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Moraes de Assis, Saulo. "Por um naturalismo moderado?; For a moderate naturalism?" Sofia 11, no. 2 (August 1, 2022): e11231861. http://dx.doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v11i2.31861.
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Neste artigo, discutiremos o naturalismo de Alvin Goldman em relação à questão da normatividade da epistemologia. Para isso, revisamos a apresentação que este autor faz do conhecimento e da justificação entendidas sob um enfoque naturalista. Pretende-se entender como Goldman incorpora elementos da epistemologia especulativa tradicional ao seu ponto de vista naturalista. Apresentamos algumas distinções, feitas pelo próprio Goldman, a fim de esclarecer as diferentes abordagens que uma postura naturalista na epistemologia pode ter e discutir sua formulação de um naturalismo moderado. No final, procuramos apresentar algumas fragilidades dessa pretensão para pensar sobre a questão de se um naturalismo moderado é necessário. Abstract In this paper, we will discuss Alvin Goldman's naturalism in relation to the question of the normativity of epistemology. For this, we review the presentation that this author makes of knowledge and justification understood under a naturalistic approach. It is intended to understand how Goldman incorporates elements of traditional speculative epistemology to his naturalistic point of view. We present some distinctions, made by Goldman himself, in order to clarify the different approaches that a naturalist stance in epistemology can take and to discuss his formulation of a moderate naturalism. In the end, we try to present some weaknesses of this pretension to think about the question of whether a moderate naturalism is necessary.
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Hegarty, Michael J. "A dilemma for naturalistic theories of intentionality." Filosofia Unisinos 22, no. 1 (March 15, 2021): 59–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.221.07.
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I argue that a dilemma arises for naturalistic philosophers of mind in the naturalised semantics tradition. Giving a naturalistic account of the mind is a pressing problem. Brentano’s Thesis — that a state is mental if, and only if, that state has underived representational content — provides an attractive route to naturalising the mental. If true, Brentano’s Thesis means that naturalising representation is sufficient for naturalising the mental. But a naturalist who accepts Brentano’s Thesis thus commits to an eliminativism about the category of the mental. This is because naturalistic theories of representation are reductive, and so over-generalise by applying to patently non-mental states. According to these theories, it has been argued, phenomena like tree rings and saliva come out as representational. Only proposing further Naturalistic conditions on representation could avoid the eliminativist conclusion. But this shows that Naturalists have made only limited progress towards naturalising the mental. And if a Naturalist rejects Brentano’s Thesis, then she gives up on a clear link between representation and mentality. Hence, it is incumbent on the Naturalist to propose another, naturalistically acceptable, mark of the mental. This, again, shows that Naturalists have made only limited progress on the issue of naturalising the mental.Keywords: Intentionality, representation, physicalism, eliminativism, Brentano, materialism, naturalism.
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Zocchi, Paola. "Natura e patria. I congressi della Società Italiana di Scienze Naturali nel processo di costruzione dell’identità nazionale." Natural History Sciences 152, no. 2 (September 1, 2011): 123. http://dx.doi.org/10.4081/nhs.2011.123.
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La Società Italiana di Scienze Naturali (SISN), fondata a Milano nel 1855 prima con il nome di “Società geologica residente in Milano” e poi, dal 22 gennaio 1860, con il nome che la contraddistingue attualmente, ebbe un ruolo attivo nel processo di costruzione dell’identità nazionale all’indomani dell’Unità d’Italia. Prima società naturalistica italiana, essa manifestò questa vocazione soprattutto attraverso i congressi annuali, organizzati tra il 1864 e il 1906 in varie città della Penisola. Le riunioni straordinarie fuori sede avevano finalità ben precise: l’esplorazione geologica e naturalistica del nuovo territorio unificato, in gran parte ancora sconosciuto; la legittimazione della figura del naturalista come scienziato professionista; la divulgazione della scienza come motore di progresso del paese; l’affermazione della SISN come centro di riferimento per tutti i naturalisti italiani. Il presente lavoro propone dunque una lettura della storia della Società dalle origini al 1906 attraverso la lente dei congressi postunitari.
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Ott, Daniel J. "“In einem Augenblick”: Christian naturalism, death, and Brahms’s Ein deutsches Requiem”." Theology Today 74, no. 2 (July 2017): 138–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0040573617702544.
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This article is a Christian naturalist reading of Johannes Brahms’s Ein deutsches Requiem. The first sections briefly introduce the basic commitments of Christian naturalism and the challenge presented to such a theology in the mystery of death. Then, the paper shows how Brahms gives artistic expression to a naturalistic interpretation of death. Brahms uses elements from the Christian myth, especially the apocalyptic, in new ways that are helpful to Christian naturalists seeking to deal with death meaningfully and beautifully.
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Pizer, Donald. "The Study of American Literary Naturalism: A Personal Retrospective." Literature of the Americas, no. 11 (2021): 424–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.22455/2541-7894-2021-11-424-436.
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Donald Pizer’s personal retrospective also embraces history of American literary naturalism studies from the early1950s up to nowadays. From his earliest seminar in American literature D. Pizer was deeply drawn to the writers of the 1890s. As a student he was assured by the standard historical and critical studies of the period that naturalists had failed in this effort to apply a scientific accuracy and detachment to fictional representation, their novels were therefore both untrue and inept and naturalism was in effect a regrettable false step in the "development" of American literature. Since the 1960s being engaged in close study of the early naturalists — Norris, Crane, Garland, Dreiser — Pizer had to confront these conventional attitudes. When looked at closely as a fictional representation of beliefs about human nature and experience, the naturalistic novel appeared to be far more complex than it was believed to be. Pizer sought in a series of books and essays to describe and thus to redefine American naturalism as a whole. Rather than a mindless adoption and crude dramatization of deterministic formulas, he found in naturalistic fiction the conflict between old values and new experience, which usually resulted in a vital thematic ambivalence. It was this very ambivalence, rather than the certainties of the convinced determinist, which was the source of the fictional strength of the naturalistic novel of the period. There has been much recent interest in the American naturalist movement and its texts. It seems, as long as American writers respond deeply to the disparity between the ideal and the actual in our national experience, naturalism will remain one of the major means for the registering of this shock of discovery.
