Journal articles: 'Naval Diplomacy'

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Widen, J. J. "Naval Diplomacy—A Theoretical Approach." Diplomacy & Statecraft 22, no. 4 (December 2011): 715–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2011.625830.

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Maulana, Anugerah Akbar. "Gunboat Diplomacy in Natuna Waters from 2010-2020: Indonesia’s Deterrence in South China Sea Conflict." Insignia: Journal of International Relations 9, no. 1 (April 11, 2022): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.20884/1.ins.2022.9.1.4550.

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Abstract SCS conflict comprises a substantial threat to Indonesia as China’s nine-dash line overlaps with Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone EEZ in Natuna waters. The spillover of the conflict was exposed through China’s incursions in Natuna waters from 2010 to 2020 as China regard it has the right to carry out activities in several areas of Natuna waters that are considered as part of maritime territorial violations for Indonesia. Indonesia deploys the capabilities of its naval forces’ in Natuna waters in response to China’s incursions in which this phenomenon could be regarded as gunboat diplomacy. This study aimed to reveal the efficacy of Indonesia's gunboat diplomacy to deter China's incursions in Natuna Waters. Through the qualitative method, official documents and relevant literature will be analyzed to answer the study's objective. Employing gunboat diplomacy and deterrence as the conceptual framework, this study discerns that Indonesian naval forces become the forefront instrument as gunboat diplomacy in deterring China's assertiveness in SCS dispute, which led to the incursions over Indonesia maritime territory in Natuna. This study discovered that Indonesia's gunboat diplomacy leveraged as the purposeful forces and expressive force in which the warship managed as the media of diplomacy that altered China's vessels' behaviour over the incursions in Natuna waters and enabled Indonesia naval force fruitful to crackdown China's incursions in particular point of the occasion. However, gunboat diplomacy as Indonesia's deterrence means has not thoroughly delivered a deterrent effect to China since Chinese vessels' activities still recurred in Natuna waters at the latest 2020. Abstrak Konflik Laut Tiongkok Selatan (LTS) memuat ancaman bagi Indonesia karena sembilan garis putus-putus Tiongkok tumpang tindih dengan Zona Ekonomi Ekslusif Indonesia (ZEE) di perairan Natuna. Limpahan konflik tersebut terpapar pada serbuan Tiongkok di perairan Natuna sejak tahun 2010 hingga 2020 dimana Tiongkok menganggap memiliki hak untuk beraktivitas di beberapa area di perairan Natuna, sedangkan hal tersebut dianggap sebagai pelanggaran wilayah maritim bagi Indonesia. Indonesia mengerahkan kemampuan angkatan lautnya di perairan Natuna sebagai tanggapan atas serbuan Tiongkok di mana fenomena ini dapat dianggap sebagai diplomasi kapal perang. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengungkap seberapa ampuh diplomasi kapal perang Indonesia untuk menangkal serbuan Tiongkok di perairan Natuna. Melalui metode kualitatif, dokumen resmi dan literatur yang relevan akan di analisa untuk menjawab tujuan penelitian. Menggunakan diplomasi kapal perang dan deterensi sebagai kerangka konseptual, penelitian ini melihat bahwa kekuatan angkatan laut menjadi instrumen terdepan sebagai diplomasi kapal perang untuk menangkal perilaku asertif Tiongkok di konflik Laut Tiongkok Selatan (LTS) yang menyebabkan Tiongkok menyerbu wilayah perairan Indonesia di Natuna. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa diplomasi kapal perang Indonesia digunakan sebagai kekuatan yang bertujuan dan kekuatan ekspresif di mana kapal perang dikelola sebagai media diplomasi untuk mengubah perilaku kapal-kapal Tiongkok pada penyerbuan di perairan Natuna yang memungkinkan kekuatan angkatan laut Indonesia dapat menindak serbuan Tiongkok di perairan Natuna pada titik waktu tertentu. Namun, diplomasi kapal perang sebagai sarana deterensi Indonesia belum dapat memberikan efek jera kepada Tiongkok secara menyeluruh karena aktivitas kapal Tiongkok di perairan Natuna masih terjadi paling terbaru pada tahun 2020.

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Ljodal, Tron, and Oscar Palma Morales. "Visita de Rusia al Mar Caribe: geopolítica, diplomacia y poder naval." Estudios en Seguridad y Defensa 4, no. 7 (July 1, 2009): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.25062/1900-8325.118.

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El poder militar siempre ha cumplido un papel fundamental en el seno de la diplomacia, como una forma de enviar mensajes políticos sin que ello necesariamente implique una amenaza directa o explícita. El poder naval es particularmente idóneo en este sentido, tanto por su alcance y flexibilidad estratégica como por su dimensión simbólica, ya que el envío de destacamentos navales muchas veces llega a ser visto como símbolo de potencia y prestigio nacional. Una de múltiples expresiones de este fenómeno se conoce como la “diplomacia de cañoneros (inglés “gunboat diplomacy”), es decir el uso o la amenaza de una fuerza naval limitada con un propósito concreto e inmediato.

