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1
Moraes de Assis, Saulo. "Por um naturalismo moderado?; For a moderate naturalism?" Sofia 11, no. 2 (August 1, 2022): e11231861. http://dx.doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v11i2.31861.
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Neste artigo, discutiremos o naturalismo de Alvin Goldman em relação à questão da normatividade da epistemologia. Para isso, revisamos a apresentação que este autor faz do conhecimento e da justificação entendidas sob um enfoque naturalista. Pretende-se entender como Goldman incorpora elementos da epistemologia especulativa tradicional ao seu ponto de vista naturalista. Apresentamos algumas distinções, feitas pelo próprio Goldman, a fim de esclarecer as diferentes abordagens que uma postura naturalista na epistemologia pode ter e discutir sua formulação de um naturalismo moderado. No final, procuramos apresentar algumas fragilidades dessa pretensão para pensar sobre a questão de se um naturalismo moderado é necessário. Abstract In this paper, we will discuss Alvin Goldman's naturalism in relation to the question of the normativity of epistemology. For this, we review the presentation that this author makes of knowledge and justification understood under a naturalistic approach. It is intended to understand how Goldman incorporates elements of traditional speculative epistemology to his naturalistic point of view. We present some distinctions, made by Goldman himself, in order to clarify the different approaches that a naturalist stance in epistemology can take and to discuss his formulation of a moderate naturalism. In the end, we try to present some weaknesses of this pretension to think about the question of whether a moderate naturalism is necessary.
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Frápolli, María José. "You and Me Baby Ain't Nothing but Mammals. Subject Naturalism and Default Positions." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 1, no. 1 (November 28, 2014): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.20141970.
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Resumen Este artículo discute el problema de la localización, tal como Price lo ha definido. En el se distinguen diferentes versiones de naturalismo y se defiende el naturalismo del sujeto. Se asume que el sistema de conceptos humano se ha desarrollado en interacción con el medio natural y social. Por esta razón no podemos evitar ser realistas y representacionalistas por defecto. Las afirmaciones básicas del realismo, el representatcionalismo y la teoría de la verdad como correspondencia son difícilmente rechazables, y esto explica el aire de artificiosidad que acompaña a las posiciones anti-realistas. Sin embargo las posiciones por defecto no apoyan en absoluto a sus versiones filosóficamente desarrolladas. Estas son incompatibles con una visión naturalista sobre la realidad, el significado y la verdad. Palabras clave: Correspondentismo por defecto, naturalismo, naturalismo del sujeto, realismo por defecto, representacionalismo por defecto, teoría de la verdad como correspondencia, teoría prooracional de la verdad, verdad aristotélica Abstract This paper deals with Price’s placement problem. In it, different versions of naturalism are distinguished and subject naturalism is defended. It is assumed that human conceptual system has evolved as a result of humans relations with the natural and social surroundings. For this reason, we cannot but be realist and representationalist by default. The basis claims of realism, representationalism, and correspondence are hardly deniable, and this explains the artificiality scent that usually accompanies anti-realist positions. Nevertheless, the natural default positions do not lend any support to their philosophically implemented versions, metaphysical realism, semantic representationalism and full-blood correspondence. These approaches to reality, meaning and truth are incompatible with a sound naturalist stand on these issues. Keywords: Aristotelian truth, correspondence theory of truth, default realism, default representationalism, default correspondentism, naturalism, prosentential theory of truth, subject naturalism.
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Hříbek, Tomáš. "Filip Tvrdý o naturalizaci filosofie." FILOSOFIE DNES 9, no. 1 (September 28, 2017): 71–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.26806/fd.v9i1.248.
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Článek rozlišuje několik verzí současného naturalismu: revizionistickou, konstruktivní a antireprezentacionalistickou. Revizionistický naturalismus doporučuje nahradit tradiční filosofické zkoumání povahy věcí genetickým zkoumáním původu našich, často mylných, přesvědčení o povaze věcí. Konstruktivní naturalismus akceptuje zadání tradiční filosofie, ale doufá, že dokáže její otázky zodpovědět pomocí více méně vědeckých metod. Antireprezentacionalistický naturalismus je extenzí metaetického expresivismu v tom smyslu, že popírá deskriptivní povahu všech filosofických tezí. Tyto distinkce mohou pomoci klasifikovat jeden z nejexplicitněji naturalistických projektů v novější české filosofii, Nesnáze introspekce (2015) Filipa Tvrdého. Tvrdý oficiálně sleduje genetický, revizionistický projekt, který však nespadá vjedno s antireprezentacionalismem. Avšak v jeho knize najdeme i stopy konstruktivního naturalismu. The paper distinguishes several versions of contemporary naturalism: revisionary, constructive, and non-representational. Revisionary naturalismus pleads substituting the traditional philosophical inquiry into the nature of things by a genetic inquiry into the origin of our – often faulty – beliefs about the nature of things. Constructive naturalism accepts the program of traditional philosophy, yet hoping that its questions could be answered by broadly scientific methods. Non-representational naturalism is an extension of metaethical expressivism, claiming that philosophical claims should not be understood as descriptive in nature. These distinctions can help us classify the most self-consciously naturalistic project in the recent Czech philosophy, Filip Tvrdý’s Troubles of Introspection (2015). Tvrdý is officially pursuing a genetic, revisionary project, which does not coincide with non-representational naturalism. However, there are also traces of constructive naturalism in Tvrdý’s book.
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Nyborg, Ole. "N. F. S. Grundtvig og naturalismen." Grundtvig-Studier 63, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 109–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/grs.v63i1.16593.
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N. F. S. Grundtvig og naturalismen[N. F. S. Grundtvig and the Concept of Naturalism]By Ole NyborgThe concepts o f ‘naturalism’, ‘naturalist’, and ‘naturalistic’ are frequently found in the writings of the Danish theologian N. F. S. Grundtvig (1783-1872), and this is the case during his whole lifetime.In scholarly literature, Grundtvig’s concept of ‘naturalism’ has mainly been interpreted from the way ‘naturalism’ etc. is used in his introduction to Nordisk Mythologi (Northern Mythology) (1832). The frequent references to ‘naturalism’ in Grundtvig’s other works have mostly been neglected by scholars. However, an analysis of Grundtvig’s works as a whole shows a very clear picture. He is a persistent, emotional, and aggressive opponent to naturalism, emphasizing numerous negative aspects of it as a philosophy, because its modern individualistic ideas destroy the natural bonds and social constraints of love, reverence, and respect. According to Grundtvig, naturalism represents a powerful, imminent, and dangerous threat to traditional Christian states and nations of Western Europe, and the notorious revolution of France of 1789 he sees as a terrible and horrifying manifestation of the unchristian, subversive, unbridled, and immoral character of naturalism.
