currently engaged in two wars, one of which many felt was unjustified. The doubled rhetoric through which Obama managed this situation forecast the strategy he deploys in his Nobel Lecture itself: he invites his audience to attend to war and peace neither as wicked nor ideal but as realistic y interdependenty and indeed comparable modes of human interaction. The result is that war and peace are held in a delicate balance through the force of a somewhat vaguely articulated moral compass.
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Novikova, Irina. "“Neither Peace nor War”: the Strategy of the German Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference." ISTORIYA 10, no. 6 (80) (2019): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207987840005979-5.
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Pitts, John. "Neither war nor peace: a review of John Hagedorn's A World of Gangs." Safer Communities 8, no. 2 (May 4, 2009): 27–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17578043200900016.
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Coleman, Kevin. "Patrick Iber. Neither Peace nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America." American Historical Review 122, no. 1 (January 31, 2017): 218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ahr/122.1.218.
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Haspel, Michael. "Evangelische Friedensethik nach dem Irakkrieg." Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik 47, no. 1 (February 1, 2003): 264–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.14315/zee-2003-0137.
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Abstract The Iraq war poses new challenges for Protestant peace ethics. Starting from an analysis of the document of the Evangelical Church in Germany »Steps on the Way towards Peace« it is argued, that the set of criteria for the legitimate use of military force provided there, is neither consistent nor workable. This seems to result from a misperception of the recent debate on just and limited war-theory. By putting under scrutiny the ethical judgments of the Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq war some inconsistency is brought to the surface, as is the need for further development of such criteria. Finally, a concept for peace ethics as ethics of international relations is provided, combining an insitutionalist, a human rights, a cosmopolitan with a just and limited war perspective aiming on the gradual realization of just peace according to the Christian doctrine of reconciliation.
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Pausch, Eberhard Martin. "Brauchen wir eine neue Friedensethik?" Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik 45, no. 1 (February 1, 2001): 17–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.14315/zee-2001-0105.
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AbstractThe article claims that in the current situation there is no need for the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) to create a new ethics of peace. Christian ethics of peace neither tends to bellicism nor to pacifism. Learned by the history of church, the EKD also rejects the traditional concepts of the holy or the just war. War can never be holy, not even just, but in certain situations warfare may be unavoidable or necessary. Cases of self-defense or the so-called humanitarian interventions are examples for the latter. As the war in Kosovo shows, the modern Christi an ethics of a just peace ( or a peace in justice) needs clear and distinct criteria in order to decide whether in a certain situation a humanitarian intervention is necessary or not.
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Braun, Marianne. "VROUWEN EN VREDE, MANNEN EN OORLOG?" De Moderne Tijd 2, no. 2 (January 1, 2018): 98–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/dmt2018.2.001.brau.
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WOMEN AND PEACE, MEN AND WAR? Dutch radical feminist Wilhelmina Drucker’s take on feminism during the Great War This article explores the connection between feminism and the fight for peace during the First World War. Although the Netherlands were officially neutral, the horrors of the battlefield, the position of women and the measures that needed to be taken were at the centre of a fierce political debate. I focus in particular on the special contribution to the Peace Movement by secularist feminist and leading figure of the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century feminist movement Wilhelmina Drucker (1847-1925). Her criticism of the war spared neither men nor women and comprised three dimensions: an antimilitarist dimension, a legal democratic one, and an ultra-radical combination of feminism and Neo-Malthusianism.
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Mayers, David. "Neither War Nor Peace: FDR's Ambassadors in Embassy Berlin and Policy Toward Germany, 1933–1941." Diplomacy & Statecraft 20, no. 1 (April 16, 2009): 50–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592290902813148.
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Jabour, Julia. "Why Has There Been a ‘Long Peace’ in Antarctica?" Yearbook of Polar Law Online 7, no. 1 (December 5, 2015): 632–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2211-6427_024.
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This article draws on the work of John Lewis Gaddis, a Pulitzer Prize-winning author and historian particularly well known for his scholarship on the Cold War. In his 1986 paper, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System” Gaddis posited a range of plausible reasons for why neither the United States nor the Soviet Union took the ultimate step of initiating a nuclear war against the other. This restraint was founded on principles of mutual understanding of the consequences of such an action and contributed to what he termed the ‘long peace’ in post-Cold War international relations. This article examines why there has also been a ‘long peace’ in Antarctic relations, using Gaddis’s theories and applying them to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties’ dealings with each other in the context of the Antarctic Treaty System – the legal regime that governs Antarctica. It finds that despite a radically different set of international relations circumstances today, Gaddis’s theories hold true. How long this long peace will last is not the point here; merely that it exists is cause for optimism.
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Bellamy, Alex J. "Thinking about World Peace." Ethics & International Affairs 34, no. 1 (2020): 47–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0892679420000027.
