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Graber, Abraham. "A methodologically naturalist defense of ethical non-naturalism." Diss., University of Iowa, 2013. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1327.
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The aim of this dissertation is to show that, if one is committed to the scientific worldview, one is thereby committed to ethical non-naturalism.
In the first chapter I offer the reader an outline of the three primary domains of ethical inquiry: normative ethics, applied ethics, and meta-ethics. I commit myself to a meta-ethical thesis--ethical non-naturalism--and contrast ethical non-naturalism with its competitors.
In the second chapter I offer a cursory defense of the moral realist's semantic thesis. I offer reason to think the realist has the correct semantic account and argue against the semantic accounts offered by the realist's primary opponents.
In the third chapter of the dissertation I argue that commitment to the scientific worldview requires that one think that the methods of the sciences provide privileged access to facts about the external world and I offer a brief sketch of inference to the best explanation--the primary method I will employ in offering a defense of ethical non-naturalism.
In the fourth chapter I develop a method for identifying non-natural properties. The method relies heavily on the predictive power that can be gained by the accurate application of predicates.
In the fifth chapter I apply the method developed in the previous chapter. The results are mixed. The method fails to demonstrate that there are non-natural moral facts; however, it does demonstrate that there are non-natural normative facts. Using this result as a lemma, I identify a hypothesis--"[H]"--that, if true, would vindicate ethical non-naturalism.
In the sixth chapter I rely on [H] to respond to evolutionary criticisms of ethical non-naturalism and argue that, if morality evolved, we have good reason to believe [H].
In the final chapter, I defend the view I have developed from objections arising from the existence of moral disagreement and I argue that [H] provides the best explanation of the existence of actual moral disagreement.
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Stinski, Brent Fitzgerald. "Appreciation and naturalism." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.614100.
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Alharbi, Afras Khalid. "Naturalism in American Literature: Tracing American Naturalism Through Word and Image." University of Akron / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=akron1574432977434362.
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Sias, James. "Naturalism and Moral Realism." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2007. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/21.
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My aim is to challenge recent attempts at reconciling moral realism and naturalism by pushing ethical naturalists into a dilemma. According to one horn of the dilemma, ethical naturalists must either (a) build unique facts and properties about divergent social structures (or varying moral belief systems) into their subvenient sets of natural facts and properties, and so jeopardize the objectivity of moral truths, or (b) insist, in the face of all possible worlds in which people have different moral beliefs than ours, that they are all mistaken—this despite the fact that the belief-forming mechanism responsible for their moral beliefs was never concerned with the truth of those beliefs in the first place. This will bring me to suggest that moral properties might only weakly supervene upon natural phenomena. But, according to the other horn of the dilemma, weak supervenience is a defeater for moral knowledge.
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Choi, Hee-Bong. "Hume's naturalism and scepticism." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.240623.
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Childers, Matthew Raymond. "A metaphilosophy of naturalism." Diss., University of Iowa, 2018. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/6393.
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While naturalism is said to be the oldest and most popular view among contemporary philosophers and scientists, serious and pervasive questions linger concerning its nature, norms, goals, and status. I critically assess these issues in defending a metaphilosophy of naturalism. I begin in arguing that naturalism is neither a trivial nor empty worldview suffering from a lack of cohesion or content. In support of this, I develop a typology of naturalism from which I extract three “core” commitments exemplified by nearly all forms of the doctrine. I thus provide some preliminary, non-arbitrary grounds for the naturalist to defend the thesis from many objections. In the second chapter, I address the fundamental ontological commitments of metaphysical naturalism. Problems with defining naturalism are connected to the many ways these notions are understood, and I defend account of what it is for an entity, process, phenomenon, etc. to be natural or occur naturally. In furtherance of this, I defend in Chapters 3 and 4 an analysis of nature according to its two primary senses: The first is the particular sense, as picked out in claims referring to the nature of some entity, and the second is the universal sense, as is picked out in reference to nature itself. For both primary senses, I assess various arguments for acosmism, the thesis that nature does not exist (in either sense). In response to these challenges, I argue that the concept of nature in both senses is theoretically and ontologically fundamental, and thus indispensable to philosophy and science. The penultimate chapter constitutes an analysis of the relationship between naturalism and physicalism. I argue that even if the basic principles upon which physicalism rests are true, they nevertheless highly questionable and problematic. I connect and resolve these issues with an assessment of the relations between them and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. I conclude the chapter with an account of naturalization. In the final chapter, I criticize various interpretations of the claim that metaphysics and science, are and/or ought to be “continuous.” I argue that there are deep commonalities between metaphysics and science which frustrate attempts to show that there is a fundamental distinction between them. In conclusion, I show that metaphysical naturalism is not only more rich and complex than what most of its sympathizers and detractors believe, but also that it is consistent with many theses, norms, and posits of traditional, non-naturalistic approaches in philosophy generally.