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Nakagawa, H. "The Soviet Naval Diplomacy and Marxism-Lenism." Annals of the Japanese Association for Soviet and East European Studies 1987, no. 16 (1987): 128–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.5823/jarees1972.1987.128.

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Sharman, J. C. "Power and Profit at Sea: The Rise of the West in the Making of the International System." International Security 43, no. 4 (April 2019): 163–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00346.

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The making of the international system from c. 1500 reflected distinctively maritime dynamics, especially “gunboat diplomacy,” or the use of naval force for commercial gain. Comparisons between civilizations and across time show, first, that gunboat diplomacy was peculiarly European and, second, that it evolved through stages. For the majority of the modern era, violence was central to the commercial strategies of European state, private, and hybrid actors alike in the wider world. In contrast, large and small non-Western polities almost never sought to advance mercantile aims through naval coercion. European exceptionalism reflected a structural trade deficit, regional systemic dynamics favoring armed trade, and mercantilist beliefs. Changes in international norms later restricted the practice of gunboat diplomacy to states, as private navies became illegitimate. More generally, a maritime perspective suggests the need for a reappraisal of fundamental conceptual divisions and shows how the capital- and technology-intensive nature of naval war allowed relatively small European powers to be global players. It also explains how European expansion and the creation of the first global international system was built on dominance at sea centuries before Europeans’ general military superiority on land.

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Alsina Jr., João Paulo. "Rio Branco, grand strategy and naval power." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 57, no. 2 (December 2014): 9–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201400302.

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This article addresses Baron of Rio Branco's grand strategy and the role played by the naval reorganization program (1904-1910) in this context. The ensuing case study determined the domestic and international constraints that affected the program, as well as the worldview of the patron of Brazilian diplomacy regarding military power's instrumentality to foreign policy.

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Moise, Ioan Gabriel, and Edith-Hilde Kaiter. "Romanian naval dimplomacy, continuous evolution in the swirl of external diplomacy." Technium Sustainability 2, no. 1 (January 3, 2022): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.47577/sustainability.v2i1.5454.

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From ancient times the dominion of the seas has been a condition for gaining power and influence, and the position of a state near a sea has been an advantage for both its development and the neighboring region. Due to its geographical position, the Black Sea is a region of great importance for all actors claiming leading positions in the world hierarchy and the intensification of economic relations between the states of the region after the end of the Soviet monopoly and its connection to the world market generated auspices for a new cycle development and regional prosperity. The relocation of the EU border to the Black Sea, along with the integration of Romania and Bulgaria, brings in many economic benefits, given its dependence on oil imports, but its expansion, like that of NATO, does not only mean benefits. The EU and NATO must also take on vulnerabilities in the area, such as underperforming economies, arms, drug and human trafficking, illegal immigration or frozen conflicts, and thus try to help stabilize the region. In recent years, the military has not only played a destabilizing role, but has made a decisive contribution to ensuring the security of the Black Sea region. In this sense, the military naval forces of the riparian countries, including Romania, had a special role. Through the wide range of missions in which the Romanian Naval Forces participate in the Danubian-Pontic space, both internally and externally, in cooperation with the states bordering the Black Sea and with the NATO member states, Romania contributes to the promotion of regional security and stability. The naval diplomacy actions carried out in the last thirty years thus reveal not only the role and purpose of the Romanian Naval Forces within NATO in the actions of maintaining and consolidating good relations with the states bordering the Black Sea, as well as maintaining security with allies in the distant maritime districts. They also point out that naval diplomacy has contributed to the expression of foreign policy in different areas and with means that have increased its effect, impact and efficiency.

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Paramasatya, Satwika, and Wing Witjahyo Poespojoedho. "Naval Diplomacy: Upaya Defensif Indonesia dalam Konflik Laut Tiongkok Selatan di Era Joko Widodo." Jurnal Hubungan Internasional 12, no. 2 (December 10, 2019): 245. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/jhi.v12i2.14027.

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The conflict involving many countries in the South China Sea has notended nor subsided. Regional tension and claims between countries areincreasing and Indonesia participates in this round of conflict. As theworld’s largest archipelagic country and an ASEAN member country thatupholds peace, security and regional stability, Indonesia then has to playan active role in the conflict. In order to do so, Indonesia is using navaldiplomacy as a way to achieve effective conflict resolution within theregion. Regarding the phenomenon, this study used the concept of seapower and naval diplomacy to explain measures that have been taken bythe Indonesian government under Joko Widodo’s presidency in resolvingthe conflicts involving its territories in the South China Sea. The author’sanalysis showed that Indonesia’s policies of using naval diplomacy in theSouth China Sea conflict have a positive and effective outcome in achievingconflict resolution and peace condition that has been confined by longtermobstacles and challenges.

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9

Wilson, Brian. "Naval Diplomacy and Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean." Strategic Analysis 33, no. 4 (June 17, 2009): 488–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160902907043.

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Maiolo, J. A. "Anglo-Soviet Naval Armaments Diplomacy Before the Second World War." English Historical Review CXXIII, no. 501 (April 1, 2008): 351–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cen010.