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AbstractFor as long as humans have fought wars, we have been beguiled and frustrated by the prospect of world peace. Only a very few of us today believe that world peace is possible. Indeed, the very mention of the term “world peace” raises incredulity. In contrast, as part of the roundtable “World Peace (And How We Can Achieve It),” this essay makes the case for taking world peace more seriously. It argues that world peace is possible, though neither inevitable nor irreversible. World peace, I argue, is something that every generation must strive for, because the ideas, social structures, and practices that make war possible are likely to remain with us. The essay proceeds in three parts. First, I briefly set out what I mean by peace and world peace. Second, I explain why I think that world peace is possible. Third, I examine how the world might be nudged in a more peaceful direction.
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Kotkin, Stephen, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. "The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations: Volume 1, between War and Peace, 1697-1985; Volume 2, Neither War Nor Peace, 1985-1998." Journal of Japanese Studies 26, no. 1 (2000): 270. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/133423.
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Stepanova, E. "Ceasefires as a Part of War, Peace Process, or a “No Peace, No War” Format." International Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy 21, no. 1 (October 5, 2023): 43–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.17994/it.2023.21.1.72.6.
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Ceasefires are increasingly relevant for contemporary conflicts and conflict management. During the first two decades of the 21st century, ceasefires also became the most widespread form of outcome for conflicts with any conclusive outcome. Half of all ceasefires, however, either had not yet been part of a political negotiated process to address key incompatibilities contested in an armed conflict, or had no relation to any peace process at all. A ceasefire in its traditional interpretation – as a technical stage on the way to peace – increasingly becomes a ceasefire in the absence of peace and a pragmatic alternative to a stalled peace process. What are the goals and functions of ceasefires at different conflict stages, including, but not limited to, a peace process? What are the main types of ceasefire based on its key function in conflict and on underlying goals and motivations of its parties? The article explores these questions at the theoretical/conceptual and empirical levels, on the basis of analysis of available statistical data and drawing upon concrete examples in various contexts, with special attention to conflicts in Syria and Donbass. It offers an original functional-motivational typology of ceasefires classified into three types: ceasefires as part of hostilities; ceasefires ‘for the sake of peace’ that aim at supporting and preparing conditions for peace negotiations; and ceasefires as a format of an intermediate state of ‘neither peace, nor war’, including as a means of structuring this semi-frozen state to achieve a degree of stabilization. In practical terms, this typology helps clarify (а) the issue of effectiveness – success of failure – of a ceasefire that should not be expected to advance or deliver one type of outcome if one or all of its parties deliberately seek to use it to achieve another type of outcome; (b) the role of the factor of armed violence at the stage of a ceasefire that may achieve its main, underlying goals even if it does not lead to lasting cessation of hostilities.
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Hunt, Maurice. "The Physiology of Peace and Coriolanus." Ben Jonson Journal 26, no. 1 (May 2019): 78–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/bjj.2019.0240.
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Written in the midst of the eight-year Jacobean Peace (1604–1612), Coriolanus turns the physiology of war and peace inside out. “No body can be healthfull without Exercise, neither Naturall Body, nor Politique,” Francis Bacon had written. “And certainly, to a Kingdome or Estate, a Just and Honourable Warre, is the true Exercise… . [A] Forraine Warre, is like the Heat of Exercise, and serveth to keepe the Body in Health: For in a Slothful Peace, both Courages will effeminate, and Manners Corrupt.” Bacon's claims were based upon Galenic medical theory that asserts that bloodletting purges the human body of debilitating toxins so that the four humours achieve a balance insuring both physical and psychological health. Shakespeare shows Coriolanus, repeatedly likened to a disease or toxin, disturbing the public body's peace. The playwright transforms the standard physiology of war and peace when Coriolanus—in keeping with the tail-end of his name—is vented through the Roman equivalent of London's Dungate. Then Romans enjoy a harmonious peace (4.6.2–9). When he returns to Rome leading a Volscian army, Coriolanus, advised by Volumnia, negotiates a peace that, while costing him his life, appears to persist at play's end when a calm Aufidius, all passion spent, never utters hostile words concerning Rome. The social importance of peace in other late plays—Antony and Cleopatra, Cymbeline, and The Life of Henry VIII—agrees with Shakespeare's revaluation of war and peace in Coriolanus.
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Nowosad, Sławomir. "War – Just or Justifiable? A Christian Orthodox Perspective." Studia Oecumenica 16 (December 26, 2016): 113–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.25167/so.3205.