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Silva, Moisés Baldissera da. "Amanhã e o anarquismo : uma outra perspectiva de Abel Botelho /." São José do Rio Preto, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/192472.
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Orientador: Luciene Marie PavaneloResumo: Esta pesquisa de Mestrado propõe a análise do romance Amanhã (1901), escrito pelo autor português Abel Botelho. A obra faz parte da pentalogia intitulada "Patologia Social", composta por outros quatro livros – O Barão de Lavos (1891), O Livro de Alda (1898), Fatal Dilema (1907) e Próspero Fortuna (1910). Com esse conjunto de publicações, segundo Saraiva (1995), o autor pretendeu criticar as famílias burguesas e nobres que comandavam Portugal, denunciando diversas hipocrisias da sociedade em finais do século XIX, justificando-as pelo viés da patologia como males ancestrais transmitidos pelos laços sanguíneos. Em Amanhã a patologia retratada é a do desvio psiquiátrico, presente no personagem principal, Mateus. Deve-se considerar também, além do viés patológico, a sua importância documental. Segundo Gomes (2009), os conflitos do romance ocorrem no período de novembro de 1894 a junho de 1895, em Lisboa, momento histórico em que há diversos levantes da população e enorme desenvolvimento sindical em Portugal. As manifestações, em sua maioria, ocorreram por influência dos ideais políticos socialistas, anarquistas e comunistas, em ascensão em toda a Europa no final do século XIX. Dessa forma, este estudo inicialmente debruçar-se-á sobre uma análise detalhada do personagem principal do romance, o contramestre Mateus. Em seguida dedicamo-nos a examinar a relação dele com Adriana, seu par romântico, pertencente a outro grupo social, mais abastado financeiramente. Outro ponto de nossa an... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo)
Abstract: This research intends to analyze the novel Amanhã (1901), written by the Portuguese author Abel Botelho. The work of Botelho is part of the pentalogy entitled “Patologia Social”, composed of four other books – O Barão de Lavos (1891), O Livro de Alda (1898), Fatal Dilema (1907) and Próspero Fortuna (1910). With this set of publications, according to Saraiva (1995), the author intended to criticize the families of the bourgeois and nobles that commanded Portugal, exposing various hypocrisies of the society at the end of the 19th century, justifying them by the pathology bias as ancestral evils transmitted by blood ties. In the novel Amanhã, the pathology portrayed is that of psychiatric deviation, present in the main character, Mateus. In addition to its pathological bias, its documentary importance must also be considered. According to Gomes (2009), the conflicts of the novel take place from November 1894 to June 1895, in Lisbon, a historic moment in which there are several population uprisings and enormous trade union development in Portugal. Most of the protests took place under the influence of socialist, anarchist and communist political ideals, which were on rise throughout Europe at the end of the 19th century. Thus, this study will initially look at a detailed analysis of the main character of the novel, the foreman called Mateus. Then we dedicated ourselves to examining his relationship with Adriana, his romantic partner, belonging to another social group, more afflue... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)
Résumé: Cette étude de Master se propose à l’analyse du roman Amanhã (1901), écrit par l'auteur Abel Botelho. L’ouvrage analysée fait partie de la série intitulée « Pathologie Sociale », composée de quatre autres livres – O Barão de Lavos (1891), O Livro de Alda (1898), Fatal Dilema (1907) e Próspero Fortuna (1910). À partir de cet ensemble de publications, selon Saraiva (1995), l’auteur a critiqué les familles bourgeoises et nobles qui dominaient le Portugal, il a dénoncé diverses hypocrisies de la société à la fin du XIXe siècle, en les justifiant par le biais pathologique des maux ancestraux transmis par les hommes. Dans Amanhã, la pathologie dépeinte est un trouble psychiatrique, dont souffre le personnage principal, Mateus. Outre son caractère pathologique, son importance documentaire doit également être prise en compte. Selon Gomes (2009), les conflits du roman se sont produits dans la période de novembre 1894 à juin 1895, à Lisbonne, un moment historique dans lequel il y a plusieurs révoltes de la population et un énorme développement syndical au Portugal. En tant que les manifestations, la plupart d'entre elles se produisent en raison de l'influence des idéaux politiques socialistes, anarchistes et communistes, qui étaient en augmentation dans toute l'Europe à la fin du XIXe siècle. Ainsi, cette étude initialement fait l'analyse détaillée du personnage principal du roman, le contremaître Mateus. Ensuite, consacrons-nous à examiner sa relation avec Adriana, son intérêt romanti... (Résumé complet accès életronique ci-dessous)
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Coyne, Steven. "Semantic arguments against moral naturalism." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/36841.
