Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Naturalismo morale'

Il considerevole sviluppo degli studi nel campo delle neuroscienze verificatosi nel corso degli ultimi decenni, costituisce un fenomeno assai rilevante sia sul piano scientifico che su quello filosofico, in quanto contribuisce a modificare e ridefinire l’immagine tradizionale dell’essere umano e segnala l’opportunità di tornare ad interrogarci in merito alla legittimità e alla fondatezza di talune categorie concettuali largamente diffuse all’interno della riflessione filosofica inerente la “natura umana”, l’etica e il diritto Seguendo questa prospettiva di fondo, la ricerca prende le mosse da un’analisi sistematica di alcune tra le più importanti definizioni elaborate nel quadro della metaetica analitica novecentesca -quali, ad esempio, la legge di Hume e la fallacia naturalistica- le quali vengono troppo spesso invocate allo scopo di distinguere e tenere separati tra loro i due campi della ricerca scientifica di tipo empirico e della riflessione etica, onde evitare di incorrere nell’errore di fallacia naturalistica, oppure di infrangere la cosiddetta legge di Hume. Nella prima parte del lavoro, quindi, vengono esposte e discusse alcune tra le più importanti ragioni per cui l’utilizzazione delle suddette definizioni al fine di dimostrare l’impossibilità di una riflessione etica fondata sui risultati provenienti dall’attuale ricerca scientifica, risulta essere spesso fuorviante e poco costruttiva; al contrario : lo sviluppo delle neuroscienze sta oggi aprendo nuovi e significativi orizzonti di ricerca e di riflessione proprio nell’ambito della riflessione etica e giuridica. La seconda parte del lavoro è dedicata ad una ricostruzione dei presupposti secondo i quali è possibile sostenere l’assoluta legittimità di una riflessione etica e giuridica fondata su un naturalismo di tipo scientifico. Fin dai tempi di Darwin, infatti, il dibattito sulle origini evolutive dei comportamenti morali ha suscitato accese controversie, subendo spesso anche delle distorsioni di tipo politico-ideologico le quali erano ben lontane dal pensiero di Darwin stesso. Gli attuali sviluppi della ricerca in questo campo, ad ogni modo, hanno fatto luce su molti equivoci e hanno messo in evidenza la fondamentale correttezza di molte delle intuizioni darwiniane, rendendo così possibile inquadrare i comportamenti etici e giuridici in un contesto di riferimento come quello costituito da una storia naturale dell’evoluzione umana. Nell’ultima parte, la ricerca prende in considerazione alcune tra le principali implicazioni che i nuovi orientamenti emergenti dalle neuroscienze comportano in merito ad alcuni concetti chiave del pensiero etico e giuridico tra cui, ad esempio, quelli di valore, di libero arbitrio, di responsabilità penale, di giustizia e di ordine sociale. Per concludere, con le parole dello stesso Darwin : “molta luce sarà fatta sull’origine dell’uomo e sulla sua storia”.
The substantial development of research in the field on neurosciences which has taken place in the course of the last decades points out a remarkable advancement, from both a scientific and philosophical point of view, contributing to a broad redefinition of the traditional representations of the “human being” and, likewise, it suggests the need to reconsider some conceptual categories concerning human nature, ethics and the law, that are widely employed in the philosophical debate. Following this basic perspective, the exposition starts with an investigation concerning some of the most meaningful concepts which were developed in the realm of Analytic Metaethics -such as the Hume’s law or the naturalistic fallacy- which are often used to keep separate the two domains of empirical science and moral philosophy, under the menace of committing the error of naturalistic fallacy or infringing the tenets of the Hume’s law. Therefore, in the first part of this work, some issues will be discussed in order to show that the traditional notions of Hume’s law and naturalistic fallacy are highly contentious in themselves and, moreover, they do not offer any reliable foundations to support the hypothesis that moral philosophy and empirical science are, and should be kept, necessarily detached from one another; on the contrary : the current development of neurosciences is beginning to open new horizons for philosophical and legal thinking. The second part of the work aims to provide an essential reconstruction of some major perspectives, endorsing the pertinence of a scientifically based form of naturalism in relation to the study of ethics and the law. As a matter of fact, since the times of Darwin the debate concerning the evolutionary origins of moral behaviour has been greatly controversial and, worse still, it has been also strongly affected by many ideological and political arguments which were well away from the thought of Darwin himself. Nevertheless, the current research in this field has made clear that most of Darwin’s intuitions were fundamentally correct, and therefore the origins of moral and legal behaviour can be adequately investigated and accounted for on the basis of a natural history of human evolution. Finally, the discussion takes into consideration some of the most significant implications deriving from the new orientations in the field of neurosciences, and evaluates their main consequences with regard to a few key concepts of moral and legal thinking, such as those of values, free will and criminal responsibility, justice and social order. To conclude with a few words from Darwin himself : “much light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history”.

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This study seeks to address the relevance of moral sentiments for moral responsibility attribution through reactive theory of Peter Strawson and his critics. The central thesis which I try to hold onto is that the attribution of moral responsibility is something quite complex, it is related to how we respond the actions of the agents, but also involves the rational capacity of reflective self-control agent, being able to present reasons for his action and be able to control his desires. Thus, the morally responsible agent is one that is motivated by his desires, but he is able to reason morally on what the consequences of his action. In other words, be a responsible person involves having social competence to act in accordance with moral norms, but also be able to reflect on his practice, so a subject with normal cognitive powers and able to regulate his beliefs and desires. Given the cultural pluralism, we note that there is a symmetrical relationship between the moral sentiments and moral beliefs, so that the moral sentiments may be influenced by moral beliefs we form throughout our life as well as moral beliefs are formed from feelings. These moral beliefs may be revised or regulated, this review may come from the acquisition of new information, which may come from comparing our set of beliefs with the set of beliefs of another culture. But this regulation of moral beliefs is the result of an evolutionary process that our species suffered, which it has made over the years, people could improve their way of working with the others, and also be able to autonomously question whether certain beliefs are in fact true. What I propose is that science is an ally of ethics, and scientific explanations can contribute to a better understanding of what is morally right and wrong. Understanding our human nature we become more able to 'see' the world differently and realize that certain emotions can contribute to our social life. In this way, we can realize that it makes no sense to continue resentful of someone in a situation which the agent has good grounds for leaving to feel such a feeling. Realizing this we can notice the complexity of our human species and how much we still need to advance the field of morality, seeking a moral improvement that does not happen only in the context of standards, but mostly at maturity that allows being able to analyze the circumstances and the reasons for the action with greater discernment. To defend such a position, I will use Strawson reactive theory, and criticism raised to such a theory by Wallace (1994), Russell (2002) and Fischer and Ravizza (1998), namely that Strawson fails to present a rational capacity guide the allocation of moral responsibility. The solution to this problem is to defend the rational capacity, as well as the social competence of the agent, it is a necessary condition to consider the morally responsible people, including the rational capacity of the agent is what allows him to reflect on his social practice. To better assess these issues it is necessary an analysis of the moral psychology and knowledge to know about the way people in their daily lives assess the actions of the agents and consequently assign moral responsibility to them. So my goal is to show how proposal of Strawson is still relevant to discussions about attribution of moral responsibility, as well as propose a progress in discussion on this topic by means of a moral realist naturalist position.
O presente estudo busca tratar da relevância dos sentimentos morais para a atribuição de responsabilidade moral, através da teoria reativa de Peter Strawson e de seus críticos. A tese central, a qual procuro sustentar, é que a atribuição de responsabilidade moral é algo bastante complexo, está relacionada à forma como reagimos frente às ações dos agentes, mas também envolve a capacidade racional do agente de autocontrole reflexivo, estando apto em apresentar razões para a sua ação e ser capaz de frear os seus desejos. Desse modo, o agente moralmente responsável é aquele que se sente motivado por seus desejos, mas é capaz de raciocinar moralmente sobre quais seriam as consequências da sua ação. Em outras palavras, ser uma pessoa responsável envolve ter competência social para agir de acordo com as normas morais, mas também ser capaz de refletir sobre a sua prática, ou seja, um sujeito com suas capacidades cognitivas normais e capaz de regular as suas crenças e desejos. Dado o pluralismo cultural, podemos notar que há uma relação simétrica entre os sentimentos morais e as crenças morais, de modo que os sentimentos morais podem ser influenciados pelas crenças morais que formamos ao longo de nossa vida, bem como as crenças morais serem formadas a partir dos sentimentos. Essas crenças morais podem ser revisadas ou reguladas, essa revisão pode vir da aquisição de novas informações, que podem vir da comparação de nosso conjunto de crenças com o conjunto de crenças de outra cultura. Mas também essa regulação das crenças morais é resultado de um processo evolutivo que sofreu a nossa espécie, que fez com que, ao longo dos anos, as pessoas pudessem aprimorar o seu modo de conviver com as demais e também ser capaz de autonomamente questionar se determinadas crenças são, de fato, verdadeiras. O que proponho é que a ciência é uma aliada da ética, sendo que as explicações científicas podem contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do que é correto e incorreto moralmente. Compreendendo a nossa natureza humana, tornamo-nos mais aptos a ver o mundo de maneira diferente e perceber que certas emoções podem contribuir para a nossa vida social. Dessa maneira, podemos dar-nos conta de que não faz sentido continuar ressentido com alguém numa situação em que o agente apresenta boas razões para que deixemos de sentir tal sentimento. Perceber isso faz com que notemos a complexidade de nossa espécie humana e o quanto ainda precisamos avançar no campo da moralidade, buscando um aprimoramento moral que não se dá apenas no âmbito de normas, mas principalmente na maturidade que permite sermos capazes de analisar as circunstâncias e as razões para a ação com maior discernimento. Para defender tal posição, utilizarei a teoria reativa de Strawson e a crítica levantada a tal teoria feita por Wallace (1994), Russell (2002) e Fischer e Ravizza (1998), a saber, que Strawson falha em apresentar uma capacidade racional que guie a atribuição de responsabilidade moral. A solução para tal problema é defender que a capacidade racional, assim como a competência social do agente, é uma condição necessária para considerar as pessoas moralmente responsáveis, inclusive a capacidade racional do agente é que lhe permite refletir sobre a sua prática social. Para avaliar melhor tais questões, faz-se necessária uma análise sobre questões de psicologia moral e de conhecimento moral, para saber como as pessoas, no seu cotidiano, avaliam as ações dos agentes e, consequentemente, atribuem-lhes responsabilidade moral. Portanto, o meu objetivo é mostrar como a proposta strawsoniana continua sendo relevante para as discussões sobre a atribuição de responsabilidade moral, mas também apresentar uma proposta de avanço na discussão sobre esse tema através de uma posição naturalista realista moral.

