Academic literature on the topic 'Naturalismo morale'

Questo articolo propone un argomento a sostegno della tesi secondo cui il concetto di responsabilitŕ morale non č eliminabile e il suo uso non č e non puň essere messo in questione da argomenti empirici o naturalistici. Anziché un argomento contro il naturalismo, č un tentativo di mostrare che il concetto di responsabilitŕ, quando se ne sono chiarite le implicazioni, č compatibile con concezioni naturalistiche della real tŕ. L'argomento si basa su una interpretazione dialogica della responsabilitŕ e mette in dubbio le pretese riduttiviste di certe versioni radicali del naturalismo.

Resumen En “Naturalismo sin representacionalismo”, Huw Price propone una variedad de naturalismo –una que él denomina naturalismo del sujeto– que supuestamente puede evitar los problemas de la localización relacionados con entidades “incómodas” como son los hechos morales, los significados, las verdades matemáticas y otras similares. A partir de una concepción expresivista de todo el lenguaje, Price defiende que los problemas de la localización descansan sobre un error categorical: el error consiste en considerar que toda oración representa algún estado de hechos mundano. En nuestro trabajo, a partir de nuestra crítica al expresivismo de Price, cuestionaremos su respuesta a los problemas de la localización. Palabras clave: Naturalismo del sujeto, representacionalismo, expresivismo global, deflacionismo, verdad. Abstract In his article “Naturalism Without Representationalism”, Price proposes a variety of naturalism –subject naturalism, as he calls it- that is supposedly able to avoid placement problems about “odd” entities such as moral facts, meanings, mathematical truths and the like. Assuming an expressivist conception about the entire language, Price argues that placement problems rest on a category mistake: the mistake of considering all sorts of sentences as representing worldly states of affairs. In this article, by arguing against Price’s expressivism, I call his response to placement problems into question. My thesis is that placement problems are genuine ontological problems. Key Words: Subject Naturalism, Representationalism, Global Expressivism; Deflationalism; Truth.

A medida que las argumentaciones no teístas se tornan cada vez más sofisticadas y complejas, se hace más difícil realizar una crítica sin antes admirar lo habilidoso de su diseño y casi maestría. Una de esas argumentaciones es una innovación relativamente reciente que es el hijo del naturalismo y la filosofía oriental: el budismo neural. Como dos diseñadores mundialmente famosos que trabajan juntos en una prenda nueva, el naturalismo y el budismo se unieron en este programa distintivo para ofrecer algo inventivo, especialmente en la explicación de la transformación moral. Por el contrario, este análisis va a develar al final que la explicación de la transformación moral del budismo neural es incapaz de ofrecer buenas respuestas a varias críticas convincentes.AbstractAs non-theistic arguments for morality become increasingly sophisticated and complex, they are harder to criticize without first admiring their skillful design and near-artistry. One such argument involves a relatively new innovation that is the child of naturalism and eastern philosophy—Neural Buddhism. Like two world- renowned designers collaborating on a new garment, Naturalism and Buddhism have come together in this distinct program to offer something inventive, especially in its explanation of moral transformation. However, this critical analysis will ultimately reveal that Neural Buddhism’s explanation of moral transformation is incapable of providing good answers to several compelling criticisms.

O objetivo deste texto é discutir alguns argumentos contra a aceitação da falácia naturalista. Pretende-se mostrar aspectos que parecem corretos na argumentação dos que recusam aquela falácia, e, a despeito de seus acertos, demonstrar que estão fundamentalmente errados. O eixo para este desfecho é a reformulação da falácia em termos da recusa da implicação entre o ser e o querer. Espera-se, assim, tornar mais claras as relações - e a ausência delas - entre verdade e moral, bem como abrir espaço para a defesa de um naturalismo moral não comprometido com a existência de fatos morais. Este texto está dividido em cinco partes. Na primeira, apresenta-se a falácia naturalista de acordo com Moore; na segunda, distingue-se essa entre as formulações de Moore e de Hume; na terceira, apresentam-se objeções à interdição da passagem do "é" ao "deve" e se formulam respostas a essas objeções; na quarta, reapresenta-se o problema da interdição entre "é" e "deve" e se focaliza uma solução alternativa a ele mediante o querer; e, finalmente, na quinta parte, elaboram-se algumas conclusões acerca do naturalismo e do realismo na moral.