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This thesis investigates the prospects of a position in metaethics called moral naturalism. Moral naturalism can be summarized as two claims. First, moral naturalism is a form of moral realism, which states that there are true moral claims that hold irrespectively of a person’s attitudes or beliefs. Second, moral naturalism claims that these moral claims are about properties that are part of the natural world.
The central challenge facing moral naturalism is to explain how these moral properties fit into the natural world. Are moral properties reducible to, or identical with, natural properties? If so, is there a semantic explanation for why moral properties are related to some natural properties, and not others? Two major arguments, the Open Question Argument and the Moral Twin Earth Argument, have suggested that such a semantic explanation is not possible, which would make moral naturalism an implausible position to hold. This thesis investigates the prospects for moral naturalism by assessing the success of these arguments.
The conclusions offered in this thesis are conservative. Both arguments turn out to depend on controversial, yet plausible, assumptions. In the case of the Open Question Argument, I argue that the success of the argument is sensitive to the form of moral naturalism under consideration; while it is fairly clear that it succeeds against reductive moral naturalism, it is less clear that it undermines non-reductive moral naturalism. It is clearer that the Moral Twin Earth Argument is successful, but it cannot categorically rule out every semantic explanation that the moral naturalist might advance.
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Wong, Ching Wa. "Psychoanalytic theory and moral naturalism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.413032.
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Hodges, Jennefer Anne. "Making sense of biological naturalism." Thesis, University of Hertfordshire, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2299/13889.
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Searle’s theory of Biological Naturalism has been largely ignored in the philosophical literature and Searle’s commentators are confused by his seemingly contradictory views. In this dissertation I attempt to make sense of Biological Naturalism. In chapter 2 I will ascertain which concerns prevent Searle’s readers from understanding his position. The remaining chapters aim to dissolve the tensions and dispel any confusion. Chapter 3 considers Searle’s notion of first-person ontology, finding that it expresses a belief that experiences are essentially subjective and qualitative. In chapter 4 I consider the notions of levels of description, causal reduction and what Searle means by causation and realisation. Chapter 5 turns to the question of how to categorise Searle’s position. Many of his critics charge him with being a property dualist. By highlighting the difference between the meaning of irreducibility intended by the property dualist and Searle I show that there is sufficient difference in their use of the term so as to reject an interpretation of Biological Naturalism as a form of property dualism. Chapter 6 is where I turn to the other end of the physicalism/dualism spectrum and assess whether Searle should be seen as holding a form of identity theory. I first argue for a neutral form of identity that I call real identity, which does not include the inherent reductive privileging of standard identity. I then argue that Searle should be seen as advocating a form of real identity theory; a form of token identity theory which does not privilege the physical over the mental. In chapter 7 I return to the main barriers to making sense of Biological Naturalism which I identified in chapter 2 and lay out my response to each. I conclude with a coherent interpretation of Searle’s position.
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Papazoglou, Alexis John. "A Hegelian alternative to naturalism." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2014. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.648759.
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Jones, Matthew. "Semantic scepticism : normativity and naturalism." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2011. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/2042/.
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The present thesis is a response to Kripke's sceptical argument for the conclusion that there are no facts of the matter concerning what any speaker means by any expression. This conclusion gives rise a paradox: if true, it is meaningless, and if it is meaningless it cannot be true. I focus on two main topics. The first of these is the putative normativity of meaning, which is taken by Kripke to provide an a priori reason to reject any putative naturalistic or reductive theory of meaning. The second is the naturalisation of meaning. The sceptical challenge is ultimately to account for semantic facts in terms of non-semantic ones. It seems that this would be achieved through a successful naturalisation of the semantic relations. I argue against the claim that meaning is normative in any sense that could provide an a priori argument against factualism about meaning. I then consider the most prominent naturalistic responses to Kripke's argument and find all of these to be unsatisfactory. I then attempt to provide a partial dissolution of the sceptical paradox by arguing that there are reasons to expect naturalising project in semantics to fail other than the truth of Kripke's sceptical conclusion. First, I contend that we are not in a position to know what the eventual resources of a naturalised semantics would be. Since our current science is incomplete and potentially subject to revision, it would be a methodological mistake to view any putative naturalising base for semantic facts as metaphysically fixed. Second, I argue that the semantic facts themselves do not constitute a tractable domain for scientific theorising. I conclude that we should neither be too perturbed by, nor draw sceptical conclusions too swiftly from, the failure of such naturalising projects.