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Frápolli, María José. "You and Me Baby Ain't Nothing but Mammals. Subject Naturalism and Default Positions." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 1, no. 1 (November 28, 2014): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.20141970.
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Resumen Este artículo discute el problema de la localización, tal como Price lo ha definido. En el se distinguen diferentes versiones de naturalismo y se defiende el naturalismo del sujeto. Se asume que el sistema de conceptos humano se ha desarrollado en interacción con el medio natural y social. Por esta razón no podemos evitar ser realistas y representacionalistas por defecto. Las afirmaciones básicas del realismo, el representatcionalismo y la teoría de la verdad como correspondencia son difícilmente rechazables, y esto explica el aire de artificiosidad que acompaña a las posiciones anti-realistas. Sin embargo las posiciones por defecto no apoyan en absoluto a sus versiones filosóficamente desarrolladas. Estas son incompatibles con una visión naturalista sobre la realidad, el significado y la verdad. Palabras clave: Correspondentismo por defecto, naturalismo, naturalismo del sujeto, realismo por defecto, representacionalismo por defecto, teoría de la verdad como correspondencia, teoría prooracional de la verdad, verdad aristotélica Abstract This paper deals with Price’s placement problem. In it, different versions of naturalism are distinguished and subject naturalism is defended. It is assumed that human conceptual system has evolved as a result of humans relations with the natural and social surroundings. For this reason, we cannot but be realist and representationalist by default. The basis claims of realism, representationalism, and correspondence are hardly deniable, and this explains the artificiality scent that usually accompanies anti-realist positions. Nevertheless, the natural default positions do not lend any support to their philosophically implemented versions, metaphysical realism, semantic representationalism and full-blood correspondence. These approaches to reality, meaning and truth are incompatible with a sound naturalist stand on these issues. Keywords: Aristotelian truth, correspondence theory of truth, default realism, default representationalism, default correspondentism, naturalism, prosentential theory of truth, subject naturalism.
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Moran, Dermot. "‘Let's Look at It Objectively’: Why Phenomenology Cannot be Naturalized." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72 (April 3, 2013): 89–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246113000064.
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AbstractIn recent years there have been attempts to integrate first-person phenomenology into naturalistic science. Traditionally, however, Husserlian phenomenology has been resolutely anti-naturalist. Husserl identified naturalism as the dominant tendency of twentieth-century science and philosophy and he regarded it as an essentially self-refuting doctrine. Naturalism is a point of view or attitude (a reification of the natural attitude into thenaturalistic attitude) that does not know that it is an attitude. For phenomenology, naturalism is objectivism. But phenomenology maintains that objectivity is constituted through the intentional activity of cooperating subjects. Understanding the role of cooperating subjects in producing the experience of the one, shared, objective world keeps phenomenology committed to a resolutely anti-naturalist (or ‘transcendental’) philosophy.
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Canadelli, Elena. "Carlo Cattaneo, le Notizie e i naturalisti lombardi. Alcune riflessioni." SOCIETÀ E STORIA, no. 161 (September 2018): 581–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/ss2018-161006.
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Oppy, Graham. "Anti-Naturalistic Arguments From Reason." Roczniki Filozoficzne 70, no. 1 (March 31, 2022): 15–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rf2201.2.
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This paper discusses a wide range of anti-naturalistic argument from reason due to Balfour, Haldane, Joad, Lewis, Taylor, Moreland, Plantinga, Reppert, and Hasker. I argue that none of these arguments poses a serious challenge to naturalists who are identity theorists. Further, I argue that some of these arguments do not even pose prima facie plausible challenges to naturalism. In the concluding part of my discussion, I draw attention to some distinctive differences between Hasker’s anti-naturalistic arguments and the other anti-naturalistic arguments mentioned above.
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SARTI, CARLO. "GIUSEPPE MONTI AND PALAEONTOLOGY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BOLOGNA." Nuncius 8, no. 2 (1993): 443–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/182539183x00659.
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Abstracttitle RIASSUNTO /title Nel XVIII secolo numerosi progressi in campo geologico-paleontologico provengono dall'Italia. Soprattutto i naturalisti dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Bologna, all'inizio del Settecento, cominciano a perlustrare sistematicamente l'Appenino o le Alpi alla ricerca di fossili. Il fondatore della moderna paleontologia a Bologna si pu ritenere Giuseppe Monti (1682-1760), ideatore e organizzatore del Museum Diluvianum in Scientiarum Instituto, primo vero museo paleontologico italiano.
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GANSSLE, GREGORY E. "Fine tuning and the varieties of naturalism." Religious Studies 47, no. 1 (April 6, 2010): 59–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412510000090.
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AbstractNaturalism has been characterized both as a claim about what exists (claim naturalism) and as a commitment to a certain methodology (method naturalism). The fine-tuning argument for God's existence presents a significant challenge to each way of characterizing naturalism. The claim naturalist faces the fact that the best response to the fine-tuning argument (the many-world hypothesis) requires the existence of many universes that are not clearly naturalistic themselves. Method naturalism faces the challenge that it does not have the resources to ground the preference of the many-world hypothesis to the designer hypothesis.
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STENMARK, MIKAEL. "Religious naturalism and its rivals." Religious Studies 49, no. 4 (December 11, 2012): 529–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412512000431.
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AbstractThe aim of this article is to explore where and why religious naturalism differs from its rivals, and also to consider some of the challenges religious naturalism faces. I argue that religious naturalism is best conceived as a reaction against both theists who are religious and naturalists who are atheists: the best option is taken to be a naturalist who is religious. Nevertheless, it is quite difficult to say more exactly what claims the view contains. In fact, it is argued, three forms of religious naturalism must be distinguished and contrasted with their rivals, which are taken to be non-religious naturalism, scientific naturalism, theism (including panentheism), divine transcendentalism, religious agnosticism, and religious relativism.
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Guerra, Michele. "Chi ha (i)scritto il film? Di orsi, naturalisti e cineasti." Rivista di estetica, no. 50 (July 1, 2012): 287–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/estetica.1497.
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Kostyukhina, Marina. "“CALLING UP BIANKI’S SPIRIT” (BASED ON CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MIKHAIL ZVEREV AND NIKOLAY SLADKOV)." Children's Readings: Studies in Children's Literature 22, no. 2 (2022): 303–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.31860/2304-5817-2022-2-22-303-318.