The prospects for moral realism and ethical naturalism have been important parts of recent debates within metaethics. As a first approximation,moral realismis the claim that there are facts or truths about moral matters that are objective in the sense that they obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers.Ethical naturalismis the claim that moral properties of people, actions, and institutions are natural, rather than occult or supernatural, features of the world. Though these metaethical debates remain unsettled, several people, myself included, have tried to defend the plausibility of both moral realism and ethical naturalism. I, among others, have appealed to recent work in the philosophy of language—in particular, to so-called theories of “direct reference” —to defend ethical naturalism against a variety of semantic worries, including G. E. Moore's “open question argument.” In response to these arguments, critics have expressed doubts about the compatibility of moral realism and direct reference. In this essay, I explain these doubts, and then sketch the beginnings of an answer—but understanding both the doubts and my answer requires some intellectual background.

AbstractIn a recent paper, Alvin Plantinga has argued that there is good reason to think that naturalism and moral realism are incompatible. He has done so by arguing that the most important argument for the compatibility of these two theses, which has been provided by Frank Jackson, fails and that any other argument that serves the same purpose is likely to fail for the same reason. His argument against the compatibility of naturalism and moral realism, then, isindirect: he argues against it by refuting the most important argument for it. In this article, I argue that Plantinga's argument is unconvincing for at least two reasons. First, Jackson's argument can be revised in such a way that it meets Plantinga's worry. Second, there is another way of arguing for the compatibility of two propositions which Plantinga does not consider. If the naturalist takes this alternative route, she does not face the problem identified by Plantinga. I thus show not only that Plantinga's argument does not count against the compatibility of naturalism and moral realism, but that there is even good reason to think that naturalism and moral realism are in fact compatible.

Abstract The Projectability Challenge states that a metaethical view must explain how ordinary agents can, on the basis of moral experience and reflection, accurately and justifiably apply moral concepts to novel situations. In this paper, we argue for two primary claims. First, paradigm nonnaturalism can satisfactorily answer the projectability challenge. Second, it is unclear whether there is a version of moral naturalism that can satisfactorily answer the challenge. The conclusion we draw is that there is an important respect in which nonnaturalism holds an advantage over its most prominent naturalist rivals. The conclusion is interesting if only because it is widely assumed that naturalism has an easier time handling thorny problems in moral epistemology. We argue that there is at least one such problem of which this assumption is not true.

Professor Fort (1999) imagines a dispute over the moral importance of certain facts, with David Messick and himself on one side and Donna Wood and me on the other. He has identified an important issue—ethical naturalism—but that issue is not a point of disagreement between Messick and me.Fort has some interesting ideas about how Messick’s views might help in creating organizations that are moral communities. Beyond noting that those ideas constitute the most important part of his essay and merit consideration, I shall not comment on them.Moral philosophers who are naturalists—I am one—hold that there is no bright line between ought-statements and is-statements and that empirical facts have implications for moral facts. So, for example, that a certain practice helps a community survive is a strong sort of reason for claiming that it is a morally good practice, other things being equal. But most naturalists do not claim that any practice that has arisen by virtue of evolution is ipso facto a morally good practice even if it does serve some purpose. Nor does ethical naturalism have a characteristic view of the extent to which our evolutionary history, as opposed to our rational deliberation, determines what we do.