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Viggiano, Andrea <1976>. "Moral explanations and ethical naturalism." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2007. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/325/1/VIGGIANO-TESI.pdf.
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Viggiano, Andrea <1976>. "Moral explanations and ethical naturalism." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2007. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/325/.
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Loveridge, Peter William. "Mathematical naturalism, some implications and alternatives." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp01/MQ35909.pdf.
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Beam, Craig. "Virtue beyond morality, Nietzsche's ethical naturalism." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0002/NQ44751.pdf.
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Nantz, Derrick Phillip. "Nietzsche on Naturalism, Egoism and Altruism." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2007. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/30.
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In this thesis I provide an overview of Nietzsche's ethics with an emphasis on showing how his naturalistic approach to ethics leads him to advance an egoistic moral code. I argue that this, though radical in the light of conventional morality, is not irrational, unprincipled, or proscriptive of other-regarding moral considerations. On the contrary, it demands the highest degree of foresight and integrity. While Nietzsche's writings are meant for a select group of people, namely "higher men," whose flourishing may be undercut by their unwitting acceptance of a self-destructive morality. I explain that Nietzsche places the highest degree of value on the life of these individuals, the development of their character, and their flourishing. Further, I explain that Nietzsche extols as a great virtue "bestowing" or "gift-giving," and that he takes generosity to be more frequently practiced under an ethics of egoism.
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Chonabayashi, Ryo. "A defence of metaphysical ethical naturalism." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2012. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/26860/.
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This dissertation is a defence of metaphysical ethical naturalism according to which there is a moral reality which is part of the natural world. The implication of this view is that moral properties, such as moral goodness, justice, compassion and so forth are part of the natural world, and inquiries concerning these moral entities are conducted in similar empirical ways of reasoning to that in which scientific inquiries are conducted. I defend metaphysical ethical naturalism by a variety of explanationist argument in the tradition of Cornell realism. I examine preceding proposals for this argument, and focus on one version of it, which I call ‘the abductive argument for moral realism’. Although there was a suggestion about the abductive argument, the argument has not been discussed enough in the literature. This dissertation is a defence and discussion about the abductive argument which has not been properly examined. The defence of the argument requires the examination of how first-order ethical theory can be developed in the similar empirical ways scientific theories are developed. This will be an attempt to show the analogy between scientific inquiries and ethical inquiries. Describing the analogy between science and ethics, I will argue that the analogy can be best explained in terms of the approximate truth of normative theory which implies the existence of mind-independent natural moral properties.
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Turp, Michael-John David. "Naturalism and the problem of normativity." Thesis, Durham University, 2011. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3469/.
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This dissertation explores the way in which normative facts create a problem for naturalist approaches to philosophy. How can lumpy scientific matter give rise to technicolour normativity? How can normative facts show up in the world described from a scientific perspective? In this context, I start by analysing Hume’s discussion of ’is’ and ‘ought’, Moore’s open question argument, and Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. I then look at the nature of philosophical naturalism in detail, arguing that is fundamentally an epistemological commitment to the norms governing scientific publications. I consider the particular examples of Penelope Maddy’s approach to naturalising logic and the instrumentalist accounts of epistemic normativity favoured by advocates of naturalised epistemology. I argue, however, that these approaches to naturalising normativity are unsuccessful. In the second half of the dissertation, I develop a novel account of the nature of normative facts and explain how this relates to and resolves some of the difficulties raised in the first half. The account I defend has Kantian foundations and an Aristotelian superstructure. I associate the right with the necessary preconditions for engaging in valuable activity and the good with the satisfaction of the constitutive ends of activities and practices. I explain how my theory can account for epistemic normativity and defend a virtue-based theory of epistemic evaluation. Finally, I argue against desire-based accounts of reasons and in favour of a role for the emotions in normative cognition. The view I defend is intended to be compatible with our best scientific theories. However, it is not naturalistic insofar as it is justified by distinctively philosophical methods and relies on extra-scientific considerations.
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Saunders, Josiah Paul. "Kant's Departure from Hume's Moral Naturalism." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Philosophy and Religious Studies, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/992.