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Collin, Richard H. "The 1904 Detroit Compact: U.S. Naval Diplomacy and Dominican Revolutions." Historian 52, no. 3 (May 1, 1990): 432–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6563.1990.tb01287.x.

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Syrett, David. "KEPPEL AT ALGIERS: DIPLOMACY AND THE LIMITATIONS OF NAVAL POWER." Mariner's Mirror 91, no. 1 (January 2005): 13–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00253359.2005.10656928.

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Müller, Leos. "Sweden’s Early-Modern Neutrality: Neutral Vessels, Prize Cases and Diplomatic Actors in London in the Late Eighteenth Century." Journal of Early Modern History 23, no. 5 (October 2, 2019): 475–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700658-12342650.

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Abstract Early modern shipping under neutral flags was an activity that required many capacities, combining practices from three different fields: commerce and shipping, diplomacy, and international law. This complexity of neutral shipping is the reason why traditional diplomatic history paid limited attention to it, despite the fact that shipping and prize cases consumed much of the attention and time of diplomats of neutral nations. The neutral agents had to be able to understand, communicate and move between all three fields. This article studies seizures of Swedish neutral vessels by British privateers and the Royal Navy between 1770 and 1800, including the years of the War of American Independence and the French Revolutionary Wars. It provides examples of how exchanges between different field actors—e.g. shipmasters, ship-owners, merchants, agents, lawyers, naval officers and diplomats—were communicated and understood from the perspective of Sweden’s representatives in London.

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Octavian, Amarulla, Priyo Cahyono, and Widodo Setiyo Pranowo. "THE INFLUENCE OF INDONESIAN NAVY DIPLOMACY THROUGH NAVAL PRESENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH NATUNA SEA." JOURNAL ASRO 11, no. 04 (December 14, 2020): 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.37875/asro.v11i04.367.

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The North Natuna Sea is still a hot topic of discussion both nationally, regionally and internationally. The discussion is inseparable from the interest in the potential of natural resources and energy contained therein. The problems with the boundaries of the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (ZEEI) and the territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS) by China make this problem more complex so that it is necessary to immediately get serious handling to prevent risks and losses for the national interest. The presence of elements of the naval presence in the North Natuna Sea is a form of handling in the field of maritime operations which aims to maintain maritime security and protect the sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) from various threats. Through this article, I would like to provide an overview of Indonesian Navy diplomacy through its naval presence in the North Natuna Sea and its influence on the effectiveness of maritime operations carried out based on the results of research using quantitative methods. Naval presence is part of the Indonesian Navy's diplomacy in dealing with the problems that occur as well as an effort to maintain world recognition of the Republic of Indonesia. Keywords : effectiveness; the presence of elements of the Indonesian Navy, North Natuna Sea; maritime operations

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Carroll, Francis M. "Civil War Diplomacy: A Fresh Look." Canadian Review of American Studies 52, no. 1 (April 1, 2022): 83–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/cras-2021-003.

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The American Civil War had a serious impact in Europe because the United States supplied vital raw materials for both Britain and France and was also a major market for their manufactured goods. The prospect of intervention in the war raised difficult issues—morally repugnant support of slavery on the one hand, but on the other, in the aftermath of the rebellions of 1848 in Europe, the possibility to weaken democratic republicanism. Mediation remained elusive. Britain, being the leading economic, naval, and colonial power, was the most threatening and most involved with both the Union and Confederate sides in the war. Britain’s diplomatic and maritime policy is the most extensively studied, augmented by fresh examinations of the British minister to the United States, Lord Lyons. New research also examines possible French involvement in the war and the complications arising from France’s invasion of Mexico.

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Smith, Frank L. "Advancing science diplomacy: Indonesia and the US Naval Medical Research Unit." Social Studies of Science 44, no. 6 (June 17, 2014): 825–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306312714535864.

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Chang, Yen-Chiang. "The ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative’ and naval diplomacy in China." Ocean & Coastal Management 153 (March 2018): 148–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2017.12.015.

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Machaliński, Zbigniew. "Wacław Kłoczkowski (1873–1930) – Rear Admiral of the Russian and Polish Navy, Advisor of the Polish Delegation to the Versailles Conference, Military and Naval Attaché at the Polish Legation in London." Studia Gdańskie. Wizje i rzeczywistość XVII (May 1, 2021): 173–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.9103.

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Wacław Kłoczkowski (1873–1930). He served in the Russian Navy from 1898 to 1917. In 1917 he was promoted to the rank of Rear Admi-ral. Served in the Polish Army since March 1919. From April 1919 to February 1922, he was a member of Polish diplomacy (member of the Polish Delegation in Paris), Chairman of the Gdańsk and Shipping Commission, military and naval plenipotentiary of the Polish Embassy in London. After arriving in Poland he was consecutively: head of the Admini-strative Branch of the Military Affairs, second deputy head of the Naval Management, general plenipotentiary of the Ministry of the Military Affairs for Westerplatte, commander of the 15th Infantry Division in Toruń. He died in Warsaw on 15 January 1930.