Moral naturalism, as I use the term here, is the view that there are moral facts in the natural world – facts that are both natural and normative – and that moral claims are true or false in virtue of their corresponding or not to these natural facts. Moral naturalists argue that, since moral claims are about natural facts, we can establish the truth about moral claims through empirical investigation. Moral knowledge, on this view, is a form of empirical knowledge.One objection to this metaethical view is that even if moral naturalists are correct in their claims about truth, they cannot answer the question of normativity. Jean Hampton, for instance, argues that it is not enough to explain the conduct's wrongness by showing it to be a property that necessarily supervenes on natural properties. For nothing in this analysis explains the relationship between these properties and us. The question is why should people care about these properties. Christine Korsgaard claims that moral realists take the normative question to be one about truth and knowledge.

Can Catharine Macaulay’s enlightenment democratic republicanism be justified from the point of view of contemporary naturalism? Naturalist accounts of political authority tend to be realist and pessimistic, foreclosing the possibility of enlightenment. Macaulay’s utopian political philosophy relies on belief in a good God, whose existence underpins the possibility of moral and political progress. This paper attempts a restoration of her optimistic utopianism in a reconciliation, grounded in a revision of natural law, of naturalist and utopian attitudes to political theory. It is proposed that the coevolution of language, moral law, and conscience (the disposition to judge one’s own actions in the light of moral principles) can be explained as solutions to the kinds of tragedy of the commons situations facing our ancestors. Moral dispositions evolved, but, in the light of its function, law is subject to rational critique. Liberal democracy plausibly offers the best prospect for developing rationally justifiable law.

Il considerevole sviluppo degli studi nel campo delle neuroscienze verificatosi nel corso degli ultimi decenni, costituisce un fenomeno assai rilevante sia sul piano scientifico che su quello filosofico, in quanto contribuisce a modificare e ridefinire l’immagine tradizionale dell’essere umano e segnala l’opportunità di tornare ad interrogarci in merito alla legittimità e alla fondatezza di talune categorie concettuali largamente diffuse all’interno della riflessione filosofica inerente la “natura umana”, l’etica e il diritto Seguendo questa prospettiva di fondo, la ricerca prende le mosse da un’analisi sistematica di alcune tra le più importanti definizioni elaborate nel quadro della metaetica analitica novecentesca -quali, ad esempio, la legge di Hume e la fallacia naturalistica- le quali vengono troppo spesso invocate allo scopo di distinguere e tenere separati tra loro i due campi della ricerca scientifica di tipo empirico e della riflessione etica, onde evitare di incorrere nell’errore di fallacia naturalistica, oppure di infrangere la cosiddetta legge di Hume. Nella prima parte del lavoro, quindi, vengono esposte e discusse alcune tra le più importanti ragioni per cui l’utilizzazione delle suddette definizioni al fine di dimostrare l’impossibilità di una riflessione etica fondata sui risultati provenienti dall’attuale ricerca scientifica, risulta essere spesso fuorviante e poco costruttiva; al contrario : lo sviluppo delle neuroscienze sta oggi aprendo nuovi e significativi orizzonti di ricerca e di riflessione proprio nell’ambito della riflessione etica e giuridica. La seconda parte del lavoro è dedicata ad una ricostruzione dei presupposti secondo i quali è possibile sostenere l’assoluta legittimità di una riflessione etica e giuridica fondata su un naturalismo di tipo scientifico. Fin dai tempi di Darwin, infatti, il dibattito sulle origini evolutive dei comportamenti morali ha suscitato accese controversie, subendo spesso anche delle distorsioni di tipo politico-ideologico le quali erano ben lontane dal pensiero di Darwin stesso. Gli attuali sviluppi della ricerca in questo campo, ad ogni modo, hanno fatto luce su molti equivoci e hanno messo in evidenza la fondamentale correttezza di molte delle intuizioni darwiniane, rendendo così possibile inquadrare i comportamenti etici e giuridici in un contesto di riferimento come quello costituito da una storia naturale dell’evoluzione umana. Nell’ultima parte, la ricerca prende in considerazione alcune tra le principali implicazioni che i nuovi orientamenti emergenti dalle neuroscienze comportano in merito ad alcuni concetti chiave del pensiero etico e giuridico tra cui, ad esempio, quelli di valore, di libero arbitrio, di responsabilità penale, di giustizia e di ordine sociale. Per concludere, con le parole dello stesso Darwin : “molta luce sarà fatta sull’origine dell’uomo e sulla sua storia”.
The substantial development of research in the field on neurosciences which has taken place in the course of the last decades points out a remarkable advancement, from both a scientific and philosophical point of view, contributing to a broad redefinition of the traditional representations of the “human being” and, likewise, it suggests the need to reconsider some conceptual categories concerning human nature, ethics and the law, that are widely employed in the philosophical debate. Following this basic perspective, the exposition starts with an investigation concerning some of the most meaningful concepts which were developed in the realm of Analytic Metaethics -such as the Hume’s law or the naturalistic fallacy- which are often used to keep separate the two domains of empirical science and moral philosophy, under the menace of committing the error of naturalistic fallacy or infringing the tenets of the Hume’s law. Therefore, in the first part of this work, some issues will be discussed in order to show that the traditional notions of Hume’s law and naturalistic fallacy are highly contentious in themselves and, moreover, they do not offer any reliable foundations to support the hypothesis that moral philosophy and empirical science are, and should be kept, necessarily detached from one another; on the contrary : the current development of neurosciences is beginning to open new horizons for philosophical and legal thinking. The second part of the work aims to provide an essential reconstruction of some major perspectives, endorsing the pertinence of a scientifically based form of naturalism in relation to the study of ethics and the law. As a matter of fact, since the times of Darwin the debate concerning the evolutionary origins of moral behaviour has been greatly controversial and, worse still, it has been also strongly affected by many ideological and political arguments which were well away from the thought of Darwin himself. Nevertheless, the current research in this field has made clear that most of Darwin’s intuitions were fundamentally correct, and therefore the origins of moral and legal behaviour can be adequately investigated and accounted for on the basis of a natural history of human evolution. Finally, the discussion takes into consideration some of the most significant implications deriving from the new orientations in the field of neurosciences, and evaluates their main consequences with regard to a few key concepts of moral and legal thinking, such as those of values, free will and criminal responsibility, justice and social order. To conclude with a few words from Darwin himself : “much light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history”.