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This thesis considers Kant's departure from moral naturalism. In doing so, it explores the relationship between ethics, naturalism, normativity and freedom. Throughout this exploration, I build the case that Kant's ethics of autonomy allows us to make better sense of ethics than Hume's moral naturalism. Hume believes that morality is ultimately grounded in human nature. Kant finds this understanding of ethics limiting. He insists that we are free - we can critically reflect upon our nature and (to an extent) alter it accordingly. This freedom, I contend, renders the moral naturalist's appeal to nature lacking. Of course, a Kantian conception of freedom - some form of independence from the causal order - is fairly unpopular in contemporary circles. In particular, a commitment to naturalism casts doubt on such a notion of freedom. I argue with Kant that such a conception of freedom is essential to the conception of ourselves as rational agents. The critical turn, unlike naturalism, warrants this conception of freedom, accommodating the point of view of our rational agency. It thus allows Kant's ethics of autonomy to better grasp certain key elements of morality - normativity and our agency - than Hume's moral naturalism.
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梁敏兒 and Man-yee Leung. "Naturalism and Mao Dun's literary theory." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1989. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31208733.
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Denenny, David Timothy. "Cultural Naturalism and the Market God." OpenSIUC, 2018. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/theses/2464.
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This work employs John Dewey's cultural naturalism to explore how and why the orthodox economic tradition functions as a religious faith.Scholars such as the theologian Harvey Cox and others now view orthodox economic practice as a religion. Other scholars such as Max Weber, Alasdair MacIntyre, and numerous others view modern economic practice as exemplifying a particular ethic. The focus in this work is placed upon the destructive consequences of practicing the Market faith. This work argues that much of contemporary economic practice maintains a view of science that is incompatible with the kind of naturalism found in Classical American Pragmatism. The history of the development of economics as a religious faith is explored beginning in the seventeenth-century up to the present day. The philosophical assumptions that have composed this relatively new faith are analyzed in detail. The conclusion provides an account of what we may hope for in the future.
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Eck, Eric Christopher. "In defense of Provisory Methodological Naturalism." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2018. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/8227/.
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Methodological naturalists generally believe that science is the best and only method for discovering the properties of reality and what exists. A central tenet of methodological naturalism is that science is limited to evaluating only natural things. Science cannot allow for the possibility of supernatural objects because doing so would irreparably damage the scientific method. Or, it may be that evaluating the supernatural is beyond the capabilities of science. In this thesis, I challenge these assumptions. I defend a form of naturalism known as Provisory Methodological Naturalism which holds that science can, at least theoretically, evaluate supernatural claims. Provisory methodological naturalists believe the notion that science only evaluates natural things is provisional and subject to being overruled. Should supernatural objects exist, science would be able to observe them.
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Campbell, Michael. "Being human : fine-tuning moral naturalism." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2012. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/being-human(164780a7-2816-4fd3-9163-f8addefa279f).html.
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This thesis addresses the question of whether morality needs to be grounded in theory of human nature. I argue that it does not. Two pressures incline us towards the view that morality must be grounded in such a theory. The first of these is the thought that the absence of belief in a divine law giver creates special problems for the putative authority of moral considerations. If we are to avoid moral scepticism, so this line of thought goes, we must show how moral requirements serve or express our natural purposes. The second pressure is the observation that moral codes vary based on contexts (environmental and cultural) in ways that are too uniform to be accidental. An ethical theory is naturalistic if it denies that morality depends on the existence of God, and accommodates the intuition that morality is necessarily connected to human ends. I describe these pressures, focussing on an example of an individual (Mary) who declares themselves morally incapable of acting in a certain way. I explain why there is a problem in accommodating this modal appeal within the structures of practical deliberative inference. I then go on to describe what I take to be the distinctive features of moral experience. These include our confidence in moral requirements, their importance within our lives, their inescapability and our inability to resent them. These features are explained from the points of view of the agent and recipient, and in relation to both past and future circumstances. I then ask whether it is possible to accommodate a view of morality with these distinctive features within a non-sceptical naturalistic framework. I consider more carefully what moral naturalism requires. I distinguish between romantic and non-romantic approaches to the grounding of moral norms, and formal and material varieties of these approaches. I distinguish between romantic and non-romantic approaches to the grounding of moral norms, and formal and material varieties of these approaches. I suggest that formal non-romanticism (FNR) provides a way of grounding moral requirements which is naturalistic but which does not depend on the provision of a theory of human nature. On this view, moral necessities are sui generis and are grounded in an awareness of the presence of another human being. FNR is compared and contrasted to the dominant contemporary forms of moral naturalism. These are Kantianism, Humeanism and Aristotelianism. In general, these positions share a commitment to grounding moral claims on the deliverances of theory. Therefore I dub this family of views theoretical naturalism (TN). I explain what ’theory’ means in this context, and show how such views account for Mary’s appeal to moral necessity. Within the family of theoretical naturalism, Humeanism and Aristotelianism form a distinctive sub-set which I call rationalism. I compare and contrast their views, arguing that underlying their approaches is a shared presumption that an account of ethics is complete insofar as we have a full account of the panoply of human ends and the most effective means to their satisfaction. Having explained the various alternatives available, I show that FNR is superior to its rivals. I argue that TN in general, in virtue of its conception of the role of theory in morality, cannot accommodate the fineness of morally good deeds. Turning to the work of writers in the Wittgensteinian tradition I show how ethics is dependent on a sense of the human condition, rather than on a theory of human nature. In other words, to explain the fineness of fine deeds and the vileness of bad ones we need to aver to considerations about what it means for an individual to have been wronged, what pathos it has given our sense of life and what may come of it.