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Blume, Kenneth J. "Preparing the South Pacific for U.S. Influence: The uss Narragansett in Samoa, 1872." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 27, no. 1 (March 19, 2020): 7–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-02701002.

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This article explores the diplomatic negotiations that U.S. Navy Commander Richard W. Meade conducted in Samoa in 1872. The resulting agreement that came to be known as “the Meade Treaty” was the first the United States negotiated with Samoa, but scholars usually have not explored the details of it and the process that produced it because the U.S. Senate rejected the treaty. Meade’s motivations and actions in Samoa provide a case study in how the interactions of naval officers, business leaders, islanders, and diplomats converged to produce early U.S. diplomacy in the Pacific. The article sketches the situation in Samoa in 1872 when Commander Meade and his ship, the uss Narragansett, arrived. The role of the United States in the Pacific was changing in the last third of the 19th Century, and Commander Meade’s motivations, influences, and actions illustrate the new wave of U.S. Pacific expansion during the years after the American Civil War.

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Ghosh, P. K. "Revisiting gunboat diplomacy: An instrument of threat or use of limited naval force." Strategic Analysis 24, no. 11 (February 2001): 2005–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160108455335.

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Wilson, Brian. "Responding to Asymmetric Threats in the Maritime Domain: Diplomacy, Law and Naval Operations." Maritime Affairs:Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India 5, no. 2 (July 2, 2010): 68–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09733150903429551.

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Scott, David. "Indonesia Grapples with the Indo-Pacific: Outreach, Strategic Discourse, and Diplomacy." Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 38, no. 2 (August 2019): 194–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1868103419860669.

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This article analyses and evaluates Indonesia’s grappling with the Indo-Pacific. Analysis is threefold – Indonesia’s actorness in the Indo-Pacific, its strategic discourse on the Indo-Pacific, and its Indo-Pacific diplomacy. Actorness is pursued with regard to Indonesia’s more active involvement in regional and subregional structures in the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. Strategic discourse is threefold – Natalegawa’s “Indo-Pacific Treaty” concept (2013–2014), Widodo’s “maritime nexus” drive (2014 onwards), and the current “Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept” (IPCC; 2018 onwards). Diplomacy is pursued with regard to Indonesia’s relationship with Australia, Japan, China, India, and the United States. The article concludes that while Indonesia certainly is on the rise as an Indo-Pacific actor, its continuing naval weakness undermines Indonesia’s “maritime nexus” stance, while its reluctance to challenge China leaves Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Treaty and its IPCC vague and to some degree ignoring uncomfortable security issues posed by China. A closer synergy for Indonesia with the US and Japanese Free and Open Indo-Pacific initiative is suggested.

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Lehrs, Lior. "A Last-Minute Private Peace Initiative: Albert Ballin’s Mediation Efforts between Germany and Britain, 1908-1914." Hague Journal of Diplomacy 13, no. 3 (August 7, 2018): 297–322. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1871191x-12341373.

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Summary As relations between Germany and Britain were deteriorating during the years 1908-1914, Albert Ballin, a German businessman, became concerned and decided to promote Anglo–German talks on naval arms limitations in order to halt the naval arms race and improve relations between the two states. This article analyses Albert Ballin’s — and his British friend Ernest Cassel’s — private peace initiatives during the years 1908-1914 as a historical example of ‘unofficial diplomacy’ long before this term was discussed in International Relations literature. It examines the tools and conditions that created the basis for Ballin’s initiatives and explores his role in the diplomatic processes between Germany and Britain before the First World War. Ballin’s and Cassel’s unofficial, persistent peace efforts had some effect on the official diplomatic sphere and led to official negotiations, but they ultimately failed in their attempt to promote an agreement or to prevent the war.

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Boccolini, Alessandro. "“In terra et in mare”: The Holy League in 1684 and Papal Diplomacy." Perspektywy Kultury 30, no. 3 (December 20, 2020): 179–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/pk.2020.3003.12.

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In the aftermath of the Liberation of Vienna by the army commanded by Jan III Sobieski, international diplomacy was activated immediately to extend the Polish-Imperial League and continue the war against the Turkish. The diplomacy of the Holy See, planned by Innocent XI, was particularly active: Francesco Buonvisi, ordinary nuncio in Vienna, and Opizio Pallavicini, nuncio in Warsaw, worked hard to encourage the adhesion of the Serenissima Republic of Venice. With the signing of the treaty on March 6, 1684 between Warsaw, Vienna, and Venice—solemnly celebrated in Rome on the following May 24— Innocent XI could count on joint action against the infidels by land and sea, with the armies of Poland, of the Empire, and the naval fleet of the Serenissima. The article intends to retrace the diplomatic phases—not always an easy task—which led to the signing of the League, paying attention to the decisive role played by the diplomacy of the Holy See.

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McKercher, B. J. C. "From Enmity to Cooperation: The Second Baldwin Government and the Improvement of Anglo-American Relations, November 1928–June 1929." Albion 24, no. 1 (1992): 65–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4051243.