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Being sent to the world Christianity had to determine its moral assessment of different worldly realities, war and peace among them. While the Western tradition rather early developed a just war doctrine, the East took a different path. War has constantly been perceived as evil though in some circumstances necessary and hence justifiable (but strictly speaking neither “just” nor “good”). Both the Greek Fathers and later Eastern authors and Church figures, like Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, would develop their understanding of warfare as “irrational” and an obstacle on every Christian’s path to theosis. The Russian Orthodox Bishops’ The Basis of the Social Concept is a rare example of a more elaborated theory of the justification of warfare.
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Shepherd, Laura J. "Gender, Violence and Global Politics: Contemporary Debates in Feminist Security Studies." Political Studies Review 7, no. 2 (May 2009): 208–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-9299.2009.00180.x.
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In this essay I develop a critique of the war/peace dichotomy that is foundational to conventional approaches to IR through a review of three recent publications in the field of feminist security studies. These texts are Cynthia Enloe's (2007) Globalization and Militarism, David Roberts' (2008) Human Insecurity, and Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics by Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry (2008). Drawing on the insights of these books, I ask first how violence is understood in global politics, with specific reference to the gendered disciplinary blindnesses that frequently characterise mainstream approaches. Second, I demonstrate how a focus on war and peace can neglect to take into account the politics of everyday violence: the violences of the in-between times that international politics recognises neither as ‘war’ nor ‘peace’ and the violences inherent to times of peace that are overlooked in the study of war. Finally, I argue that feminist security studies offers an important corrective to the foundational assumptions of IR, which themselves can perpetuate the very instances of violence that they seek to redress. If we accept the core insights of feminist security studies – the centrality of the human subject; the importance of particular configurations of masculinity and femininity; and the gendered conceptual framework that underpins the discipline of IR – we are encouraged to envisage a rather different politics of the global.
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Simons, Claudia, Franzisca Zanker, Andreas Mehler, and Denis M. Tull. "Power-sharing in Africa's war zones: how important is the local level?" Journal of Modern African Studies 51, no. 4 (November 18, 2013): 681–706. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x13000645.
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ABSTRACTResearch on power-sharing in Africa remains silent on the effects of national peace agreements on the sub-national level. Conversely, most armed conflicts originate and are fought in (or over) specific areas. A plausible hypothesis would be that for power-sharing to have the desired pacifying effect throughout the national territory, it needs to be extended to the local level. Based on fieldwork in six former hotspots in Liberia, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) we find that there is hardly any local content, including local power-sharing, in national agreements. However, contrary to our hypothesis, neither local content (inclusion of actors or interest) nor local-power-sharing (either introducing a local power balance or monopoly) are indispensable to effectively bring about local peace, at least in the short-term. On the contrary, it might even endanger the peace process. The importance of the sub-national level is overestimated in some cases and romanticised in others. However, the history of spatial-political links, centralised policies, and the establishment of local balances or monopolies of power ultimately play an important role.
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Mirza, Dr Muhammad Nadeem, Hussain Abbas, and Ummul Baneen. "Mapping Contours of Reconciliation and Peace Process in Afghanistan: Policy Options for Pakistan." Volume-04 Issue-1 04, no. 01 (June 30, 2020): 01–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.36968/jpdc-v04-i01-01.
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Afghan war has long been considered as a strategic failure, as the US could neither bring an end to the violence, nor ensure complete territorial control. Deteriorating security situation has also endangered stability of adjoining states. With the failure of military means to resolve Afghan crisis, the need for a political solution gained momentum resulting in the US-Taliban agreement in early 2020. This study traces out why, despite various rounds of talks and initiatives of reconciliation and peace process, the successful stability could not be achieved in Afghanistan. The study concluded that all the stake-holders continued to pursue unrealistic objectives, resulting in failure of the previous efforts of peace talks.
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Betts, Richard K. "Should Strategic Studies Survive?" World Politics 50, no. 1 (October 1997): 7–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100014702.
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Political science attends to causes and consequences of war but only fitfully welcomes study of its conduct, because few grasp how much the dynamics of combat shape politics. Bernard Brodie called for development of strategic studies on the model of the discipline of economics, because neither the military nor academia treated the subject rigorously. His call was answered in the early cold war, with mixed results. Theories about nuclear deterrence burgeoned while empirical studies of war lagged. The late—cold war impasse in nuclear strategy, rooted in NATO doctrine, shifted attention to conventional military operations and empirically grounded theory. Since the cold war, research on general theoretical questions about war and peace has been prospering, but education in military matters has been eroding. Interdisciplinary strategic studies integrate political and military elements of international conflict, but there is no recognized discipline of military science; military analysis is smuggled into political science and history departments, where it is resisted by calls to conceptualize security broadly or focus on purely theoretical work. If serious military studies are squeezed out of universities, there will be no qualified civilian analysts to provide independent expertise in policy and budget debates, and decisions on war and peace will be made irresponsibly by uninformed civilians or by the professional military alone.