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Lawler, Diego, and Eleonora Orlando. "The Price of Living a Philosophical Life Without Object Naturalism." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 1, no. 1 (November 28, 2014): 25. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.20141979.
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Resumen En nuestro artículo nos centramos en las principales críticas al representacionalismo desarrolladas por Huw Price en su trabajo “Naturalism without Representationalism”, unas críticas que sientan las bases de su primer argumento contra el naturalismo del objeto. Con posterioridad examinamos su segundo argumento, el que se sigue de sus consideraciones sobre la posibilidad de comenzar con una concepción material de los problemas de la localización. Palabras clave: Huw Price, naturalismo del objeto, naturalismo del sujeto, representacionalismo. Abstract In our paper we first focus on Price´s central objections to representationalism in his “Naturalism without Rpresentationalism”, which pave the way for his first argument against object naturalism –in his terms, they throw doubts on the possibility of ‘validating’ object naturalism. Then, we will examine his second argument, stemming from his considerations on the possibility of starting off with a material conception of the placement problems Key Words: Huw Price, object naturalism, subject naturalism, representationalism
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Bell, Martin, and Marie McGinn. "Naturalism and Scepticism." Philosophy 65, no. 254 (October 1990): 399–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100064652.
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In this paper we argue that a dominant view of Humean naturalism involves a fundamental misconception of Hume's naturalist project. We shall show that the naturalist project as Hume conceives it is philosophically much more interesting than the form of naturalism commonly attributed to him. We shall also argue, however, that Hume's commitment to principles of empiricist epistemology prevented him from bringing his naturalist project to a satisfactory conclusion. Finally, we shall suggest that Wittgenstein shares Hume's conception of a philosophically satisfactory form of naturalism, and that, unencumbered by empiricist doctrines, Wittgenstein was able to provide the sort of undogmatic unravelling of the sceptical problem that eluded Hume.
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Phillips, Rory Lawrence. "Transcendental Idealism and Naturalism: The Case of Fichte." Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 1, no. 1 (March 26, 2020): 43–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2019-0013.
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AbstractIn this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Fichte. I conclude that Fichte is a near-naturalist, akin to Baker, Lynne Rudder (2017). “Naturalism and the idea of nature,” Philosophy 92 (3): 333–349. A near-naturalist is one whose position looks akin to the naturalist in some ways but the near-naturalist can radically differ in metaphilosophical orientation and substantial commitment. This paper is composed of three sections. In the first, I outline briefly what I take transcendental idealism to be, as well as some differences in types of naturalism, and how this maps on to Fichte. In the second, I give an exegesis of Fichte’s key arguments in the Later Jena period, which are important for the question of his relationship to naturalism. In the third, I continue the exegesis with a discussion of Fichte’s conception of God, and conclude that these arguments support a near-naturalist reading of Fichte.
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Papazoglou, Alexis. "Hegel and Naturalism." Hegel Bulletin 33, no. 02 (2012): 74–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200000513.
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In the recent Hegel literature there has been an effort to portray Hegel's philosophy as compatible with naturalism, or even as a form of naturalism (see for example Pippin 2008 and Pinkard 2012). Despite the attractions of such a project, there is, it seems to me, another, and potentially more interesting way of looking at the relationship of Hegel to naturalism. Instead of showing how Hegel's philosophy can be compatible with naturalism, I propose to show how Hegel's philosophy offers a challenge to naturalism. Naturalism has become the dominant ideology in much of contemporary analytic philosophy (Kim 2003: 84), but also within other disciplines. Evolutionary psychology and behavioral genetics, which attract a lot of media attention, attempt to explain the human mind and human behavior in purely naturalistic terms, usually in terms of the biological past and makeup of humans (Pinker 2002). Philosophy's task is, among other things, to examine the assumptions of human practices including its own. In that vein I am interested in showing how Hegel can be seen as someone offering a challenge to our contemporary philosophical culture and its underlying naturalist premise.Of course that Hegel never explicitly talks about naturalism in his writings already presents us with the problem of risking anachronism. The other great problem is the fact that naturalism is an elusive philosophical position. There are a few different versions of the key theses of naturalism, so that if our aim is to diagnose Hegel's philosophy as naturalist or anti-naturalist it would seem we have to pick which version of naturalism we are going to work with.
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Bevir, Mark, and Asaf Kedar. "Concept Formation in Political Science: An Anti-Naturalist Critique of Qualitative Methodology." Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 3 (August 18, 2008): 503–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592708081255.
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This article offers an anti-naturalist philosophical critique of the naturalist tendencies within qualitative concept formation as developed most prominently by Giovanni Sartori and David Collier. We begin by articulating the philosophical distinction between naturalism and anti-naturalism. Whereas naturalism assumes that the study of human life is not essentially different from the study of natural phenomena, anti-naturalism highlights the meaningful and contingent nature of social life, the situatedness of the scholar, and so the dialogical nature of social science. These two contrasting philosophical approaches inspire, in turn, different strategies of concept formation. Naturalism encourages concept formation that involves reification, essentialism, and an instrumentalist view of language. Anti-naturalism, conversely, challenges reified concepts for eliding the place of meanings, essentialist concepts for eliding the place of contingency, and linguistic instrumentalism for eliding the situatedness of the scholar and the dialogical nature of social science. Based on this philosophical framework, we subject qualitative concept formation to a philosophical critique. We show how the conceptual strategies developed by Sartori and Collier embody a reification, essentialism, and instrumentalist view of language associated with naturalism. Although Collier's work on concept formation is much more flexible and nuanced than Sartori's, it too remains attached to a discredited naturalism.
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STENMARK, MIKAEL. "Religious naturalism and its rivals." Religious Studies 49, no. 4 (December 11, 2012): 529–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412512000431.
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AbstractThe aim of this article is to explore where and why religious naturalism differs from its rivals, and also to consider some of the challenges religious naturalism faces. I argue that religious naturalism is best conceived as a reaction against both theists who are religious and naturalists who are atheists: the best option is taken to be a naturalist who is religious. Nevertheless, it is quite difficult to say more exactly what claims the view contains. In fact, it is argued, three forms of religious naturalism must be distinguished and contrasted with their rivals, which are taken to be non-religious naturalism, scientific naturalism, theism (including panentheism), divine transcendentalism, religious agnosticism, and religious relativism.