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This study seeks to address the relevance of moral sentiments for moral responsibility attribution through reactive theory of Peter Strawson and his critics. The central thesis which I try to hold onto is that the attribution of moral responsibility is something quite complex, it is related to how we respond the actions of the agents, but also involves the rational capacity of reflective self-control agent, being able to present reasons for his action and be able to control his desires. Thus, the morally responsible agent is one that is motivated by his desires, but he is able to reason morally on what the consequences of his action. In other words, be a responsible person involves having social competence to act in accordance with moral norms, but also be able to reflect on his practice, so a subject with normal cognitive powers and able to regulate his beliefs and desires. Given the cultural pluralism, we note that there is a symmetrical relationship between the moral sentiments and moral beliefs, so that the moral sentiments may be influenced by moral beliefs we form throughout our life as well as moral beliefs are formed from feelings. These moral beliefs may be revised or regulated, this review may come from the acquisition of new information, which may come from comparing our set of beliefs with the set of beliefs of another culture. But this regulation of moral beliefs is the result of an evolutionary process that our species suffered, which it has made over the years, people could improve their way of working with the others, and also be able to autonomously question whether certain beliefs are in fact true. What I propose is that science is an ally of ethics, and scientific explanations can contribute to a better understanding of what is morally right and wrong. Understanding our human nature we become more able to 'see' the world differently and realize that certain emotions can contribute to our social life. In this way, we can realize that it makes no sense to continue resentful of someone in a situation which the agent has good grounds for leaving to feel such a feeling. Realizing this we can notice the complexity of our human species and how much we still need to advance the field of morality, seeking a moral improvement that does not happen only in the context of standards, but mostly at maturity that allows being able to analyze the circumstances and the reasons for the action with greater discernment. To defend such a position, I will use Strawson reactive theory, and criticism raised to such a theory by Wallace (1994), Russell (2002) and Fischer and Ravizza (1998), namely that Strawson fails to present a rational capacity guide the allocation of moral responsibility. The solution to this problem is to defend the rational capacity, as well as the social competence of the agent, it is a necessary condition to consider the morally responsible people, including the rational capacity of the agent is what allows him to reflect on his social practice. To better assess these issues it is necessary an analysis of the moral psychology and knowledge to know about the way people in their daily lives assess the actions of the agents and consequently assign moral responsibility to them. So my goal is to show how proposal of Strawson is still relevant to discussions about attribution of moral responsibility, as well as propose a progress in discussion on this topic by means of a moral realist naturalist position.
O presente estudo busca tratar da relevância dos sentimentos morais para a atribuição de responsabilidade moral, através da teoria reativa de Peter Strawson e de seus críticos. A tese central, a qual procuro sustentar, é que a atribuição de responsabilidade moral é algo bastante complexo, está relacionada à forma como reagimos frente às ações dos agentes, mas também envolve a capacidade racional do agente de autocontrole reflexivo, estando apto em apresentar razões para a sua ação e ser capaz de frear os seus desejos. Desse modo, o agente moralmente responsável é aquele que se sente motivado por seus desejos, mas é capaz de raciocinar moralmente sobre quais seriam as consequências da sua ação. Em outras palavras, ser uma pessoa responsável envolve ter competência social para agir de acordo com as normas morais, mas também ser capaz de refletir sobre a sua prática, ou seja, um sujeito com suas capacidades cognitivas normais e capaz de regular as suas crenças e desejos. Dado o pluralismo cultural, podemos notar que há uma relação simétrica entre os sentimentos morais e as crenças morais, de modo que os sentimentos morais podem ser influenciados pelas crenças morais que formamos ao longo de nossa vida, bem como as crenças morais serem formadas a partir dos sentimentos. Essas crenças morais podem ser revisadas ou reguladas, essa revisão pode vir da aquisição de novas informações, que podem vir da comparação de nosso conjunto de crenças com o conjunto de crenças de outra cultura. Mas também essa regulação das crenças morais é resultado de um processo evolutivo que sofreu a nossa espécie, que fez com que, ao longo dos anos, as pessoas pudessem aprimorar o seu modo de conviver com as demais e também ser capaz de autonomamente questionar se determinadas crenças são, de fato, verdadeiras. O que proponho é que a ciência é uma aliada da ética, sendo que as explicações científicas podem contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do que é correto e incorreto moralmente. Compreendendo a nossa natureza humana, tornamo-nos mais aptos a ver o mundo de maneira diferente e perceber que certas emoções podem contribuir para a nossa vida social. Dessa maneira, podemos dar-nos conta de que não faz sentido continuar ressentido com alguém numa situação em que o agente apresenta boas razões para que deixemos de sentir tal sentimento. Perceber isso faz com que notemos a complexidade de nossa espécie humana e o quanto ainda precisamos avançar no campo da moralidade, buscando um aprimoramento moral que não se dá apenas no âmbito de normas, mas principalmente na maturidade que permite sermos capazes de analisar as circunstâncias e as razões para a ação com maior discernimento. Para defender tal posição, utilizarei a teoria reativa de Strawson e a crítica levantada a tal teoria feita por Wallace (1994), Russell (2002) e Fischer e Ravizza (1998), a saber, que Strawson falha em apresentar uma capacidade racional que guie a atribuição de responsabilidade moral. A solução para tal problema é defender que a capacidade racional, assim como a competência social do agente, é uma condição necessária para considerar as pessoas moralmente responsáveis, inclusive a capacidade racional do agente é que lhe permite refletir sobre a sua prática social. Para avaliar melhor tais questões, faz-se necessária uma análise sobre questões de psicologia moral e de conhecimento moral, para saber como as pessoas, no seu cotidiano, avaliam as ações dos agentes e, consequentemente, atribuem-lhes responsabilidade moral. Portanto, o meu objetivo é mostrar como a proposta strawsoniana continua sendo relevante para as discussões sobre a atribuição de responsabilidade moral, mas também apresentar uma proposta de avanço na discussão sobre esse tema através de uma posição naturalista realista moral.