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The article is dedicated to a review of the literary and personal communication of Soviet nature writers in the 1960s and 1980s. V. Bianki was the inspirer and literary teacher of this writing community, and his students were Leningrad authors who wrote about nature. V. Bianki referred to N. Sladkov as his heir in literature. The correspondence between N. Sladkov and the Kazakh naturalist writer M. Zverev provides material for the analysis of the artistic and philosophical attitudes of the authors who ranked themselves among the literary school of V. Bianki and also allows to understand not only the personal relationship between the correspondents but also the phenomenon of the Soviet writer-naturalist. In setting themselves in opposition to amateur amateurs, “naturalists” insisted on the need to combine scientific authenticity with artistic imagery, seeing this as the specificity of natural history literature. Another important part of the identity of “naturalists” was participation in biological fieldwork, which allowed collecting material for literary work. The artistic program of the Leningrad naturalists was contradictory: in some ways, it inherited Bianki’s naturalist concept and literary method, and in other ways it challenged them. However, the circle of Bianki’s followers took on the role of unquestionable experts in the field of novelty naturalistic prose for children.
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O'Grady, Paul. "Aquinas and Naturalism." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3, no. 2 (September 23, 2011): 369–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v3i2.401.
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Aquinas’s actual response to a naturalistic challenge at St I.2.3 is one which most naturalists would find unimpressive. However, I shall argue that there is a stronger response latent in his philosophical system. I take Quine as an example of a methodological naturalist, examine the roots of his position and look at two critical responses to his views (those of BonJour and Boghossian). If one adjusts some of the problematical aspects of their responses and establishes a hybrid position on the epistemology and metaphysics of an anti-naturalistic stance, it turns out to be the position Aquinas himself takes on meaning and knowledge.
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Stone, Alison. "Hegel, Naturalism and the Philosophy of Nature." Hegel Bulletin 34, no. 1 (April 17, 2013): 59–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2013.2.
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AbstractIn this article I consider whether Hegel is a naturalist or an anti-naturalist with respect to his philosophy of nature. I adopt a cluster-based approach to naturalism, on which positions are more or less naturalistic depending how many strands of the clusternaturalismthey exemplify. I focus on two strands: belief that philosophy is continuous with the empirical sciences, and disbelief in supernatural entities. I argue that Hegel regards philosophy of nature as distinct, but not wholly discontinuous, from empirical science and that he believes in the reality of formal and final causes insofar as he is a realist about universal forms that interconnect to comprise a self-organizing whole. Nonetheless, for Hegel, natural particulars never fully realize these universal forms, so that empirical inquiry into these particulars and their efficient-causal interactions is always necessary. In these two respects, I conclude, Hegel's position sits in the middle of the naturalism/anti-naturalism spectrum.
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Papazoglou, Alexis. "Hegel and Naturalism." Hegel Bulletin 33, no. 02 (2012): 74–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200000513.
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In the recent Hegel literature there has been an effort to portray Hegel's philosophy as compatible with naturalism, or even as a form of naturalism (see for example Pippin 2008 and Pinkard 2012). Despite the attractions of such a project, there is, it seems to me, another, and potentially more interesting way of looking at the relationship of Hegel to naturalism. Instead of showing how Hegel's philosophy can be compatible with naturalism, I propose to show how Hegel's philosophy offers a challenge to naturalism. Naturalism has become the dominant ideology in much of contemporary analytic philosophy (Kim 2003: 84), but also within other disciplines. Evolutionary psychology and behavioral genetics, which attract a lot of media attention, attempt to explain the human mind and human behavior in purely naturalistic terms, usually in terms of the biological past and makeup of humans (Pinker 2002). Philosophy's task is, among other things, to examine the assumptions of human practices including its own. In that vein I am interested in showing how Hegel can be seen as someone offering a challenge to our contemporary philosophical culture and its underlying naturalist premise.Of course that Hegel never explicitly talks about naturalism in his writings already presents us with the problem of risking anachronism. The other great problem is the fact that naturalism is an elusive philosophical position. There are a few different versions of the key theses of naturalism, so that if our aim is to diagnose Hegel's philosophy as naturalist or anti-naturalist it would seem we have to pick which version of naturalism we are going to work with.
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Moberger, Victor. "Hume’s Dictum and Metaethics." Philosophical Quarterly 70, no. 279 (September 14, 2019): 328–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqz058.
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Abstract This paper explores the metaethical ramifications of a coarse-grained criterion of property identity, sometimes referred to as Hume's dictum. According to Hume's dictum, properties are identical if and only if they are necessarily co-extensive. Assuming the supervenience of the normative on the natural, this criterion threatens the non-naturalist view that there are instantiable normative properties which are distinct from natural properties. In response, non-naturalists typically point to various counterintuitive implications of Hume's dictum. The paper clarifies this strategy and defends it against objections by Bart Streumer and Ralf Bader. In addition, it is argued that proponents of naturalist and supernaturalist views, along with proponents of a certain kind of nihilism, should also reject Hume's dictum. This shows that non-naturalists can also attack the criterion indirectly, by pointing to partners in guilt. Also, it shows that not just any opponent of non-naturalism can appeal to Hume's dictum. Only certain nihilists can.
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García Ruiz, Pedro Enrique. "¿Naturalizar la conciencia? Husserl y la tesis de la excepción humana." Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, no. 11 (January 29, 2021): 99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/rif.11.2014.29535.
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Uno de los aspectos dominantes en los desarrollos de las ciencias sociales y las humanidades en la actualidad es la adaptación de enfoques naturalistas. Los programas naturalistas rechazan el estatuto de lo humano que había defendido tradicionalmente la filosofía al sostener que la conciencia es reducible a un hecho contingente y, por lo tanto, puede comprenderse desde un criterio meramente objetivista. El filósofo francés Jean-Marie Schaeffer llama a esta postura la “tesis de la excepción humana” y sostiene que la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl es el último ejemplo de esta postura. Trataremos de mostrar que el antinaturalismo tan característico de la fenomenología husserliana es sostenible pese a la crítica de Schaeffer. En este sentido, buscamos explorar brevemente la posibilidad y sentido de una fenomenología naturalizada.One of the key aspects in the development of the social sciences and humanities today is the adaptation of naturalistic approaches. Naturalists programs reject the status of the human that had traditionally defended philosophy holding that consciousness is reducible to a contingent fact and, therefore, can be understood from a purely objectivist approach. The French philosopher Jean-Marie Schaeffer calls this approach the “thesis of human exception” and argues that the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is the latest example of this approach. Try to show that the anti-naturalism so characteristic of Husserlian phenomenology is sustainable despite criticism of Schaeffer. Here, looking briefly to explore the possibility and way of a naturalized phenomenology.