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Mielke, Katja. "On Peace Activists and Skilled Survivors." Iran and the Caucasus 27, no. 1 (April 13, 2023): 105–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573384x-02701007.
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Abstract This article examines multiple entanglements of Afghan exiles’ biographies in West Germany with Cold War- and contemporary history. The life stories of six men who have been residing in Germany since the 1970s but were physically and cognitively highly mobile in their engagement for change in Afghanistan highlight the role of human agency in transnational history-making. The analysis shows that during the time of intense engagement connecting West Germany and Afghanistan, their lives became truly transnational, and the vernacular cosmopolitanism they practised has shaped transnational history from below. While all six life stories mirror transgressive biographies in connection with wartime events and differ from the global cosmopolitanism of elites, these life courses are neither standardised nor linear. The findings point to three types of transgressive biographies—skilled survivors, quietists and masters of crossover—that have preserved the transnational dimension that had been so significant earlier in the exiles’ lives to varying degrees and differed regarding related perceptions of failure, loss and regret.
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KOULI, Yaman, and Léonard LABORIE. "European Disintegration and Integration During the First World War Revisited." Journal of European Integration History 29, no. 2 (2023): 187–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2023-2-187.
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This article introduces a partially special issue exploring the ways in which diverse political, economic, military, and technical actors in both camps perceived the techno-economic integration and disintegration of Europe during and after the First World War. How to deal with the severing of ties forged over the previous decades? How to go about re-establishing new ties, and with whom? To what extent did wartime reflection and experience relating to these issues shape post-war responses? Research focusing on war aims and peace negotiations shows that in terms of international cooperation and the organisation of Europe, these years were neither the polar opposite nor a simple pause of pre-1914 integration. Our aim is to use specific case studies to document how this disintegration unfolded or was contained, as well as to examine why and how new integration was implemented during the war and subsequently called into question when peace returned, before often re-emerging in Europeanist movements and expert networks linked to state foreign policy after Locarno. We will especially focus on transport (rail and road) and patents, two of the most hotly debated issues on both sides, albeit asymmetrically.
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Larmer, Miles, Ann Laudati, and John F. Clark. "Neither war nor peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): profiting and coping amid violence and disorder." Review of African Political Economy 40, no. 135 (March 2013): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2013.762165.
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Bhuiya, Sharmin, and Miskat Jahan. "The Justification of Democracy Peace Theory in the 21st Century." Social Science Review 39, no. 1 (April 12, 2023): 211–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/ssr.v39i1.64921.
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Dependent on liberal ideologies , the democratic peace theory assumes that democracies rarely wage war on one another than non- democracies. But critics argue that merely being democratic in nature may not be the main reason for peace between democracies. Throughout the 21st century, we have witnessed the “War on Terrorism” after 9/11, the rise of multipolarity, several buffer zones underpinning major powers’ divisive politics and reflection of national leaders’ decisions on regional cooperatives and international institutions, etc., which have had varying effects on international politics. Therefore, this study begs a question that whether the implications of democratic peace theory are justified in the 21st century or not. Answering this question required a thorough review of the arguments put forward by democratic peace theorists and detractors. This article examines the justification of democratic peace theory by focusing on the remarkable political phenomena in the 21st century. The method of this study is based on the thematic literature review and in-depth study of the documents and summaries comprised of articles and journals. This study found that authoritarianism, democratic backsliding, the rise of populism, contentious politics, border and regional conflicts, violent annexation, etc. have become critical issues in democracies where neither the values of democracy are protected, nor the liberal ideology is followed in the state mechanisms. Social Science Review, Vol. 39(1), June 2022 Page 211-229
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Chasi, Colin T. "Provisional notes on ubuntu for journalists covering war." International Communication Gazette 78, no. 8 (July 27, 2016): 802–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1748048516642730.
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There is a growing pool of literature on the implications for journalism of the African moral philosophy of ubuntu. However, little of this literature is framed around the conception that the world is fundamentally violent and/or that communication itself is violent, focusing on the idea of harmonious life. This article contributes to changing this, insisting that valuing of harmonious community relations should neither involve denying the violence within which communities are established nor the taking for granted of any “we.” After all, communication is violent and failing to conceptualize African journalistic practice in ways that are consistent with how Africans inordinately experience violence is concerning. With special interest in news regarding violent, I draft a provisional understanding of news that reflects values of ubuntu, tentatively conceptualizing news values inspired by ubuntu, and advocating an ubuntu-informed normative account of how journalists should cover conflict, war, and possibilities regarding peace.
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Broers, Laurence. "Requiem for the Unipolar Moment in Nagorny Karabakh." Current History 120, no. 828 (October 1, 2021): 255–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2021.120.828.255.