Orientador: Márcia Azevedo de Abreu
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem
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Resumo: O critério moralizante, presente de maneira inconteste enquanto elemento de atribuição de valor dos romances produzidos em meados do século XIX no Brasil, também esteve presente na literatura naturalista. Essa constatação, nada óbvia se considera a crítica sobre o naturalismo produzida durante todo o século XX, ampara-se tanto na recepção crítica dos romances naturalistas contemporânea ao seu lançamento, quanto na elaboração teórica do escritor Émile Zola. Ao se deter no tema da moral enquanto critério avaliativo da literatura de finais do XIX, o presente trabalho procura também explicar a relação que a literatura e o naturalismo guardaram com a idéia de natureza, muito presente nas discussões que envolveram a tarefa de representação da realidade que seria própria ao naturalismo. Ele propõe ainda uma leitura dos romances Bom- Crioulo, A carne e Livro de uma sogra, a partir das discussões teóricas tratadas na tese
Abstract: The moral criterion for evaluating the literature, unchallenged while the mid-nineteenth century in Brazil, was also present in the literature naturalist. This finding, nothing obvious if one considers the criticism on naturalism produced throughout the twentieth century, is supported by both the critical reception of contemporary naturalistic novels, as the theoretical elaboration of the writer Émile Zola. By dwelling on the theme of morality as a criterion of evaluation literature from the late nineteenth, this thesis also seeks to explain the relationship that literature and naturalism kept with the idea of nature, very present in discussions involving the task of representing reality that would be proper to naturalism. He also proposes a reading of the novels Bom-Crioulo, A carne e Livro de uma sogra, taking into account the theoretical discussions addressed in the thesis
Doutorado
Historia e Historiografia Literaria
Doutor em Teoria e História Literária