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DeVito, Michael. "Abduction, Imagination, and Science." Philosophia Christi 22, no. 2 (2020): 335–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc202022228.
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In this essay, I argue that developments in Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism—specifically, Thomas Crisp’s argument against a naturalistic metaphysics—have likely undermined the project of science for naturalists who are scientific realists. Scientific theorizing requires the use of abductive reasoning. A central component of abductive reasoning is the use of one’s imagination. However, Crisp’s argument provides us reason to doubt the trustworthiness of our cognitive faculties as it relates to the imaginative abilities necessary for complex abductive reasoning.
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FitzPatrick, William J. "Representing ethical reality: a guide for worldly non-naturalists." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 3-4 (2018): 548–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1432396.
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AbstractEthical realists hold (i) that our ethical concepts, thoughts, and claims are in the business of representing ethical reality, by representing evaluative or normative properties and facts as aspects of reality, and (ii) that such representations are at least sometimes accurate. Non-naturalist realists add the further claim that ethical properties and facts are ultimately non-natural, though they are nonetheless worldly. My aim is threefold: to elucidate the sort of representation involved in ethical evaluation on realist views; to clarify what exactly is represented and how non-naturalism comes into the picture for non-naturalists; and to defend worldly non-naturalism against some objections. The first question addressed is how we should model evaluation on any realist view, which should in turn guide the identification of which properties and facts are credibly regarded as ‘evaluative’ ones. Then the question is: what role might non-natural properties and facts play, and how are they related to what is represented in ethical evaluation? Once that is clear, we will be in a position to answer certain objections to non-naturalist realism from Jackson, Gibbard, Bedke, and Dreier. I argue that the objections all mischaracterize the role played by non-natural properties and facts on plausible versions of non-naturalist realism.
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Nyborg, Ole. "N. F. S. Grundtvig og naturalismen." Grundtvig-Studier 63, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 109–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/grs.v63i1.16593.
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N. F. S. Grundtvig og naturalismen[N. F. S. Grundtvig and the Concept of Naturalism]By Ole NyborgThe concepts o f ‘naturalism’, ‘naturalist’, and ‘naturalistic’ are frequently found in the writings of the Danish theologian N. F. S. Grundtvig (1783-1872), and this is the case during his whole lifetime.In scholarly literature, Grundtvig’s concept of ‘naturalism’ has mainly been interpreted from the way ‘naturalism’ etc. is used in his introduction to Nordisk Mythologi (Northern Mythology) (1832). The frequent references to ‘naturalism’ in Grundtvig’s other works have mostly been neglected by scholars. However, an analysis of Grundtvig’s works as a whole shows a very clear picture. He is a persistent, emotional, and aggressive opponent to naturalism, emphasizing numerous negative aspects of it as a philosophy, because its modern individualistic ideas destroy the natural bonds and social constraints of love, reverence, and respect. According to Grundtvig, naturalism represents a powerful, imminent, and dangerous threat to traditional Christian states and nations of Western Europe, and the notorious revolution of France of 1789 he sees as a terrible and horrifying manifestation of the unchristian, subversive, unbridled, and immoral character of naturalism.
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Crook, Zeba. "On the Treatment of Miracles in New Testament Scholarship." Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 40, no. 4 (September 14, 2011): 461–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0008429811420693.
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All introductory textbooks to the New Testament have something to say about the miracles and resurrection of Jesus, sometimes implicitly but more often explicitly. Not surprisingly, conservative textbooks take a conservative approach, rejecting outright the “naturalism” that governs other human and natural sciences. Yet even liberal textbooks stop short of assuming a fully naturalistic paradigm. This paper analyses the assumptions that serve as the foundation of both conservative and liberal treatments of the miraculous, and joins others in calling for the academic study of Christian Origins to situate itself more fully within the academic study of religion. Tous les manuels d’introduction au Nouveau Testament ont quelque chose à dire sur les miracles et la résurrection de Jésus, parfois implicitement, mais le plus souvent de manière explicite. Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, les manuels conservateurs adoptent une approche conservatrice, en rejetant purement et simplement le « naturalisme » qui régit les autres sciences humaines et naturelles. Pourtant, même les manuels libéraux s'arrêtent avant d’assumer un paradigme entièrement naturaliste. Cet article analyse les hypothèses qui servent de base aux traitements conservateurs et libéraux du miraculeux, et s'unit à d’autres pour l’appel à une étude universitaire des origines chrétiennes afin de s'intégrer pleinement dans l’étude scientifique de la religion.
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LA VERGATA, ANTONELLO. "THEODICY AND NATURE'S ECONOMY *." Nuncius 3, no. 1 (1988): 139–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/182539188x00050.
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Abstract<title> RIASSUNTO </title>L'idea dell'abbondanza, della varietà e della necessaria imperfezione delle cose create svolse fin dalla Rivoluzione scientifica del '600 un ruolo importante nelle rivendicazioni del disegno divino, nelle fisicoteologie e nelle teodicee. C'è una stretta connessione fra le riflessioni di filosofi e teologi naturali sul problema del male e le riflessioni dei naturalisti sull'economia della natura e sull'equilibrio fra le specie attraverso la reciproca distruzione. La concezione dell'economia della natura è piuttosto una concezione dell'economia morale della natura. Nella seconda parte dell'articolo viene considerata l'influenza esercitata da queste idee sui primi studiosi di demografia quantitativa e, in particolare, sulla teologia naturale che informa la prima edizione del saggio di Malthus sulla popolazione.
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Ferretti, Francesco. "L'origine del linguaggio puň attendere." PARADIGMI, no. 1 (May 2009): 163–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/para2009-001012.