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The Minsk Group, led by the United States, France, and Russia, has brokered the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict since the mid-1990s after Armenia-backed secessionists in the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic won the first Karabakh war of 1992–94. That mediation embodied the ideals of the mid-1990s unipolar moment, which assumed that liberalized markets and democratic transitions would converge internally to resolve legacy conflicts in postsocialist states while bringing them into convergence externally with Euro-Atlantic nations. Those assumptions withered away over the next quarter-century. Neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia transitioned to liberal democracy. Backed by an increasingly assertive Turkey, Azerbaijan prevailed in a bloody war in 2020. This time, the regional authoritarian powers, Russia and Turkey, are overseeing what could be a test case for a new form of “illiberal peace.”
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Fujisawa, Iwao. "Conference, Arbitration and the Triple Intervention of 1895: Relevance of the Western Ways of Dispute Settlement in East Asia." Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, no. 1 (2013): 65–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134484-12340010.
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Abstract This article attempts to understand how East Asian nations dealt with the norms and concepts of Western international law and for that purpose takes up the peace process of the Sino-Japanese War. It argues that in that incident neither China nor Japan passively accepted the methods of dispute settlement developed in Western international law and that rather those countries tried to pick and choose among the legal institutions of that law according to their respective interests. This article concludes that the incident suggests Western international law was not immune to changes through the interaction between Europeans and East Asians in the process of its expansion.
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Thompson, J. A. "Woodrow Wilson and World War I: A Reappraisal." Journal of American Studies 19, no. 3 (December 1985): 325–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021875800015310.
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Woodrow Wilson was the first American President to leave the Western Hemisphere during his period of office, and, as befitted him, the circumstances in which he did so were neither casual nor frivolous. He went to Europe in late 1918 to take part in the peace conference following a war that the United States had played a crucial part in bringing to a decisive end. His aim was to secure a peace that accorded with the proposals he had set out in his Fourteen Points address of January 1918 and in other speeches — a peace that would be based upon justice and thus secure consent, that would embody liberal principles(the self-determination of peoples as far as practicable, the prohibition of discriminatory trade barriers), and that would be maintained by a new international organization in which the United States, breaking its tradition of isolation, would take part — a league of nations that would provide a general guarantee of “political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”The symbolism of this dramatic moment, with the American prophet coming to bring redemption to the Old World, imprinted on the minds of contemporaries an image of Wilson which has affected most subsequent historiography. Viewing events from Vienna, that special victim of the First World War, Sigmund Freud found “the figure of the American President, as it rose above the horizon of Europeans, from the first unsympathetic, and… this aversion increased in the course of years the more I learned about him and the more severely we suffered from the consequences of his intrusion into our destiny.”
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Hodel, Robert. "Leo Tolstoy and Andrei Platonov’s Prose of 1941–1945." Studia Litterarum 6, no. 2 (2021): 212–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.22455/10.22455/2500-4247-2021-6-2-212-237.
Full textAbstract:
Comparative analysis of A. Platonov’s wartime stories (1941–1945) and Leo Tolstoy’s Sevastopol Stories, War and Peace and Hadji Murat is performed. Items reviewed: 1) Both Red Army fighters in Platonov’s works and soldiers in Tolstoy’s works identify themselves not with an abstract “Fatherland,” but with their local “small motherland.” 2) Both for Tolstoy and Platonov, neither skilful strategy nor overpowering armaments become the war decisive factor but every single soldier’s courage. The battle often develops as an intersection of planned and unforeseen happenings, and everyone bears his own responsibility in it. 3) Platonov’s “truth,” like Tolstoy’s “providence,” is linked to the attacked side and serves as a moral justification of resistance to the aggressor. 4) Platonov, however, like Tolstoy (who speaks as a consistent pacifist in his later works), sees the danger of moral degradation as the result of war, and degradation signs had been notable before the war. Sacrifices (including, in this context, Platonov’s own son) are not in vain only if there is better life after the war.
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Hodel, Robert. "Leo Tolstoy and Andrei Platonov’s Prose of 1941–1945." Studia Litterarum 6, no. 2 (2021): 212–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.22455/2500-4247-2021-6-2-212-237.
Full textAbstract:
Comparative analysis of A. Platonov’s wartime stories (1941–1945) and Leo Tolstoy’s Sevastopol Stories, War and Peace and Hadji Murat is performed. Items reviewed: 1) Both Red Army fighters in Platonov’s works and soldiers in Tolstoy’s works identify themselves not with an abstract “Fatherland,” but with their local “small motherland.” 2) Both for Tolstoy and Platonov, neither skilful strategy nor overpowering armaments become the war decisive factor but every single soldier’s courage. The battle often develops as an intersection of planned and unforeseen happenings, and everyone bears his own responsibility in it. 3) Platonov’s “truth,” like Tolstoy’s “providence,” is linked to the attacked side and serves as a moral justification of resistance to the aggressor. 4) Platonov, however, like Tolstoy (who speaks as a consistent pacifist in his later works), sees the danger of moral degradation as the result of war, and degradation signs had been notable before the war. Sacrifices (including, in this context, Platonov’s own son) are not in vain only if there is better life after the war.