Orientador: Márcia Azevedo de Abreu
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem
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Resumo: O critério moralizante, presente de maneira inconteste enquanto elemento de atribuição de valor dos romances produzidos em meados do século XIX no Brasil, também esteve presente na literatura naturalista. Essa constatação, nada óbvia se considera a crítica sobre o naturalismo produzida durante todo o século XX, ampara-se tanto na recepção crítica dos romances naturalistas contemporânea ao seu lançamento, quanto na elaboração teórica do escritor Émile Zola. Ao se deter no tema da moral enquanto critério avaliativo da literatura de finais do XIX, o presente trabalho procura também explicar a relação que a literatura e o naturalismo guardaram com a idéia de natureza, muito presente nas discussões que envolveram a tarefa de representação da realidade que seria própria ao naturalismo. Ele propõe ainda uma leitura dos romances Bom- Crioulo, A carne e Livro de uma sogra, a partir das discussões teóricas tratadas na tese
Abstract: The moral criterion for evaluating the literature, unchallenged while the mid-nineteenth century in Brazil, was also present in the literature naturalist. This finding, nothing obvious if one considers the criticism on naturalism produced throughout the twentieth century, is supported by both the critical reception of contemporary naturalistic novels, as the theoretical elaboration of the writer Émile Zola. By dwelling on the theme of morality as a criterion of evaluation literature from the late nineteenth, this thesis also seeks to explain the relationship that literature and naturalism kept with the idea of nature, very present in discussions involving the task of representing reality that would be proper to naturalism. He also proposes a reading of the novels Bom-Crioulo, A carne e Livro de uma sogra, taking into account the theoretical discussions addressed in the thesis
Doutorado
Historia e Historiografia Literaria
Doutor em Teoria e História Literária

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2017.
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O naturalismo moral é a teoria metaética que sustenta que fatos e propriedades morais são fatos e propriedades naturais. Desde que G. E. Moore apresentou o seu argumento da questão aberta, tem havido várias críticas a essa teoria, o que fez com que os filósofos articulassem várias teorias metaéticas alternativas ao naturalismo, tais como intuicionismo, emotivismo, prescritivismo e a teoria do erro. Mas a partir da década de oitenta David Brink, Richard Boyd e Nicholas Sturgeon desenvolveram uma nova versão do naturalismo moral ? o naturalismo não reducionista ? que, argumentativamente, evita essas objeções e apresenta inúmeras outras vantagens. O resultado foi uma reascensão do realismo moral naturalista. No entanto, dois filósofos formularam uma objeção ao naturalismo não reducionista, que ficou conhecida como ?Argumento da Terra Gêmea Moral?, que tem gerado bastante discussão. O objetivo deste trabalho é reconstruir as linhas principais desse debate mostrando que: o naturalismo não reducionista realmente tem boas respostas a algumas críticas frequentes, tais como o argumento da questão aberta de Moore, a reformulação de Hare deste argumento, à objeção construtivista, à crítica de relativismo, ao argumento do desacordo moral etc; e que, mesmo que o argumento da terra gêmea moral seja o seu principal problema, o que parece ser o caso, há algumas estratégias de respostas possíveis a favor do naturalista.

Abstract : Moral naturalism is the metaethical theory that maintains that moral facts and properties are natural facts and properties. Since G. E. Moore presented his open question argument there have been several critiques to this theory, which made the philosophers articulate several alternative metaethical theories to naturalism as intuitionism, emotivism, prescriptivism and the error theory. But from the eighties David Brink, Richard Boyd and Nicholas Sturgeon developed a new version of moral naturalism ? the non reductionist naturalism ? that, arguably, avoids these objections and it have numerous another advantages. The result was a resurrection of naturalistic moral realism. However, two philosophers formulated an objection to non reductionist naturalism that became known as ?Moral Twin Earth Argument? that has generated much discussion. The objective of this work is to reconstruct the main lines of this debate showing that: the non reductionist naturalism really have good replies to some frequent critiques such as Moore?s open question argument, Hare?s reformulation of this argument, the constructivist?s objection, the critique of relativism, to the moral disagreement?s argument etc; and that, even if the moral twin earth argument be its main problem, what looks to be the case, there are some possible response strategies in favor of the naturalist.

My aim is to challenge recent attempts at reconciling moral realism and naturalism by pushing ethical naturalists into a dilemma. According to one horn of the dilemma, ethical naturalists must either (a) build unique facts and properties about divergent social structures (or varying moral belief systems) into their subvenient sets of natural facts and properties, and so jeopardize the objectivity of moral truths, or (b) insist, in the face of all possible worlds in which people have different moral beliefs than ours, that they are all mistaken—this despite the fact that the belief-forming mechanism responsible for their moral beliefs was never concerned with the truth of those beliefs in the first place. This will bring me to suggest that moral properties might only weakly supervene upon natural phenomena. But, according to the other horn of the dilemma, weak supervenience is a defeater for moral knowledge.

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Este trabalho investiga o naturalismo moral contemporâneo a partir das variadas formulações do argumento conhecido como a falácia naturalista, assim como do contraponto de algumas teorias não-naturalistas, em especial a de G. E. Moore. Parto da análise destas formulações do argumento no contexto formal da metaética contemporânea, buscando aferir a validade da falácia naturalista no contexto atual, bem como de seus limites na aplicação contra o naturalismo moral. Apresento então o naturalismo moral numa versão humeana, que sugere uma abordagem descritivista da moralidade, em oposição ao viés prescritivista. Trabalho as origens do naturalismo e apresento algumas posições em metaética a fim de melhor entender a situação contemporânea do debate moral no que tange à naturalização da ética, contrastando teorias da ação e do valor quanto ao tema da motivação e da normatividade morais.
This work addresses contemporary moral naturalism from the investigation of an array of formulations of the argument known as the naturallistic fallacy, as from the contrast of a few non-naturalistic theories, especially G. E. Moore’s. Proceeding from the analysis of such formulations of the argument in the formal context of contemporary metaethics, attempting to assert the validity of the naturallistic fallacy in the current context, as so its limits in its application against moral naturalism. Then I am going to present moral naturalism in a humean version, which suggests a descriptivist naturalism instead of a prescriptivist one. Such origins of naturalism will be worked with and some positions in metaethics to further understand of the contemporary situation of the moral debate concerning the naturalization of ethics will be presented, contrasting theories of action and of value on the matter of moral motivation and normativity.

This thesis investigates the prospects of a position in metaethics called moral naturalism. Moral naturalism can be summarized as two claims. First, moral naturalism is a form of moral realism, which states that there are true moral claims that hold irrespectively of a person’s attitudes or beliefs. Second, moral naturalism claims that these moral claims are about properties that are part of the natural world. The central challenge facing moral naturalism is to explain how these moral properties fit into the natural world. Are moral properties reducible to, or identical with, natural properties? If so, is there a semantic explanation for why moral properties are related to some natural properties, and not others? Two major arguments, the Open Question Argument and the Moral Twin Earth Argument, have suggested that such a semantic explanation is not possible, which would make moral naturalism an implausible position to hold. This thesis investigates the prospects for moral naturalism by assessing the success of these arguments. The conclusions offered in this thesis are conservative. Both arguments turn out to depend on controversial, yet plausible, assumptions. In the case of the Open Question Argument, I argue that the success of the argument is sensitive to the form of moral naturalism under consideration; while it is fairly clear that it succeeds against reductive moral naturalism, it is less clear that it undermines non-reductive moral naturalism. It is clearer that the Moral Twin Earth Argument is successful, but it cannot categorically rule out every semantic explanation that the moral naturalist might advance.

This thesis considers Kant's departure from moral naturalism. In doing so, it explores the relationship between ethics, naturalism, normativity and freedom. Throughout this exploration, I build the case that Kant's ethics of autonomy allows us to make better sense of ethics than Hume's moral naturalism. Hume believes that morality is ultimately grounded in human nature. Kant finds this understanding of ethics limiting. He insists that we are free - we can critically reflect upon our nature and (to an extent) alter it accordingly. This freedom, I contend, renders the moral naturalist's appeal to nature lacking. Of course, a Kantian conception of freedom - some form of independence from the causal order - is fairly unpopular in contemporary circles. In particular, a commitment to naturalism casts doubt on such a notion of freedom. I argue with Kant that such a conception of freedom is essential to the conception of ourselves as rational agents. The critical turn, unlike naturalism, warrants this conception of freedom, accommodating the point of view of our rational agency. It thus allows Kant's ethics of autonomy to better grasp certain key elements of morality - normativity and our agency - than Hume's moral naturalism.