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- Starting from a discussion of Sylvain Auroux's new book (L'origine des langues... 2007), the paper develops a critique of the anti-naturalistic approach to the study of language. The rejection of the quest for language origin as a theory unsusceptible to scientific empirical treatment is an aspect of the idealistic consequences of anti-naturalist positions. A survey is presented of recent literature on the subject. In our opinion, evolutionary theories, revisited from a cognitive perspective, have radically changed the terms of the debate and made naturalism a viable alternative. Keywords: Evolutionism, FOXP2, Innateness, Linguistic variation, Nature-nurture debate, Origin of language.
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Hříbek, Tomáš. "Filip Tvrdý o naturalizaci filosofie." FILOSOFIE DNES 9, no. 1 (September 28, 2017): 71–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.26806/fd.v9i1.248.
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Článek rozlišuje několik verzí současného naturalismu: revizionistickou, konstruktivní a antireprezentacionalistickou. Revizionistický naturalismus doporučuje nahradit tradiční filosofické zkoumání povahy věcí genetickým zkoumáním původu našich, často mylných, přesvědčení o povaze věcí. Konstruktivní naturalismus akceptuje zadání tradiční filosofie, ale doufá, že dokáže její otázky zodpovědět pomocí více méně vědeckých metod. Antireprezentacionalistický naturalismus je extenzí metaetického expresivismu v tom smyslu, že popírá deskriptivní povahu všech filosofických tezí. Tyto distinkce mohou pomoci klasifikovat jeden z nejexplicitněji naturalistických projektů v novější české filosofii, Nesnáze introspekce (2015) Filipa Tvrdého. Tvrdý oficiálně sleduje genetický, revizionistický projekt, který však nespadá vjedno s antireprezentacionalismem. Avšak v jeho knize najdeme i stopy konstruktivního naturalismu. The paper distinguishes several versions of contemporary naturalism: revisionary, constructive, and non-representational. Revisionary naturalismus pleads substituting the traditional philosophical inquiry into the nature of things by a genetic inquiry into the origin of our – often faulty – beliefs about the nature of things. Constructive naturalism accepts the program of traditional philosophy, yet hoping that its questions could be answered by broadly scientific methods. Non-representational naturalism is an extension of metaethical expressivism, claiming that philosophical claims should not be understood as descriptive in nature. These distinctions can help us classify the most self-consciously naturalistic project in the recent Czech philosophy, Filip Tvrdý’s Troubles of Introspection (2015). Tvrdý is officially pursuing a genetic, revisionary project, which does not coincide with non-representational naturalism. However, there are also traces of constructive naturalism in Tvrdý’s book.
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Alfieri, Gabriella. "“Noi altri, detti non so perché, naturalisti”: il “realismo” di Giovanni Verga e Thomas Hardy." Italica 99, no. 2 (June 1, 2022): 241–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/23256672.99.2.06.
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Abstract Questo contributo si inserisce nel programma culturale della Fondazione Verga, che prevede di rivisitare il verismo nell'orizzonte sovranazionale del realismo letterario: si sta tentando un'interpretazione globale della narrativa realista, senza obliterare le specificità dei singoli contesti culturali. Il primo passo per studiare trasversalmente la testualità di naturalismo in Francia, verismo in Italia e socio-realismo in Inghilterra e Germania, è un ideale macrotesto di riferimento, in cui gli autori siano confrontati nell'ottica della stilistica comparata. Si metteranno dunque in relazione qui Giovanni Verga e Thomas Hardy per evidenziare, al di là della reciproca conoscenza, concomitanze o vere e proprie analogie di intenti estetici e di risultati stilistici.
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Monterroza-Ríos, Álvaro. "La técnica y el naturalismo metodológico." TecnoLógicas, no. 21 (December 7, 2008): 191. http://dx.doi.org/10.22430/22565337.254.
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El artículo reseña y reconstruye algunas reflexiones sobre la naturaleza de la técnica para mostrar que ésta no es sólo una estrategia evolutiva ligada a la supervivencia como el resto de animales, sino como moldeadora del ser humano en su integridad. Adopto una postura naturalista flexible (naturalismo metodológico) en la que se acepta la complementariedad de la filosofía con las ciencias naturales y la favorabilidad de ésta para el estudio filosófico de la técnica. Aunque en un principio se puede pensar que las reflexiones sobre la técnica desde la tradición filosófica como las de Ortega y Gasset y las de Heidegger son distantes y excluyentes de las tesis de algunos filósofos naturalistas, se muestra que esta distinciónes difusa y que, por el contrario, se pueden complementar, si se asume un naturalismo como el que adoptamos.
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Staten, Henry. "Derrida, Dennett, and the Ethico-Political Project of Naturalism." Derrida Today 1, no. 1 (May 2008): 19–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1754850008000067.
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Does Derrida's radicalization of the science-respecting Enlightenment tradition redefine it in such a way that the concept of nature is no longer relevant? But where is the tradition of Copernicus, Darwin, Nietzsche, Marx, without nature? Must there not be a post-deconstructive sense of nature that preserves the connection with the ethico-political project of naturalism? Derrida consistently defines deconstruction in naturalistic terms, specifically in terms of a commitment to the concept of materiality, and this commitment is essential to the ethico-political project of naturalism, which is continually eroded by ‘weak’ naturalisms that at certain point collapse back into supernaturalism. A prime case in point in contemporary analytic philosophy is the attempt made by Nagel, Chalmers, and others to assign a special metaphysical status to ‘consciousness’ or ‘experience.’ When the project of deconstruction is seen as a form of naturalism, Daniel Dennett looms as an important potential ally against the forms of covert ‘spiritism’ represented by Nagel and Chalmers.
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Tiras, H. P. "THE APOLOGY OF THE WHOLE." Bioethics 27, no. 1 (May 19, 2021): 13–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.19163/2070-1586-2021-1(27)-13-17.
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At the level of the whole organism, an idea of the complexity of living things is formed as a combination of levels of organization (layers) of biological and virtual reality, which develops as a space for visualization (digitization) of living objects. New digital formats of living objects, coupled with the naturalistic ethics of obtaining them, create a trend towards a complete transition of biology to a quantitatively new level of obtaining biological information – information about the state of living biological objects. The development of digital biology contributes to an increasingly large-scale transition to the creation and analysis of virtual images of living biological objects, and at the same time "removes" the biologist from the actual object of research: a biologist can work with a virtual image and not destroy his research object. Digital naturalism appears, and, consequently, a digital "experiment" must also be expected, which will undoubtedly continue the eternal confrontation between naturalists and naturalists or vitalists with mechanists in the new techno environment.