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One of the pervading interpretations of Anglo-American relations in the interwar period is that the advent of James Ramsay MacDonald's Labour government in June 1929 set in train the series of events that ended bitter relations between Britain and the United States, bitterness which had been caused by the naval question. There are several strands to this: first, that the American policy pursued by the Conservative second Baldwin government from November 1924 to June 1929, and especially after the failure of the Coolidge naval conference in the summer of 1927, was bankrupt; second, that MacDonald was more amenable to settling British differences with the Americans than were his Conservative predecessors and, that being so, softened the hardline towards the United States that had marked Conservative foreign and naval policy for more than two years; and, finally, that MacDonald's decision to travel to the United States on what proved to be a very successful visit in the autumn of 1929 to meet Herbert Hoover, the new president, to discuss outstanding issues personally, was a major diplomatic coup. Some of this received version is true. No one can doubt that MacDonald and his Labour ministry played a crucial role in helping to ameliorate the crisis that had been dogging good Anglo-American relations for more than two years before June 1929. The Labour Party constituted the government when the London naval conference of 1930 ended the period of Anglo-American naval rivalry. Moreover, for six months before that conference convened, Labour had conducted effective diplomacy in preparing for its deliberations.

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Murfett, Malcolm H. "British Naval Policy on the Yangtse in 1949: A Case of Diplomacy on the Rocks." War & Society 6, no. 1 (May 1988): 79–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/106980488790304995.

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Salerno, Reynolds M. "Mulitlateral strategy and diplomacy: The Anglo‐German naval agreement and the mediterranean crisis, 1935–1936." Journal of Strategic Studies 17, no. 2 (June 1994): 39–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402399408437551.

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Wong, J. Y. "The Limits of Naval Power: British Gunboat Diplomacy in China from theNemesisto theAmethyst, 1839–1949." War & Society 18, no. 2 (October 2000): 93–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/072924700791201630.

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Odgaard, Liselotte. "European Engagement in the Indo-Pacific: The Interplay between Institutional and State-Level Naval Diplomacy." Asia Policy 26, no. 4 (2019): 129–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/asp.2019.0051.

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Zanardi, Claude. "China’s soft power with Chinese characteristics: the cases of Confucius Institutes and Chinese naval diplomacy." Journal of Political Power 9, no. 3 (September 2016): 431–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2158379x.2016.1232289.

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Grabowski, Tomasz. "The Activity of Ptolemy II’s Fleet in the Aegean Sea." Electrum 27 (2020): 131–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/20800909el.20.007.12797.

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Ptolemy I, the founder of the Lagid dynasty, heavily invested in the navy and thus established the Ptolemies as a formidable sea power, his work continued by his successor Ptolemy II Philadelphus, who employed his fleet to pressure lesser powers of the Mediterranean. The following article examines the activity of Ptolemy II’s fleet in the Aegean Sea. At the end of the 270s, Ptolemy II sent a naval expedition to the Black Sea; the operation helped him establish a political relationship with Byzantion and demonstrated that maintaining a naval presence on foreign waters could influence other rulers to favor the Ptolemies. The Ptolemaic fleet under Ptolemy II Philadelphus operated in the Aegean during two major international conflicts, the Chremonidean War and the Second Syrian War. In this article I argue that the surviving evidence on the Chremonidean War indicates that Ptolemy II’s aim was not to subdue Greece or even Macedonia but to maintain the Ptolemaic hold over the Aegean with Egypt’s relatively small naval force under Patroclus. In turn, the outcome of the Second Syrian War led to a considerable weakening of the Lagids’ position in the Aegean. Ptolemy II adroitly cultivated international relations through diplomacy, propaganda, international euergetism and spreading his dynastic cult; sending the Ptolemaic fleet to patrol foreign seas constituted one crucial instrument Philadelphus could employ to shift the Mediterranean balance of power in his favor.

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Owoyale, Aremu Sherif. "DOUBLE HEDGE DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMATIC OPTION FOR RESOLVING INDONESIA – CHINA FRICTION IN THE NATUNA ISLANDS." Jurnal Diplomasi Pertahanan 8, no. 2 (June 6, 2022): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.33172/jdp.v8i2.1003.

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The diplomatic strategy option open to Indonesia in response to escalating friction between Indonesia and China over possession of the Natuna Islands is highlighted in this article. The paper employed a qualitative research approach that utilized secondary data sources. The finding shows that intensifying competition among big power nations such as the United States and China facilitates this diplomacy strategy choice (hedging). Several countries have embraced this diplomatic tactic, known as double 'hedged' diplomacy, as a means of balancing and stabilizing the influence of powers in their territories. Hedging allows some leeway for nations to discover a balance between priority gains and inevitable costs, albeit it is far from ideal. The study shows that Indonesia could enhance its sovereignty by accommodating the interests of China and those of other major power nations like the United States on the Natuna Waters by balancing China's assertiveness with the investment interest of the United States. The paper conceptualized ‘hedging’ as strategic diplomacy options adopted by nations seeking a balance of influence; while using a balance of power theory to analyze the situation, actors and processes as it affects the concerns of Indonesia on Natuna waters. Indonesia engagement in numerous naval cooperation with regional and international partners, as well as her maritime force presence in the Natuna waters, is a critical tool to project her defence diplomacy. As a result, this study suggests that Indonesia could take a double-hedged diplomatic approach to resolving the escalating tensions between Indonesia and China on Natuna Island. Consequently, there is the need to design ways of balancing China's growing aggressiveness with the existence and interests of another large power nation like the United States on the Natuna waters.

