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Demeo, Elizabeth. "Accidental necessity." View electronic thesis, 2008. http://dl.uncw.edu/etd/2008-3/rp/demeoe/elizabethdemeo.pdf.
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Sabbarton-Leary, Nigel. "Naming without necessity." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2010. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/1151/.
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In this thesis I argue that we should break with the dominant Kripkean tradition concerning natural kind terms and theoretical identity. I claim that there is just no interesting connection between the metaphysics and semantics of natural kind terms, and demonstrate this by constructing a version of descriptivism that is combined with the same metaphysics – that is, a nontrivial version of essentialism – found in Kripke, but which effectively avoids all of the standard criticisms. With my version of descriptivism in place, I present what I take to be the most reasonable version of metaphysical essentialism, positing only what I call 'thin' essences. I claim that thin essences are perfectly adequate to underpin scientific realism, and moreover that they are sufficient to support the version of descriptivism developed here. In effect, what I offer here is an error theory of the Kripkean tradition: Kripke is right to think that there are interesting things to say about meaning and essence, but just wrong about what those things are. Thus whilst Kripke thinks that it is possible to make discoveries about the meanings of natural kind terms, I think, rather, that we make empirical discoveries that lead to revisions in meaning. Furthermore, whilst Kripke thinks there is a dichotomy between de re and de dicto necessity, and that theoretical identities are necessary de re, I think this distinction is both misleading and inaccurate, and that the necessity of theoretical identities is neither entirely de re nor entirely de dicto. By separating and insulating questions concerning meaning from questions concerning essence I show that whilst scientific discoveries are contingent and a posteriori, the definition of scientific terms are both necessary and a priori.
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Grotvedt, Haze Tristan Jamison. "Necessity and Propositions." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/17213.
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Some propositions are not only true, but could not have been otherwise, no matter how things had turned out. Under what conditions do propositions have this property of being necessarily true? This thesis examines some existing answers to this question and develops a new answer: a proposition is necessary iff it is, or is implied by, a proposition which is both true and inherently counterfactually invariant. The notion of inherent counterfactual invariance is introduced especially for the purpose of giving this answer. In support of this answer, an approach to a cluster of key issues in the philosophy of language is suggested.
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Liu, Bin. "Conventionalism and Necessity." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/16603.
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I argue that conventionalism is a promising doctrine by defending it against the following four major objections. (1) Quine’s objection to truth by convention. (2) Quine’s objection regarding the definition of analytic, and regarding the distinction between the analytic and synthetic. (3) The objection from the necessary a posteriori. (4) The contingency problem. Some of the objections apply to analytic propositions, whereas some of them apply to necessary a posteriori propositions. I take Ayer’s doctrine as a typical version of Traditional Conventionalism. I develop my Revised Conventionalism about analytic propositions based on Ayer’s doctrine. The main revisions I argue for include that analytic propositions are a model constructed from our use of language, and that the necessity of analytic propositions can be given up. I take Sidelle’s doctrine as a typical version of Neo-Conventionalism. I develop my Revised Conventionalism about necessary a posteriori propositions based on Sidelle’s view. The main revision I argue for is that purportedly unrestricted necessary a posteriori propositions are only restrictedly necessary. I argue that my Revised Conventionalism can withstand the above four major objections. Conventionalism opens up a new line of thought for resolving philosophical problems. That is, conventionalism proposes explanations by virtue of our use of language, rather than by virtue of objective reality or by the nature of our thought. Given my defence of conventionalism, it follows that we can use the conventionalist line of thought to resolve a wide range of philosophical problems.
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Welch, Allison Pearl Snow. "Necessity and nostalgia." Thesis, University of Iowa, 2011. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1107.
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Why do we keep things? To remember.
Bedside tables are our modern-day altars, places where habit, respect, mystery, and love collide. Our physical materials wait while we travel through dreams, coaxing us back into activity come morning. Books and remote controls summon sleep, alarm clocks and written reminders startle the mind into a wakeful state. But not all objects are directly linked to sleeping or waking; some things simply exist to comfort us, reflecting our need to gather, collect, and nest.
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Lancaster, Philip Charles. "Reason, necessity and genocide." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/9233.
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This work examines core assumptions of the rationalism that underlies liberal political theory by placing it against the background of a dramatic historical phenomenon---genocide. An attempt is made to draw on historical accounts of two genocides to develop a critique of liberal political theory as it has been articulated during the latter years of the 20th Century by John Rawls. Ultimately, this thesis attempts to sort out the conceptual problems arising at the junction point of normative and descriptive theories of politics and argues that the basic elements of both kinds theories would benefit greatly from closer attention to history. The first chapter is devoted to a discussion of the ways in which political reason can be adapted to the needs of state and suggests that there are problems associated with the attempt to universalize the notion of human rights across a community of nations lacking the basic contextual requirements for rights. Chapter two considers the uncomfortable fit between political structure and value in liberal political theory. It argues that the administrative structure of states now exists as an important part of contemporary formal reality and thus ought to be a critical element in any serious study of politics. An argument begins here that works towards the final conclusion that states constitute an arena within which individualist and collectivist values collide. The third chapter examines the relationship between liberal values and rationality. It includes a technical discussion of Max Weber's theory of rationality but limits the discussion to political applications. This chapter raises a series of questions about the concept of rationality used in the construction of political theory. Chapters four, five and six examine the complications that arise when a liberal perspective is taken to issues of ontological existence, community values and the powers inhering in states to shape identity frames in the interests of administrative efficiency. This leads into a more technical discussion of rationality as represented in the theories of John Rawls and Alan Gewirth that is contained in the seventh chapter. Chapters eight and nine are devoted to discussions of elements of the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide respectively. Both examples are used as a means of illustrating the complex power relations arising out of the various forms of collective agency needed to sustain state sovereignty and which complicate political theory far beyond the explanatory power of liberal rationalism. The examples are used to argue that theories based on notions of disassociated rational persons just fail to support their normative conclusions. The final chapter argues for a re-examination of the way in which political theory is read and suggests that liberal theory, in particular, tends towards abstraction in ways that limit its usefulness as either explanatory or normative theory.
