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Journal articles on the topic 'Naturalismo morale'
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1
Bagnoli, Carla. "Responsibility for Action." PARADIGMI, no. 1 (April 2010): 75–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/para2010-001006.
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Questo articolo propone un argomento a sostegno della tesi secondo cui il concetto di responsabilitŕ morale non č eliminabile e il suo uso non č e non puň essere messo in questione da argomenti empirici o naturalistici. Anziché un argomento contro il naturalismo, č un tentativo di mostrare che il concetto di responsabilitŕ, quando se ne sono chiarite le implicazioni, č compatibile con concezioni naturalistiche della real tŕ. L'argomento si basa su una interpretazione dialogica della responsabilitŕ e mette in dubbio le pretese riduttiviste di certe versioni radicali del naturalismo.
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Kalpokas, Daniel. "Price on Expressionism and the Placement Problems." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 1, no. 1 (November 28, 2014): 101. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.20141973.
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Resumen En “Naturalismo sin representacionalismo”, Huw Price propone una variedad de naturalismo –una que él denomina naturalismo del sujeto– que supuestamente puede evitar los problemas de la localización relacionados con entidades “incómodas” como son los hechos morales, los significados, las verdades matemáticas y otras similares. A partir de una concepción expresivista de todo el lenguaje, Price defiende que los problemas de la localización descansan sobre un error categorical: el error consiste en considerar que toda oración representa algún estado de hechos mundano. En nuestro trabajo, a partir de nuestra crítica al expresivismo de Price, cuestionaremos su respuesta a los problemas de la localización. Palabras clave: Naturalismo del sujeto, representacionalismo, expresivismo global, deflacionismo, verdad. Abstract In his article “Naturalism Without Representationalism”, Price proposes a variety of naturalism –subject naturalism, as he calls it- that is supposedly able to avoid placement problems about “odd” entities such as moral facts, meanings, mathematical truths and the like. Assuming an expressivist conception about the entire language, Price argues that placement problems rest on a category mistake: the mistake of considering all sorts of sentences as representing worldly states of affairs. In this article, by arguing against Price’s expressivism, I call his response to placement problems into question. My thesis is that placement problems are genuine ontological problems. Key Words: Subject Naturalism, Representationalism, Global Expressivism; Deflationalism; Truth.
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Dickson, Jeffrey R. "ANÁLISIS CRÍTICO DE LA EXPLICACIÓN DE LA TRANSFORMACIÓN MORAL EN EL BUDISMO NEURAL." Revista Científica Arbitrada de la Fundación MenteClara 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 206–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.32351/rca.v1.1.9.
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A medida que las argumentaciones no teístas se tornan cada vez más sofisticadas y complejas, se hace más difícil realizar una crítica sin antes admirar lo habilidoso de su diseño y casi maestría. Una de esas argumentaciones es una innovación relativamente reciente que es el hijo del naturalismo y la filosofía oriental: el budismo neural. Como dos diseñadores mundialmente famosos que trabajan juntos en una prenda nueva, el naturalismo y el budismo se unieron en este programa distintivo para ofrecer algo inventivo, especialmente en la explicación de la transformación moral. Por el contrario, este análisis va a develar al final que la explicación de la transformación moral del budismo neural es incapaz de ofrecer buenas respuestas a varias críticas convincentes.AbstractAs non-theistic arguments for morality become increasingly sophisticated and complex, they are harder to criticize without first admiring their skillful design and near-artistry. One such argument involves a relatively new innovation that is the child of naturalism and eastern philosophy—Neural Buddhism. Like two world- renowned designers collaborating on a new garment, Naturalism and Buddhism have come together in this distinct program to offer something inventive, especially in its explanation of moral transformation. However, this critical analysis will ultimately reveal that Neural Buddhism’s explanation of moral transformation is incapable of providing good answers to several compelling criticisms.
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Brito, Adriano Naves de. "Falácia naturalista e naturalismo moral: do é ao deve mediante o quero." Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 51, no. 121 (June 2010): 215–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0100-512x2010000100011.
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O objetivo deste texto é discutir alguns argumentos contra a aceitação da falácia naturalista. Pretende-se mostrar aspectos que parecem corretos na argumentação dos que recusam aquela falácia, e, a despeito de seus acertos, demonstrar que estão fundamentalmente errados. O eixo para este desfecho é a reformulação da falácia em termos da recusa da implicação entre o ser e o querer. Espera-se, assim, tornar mais claras as relações - e a ausência delas - entre verdade e moral, bem como abrir espaço para a defesa de um naturalismo moral não comprometido com a existência de fatos morais. Este texto está dividido em cinco partes. Na primeira, apresenta-se a falácia naturalista de acordo com Moore; na segunda, distingue-se essa entre as formulações de Moore e de Hume; na terceira, apresentam-se objeções à interdição da passagem do "é" ao "deve" e se formulam respostas a essas objeções; na quarta, reapresenta-se o problema da interdição entre "é" e "deve" e se focaliza uma solução alternativa a ele mediante o querer; e, finalmente, na quinta parte, elaboram-se algumas conclusões acerca do naturalismo e do realismo na moral.
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Brink, David O. "Realism, Naturalism, and Moral Semantics." Social Philosophy and Policy 18, no. 2 (2001): 154–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500002946.