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Teruel, Pedro Jesús. "Critical Naturalism." Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica 77, Extra 295 (November 30, 2021): 467–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.14422/pen.v77.i295.y2021.002.
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In this paper I map the conceptual framework of naturalism, its ontological implications and its current projection in the field of neurophilosophy. I show how critical naturalism formally differs from radical ontological naturalisms, both global and sectoral, in order to become a critical instance. Its theoretical implications lead to a definition of natural causality from the emergentist perspective and to metaphysical scenarios ranging from ontological pluralism to noumenal monism.
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Perconti, Pietro. "Varietŕ di naturalismo." PARADIGMI, no. 1 (May 2009): 185–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/para2009-001014.
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- Naturalism is a widely accepted trend of contemporary philosophy, the analytic tradition in particular. However, the (dis)continuity between philosophy and the sciences is still controversial. In this paper a survey is presented of the different approaches to philosophical naturalism, focusing on the debate between a pluralistic position and a more restrictive one. The latter is well represented by Sandro Nannini's Naturalismo cognitivo (2007), the best example of "hard" naturalism on the Italian philosophical scene. In contrast with this position, we argue that many genuine philosophical issues, such as the first person perspective of conscious experience and the ontological commitment about social rules, remain "hard problems" for radical naturalism. Keywords: Analytical philosophy, Cognitive science, Hard naturalism, Pluralistic naturalism, Reductionism, Social ontology.
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Macarthur, David. "Subject Naturalism, Scientism and the Problem of Linguistic Meaning: Critical Remarks on Price's 'Naturalism without Representationalism'." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 1, no. 1 (November 28, 2014): 69. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.20141971.
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Resumen Huw Price es sin duda uno de los pragmatistas lingüísticos contemporáneos más importantes. Como admirador de su trabajo desde hace mucho tiempo, agradezco la oportunidad de realizar un comentario critico de su inflyente trabajo “Naturalism without Representationalism” (2004) publicado originalmente en un volumen que co-edité con mario De Caro titulado Naturalism in Question. Mis comentarios se centrarán en este trabajo suyo; discutiré cualquier otro material incluido en sus otros trabajos tan solo si sirve para aclarar algún aspect de este trabajo. No discutiré ningún desarrollo reciente de la posición anti-representacionalista de Price. Palabras clave: Huw Price, naturalismo, representacionalismo, naturalismo del sujeto, cientificismo. Abstract Huw Price is undoubtedly one of the most important contemporary linguistic pragmatists. As a long-time admirer of his work I welcome this opportunity to critically comment on his influential paper, “Naturalism without Representationalism” (2004), that first appeared in a volume I co-edited with Mario De Caro titled Naturalism in Question. My comments will be focused mainly on this paper; material from other papers will only be discussed in so far as it helps elucidate themes in this paper. I shall not be discussing recent refinements in Price’s anti-representationalist position. Keywords: Huw Price, naturalism, representationalism, subject naturalism, scientism.
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Rozema, David. "Naturalism." Theology Today 75, no. 3 (October 2018): 330–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0040573618791731.
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In May of 1947, C. S. Lewis’s book Miracles was published, the third chapter of which was entitled, “The Self-contradiction of Naturalism.” In this chapter, Lewis presented a reductio argument, concluding that the metaphysical theory of Naturalism, if assumed to be true, undermines itself. Lewis’s main aim in giving this argument against naturalism is to leave us with the only alternative to naturalism: supernaturalism. This argument for the existence of the supernatural (i.e., God) has come to be known as “the Argument from Reason.” It has become a staple argument among present-day Christian apologists. Rather than offering either a defense or a refutation of the argument, in this article I wish to do a preliminary examination of what those who argue about naturalism might mean by the term. The aim of such an examination is to determine if the debates over naturalism can even get off the ground. I use the 1948 “debate” between C. S. Lewis and Elizabeth Anscombe, along with a little-known paper (“Naturalism”) by the American philosopher O. K. Bouwsma, to show how the arguments dissolve upon grammatical investigation, and a more sensible understanding of the naturalist “hypothesis” is to take it as a mandate. Finally, I take up a third possible interpretation of naturalism, suggested by Lewis himself, that its appeal is strongest when it is couched in mythical terms.
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Moran, Dermot. "‘Let's Look at It Objectively’: Why Phenomenology Cannot be Naturalized." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72 (April 3, 2013): 89–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246113000064.
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AbstractIn recent years there have been attempts to integrate first-person phenomenology into naturalistic science. Traditionally, however, Husserlian phenomenology has been resolutely anti-naturalist. Husserl identified naturalism as the dominant tendency of twentieth-century science and philosophy and he regarded it as an essentially self-refuting doctrine. Naturalism is a point of view or attitude (a reification of the natural attitude into thenaturalistic attitude) that does not know that it is an attitude. For phenomenology, naturalism is objectivism. But phenomenology maintains that objectivity is constituted through the intentional activity of cooperating subjects. Understanding the role of cooperating subjects in producing the experience of the one, shared, objective world keeps phenomenology committed to a resolutely anti-naturalist (or ‘transcendental’) philosophy.
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GANSSLE, GREGORY E. "Fine tuning and the varieties of naturalism." Religious Studies 47, no. 1 (April 6, 2010): 59–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412510000090.
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AbstractNaturalism has been characterized both as a claim about what exists (claim naturalism) and as a commitment to a certain methodology (method naturalism). The fine-tuning argument for God's existence presents a significant challenge to each way of characterizing naturalism. The claim naturalist faces the fact that the best response to the fine-tuning argument (the many-world hypothesis) requires the existence of many universes that are not clearly naturalistic themselves. Method naturalism faces the challenge that it does not have the resources to ground the preference of the many-world hypothesis to the designer hypothesis.
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Kalpokas, Daniel. "Price on Expressionism and the Placement Problems." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 1, no. 1 (November 28, 2014): 101. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.20141973.