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WUNDER, TYLER. "Anti-naturalism and proper function." Religious Studies 44, no. 2 (May 2, 2008): 209–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412508009414.
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AbstractThe penultimate chapter of Alvin Plantinga's Warrant and Proper Function attacks metaphysical naturalism through an argument which concludes that only a supernaturalistic worldview can accommodate the indispensable concept of proper function. I make the case that this argument, which I dub ‘the argument from proper function’, suffers from two major flaws. First, it underestimates the naturalist's ability to ground natural proper function ascriptions in the concept of health. Second, it relies upon an overly stringent standard for successful conceptual analysis; ironically, the naturalist can undercut the argument by adopting Plantinga's own recommended model for analysing concepts.
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Hakiki, Nurhalimah. "Pengembangan Kecerdasan Naturalistik Melalui Kegiatan Mozaik pada Kelompok A di RA Ulul Albab Jember." PRESCHOOL: Jurnal Pendidikan Anak Usia Dini 2, no. 1 (June 10, 2021): 19–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.35719/preschool.v2i1.11.
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Early children are little individuals who have potential that has yet to be developed. One of the potential in children that needs to be developed is naruralistic intelligence. Naturalistic intelligence is the ability to treat the environment and treat it in a balanced manner. Someone who has a strong naturalistic intelligence usually has more interest in the outside world. At RA Ulul Albab, there are mosaic activities to develop children's naturalistic intelligence. The purpose of this research is to develop children's naturalistic intelligence through mosaic activities. This research uses qualitative research methods, with the type of field research. The results of this study indicate that theoretically, mosaic play activities are not only interesting and able to develop children's naturalistic intelligence, which is manifested by making children closer to and like nature. Anak usia dini adalah individu kecil yang memiliki potensi yang masih harus dikembangkan. Salah satu potensi yang pada diri anak yang perlu dikembangkan yaitu kecerdasan naruralistik. Kecerdasan naturalistik adalah suatu kemampuan untuk mengenali lingkungan dan memperlakukannya dengan seimbang. Seseorang yang memiliki kecerdasan naturalistik yang kuat biasanya memiliki ketertarikan lebih terhadap dunia luar. Di RA Ulul Albab terdapat kegiatan mozaik untuk mengembangkan kecerdasan naturalistik anak. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mengembangkan kecerdasan naturalistik anak melalui kegiatan mozaik. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif, dengan jenis penelitian lapangan. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa secara teoritis kegiatan bermain mozaik selain menarik serta mampu mengembangkan kecerdasan naturalistik anak, yang diwujudkan dengan membuat anak semakin dekat dan menyukai alam. Kata Kunci: anak usia dini, kecerdasan naturalistik, mozaik
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Pedrosa, José Manuel. "Rosso Malpelo (1878), infrahéroe y fantasma: mitologías de la mina y el infierno." Estudios Humanísticos. Filología, no. 36 (December 18, 2014): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.18002/ehf.v0i36.1351.
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<p>Resumen</p> <p>Análisis del cuento <em>Rosso Malpelo</em> (“<em>Malpelo el Pel</em>irrojo”), publicado por el escritor naturalista y verista italiano Giovanni Verga en 1878. El cuento describe la dura explotación infantil en las minas italianas del siglo XIX. El análisis conecta el perfil literario del protagonista del cuento con el de muchos héroes mitológicos que realizan el viaje al infierno, el <em>descensus ad inferos</em>.</p><p>Palabras clave: Rosso Malpelo, Giovanni Verga, mina, minería, naturalismo, verismo, héroe, épica, tragedia, <em>descensus ad inferos</em>.</p><p>Abstract</p><p>Analysis of the tale <em>Rosso Malpelo</em> (“<em>Malpelo the Redhead</em>”), published in 1878 by Italian writer Giovanni Verga, exponent of the naturalist and verista movements. The story describes the harsh child labor in Italian mines during the nineteenth century. The analysis connects the literary profile of the protagonist of the story with many mythological heroes that go to hell (<em>descensus ad inferos).</em></p> <p>Key words: Rosso Malpelo, Giovanni Verga, mine, mining, naturalism, verismo, hero, epics, tragedy, <em>descensus ad inferos.</em></p>
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Pérez Marcos, Moisés. "El naturalismo cientificista como pseudorreligión y anti-teología natural." Scientia et Fides 10, no. 1 (March 3, 2022): 73–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.004.
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Tras exponer las ideas básicas de la cosmovisión naturalista (apartados 1, 2 y 3) se intenta mostrar que el naturalismo es una interpretación de la ciencia que posee una ineludible dimensión “mitológica”, en el sentido que Midgley da a esta expresión (apartado 5), lo que no lo desacredita por principio, pero hace que no podamos aceparlo acríticamente por el mero hecho de que apele a las ciencias naturales para justificar su validez. Se defiende, después, que el compromiso central de los naturalistas es la afirmación del ateísmo. De hecho, los naturalismos contemporáneos más radicales pueden ser interpretados como un intento de hacer imposible toda teología natural, es decir, buscan destruir los asideros en los que la razón se apoya clásicamente para afirmar la existencia de Dios. Se defiende que el naturalismo no tiene por qué gozar de superioridad epistemológica a priori con respecto al teísmo.
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Bikaraan-Behesht, Hamed. "Methodological Naturalism and Reflexivity Requirement." Logos & Episteme 12, no. 3 (2021): 311–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112323.
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Methodological naturalists regard scientific method as the only effective way of acquiring knowledge. Quite the contrary, traditional analytic philosophers reject employing scientific method in philosophy as illegitimate unless it is justified by the traditional methods. One of their attacks on methodological naturalism is the objection that it is either incoherent or viciously circular: any argument that may be offered for methodological naturalism either employs a priori methods or involves a vicious circle that ensues from employing the very method that the argument is aimed to show its credentials. The charge of circularity has also been brought against the naturalistic arguments for specific scientific methods; like the inductive argument for induction and the abductive argument for the inference to the best explanation. In this paper, I respond to the charge of circularity using a meta-methodological rule that I call ‘reflexivity requirement.’ Giving two examples of philosophical works, I illustrate how the requirement has already been considered to be necessary for self-referential theories. At the end, I put forward a meta-philosophical explanation of the naturalism-traditionalism debate over the legitimate method of philosophy.