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Bassett, Melanie. "Port towns and diplomacy: Japanese naval visits to Britain and Australia in the early twentieth century." International Journal of Maritime History 32, no. 1 (February 2020): 45–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0843871420903160.

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The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1905 was a watershed moment for the presence of the Royal Navy in the Pacific. Although it allowed the Royal Navy to concentrate its fleets in European waters, this strategy caused resentment due to the underlying fear of the ‘Yellow Peril’, especially in the British dominions of Australia and New Zealand. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance presented some challenges to the received Edwardian racial hierarchy and the idea of British military supremacy. This article demonstrates how the ‘port town’ not only became a place of mediation where high-level international diplomacy mingled with the face-to-face experience of an alliance ‘in practice’, but also a space through which issues such as Otherness and imperial security were contested and explored.

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Elmahly, Hend, and Degang Sun. "China’s Military Diplomacy towards Arab Countries in Africa’s Peace and Security." Contemporary Arab Affairs 11, no. 4 (December 2018): 111–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/caa.2018.114006.

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China’s security concept is evolving, and its participation in Africa’s Arab countries’ peacekeeping is transforming itself from aloof bystander to active player, and from multilateralism to both multi- and unilateralism. The establishment of China’s logistics base in Djibouti does not signify a sudden change in China’s African foreign policy; instead, change has been gradual and tangible and began with the evolution of China’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and engagement in Africa’s infrastructure projects, in parallel with China’s increasing global presence. The base serves as a logistics and support facility for Chinese peacekeepers, as well as a naval facility to support anti-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia as part of an international anti-piracy operation. Moreover, the base helps China to ensure its maritime and commercial interests and safeguard Chinese nationals in West Asia and the African continent. However, the United States and the West are concerned with the geopolitical and geoeconomic implications of China’s logistics base in Djibouti. The geography of Djibouti has led to the rising of geopolitical rivalries between the great powers, which may intensify in the coming years.

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Onnekink, David. "Symbolic Communication in Early Modern Diplomacy: Naval Incidents and the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1667–1672)*." English Historical Review 135, no. 573 (April 2020): 337–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ehr/ceaa067.

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Abstract This article underscores the significance of symbolic communication in early modern international relations. Taking naval incidents during the period leading up to the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1667–72) as a case-study, it shows how the use of imagery constituted an undervalued symbolic language in which vital interests were communicated by diplomats. Moreover, it argues that the way in which these incidents were discussed in diplomatic circles was relevant to and congruous with public debates. It also highlights the often-ignored international dimension of popular disputes. An overall objective is to further the debate on a New Diplomatic History for the early modern period.

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Bradford, James C. "Book Review: Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century." International Journal of Maritime History 22, no. 2 (December 2010): 463–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/084387141002200293.

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Wirta, Kaarle, and Henri Hannula. "Trade Must Go On. The Tar Trade, Nordic Rivalry, and Cross-Imperial Commercial Diplomacy, 1675–79." Legatio: The Journal for Renaissance and Early Modern Diplomatic Studies, no. 5 (January 1, 2022): 53–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/legatio.2021.03.

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The Scanian War fought between Sweden and Denmark (1675–1679) is an example of an armed conflict, which uncovers the clash between the commercial and political interests. This article analyses the dispute between the political allies, the Danish Crown and the Dutch States General considering the trade with Sweden. The Danish naval officials had captured and confiscated the cargoes of seven Dutch tar vessels, heading to Amsterdam from present-day Finland in 1677, which resulted in a major political dispute between Denmark and the Dutch Republic. By drawing upon the methodology of new diplomatic history, the article analyses the negotiations between the diplomatic actors involved in the disputes relating to the confiscation of the ships, all of whom represented the various powers involved in the Baltic export trade.

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Madsen, Chris. "Dollars, Diplomacy and Fleets: John Maynard Keynes and Stage II Naval Requirements for the War against Japan." International Journal of Maritime History 19, no. 1 (June 2007): 107–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/084387140701900107.

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BONNER, E. "The Recovery of St Andrews Castle in 1547: French Naval Policy and Diplomacy in the British Isles." English Historical Review CXI, no. 442 (June 1, 1996): 578–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cxi.442.578.

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Black, Jeremy. "England and Spain in the early modern era: royal love, diplomacy, trade and naval relations, 1604–25." European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire 27, no. 6 (March 3, 2020): 866. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2020.1731140.

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Lalita, Vania, and Anak Agung Banyu Perwita. "THE INDONESIAN NAVY’S ACTIVITIES TO SECURE THE NORTH NATUNA SEA FROM THE PESPECTIVE OF THE NAVY’S TRINITY ROLES (2014 - 2019)." Jurnal Pertahanan: Media Informasi ttg Kajian & Strategi Pertahanan yang Mengedepankan Identity, Nasionalism & Integrity 6, no. 2 (August 11, 2020): 239. http://dx.doi.org/10.33172/jp.v6i2.828.