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Resumen En “Naturalismo sin representacionalismo”, Huw Price propone una variedad de naturalismo –una que él denomina naturalismo del sujeto– que supuestamente puede evitar los problemas de la localización relacionados con entidades “incómodas” como son los hechos morales, los significados, las verdades matemáticas y otras similares. A partir de una concepción expresivista de todo el lenguaje, Price defiende que los problemas de la localización descansan sobre un error categorical: el error consiste en considerar que toda oración representa algún estado de hechos mundano. En nuestro trabajo, a partir de nuestra crítica al expresivismo de Price, cuestionaremos su respuesta a los problemas de la localización. Palabras clave: Naturalismo del sujeto, representacionalismo, expresivismo global, deflacionismo, verdad. Abstract In his article “Naturalism Without Representationalism”, Price proposes a variety of naturalism –subject naturalism, as he calls it- that is supposedly able to avoid placement problems about “odd” entities such as moral facts, meanings, mathematical truths and the like. Assuming an expressivist conception about the entire language, Price argues that placement problems rest on a category mistake: the mistake of considering all sorts of sentences as representing worldly states of affairs. In this article, by arguing against Price’s expressivism, I call his response to placement problems into question. My thesis is that placement problems are genuine ontological problems. Key Words: Subject Naturalism, Representationalism, Global Expressivism; Deflationalism; Truth.
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Barbosa, Antero. "Eugénia e Silvina, os meios da transgressão/ Eugénia e Silvina, the Means of Transgression." Revista do Centro de Estudos Portugueses 42, no. 68 (May 4, 2023): 154. http://dx.doi.org/10.17851/2359-0076.42.68.154-170.
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Resumo: Consagrado em Portugal com a publicação da obra de Eça de Queirós O crime do padre Amaro (1875) – como o fora antes em França com Teresa Raquin (1867) de Zola –, o Naturalismo é, porventura, a corrente literária mais afrontada e controvertida, dada como morta em França e com direito a funerais logo a 20 de março de 1891, em conferência pública de Léon Bloy, e definitivamente morta em Portugal com a publicação, em 1919, de Terras do demo de Aquilino Ribeiro. O presente artigo tem por principal objetivo comprovar que a corrente naturalista, numa das suas vertentes de oposição e caricatura, o romance faceto de Camilo consubstanciado nas obras Eusébio Macário (1879) e A corja (1880), permanece e perdura mais de cem anos, vindo a confirmar a sua viabilidade na obra Eugénia e Silvina (1989) de Agustina Bessa-Luís.Palavras-chave: Naturalismo; Camilo; Agustina: Eugénia e Silvina; Romance faceto.Abstract: Consecrated in Portugal with the publication of the work of Eça de Queirós O crime do padre Amaro (1875) – as it had been before in France with Teresa Raquin (1867) by Zola – Naturalism is perhaps the most affronted and controversial literary current, given as died in France and entitled to a funeral on March 20, 1891, in a public conference by Léon Bloy, and definitively dead in Portugal with the publication, in 1919, of Terras do demo by Aquilino Ribeiro. The main objective of 8 Rev. Cent. Estud. Port, Belo Horizonte, v. 42, n. 68, p. Section 1-23, 2022 this article is to prove that the naturalist current, in one of its aspects of opposition and caricature, Camilo’s facet novel embodied in the works Eusébio Macário (1879) and A corja (1880), remains and lasts for over a hundred years, confirming its viability in the work Eugénia e Silvina (1989) by Agustina Bessa-Luís. Keywords: Naturalism; Camilo; Agustina: Eugénia e Silvina; Facet romance
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Kim, Jung Ho. "Joseph Losey and Impulse Image in Naturalist Cinema." Institute of Art & Design Research 26, no. 2 (December 31, 2023): 41–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.59386/jadr.2023.26.2.41.
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Naturalist cinema contain the Impulse Image. Since the I mpulse Image has the properties of Action Image and Af fection Image, Naturalism refers simultaneously to four c o-ordinates: Originary World/Derivied Milieu; Impulses/ Modes of Behavior. For Deleuze, There were three great masters of naturalism in cinema: Stroheim, Bunuel, and Losey. Losey’s naturalism is characterized by violence, pr edators and prey, Servility, fetish, reversal against the sel f, salvation, and a landscape that simultaneously captures the original world and the derived world.
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Rouse, Joseph. "Barad's Feminist Naturalism." Hypatia 19, no. 1 (2004): 142–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2004.tb01272.x.
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Philosophical naturalism is ambiguous between conjoining philosophy with science or with nature understood scientifically. Reconciliation of this ambiguity is necessary but rarely attempted. Feminist science studies often endorse the former naturalism but criticize the second. Karen Barad's agential realism, however, constructively reconciles both senses. Barad then challenges traditional metaphysical naturalisms as not adequately accountable to science. She also contributes distinctively to feminist reinterpretations of objectivity as agential responsibility, and of agency as embodied, worldly, and intra-active.
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Vicente, Agustín, and Adrián Sampedro León. "La perspectiva de la primera persona y el naturalismo." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 1, no. 1 (November 28, 2014): 161. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.20141975.
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Resumen En el presente artículo examinamos diversas respuestas a la cuestión de qué somos, fijándonos sobre todo en las propuestas reduccionistas y eliminativistas sobre las personas o los yoes. Concluimos que, a día de hoy, parece más razonable el dualismo que el naturalismo, si por tal cosa entendemos la reducción o eliminación de entidades psicológicas. Palabras clave: Persona, yo, naturalismo, dualismo, relación de constitución, experiencia y su unidad. Abstract In this paper we examine different answers to the question of what we are, focusing in particular on eliminative and reductivist proposals about persons or selves. We conclude that, as of today, dualism seems more reasonable than naturalism, if by naturalism we understand the thesis that psychological entities can be reduced or eliminated. Keywords: Person, self, naturalism, dualism, the constitution relation, experience and its unity.
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J. Boongaling, Pamela Ann. "Is Quinean naturalism dependent on the metametalanguage of metaphysics?" Discusiones Filosóficas 21, no. 36 (January 1, 2020): 39–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.4.
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I will demonstrate that Quinean naturalism must accommodate a priori truths in its epistemology if it aims to retain its naturalist stance. This happens becausethe laws of first-order logic which it uses in the regimentation of scientific theories are best perceived as metaphysical principles rather than logical laws. To support this position, I will demonstrate that since our best scientific theories are dependent on the meta-language of first-order logic and since the meta-language of first-order logic is included in the metametalanguage of metaphysics, science is also dependent on the metametalanguage of metaphysics.Hence, the cogency of Quinean naturalism’s account of our best scientific theories must explain how science is dependent on the metametalanguage of metaphysics.
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Playford, Richard. "Non-natural natural law: bridging the gap between Aristotle and Ross." ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy 20, no. 1 (April 30, 2021): 344–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.e79185.