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Phillips, Rory Lawrence. "Transcendental Idealism and Naturalism: The Case of Fichte." Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 1, no. 1 (March 26, 2020): 43–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2019-0013.
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AbstractIn this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Fichte. I conclude that Fichte is a near-naturalist, akin to Baker, Lynne Rudder (2017). “Naturalism and the idea of nature,” Philosophy 92 (3): 333–349. A near-naturalist is one whose position looks akin to the naturalist in some ways but the near-naturalist can radically differ in metaphilosophical orientation and substantial commitment. This paper is composed of three sections. In the first, I outline briefly what I take transcendental idealism to be, as well as some differences in types of naturalism, and how this maps on to Fichte. In the second, I give an exegesis of Fichte’s key arguments in the Later Jena period, which are important for the question of his relationship to naturalism. In the third, I continue the exegesis with a discussion of Fichte’s conception of God, and conclude that these arguments support a near-naturalist reading of Fichte.
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FitzPatrick, William J. "Moral Progress for Evolved Rational Creatures." Analyse & Kritik 41, no. 2 (November 1, 2019): 217–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2019-0014.
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Abstract Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell have developed a rich ‘biocultural theory’ of the nature and causes of moral progress (and regress) for human beings conceived as evolved rational creatures with a nature characterized by ‘adaptive plasticity’. They characterize their theory as a thoroughly naturalistic account of moral progress, while bracketing various questions in moral theory and metaethics in favor of focusing on a certain range of more scientifically tractable questions under some stipulated moral and metaethical assumptions. While I am very much in agreement with the substance of their project, I wish to query and raise some difficulties for the way it is framed, particularly in connection with the claim of naturalism. While their project is clearly naturalistic in certain senses, it is far from clear that it is so in others that are of particular interest in moral philosophy, and these issues need to be more carefully sorted out. For everything that has been argued in the book, the theory on offer may be only a naturalistic component of a larger theory that must ultimately be non-naturalistic in order to deliver the robust sort of account that is desired. Indeed, there are significant metaethical reasons for believing this to be the case. Moreover, if it turns out that some of the assumptions upon which their theory relies require a non-naturalist metaethics (positing irreducibly evaluative or normative properties and facts) then even the part of the theory that might have seemed most obviously naturalistic, i.e., the explanation of how changes in moral belief and behavior have come about, may actually require some appeal to non-naturalistic elements in the end.
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Castaldi, João Luiz Xavier. "A fome de Rodolfo Teófilo: voz naturalista, fôlego romântico / Rodolfo Teófilo’s A fome: naturalistic voice, romantic breath." O Eixo e a Roda: Revista de Literatura Brasileira 30, no. 3 (October 8, 2021): 269. http://dx.doi.org/10.17851/2358-9787.30.3.269-289.
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Resumo: O presente trabalho procura demonstrar certas peculiaridades presentes no romance A fome, publicado pelo brasileiro Rodolfo Teófilo em 1890. Embora geralmente associado à Escola Naturalista (e até mesmo um precursor do Neorrealismo de 1930), observamos características que destoam da estética proposta por esse movimento, e em certa medida aproximam a obra da prosa romântica que se desenvolvera no Brasil nas décadas anteriores. Outrossim, nosso texto procura investigar as possíveis relações entre as escolhas formais feitas pelo autor nessa obra e suas intervenções mais objetivas na sociedade em que estava inserido, a fim de averiguar qual seria, na visão de Teófilo, a missão do intelectual no Ceará de fins do século XIX.Palavras-chave: Rodolfo Teófilo; A fome; naturalismo; romantismo.Abstract: This work intends to demonstrate some peculiarities of the novel A fome, written by the Brazilian author Rodolfo Teófilo in 1890. Although it is usually associated with the Naturalistic School (and even a precursor of the 1930’s Neorealism), we see features that clash with this movement, and in a certain way bring the book closer to the romantic narrative that developed in Brazil in the previous decades. Furthermore, our work tries to investigate the possible relations between the author’s stylistic choices in this novel and his more objective interventions in the society in which he lived, in order to find out what it would be, in Teófilo’s vision, the mission of an intellectual in the Ceará region at the end of the 19th century.Keywords: Rodolfo Teófilo; A fome; naturalism; romanticism.
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Drees, Willem B. "Should Religious Naturalists Promote a Naturalistic Religion?" Zygon® 33, no. 4 (December 1998): 617–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0591-2385.00177.
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Zeng, Xiu. "On the Reflection of Naturalism in the Main Character in The Call of the Wild." Theory and Practice in Language Studies 8, no. 11 (November 1, 2018): 1530. http://dx.doi.org/10.17507/tpls.0811.20.
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Jack London is one of the most outstanding and celebrated critical realists in American literature in the 20th century, he is well recognized in his artistic creation of literary works with the feature of naturalism. The Call of the Wild is one of his naturalistic works filled with adventure and fighting spirit. The main character of the novel is a dog named Buck. By concentrating on Buck's gradual reversion from a civilized pet to a primordial beast, Jack London demonstrates the power of heredity and environment in determining and shaping one’s mind and behaviors. Naturalists believe that mankind is the product of environment, the power of heredity and force of environment are greater than the will of human beings. It is not the strongest of the species that can survive, but the one most responsive to changes. Humans have to adapt themselves to the environment for survival. In The Call of the Wild, the principle of literary naturalism is mainly reflected in the effects of the hereditary and environmental factors on the fate of the main character, Buck.
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Louden, Robert B. "Kant the Naturalist." Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 1, no. 1 (March 26, 2020): 3–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2019-0001.
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AbstractKant is widely admired – and sometimes also widely criticized – as the founding father of transcendental philosophy. But in much of my own writing, I have been concerned with a very different Kant: an impure rather than a pure Kant, an a posteriori rather than an a priori Kant, a naturalistic rather than a transcendental Kant. This other Kant has often been overlooked by professional philosophers, and when not overlooked, he is often regarded as shallow and unoriginal. My aim in this paper is to demonstrate not only the existence but also the importance and originality of Kant, the naturalist. Without Kant’s naturalism, we lack what he called the empirically-informed “eye of true philosophy” that gives its possessors a necessary “broadened way of thinking” and provides philosophy with “dignity, i. e., an absolute worth.”