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Hartner, Daniel F. "Toward a Genuinely Natural Ethical Naturalism." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1307321601.
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Looren, de Jong Huibert. "Naturalism and psychology : a theoretical study /." Kampen : J. H. Kok, 1992. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb356148950.
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Almeida, Leandro Thomaz de 1978. "Literatura naturalista, moralidade e natureza." [s.n.], 2013. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/270046.
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Orientador: Márcia Azevedo de AbreuTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-23T10:29:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Almeida_LeandroThomazde_D.pdf: 1735364 bytes, checksum: c7cb2d8f47efd71585fbe1492cb96185 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013
Resumo: O critério moralizante, presente de maneira inconteste enquanto elemento de atribuição de valor dos romances produzidos em meados do século XIX no Brasil, também esteve presente na literatura naturalista. Essa constatação, nada óbvia se considera a crítica sobre o naturalismo produzida durante todo o século XX, ampara-se tanto na recepção crítica dos romances naturalistas contemporânea ao seu lançamento, quanto na elaboração teórica do escritor Émile Zola. Ao se deter no tema da moral enquanto critério avaliativo da literatura de finais do XIX, o presente trabalho procura também explicar a relação que a literatura e o naturalismo guardaram com a idéia de natureza, muito presente nas discussões que envolveram a tarefa de representação da realidade que seria própria ao naturalismo. Ele propõe ainda uma leitura dos romances Bom- Crioulo, A carne e Livro de uma sogra, a partir das discussões teóricas tratadas na tese
Abstract: The moral criterion for evaluating the literature, unchallenged while the mid-nineteenth century in Brazil, was also present in the literature naturalist. This finding, nothing obvious if one considers the criticism on naturalism produced throughout the twentieth century, is supported by both the critical reception of contemporary naturalistic novels, as the theoretical elaboration of the writer Émile Zola. By dwelling on the theme of morality as a criterion of evaluation literature from the late nineteenth, this thesis also seeks to explain the relationship that literature and naturalism kept with the idea of nature, very present in discussions involving the task of representing reality that would be proper to naturalism. He also proposes a reading of the novels Bom-Crioulo, A carne e Livro de uma sogra, taking into account the theoretical discussions addressed in the thesis
Doutorado
Historia e Historiografia Literaria
Doutor em Teoria e História Literária
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Byrd, Brandon Thomas. "Virtue ethics and Moore's criticisms of naturalism." unrestricted, 2007. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-07312007-162233/.
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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007.Title from title page. Andrew I. Cohen, committee chair; Andrew Altman, Andrew J. Cohen, committee members. Electronic text (52 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed October 11, 2007. Includes bibliographical references.
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Rönnström, Niclas. "Kommunikativ naturalism : om den pedagogiska kommunikationens villkor /." Stockholm : HLS förlag, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-1310.
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Fisher, Andrew David. "Naturalism, normativity, and the 'open question' argument." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13218.
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The 'open question' argument, as it has come to be known, was popularized by G. E. Moore. However, it is universally recognized that his presentation of it is unconvincing, as it is based on dubious metaphysics, semantics and epistemology. Yet, philosophers have not confined the argument to the history books, and it continues to influence and shape modern meta-ethics. This thesis asks why this is the case, and whether such an influence is justified. It focuses on three main positions, analytic naturalism, non-analytic naturalism and supernaturalism. It concludes that the 'open question' argument challenges all three.
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Miller, Jean Anne. "Naturalism & Objectivity: Methods and Meta-methods." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28329.