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Aristotelianism is often considered to be a version of naturalism. As a result, non-naturalism is often considered to be incompatible with Aristotelianism. In this paper, I will show that the Aristotelian can actually accept much of what the non-naturalist wants to say. I will show that the Aristotelian can accept a non-natural account of the good, need not be concerned by G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument and that, as long as we carefully consider and define our terms, they can accept much of non-naturalism in abstract. This then paves the way for the possibility of a non-natural natural law and should go some way to challenging the prevailing orthodoxy that Aristotelianism is a version of naturalism. I do not go so far as to label Aristotelianism a form of non-naturalism as there are some important areas of disagreement. Instead, I think that Aristotelianism should count as its own label and that it will resist any attempts to label it a form of naturalism, non-naturalism or, indeed, supernaturalism.
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Özbe, Ufuk. "Logical Aliens? Eine Verallgemeinerung und Verteidigung der Psychologismus-Kritik Freges gegen Wittgensteins Naturalismus." Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 76, no. 4 (December 15, 2022): 580–605. http://dx.doi.org/10.3196/004433022836164996.
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The fundamental laws of logic hold independently of us. Thus, if there were beings who thought in contradiction to these laws, they would be in error. The paper defends this stance of Frege's against Wittgenstein's combination of logical constitutivism and logical naturalism. Frege's arguments against psychologism are more general than his usual wording suggests and are, at their core, directed against the whole of logical naturalism. Contrary to prevailing opinions on this subject, I argue that constitutivism alone cannot deflect Frege's attack. Rather, constitutivism is neutral to the opposition between logical realism and logical naturalism. The later Wittgenstein was not only a constitutivist, but, as will be explained, also a logical naturalist. By shedding new light on the logical alien problem, I attempt to apply Frege's generalized arguments to Wittgensteinian naturalism. This naturalism inevitably leads to a radical and self-undermining relativism.
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Kuukkanen, Jouni-Matti. "Naturalism and the Problem of Normativity: The Case of Historiography." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49, no. 5 (April 23, 2019): 331–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393119842787.
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This article tackles the problem of normativity in naturalism and considers it in the context of the philosophy of historiography. I argue that strong naturalism is inconsistent with genuine normativity. The strong naturalist faces a difficult dilemma. If he rejects any reliance on conceptual intuitions, his epistemic inquiries will not get off the ground. As a consequence, his analyses of historiography are, in effect, normatively irrelevant: any practice is epistemically as valuable as any other. Another option for the strong naturalist is to relax methodological requirements and accept that epistemic inquiries may begin with nonempirical conceptual reflection or a priori reasoning.
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Moreland, J. P. "A Critical Assessment of Shafer-Landau’s Ethical Non-Naturalism." Religions 14, no. 4 (April 18, 2023): 546. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14040546.
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I focus on the ethical non-naturalism of Russ Shafer-Landau. First, I spend a good bit of time specifying the nature of two versions of naturalism and arguing that one is embraced ubiquitously—more importantly, should be embraced—by contemporary naturalists. I do so because if I am right about this, before we investigate the details of Shafer-Landau’s ethical non-naturalism, there will be a significant burden of proof for him to meet. In my view, that burden is strong enough to justify the claim that a critic’s epistemic task is merely to provide undercutting defeaters for Shafer-Landau’s position, and not to proffer rebutting defeaters, though I will attempt to supply both. After presenting a crucial characterization of contemporary naturalism followed by a critique of naturalist emergent properties, I state and critique Shafer-Landau’s ontology followed by the same for his epistemology. Both will be evaluated with a particular focus on their plausibility to support his ethical non-naturalism.
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Obiora, Anichebe, and Onoja Christian Nnabuike. "Naturalism of consciousness: A dialogue between Colin McGinn and Owen Flanagan." IKENGA International Journal of Institute of African Studies 24, no. 2 (June 30, 2023): 1–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.53836/ijia/2023/24/2/008.
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Opinions are divided among naturalists on whether we can specify any property of the brain as the basis of consciousness. This is the question of naturalism of consciousness. While constructive naturalists hold that naturalism is possible, anti-constructive naturalists don’t think so. Owen Flanagan falls within the former camp, while McGinn is an anti-constructive naturalist. In this study, we assess the contributions of McGinn and Flanagan with respect to the possibility of naturalising consciousness. The research demonstrates that constructive naturalism is more plausible than anti-constructive naturalism. We do this through the following routes: 1) highlighting the weaknesses in McGinn’s postulation of the “hidden structure” of consciousness; 2) projecting the explanatory relevance of Flanagan’s use of brain scanner technology in consciousness studies; and 3) demonstrating, on the basis of science, how the immaterial can emerge from matter. The paper concludes that through the science of consciousness, we can achieve possible naturalism of consciousness.
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Nemes, Steven. "A PROPERLY SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM CAN BE COMPATIBLE WITH CLASSICAL THEISM." Think 21, no. 62 (2022): 91–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s147717562200015x.
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One might think at first glance that naturalism excludes any form of theism by definition. This article argues to the contrary that proper scientificity requires that a naturalist remain open to the possibility of the truth of the classical theistic conception of God in particular. The only alternative is for naturalism to devolve into an anti-theistic bias and ideology, forsaking the claim to being properly scientific.
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LEFTOW, BRIAN. "A naturalist cosmological argument." Religious Studies 53, no. 3 (August 10, 2017): 321–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412517000257.
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Stone, Alison. "Hegel, Naturalism and the Philosophy of Nature." Hegel Bulletin 34, no. 1 (April 17, 2013): 59–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2013.2.
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AbstractIn this article I consider whether Hegel is a naturalist or an anti-naturalist with respect to his philosophy of nature. I adopt a cluster-based approach to naturalism, on which positions are more or less naturalistic depending how many strands of the clusternaturalismthey exemplify. I focus on two strands: belief that philosophy is continuous with the empirical sciences, and disbelief in supernatural entities. I argue that Hegel regards philosophy of nature as distinct, but not wholly discontinuous, from empirical science and that he believes in the reality of formal and final causes insofar as he is a realist about universal forms that interconnect to comprise a self-organizing whole. Nonetheless, for Hegel, natural particulars never fully realize these universal forms, so that empirical inquiry into these particulars and their efficient-causal interactions is always necessary. In these two respects, I conclude, Hegel's position sits in the middle of the naturalism/anti-naturalism spectrum.
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Spiegel, Thomas J. "The Scientific Weltanschauung: (Anti-)Naturalism in Dilthey, Jaspers and Analytic Philosophy." Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 2, no. 2 (June 23, 2021): 259–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0016.