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Dahl, Marianne, and Bjørn Høyland. "Peace on quicksand? Challenging the conventional wisdom about economic growth and post-conflict risks." Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 3 (April 16, 2012): 423–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343312436767.
Full textAbstract:
In a widely cited study, Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom show that economic growth reduces the risk of post-conflict peace collapse – particularly when the UN is present with a peace mission. These findings are encouraging for interventionist international policymakers. We replicate their study using data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database instead of the Correlates of War database. We generate a series of different datasets on the basis of different coding criteria commonly used in the literature, and rerun a simplified version of their model. Our results do not support their findings regarding the risk-reducing effect of economic growth and UN involvement. At best, the results are mixed. Some of the models even suggest that economic growth may increase the risk of post-conflict peace collapse. Overall, we are forced to conclude that the impacts of economic growth and UN involvement on the risk of post-conflict peace collapse are neither clear nor simple. The differences in the results seem to be driven by two sources: the conflicts included in the original datasets and the coding of the start and end dates of the conflicts.
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Hill, Christopher. "1939: the origins of liberal realism." Review of International Studies 15, no. 4 (October 1989): 319–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500112732.
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1939 was neither one thing nor the other. It was not the last golden year of peace at the end of a period of expansion and confidence, as 1914 had seemed to be, and it was not the start of a dramatic new era, as war had been in 1775 and revolution in 1917. Rather, 1939 was the ante-chamber through which the nations of Europe were slowly ushered into war, and its association with reactive and hesistant policy–making has compounded the sense of determinism. This article will challenge such a perspective in two ways: first it will suggest that the events of 1939 are in themselves rather more significant than is sometimes assumed, and second it will see 1939 and the war which then unstoppably unrolled, as having initiated changes which are still being worked out in the nature and quality of international relationships, as well as major particular developments like the rise of American power and the division of Germany.
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Goldsmith, Benjamin E., Dimitri Semenovich, Arcot Sowmya, and Gorana Grgic. "Political Competition and the Initiation of International Conflict." World Politics 69, no. 3 (March 8, 2017): 493–531. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887116000307.
Full textAbstract:
Although some scholars claim that the empirical evidence for the very low instance of interstate war between democracies is well established, others have raised new challenges. But even if democratic peace is observed, its theoretical explanation remains unresolved. Consensus has not emerged among competing approaches, some of which are criticized for offering monadic logic for a dyadic phenomenon. This article synthesizes recent literature to advance a simple, but distinct, explicitly dyadic theory about institutionalized political competition, leading to expectations that it is the most important source of democratic peace. While the authors are far from the first to consider political competition, their approach stands out in according it the central role in a dyadic theory focused on the regime type of initiators and target states. They argue that potential vulnerability to opposition criticism on target-regime-specific normative and costs-of-war bases is more fundamental than mechanisms such as audience costs, informational effects, or public goods logic. Incumbents in high-competition states will be reluctant to initiate conflict with a democracy due to anticipated inability to defend the conflict as right, necessary, and winnable. The authors present new and highly robust evidence that democratic peace is neither spurious nor a methodological artifact, and that it can be attributed to high-competition states’ aversion to initiating fights with democracies.
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Monteiro, Nuno P. "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful." International Security 36, no. 3 (January 2012): 9–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00064.
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The United States has been at war for thirteen of the twenty-two years since the Cold War ended and the world became unipolar. Still, the consensual view among international relations theorists is that unipolarity is peaceful. They base this view on two assumptions: first, the unipole will guarantee the global status quo and, second, no state will balance against it. Both assumptions are problematic. First, the unipole may disengage from a particular region, thus removing constraints on regional conflicts. Second, if the unipole remains engaged in the world, those minor powers that decide not to accommodate it will be unable to find a great power sponsor. Placed in this situation of extreme self-help, they will try to revise the status quo in their favor, a dynamic that is likely to trigger conflict with the unipole. Therefore, neither the structure of a unipolar world nor U.S. strategic choices clearly benefit the overall prospects for peace. For the world as a whole, unipolarity makes conflict likely. For the unipole, it presents a difficult choice between disengagement and frequent conflict. In neither case will the unipole be able to easily convert its power into favorable outcomes peacefully.
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Cazacu, Ioana Ecaterina. "The Nansen Commission and the Romanian Prisoners of War’s repatriation from the Russian territories." Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies 3, no. 1 (August 15, 2011): 145–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.53604/rjbns.v3i1_8.