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The prospects for moral realism and ethical naturalism have been important parts of recent debates within metaethics. As a first approximation,moral realismis the claim that there are facts or truths about moral matters that are objective in the sense that they obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers.Ethical naturalismis the claim that moral properties of people, actions, and institutions are natural, rather than occult or supernatural, features of the world. Though these metaethical debates remain unsettled, several people, myself included, have tried to defend the plausibility of both moral realism and ethical naturalism. I, among others, have appealed to recent work in the philosophy of language—in particular, to so-called theories of “direct reference” —to defend ethical naturalism against a variety of semantic worries, including G. E. Moore's “open question argument.” In response to these arguments, critics have expressed doubts about the compatibility of moral realism and direct reference. In this essay, I explain these doubts, and then sketch the beginnings of an answer—but understanding both the doubts and my answer requires some intellectual background.
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PEELS, RIK. "Are naturalism and moral realism incompatible?" Religious Studies 50, no. 1 (May 23, 2013): 77–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412513000206.
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AbstractIn a recent paper, Alvin Plantinga has argued that there is good reason to think that naturalism and moral realism are incompatible. He has done so by arguing that the most important argument for the compatibility of these two theses, which has been provided by Frank Jackson, fails and that any other argument that serves the same purpose is likely to fail for the same reason. His argument against the compatibility of naturalism and moral realism, then, isindirect: he argues against it by refuting the most important argument for it. In this article, I argue that Plantinga's argument is unconvincing for at least two reasons. First, Jackson's argument can be revised in such a way that it meets Plantinga's worry. Second, there is another way of arguing for the compatibility of two propositions which Plantinga does not consider. If the naturalist takes this alternative route, she does not face the problem identified by Plantinga. I thus show not only that Plantinga's argument does not count against the compatibility of naturalism and moral realism, but that there is even good reason to think that naturalism and moral realism are in fact compatible.
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Bengson, John, Terence Cuneo, and Andrew Reisner. "The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism." Journal of Moral Philosophy 17, no. 5 (October 14, 2020): 471–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20202934.
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Abstract The Projectability Challenge states that a metaethical view must explain how ordinary agents can, on the basis of moral experience and reflection, accurately and justifiably apply moral concepts to novel situations. In this paper, we argue for two primary claims. First, paradigm nonnaturalism can satisfactorily answer the projectability challenge. Second, it is unclear whether there is a version of moral naturalism that can satisfactorily answer the challenge. The conclusion we draw is that there is an important respect in which nonnaturalism holds an advantage over its most prominent naturalist rivals. The conclusion is interesting if only because it is widely assumed that naturalism has an easier time handling thorny problems in moral epistemology. We argue that there is at least one such problem of which this assumption is not true.
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Hartman, Edwin M. "On Messick and Naturalism: A Rejoinder to Fort." Business Ethics Quarterly 10, no. 3 (July 2000): 735–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3857902.
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Professor Fort (1999) imagines a dispute over the moral importance of certain facts, with David Messick and himself on one side and Donna Wood and me on the other. He has identified an important issue—ethical naturalism—but that issue is not a point of disagreement between Messick and me.Fort has some interesting ideas about how Messick’s views might help in creating organizations that are moral communities. Beyond noting that those ideas constitute the most important part of his essay and merit consideration, I shall not comment on them.Moral philosophers who are naturalists—I am one—hold that there is no bright line between ought-statements and is-statements and that empirical facts have implications for moral facts. So, for example, that a certain practice helps a community survive is a strong sort of reason for claiming that it is a morally good practice, other things being equal. But most naturalists do not claim that any practice that has arisen by virtue of evolution is ipso facto a morally good practice even if it does serve some purpose. Nor does ethical naturalism have a characteristic view of the extent to which our evolutionary history, as opposed to our rational deliberation, determines what we do.
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Babbitt, Susan E. "Moral Naturalism and the Normative Question." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 26 (2000): 139–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2000.10717551.
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Moral naturalism, as I use the term here, is the view that there are moral facts in the natural world – facts that are both natural and normative – and that moral claims are true or false in virtue of their corresponding or not to these natural facts. Moral naturalists argue that, since moral claims are about natural facts, we can establish the truth about moral claims through empirical investigation. Moral knowledge, on this view, is a form of empirical knowledge.One objection to this metaethical view is that even if moral naturalists are correct in their claims about truth, they cannot answer the question of normativity. Jean Hampton, for instance, argues that it is not enough to explain the conduct's wrongness by showing it to be a property that necessarily supervenes on natural properties. For nothing in this analysis explains the relationship between these properties and us. The question is why should people care about these properties. Christine Korsgaard claims that moral realists take the normative question to be one about truth and knowledge.
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Green, Karen. "Restoring Catharine Macaulay’s Enlightenment Republicanism?" Dialogue and Universalism 31, no. 3 (2021): 39–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du202131344.
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Can Catharine Macaulay’s enlightenment democratic republicanism be justified from the point of view of contemporary naturalism? Naturalist accounts of political authority tend to be realist and pessimistic, foreclosing the possibility of enlightenment. Macaulay’s utopian political philosophy relies on belief in a good God, whose existence underpins the possibility of moral and political progress. This paper attempts a restoration of her optimistic utopianism in a reconciliation, grounded in a revision of natural law, of naturalist and utopian attitudes to political theory. It is proposed that the coevolution of language, moral law, and conscience (the disposition to judge one’s own actions in the light of moral principles) can be explained as solutions to the kinds of tragedy of the commons situations facing our ancestors. Moral dispositions evolved, but, in the light of its function, law is subject to rational critique. Liberal democracy plausibly offers the best prospect for developing rationally justifiable law.
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Copp, David. "Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 26 (2000): 30–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2000.10717548.