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The error statistical account provides a basic account of evidence and inference. Formally, the approach is a re-interpretation of standard frequentist (Fisherian, Neyman-Pearson) statistics. Informally, it gives an account of inductive inference based on arguing from error, an analog of frequentist statistics, which keeps the concept of error probabilities central to the evaluation of inferences and evidence. Error statistical work at present tends to remain distinct from other approaches of naturalism and social epistemology in philosophy of science and, more generally, Science and Technology Studies (STS). My goal is to employ the error statistical program in order to address a number of problems to approaches in philosophy of science, which fall under two broad headings: (1) naturalistic philosophy of science and (2) social epistemology. The naturalistic approaches that I am interested in looking at seek to provide us with an account of scientific and meta-scientific methodologies that will avoid extreme skepticism, relativism and subjectivity and claim to teach us something about scientific inferences and evidence produced by experiments (broadly construed). I argue that these accounts fail to identify a satisfactory program for achieving those goals and; moreover, to the extent that they succeed it is by latching on to the more general principles and arguments from error statistics. In sum, I will apply the basic ideas from error statistics and use them to examine (and improve upon) an area to which they have not yet been applied, namely in assessing and pushing forward these interdisciplinary pursuits involving naturalistic philosophies of science that appeal to cognitive science, psychology, the scientific record and a variety of social epistemologies.Ph. D.
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Burkette, Jerry W. Jr. "What Does Theism Add to Ethical Naturalism?" Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/83836.
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Recent literature seems to have opened up space for naturalistic theistic metaethics
in a contemporary context, as proponents of divine command theories have tended
to be restricted to either supernatural or theistic non-natural theories within existing
taxonomies of normative theory. While perhaps encouraging for theists, would theism
add anything substantive to theories of ethical naturalism? In this paper, I examine this
question. I argue that theistic naturalism appears to incur certain objections as well as
provide a plausible and explanatory constraint on content for theories of ethical
naturalism. As a result, a corresponding challenge to non-theistic variants is raised.Master of Arts
Realists, roughly summarized, are those metaethicists who believe that some moral propositions have truth values, that some (or at least one) of those propositions turn out to be true, and that if rational agents disagree on the truth value of a particular moral proposition, only one of them has the possibility of being correct. Broadly construed, moral realists tend to fall under one of two “tents”, preferring either naturalism (for which moral properties turn out to be wholly natural in constitution) or non-naturalism (which posits that at least some moral properties have, even if only partly, non-natural constituents as part of their make-up. Theists, who base their theories of morality on some facet of the nature or essence (or commands) of God, have tended to either be relegated in philosophical debate to a characterization of “supernaturalism” or to some seldom visited corner of the non-natural “tent” of moral realism. The former tends to limit theistic engagement in contemporary metaethical dialogue such that it can seem (at times) as if theists and non-theists are talking about two different subjects entirely. On the other hand, a non-naturalistic theory of theistic moral realism saddles the view with some fairly difficult metaphysical and epistemological baggage in the form of powerful objections levied against non-naturalistic theories in general. This paper explores another option for theism in light of very recent work by Gideon Rosen, namely his article examining the metaphysical implications of varieties of moral realism, particularly naturalistic ones. This article has already garnered a general characterization (within metaethical research, writ large) as being a “taxonomy” of naturalistic (and non-naturalistic, for that matter) theories. Specifically for my purposes here, Rosen suggests that divine command theory (and theistic metaethics in general) should be understood as being naturalistic in formulation. This would seem to be advantageous to theists, in that their metaethical theories might avoid either the bounded characterization of supernaturalism or the difficult challenges of non-naturalism. However, the theist, should she avail herself of naturalism in this regard, will need to tread carefully. Given that Rosen has couched his 'taxonomy' in terms of metaphysical grounding, I examine some resultant challenges for naturalistic theistic metaethics, concluding they can be overcome, as well as a related objection to non-theistic naturalism that arise as a result of the same grounding discussion coupled with the resources theists can leverage in a naturalistic context.
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Frazier, Joseph. "Kantianism and Its Commitment to Non Naturalism." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/71634.
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Kantian ethics has a strong following amongst the philosophical community when it comes to morality and ethics. Many Kantians, including Christine Korsgaard, subscribe to the view that Kantianism is opposed to Non-Naturalism. This view, while understandable, is incorrect. In fact, the Kantian approach to ethics has a strong commitment to Non-Naturalism in its metaphysical construction. The purpose of this paper is to prove this dependence by showing the inferences and concepts of Kantianism that one cannot accept without accepting Non-Naturalistic principles. To demonstrate this connection between Kantianism and Non-Naturalism, I will give a summary of Kantianism through the interpretation given by Velleman (2005). Then I will present Non-Naturalism as presented by Fitzpatrick (2008) and Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014). After explaining these views as clearly as possible, I will explain why Kantianism is committed to Non-Naturalism, address the possible contradiction of Kantianism and Fitzpatrick's idea of 'ethical truths being independent of any perspective,' as well as address the issues raised by Korsgaard (2003) concerning the realist approach to Kantian ethics.Master of Arts
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Wilson, Sara Curnow. "Unnaturalism: British Literary Naturalism Between the Wars." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2017. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/448805.