This thesis addresses the question of whether morality needs to be grounded in theory of human nature. I argue that it does not. Two pressures incline us towards the view that morality must be grounded in such a theory. The first of these is the thought that the absence of belief in a divine law giver creates special problems for the putative authority of moral considerations. If we are to avoid moral scepticism, so this line of thought goes, we must show how moral requirements serve or express our natural purposes. The second pressure is the observation that moral codes vary based on contexts (environmental and cultural) in ways that are too uniform to be accidental. An ethical theory is naturalistic if it denies that morality depends on the existence of God, and accommodates the intuition that morality is necessarily connected to human ends. I describe these pressures, focussing on an example of an individual (Mary) who declares themselves morally incapable of acting in a certain way. I explain why there is a problem in accommodating this modal appeal within the structures of practical deliberative inference. I then go on to describe what I take to be the distinctive features of moral experience. These include our confidence in moral requirements, their importance within our lives, their inescapability and our inability to resent them. These features are explained from the points of view of the agent and recipient, and in relation to both past and future circumstances. I then ask whether it is possible to accommodate a view of morality with these distinctive features within a non-sceptical naturalistic framework. I consider more carefully what moral naturalism requires. I distinguish between romantic and non-romantic approaches to the grounding of moral norms, and formal and material varieties of these approaches. I distinguish between romantic and non-romantic approaches to the grounding of moral norms, and formal and material varieties of these approaches. I suggest that formal non-romanticism (FNR) provides a way of grounding moral requirements which is naturalistic but which does not depend on the provision of a theory of human nature. On this view, moral necessities are sui generis and are grounded in an awareness of the presence of another human being. FNR is compared and contrasted to the dominant contemporary forms of moral naturalism. These are Kantianism, Humeanism and Aristotelianism. In general, these positions share a commitment to grounding moral claims on the deliverances of theory. Therefore I dub this family of views theoretical naturalism (TN). I explain what ’theory’ means in this context, and show how such views account for Mary’s appeal to moral necessity. Within the family of theoretical naturalism, Humeanism and Aristotelianism form a distinctive sub-set which I call rationalism. I compare and contrast their views, arguing that underlying their approaches is a shared presumption that an account of ethics is complete insofar as we have a full account of the panoply of human ends and the most effective means to their satisfaction. Having explained the various alternatives available, I show that FNR is superior to its rivals. I argue that TN in general, in virtue of its conception of the role of theory in morality, cannot accommodate the fineness of morally good deeds. Turning to the work of writers in the Wittgensteinian tradition I show how ethics is dependent on a sense of the human condition, rather than on a theory of human nature. In other words, to explain the fineness of fine deeds and the vileness of bad ones we need to aver to considerations about what it means for an individual to have been wronged, what pathos it has given our sense of life and what may come of it.

1. ¿Qué es el realismo moral? El artículo rechaza las respuestas habituales (Sayre-McCord, Railton) en términos de verdad y significado. Estas respuestas estándares están parcialmente motivadas por el fenómeno del no-cognitivismo. Ciertamente el no-cognitivismo es problemático para formular una respuesta abiertamente metafísica, no obstante es posibleformular tal respuesta. 2. ¿Por qué creer en el realismo moral? Él es prima facie plausible, mientras que sus alternativas no lo son. Preocupación central: ¿cómo se puede lograr que el realismo moral coincida con una perspectiva naturalista del mundo? 3. ¿Y qué sucede con los argumentos en contra del realismo moral? El artículo analiza críticamente el argumentoproveniente de la extrañeza”, el proveniente de la relatividad, el proveniente de la explicación, así como los argumentos epistemológicos. 4. El artículo concluye con algunas observaciones breves e insuficientes sobre la realización del proyecto naturalista.

Cognitivismo Avaliativo Descritivista é a tese segundo a qual atribuições de valor pretendem descrever aspectos da realidade. Segundo essa tese, ser valioso não é senão instanciar certa propriedade ou participar de certa relação. O esforço de reflexão e discussão avaliativa é concebido como um esforço para ajustar nossas convicções avaliativas à realidade, e quando este esforço é bem-sucedido obtermos conhecimento avaliativo. Atribuições de valor se distinguem de outras proposições descritivas apenas em razão do caráter peculiar dos aspectos da realidade dos quais se ocupa. O objetivo da presente dissertação é objetar a este tese. Cabe ao defensor do Cognitivismo Descritivista delimitar a região da realidade da qual tratam atribuições de valor. É por referência a ela que o cognitivista deve explicar os traços distintivos do juízo de valor. Há duas alternativas disponíveis: ou juízos de valor dizem respeito a um reino de fatos que transcendem a realidade natural ou dizem respeito a fatos naturais. No primeiro capítulo argumento que o Cognitivismo em sua forma Não-Naturalista não pode dar conta da covariação do valor. A covariação consiste no fato de diferenças em valor sempre são acompanhadas de diferenças não-avaliativas. Esta é uma restrição à qual nossas atribuições de valor se conformam, mas não podemos dar sentido a ela se assumimos a verdade do Cognitivismo Não-Naturalista. O Cognitivismo Descritivista deve, portanto, assumir uma forma Naturalista. No segundo capítulo argumento a única razão para preferir o Cognitivismo Naturalista a caracterizações alternativas do juízo de valor consiste no fato de que essa tese promete dar conta da objetividade de atribuições de valor segundo certa concepção de objetividade Segundo esta concepção só são objetivos aqueles aspectos da realidade acessíveis em abstração de qualquer perspectiva particular, incluída aí a perspectiva caracterizada pela propensão a certas respostas comportamentais e afetivas que adquirimos ao longo de nossa educação moral. Argumento que esta concepção de objetividade não se sustenta e que, portanto, não temos nenhuma razão para adotar o Cognitivismo Naturalista. No terceiro capítulo argumento que, mesmo que tivéssemos alguma razão para supor que atribuições de valor consistem na descrição de aspectos naturais da realidade, esta caracterização do juízo de valor também falha em dar conta de um traço distintivo de tais juízos, qual seja, a restrição à terceirização de juízos de valor. A restrição à terceirização consiste no fato de que o parecer de pretensos especialistas em valor não pode fornecer razão para aceitar certo juízo de valor. Usualmente o parecer de especialistas pode fornecer razão para adotar juízos descritivos, e se assumimos que atribuições de valor descrevem aspectos naturais da realidade não podemos dar conta dessa restrição. Concluo que devemos recusar o Cognitivismo Descritivista.
Descriptive Evaluative Cognitivism is the thesis according to which ascriptions of value aim at describing features of reality. According to this thesis, to be valuable is just to instantiate some property or to take part in some relation. The effort of evaluative reflection and discussion is conceived as an effort to adjust our evaluative convictions to reality, and if we succeed in this effort we obtain evaluative knowledge. Ascriptions of value distinguish themselves from other descriptive propositions in virtue of the peculiar character of the features of reality they aim to describe. The goal of this dissertation is to present an objection to this thesis. The defender of Descriptive Cognitivism must specify the domain of reality ascriptions of value are about. It is by reference to it that the cognitivist must explain the distinctive traits of value judgments. There are two available options: either value judgments are about a domain of facts that transcends natural reality, or they are about natural facts. In the first chapter I argue that Cognitivism in its Non-naturalistic form cannot account for the covariation of value. Covariation consists in the fact that differences in value are always accompanied by non-evaluative differences. Our ascriptions of value comply with this constraint, but we cannot make sense of it if we assume that Non-naturalist Cognitivism is correct. Descriptive Cognitivism must, therefore, adopt a Naturalistic form. In the second chapter I argue that the only reason to prefer Naturalist Cognitivism to alternative characterizations of value judgments is the fact that it can account for the objectivity of value ascriptions according to a certain conception of objectivity According to this conception, only those features of reality accessible in abstraction from any particular perspective, including the perspective characterized by the propensity to certain behavioral and affective responses that we acquire during our moral education, are objective. I argue that this conception of objectivity does not hold and that, therefore, we have no reason to accept Naturalist Cognitivism. In the third chapter I argue that even if we had some reason to suppose that ascriptions of value consist in the description of natural aspects of reality, this characterization of value judgments also fails to account for a distinctive feature of such judgments - the restriction on the outsourcing of value judgments. The restriction on outsourcing consists in the fact that the opinion of would-be value experts cannot provide a reason to accept a certain value judgment. Usually the expert opinion can provide a reason to accept descriptive judgments, and if we assume that ascriptions of value describe natural features of reality, then we cannot account for this restriction. I conclude that we must reject Descriptive Cognitivism.