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Lancaster, Phil. "Reason, necessity and genocide." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/NQ57050.pdf.
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Williams, S. G. "Meaning, validity and necessity." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.354816.
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Cassam, A.-Q. A. "Transcendental arguments and necessity." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.371605.
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Pollock, William J. "The epistemology of necessity." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/4053.
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The thesis examines the direct reference theory of proper names and natural kind terms as expounded by Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam and others and finds that it has not succeeded in replacing some kind of description theory of the reference of such terms - although it does concede that the traditional Fregean theory is not quite correct. It is argued that the direct reference theory is mistaken on several counts. First of all it is question-begging. Secondly, it is guilty of a 'use/mention' confusion. And thirdly, and most importantly, it fails to deal with the notion of understanding. The notion of understanding is crucial to the present thesis - specifically, what is understood by a proper name or natural kind term. It is concluded that sense (expressed in the form of descriptions) is at least necessary for reference, which makes a significant difference to Kripke's claim that there are necessary a posteriori truths as well as contingent a priori truths. It is also argued that sense could be sufficient for reference, if it is accepted that it is speakers who effect reference. In this sense, sense determines reference. The thesis therefore not only argues against the account of reference given by the direct reference theorists, it also gives an account of how proper names and natural kind terms actually do function in natural language. As far as the epistemology of necessity is concerned the thesis concludes that Kripke (along with many others) has not succeeded in establishing the existence of the necessary a posteriori nor the contingent a priori from the theory of direct reference. Whether such truths can be established by some other means, or in principle, is not the concern of the thesis; although the point is made that, if a certain view of sense is accepted, then questions of necessity and a priority seem inappropriate.
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Ahmed, A. "A study of necessity." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.595393.
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The concern of this thesis is the widely-held belief in the necessity, in the strongest sense, of certain statements and inferences, in particular those whose truth, or truth-preservation, is a matter of simple arithmetic or logic applied to experience. Concerning this belief, I ask; i) can it be justified? and ii) can it be explained? The answers will be i) No; ii) Yes. Chapter 1 attempts to clarify just what is involved in regarding a statement or rule of inference as necessary. It discusses and rejects a number of suggestions, including one of Quine's. It settles on an answer of Ian McFetridge's (1.4-5) considers arguments of Wright and Hale that the practice of refuting theories on the basis of observation imposes a methodological imperative to treat some statements or inferences as necessary. The chapter attempts to rebut these arguments and to defend a Quinean methodology that imposes no such need for necessity. It is conceded, though, that the arguments drive the Quinean into Dummettian anti-realism about doxastic modification. It is concluded that the answer to question i) is "No". Chapter 2 discusses the connection commonly held to obtain between these two distinctions: necessary/contingent and imaginable/unimaginable. It distinguishes a number of ways of understanding "imaginable" and in each case argues that our inability to imagine that ~p neither justifies nor explains our belief in the necessity of p. In particular, it analyses the notion of visualisation. An appendix applies the analysis of visualisation in defence of Berkeley's "Master Argument". Chapter 3 considers an argument that the necessity of truths of propositional logic can be derived from the truth-tabular definitions of the logical constants. It is argued that such a derivation rests on a misinterpretation of the truth-tables. An appendix applies this argument to a related discussion of Peacocke's.
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Al-Mutairi, M. Z. "Necessity in Islamic law." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.510056.
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This study aims at exploring thewidely applied principle of necessity ( darnrah ) in Islamic law. Its main focus is to examine the legal definition and limitations of necessity. It has been divided into five chapters, an introduction and a conclusion. In the first chapter, special attention has been given to the definition of necessity in Islamic classical and modern jurisprudence. Since the maxims of necessity are an essential element of this topic, these have been explored in the second chapter. The causes of the state of necessity are dealt with in the third chapter. In this regard, compulsion, legitimate defence, illness, change in circumstances have been discussed insofar as they related to necessity. To give an accurate idea of the limitation of this principle, the conditions of necessity are the main concern of the fourth chapter. In the fifth chapter, the discussion is concerned with the relation between necessity and other Islamic legal concepts particularly those concepts which are regarded as sources of law. The link between public interest ( aslmah ah iursalah , blocking the means ( sadd al-dharä'i') , istihsdn and concession ( Iknh sah ), and necessityo n the other hand was found to be strong. The conclusion, finally, summarizes the discussion previously made and presents the findings of this study
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Recber, Mehmet Sait. "Necessity, logic and God." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 1998. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/necessity-logic-and-god(feaf3ab1-95c5-4928-99c3-e374497494da).html.
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Tahko, Tuomas E. "The necessity of metaphysics." Thesis, Durham University, 2008. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2256/.