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Abstract Different forms of methodological and ontological naturalism constitute the current near-orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Many prominent figures have called naturalism a (scientific) image (Sellars, W. 1962. “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.” In Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, Reality, 1–40. Ridgeview Publishing), a Weltanschauung (Loewer, B. 2001. “From Physics to Physicalism.” In Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett, and B. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stoljar, D. 2010. Physicalism. Routledge), or even a “philosophical ideology” (Kim, J. 2003. “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism.” Journal of Philosophical Research 28: 83–98). This suggests that naturalism is indeed something over-and-above an ordinary philosophical thesis (e.g. in contrast to the justified true belief-theory of knowledge). However, these thinkers fail to tease out the host of implications this idea – naturalism being a worldview – presents. This paper draws on (somewhat underappreciated) remarks of Dilthey and Jaspers on the concept of worldviews (Weltanschauung, Weltbild) in order to demonstrate that naturalism as a worldview is a presuppositional background assumption which is left untouched by arguments against naturalism as a thesis. The concluding plea is (in order to make dialectical progress) to re-organize the existing debate on naturalism in a way that treats naturalism not as a first-order philosophical claim, but rather shifts its focus on naturalism’s status as a worldview.
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Van Doorn, Maarten. "A Tension in Some Non-Naturalistic Explanations of Moral Truths." Croatian journal of philosophy 23, no. 68 (October 17, 2023): 181–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.52685/cjp.23.68.4.
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Recently, there has been some excitement about the potential explanatory payoffs the newish metaphysical notion of grounding seems to have for metaethical non-naturalism. There has also been a recent upsurge in the debate about whether non-naturalism is implausibly committed to some acts being wrong because of some sui generis piece of ontology. It has, in response, been claimed that once we have a clear enough picture of the grounding role of moral laws on non-naturalism, this is not (objectionably) so. This move, I argue, is inconsistent with certain constraints on what non-naturalist-friendly moral laws must be for them to do the explanatory work non-naturalism requires of them elsewhere. In other words, there is tension between the grounding reply to the supervenience objection and the grounding structure implied by some responses to the normative objection.
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Sibille, Benoît. "Ontologie naturaliste et travail abstrait : Relire Marx après Descola et inversement." Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 1-2 (July 31, 2024): 401–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2024_80_1_0401.
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Descola’s work has profoundly renewed ecological thought by suggesting that the global planetary crisis is linked to the ‘naturalist ontology’, by which modern Westerners distance themselves from non-humans. This article proposes to re-read Descola with Marx in order to critically assess question the genesis of this ontology. Rather than looking to the history of ideas in search of what prepared this naturalism, a close reading of Marx allows to hypothesise a practical origin of naturalism, in the worldly occupations that make up ‘abstract labour’. By shedding light on the practical ontogeny of naturalism, we emphasize that the Marxian analysis of capitalism remains highly needed for thinking about and living through the ecological crisis.
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ANGEL, LEONARD. "Mystical naturalism." Religious Studies 38, no. 3 (September 2002): 317–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003441250200598x.
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This paper suggests that an ontologically reductionist view of nature which also accepts the completeness of causality at the level of physics can support (1) the blissful transfiguration of the moral, (2) mystical release from standard ego-identification, and (3) psycho-physical transformation cultivated through meditative practice. This mystical naturalism provides the basis for a thicker, more vigorous institutional religious life, including religious life centred around meditation practices, personalist meanings, and the theology of incarnation, than current proposals for strongly naturalist religions allow.
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Gregoratto, Federica, Heikki Ikäheimo, Renault Emmanuel, Särkelä Arvi, and Testa Italo. "Critical Naturalism: A Manifesto." Krisis | Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 42, no. 1 (December 8, 2022): 108–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.21827/krisis.42.1.38637.
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The Critical Naturalism Manifesto is a common platform put forward as a basis for broad discussions around the problems faced by critical theory today. We are living in a time, e.g. a pandemic time, when present-day challenges exert immense pressure on social critique. This means that models of social critique should not be discussed from the point of view of their normative justification or political effects alone, but also with reference to their ability to tackle contemporary problematic issues (like the dismantlement of the welfare state, the environmental catastrophe, and the sanitary crisis). With this manifesto, we invite varying practices of philosophical, artistic and scientific social critique to take seriously the enormous challenges our societies face with regard to inner and outer nature.
We first identity eleven theses of critical naturalism which contemporary critical theory should take into consideration. We then identify the historical crises and catastrophes that critical naturalism seeks to respond to, dispelling the prejudices against naturalism in contemporary critical thought, and considering alternative answers to these questions such as social constructivism, accelerationism, xenofeminism, flat ontologism, and monist world ecology. By sketching the notions of nature and naturalism, we anchor critical naturalism in the history of materialism and critical theory, understood initially as that of the Frankfurt School, but expanded and enriched by other approaches to social critique. Finally, we sketch models and projects of critical naturalism, which are exemplary fragments of varying ways to practice naturalist social critique.
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Scheopner, Cynthia. "Subversive Spirituality: the Feminism of Emilia Pardo Bazán (1851–1921)." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 50, no. 4 (March 4, 2024): 393–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-12340124.
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Abstract Emilia Pardo Bazán challenged French naturalist writers in the 19th century who maintained that our lives are completely determined by inheritance/background, environment, and the historical moment. She maintained that naturalism as materialism misses the spiritual component of human existence, which is captured in her theory of realism. Against descriptions of her “Catholic Naturalism” as a sort of weakened compromise, I argue that she weaponized Church doctrines to forge a strong feminist philosophy firmly rooted in Spanish Roman Catholicism.
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Marfori, Marianna Antonutti. "Naturalising Mathematics: A Critical Look at the Quine-Maddy Debate." Disputatio 4, no. 32 (May 1, 2012): 323–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2012-0002.
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Abstract This paper considers Maddy’s strategy for naturalising mathematics in the context of Quine’s scientific naturalism. The aim of this proposal is to account for the acceptability of mathematics on scientific grounds without committing to revisionism about mathematical practice entailed by the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. It has been argued that Maddy’s mathematical naturalism makes inconsistent assumptions on the role of mathematics in scientific explanations to the effect that it cannot distinguish mathematics from pseudo-science. I shall clarify Maddy’s arguments and show that the objection can be overcome. I shall then reformulate a novel version of the objection and consider a possible answer, and I shall conclude that mathematical naturalism does not ultimately provide a viable strategy for accommodating an anti-revisionary stance on mathematics within a Quinean naturalist framework.