Ce travail cherche à répondre à la question : pourquoi sommes-nous moraux ? Il s'appuie sur deux approches. La première, naturaliste, reprend la tradition du sens moral (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, et Adam Smith) et cherche à expliquer la morale à l'aide des outils des sciences naturelles (en particulier la théorie de l'évolution et la psychologie cognitive). La seconde, mutualiste, correspond à la tradition du contrat social (Hobbes, Rousseau ou Rawls) et considère les rapports moraux comme des rapports mutuellement avantageux. Ce travail se démarque donc à la fois des théories non naturalistes (comme les théories culturalistes ou les théories du choix rationnel) et des théories naturalistes non mutualistes (comme les théories de la sélection de groupe ou les théories basées sur les sentiments). Il montre comment, dans un grand nombre de situations morales (justice, assistance mutuelle, dilemme moral, jeux économiques, faute sans victime, limites de la communauté morale), les jugements comme les comportements s'expliquent mieux dans un cadre naturaliste et mutualiste
Why are we moral? This work relies on two approaches. The naturalist approach comes from the tradition of moral sense (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Adam Smith) and aims at explaining morality with the help of tools coming from natural sciences (evolutionary theory, cognitive psychology). The mutualist approach comes from the social contract tradition (Hobbes, Rousseau and Rawls) et see moral relationships as mutually advantageous interactions. Thus, this work distances oneself from non naturalist theories of morality ( culturalist theories, rational choice theories) and fron non mutualist theories (group selection or altruistic theories, sentimentalist or continuiste theories). This works shows that numerous moral situations (justice, solidarity, moral dilemmas, economic games, crimes without victim) are better explained in a naturalist and mutualist framework

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia.
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Segundo Hume, a razão sozinha jamais poderia fundamentar a moral, pois ela necessita de um sentimento básico de dor e prazer, relacionado não só ao nosso interesse particular, mas também ao geral, que lhe dê um sentido prático relativo à ética. Da mesma forma, em poucos casos nossos julgamentos morais são derivados exclusivamente do campo do sentimento, sendo necessário que a racionalidade tome partido indicando o verdadeiro valor do objeto em questão, e, em muitos casos, indicando ações que se tornam deveres por melhor se adequarem aos sentimentos morais e receberem o assentimento destes. Explicitar essa relação entre sentimento e razão no âmbito moral é a nossa tarefa no presente trabalho. E ao fazermos estaremos apontando, mesmo não sendo o objeto dessa dissertação, os limites do naturalismo de Hume, limites que ele próprio coloca para o tratamento da moral. Tal é a fronteira entre natureza e cultura no território ético, segundo a perspectiva humana.

This thesis critically assesses ‘relaxed realism’ – a group of views that have entered the metaethical debate recently (Dworkin, 1996; Kramer, 2009; Parfit, 2011; Scanlon, 2014). Relaxed realism promises a novel perspective on our normative practice. In particular, it aims for a view that is genuinely distinct from traditional non-naturalism on the one hand, and sophisticated forms of expressivism on the other. This thesis calls into question whether such an aspiration can be met. The approach is twofold. First, the thesis argues that relaxed realism can meet various of its objectives better by relying on theoretical resources that expressivism offers. To argue for this claim, it discusses three challenges that relaxed realism should be able to meet according to its own objectives. With regards to each challenge, it then shows that as it stands relaxed realist views fail to adequately respond to it. Finally, the thesis suggests that relaxed realism can better respond to the respective challenges – and hence, better meet their own objectives – by endorsing certain expressivist resources. Second, the thesis argues that relaxed realism is an inherently unstable view. It does so by raising a dilemma. Either relaxed realism fails to establish the desired difference to expressivism or it succeeds, but at the expense of erasing the difference to traditional non-naturalism. The conclusion of the thesis is critical: the relaxed realist aspiration for a novel take on our normative practice – distinct from both traditional non-naturalism and expressivism – remains unmet.

El siguiente trabajo, pretende mostrar el mecanismo de la ilusión —que es una forma de duplicación— y su manifestación a través de algunas paradojas insertas tanto en la filosofía como en la vida cotidiana de los hombres. La filosofía de Clément Rosset detecta algunas de las ideas más incrustadas en el pensamiento filosófico ortodoxo, y las pone en tela de juicio, si no para demolerlas —lo cual él mismo admite, le parece imposible— sí para dar cuenta de que la ilusión, la ficción y la falsedad, son sus fundamentos. La moral, la idea de naturaleza y el yo personal, son algunas de estas ideas, que la filosofía ortodoxa, de corte metafísico ha tomado como cimiento para construir su edificio teórico; estas mismas ideas son las que la filosofía de Rosset anuncia como ilusorias. La visión trágica de Rosset es presentada aquí como una denuncia al pensamiento metafísico, a la idealización del mundo, al optimismo y al pesimismo, a la moral, a toda razón que intente justificar e interpretar la realidad desde un orden preestablecido, una llamada a aceptar lo real, el azar, tal y como se presenta, no como se desea que sea.

Paul Russell argues that the interpretation of Hume as a classical compatibilist is misguided. Russell defends a naturalistic reading of Humean freedom and moral responsibility. On this account, Hume holds two theses: that moral responsibility is a product of our moral sentiments, and that our concept of moral freedom is derived from our considerations of moral responsibility. Russell claims that Hume’s theory of the passions is non-cognitivist, and thus that his account of moral judgment fails to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions or qualities of mind. He concludes that Hume’s account of moral responsibility is inadequate. I argue that Hume has a cognitivist account of the passions. For Hume, our character is judged to be a proper object of praise or censure on account of our ability to partake in a moral community with our fellows. I conclude that Hume does not naturalize freedom and moral responsibility, but socializes it.

In this dissertation, I argue for a set of interpretations regarding the relationship between moral obligation and reasons for acting in the theories of Hobbes, Hutcheson, and Hume. Several commentators have noted affinities between these naturalist moral theories and contemporary ethical internalism. I argue that attempts to locate internalist theses in these figures are not entirely successful in any clear way. I follow Stephen Darwall's suggestion that addressing the question “why be moral?” is one of the fundamental problems of modern moral philosophy. Since, as some have argued, there is a tension between accepting internalism and providing an adequate response to the “why be moral” question, I argue that each figure maintains a distinctive response to this question given the sort of internalism, if any, he would accept. In the introduction, I provide the key distinctions that arise from contemporary discussions of ethical internalism, and I motivate my project of looking for insight into the relationship between internalism and amoralism in the British Moralists. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the moral theory Hobbes who, I argue, would accept a version of constitutive existence internalism because he holds that there is a necessary connection between one's being contractually obligated and one's being in certain rationally motivating states. I then present the fool's objection as an objection to the assumption of a relevant similarity between divine obligation and contractual obligation. I argue that, irrespective of this dissimilarity, the fool has some rational motive to keep his covenants in virtue of the fact that making covenants changes one's decision situation in such a way that it becomes reasonable to treat covenants as if they imposed categorical constraints on behavior. I claim that Hobbes's response to the fool is, at least in part, that the fool fails to understand what moral obligation consists in. In the remainder of the dissertation I turn my attention to two classical sentimentalist moral theories. I examine the theories of Hutcheson and Hume because it is not clear what resources moral sentimentalism has available to it in order to address questions about the reasonableness of moral action. In chapters 3 and 4, I develop an interpretation of Hutcheson who, because he distinguishes between exciting and justifying reasons, is able to say there is some non-derivative sense in which moral actions are reasonable. I argue that he develops a theory whereby moral obligation is to be understood in terms of the non-motivating states of approval of moral spectators, and I do not think, contrary to Darwall, that there is anything puzzling about his doing so. I argue that Hutcheson does not accept a version of motive internalism, but that he shares much in common with internalist views: he claims that there is a very strong, if contingent, connection between our states of approval and our motivational states. I offer an explanation of how Hutcheson could respond to the amoalist, which holds that we ought to be moral because, in part, we all already have the motives for and the interests in doing the sorts of things of which moral spectators approve. In chapters 5 and 6, I turn my attention to Hume who, because he makes no distinction between motivating and justifying reasons, does not seem to have anything to say about the non-derivative reasonableness of moral action. I argue that a textually grounded interpretation of Hume's theory of the passions provides us with more reason to favor an (appraiser motive) internalist reading over an externalist reading of his moral theory. Much of my argument depends on an interpretation of Hume's claim that it is possible for agents to be moved to act from a sense of duty alone. When we ask what Hume can say to the question “why be moral,” some of the options that Hutcheson pursues are initially open to him. However, I argue that Hume thinks philosophical theorizing must give way to the operations of psychological mechanisms that are causally responsible for inspiring agents to act morally by giving rise in them to particular kinds of affections. I conclude with some general remarks about the problems surrounding Darwall's interpretation of Hume's theory of justice, and use this discussion to lend further support to the claim that the actual theories of Hobbes, Hutcheson, and Hume do not neatly fit into the taxonomies that Darwall seems to think they do.