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2017.
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O naturalismo moral é a teoria metaética que sustenta que fatos e propriedades morais são fatos e propriedades naturais. Desde que G. E. Moore apresentou o seu argumento da questão aberta, tem havido várias críticas a essa teoria, o que fez com que os filósofos articulassem várias teorias metaéticas alternativas ao naturalismo, tais como intuicionismo, emotivismo, prescritivismo e a teoria do erro. Mas a partir da década de oitenta David Brink, Richard Boyd e Nicholas Sturgeon desenvolveram uma nova versão do naturalismo moral ? o naturalismo não reducionista ? que, argumentativamente, evita essas objeções e apresenta inúmeras outras vantagens. O resultado foi uma reascensão do realismo moral naturalista. No entanto, dois filósofos formularam uma objeção ao naturalismo não reducionista, que ficou conhecida como ?Argumento da Terra Gêmea Moral?, que tem gerado bastante discussão. O objetivo deste trabalho é reconstruir as linhas principais desse debate mostrando que: o naturalismo não reducionista realmente tem boas respostas a algumas críticas frequentes, tais como o argumento da questão aberta de Moore, a reformulação de Hare deste argumento, à objeção construtivista, à crítica de relativismo, ao argumento do desacordo moral etc; e que, mesmo que o argumento da terra gêmea moral seja o seu principal problema, o que parece ser o caso, há algumas estratégias de respostas possíveis a favor do naturalista.

Abstract : Moral naturalism is the metaethical theory that maintains that moral facts and properties are natural facts and properties. Since G. E. Moore presented his open question argument there have been several critiques to this theory, which made the philosophers articulate several alternative metaethical theories to naturalism as intuitionism, emotivism, prescriptivism and the error theory. But from the eighties David Brink, Richard Boyd and Nicholas Sturgeon developed a new version of moral naturalism ? the non reductionist naturalism ? that, arguably, avoids these objections and it have numerous another advantages. The result was a resurrection of naturalistic moral realism. However, two philosophers formulated an objection to non reductionist naturalism that became known as ?Moral Twin Earth Argument? that has generated much discussion. The objective of this work is to reconstruct the main lines of this debate showing that: the non reductionist naturalism really have good replies to some frequent critiques such as Moore?s open question argument, Hare?s reformulation of this argument, the constructivist?s objection, the critique of relativism, to the moral disagreement?s argument etc; and that, even if the moral twin earth argument be its main problem, what looks to be the case, there are some possible response strategies in favor of the naturalist.