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Ethical naturalism is the doctrine that moral properties, such as moral goodness, justice, rightness, wrongness, and the like, are among the “natural” properties that things can have. It is the doctrine that moral properties are “natural” and that morality is in this sense an aspect of “nature.” Accordingly, it is a view about the semantics and metaphysics of moral discourse. For example, a utilitarian naturalist might propose that wrongness is the property an action could have of being such as to undermine overall happiness, where happiness is taken to be a psychological property. Unfortunately, it is unclear what the naturalist means by a “natural” property. For my purposes in this paper, I shall assume that natural properties are such that our knowledge of them is fundamentally empirical, grounded in observation. More precisely, a property is “natural” just in case any synthetic proposition about its instantiation can be known only a posteriori, or with the aid of experience.
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Campbell, Jennifer. "Irreducible Freedom in Nature." Philosophy 89, no. 2 (October 25, 2013): 301–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819113000752.
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AbstractI provide a novel response to scepticism concerning freedom and moral responsibility. This involves my extension to freedom of John McDowell's liberal natural approach to ethics and epistemology. I trace the source of the sceptical problem to an overly restrictive, brute conception of nature, where reality is equated with what figures, directly or indirectly, in natural scientific explanation. I challenge the all encompassing explanatory pretensions of restrictive naturalism, advocating a re-conception of nature such that it already incorporates reasons. This allows for an explanation of free actions which is not ultimately brute, but irreducibly normative. Against the backdrop of liberal naturalism I conceive freedom as an emergent capacity to respond to reasons which arises from the acquisition of language. I claim that freedom is a rational causal power to originate actions based within a naturalised ontology, which has sufficient depth to justify moral responsibility without begging ontological or epistemological questions.
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Dumsday, Travis. "Evidentially Compelling Religious Experiences and the Moral Status of Naturalism." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8, no. 3 (September 23, 2016): 123–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v8i3.1690.
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Religious experiences come in a variety of types, leading to multiple taxonomies. One sort that has not received much attention as a distinct topic is what I will call ‘evidentially compelling religious experience’ (ECRE). The nature of an ECRE is such that if it actually occurs, its occurrence plausibly entails the falsity of metaphysical naturalism. Examples of ECREs might include visions / auditions / near-death experiences conveying information the hearer could not have known through natural means, later verified; unambiguously miraculous healings; fulfilled prophecy; supernatural rescues; inter-subjective religious experiences (e.g., multiple people simultaneously having the same vision of the Virgin Mary), etc. After presenting a representative set of published case studies of ECREs, I argue that for most settled metaphysical naturalists (though not all), the combination of a settled metaphysical naturalism with an awareness of the relative commonality of testimony to ECREs is either irrational or immoral. This is because that conjunction entails either an unjust and uncharitable judgement on a great many of those testifying to ECREs (namely that they are liars), or an irrational refusal to acknowledge this entailment.
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Yahya, Mohd, Fathul Jannah, and Abdul Basid. "Terciptanya Generasi Emas dengan Pendekatan Realis Naturalisme (Kajian Filsafat Pendidikan)." JIIP - Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Pendidikan 6, no. 3 (March 1, 2023): 1831–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.54371/jiip.v6i3.1601.
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Pendidikan moral dan karakter kian mulai terabaikan dengan hadirnya perkembangan digitalisasi. Perlu adanya inovasi ke arah pendidikan agar karakter dan moral generasi lebih ke arah tujuan pendidikan nasional. Pendekatan realis naturalisme sebagai langkah pendekatan baru berbasis karakter merupakan sebuah model pembelajaran yang menyiapkan peserta didik bermoral dan berkarakter yang dibentuk dari lingkungan belajar. Tujuan penelitian: (1) mengetahui pandangan umum sistem pendidikan di Indonesia, (2) mengetahui penerapan sistem yang baik untuk generasi emas melalui pendekatan realis naturalisme. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif fenomenologi sosial, data yang dikumpulkan berasal dari kajian pustaka dan dokumentasi wawancara, yaitu data yang berasal dari wawancara berbagai sumber dan kajian bahan-bahan kepustakaan, berupa: ensiklopedi, buku-buku, artikel, dan karya ilmiah yang dimuat dalam media massa seperti majalah, surat kabar dan jurnal ilmiah serta penelitian yang dilakukan dengan terjun secara langsung ke lapangan tanpa melalui media informasi untuk memperoleh hasil pengembangan pendidikan karakter melalui pendekatan realis naturalis. Hasil dari penelitian ini adalah: (1) Sistem pendidikan di Indonesia mempunyai kelemahan dan kelebihannya masing-masing. (2) penerapan sistem yang baik untuk generasi emas meliputi; upgrade 4 unsur pendidikan, aktualisasi penerapan teknologi pada pendidikan, implementasi pendekatan realis naturalisme, dicipline theory, serta pembelajaran yang menyenangkan.
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Pettit, Philip. "Deux sources de la moralité." Philosophiques 28, no. 1 (October 2, 2002): 173–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/004967ar.
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Comment chercher à situer, dans l'expérience humaine, les termes ou les concepts moraux ? Autrement dit, où, dans l'expérience, la morale devient-elle saillante pour nous ? C'est par le biais d'une généalogie naturaliste qu'il nous faut envisager la problématique, dans la mesure où nous ne possédons pas un sens moral irréductible par lequel des propriétés morales irréductibles nous seraient connues. Je soutiens que si des sujets intentionnels n'ont nul besoin de disposer de concepts normatifs, il en sera autrement pour des créatures discursives. Ces dernières, afin de raisonner ensemble, devront avoir accès aux concepts normatifs inférentiels et c'est par deux voies distinctes qu'elles seront amenées à prendre note des considérations morales. La première engage les individus qui privilégient le discours, comme forme d'interaction ; la seconde, ceux qui étendent cette pratique discursive au domaine du sentiment. Le privilège accordé au discours et l'exercice discursif du sentiment constituent les deux sources distinctes d'une conceptualisation morale, évoquées dans le titre de cet article. Dans une brève conclusion, il est suggéré que les différents concepts qu'elles fournissent représentent des candidats attractifs rivaux pour la construction de la théorie morale.