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The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that metaphysics is a necessary discipline - necessary in the sense that all areas of philosophy, all areas of science, and in fact any type of rational activity at all would be impossible without a metaphysical background or metaphysical presuppositions. Because of the extremely strong nature of this claim, it is not possible to put forward a very simple argument, although I will attempt to construct one. A crucial issue here is what metaphysics in fact is - the nature of metaphysics. The conception of metaphysics which I support could be called Aristotelian, as opposed to Kantian: metaphysics is the first philosophy and the basis of all other philosophical and scientific inquiry. I will argue that this is indeed the most plausible conception of metaphysics. The thesis consists of a brief historical introduction of certain important views concerning the nature of metaphysics, namely Aristotle's, Kant's, Camap's and Quine's, and of a longer survey of the status of metaphysics in the context of contemporary analytic metaphysics. I make some critical observations of recent accounts by people like Hilary Putnam, Michael Dummett, Frank Jackson and Eli Hirsch before launching into a thorough analysis of the relationship between metaphysics and other philosophical and scientific disciplines. The central argument of the thesis is that our a priori capabilities, which I claim to be grounded in metaphysical modality and ultimately in essences, are necessary for rational inquiry. Detailed accounts of a priori knowledge and modality will be offered in support of this claim. In fact, my accounts of the a priori and modality are perhaps the most important contributions of the thesis, as given this basis, the 'necessary' role of metaphysics in other disciplines should be quite obvious. I also pursue topics like the metaphysical status of logic and the law of non-contradiction as well as truthmaking, the substance of metaphysical debates, and the methodology of metaphysics. There is, however, a distinct theme which connects the broad range of topics that I discuss: they are all analysed from a metaphilosophical point of view. Indeed, it could be said that this is a metametaphysical survey of the status of metaphysics. The upshot is an original account of the status of metaphysics in contemporary analytic philosophy - the conclusion that metaphysics is the core of all our rational activities, from natural science to logic, semantics and truth.
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Lambley, Dorrian Elizabeth. "The necessity for tragedy." Thesis, University of Exeter, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.282674.
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Taylor, Craig Duncan. "Sympathy, reason and necessity." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.338469.
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Manton, Ryan. "Necessity in international law." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2016. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:0ee2dd8e-6eac-4364-b538-21ae5eb932a2.
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This thesis examines the role of necessity, as a defence to State responsibility, in international law. Necessity provides a State with a defence to the responsibility that would otherwise arise from its breach of an international obligation where the only way that State can safeguard an essential interest from a grave and imminent peril is to breach an obligation owed to a less imperilled State. It is a defence that has generated a considerable body of jurisprudence in recent years and yet it continues to be plagued by a perception that States have abused it in the past and by fears that States will abuse it in the future - 'necessity', declared the German Chancellor on the eve of World War I, 'knows no law'. This thesis contends that this perception is flawed and these fears are unfounded. The main claim of this thesis is that necessity operates as a safety valve within the law of State responsibility that mediates between the binding quality of international obligations and the harsh consequences that may follow from requiring compliance with those obligations at all costs. This safety valve promotes the reasonable application of international law and it recognises that international law must sometimes bend so that it does not break. The thesis bears out this claim by contending that necessity has a stronger pedigree than is commonly appreciated and that it is solidly grounded in, and its contours are constrained by, customary international law. It charts those contours by first examining the scope of the obligations to which necessity may provide a defence, which includes examining how necessity relates to fields of law that contain their own safety valves regulating emergency situations. It then proceeds to examine the conditions that a State must satisfy in order to establish necessity and it finally examines the consequences of necessity, including for the stability of international law. The thesis concludes that any suggestion that 'necessity knows no law' has no place in international law today.
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Allen, Emily. "The Necessity of Movement." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2014. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc699849/.
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This dissertation is a collection of poems preceded by a critical preface. The preface considers emotional immediacy—or the idea of enacting in readers an emotional drama that appears genuine and simultaneous with the speaker's experience—and furthermore argues against the common criticism that accessibility means simplicity, ultimately reifying the importance of accessibility in contemporary poetry. The preface is divided into an introduction and three sections, each of which explores a different technique for creating immediacy, exemplified by Robert Lowell’s "Waking in the Blue,” Sylvia Plath's "Lady Lazarus,” and Louise Gluck's "Eros." The first section examines "Waking in the Blue,” and the poem's systematic inflation and deflation of persona as a means of revealing complexity a ambiguity. The second section engages in a close reading of "Lady Lazarus,” arguing that the poem's initially deliberately false erodes into sincerity, creating immediacy. The third section considers the continued importance of persona beyond confessionalism, and argues that in "Eros," it is the apparent lack of drama, and the focus on the cognitive process, that facilitates emotional immediacy.
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Habington, William A. "Necessary evil, the interplay of compulsion and necessity in Doctor Faustus and Macbeth." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape15/PQDD_0001/MQ36458.pdf.
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Nyseth, Fredrik. "Language, necessity and convention : reconsidering the linguistic approach to modality." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2018. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/275585.
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This thesis is an examination of the linguistic approach to modality (also known as 'linguistic conventionalism') - i.e. the view that necessity is to be explained in terms of the linguistic rules that we have adopted. Drawing on an investigation into the history of this approach, I argue against the currently prevalent attitude that it can be dismissed as misguided. The aim, however, is not to argue that the linguistic approach is correct, but, more modestly, to put it back on the table as an interesting and viable research program. The thesis is divided into three parts. In part A, I articulate a conception of the commitments of the approach based on the ideas that influenced it, how it emerged and developed in the work of the logical positivists, and, in particular, the role it was meant to play in "making a consistent empiricism possible". Next, in part B, I defend the core ideas of the approach against various objections. Notably, I consider the objection that truth cannot be "created" by convention, the objection that necessities cannot be explained in terms of contingencies, and the objection that determining what the linguistic conventions are, unlike determining what the modal facts are, is a straightforwardly empirical matter. In part C, finally, I turn to objections which purport to show that there are limits to what can be explained in terms of linguistic convention. Specifically, I consider whether we need to assume a non-conventional distinction between admissible and inadmissible linguistic rules, a non-conventional consequence relation, or a non-conventional starting-point in order to get the linguistic approach off the ground. An overarching question is whether we are forced to take some logic for granted in a way which would undermine the explanatory ambitions of the approach. I argue that some of the prominent objections rely on misunderstandings, that some can be answered head-on, and that some point to genuine challenges and constraints which put pressure on the linguistic approach, but do not warrant a wholesale rejection of the view. Instead, they point to areas where further work is needed.