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The end of the Great War was the beginning of a long string of problems requiring immediate solutions, one of the most important of which being the repatriation of former prisoners of war. Given the fact that there were a large number of prisoners as a result of the huge amount of troops engaged in the conflict, we can approximate a number of 6,637,000 prisoners at the end of the war. This situation did not remain without consequences in the international debate. At the Paris Peace Conference, the General Secretariat had organized a Special Committee on all matters relating to prisoners. The lead of the Commission was entrusted to Fridtjof Nansen, explorer, scientist and public figure of the period. However, there were a number of difficulties generated by the absence of Russia from the Peace Conference. This country did not obey any decisions of the Commission, having neither rights, nor duties. To solve the problems, the High Commissioner made use of the prestige given by the League of Nations in order to facilitate the carrying out of his duty, but in reality the effort to repatriate the prisoners was supported by humanitarian agencies and private organizations, for example the International Red Cross. Overall the Mission led by Dr. Nansen managed to repatriate 427,885 prisoners, 19,188 of whom were Romanians.
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Ezugwu, Olileanya. "The 21st Century Israel-Palestine Conflict Over Jerusalem and its Peace Processes." Malaysian Journal of International Relations 11, no. 1 (December 25, 2023): 107–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.22452/mjir.vol11no1.6.
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Jerusalem is a depiction of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict's national politics and contrasting identities. The continuous rise in violence, with its devastating effect on peace and security prompts the examination of the conflict, various peace processes and the status of Jerusalem. The major objectives of this paper are to examine the Israel-Palestine conflict over Jerusalem in the 21st century and analyse the status of Jerusalem and different peace talks through external mediation and intervention. The theory of structural realism was adopted for this study; which, concerning the conflict over Jerusalem, emphasises that war is a significant, and fundamental instrument of change in international affairs. Secondary data was used in this paper, by reviewing and analysing data gathered from scholarly publications, journals, articles, and online materials. The paper finds an intensified increase of violence between Israel and Palestine, especially regarding the status of Jerusalem and Palestine as an independent state. The paper concludes that despite numerous peace processes and diplomatic efforts, a lasting resolution has remained elusive. The failure to achieve a comprehensive agreement stems from a combination of factors, including conflicting narratives, incompatibility of goals, deep-rooted mistrust, geopolitical complexities, and the influence of external actors. Peace, stability, and acceptable status of Jerusalem can only be initiated and resolved solemnly between Israel and Palestine, but until then, neither the status of Jerusalem nor Palestine would be defined.
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Arato, Andrew. "International Role in State-Making in Ukraine: The Promise of a Two-Stage Constituent Process." German Law Journal 16, no. 3 (July 2015): 691–712. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200021027.
Full textAbstract:
The conflict in the Ukraine—barely placated by a fragile truce that temporarily froze its territorial fault lines—remains one of the gravest threats to both regional and international peace since the end of the Cold War. The present de facto territorial arrangements in Ukraine remain highly unstable—as well as entirely unacceptable—to at least one of the parties to the conflict. With the fate of the second Minsk Agreement in question, neither the parties involved in the conflict nor the powers that support them have been able to propose mutually-acceptable, comprehensive solutions that would significantly diminish the danger of a renewed violent confrontation. In such a situation, the wider international community could play a helpful role in achieving a lasting political settlement.
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Thorpe, Wayne. "Keeping the Faith: The German Syndicalists in the First World War." Central European History 33, no. 2 (June 2000): 195–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156916100746301.
Full textAbstract:
In December 1918, in its first conference since the outbreak of the Great War, the revolutionary syndicalist Free Association of German Trade Unions (Freie Vereinigung deutscher Gewerkschaften — FVdG) noted that it was the only trade union organization in the country that did not have to readjust its program with the return of peace. The syndicalists were alluding to the fact that theirs had been the only German workers' organization to have adopted an internationalist rather than a patriotic response to the war. The FVdG had neither supported the national cause nor endorsed the Burgfrieden, or civil truce, whereby all factional disputes were to be set aside and all sectoral interests subordinated to the higher interests of the imperiled nation. Its opposition to the war, its refusal to cooperate with the state and the employers, moreover, had made the FVdG a beneficiary of the growing radicalization of German workers. In the immediate postwar period it expanded at a rate six times greater than any other labor organization in the country.
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Tracy, James D. "The Habsburg Monarchy in Conflict with the Ottoman Empire, 1527–1593: A Clash of Civilizations." Austrian History Yearbook 46 (April 2015): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0067237814000071.