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ANGEL, LEONARD. "Mystical naturalism." Religious Studies 38, no. 3 (September 2002): 317–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003441250200598x.
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This paper suggests that an ontologically reductionist view of nature which also accepts the completeness of causality at the level of physics can support (1) the blissful transfiguration of the moral, (2) mystical release from standard ego-identification, and (3) psycho-physical transformation cultivated through meditative practice. This mystical naturalism provides the basis for a thicker, more vigorous institutional religious life, including religious life centred around meditation practices, personalist meanings, and the theology of incarnation, than current proposals for strongly naturalist religions allow.
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Flage, Daniel E. "Locke and Natural Law." Dialogue 39, no. 3 (2000): 435–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300007496.
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RésuméL'auteur soutient que Locke, dans l'Essai, est un égoïste en éthique. Bien que la position de Locke à propos des modes mixtes implique que les vérités morales soient aussi démontrables que les mathématiques, elle apparaît incompatible avec les principes de base de la doctrine traditionnelle de la loi naturelle. Portant attention aux discussions mensés par Locke au sujet des tendances psychologiques en rapport avec ses conceptions du bien, du bien moral et de l'obligation, on soutient ici que Locke s'est fait le champion d'une forme d'égoïsme naturaliste qui fournit les bases de l'obligation morale et épistémique. L'article montre, en conclusion, comment l'égoïsme lockien fournit la base d'une théorie de la loi naturelle.
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Zhong, Lei. "Exclusion in Morality." Grazer Philosophische Studien 93, no. 2 (May 18, 2016): 275–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-09302002.
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Recently some philosophers (e.g. Shafer-Landau 2003; Wedgwood 2007) suggested an exclusion problem for moral non-naturalism, which is similar to the exclusion problem in philosophy of mind. In this article, the author aims to advance the discussion of exclusion in morality by investigating two influential solutions to the exclusion problem: the autonomy solution and the overdetermination solution. The author attempts to show that the moral non-naturalist can solve the exclusion problem in a way that is different from the approach to solving mental-physical exclusion. First, the author argues that while the autonomy solution to mental exclusion may work, a similar autonomy approach to moral exclusion is implausible. Second, the author argues that whereas the overdetermination solution to mental exclusion fails, a similar overdetermination solution to moral exclusion is promising.
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Sánchez Fernández, Luis Manuel. "¿Se origina la falacia en Hume?" Doxa. Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho, no. 30 (November 15, 2007): 635. http://dx.doi.org/10.14198/doxa2007.30.52.
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Este artículo está dirigido a interpretar el sentido de las afirmaciones de Hume sobre la relación entre proposiciones de ser y deber ser, en comparación con las implicancias de la llamada falacia naturalista postulada por G. E. Moore. El análisis revela que las teorías de ambos autores se hallan muy distantes la una de la otra. Más aún, de aceptarse la tesis de Moore, la primera en ser afectada vendría a ser la teoría de los sentimientos morales de Hume. Sobre esta base, el artículo sugiere que tanto la ley de Hume como la tesis de la falacia no son de por sí una valla invencible para algún tipo de naturalismo normativo.
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Gracia, Javier. "Crítica a la naturalización del deontologismo en la teoría del proceso dual del juicio moral de Joshua Greene." Isegoría, no. 58 (May 24, 2018): 205. http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2018.058.11.
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En este trabajo me propongo cuestionar la tesis neuroética de Joshua Greene acerca del carácter esencialmente emocional de los llamados “juicios morales deontológicos”. Centrándome en su teoría del proceso dual del juicio moral cuestiono que solo y principalmente los juicios morales deontológicos sean intuitivos y no reflexivos. En segundo lugar, cuestiono que el juicio utilitarista pueda ser asimilable al cálculo matemático y que el juicio deontológico se reduzca al factor no reflexivo de la emoción. La principal objeción que planteo al naturalismo de Greene es pretender eliminar la justificación filosófica acerca de la validez moral que lleva a cabo el deontologismo en Kant, reduciéndolo exclusivamente a factores psicológicos y neurofisiológicos vinculados con la emoción.
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Campbell, Joe. "P. F. Strawson’s Free Will Naturalism." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7, no. 1 (April 17, 2017): 26–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-006011220.
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This is an explication and defense of P. F. Strawson’s naturalist theory of free will and moral responsibility. I respond to a set of criticisms of the view by free will skeptics, compatibilists, and libertarians who adopt the core assumption: Strawson thinks that our reactive attitudes provide the basis for a rational justification of our blaming and praising practices. My primary aim is to explain and defend Strawson’s naturalism in light of criticisms based on the core assumption. Strawson’s critiques of incompatibilism and free will skepticism are not intended to provide rational justifications for either compatibilism or the claim that some persons have free will. Hence, the charge that Strawson’s “arguments” are faulty is misplaced. The core assumption resting behind such critiques is mistaken.
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Dambros, Bruno Rodrigo. "Naturalismo moral no Lucullus de M. T. Cícero: a virtutum cognitio e a perspicui adsensio contra o ceticismo de Carnéades de Cirene." Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences 40, no. 3 (November 27, 2018): 38238. http://dx.doi.org/10.4025/actascihumansoc.v40i3.38238.