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Bell, Martin, and Marie McGinn. "Naturalism and Scepticism." Philosophy 65, no. 254 (October 1990): 399–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100064652.
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In this paper we argue that a dominant view of Humean naturalism involves a fundamental misconception of Hume's naturalist project. We shall show that the naturalist project as Hume conceives it is philosophically much more interesting than the form of naturalism commonly attributed to him. We shall also argue, however, that Hume's commitment to principles of empiricist epistemology prevented him from bringing his naturalist project to a satisfactory conclusion. Finally, we shall suggest that Wittgenstein shares Hume's conception of a philosophically satisfactory form of naturalism, and that, unencumbered by empiricist doctrines, Wittgenstein was able to provide the sort of undogmatic unravelling of the sceptical problem that eluded Hume.
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Lemos, John. "A Defense of Naturalistic Naturalized Epistemology." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 35, no. 105 (January 8, 2003): 49–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2003.1052.
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Naturalistic naturalized epistemology combines ontological naturalism with naturalized epistemology. Ontological naturalism is the view that nothing exists other than spatio-temporal beings embedded within a space-time framework. Naturalized epistemology is a view about the nature of knowledge characterized by its commitment to externalism and the idea that knowledge consists in beliefs reliably generated by cognitive mechanisms operating in a suitable environment. Alvin Plantinga has provided a much discussed evolutionary biological argument against naturalistic naturalized epistemology. In this article I defend naturalistic naturalized epistemology by refuting Plantinga's replies to two important criticisms of his argument.
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Vilatta, Emilia. "Filosofía de la mente y Psiquiatría alcances y límites de una perspectiva naturalista para el estudio de los delirios." Co-herencia 14, no. 27 (October 2017): 159–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.17230/co-herencia.14.27.7.
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En el presente artículo me concentraré en el estudio filosófico de los delirios, como un caso ejemplificador del vínculo que pueden establecer la filosofía de la mente y la psiquiatría. Frente a versiones radicalmente naturalistas, que proponen variantes reduccionistas o eliminativistas para la explicación de ciertos fenómenos mentales y sus variantes “anormales”, defenderé una versión moderada de la perspectiva naturalista. Al respecto, señalaré que retener algún grado de simpatía hacia el naturalismo en las investigaciones filosóficas sobre los delirios es necesario para desarrollar teorías sobre las creencias empíricamente informadas que no resulten contradictorias con los desarrollos actuales en psicología cognitiva y neurociencias. No obstante, afirmaré también que una perspectiva exclusivamente naturalista -tanto por parte de la filosofía como de la psiquiatría misma- es incapaz de dar cuenta del contexto normativo en donde juegan las creencias. Los criterios normativos, especialmente externos (sociales y pragmáticos) que se emplean para clasificar ciertas creencias como delirantes no resultan inteligibles bajo una explicación puramente natural. Por el contrario, para comprender las creencias delirantes qua delirantes, será preciso acercarnos a un abordaje híbrido que pueda contemplar las causas naturales del fenómeno así como su evaluación normativa.
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Suikkanen, Jussi, and Jussi Suikkanen. "Non-Naturalism and Reference." Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11, no. 2 (June 7, 2017): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v11i2.111.
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Metaethical realists disagree about the nature of normative properties. Naturalists think that they are ordinary natural properties: causally efficacious, a posteriori knowable, and usable in the best explanations of natural and social sciences. Non-naturalist realists, in contrast, argue that they are sui generis: causally inert, a priori knowable and not a part of the subject matter of sciences. It has been assumed so far that naturalists can explain causally how the normative predicates manage to refer to normative properties, whereas non-naturalists are unable to provide equally satisfactory metasemantic explanations. This article first describes how the previous non-naturalist accounts of reference fail to tell us how the normative predicates could have come to refer to the non-natural properties rather than to the natural ones. I will then use the so-called qua-problem to show how the causal theories of reference of naturalists also fail to fix the reference of normative predicates to unique natural properties. Finally, I will suggest that, just as naturalists need to rely on the non-causal mechanism of reference magnetism to solve the previous problem, non-naturalists, too, can rely on the very same idea to respond to the pressing metasemantic challenges that they face concerning reference.
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Cortina, Adela, and Jesús Conill. "Bioética y neuroética." Arbor 195, no. 792 (June 27, 2019): 503. http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2019.792n2004.
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La neuroética nace oficialmente a comienzos del siglo XXI, gracias al avance de las neurociencias, como ética aplicada vinculada a la bioética, pero también como neuroética autónoma. Como ética aplicada, aborda cuestiones cercanas a la bioética. Como neuroética autónoma, se enfrenta a problemas clásicos de la filosofía desde una perspectiva neurocientífica en sentido amplio. Dos cuestiones serán centrales en ella: diseñar un marco para seleccionar, interpretar e integrar los datos de las neurociencias acerca de la moralidad, y trazar el método -o métodos- adecuados para el nuevo saber. Curiosamente, en ambos casos la mayor parte de los neuroéticos dice inscribirse en posiciones naturalistas, pero realmente procede de forma no-naturalista. El artículo se propone analizar los distintos lados de la neuroética y sacar a la luz el método que realmente siguen los neuroéticos, que desmiente al naturalismo.
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Catling, Paul, Dan Brunton, Jeff Saarela, and Frank Pope. "Francis Cook steps down after long and distinguished service with the Ottawa Field-Naturalists’ Club and the Canadian Field-Naturalist." Canadian Field-Naturalist 130, no. 4 (April 11, 2017): 385. http://dx.doi.org/10.22621/cfn.v130i4.1944.
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Stringer, Ryan. "Realist ethical naturalism for ethical non-naturalists." Philosophical Studies 175, no. 2 (January 21, 2017): 339–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0870-0.
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Zargar, Zahra, Ebrahim Azadegan, and Lotfollah Nabavi. "Should Methodological Naturalists Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism?" Journal for General Philosophy of Science 51, no. 1 (July 17, 2019): 185–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09464-8.
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Cometti, Jean-Pierre. "Le naturalisme pragmatiste et l’esthétique naturalisée." Nouvelle revue d’esthétique 15, no. 1 (2015): 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/nre.015.0033.
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