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<p>This article aims to explicate the role and activities of the Indonesian Navy to protect Indonesia's sovereignty in the North Natuna Sea based on the perspective of the Naval Trinity Theory. To do so, this paper combines the application of some pertinent concepts and theories, such as maritime security theory, maritime diplomacy, and the Navy trinity roles of Ken Booth. It shows that those pertinent concepts and theories are very essential to further understand the roles and activities of the Indonesian Navy to protect our sovereignty in the North Natuna Sea. This paper utilizes the method of descriptive qualitative research by looking at the activities of the Indonesian Navy's to Secure North Natuna Sea from the perspective of the Navy’s Trinity Roles (2014 - 2019).</p>

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del Rosario Rodríguez Díaz, María. "Henry J. Hendrix . Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century . Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 2009. Pp. xvii, 230. $34.95." American Historical Review 116, no. 4 (October 2011): 1148–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/ahr.116.4.1148.

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Pereira, Edgar. "An Instrumental Connection. Economic Diplomacy, International Arms Trade and Overseas Aspirations between Portugal and Sweden, 1640–80." Legatio: The Journal for Renaissance and Early Modern Diplomatic Studies, no. 5 (January 1, 2022): 105–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/legatio.2021.05.

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This paper offers an Iberian perspective on Sweden’s ‘Age of Greatness’ by looking at the intersection of international politics and trade involving Portugal and Sweden after Portugal regained its independence from Spain at the end of 1640. Sweden’s exports of timber, naval stores, iron, copper, and weapons to Braganza Portugal are seen in the context of the Portuguese wars for overseas trade and colonial settlement against the Dutch Republic and the struggle for autonomy against Spain in its home turf. By revisiting the accounts of diplomatic actors, this contribution will discuss how Portugal turned to Sweden for diplomatic recognition and new consumption markets and carriers for its export sector. It will also be shown how Sweden stood to gain by adding a new customer to its military export sector and by tapping into Portugal’s colonial goods and salt, while at the same time it entertained the prospect of using the Portuguese offshoots in West Africa and the East Indies to further its ambitions in overseas trade.

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A.V., Goncharenko. "THE PROBLEM OF NAVAL WEAPONS’ LIMITATION IN FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USA IN THE EARLY 20-IES OF XX CENTURY." Sums'ka Starovyna (Ancient Sumy Land), no. 54 (2019): 64–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/starovyna.2019.54.6.

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The article researches the position of the United States on the issue of naval arms restriction in the early 20-ies of the XX century. There are outlined causes, the course and the consequences of the intensification of Washington’s naval activity during the investigated period. It is explored the process of formation and implementation of the US initiatives to limit naval weapons before and during the Washington Peace Conference of 1921–1922. The role of the USA in the settlement of foreign policy contradictions between the leading countries of the world in the early 20-ies of the XX century is analyzed. In the early 20’s of the XX century there have been some changes in the international relations system and the role of the USA in it. Despite the isolation stance taken by Washington, the White House continues its policy of «open doors» and «equal opportunities», promoting the elimination of unequal agreements between foreign countries with China, and attempts to influence the position of European countries and Japan in the naval contest issues and limitation of naval weapons. Taking full advantages, which were giving the United States’ the richest country and world creditor status, the US Department of State has stepped up its US impact in the Asia-Pacific region. The new Republican administration succeeded in offsetting the failures of the Paris Decisions of 1919–1920 and began to СУМСЬКА СТАРОВИНА 2019 №LIV 75 construct a new model of international relations in which the United States would occupy a leading position. The success of US diplomacy at the Washington Peace Conference of 1921– 1922 contributed to this. However, the conflict between the former allies within the Entente was only smoothed out and not settled. The latter has led to increasing US capital expansion into Europe due to the significant economic growth in the country. Despite the fact that the Republicans’ achievements in US foreign policy on local issues have been much more specific than trying to solve the problem of a new system of international relations globally, these achievements have been rather relative. Leading countries in the world were still making concessions to the White House on separate issues, but in principle they were not ready to accept the scheme of relations offered by the States. That is why American foreign policy achievements have been impermanent. Key words: the

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Kohli, S. N. "Indian Ocean: An Area of Tension and Big Power Pressures." India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 42, no. 2 (January 1986): 154–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097492848604200204.