My aim is to challenge recent attempts at reconciling moral realism and naturalism by pushing ethical naturalists into a dilemma. According to one horn of the dilemma, ethical naturalists must either (a) build unique facts and properties about divergent social structures (or varying moral belief systems) into their subvenient sets of natural facts and properties, and so jeopardize the objectivity of moral truths, or (b) insist, in the face of all possible worlds in which people have different moral beliefs than ours, that they are all mistaken—this despite the fact that the belief-forming mechanism responsible for their moral beliefs was never concerned with the truth of those beliefs in the first place. This will bring me to suggest that moral properties might only weakly supervene upon natural phenomena. But, according to the other horn of the dilemma, weak supervenience is a defeater for moral knowledge.

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Este trabalho investiga o naturalismo moral contemporâneo a partir das variadas formulações do argumento conhecido como a falácia naturalista, assim como do contraponto de algumas teorias não-naturalistas, em especial a de G. E. Moore. Parto da análise destas formulações do argumento no contexto formal da metaética contemporânea, buscando aferir a validade da falácia naturalista no contexto atual, bem como de seus limites na aplicação contra o naturalismo moral. Apresento então o naturalismo moral numa versão humeana, que sugere uma abordagem descritivista da moralidade, em oposição ao viés prescritivista. Trabalho as origens do naturalismo e apresento algumas posições em metaética a fim de melhor entender a situação contemporânea do debate moral no que tange à naturalização da ética, contrastando teorias da ação e do valor quanto ao tema da motivação e da normatividade morais.
This work addresses contemporary moral naturalism from the investigation of an array of formulations of the argument known as the naturallistic fallacy, as from the contrast of a few non-naturalistic theories, especially G. E. Moore’s. Proceeding from the analysis of such formulations of the argument in the formal context of contemporary metaethics, attempting to assert the validity of the naturallistic fallacy in the current context, as so its limits in its application against moral naturalism. Then I am going to present moral naturalism in a humean version, which suggests a descriptivist naturalism instead of a prescriptivist one. Such origins of naturalism will be worked with and some positions in metaethics to further understand of the contemporary situation of the moral debate concerning the naturalization of ethics will be presented, contrasting theories of action and of value on the matter of moral motivation and normativity.

This thesis investigates the prospects of a position in metaethics called moral naturalism. Moral naturalism can be summarized as two claims. First, moral naturalism is a form of moral realism, which states that there are true moral claims that hold irrespectively of a person’s attitudes or beliefs. Second, moral naturalism claims that these moral claims are about properties that are part of the natural world. The central challenge facing moral naturalism is to explain how these moral properties fit into the natural world. Are moral properties reducible to, or identical with, natural properties? If so, is there a semantic explanation for why moral properties are related to some natural properties, and not others? Two major arguments, the Open Question Argument and the Moral Twin Earth Argument, have suggested that such a semantic explanation is not possible, which would make moral naturalism an implausible position to hold. This thesis investigates the prospects for moral naturalism by assessing the success of these arguments. The conclusions offered in this thesis are conservative. Both arguments turn out to depend on controversial, yet plausible, assumptions. In the case of the Open Question Argument, I argue that the success of the argument is sensitive to the form of moral naturalism under consideration; while it is fairly clear that it succeeds against reductive moral naturalism, it is less clear that it undermines non-reductive moral naturalism. It is clearer that the Moral Twin Earth Argument is successful, but it cannot categorically rule out every semantic explanation that the moral naturalist might advance.