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Neste artigo tratamos de dois trechos do texto Lucullus de Cícero – Lucullus VIII 23 e XII 38-39 – onde há a apresentação de dois importantes conceitos para a compreensão de sua querela com o ceticismo de Carnéades de Cirene, a saber, as noções de virtutum cognitio e de perspicui adsensio. Após uma introdução onde situamos o texto de Lucullus dentro do contexto dos Academica e de sua íntima relação com o tema da lex naturalis, na primeira seção mostramos como Cícero se alinha com a tese socrática sobre a relação entre conhecimento e virtude. Na segunda seção tratamos da virtutum cognitio como uma noção moral conatural prévia à especulação. E na terceira seção tratamos da perspicui adsensio como uma noção predecessora da ação moral. Concluímos reiterando que estes dois trechos em questão devem ser compreendidos dentro do tema geral da epistemologia moral ciceroniana, que inclui seu jusnaturalismo, pondo-o, assim, como um autêntico naturalista moral.
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Hédoin, Cyril. "Naturalism and Moral Conventionalism." Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 11, no. 1 (July 19, 2018): 50–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v11i1.246.
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This article provides a critical examination of Ken Binmore’s theory of the social contract in light of philosophical discussions about moral naturalism and moral conventionalism. Binmore’s account builds on the popular philosophical device of the original position but gives it a naturalistic twist. I argue that this makes it vulnerable to moral skepticism. I explore a possible answer to the moral skeptic’s challenge, building on the fact that Binmore’s account displays a variant of moral conventionalism. I ultimately conclude however that the conventionalist answer leads to a purely behaviorist view of morality, which implies that there is nothing special about morality and fairness norms. I propose alternative interpretations of conventionalism. These accounts escape most of the difficulties because they place emphasis on the reasons that establish a moral convention.
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Hampton, Jean. "Naturalism and Moral Reasons." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 21 (1995): 107–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1995.10717435.
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Why are traditional ‘objectivist’ theories of morality, such as those put forward by Aristotle, or Kant, or even Bentham, commonly thought not to pass ‘scientific muster’ insofar as they are not ‘naturalist’? My interest in this question is based on my being a moral objectivist, but answering this question is one that moral skeptics should be as interested in as I. The view that the commitments of science preclude us from accepting such theories is the basis of the moral skeptic's position. Yet showing what is wrong with a moral objectivist position is surprisingly difficult. It involves reflecting on what ‘scientific muster’ is supposed to be, and on why a theory is commonly thought to be disreputable unless it passes it. It also involves locating the ‘queer’ element in objectivist moral theory that makes it scientifically disreputable. Yet, as I hope to show in this article, there is no commonly accepted statement of what makes a theory scientifically acceptable or unacceptable, and (perhaps even more surprisingly) no rigorous account of what the queer component of objectivist moral theory is that makes any such theory scientifically unacceptable.
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Schönecker, Dieter. "SUPERNATURALISMO: DEUS E O MUNDO MORAL." Revista Dissertatio de Filosofia 39 (July 1, 2014): 93. http://dx.doi.org/10.15210/dissertatio.v39i0.8581.
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Esse paper pretende introduzir alguns argumentos no debate atual em Filosofia da Religião, especialmente na controvérsia contra o Naturalismo. Nossa abordagem irá focar no significado moral da ideia de Deus, bem como em outros conceitos morais relevantes, a saber, os conceitos de consciência moral, mundo moral e a ideia mesma de “bem”. Em suma, é nossa intenção demonstrar que a maioria de nossas ideias morais (tais quais vergonha, responsabilidade e similares) está relacionada a uma Pessoa: Deus. Essa conclusão, como pretendemos demonstrar, refuta o Naturalismo.
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Hanly, Charles. "La psychanalyse et les fondements de la morale." Dialogue 26, no. 4 (1987): 669–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300018254.
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La philosophie morale, pas moins que les autres branches de la philosophie, est caractérisée par des contradictions et des dichotomies (par exemple, le déterminisme versus la liberté, le naturalisme versus l'antinaturalisme, l'émotion versus la raison) qui aboutissent à des discussions sans fin. On garde l'impression que l'expérience morale doit être extrêmement individualisée; sans cela, comment des philosophes, également, sinon exceptionnellement, doués intellectuellement, en arrivent-ils à des conclusions aussi diverses quand ils réfléchissent à la question? Et le problème est plus qu'un problème intellectuel. La valeur de l'existence humaine et l'existence humaine elle-même dépendent de valeurs morales et d'impératifs selon lesquels l'homme dirige sa vie. Comprendre de façon cohérente et réaliste la moralité constitue un besoin perpétuellement urgent que la philosophie jusqu'à maintenant, du moins, n'a pu satisfaire.
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Couture, Jocelyne, and Kai Nielsen. "Afterword: Whither Moral Philosophy?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 21 (1995): 273–337. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1995.10717441.
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Most of the essays collected here are essays in metaethics seeking in exacting and interesting ways to resolve problems raised by the familiar options in metaethics we outlined in our Introduction. Richard Brandt, for example, forcefully argues, going much against the at least modestly holistic grain of our time, for a foundationalism (noncognitivist though it be) which would be foundational in both metaethics and normative ethics. R.M. Hare makes a brief but systematic defense, which is both spirited and clear, of his prescriptivism (a species of what we, following tradition, have called ‘noncognitivism,’ but which he argues should instead be called ‘nondescriptivism’). His arguments here for his position - call it nondescriptivism or noncognitivism- are directed forcefully against ethical naturalism (descriptivism) and specifically against the naturalism of Philippa Foot. Nicholas Sturgeon and David Copp contribute elaborate and rigorously argued defenses of ethical naturalism, or, as they might prefer to call it, ‘moral realism.’