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Badejo, Omobola Olufunto. "A Non-Naturalised Methodology for Social Sciences." UJAH: Unizik Journal of Arts and Humanities 20, no. 2 (March 17, 2020): 168–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ujah.v20i2.9.
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At the rise of the twentieth century, armed with the success of natural sciences, the school of naturalism argued that the appropriate methodology for all disciplines, including social sciences, is that of natural science. The paper argued that social sciences cannot be naturalised and has its own appropriate methodology. The paper examined the arguments for naturalism and non-naturalism of the method of philosophy of social sciences. The paper employed both primary and secondary sources of data. Data collected were subjected to critical analysis and philosophical argumentation. The results showed that the nature of social sciences is such that it cannot be subjected to only scientific methods. The paper concludes that there is a need for a methodology that understands the subject matter of social sciences to address issues in social sciences. The paper addressed some key issues in philosophy of social sciences.
Keywords: Methodology, Natural sciences, Naturalism, Social sciences.
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Ratcliffe, Matthew. "Phenomenology, Naturalism and the Sense of Reality." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72 (April 3, 2013): 67–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246113000052.
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AbstractPhenomenologists such as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty reject the kind of scientific naturalism or ‘scientism’ that takes empirical science to be epistemologically and metaphysically privileged over all other forms of enquiry. In this paper, I will consider one of their principal complaints against naturalism, that scientific accounts of things are oblivious to a ‘world’ that is presupposed by the intelligibility of science. Focusing mostly upon Husserl's work, I attempt to clarify the nature of this complaint and state it in the form of an argument. I conclude that the argument is effective in exposing naturalism's reliance upon impoverished conceptions of human experience, and that it also weakens the more general case for naturalism.
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Al Faruqi, Achmad Reza Hutama, Muhammad Hadi Wannes, and Muhammad Arief. "Mafhūm Khalq al-‘Ālam inda Badī’uzzamān Sa’īd al-Nūrsī." Tasfiyah: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam 7, no. 1 (April 29, 2023): 143–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.21111/tasfiyah.v7i1.9207.
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This article aims to explain Said Nursi's thoughts on the Creation of Nature and criticism of the views of naturalist philosophers. In his work, Risalah Nur tries to reveal the concept of the Creation of Nature According to Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (based on his criticism of the philosophy of Naturalism). To build this works, the authors use a philosophical approach with descriptive and analytical methods in his concept of the Creation of Nature with his logical thinking so that it can be a critique of the concept of Naturalism. Analyze the data by describing Nursi’s thoughts and analyzing them both by comparing and contrasting with the thougths of other figures in muslim philosophy and Naturalism. In his study on the creation of nature, as a paradigm Nursi used philosophy method in his critique of the philosophy of Naturalism. Bediuzzaman stated that in fact Nature was Allah’s creation, as this proved the testimony of the facts presented in Islam to mankind in humans and objects in this nature. The essence of the nature creation is to reflect or prove the existence of God. The positions of God as an existence that controls and creates nature. which is contrary to the philosophical understanding of Naturalism which assumes that nature was created by itself or without the God.
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Lundager Jensen, Hans J. "Virkeligheder og religionshistorie: En introduktion til ontologier ifølge Philippe Descola." Religionsvidenskabeligt Tidsskrift, no. 71 (May 19, 2021): 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/rt.v0i71.127008.
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ENGLISH SUMMARY: A presentation of Philippe Descola’s model of four ontol-ogies (animism, totemism, analogism, and naturalism) and six forms of attach-ment (gift, exchange, etc.) and an argument for their relevance for the academic study of religion. The four ontologies overlap partly with Robert Bellah’s stages of cultural-religious evolution: Animism and totemism dominate in tribal religions, analogism in archaic and post-axial religions, naturalism (or natura-culturalism) in the post-Christian modernity.
DANSK RESUME: En præsentation af Philippe Descolas model over fire ontolo-gier (animisme, totemisme, analogisme og naturalisme) og seks relationsformer (gave, bytte m.m.) med argumentation for deres relevans for religionsvidenskaben. De fire ontologier relateres til Robert Bellahs religionshistoriske stadier: Animisme og totemisme dominerer i tribale religioner, analogisme i arkaiske og post-aksiale religioner og naturalisme i den post-kristne modernitet.
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Pihlström, Sami. "A pragmatic critique of three kinds of religious naturalism." Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 17, no. 3 (2005): 177–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1570068054922830.
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AbstractThis paper takes a critical look at a number of recent attempts to reconcile religious and scientifi c ways of thinking. Three basic programs of what I call "religious naturalism" are discussed: (1) attempts to synthesize science and religion by defending a combination of (Christian) theism and naturalism by means of the concept of emergence; (2) "demythologized" interpretations of religious statements, allegedly rendering them compatible with science (for example, in John Dewey's pragmatic naturalism or in the religious naturalism inherited from the Chicago School of liberal theology); and (3) a form of naturalism analogous to Arthur Fine's "natural ontological attitude" (NOA), debated in the philosophy of science over the past two decades. I suggest that (1) amounts to a nonreductively naturalist metaphysics, whereas (2) is a nonmetaphysical and (3) a postmetaphysical program in the philosophy of religion. It is argued, among other things, that while the concept of emergence has become increasingly relevant in the philosophy of mind and science, its place in the philosophy of religion remains obscure. Similarly, nonmetaphysical discussions of religious experiences or "the religious" à la Dewey and his followers are difficult to combine with genuinely religious views. Further, it is hard to see how postmetaphysical naturalism (NOA) could be part of a philosophically responsible program at all, because of its diffi culties in accounting for the normativity of ontological commitments. It is proposed that, instead of elaborating on these pseudo-solutions, the problem of the relation between science and religion should be subordinated to a pragmatist re-evaluation.
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Koomson, Sika, and Daniel Kofi Brako. "THEATRICAL METAMORPHOSIS: NATURALISM’S LEGACY IN SHAPING SCENIC DESIGN NARRATIVES." International Journal of Education Humanities and Social Science 07, no. 03 (2024): 744–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.54922/ijehss.2024.0742.