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This doctoral dissertation addresses the analysis of the contemporary debate that puts forward the relation between Friedrich Nietzsche?s thought and philosophical naturalism. From this analysis, I argue that Nietzsche's thought cannot be related, prima facie, to any preconceived type of naturalist proposal. To achieve this goal, I analyze the following arguments: (i) the current debate about naturalism in Nietzsche tends to value a typology and wards off the meaning of philosophy proposed by him; (ii) it is not possible to relate Nietzsche's thought to any kind of preconceived concept of naturalism, though one can find naturalistic perspectives in his philosophy; (iii) Nietzsche can only be considered a naturalistic philosopher insofar as his philosophy is to represent a new approach away from the naturalistic categories that can be found in contemporary philosophy; (iv) his naturalistic perspectives are related to a notion of nature remote from the concept of nature proposed by contemporary naturalism; (v) the problem of morality in Nietzsche is related to his project of a transvaluation of values which is upheld by his notion of nature; (vi) the problem of morality in Nietzsche intends to seize the tragic element in its constitution.
O objetivo deste estudo ? analisar o debate contempor?neo que prop?e a rela??o do pensamento de Friedrich Nietzsche com o naturalismo filos?fico. A partir dessa an?lise, procuro demonstrar que o pensamento de Nietzsche n?o pode ser relacionado com nenhum tipo de proposta naturalista fechada. Para atingir esse objetivo, analiso os seguintes argumentos: (i) o debate atual a respeito do naturalismo em Nietzsche tende a valorizar uma tipologia e se afasta do significado de filosofia proposto por ele; (ii) n?o ? poss?vel relacionar o pensamento de Nietzsche a um tipo de naturalismo fechado, mas ? poss?vel encontrar perspectivas naturalistas em sua filosofia; (iii) Nietzsche s? pode ser considerado um fil?sofo naturalista se a sua filosofia representar um novo tipo de abordagem, diferente das categorias naturalistas que existem na filosofia contempor?nea; (iv) suas perspectivas naturalistas est?o relacionadas com uma no??o de natureza distante do conceito de natureza proposto pelo naturalismo contempor?neo; (v) o problema da moral em Nietzsche est? conectado com o seu projeto de transvalora??o dos valores, o qual est? sustentado pela sua no??o de natureza; (vi) o problema da moral em Nietzsche pretende apreender o elemento tr?gico em sua constitui??o.

This dissertation aims, in the metaethical level, to investigate the question of the naturalization of Ethics in the work of G. E. Moore (1873-1958). Moore has developed an argument aimed to test the truth of an naturalized ethics. His anwser, at his first book, Principia Ethica (1903), was negative because he sustained that every attempt to naturalize ethics implies in a mistake, the naturalistic fallacy, a fallacy which existence could be proved by the experiment of the open question argument. In answer to this, Moore developed and defended a non-naturalistic position in the ethical field. The difficults involved in this non-naturalistic conception of ethics nevertheless led him to review his initial position and to develop what could be view as a discovery : the supervenient character of the ethical properties over the natural properties. This is the path that the dissertation pretends to follow.
A presente dissertacao aborda, no plano metaetico, a questao da naturalizacao da etica a partir dos trabalhos de G. E. Moore (1873 1958). Moore desenvolveu uma argumentacao visando testar a validade de uma etica naturalizada. Sua resposta inicial apresentada no livro Principia Ethica (1903), negativa, passa pela constatacao de que todas as tentativas nesse sentido acarretam um erro fundamental, a saber, a falácia naturalista, falacia essa que seria confirmada pelo experimento do argumento da questão aberta. Dessa posicao inicial, nosso autor passou a defesa de uma posicao nao-naturalista no campo da etica. No entanto, as dificuldades em torno dessa posicao levaram-no a uma reavaliacao de suas posicoes iniciais e ao que pode ser considerado uma descoberta: o carater superveniente das propriedades morais frente as propriedades naturais. E esse percurso que procuramos percorrer e compreender na dissertacao.

Dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle, la philosophie est confrontée à une crise identitaire. On se détourne de l'idéalisme spéculatif pour privilégier un mode de pensée articulé autour de la rationalité scientifique. C'est dans cet horizon en transformation que naît l'impératif d'un retour à la philosophie d'Emmanuel Kant. Au sein du courant de pensée néo-kantien on trouve la thèse aujourd'hui méconnue de Friedrich-Albert Lange exposée dans « l'Histoire du matérialisme et critique de son importance à notre époque ». Lange poursuit dans cette œuvre deux objectifs : (a) il limite la portée explicative des sciences de la nature pour dégager une sphère propre à la philosophie pratique et (b) il se réapproprie l'épistémologie de Kant à l'aune des thèses évolutionnistes de Charles Darwin. Nous avons donc cherché dans ce mémoire à évaluer la portée de la naturalisation de l'épistémologie kantienne et ses implications pratiques.

Quelle obligation morale peut être désormais pensée et pratiquée, à l’heure du déclin des absolus religieux et des sciences évolutionnistes ? Tel est le problème auquel Jean-Marie Guyau, philosophe français de la fin du XIXème siècle, entend apporter une contribution décisive. Dans ce travail, nous proposons de redécouvrir l’itinéraire logique et chronologique suivi par Guyau pour élaborer sa propre pensée. Celle-ci doit se comprendre comme le dénouement logique d’une problématisation qui passe par l’étude de l’histoire de la philosophie morale. Après avoir élaboré une méthode de commentaire pour l’étude des doctrines passées, Guyau pense pouvoir interpréter l’histoire de la morale comme un antagonisme entre le naturalisme (d’Épicure à Mill et Spencer) et l’idéalisme (d’Épictète à Kant et Fouillée). Une exposition critique détaillée permet à Guyau de montrer les lacunes de chacune de ces traditions : l’idéalisme absolutise ce qui n’est qu’hypothétique ; l’obligation théorisée par le sensualisme est dissoute par cette théorie même ; et l’évolutionnisme, forme ultime que prend la science des mœurs, pense indûment l’avenir sur le modèle du passé. Dès lors, l’obligation ne peut plus être conçue ni comme catégorique ni comme instinctive : elle doit être pensée à partir du principe qui engage le moins de présupposés (la vie), et ne doit plus être considérée comme uniforme mais comme anomique. Partant des prémisses naturalistes, la philosophie de Guyau tente alors d’idéaliser l’existence morale de l’homme ; le principal relais de cet accroissement de la vitalité est l’éducation, dont Guyau reconsidère non seulement le but (la moralisation) mais encore les moyens (la suggestion)
At the time of evolutionist science and the decline of the religious absolute, what moral obligation can be thought and practised nowadays ? Such is the problem Jean-Marie Guyau, a French philosopher of the late 19th century, intends to make a decisive contribution to.In this research work, we suggest rediscovering the logical and chronological route followed by Guyau to elaborate his own thought. This thought has to be understood as the logical outcome of a raised issue which starts by studying the history of moral philosophy.After elaborating a method of comment upon past doctrines, Guyau thinks he can interpret the history of morality as an antagonism between naturalism (from Epicurus to Mill and Spencer) and idealism (from Epictetus to Kant and Fouillée). A thorough scrutiny allows Guyau to show the gaps of each of these traditions : idealism absolutises what is only hypothetical ; the obligation theorized by sensualism is dissolved by this same theory ; as for evolutionism, the ultimate shape taken by the science of customs, its view of the future is wrongfully based on the model of the past. From then on, obligation cannot be conceived either as categorical or as instinctive any more : it must be thought from the principle which involves as few presuppositions (life) as possible, and must not be considered as uniform but anomic any more. Relying on naturalist beginnings, Guyau’s philosophy then tries to idealize the moral existence of Man ; this increase in vitality is mainly handed over through education. Actually, not only does Guyau reconsider its purpose, i-e raising moral standards, but also its means, namely suggestion

Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework. Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a full-blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory model cannot be maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of agent-causal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian.
B.A.
Bachelors
Philosophy
Arts and Humanities

Les antinaturalistes ! Ce terme fait jaillir les figures de critiques du XIXe siècle, dont les noms sont demeurés plus ou moins gravés dans la mémoire et dans l’histoire littéraire : Barbey d’Aurevilly, Léon Bloy, Léon Daudet, mais aussi Pontmartin, Remy de Gourmont ou Jean-Marie Guyau... auteurs fascinants par leur virulence, leur refus de la modernité, leurs positions philosophiques hors-norme ou novatrices... La présente étude tend à montrer la diversité qui peut animer ce groupe, qui se définit par la négative comme « ceux qui s’opposent à la littérature de Zola ». Cette alliance des contraires leur permet de se constituer en force à part entière sur l’échiquier littéraire.Pour appréhender cette tension entre la pluralité des figures et la force d’un groupe dont l’unité se fracasse sur l’affaire Dreyfus, une première partie proposera quelques parcours dans la sociologie et la philosophie de l’époque, qui mettent en évidence un paysage complexe, traversées par d’étranges phénomènes de ruptures et de continuité. Puis, en questionnant la manière dont les antinaturalistes mettent en forme un discours critique. Un chapitre consacré aux rhétoriques antinaturalistes ne fera que renforcer l’idée de multiplicité au sein de ce groupe. Un double-mouvement de construction et de déconstruction de ce concept, conduira à réévaluer quelques griefs adressés à Zola par ses ennemis pour mettre en lumière des phénomènes de ré-emprunts et des positions singulières et paradoxales, qui témoignent de l’importance de l’auteur naturaliste dans le champ littéraire de la fin du XIXe siècle, tant sur le plan littéraire que sur le plan politique
Antinaturalists! This term brings out the figures of critics of the nineteenth century, whose names have remained more or less engraved in memory and in literary history: Barbey d'Aurevilly, Leon Bloy, Leon Daudet, but also Pontmartin, Remy de Gourmont or Jean-Marie Guyau ... fascinating authors by their virulence, their rejection of modernity, their philosophical positions out of norm or innovative ... The present study tends to show the diversity that can animate this group, which is defined by the negative as "those who oppose Zola's literature". This alliance of opposites allows them to constitute themselves in full force on the literary chessboard.To apprehend this tension between the plurality of figures and the strength of a group whose unity is shattered on the Dreyfus affair, a first part will propose some pathways in the sociology and philosophy of the time, which highlight a complex landscape, traversed by strange phenomena of breaks and continuity. Then, questioning the way in which antinaturalists form a critical discourse. A chapter devoted to antinaturalist rhetoric will only reinforce the idea of ​​multiplicity within this group. A double-movement of construction and deconstruction of this concept, will lead to reevaluate some grievances addressed to Zola by his enemies to highlight phenomena of re-borrowing and singular and paradoxical positions, which testify to the importance of the naturalist author in the literary field of the late nineteenth century, both literary and political