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Bostock, Simon J. "The necessity of natural laws." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.392731.
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Sampognaro, Jenny, and Lindgren Sandra Grönvall. "The necessity of social meetingplaces." Thesis, Malmö högskola, Fakulteten för hälsa och samhälle (HS), 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-26957.
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Abstract: Uppsatsen behov av sociala mötesplatser i Malmö är en kvantitativstudie med delvis öppna frågor vilket innebär att den har en kvalitativ ansatsockså. Uppsatsen handlar om sociala mötesplatsers betydelse för känslan avgemenskap och känslan av delaktighet i samhället. Men också om det finns envilja att engagera sig i en social verksamhet såsom en mötesplats. vi undersökervad dessa mötesplatser måste innehålla för att möta de behov som finns hosmänniskor, vidare vilka behov som finns. Detta undersöker vi genom att studeraolika faktorer som påverkar upplevelsen av gemenskap i det närområde man bor,varför man besöker mötesplatser och om man anser att de är nödvändiga och i såfall varför. Teorierna har hjälpt oss att förstå bakgrunden till ett merindividualiserat samhälle med minskad känsla av gemenskap, också möten övergenerationsgränser, som lett till ett ökat behov av social samvaro och därmedmötesplatser. Vi studerar vilka behov som finns utifrån att se på vilka olika behovsom finns beroende på livssituation och roller i livet samt hur dessa förändras. Detsom är gemensamt hos dem som varit med i undersökningen är att de har ettbehov av att umgås med andra oavsett livssituation eller livsstil. Många villengagera sig i sociala mötesplatser vilket visar att det finns en resurs i samhället,medborgarna. Det behövs ett samarbete mellan kommun och frivilligsektorn ochmedborgarna. Vi bör skapa tillsammans.Abstract: The essay needs of social meetingplaces in Malmö is a quantitativestudy with some open questions which means that it has a qualitative approach aswell. The essay is about social meeting places importance for the sense ofcommunity and sense of participation in the community. But also about awillingness of engagement in social activities such as a meeting place. Weinvestigated what these meetingplaces must contain to meet the needs of thepeople, and also which further needs there are. We also investigated the needs bylooking at factors such as experience of sense of community in the neighborhoodone lives in, and if they are necessary and if so, why? The theories have helped usunderstand the background to a more individualized society with less sense ofcommunity, including meetings between generations, which has led to anincreased need for social interaction and therefore meetingplaces. We are studyingwhat the needs are from the basis of looking at the different needs depending onlife situations and roles in life and how these are changing. The common thingsamong those who participated in the investigation is that they have a need tosocialize with others regardless of life situation or lifestyle. Many people want toengage themselves in social meetingplaces which demonstrate that there is aresource in the community, the citizens. There is a need for cooperation betweenthe municipal and voluntary sector and citizens.We should build together
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Lightner, David Eric. "Hume on possibility and necessity /." The Ohio State University, 1996. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487936356159386.
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Meera, B. M. "Profound management focus - Mandatory necessity." School of Communication & Information, Nanyang Technological University, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/106401.
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Seamless information and their accessibility in different formats have created a turbulent atmosphere in the ever-changing library and information domain. A multitude of resources, such as information, human, financial and many more, and the need for their management, makes it imperative for advanced training in ‘Management’ as a discipline on a larger scale in LIS programs. In view of the changing paradigms of library and information organizations in the recent past, an attempt is made to frame appropriate course contents with management facets to be included in the 2 years integrated Master’s level programs in India.
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Elliott, Tracey Ann. "Necessity or pragmatism? : the development and use of the justification of necessity in medical law." Thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2013. http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/8456.
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Traditionally, the courts have been very reluctant to permit the use of necessity as a defence in civil or criminal cases. However, following the case of F v. West Berkshire Health Authority [1990] 2 A.C. 1 and up until the coming into force of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the common law principle of necessity was extensively used in medical law to provide a lawful basis for the care and medical treatment of incapacitated adults without consent. This thesis examines why this was the case, and suggest that the answer may be found in the need to fill a “gap” in the law left by the ending of the parens patriae jurisdiction over incapacitated adults and in the development of the declaratory jurisdiction, enabling the courts to consider ex ante whether treatment is lawful and to exercise control over the application of the defence. It is suggested that judicial pragmatism, rather than legal principle lies behind this development and use of necessity This essentially historical study (although the impact that the Mental Capacity Act 2005 will have upon the justification of necessity is examined) critically considers what judicial pragmatism is, before examining the development of the declaratory jurisdiction and its role, together with the justification of necessity, in providing a substitute to the former parens patriae jurisdiction. The origins of and development of the defence and its use in medical law cases are critically scrutinised. It is suggested that the ‘principle’ of necessity developed in Re F is essentially a pragmatic, rather than a principled construct, and that ‘necessity’ in this medico-legal context is essentially a paradoxical concept, being a best interests defence rather than one of true necessity, with the test of best interests being sufficiently vague and broad to permit the courts to maintain an illusion of coherence and consistency whilst maximising flexibility.