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Hare, R. M. "How to Decide Moral Questions Rationally." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 18, no. 54 (December 10, 1986): 63–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1986.633.
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He aquí un falso dilema: o los juicios morales se han de equiparar con enunciados de hecho (descriptivismo), o el pensamiento moral no es de índole racional (emotivismo). Los dos únicos tipos posibles de descriptivismo, el naturalismo y el intuicionismo, se reducen al relativismo: el primero porque liga la corrección de los juicios morales a la conformidad con las reglas del lenguaje relativas a la cultura, y el segundo porque los liga con los hábitos de pensamiento y pautas de reacción producidas por la educación que, de igual forma, son relativas a la cultura. La solución del dilema estriba en buscar una forma racionalista de no descriptivismo, es decir una manera de que tenga lugar el razonamiento moral aun cuando los juicios morales no sean fácticos. Atender a las propiedades lógicas de los juicios morales, la prescriptividad y la universalizabilidad, lleva a una perspectiva kantiana en cuanto a la forma y utilitaria por lo que hace al contenido. Se salvan las objeciones comunes al utilitarismo separando el pensamiento moral en dos niveles: el intuitivo y el crítico, del cual procede el primero, según afirman los intuicionistas, pero el segundo puede usarse para justificar nuestras intuiciones y para resolver los conflictos entre ellas. En el Apéndice se comenta el artículo del profesor Putnam incluido en este mismo número de Crítica.
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Frolov, Konstantin G. "Naturalistic ontology and epistemology of moral facts." Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies 38, no. 2 (2022): 204–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2022.205.
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The paper presents an original version of the moral naturalism — a theory that combines moral realism and naturalistic empiricism. In the first section, I give initial definitions of the basic concepts for our study (such as moral realism, epistemological and metaphysical naturalism, supervenience) and clarify their meaning. In the second section, I present the main motivation for this study and those grounds on which we should try to defend both moral realism and naturalism. In the third section, we take a series of steps aimed at the explication of the logical form of moral facts. The advantage of the proposed logical form is that it allows us to argue that knowledge of such facts can be a result of knowledge of the physical properties of objects. This implies that moral realism and epistemological naturalism are compatible. In the fourth section, I demonstrate another feature of the proposed logical form: it is similar to the logical form of some other, much less controversial modal facts (such as, for example, facts about physical possibilities). This similarity allows us to propose some kind of analogy of Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility for moral facts. Doing so I show how moral facts can supervene on the totality of all physical facts. In the fifth section, I analyze the most serious problem for moral naturalism: Hume’s guillotine. In the sixth final section, I present the main argument of this paper and make some remarks.
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Norton, Bryan G. "Moral Naturalism and Adaptive Management." Hastings Center Report 26, no. 6 (November 1996): 24. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3528751.
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Campbell, R., and V. Kumar. "Pragmatic naturalism and moral objectivity." Analysis 73, no. 3 (July 1, 2013): 446–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant058.
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Majors, Brad. "QUASI-NATURALISM AND MORAL REALITY." Ratio 19, no. 1 (March 2006): 64–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00309.x.
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Yang, Sunny. "Naturalism, Moral Value and Normativity - Hume’s Naturalism and Neo-Sentimentalism -." Korean Journal of Philosophy 139 (May 31, 2019): 91–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.18694/kjp.2019.05.139.91.
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Miranda Rojas, Rafael. "Intuicionismo y cognitivismo: Sobre las verdades morales y la base intuitiva del juicio moral." Discusiones Filosóficas 23, no. 40 (January 1, 2022): 15–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.17151/difil.2022.23.40.2.
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El presente escrito argumenta que en la propuesta intuicionista desarrollada en Haidt (2001) no se distingue claramente una propuesta intuicionista de una propuesta emotivista. Esto supone un problema epistémico, pues la primera se comprende desde una perspectiva cognitivista,mientras que la segunda lo es desde una postura no cognitivista en el ámbito moral. Hay por tanto una tensión en los presupuestos de la propuesta intuicionista haidtiana, que inter alia Huemer (2005) discute desde una perspectiva racionalista moderada. Este escrito sostiene que elintuicionismo no supone un compromiso con la discusión entre objetivismo y subjetivismo moral, permitiendo de este modo una aproximación que permita un diálogo fructífero entre el emotivismo, el intuicionismo y el racionalismo en el estatus epistémico del juicio moral. Ello permite abordar la arista del estatuto moral desde una posición racionalista moderada, abierta a los aportes interdisciplinares y de este modo al naturalismo no reduccionista. Este análisis permite afirmar que sí hay verdades morales, siendo el foco de discusión objetivismo-subjetivismo más bien sobre el acceso a ellas, que del cuestionamiento de su existencia.
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Vogelmann, Rafael. "A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments." Manuscrito 40, no. 3 (September 2017): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2017.v40n3.rv.
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PESTANO, Sdnei Almeida. "Nietzsche: do niilismo ao naturalismo na moral." Estudos de Nietzsche 4, no. 660 (2013): 237. http://dx.doi.org/10.7213/estudosnietzsche.04.002.rs.02.
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Uzomah, Michael M. "The Ontological Basis and Justification of Law." PINISI Discretion Review 4, no. 1 (October 8, 2020): 151. http://dx.doi.org/10.26858/pdr.v4i1.15274.