L’écriture de la nature de Thoreau plonge ses racines dans la Nouvelle-Angleterre du XIXe. Nourri de ses valeurs, l’auteur montre comment la vie doit être économisée et non dépensée en vain dans des activités frivoles. Pour se faire, il choisit la voie de la simplicité et de la solitude dans la nature ce qui lui permet de remettre en cause ce que la société considère d’ordinaire comme des vertus. Vivre seul dans la nature sauvage est un moyen anthropocentrique pour accéder au bonheur car la nature apporte à l’homme tout ce dont il a besoin. Ainsi, Thoreau est un naturaliste qui vit dans la nature et la parcourt. Son naturalisme s’éloigne de plus en plus des théories emersoniennes sur l’immanence. Le véritable scientifique sait regarder les animaux en engageant sa subjectivité et peut aller jusqu’à voir dans certains animaux l’incarnation de vertus.Pour nuancer cet anthropocentrisme, Thoreau appelle au zoocentrisme. Celui-ci peut même amener à une cohabitation pacifique entre les espèces. Toutefois, l’écriture et la pratique de Thoreau sont nourries de paradoxes en ce qui concerne la chasse, la pêche et le végétarisme. Pour vivre en harmonie avec la nature, Thoreau se rapproche du modèle indien qui a ses limites. Parmi quelques suggestions, Thoreau est le premier à proposer la création de parcs nationaux
Thoreau’s nature writing is rooted in 19th century New-England. Fed on New-England’s values, the author shows life should be spared and not spent in vain in mundane activities. In order for him to do so, he chooses the way of a life of simplicity and solitude in nature, which enables him to question what society traditionally sees as virtues.Living alone in the wild is an anthropocentric means to reach happiness because nature provides man with all that he needs. Hence, Thoreau is a naturalist who lives in nature and walks in ii. His naturalism becomes more and more estranged from Emerson’s theory on immanence. The real scientist can watch animals using his subjectivity and can go so far as to see in certain animals the incarnation of some virtues.To nuance this anthropomorphist approach, Thoreau advocates zoocentrism. This point of view can even lead to a peaceful cohabitation between species. However, Thoreau’s writing and actions are fed with paradoxes as far as hunting, fishing and being a vegetarian is concerned. To live in harmony with nature, Thoreau gests closer to the Indian model which has limits. Thoreau makes many suggestions, among which the creation of national parks

L’éducation morale est un aspect central de l’éthique de la vertu de tradition aristotélicienne. De nombreux auteurs sont attachés à l’idée qu’une bonne théorie éthique doit nous informer sur la manière de former de meilleurs agents moraux. Les éthiciens de la vertu considèrent que c’est par une éducation du caractère que l’on peut façonner des agents vertueux. Or, une telle éducation est-elle vraiment possible? Et si elle l’est, en quoi consiste-t-elle? Ce mémoire entend répondre à ces questions en explorant les horizons de la théorie des vertus, horizons qui dépassent maintenant les limites de la philosophie. En s’interrogeant d’abord sur le naturalisme moral en théorie des vertus, le naturalisme libéral est retenu comme la position métaéthique la plus réaliste pour l’avenir de la théorie. Celle-ci doit tenir compte des avancées scientifiques, notamment en psychologie sociale, si elle souhaite accomplir ses objectifs éducatifs. Pour suivre cette démarche, les caractéristiques centrale du concept de vertu sont identifiés, puis mis à l’épreuve par la critique situationniste des vertus. Selon le situationnisme, de nombreuses études empiriques montreraient que les comportements moraux des agents sont déterminés par des facteurs circonstanciels et arbitraires. Par conséquent, une caractéristique centrale de la théorie, la robustesse des vertus, est abandonnée. Cet abandon ne marque toutefois pas la fin de la théorie des vertus : elle est alors orientée vers l’éducation morale où elle demeure pertinente grâce à la littérature sur l’expertise et sur l’intelligence émotionnelle. Ce cadre théorique et empirique permet de donner une solide fondation pour l’éducation de vertus. Certaines difficultés demeurent présentes quant à l’implantation de programmes concrets d’éducation des vertus dans les écoles. Pour le futur, les chercheurs devront relevés les défis que représentent l’environnement scolaire et la mesure de vertus.
Moral education is a central aspect of the virtue ethics of Aristotelian tradition. Many authors are attached to the idea that a good ethical theory should inform us about how to form better moral agents. The ethicists of virtue consider that it is through an education of character that virtuous agents can be fashioned. But is such an education really possible? And if it is, what does it consist of? This thesis aims to answer these questions by exploring the horizons of the theory of virtues, horizons that now exceed the limits of philosophy. By first questioning moral naturalism in the theory of virtues, liberal naturalism is retained as the most realistic metaethical position for the future of the theory. It must take into account scientific advances, particularly in social psychology, if it wishes to achieve its educational objectives. To follow this approach, the central characteristics of the concept of virtue are identified and then tested by the situationist critique of virtues. According to the situationism, many empirical studies would show that the moral behaviors of the agents are determined by circumstantial and arbitrary factors. Therefore, a central feature of the theory, the robustness of virtues, is abandoned. This abandonment, however, does not mark the end of the theory of virtues: it is then oriented towards moral education where it remains relevant thanks to the literature on expertise and emotional intelligence. This theoretical and empirical framework makes it possible to give a solid foundation for the education of virtues. Some difficulties remain in implementing concrete curricula for the education of virtues in schools. For the future, researchers will have to take up the challenges of the school environment and the measurement of virtues.

This dissertation is a critique of synthetic ethical naturalism (SEN). SEN is a view in metaethics that comprises three key theses: first, there are moral properties and facts that are independent of the beliefs and attitudes of moral appraisers (moral realism); second, moral properties and facts are identical to (or constituted only by) natural properties and facts (ethical naturalism); and third, sentences used to assert identity or constitution relations between moral and natural properties are expressions of synthetic, a posteriori necessities. The last of these theses, which distinguishes SEN from other forms of ethical naturalism, is supported by a fourth: the semantic contents of the central moral predicates such as ‘morally right’ and ‘morally good’ are fixed in part by features external to the minds of speakers (moral semantic externalism). Chapter 1 introduces SEN and discusses the most common motivations for accepting it. The next three chapters discuss the influential “Moral Twin Earth” argument against moral semantic externalism. In Chapter 2, I defend this argument from the charge that the thought experiment upon which it depends is defective. In Chapters 3 and 4, I consider two attempts to amend SEN so as to render it immune to the Moral Twin Earth argument. I show that each of these proposed amendments amounts to an abandonment of SEN. Chapter Five explores Richard Boyd’s proposal that moral goodness is a “homeostatic property cluster.” If true, Boyd’s hypothesis could be used to support several metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic claims made on behalf of SEN. I advance three arguments against this account of moral goodness. In the sixth chapter, I argue that moral facts are not needed in the best a posteriori explanations of our moral beliefs and moral sensibility. Because of this, those who accept a metaphysical naturalism ought to deny the existence of such facts or else accept skepticism about moral knowledge. In Chapter 7, I consider a counterargument on behalf of SEN to the effect that moral facts are needed in order to explain the predictive success of our best moral theories. I show that this argument fails.

Une des questions centrales de la métaéthique est celle de savoir si les propriétés morales sont des propriétés naturelles ou non-naturelles. Ce mémoire fait valoir que nous ferions bien de remettre en question une constellation d’arguments en faveur du non-naturalisme moral : l’argument de la question ouverte, l’intuition normative et l’argument du gouffre. L’influent argument de la question ouverte de Moore, d’abord, ne soutient le non-naturalisme que s’il commet une pétition de principe. L’intuition normative commet ou bien le sophisme d’inférer sur la base de sa différence spécifique qu’une chose n’appartient pas à un genre donné, ou bien sous-estime la panoplie de propriétés naturelles qui possèdent les caractéristiques censées être distinctives des propriétés morales et normatives. L’argument du gouffre, quant à lui, sous-estime l’ubiquité du fossé logique et conceptuel censé marquer une discontinuité métaphysique profonde entre les domaines normatif et naturel.
One of the burning questions among metaethical realists is whether moral facts and properties are natural or non-natural. In this thesis, I argue that we should treat a family of arguments for non-naturalism with considerable scepticism: the Open Question Argument, the Normative Intuition, and the argument from the Is-Ought Gap. Moore’s famous Open Question Argument only supports moral non-naturalism if it begs the question against the modest (non-reductionist) naturalist. As for the Normative Intuition, it either commits the fallacy of inferring on the basis of a thing’s specific difference that it does not belong to the genus it putatively belongs to, or it underestimates the breadth of natural properties that possess the features which non-naturalists allege are distinctive of moral and normative properties. The argument from the Is-Ought Gap, for its part, underestimates the ubiquity of the logical and conceptual gap that allegedly marks a deep metaphysical discontinuity between the normative and natural domains.