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The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were periods of global transformation, marked by significant scientific, political, and economic breakthroughs. These changes profoundly influenced various aspects of society. This article examines the shifts in theatrical presentation during this era, focusing specifically on the role and impact of Naturalism in scenic design. The objective was to explore the origins, components, and impact of Naturalism on set design. In tracing the history of scenic design from classical to modern times, this paper highlights the influence of Naturalism on modern theatre. The paper adopts a historical and analytical approach, examining the works and theories of renowned designers. Through the analysis of primary and secondary sources, the study explores the evolution of scenic design, focusing on the contributions of prominent figures of the period. The findings reveal that Naturalism significantly shaped scenic design by emphasizing a meticulous portrayal of everyday life. It challenged romantic and idealistic styles, advocating for realistic representation. The study highlights how Naturalist designers strived to create set designs that mirrored reality with high fidelity evident in the works of figures such as Emile Zola, who championed a return to nature and humanity through direct observation and accurate representation. The article underscores the impact of Naturalism on modern scenic design. By bridging the gap between evolving theatrical trends and the broader socio-scientific landscape, Naturalism transformed the aesthetic dimensions of theatre and enhanced its capacity to reflect and critique contemporary life and the legacy continues to influence theatrical practices today
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Stringer, Ryan. "Realist ethical naturalism for ethical non-naturalists." Philosophical Studies 175, no. 2 (January 21, 2017): 339–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0870-0.
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Zargar, Zahra, Ebrahim Azadegan, and Lotfollah Nabavi. "Should Methodological Naturalists Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism?" Journal for General Philosophy of Science 51, no. 1 (July 17, 2019): 185–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09464-8.
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Sherman, David. "Nietzsche Contra the Naturalists." Journal of Nietzsche Studies 55, no. 1 (March 2024): 67–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jnietstud.55.1.0067.
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Abstract Even among scholars who emphasize Nietzsche’s naturalism (“the naturalists”), what it actually involves is disputed. This article identifies the foundations of Nietzsche’s naturalism and then elaborates on these foundations through a critical analysis of the works of those naturalists who also identify them. Nietzsche is a methodological naturalist, who, epistemically, is a reliabilist, and while he acknowledges the innate limitations of our cognitive inheritance, which is reflected in his perspectivism, he sees no reason to conclude that we cannot grasp the natural world truly. As to the primary issue in scientific explanation, causation, Nietzsche adopts a regularity theory as early as The Gay Science, and, on the basis of this theory, rejects determinism. One consequence of this analysis is that Nietzsche’s naturalism is not as restrictive as the naturalists tend to portray it, and this opens up new possibilities for interpreting many of his other commitments.
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PEELS, RIK. "Are naturalism and moral realism incompatible?" Religious Studies 50, no. 1 (May 23, 2013): 77–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412513000206.
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AbstractIn a recent paper, Alvin Plantinga has argued that there is good reason to think that naturalism and moral realism are incompatible. He has done so by arguing that the most important argument for the compatibility of these two theses, which has been provided by Frank Jackson, fails and that any other argument that serves the same purpose is likely to fail for the same reason. His argument against the compatibility of naturalism and moral realism, then, isindirect: he argues against it by refuting the most important argument for it. In this article, I argue that Plantinga's argument is unconvincing for at least two reasons. First, Jackson's argument can be revised in such a way that it meets Plantinga's worry. Second, there is another way of arguing for the compatibility of two propositions which Plantinga does not consider. If the naturalist takes this alternative route, she does not face the problem identified by Plantinga. I thus show not only that Plantinga's argument does not count against the compatibility of naturalism and moral realism, but that there is even good reason to think that naturalism and moral realism are in fact compatible.
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Hartimo, Mirja. "Husserl’s Transcendentalization of Mathematical Naturalism." Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 1, no. 3 (November 18, 2020): 289–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2019-0007.
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AbstractThe paper aims to capture a form of naturalism that can be found “built-in” in phenomenology, namely the idea to take science or mathematics on its own, without postulating extraneous normative “molds” on it. The paper offers a detailed comparison of Penelope Maddy’s naturalism about mathematics and Husserl’s approach to mathematics in Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929). It argues that Maddy’s naturalized methodology is similar to the approach in the first part of the book. However, in the second part Husserl enters into a transcendental clarification of the evidences and presuppositions of the mathematicians’ work, thus “transcendentalizing” his otherwise naturalist approach to mathematics. The result is a moderately revisionist view that takes the existing mathematical practices seriously, calls for reflection on them, and eventually gives suggestions for revisions if needed.
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Morris, Brian. "Remembering Murray Bookchin (1921-2006): Dialectical Naturalism." Anarchist Studies 30, no. 2 (September 16, 2022): 79–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.3898/as.30.2.04.
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This essay examines Murray Bookchin's dialectical or evolutionary naturalism, the metaphysic that underpins his social ecology, his libertarian socialism, and his ethical naturalism. Using Joel Kovel's suggestion that there were two Bookchins – a dialectical naturalist and promoter of Enlightenment humanism and a polemicist consumed with venom and rage – I outline Bookchin's metaphysics of nature and then turn, in the second part, to Bookchin's critique of several ontologies advocated by deep ecologists, in the closing decades of the twentieth century. The essay explains why Bookchin felt that these were either shallow or inadequate as metaphysics and led to reformist, or even reactionary, forms of politics.
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Pedrosa, José Manuel. "Rosso Malpelo (1878), infrahéroe y fantasma: mitologías de la mina y el infierno." Estudios Humanísticos. Filología, no. 36 (December 18, 2014): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.18002/ehf.v0i36.1351.
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<p>Resumen</p> <p>Análisis del cuento <em>Rosso Malpelo</em> (“<em>Malpelo el Pel</em>irrojo”), publicado por el escritor naturalista y verista italiano Giovanni Verga en 1878. El cuento describe la dura explotación infantil en las minas italianas del siglo XIX. El análisis conecta el perfil literario del protagonista del cuento con el de muchos héroes mitológicos que realizan el viaje al infierno, el <em>descensus ad inferos</em>.</p><p>Palabras clave: Rosso Malpelo, Giovanni Verga, mina, minería, naturalismo, verismo, héroe, épica, tragedia, <em>descensus ad inferos</em>.</p><p>Abstract</p><p>Analysis of the tale <em>Rosso Malpelo</em> (“<em>Malpelo the Redhead</em>”), published in 1878 by Italian writer Giovanni Verga, exponent of the naturalist and verista movements. The story describes the harsh child labor in Italian mines during the nineteenth century. The analysis connects the literary profile of the protagonist of the story with many mythological heroes that go to hell (<em>descensus ad inferos).</em></p> <p>Key words: Rosso Malpelo, Giovanni Verga, mine, mining, naturalism, verismo, hero, epics, tragedy, <em>descensus ad inferos.</em></p>