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This paper responds to the linchpin and central problem of jurisprudence in all its variants (legal schools) which is the task of establishing the meaning, nature and validity of law. The notion of validity and obligation is not only crucial to the concept of law, but also essentially inalienable. In the naturalist perception of law as well as in the positivist explication of law, the notion of validity is given fundamental attention. However, the point of disagreement or conflict, between legal naturalism and legal positivism (which are the two most outstanding and contending legal thoughts) revolves around the question: Where exactly does or from where does the law acquire its obligatory or binding or legal force? Differently put, in what does the validity of the law subsists? What invests a legal stamp or seal on a piece of legislation? Or what confers legality on legal norms that justifies and commands their obedience? While the naturalist appeal to some extra-legal, moral and metaphysical elements as the foundation of the binding force and validity of law (the oughts), the legal positivist took a formal and empirical approach to the explanation of the obligation and validity of law (law as it is, without recourse to metaphysical or moral oughts, is valid and commands unconditional obedience). Consequently, as an attempt towards establishing the ontological nature and justification of law, this paper defends the naturalist jurisprudence. The paper argues that to properly configure the true nature of positive laws otherwise called the jurisprudential laws in relation to law per se, the philosopher transcend the formalistic and materialistic study of law (empirical and descriptive) to the transcendental (prescriptive) examination of law not just in its ontological descriptive dimension, but most essentially in relation to its normative or prescriptive form. In lieu, the paper further argue that consequent upon the prescriptive nature of the law of nature, and the concomitant rational nature of man, positive laws cannot but inexorably be morally biased. The methods adopted by the research include the expository analytic and prescriptive methods.
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Refini, Eugenio. "Bodily Passions: Physiognomy and Drama in Giovan Battista Della Porta." Renaissance and Reformation 40, no. 1 (July 21, 2017): 121–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.33137/rr.v40i1.28450.
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This article explores the intersections of physiognomic knowledge and drama in the works of Neapolitan naturalist and playwright Giovan Battista Della Porta (1535–1616). It first looks at references to theatre—classical drama in particular—in Della Porta’s writings on physiognomy, thus showing that Latin comic plays provided the naturalist with a gallery of stock characters able to summarize the alleged interdependence of physical and moral traits. The article then analyzes the various ways in which Della Porta—who was a prolific author of comedies—brought his physiognomic expertise into his own experience as a playwright. The study of these two different perspectives on the relation between physiognomy and drama reveals that, far from being a direct translation of physiognomic theories, Della Porta’s dramatic production deploys an ironic and almost paradoxical take on physiognomy that aims to challenge (if not actually subvert) the very principles of the discipline.
Cet article explore les interactions entre la physionomie et le drame dans les oeuvres du naturaliste et dramaturge napolitain Giovan Battista Della Porta (1535–1616). On examine d’abord les références que fait Della Porta au théâtre — en particulier à la tragédie classique — dans ses écrits sur la physionomie, avant de montrer que le théâtre comique latin a fourni au naturaliste une panoplie de personnages stéréotypés lui permettant de mettre en avant l’interdépendance présumée entre traits physiques et traits moraux. L’article poursuit en analysant les diverses façons dont Della Porta, auteur prolifique de comédies, a exploité dans son travail ses connaissances en physionomie et son expérience de dramaturge. L’étude de ces deux aspects de la relation entre physionomie et théâtre montre que l’oeuvre dramatique de Della Porta déploie une approche ironique et presque paradoxale de la physionomie qui, bien loin d’être une traduction littérale des théories physionomiques, vise à remettre en question, voire à inverser, les principes fondamentaux de cette discipline.
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FitzPatrick, William J. "Moral Progress for Evolved Rational Creatures." Analyse & Kritik 41, no. 2 (November 1, 2019): 217–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2019-0014.
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Abstract Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell have developed a rich ‘biocultural theory’ of the nature and causes of moral progress (and regress) for human beings conceived as evolved rational creatures with a nature characterized by ‘adaptive plasticity’. They characterize their theory as a thoroughly naturalistic account of moral progress, while bracketing various questions in moral theory and metaethics in favor of focusing on a certain range of more scientifically tractable questions under some stipulated moral and metaethical assumptions. While I am very much in agreement with the substance of their project, I wish to query and raise some difficulties for the way it is framed, particularly in connection with the claim of naturalism. While their project is clearly naturalistic in certain senses, it is far from clear that it is so in others that are of particular interest in moral philosophy, and these issues need to be more carefully sorted out. For everything that has been argued in the book, the theory on offer may be only a naturalistic component of a larger theory that must ultimately be non-naturalistic in order to deliver the robust sort of account that is desired. Indeed, there are significant metaethical reasons for believing this to be the case. Moreover, if it turns out that some of the assumptions upon which their theory relies require a non-naturalist metaethics (positing irreducibly evaluative or normative properties and facts) then even the part of the theory that might have seemed most obviously naturalistic, i.e., the explanation of how changes in moral belief and behavior have come about, may actually require some appeal to non-naturalistic elements in the end.
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Brogaard, Berit, and Michael Slote. "Against and For Ethical Naturalism." American Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 4 (October 1, 2022): 327–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.4.01.
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Abstract Moral realism and ethical naturalism are both highly attractive ethical positions but historically they have often been thought to be irreconcilable. Since the late 1980s defenders of Cornell Realism have argued that the two positions can consistently be combined. They make three constitutive claims: (i) Moral properties are natural kind properties that (ii) are identical to (or supervene) on descriptive functional properties, which (iii) causally regulate our use of moral terms. We offer new arguments against the feasibility of Cornell realism and then show that there is a way to be a naturalistic realist that avoids internal inconsistency and uniquely provides for moral normativity.