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The Indian Ocean has become an area of acute tension—a peril zone with conventional and nuclear naval vessels of the major powers staging a permanent presence in the area. Naval task forces, because of their inherent mobility, can constitute a powerful projection of military might. That is why the non-aligned countries of the Indian Ocean are exercised over the threat posed to their national security from the high seas. They can hardly forget that the powers that dominated and colonised them for centuries came to the area via the high seas. They also remember that, even in the decades since the Second World War there have been several glaring instances of naval might being used by the Big Powers to exert military pressure in almost every ocean. The concern expressed by nations who do not want a return to gun-boat diplomacy and domination by military forces is, therefore, indisputably legitimate. Rivalry and competition are not new trends in international affairs or in the Indian Ocean. They were imported into this ocean by the colonial powers, when they sought to oust one another from enjoying the fruits of colonisation. Today, they exist in the Indian Ocean area for a variety of stated and unstated reasons. When the 26th Session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1971 a resolution proclaiming the Indian Ocean ‘a zone of peace for all times,’ people in many countries heaved a sigh of relief. Those countries whose merchant vessels plied the Indian Ocean hoped that a zone of peace would guarantee their security and enable them to develop economic contacts with different countries of the world. For champions of peace throughout the world demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean would mean elimination of one of the world's most dangerous hot-beds of tension. This however, did not happen. The safeguarding of vital interests of the Big Powers provided to them enough justification for an unprecedented escalation of military presence in the area. There was a time when the ‘vacuum theory’ was universally peddled by the western powers and their mass-media. It postulated that the withdrawal of British naval power from the Indian Ocean would create a void which if not filled by the United States and its allies would invite Soviet presence. The non-aligned countries felt very strongly that if at all there was a vacuum, it should be filled by the littoral states, who alone would be responsible for the security of their waters. Though the vacuum theory is seldom mentioned now, the quantum of the Big Power naval forces in the Indian Ocean has steadily increased.

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McKercher, B. J. C. "A Sane and Sensible Diplomacy: Austen Chamberlain, Japan, and The Naval Balance of Power in the Pacific Ocean, 1924-29." Canadian Journal of History 21, no. 2 (August 1986): 187–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/cjh.21.2.187.

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Shulman, M. R. "Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century. By Henry J. Hendrix. (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 2009. xviii, 230 pp. $34.95, ISBN 978-1-59114-363-5.)." Journal of American History 97, no. 2 (September 1, 2010): 536–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jahist/97.2.536.

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Taylor, Lawrence D. "Gunboat Diplomacy's Last Fling in the New World: The British Seizure of San Quintin, April 1911." Americas 52, no. 4 (April 1996): 521–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1008476.

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In considering acts of military intervention by foreign powers which occurred in Mexico during the Mexican Revolution, one is apt to think of the years 1914, 1916 and 1919, when U.S. forces invaded or occupied portions of Mexican territory. There was, however, one case of intervention of this sort during the revolution in which U.S. military personnel were not involved–the landing of a small party of British marines belonging to the H.M.S. “Shearwater” at the port of San Quintín on the northwest coast of the Baja Californian peninsula in April 1911.The British landing at San Quintm constituted a vestige or remnant of "gunboat diplomacy", an aspect of English foreign policy that had originated in the age of Palmerston and which reflected the unrivaled naval supremacy enjoyed by Great Britain during the period extending from the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 to the end of the Second World War. The episode represented, in a rather overt way, the hard-nosed attitude characteristic of British foreign policy at that time with regards to Latin America in general and other so-called "backward" regions of the globe.

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Cutter. "Peace with Pirates? Maghrebi Maritime Combat, Diplomacy, and Trade in English Periodical News, 1622–1714." Humanities 8, no. 4 (November 20, 2019): 179. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/h8040179.

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Commonly represented in contemporary texts and modern historiographical accounts as a dangerous and alien region, characterised by piracy and barbarism, the history of the early modern Maghreb and the cultural impact it had on British society is one highly limited by indirect sources, cultural, political, and religious biases, and the distorting influence of Orientalist and colonial historiography. Historians have drawn on a wide range of popular media and government-held archival material, each with its own limitations, but one important corpus has been neglected. Drawn from up-to-date and trusted sources and distributed to vast audiences from a wide range of social groups, periodical news publications provide a vast and fruitful body of sources for evaluating popular and elite English viewpoints on Maghrebi piracy. This paper draws upon a corpus of 3385 news items comprising over 360,000 words relating to the Maghreb and its people, drawn from Stuart and Republican English news publications, with a view towards examining the discourse and reality around Maghrebi maritime combat, diplomact and trade in seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England. To what extent did maritime combat dominate coverage of the Maghreb, over other social, political and military events? Why did news writers use the word ‘pirate’ so infrequently to describe Maghrebi ships? Was Maghrebi piracy chaotic and unfettered, or did peace treaties and consular presence lead to stable trade relations? Were Maghrebi economies seen to be fundamentally built on naval predation, or was real benefit available from peaceful engagement with the Maghrebi states? Examining these and other questions from English news coverage, this paper argues that the material in English periodical news is generally consistent with what we know of the military, diplomatic and economic conditions of the time, surprisingly neutral in tone with a possible emphasis on positive stories when dealing with British–Maghrebi relations, and increasingly after the Restoration played a significant role in influencing British popular discourse.

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Matray, James I. "William Michael Morgan . Pacific Gibraltar: U.S.‐Japanese Rivalry over the Annexation of Hawai‘i, 1885–1898 . (ADST‐DACOR Diplomats and Diplomacy Series.) Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 2011. Pp. x, 330. $34.95." American Historical Review 117, no. 2 (April 2012): 489–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/ahr.117.2.489.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Naval Diplomacy'

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