MA Research Report
What is the relationship between evolutionary naturalism and moral realism? More specifically, is moral realism compatible with evolutionary naturalism? Moral realism depends on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable. Considerations from evolutionary science allegedly suggest otherwise. Certain evolutionary naturalists employ these considerations in so-called ‘Evolutionary Debunking’ arguments which show, if sound, that moral realism is unjustified or implausible. Evolutionary naturalism, therefore, appears to be incompatible with moral realism. I consider this to be a forceful challenge for moral realism. In this dissertation I investigate whether or not, or in which sense, the challenge is successful. I argue that (what I call) ‘moral realism (traditionally construed)’, a version of moral realism which depends on the epistemic reliability of our ‘moral intuitions’, is, given evolutionary naturalism and evolutionary science, probably implausible. I outline a version of moral realism (‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed)) which does not depend on the epistemic reliability of our ‘moral intuitions’. I argue that given evolutionary naturalism, evolutionary science, and nativist evolutionary psychology, ‘moral realism’ (nontraditionally construed) is a naturalized version of moral realism, and is probably compatible with evolutionary naturalism. If the outline of ‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed) is plausible, then there is a form of moral realism which is compatible with evolutionary naturalism. If it is not then ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is probably implausible given evolutionary naturalism.

This thesis examines Kantian conceptions of freedom. Beginning with Kant himself, I show how Kant’s response to Hume concerning the rational justification of causal judgements results in his claim that the sensible world is governed a priori by causal principles. Kant’s moral philosophy, however, requires a robust conception of freedom for moral agency to be possible. These two features leave Kant in an apparent contradiction, for it is unclear how we, as members of the physical, causal world, can be truly free if all events are governed by causal laws. I show that Kant’s solution to this contradiction lies in an important aspect of his transcendental idealism: the noumenal/phenomenal distinction. I argue, further, that his solution is problematic due to the fundamentally unknowable quality of the noumenal realm, wherein freedom is located. John McDowell’s Mind and World is introduced as an alternative to the extreme Kantian dualism between noumena and phenomena, while remaining within a broadly Kantian framework. Like Kant, McDowell locates our freedom in our ability to operate through reason, though unlike his predecessor, he situates “the space of reasons” within nature. This becomes possible by extending our conception of nature to include a “second nature”, thus making our initiation into the space of reasons—into the realm of freedom—a natural process. Remaining Kantian in spirit, however, McDowell’s account inherits a problematic Kantian feature. He maintains the distinction between two modes of intelligibility—between naturalistic and rational modes of explanation—thus leaving room for a hard-nosed naturalist to question the autonomy of the latter. I argue that Peter Strawson’s proposal in “Freedom and Resentment” is able to assuage this worry in McDowell’s otherwise plausible model. In it, Strawson provides an account of why the autonomy of rational explanations can never be undermined by purely naturalistic explanations, even in the face of a theoretical conviction in determinism. Strawson argues that our “personal reactive attitudes” (like gratitude and resentment)—attitudes that express our commitment to a moral life and are representative of our functioning within the space of reasons—could never be undermined by the truth of determinism, and this reveals the extent to which our conception of ourselves as rational agents is immune from assault by the determinist. The result is a compelling form of compatibilism that persuasively retains the space of reasons without appeal to Kantian noumenalism.
Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-14 14:36:23.511

La réflexion morale de Theodor Adorno est manifestement traversée par une tension : l’exigence paradoxale d’enraciner pleinement la morale à la fois dans les impulsions les plus vives et dans la raison la plus lucide. Plus qu’une excentricité parmi d’autres de la figure de proue de l’École de Francfort, le présent mémoire donne à penser que ce problème pourrait être une des principales charnières de son éthique. L’objectif de ma recherche est de dégager une voie pour articuler conjointement, «sans sacrifice aucun», ces deux exigences. Pour ce faire, je tenterai d’étayer l’hypothèse suivante : l’analyse du problème de la liberté et de la non-liberté que développe le premier des trois «modèles» de Dialectique négative permet de comprendre à la fois le lien et l’écart entre la dimension impulsive et rationnelle de l’éthique d’Adorno. L’argument qui sera déployé se penchera d’abord sur le problème de la non-liberté et son incarnation à travers le phénomène concret de l’antisémitisme ainsi que de la peur et de la rage animale dans lesquelles il s’enracine, pour ensuite examiner la conception adornienne de la liberté dans ses deux dimensions de «pleine conscience théorique» et «d’impulsion spontanée», et pour finalement tenter d’apprécier la portée plus générale pour la compréhension de l’éthique d’Adorno de cette interprétation du problème de la liberté en tentant de comprendre sur cette base son «nouvel impératif catégorique».
Throughout Theodor Adorno’s moral thought runs a paradoxical demand : that morality should be fully rooted in both the liveliest impulses and the keenest reasonings. More than a quirk among Adorno’s many, this essay suggests that this problem plays a pivotal role in his ethics. The current research seeks to develop a strategy to conjointly articulate these two demands. To this end, I will try to expound the following hypothesis : the analysis of the problem of freedom and unfreedom set forth by the first of the ‘models’ in Negative Dialectics enables making sense of both the bond and the disparity between the impulsive and rational constituents of adornian ethics. This study will first focus on the problem of unfreedom and its embodiment in the concrete phenomena of anti-Semitism as well as the animal fear and rage that it builds upon. It will then go on to examine Adorno’s conception of freedom in its two facets : «full theoretical consciousness» and «spontaneous impulse». It will finally try to ascertain the more general relevance of this interpretation of the problem of freedom for making sense of Adorno’s ethics, by trying to make sense on that basis of his «new categorical imperative».

The atheistic worldview has, ironically, experienced a sort of “re-birth” in modern times. The “New Atheists,” of which Sam Harris is a prominent spokesperson, have made no secret of their desire to make converts to their worldview, liberating people from the false and repressive shackles of religion. It is their desire to officiate the funeral of religion, and usher in a new era governed by reason and science. Harris, in his book The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values, seeks to naturalize ethics through the means of science, so that religion might lose its grasp on a stronghold it has held for centuries. In so doing, he presents an ethical system based on the worldview of philosophical naturalism, which leaves no room for a divine foot in the door. His ethical system is supported by several presuppositional pillars, including an unwavering belief in Darwinian evolution, a neo-Aristotelian concept of well-being, a commitment to strict determinism, a confidence in moral realism, and the belief that science and religion are in irresolvable conflict with each other as modes of seeking truth. This dissertation seeks to analyze Harris’ naturalistic worldview by inspecting these five pillars as the foundation upon which his ethical system stands. In the famous words of Francis Schaeffer, I attempt to “take the roof off” of Harris’ worldview, in order to analyze the philosophical ideas he espouses. It is my assertion that Harris ultimately fails to properly defend the controversial claims his book makes, as the most important points he makes are not actually scientific at all, but philosophical. Although he approaches the issue as a scientist, his arguments rely on philosophical presuppositions of which science can only be applied a posteriori. If this is true, it is a positive force for Christian apologetics, as the Christian worldview may continue to be a valid alternative to the philosophical naturalism Harris espouses.

The text deconstructs notions of ideal community which, while affinning irmnediate proximate human relations, effectiveiy disaffirms and thus devalues those mediated over distance and time. It argues against such social ontologies as the basis of what should constitute ideal consociality. In place of the idealized notions of community critiqued, the work elaborates an ontological ethics of responsibility as a basis for conceptualizing ethical relations. The text grounds its ethic in what is proffered to be humankind's ontological relatedness to the other, regardless of the nature (human or nonhuman) or proximity (face-to-face or nonface-to-face) of that other. Moreover, the text sets forth the importance of humankind developing a sense of this ontological relatedness. The work discusses this sense-of-relatedness from three perspectives. First, it elaborates a philosophic naturalism to establish in humankind an ontological basis for ethical relations. Second, it claims that humankind is in the world, existentially, who and what it understands itself to be with respect to the depth with which it apprehends a sense of its ontological relatedness to all that there is. Third, it argues that this sense-ofrelatedness may be understood as a religious sensibility.
Religious Studies
M.Th. (Religious Studies)

La presente ricerca si inserisce all'interno del panorama del naturalismo filosofico e più nello specifico all'interno della metaetica naturalizzata. Concentrando la propria attenzione sulle ricerche contemporanee in ambito della teoria dell'evoluzione darwiniana (sintesi estesa, teoria della costruzione della nicchia e sistemi di sviluppo) e sulle prospettive situate nell'ambito della nuova scienza cognitiva (4E cognition, mente estesa, distribuita etc.), il lavoro prova a offrire un punto di vista ecologico e relazionale sulla nozione di soggettività.