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Öberg, Anders. "Hilary Putnam on Meaning and Necessity." Doctoral thesis, Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-160279.
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In this dissertation on Hilary Putnam's philosophy, I investigate his development regarding meaning and necessity, in particular mathematical necessity. Putnam has been a leading American philosopher since the end of the 1950s, becoming famous in the 1960s within the school of analytic philosophy, associated in particular with the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. Under the influence of W.V. Quine, Putnam challenged the logical positivism/empiricism that had become strong in America after World War II, with influential exponents such as Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach. Putnam agreed with Quine that there are no absolute a priori truths. In particular, he was critical of the notion of truth by convention. Instead he developed a notion of relative a priori truth, that is, a notion of necessary truth with respect to a body of knowledge, or a conceptual scheme. Putnam's position on necessity has developed over the years and has always been connected to his important contributions to the philosophy of meaning. I study Hilary Putnam's development through an early phase of scientific realism, a middle phase of internal realism, and his later position of a natural or commonsense realism. I challenge some of Putnam’s ideas on mathematical necessity, although I have largely defended his views against some other contemporary major philosophers; for instance, I defend his conceptual relativism, his conceptual pluralism, as well as his analysis of the realism/anti-realism debate.
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Mason, Andrew Staveley. "Reason and necessity in Plato's Timaeus." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.306756.
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Flores, Victor Cantero. "The source of broadly logical necessity." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.548565.
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McGee, A. J. "Derrida and the necessity of metaphysics." Thesis, University of Essex, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.343548.
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Oki, Takashi. "Aristotle on teleology, chance, and necessity." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9f6e9f40-eb61-43a8-92d6-b3749820e738.
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In this doctoral thesis, I address questions concerning teleology, chance, and necessity in Aristotle's philosophy. These three concepts are closely related. Aristotle considers chance in relation to teleology, and contrasts his conception of teleology with his own and his predecessors' views of necessity. He explains accidental causation on the basis of the absurdity of necessitarianism. In Chapter I, I clarify Aristotle's definitions of chance events and chance in Physics B 4-6 on the basis of a detailed examination of 'coming to be accidentally' (196b23), 'for the sake of something' (196b21), 'might be done by thought or by nature' (196b22). I analyze accidental and non-accidental relations involved in the marketplace example. In Chapter II, I argue that Aristotle accepts that the regularly beneficial winter rainfall is for the sake of the crops in Physics B 8. I scrutinize Empedocles’ view as described by Aristotle and show that it is not a theory of natural selection. I seek to show that the rival view against which Aristotle argues is an amalgam of reductionism and eliminativism. In Chapter III, I analyze what Aristotle means by 'simple necessity' and 'necessity on a hypothesis' (199b34-35), and argue that, in Physics B 9, he only acknowledges hypothetical necessity. Scrutinizing the wall example and Aristotle’s reply to it, I clarify his view of the relation between teleological causation and material necessity. In Chapter IV, I clarify Aristotle's conception of accidental causes, while taking his presentation of the necessitarian argument in Metaphysics E 3 as a reductio ad absurdum. I criticize the view that Aristotle himself accepts necessitation in this chapter. In doing so, I argue that, although this point is not explicitly stated in Physics B, Aristotle thinks that what is accidental is not necessary prior to its occurrence.
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Snopchenko, Anna. "Necessity of ecological insurance in Ukraine." Thesis, Видавництво СумДУ, 2008. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/8228.
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Gaj, Amber. "Thoughts on the Necessity of Disease." Kent State University Honors College / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ksuhonors1346774280.
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Judson, Lindsay. "Aristotle on necessity, chance and explanation." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1986. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a2a915a2-d946-4da3-a472-172afbe9bafc.
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Aristotle endorses a very striking doctrine connecting necessity with what seems to be a non-modal notion -- that of 'being or happening always'. He also forges a connection between the idea of 'happening by chance' and 'happening neither always nor for the most part'. These two connections form the subject of this essay. My guiding aim is to provide an account of what the 'always/necessary' doctrine involves and of why Aristotle might have held it. Reflection on the nature of the connection between 'by chance' and 'neither always nor for the most part' throws light on what Aristotle means by 'happening always', and, in consequence, on the nature of the link between 'always' and 'necessary'; it also suggests that the basis of this link is to be found in Aristotle's general conception of the natural world as the object of explanation and knowledge. The primary texts upon which discussion of these connections must focus are De Caelo I. 12 and the analysis of chance in Physics II. 4â6. I discuss these two texts in turn, after a opening chapter which surveys the evidence for Aristotle's acceptance of the 'always/necessaryâ doctrine and considers the nature of the restrictions which he places on it. Chapter 2 comprises a translation of and commentary on Cael. I. 12, together with a translation and discussion of its companion chapter, I. 10. In Chapter 3, I examine the nature of Aristotle's argument in I. 12, and criticise various interpretations which see it as evidence that Aristotle's 'always/necessary' doctrine rests on a distinctive conception of possibility. The translation of and commentary on Phys. II. 4-6 (Chapter 4) are followed in Chapter 5 by a discussion of issues relating to the association of chance with 'neither always nor for the most part'. The final chapter returns to the question of the connection between 'always' and 'of necessity'.
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Darland, Jeff II. "The Necessity of Presence and Play." VCU Scholars Compass, 2019. https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/5742.