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Tropman, Elizabeth. "Naturalism and the New Moral Intuitionism." Journal of Philosophical Research 33 (2008): 163–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2008_1.
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Yu, Jiyuan. "Moral Naturalism in Stoicism and Daoism." Philosophical Inquiry 40, no. 1 (2016): 95–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philinquiry2016401-28.
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Levy, Sanford. "Metaethical Naturalism and Thick Moral Arguments." Philo 12, no. 1 (2009): 46–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philo20091214.
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Jordan, Matthew Carey. "Metaphysical Naturalism and Some Moral Realisms." Philo 14, no. 1 (2011): 5–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philo20111411.
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Viggiano, Andrea. "Ethical Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11, no. 2 (February 16, 2008): 213–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-007-9094-2.
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Crow, Daniel. "The Mystery of Moral Perception." Journal of Moral Philosophy 13, no. 2 (March 16, 2016): 187–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681053.
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Accounts of non-naturalist moral perception have been advertised as an empiricist-friendly epistemological alternative to moral rationalism. I argue that these accounts of moral perception conceal a core commitment of rationalism—to substantive a priori justification—and embody its most objectionable feature—namely, “mysteriousness.” Thus, accounts of non-naturalist moral perception do not amount to an interesting alternative to moral rationalism.
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Harvey, Martin. "Hobbes's Voluntarist Theory of Morals." Hobbes Studies 22, no. 1 (2009): 49–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187502509x415247.
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AbstractTwo interpretations of Hobbes's theory of morals dominate the subject: the Egoistic Reading (ER) and the Naturalist Reading (NR). According to ER, all of Hobbes's moral concepts are self-interested at their core. According to NR, Hobbes's Laws of Nature set down genuine moral obligations/virtues both inside of the state of nature and out. This article rejects both of these interpretations in favor of a Voluntarist Reading (VR). On this reading, morality is an artifact of human endeavor, specifically covenanting. Unlike both ER and NR, VR takes seriously Hobbes's claim that there is “no obligation on any man which ariseth not from some act of his own”.
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Devitt, Michael. "Realismo moral: una perspectiva naturalista." Areté 16, no. 2 (March 7, 2004): 185–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.18800/arete.200402.001.
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1. ¿Qué es el realismo moral? El artículo rechaza las respuestas habituales (Sayre-McCord, Railton) en términos de verdad y significado. Estas respuestas estándares están parcialmente motivadas por el fenómeno del no-cognitivismo. Ciertamente el no-cognitivismo es problemático para formular una respuesta abiertamente metafísica, no obstante es posibleformular tal respuesta. 2. ¿Por qué creer en el realismo moral? Él es prima facie plausible, mientras que sus alternativas no lo son. Preocupación central: ¿cómo se puede lograr que el realismo moral coincida con una perspectiva naturalista del mundo? 3. ¿Y qué sucede con los argumentos en contra del realismo moral? El artículo analiza críticamente el argumentoproveniente de la “extrañeza”, el proveniente de la relatividad, el proveniente de la explicación, así como los argumentos epistemológicos. 4. El artículo concluye con algunas observaciones breves e insuficientes sobre la realización del proyecto naturalista.
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Estany, Anna. "Naturalización de la ética y la moral." Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso, no. 19 (July 6, 2022): 293–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp293-312.
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El abordaje de cuestiones como el bien y el mal desde la filosofía nos lleva a especificar lo que se entiende por ética y por moral. Canónicamente, la ética es una rama de la filosofía que estudia y sistematiza dichos conceptos y tiene como objetivo definir de forma racional qué constituye un acto bueno o virtuoso, independientemente de la cultura en la que se enmarque. La moral se define como el conjunto de normas que rigen el comportamiento de las personas que forman parte de una sociedad determinada, contribuyendo así al mantenimiento de la estabilidad y de la estructura social. A partir de estas definiciones, la naturalización consiste en buscar fundamentos en las ciencias empíricas para justificar los principios morales. El objetivo de este trabajo es ver cómo las disciplinas científicas pueden aportar conocimientos que fundamenten la ética y los principios morales, un proyecto basado en la naturalización de la filosofía, cuestionando cualquier apriorismo que haga caso omiso de la ciencia. En primer lugar, se examinará el programa naturalizador y sus principales variantes en la filosofía. En segundo lugar, se analizarán dos propuestas desde la filosofía de la ciencia que pueden enmarcarse en el naturalismo, a saber: Philip Kitcher y Patricia S. Churchland. A continuación, se abordarán algunas de las principales tesis que proporcionan explicación científica del comportamiento humano desde el punto de vista de las virtudes morales.
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Larmore, Charles. "L’autonomie de la morale." Interventions 24, no. 2 (August 7, 2007): 313–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/027453ar.
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RÉSUMÉ L'auteur défend la thèse selon laquelle la morale constitue un domaine de valeur irréductible. Il n'existe à l'extérieur de la morale aucun point de vue d'où la raison peut nous amener à une juste intelligence de la nature de la vie morale. Cette thèse est développée non seulement contre la perspective hobbésienne, mais aussi contre certains aspects centraux de la pensée kantienne. Au lieu d'une morale de l'autonomie, c'est en effet l'autonomie de la morale qu'il faut embrasser. Une telle conception exige pourtant que l'on abandonne une des plus grandes idéologies philosophiques de notre époque, à savoir l'image naturaliste du monde.