En Occident au XIIIe siècle, pour répondre au nouvel afflux de connaissances issues des traductions gréco-latines et arabo-latines du siècle précédent, s'organisent des milieux d'enseignement et de diffusion, sinon de vulgarisation de la philosophie et de la science. Les universités naissent alors, mais les collèges d'ordres religieux surtout s'établissent en relais du savoir ; parmi eux, les ordres mendiants prennent une part essentielle. En parallèle se met en place un outillage mental et intellectuel capable d'assimiler et de manier ces nouveaux contenus qui ouvrent peu à peu à une autre conception du monde : on découvre les œuvres sur la nature d'Aristote après avoir usé longuement de sa seule logique. On comprend mieux Platon à la lumière des écrits arabes. On décrit les astres, les animaux, les plantes, les maladies, grâce à des critères qui mêlent à la fois une typologie neuve influencée par Aristote et des héritages de l'Antiquité tardive. Dans ce processus dynamique, Arnold de Saxe est un des premiers à satisfaire une telle demande intellectuelle en offrant une compilation-florilège de philosophie naturelle et morale intitulée "De floribus rerum naturalium" ; celle-ci compte quatre livres de véritables "fleurs de la nature" et un cinquième consacré à la morale où s'organisent des citations puisées dans la littérature latine disponible. Ce travail de doctorat s'intéresse à Arnold de Saxe à travers une étude complète de l'ensemble de sa production, qui permet de déterminer quels furent son milieu d'activité et son époque, la France et l'Allemagne des deuxième et troisième quarts du XIIIe siècle. Avant cette étude, Arnoldus Saxo, Arnoldus Luca ou Arnoldus de Saxonia n'était connu qu'à travers le "De floribus" (erronément appelé "De finibus" par V. Rose), qu'on situait entre 1220 et 1230. L'étude met au jour huit nouveaux manuscrits de l'ouvrage encyclopédique qui s'ajoutent aux quatre déjà connus [depuis la thèse déposée en nov. 2000, j'ai découvert deux autres manuscrits partiels du De floribus rerum naturalium]. En outre, la thèse a permis la découverte et l'étude de trois autres ouvrages du même auteur : un traité de médecine "a capite ad calcem" qui intègre les progrès récents de la science médicale ; un dialogue en forme de disputatio en quatre parties sur les vertus et des vices ("De iudiciis virtutum et viciorum"), et une brève " consolation " imitée de celle attribuée à Sénèque. La thèse, centrée sur l'histoire des textes et l'assimilation du savoir, caractérise les sources d'information philosophiques et scientifiques d'Arnold de Saxe. Chacune des œuvres dont l'auteur a fait des extraits est identifiée précisément, l'origine possible de l'information est caractérisée, et l'utilisation qu'en fait Arnold de Saxe est comparée à celle des philosophes contemporains. L'analyse est articulée sur les matières présentes dans la production de l'auteur : physique du ciel et de la terre ; animaux, plantes et médecine ; minéralogie ; morale. Dans ces différents domaines, la documentation est composée d'un tiers de traités sous le nom d'Aristote, dont les petites œuvres authentiques sur la nature et quelques textes importants comme les Météorologiques, ou le De animalibus, et l'Ethique, mais aussi de nombreux pseudépigraphes, comme le "De causis" néoplatonicien ou un De speculis (Catroptique d'Euclide). S'ajoutent au corpus aristotélicien des textes issus de la tradition médicale et hermétique arabe, dont certains sont peu répandus mais se couvrent de noms connus comme Pythagore, Esculape ou Hermès. Les versions de tous ces textes sont des traductions gréco-latines de Jacques de Venise et Burgundio de Pise, et arabo-latines de Dominicus Gundissalvi, Johannes Hispanus, Jean de Séville et de Limia, Gérard de Crémone et Michel Scot ; toutes ces traductions sont antérieures à celles de Robert Grosseteste et de Guillaume de Moerbeke. Les joyaux de l'Antiquité, sertis dans la monture du christianisme mais souvent transformés et légués par les Arabes, devaient une certaine lumière à la tradition hermétique. La troisième part du corpus documentaire d'Arnold de Saxe est constituée d'œuvres latines anciennes, dans le domaine de la cosmologie et de la morale : Macrobe et Martianus Capella y côtoient Sénèque et Cicéron. Le tout forme un ensemble qui hésite entre néo-platonisme et aristotélisme de la pensée, entre tradition et nouveauté de la documentation. Arnold de Saxe a collecté cette documentation au début de son activité, dans une sorte de compendium qui ne semble pas avoir survécu. L'auteur fait mention de cette première étape de son travail sous l'intitulé vague de "Sermo de libris philosophorum", dont les sources du "De floribus rerum naturalium" sont manifestement en grande partie issues. Arnold de Saxe leur sera fidèle par volonté et dépendant par nécessité : il s'applique à respecter la lettre, tout en abrégeant de manière sévère, et il utilise la documentation disponible, quelle que soit sa qualité. Le "De uirtutibus lapidum" (Livre des pierres) est la part scientifique la plus originale de l'encyclopédie naturelle "De floribus", dont elle constitue un traité particulier plusieurs fois remanié ; elle est aussi celle qui aura un succès immédiat considérable via la reprise intégrale de son contenu chez Albert le Grand, (De mineralibus, tr. 2 et 3), et Vincent de Beauvais (Speculum naturale, livre VIII). Au "De floribus rerum naturalium" en quatre livres sera ajouté un cinquième, "De moralibus", qui a également circulé comme œuvre indépendante. Le traité de médecine (Practica medicine) qui a suivi ces premiers travaux assimile les apports de l'école de Salerne et fait preuve d'une connaissance de l'évolution médicale contemporaine. En effet, Avicenne y tient une place importante en rival de Constantin l'Africain et un chapitre particulier est consacré à la maladie d'amour (De amore hereos). Le traité éthique des vertus et des vices, rédigé en fin de parcours sous la forme d'un dialogue scolastique aux accents d'humanisme chrétien, s'inspire surtout des auteurs antiques, déjà cités dans le "De moralibus", la cinquième partie du De floribus. L'homme et le démon s'y affrontent verbalement l'homme et le démon sous l'œil du juge suprême qu'est Dieu. Paradoxalement pour un tel sujet, on n'y trouve ni sentences bibliques ou patristiques, ni préceptes religieux issus de textes médiévaux, car Sénèque y domine sur l'Ethique d'Aristote. Le penchant stoïcien se confirme dans la courte "consolation". En plus de ces œuvres, il est possible qu'Arnold de Saxe soit l'auteur d'une introduction à l'astronomie/astrologie, trouvée dans un manuscrit copié à Bâle au début du XVe siècle. A partir du contenu de ses œuvres, destinées surtout à répondre à l'"utilitas" d'une communauté qu'il est difficile de caractériser, on ne peut faire d'Arnold de Saxe un penseur ; mais il s'agit d'un "philosophe" au sens médiéval du terme, dans la mesure où il produit une œuvre de compilation multiple et originale à partir de la seule littérature profane et est rompu aux techniques intellectuelles de son temps. Naturaliste, féru de médecine, c'était aussi un enseignant amoureux de la morale classique. Sa diffusion, relativement limitée, fut surtout germanique (manuscrits d'origine allemande et du tiers nord de la France). En revanche, sa réception, pour l'étude des pierres et la description du monde animal, fut immédiate dans la littérature didactique, chez le franciscain Barthélemy l'Anglais et chez les dominicains Vincent de Beauvais et Albert le Grand. Arnold a alimenté, dans le De mineralibus d'Albert le Grand, la conception hermétique de la "vertu universelle" et de la vertu spécifique qu'on trouve chez Avicenne pour expliquer l'action thérapeutique de certaines substances et voir dans tout élément naturel un principe actif ; il a aussi fourni à Albert toutes les citations d'Evax et Aaron et la plupart des extraits du lapidaire d'Aristote. Arnold de Saxe a par ailleurs été le relais de savoirs qui se seraient sans lui perdus, comme la biologie des plantes et des animaux de Iorach (qu'il faut identifier avec Iuba, roi de Mauritanie, qui écrivit en grec au Ier siècle) et le traité des pierres attribué à Aristote dont il retient entre autres les notions de pôle et d'aimant. Arnold de Saxe conserve des extraits de la minéralogie d'Aristote en deux versions distinctes, secundum Dioscoridem et secundum Gerardi, ce qui met sur la piste d'une traduction de Gérard de Crémone qui n'avait pas été mise au jour jusqu'ici. L'analyse de sa documentation et des influences qu'il subit ou qu'il propage montrent que les foyers de l'activité d'Arnold ont dû être Magdeburg, où il connut sans doute le franciscain Barthélemy l'Anglais qui s'y trouvait dès 1231 (le manuscrit d'Heidelberg attribue le traité des pierres à Arnoldus Saxo Magdeburgensis); Cologne, où il rencontra peut-être le dominicain Albert le Grand qui y fut lecteur, comme l'induisent les citations réciproques (Albert est cité dans le traité de médecine) ; Paris, où il croisa sans doute les médecins du temps et fit connaître son encyclopédie ; Erfurt peut-être, où ses œuvres sont conservées mieux qu'ailleurs. Faut-il voir dans Arnold de Saxe, appelé "Arnoldus Luca Magdeburgensis" dans le manuscrit d'Heidelberg, le maître de l'école cathédrale de Magdeburg, qui disparaît des documents diplomatiques vers 1243 ? Arnoldus Luca n'est-il pas aussi l'"Arnoldus Luscus" dominicain expérimenté en astronomie que cite avec admiration Berthold von Moosburg, un disciple de l'albertinisme à Cologne au XIVe siècle ? En dehors de l'histoire des textes, des documents qui l'attesteraient restent encore à découvrir. Comme les autres encyclopédistes de son époque, le Saxon a privilégié une information tirée d'auteurs qui nourrissaient déjà une volonté de synthèse totale, c'est-à-dire - pour ce qui le concerne - Aristote, Avicenne, Constantin l'Africain. Mais il a évité pour sa part les textes rabattus de Pline et d'Isidore de Séville pour se tourner vers ce qu'il appelle des "philosophes modernes", à savoir les médecins et naturalistes arabes, Aristote, mais aussi Sénèque, Boèce et Martianus Capella. Ensemble, ces "auctoritates" donnent au "De floribus rerum naturalium" l'allure néoplatonisante d'une synthèse naturaliste faite de métaphysique, de physique et d'éléments hermétiques qui accompagnèrent le célébrissime Aristote à travers les étapes de sa transmission grecque, syriaque, arabe et latine.