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Theater programs that focus solely on the influence of the Stanislavski system are neglecting students’ opportunity to experience additional approaches to performance study that focus more readily on the sensations of the human body and the practices of improvisation to prepare actors to be able to stay present and respond truthfully within any moment. The pedagogical work of Jacques Copeau and Jacques Lecoq, which relies on improvisation, paired with more recent stylings of improv teachers such as Viola Spolin, Keith Johnstone, and Del Close reignite a modern sensation of play, found uninhibited in the world of nature, such as the expressive freedoms found in infants. These techniques bring out a truthful style of performance that is tailored to the individual, instead of tailoring the individual to the style. Not only are these performance methodologies useful to the performance artist, but they also hold proven in communities outside of the arts, helping people understand different perspectives, and improve their compacity for empathy and communication.
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Fantinato, Luisa. "Necessità, emergenza e pubblici poteri: profili penalistici." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Padova, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3422050.
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The study of necessity and duress is quite interesting in criminal law, especially with reference to problems of foundations and concrete applications. Particularly interesting is the problem of the justification of actions performed in breach of law by public authorities in order to counteract terrorism and protect community interests, for example in the case of privacy violation, kidnapping and tortures. Thus, the relationship between legality and security turns out to be very interesting with reference to old and new cases.
The comparative analysis concerns the German legal system. With reference to Germany, the application of the principles of necessity and duress to actions of public authorities is studied in parallel. Other legal systems are discussed very briefly.
Moreover, the study of necessity and duress gives the opportunity to analyze important issues, such as the problem of “legalizing” torture or the problem of so-called extraordinary rendition.
The necessity of counteract terrorism also inspires the so-called state-of-emergency legislation which is recalled – without any claim of completeness - with reference to those states that have introduced exceptional regulations after September 11th, in order to legitimate actions of public authorities which would be illegitimate otherwise (e.g. Patriot Act USA).
In conclusion this study points out the role of penal law as important tool in the fight against terrorism.La disciplina penalistica dello stato di necessità offre interessanti profili di studio con riferimento al suo fondamento e alle applicazioni pratiche. Tra queste è particolarmente interessante la problematica dell’applicabilità della norma sullo stato di necessità contro la nuova emergenza terroristica: l’importanza della lotta al terrorismo permette di giustificare le condotte che integrano la commissione di reati (ad esempio in tema di violazione della riservatezza, dalle restrizioni della libertà di movimento fino all’ipotesi di ricorso alla tortura) compiuti da organi pubblici in nome della sicurezza collettiva? In particolare appare quindi interessante il rapporto tra legalità e sicurezza, con riferimento a casi sia recenti che del passato. L’analisi comparata riguarda le norme dell’ordinamento tedesco, con un parallelo approfondimento delle applicazioni della norme all’azione dei pubblici poteri in tale ordinamento. Agli altri ordinamenti è stato riservato solo un cenno. Lo studio dello stato di necessità rappresenta inoltre l’occasione per analizzare temi significativi come quello della “legalizzazione” della tortura o come quello delle c.d. extraordinary rendition. Dall’analisi emerge infine che la necessità è ispiratrice della c.d. legislazione emergenziale, che viene ricordata senza pretese di completezza con riferimento a quegli stati che dopo l’11 settembre si sono dotati di regole eccezionali, volte a legittimare condotte di pubblici poteri che altrimenti sarebbero state illegittime (es. Patriot Act USA). In definitiva il lavoro pone in evidenza il ruolo dell’intero diritto penale quale strumento essenziale alla lotta all’emergenza terroristica.
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Kim, Yong-Beom. "U.S.-Japan national interests : necessity and implications." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 1998. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA358947.
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Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, December 1998."December 1998." Thesis advisor(s): Edward A. Olsen. Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-71). Also available online.
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Lyshaugen, Thomas. "Capacity handling : a necessity in Linux clusters." Thesis, University West, Department of Technology, Mathematics and Computer Science, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hv:diva-533.
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Rösiö, Carl Christian. "Warranties in Marine Insurance : an unpleasant necessity?" Thesis, Stockholm University, Department of Law, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-36838.
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Ismailov, Otabek. "The Necessity Defense in International Investment Law." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/35860.
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More than fifty investor-state arbitration claims have been filed by foreign investors against the Republic of Argentina due to the country's adoption of measures to mitigate the consequences of a severe financial crisis that struck the country in the early 2000s. Argentina invoked the Non-Precluded Measures (NPM) clause in the U.S.-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and the necessity defence in customary international law as its defense in these arbitrations. As a result of taking divergent approaches to interpreting the NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the tribunals reached inconsistent decisions on Argentina’s liability for damages incurred by foreign investors, which intensified the legitimacy crisis in the investment arbitration regime. Consequently, the tribunals’ approaches to interpreting the nexus requirement of the treaty NPM clause (the "necessary for" term) caused a fierce academic debate among scholars.
This thesis studies the issues related to the inconsistent interpretation of treaty NPM clauses and the customary necessity defense in the investment arbitration regime. It presents a detailed examination of the necessity defense in customary international law and treaty NPM clauses through the lens of regime theory. By applying relevant concepts of regime theory, such as regime formation, regime attributes, regime consequences and regime dynamics, this work explores the origins and evolution of the necessity doctrine, and provides a comparative analysis of the attributes, structural elements and the consequences of invoking the customary necessity defense and treaty NPM clauses.