Introdução: Considera-se que a diversidade de saberes e experiências influenciam no modo como os educadores desenvolvem a sua prática. De igual maneira, acredita-se que as escolha teóricas são influenciadas pelo modo como os educadores concebem o mundo e as suas inter-relações. Objetivo: Analisar as características da prática docente em Educação Ambiental do educador de Geografia nos anos finais do Ensino Fundamental em uma escola da rede privada de Curitiba/PR. Material e métodos: Utilizou-se como base os referenciais da Educação Ambiental a partir dos autores: Carvalho (2004, 2012) e Sauvé (2005a); no campo da Geografia: Moraes (1989, 2007), Mendonça (2004, 2009, 2019) e Vesentini (1994, 2001, 2008). A pesquisa de cunho qualitativo, investigou dois educadores de Geografia que atuam nos anos finais do Ensino Fundamental em uma escola em Curitiba-PR. O percurso metodológico amparou-se em Creswell (2010, 2014), Saldaña (2013) e Flick (2009). As técnicas de coleta de dados utilizadas foram a entrevista semiestruturada, observação participante por meio da plataforma digital Blackboard e análise documental do Projeto Político Pedagógico Pastoral, dos Planos Anuais de Geografia e de Interioridade. Os dados foram analisados com o auxílio do software ATLAS.ti. Resultados: Os resultados apontam que o desenvolvimento da Educação Ambiental ocorre de modo contínuo, fortalecido por ações mais abrangentes com caráter interdisciplinar, a exemplo de trabalhos de campo e campanhas escolares pautadas na coleta de lixo e preservação de recursos naturais. Foi possível identificar que as correntes crítica, naturalista, recursista, humanista e de sustentabilidade da Educação Ambiental apareceram de modo enfático, sem desconsiderar a presença das outras correntes. No que diz respeito à presença das correntes da Geografia, percebe-se a predominância das correntes crítica, socioambiental e humanista. Percebe-se que a relação entre as correntes da EA e da Geografia não possui uma homogeneidade, ocorrem de modo diferente a depender do educador e do conteúdo abordado. Conclusão: Conclui-se que as experiências dos educadores e a sua percepção de mundo influenciam em sua prática, de modo que, mesmo abordando o mesmo conteúdo, cada educador o discute de uma perspectiva diferente, dependendo do seu referencial de mundo e compreensão das inter-relações no espaço.

Drawing on Milbank and Agamben, a politico-juridical anthropology matrix can be drawn describing the relations between ius and bios (justice and political life) on the one hand and dominium and zoe (private power and ‘bare life’) on the other hand. Mapping movements in the basic configurations of this matrix over the long sweep of Western cultural history enable us to see where we are currently situated in relation to the nexus between politico-juridical authority (sovereignty) and the emergency use of executive State powers in the context of biosecurity. The argument presented is that pre-19th century understandings of ius and bios presupposed transcendent categories of Justice and the Common Good that were not naturalistically defined. The very recent idea of a purely naturalistic naturalism has made distinctions between bios and zoe un-locatable and civic ius is now disappearing into a strangely ‘private’ total power (dominium) over the bodies of citizens, as exercised by the State. The very meaning of politico-juridical authority and the sovereignty of the State is undergoing radical change when viewed from a long perspective. This paper suggests that the ancient distinction between power and authority is becoming meaningless, and that this loss erodes the ideas of justice and political life in the Western tradition. Early modern capitalism still retained at least the theory of a Providential moral order, but since the late 19th century, morality has become fully naturalized and secularized, such that what moral categories Classical economics had have been radically instrumentalized since. In the postcapitalist neoliberal world order, no high horizon of just power –no spiritual conception of sovereignty– remains. The paper argues that the reduction of authority to power, which flows from the absence of any traditional conception of sovereignty, is happening with particular ease in Australia, and that in Australia it is only the Indigenous attempt to have their prior sovereignty –as a spiritual reality– recognized that is pushing back against the collapse of political authority into mere executive power.