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From 1527 until 1606, there was nearly constant fightingon the long frontier in Hungary and Croatia that divided the Ottoman Empire from the Habsburg monarchy. The conflict began when Sultan Suleiman the Lawgiver invaded Hungary in 1526 and defeated King Louis II Jagellio, who died trying to escape. Thereafter, Hungary was claimed by Suleiman, by Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, and by thevojvodof Transylvania, Janós Szapolyai. Apart from the “Long” Turkish War of 1593–1606, major invasions from either side were infrequent. The Habsburg monarchy and the Ottoman Empire also agreed to several multiyear treaties of peace, starting in 1547. When a treaty had elapsed, both powers usually accepted truces in the interim. Yet the 1547 Treaty of Edirne reflected the priorities of distant capitals. Emperor Charles V had to have calm in Hungary in order to pursue his plans against the Protestant Schmalkaldic League in Germany; Suleiman needed quiet in the west, so as to march east against Shi'ite Iran, the Ottoman Empire's main enemy. But neither Charles nor Suleiman required more than a semblance of peace in Hungary. Hence, Ferdinand, like his new adversary, thepaşaor governor-general of Buda, had to deal with border garrisons eager for booty and angry subjects demanding retaliation. The counterpart of imperial peace wasKleinkriegin Hungary and Croatia.
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Epstein, Alek. "Israel-Egypt Agreements of 1974–1975 in the Context of Regional and International Relations: A New Perspective." Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no. 6 (2021): 149. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013038640017187-3.
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After the October 1973 War president Sadat had come to realize the United States alone could lead to an Israeli withdrawal from the territories it occupying during the June 1967 War. For although the Soviet Union supplied Egypt with the desirable types and amounts of weapons, Moscow had no impact on Israeli policy. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saw the United States gaining clout in the Middle East while pushing the Soviet Union out of the region. Kissinger succeeded to bring about the signing of two separation of forces agreements between Israel and Egypt, in January 1974 and in September 1975; the second Disengagement Agreement even placed American troops in the Sinai Peninsula to monitor the demilitarized zones established between the two countries. In both cases the United States had resorted to exerting pressure on the Israeli government lead by Golda Meir (in 1974) and Yitzhak Rabin (in 1975) by denying financial aid and holding no discussions on weapon transactions. Neither in 1974 nor in 1975 president Sadat was willing to recognize Israel or to sign a peace agreement with the Jewish state. In fact, he was involved in a “step-by-step peace process” with the United States rather than with Israel. American administration had no doubt that Israel would have no choice but “to pay the bills”, whatever they would be.
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ANAND, R. P. "The Formation of International Organizations and India: A Historical Study." Leiden Journal of International Law 23, no. 1 (February 2, 2010): 5–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156509990318.
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AbstractAs the clash of aspirations increased among European countries, a European ‘civil war’ started in 1914, which engulfed the whole world. With all the terrible destruction and loss of life, it was felt that an international organization must be established to avert war in future. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the British government succeeded in gaining separate representation for its dominions, including India. This created a rather anomalous situation, since a dependency of a foreign power, a colony which could not control its internal affairs, was accepted as a sovereign state by an international treaty. Europe had hardly recovered from the First World War in the late 1920s when it drifted towards a second holocaust in 1939. India became a founding member of the United Nations in 1945, even though it was still under British rule, participating in the historic founding conference. But Indian national public opinion was neither very hopeful nor enthusiastic about the conference on the new international organization. Not only India, which was not even independent at that time, but Asian countries as such played a very small and insignificant role in the formulation of the UN Charter.
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Flachenecker, Helmut. "Local Interactions in Times of Peace and Times of Crisis." Klio - Czasopismo Poświęcone Dziejom Polski i Powszechnym 62, no. 2 (July 14, 2022): 19–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/klio.2022.014.
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The crucial question for this exploration is: how could ordinary citizens (Gemeine), who had no chance of becoming members of the city-council, be incorporated into a common decision-making-process in the Late Middle Ages? In the background of this specific research-question lie the fundamental criteria for the ideal of urban peace and common good (gemein Gut) as an ideal vision of community. The following examples are primarily from Franconia, an area which had neither a unifying territory nor a supreme ruler. Instead, it was dominated by a multitude of different secular and spiritual rulers with many castles, monasteries and towns/citie. The town’s community was organized into neighborhoods, suburbs, quarters. Therefore, the quartermasters (Viertelsmeister) played an important role as speaker or representatives of the quarters or suburbs. The variety of possible duties for quartermasters were enormous. The quartermasters as representatives of the quarter communities were, for example, questioned by the council when it came to socio-politically sensitive issues. Mentioning the quartermasters and the community during the Peasants War is not coincidental but tells us a lot about the crisis of confidence of the city council by the citizens. A few hints should demonstrate the political influence of quartermasters in Franconian cities and towns as an example for future comparable research projects.