This thesis analyses the interpretative issues in the Argentine cases, and based on the dynamics of developments in the practice of states, it arrives at concrete proposals that will contribute to the coherent practice of investment arbitration tribunals in interpreting treaty NPM clauses. By applying the concept of interaction of regimes, this thesis provides a comparative analysis of tests suggested by scholars for interpreting Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. It examines whether the interpretative testsmargin of appreciation, proportionality and less restrictive meansused by dispute settlement bodies in other specialized treaty regimes have the potential to serve as an optimal standard for interpreting Article XI. This work explains the contents of these tests and inquires as to the advantages and criticisms related to their application in the investment arbitration regime. This thesis further advances the argument that the interpretation of treaty NPM clauses (Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT) should be performed with strict adherence to the general rules of interpretation as established under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Specifically, it argues that in cases when tribunals fail to define the meaning of a treaty provision under Article 31 (1) and (2) of VCLT, they should not look for guidance from other specialized treaty regimes, but rather, must have recourse to general international law, specifically, customary rules of international law. As a methodology for performing this interpretation, this thesis proposes to apply a systemic integration approach through operationalizing Article 31(3)(c) of VCLT.
Furthermore, this thesis advances the argument that the interpretation of the only means requirement of the customary necessity defense (Article 25 of Articles on the Responsibility of States) does not accurately reflect the contemporary customary rules on necessity. Thus, by applying the concept of regime dynamics, it proposes to reconceptualise the interpretation of the only means requirement through incorporating the elements of a more progressive version, which is found in the international trade regime. Unlike the scholars who rejected the application of the customary necessity elements, and proposed the direct importation of the LRM test from the international trade regime to interpret Article XI, this thesis proposes a different approach to taking advantage of the WTO jurisprudence. Specifically, it argues that WTO jurisprudence can be incorporated into the investment regime indirectly by serving as a source from which we can identify the development of state practice in examining the "only means" nature of state measures adopted in emergency (necessity) circumstances. It is contended that such state practice represents a more progressive and practical approach to interpreting the only means requirement of customary necessity defense, and thus, should be incorporated into the interpretation practice of investment arbitral tribunals.
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Chetelat, Pierre J. "Hegel's logic: Its function, method and necessity." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/9955.
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This thesis is essentially an attempt to grasp the nature of Hegel's logic as a whole. In my first chapter I consider what Hegel is trying to accomplish in the logic. Here we see that Hegel's logic is not only a science of thought but a metaphysics as well. In my second chapter I examine Hegel's famous dialectical method by criticizing two previous interpretations of this method and by arguing for a third interpretation. In my last chapter I develop an interpretation of logical necessity by considering Hegel's comments on this topic as well as his discussion of the concept of necessity at the end of the "Doctrine of Essence".
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Philie, Patrice. "A vindication of logical necessity against scepticism." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12919.
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Some philosophers dispute the claim that there is a notion of logical necessity involved in the concept of logical consequence. They are sceptical about logical necessity. They argue that a proper characterisation of logical consequence - of what follows from what - need not and should not appeal to the notion of necessity at all. Quine is the most prominent philosopher holding such a view. In this doctoral dissertation, I argue that scepticism about logical necessity is not successful. Quine's scepticism takes three forms. Firstly, he is often interpreted as undermining, in his classic paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', the very intelligibility of notions such as meaning, necessity, and analyticity. If the notion of necessity is meaningless, it is clear that ascriptions of logical necessity are also meaningless. In the thesis, I defend Quine's criticism of these notions by situating it in its historical context and emphasising that the real target in those writings is not the intelligibility of these notions as such, but only their Platonistic interpretation. I agree with Quine that a good theory about meaning, necessity, or analyticity must avoid such an ontological commitment. Secondly, Quine advocates, in the same paper, a holistic picture of knowledge and claims that in this picture, ascriptions of logical necessity are superfluous. I then show that holism a la Quine is committed to admit the necessity of statements of logical consequence. Thirdly, there is Quine's substitutional account of logical consequence (as exposed in his (1970)). He contends that this theory makes no use of logical necessity, thus showing its superfluousness. I show that any plausible account of logical consequence needs to appeal to logical necessity, thus undercutting Quine's claim - and, more generally, undercutting scepticism about logical necessity.
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Chételat, Pierre. "Hegel's logic, its function, method and necessity." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp05/mq20909.pdf.
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Davis, Richard Brian. "The Dependence Problem, theism, counterpossibles, and necessity." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/nq35140.pdf.
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Diakoulakis, Christoforos. "Jacques Derrida and the necessity of chance." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2012. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/43290/.
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Chance, in the sense of the incalculable, the indeterminable, names the limit of every estimation of the truth. Whereas traditional philosophical discourses aspire to transcend this limit, deconstruction affirms on the contrary its necessity; not as a higher principle that relativizes truth and renders all our calculations futile, as is commonly suggested by flippant appropriations of Derrida's work, but as a structural property within every event and every concept, every mark. Rather than a mere impediment to the pursuit of truth then, the incalculable forms a necessary correlative of the pursuit itself. Deconstruction effectively attests to and exemplifies the dependence of every philosophical discourse on its irreducible, inherent limitation. With reference to numerous commentaries on Derrida's work, Chapter 1 shows that the unconditional indeterminability of a deconstructive, methodological identity is indissociable from deconstruction's critical import. And as Chapter 2 verifies in turn, focusing now primarily on Derrida's lecture ‘My Chances/Mes Chances' and the performative aspects of his writing, deconstruction's appeal to the accidental and the idiomatic is not a call to irresponsibility and a turning away from theory; it is what ensures its remarkable theoretical consistency. Through close readings of Aristotle, Freud, Richard Rorty and William James, Chapter 3 demonstrates that any attempt to regulate chance cannot help but put chance to work instead. Not even fiction can arrest its contaminating force. Reading Derrida alongside Edgar Allan Poe, Chapter 4 posits that the commonsensical conception of chance as a deviation from the truth is bound up with an uncritical notion of literary writing as sheer untruthfulness, and hence as the site of pure chance. The constitutive pervasiveness of chance bears out, in the first place and above all, the instability of the limit that separates fiction from non-fiction, truth from non-truth.
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Shaw, Eudean. "The necessity of debranching in starch biosynthesis." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/29739.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Biology, 1999.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 113-119).
Although research in starch biosynthesis has been carried out since the 1940s, many issues remain unresolved. For example, the number of reactions in the pathway is still an open question. The biosynthesis of the starch granule from glucose-1-phosphate has long been considered to consist of three steps: 1. The synthesis of a glucosyl donor. 2. The formation of a-1,4 linkages to add the donor to a growing chain. 3. The hydrolysis of an a-1,4 linkage and subsequent formation of an a-1,6 linkage to introduce a branch point. Recently, a fourth step has been proposed in starch granule biosynthesis (Ball et al., 1996). This step involves the hydrolysis of a-1,6 linkages by the action of a debranching enzyme. Our study provides further evidence for the necessity of this debranching step through the analysis of the production of phytoglycogen and other novel polysaccharides in strains of Chlamydomonas reinhardtii lacking isoamylase activity. We demonstrate that granule-bound starch synthase I (GBSS I) is necessary to synthesize the minute amounts of novel insoluble amylose-like materials found in these mutants, and can do so in an unbound form. We also show that crystalline amylopectin is necessary for granule binding of GBSS I.
(cont.) In addition, an understanding of phytoglycogen production is required for elucidating the role of debranching enzymes in starch biosynthesis. Since phytoglycogen has a higher percentage of branching than amylopectin, two explanations for the presence of phytoglycogen in plants have been proposed: 1. Plants producing phytoglycogen have a "phytoglycogen branching enzyme" that increases the number of branches in amylopectin to form phytoglycogen. 2. Plants producing phytoglycogen are lacking a debranching enzyme, implying that phytoglycogen is or comes from an intermediate in the amylopectin pathway. The results presented here suggest that the phytoglycogen branching activity that is clearly seen in a phytoglycogen-producing strain of C. reinhardtii also exists in the wild type strain but simply appears inhibited because the naturally present isoamylase interferes with the branching enzyme activity assay. Based on this, a model for starch biosynthesis that accounts for the conflicting data on phytoglycogen biosynthesis is identified.
by Eudean Shaw.
Ph.D.
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Barbika, M. M., and V. V. Moskalenko. "Necessity of the judicial reform in Ukraine." Thesis, Sumy State University, 2016. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/45896.
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The Cabinet of Ministers identified key areas of the amendment concept of judicial reform in the Ukrainian Constitution. The content of these changes is the transition to three-tier system of courts, the determination of the court network by the law, the creation of a single collegial body. The concept of this body includes the selection, career and responsibility of judges, as well as a complete personnel rearrangement of the judiciary based on a transparent competitive basis. According to the President of Ukraine, amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine concerning judicial reform also include the abolition of judge immunity and simplified system for their dismissal from the office.
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Дядечко, Алла Миколаївна, Алла Николаевна Дядечко, Alla Mykolaivna Diadechko, and T. V. Nestorenko. "Ecological and economical necessity of wastes recycling." Thesis, Видавництво СумДУ, 2008. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/16074.
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Pettersson, Elsa. "Force majeure, distress, and necessity : - COVID-19." Thesis, Örebro universitet, Institutionen för juridik, psykologi och socialt arbete, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-92972.
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Spicer, Brent C. "Warfare: An "undesirable necessity" in Navajo life." Thesis, The University of Arizona, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/291705.
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The first part of this thesis examines how Navajo cultural philosophy views raiding, warfare, and warriors. Navajos understand raiding and warfare as controlled evils that should only be used for defense and protection. Anything human, environmental, or spiritual that poses a threat to Navajo individuals and/or society is considered an enemy. Likewise, anyone who provides protection against these potential harms may be considered a warrior. The second part of this research tests Clifton Kroeber and Bernard Fontana's hypothesis regarding indigenous warfare in respect to the Navajo. These scholars theorize that indigenous men used warfare as a means to re-establish their social worth which had presumably diminished as a result of some cultural shift in equity between the sexes. Their hypothesis is somewhat accurate as it pertains to Navajo warfare. Warfare, understood as protection, provides several outlets for men, women, and medicine people to bolster their self-esteem and social worth.
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Abt, John Michael. "The Impact of Necessity on Consumer Behavior." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2017. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/421886.
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Business Administration/InterdisciplinaryPh.D.
I find that a bad reputation is not necessarily bad for business. I argue that a bad corporate reputation is less likely to hurt sales of tangible goods than intangible services, because assessing quality for the latter is inherently difficult and customers often rely on seller reputation to choose providers. I also argue that a necessary product is less likely to be adversely impacted than a discretionary one because in many cases the customers cannot avoid purchase of the product. I find that product necessity strongly affects consumer opinions and behavior. I argue that consumers “like” firms that offer products they want more than firms that offer products they need but that these opinions do not necessarily drive purchase behavior. I partition firms included in a well-established, corporate reputational survey into those that offer basic needs, perceived necessities and discretionary products. I find that consumers rate firms that offer discretionary products higher than firms that offer necessary products. Despite this tendency, firms that offer discretionary products and necessary products have similar profitability. Lastly, while consumers dislike price increases, they are more likely to repurchase basic needs than perceived necessities or discretionary products, arguably because they have no choice for the former.
Temple University--Theses