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EnglishPh.D.
My dissertation explores a turn in British literature back toward naturalism in the late modernist period, a literary move I call unnaturalism to refer to the way it resembles but deviates from the classic naturalist tradition of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. In the 1930s, Virginia Woolf, Samuel Beckett, Jean Rhys, and George Orwell separately play with the form that can best merge literature and politics. The resulting novels—The Years (1937), Murphy (1938), Good Morning, Midnight (1939), and Coming Up for Air (1939)—might not all look like naturalism, but they share a concern with determinism and social conditions, a tendency toward extreme external detail, and an engagement with contemporary scientific and medical discourse. Socially and politically engaged, these writers work to expose the mechanics behind the ‘natural’ order and reveal social determinism misrepresented as biological determinism. Rather than work to disprove or deny this way of understanding the world, the novels of my study complicate all singular understandings of human development. In short, these writers recover naturalist conventions in order to expose a functional determinism that is not rooted in biology—is not, in another word, natural—but rather constructed and reconstructed by contemporary discourses. By focusing on the details of the immediate, individual experience of women and economic or national outsiders, unnaturalists seek a more accurate presentation of the deep inequalities of society and the forces that keep them in place. In The Years, Woolf focuses on the way women continue to be limited by social norms despite the women’s rights developments of the early twentieth century (the professions were unbarred in 1919 and the Representation of the People Act of 1928 provided women with the same suffrage terms as men). In Murphy, Beckett gestures toward the growing field of experimental psychology, revealing the determinist assumptions on which the field relies. Rhys reveals similar assumptions in popular male depictions of women in Good Morning, Midnight as she addresses and revises Sigmund Freud’s “Femininity” and James Joyce’s Ulysses. Orwell looks at politics and language itself in Coming Up for Air, turning to sensory description as a way of working within a language tradition that he sees as keeping in place an anachronistic class system.
Temple University--Theses
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Vieira, Renata Ferreira. "Uma penca de canalhas: Figueiredo Pimentel e o naturalismo no Brasil." Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2015. http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=8482.
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Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de JaneiroO nome do escritor fluminense Alberto Figueiredo Pimentel (1869 1914) é uma ausência notável na história da literatura brasileira e, principalmente, na história do naturalismo no Brasil. Observando que o tema naturalismo no Brasil ainda é mal compreendido pela historiografia, esta pesquisa tem como objetivo escrever a história do escritor Figueiredo Pimentel como autor de romances naturalistas, tendo como foco de interesse o estudo dos romances O aborto, publicado pela Livraria do Povo em 1893, e Um canalha, publicado pela Laemmert &Comp. em 1895, ambos no Rio de Janeiro. Para cumprir o objetivo do trabalho, a pesquisa levantou novas informações sobre Figueiredo Pimentel e sua relação com a estética naturalista, especialmente na década de 1890, no acervo da Hemeroteca Digital Brasileira da Biblioteca Nacional. Por meio das consultas às fontes primárias foi possível conhecer a trajetória de um escritor naturalista brasileiro esquecido e as primeiras recepções de O aborto e Um canalha pelos homens de letras escritores, críticos, livreiros e editores e pelo leitor comum
Alberto Figueiredo Pimentel (1869 - 1914) is a notable absence in Brazilian literature and history, especially in the history of naturalism in Brazil. Noting that the theme of naturalism in Brazil is still mis understood by historiography, this research aims to write the history of Figueiredo Pimentel as writer and author of naturalistic novels, focusing on the study of his novels O aborto, published by the Livraria do Povo in 1893, and Um canalha, published by Laemmert & Comp. in 1895, both in Rio de Janeiro. To fulfill the objective of the work, the research has raised new data about Figueiredo Pimentel and his relationship with the naturalistic esthetic, especially in the 1890s, in the collection of the Brazilian Digital Newspaper Library. Through consultations of primary sources it was possible to know the history of a forgotten Brazilian naturalist writer and the first receptions of O aborto and Um canalha by writers, critics, booksellers, publishers and the general reader.
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Vogelmann, Rafael Graebin. "Cognitivismo avaliativo descritivista : uma objeção." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/157030.
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Cognitivismo Avaliativo Descritivista é a tese segundo a qual atribuições de valor pretendem descrever aspectos da realidade. Segundo essa tese, ser valioso não é senão instanciar certa propriedade ou participar de certa relação. O esforço de reflexão e discussão avaliativa é concebido como um esforço para ajustar nossas convicções avaliativas à realidade, e quando este esforço é bem-sucedido obtermos conhecimento avaliativo. Atribuições de valor se distinguem de outras proposições descritivas apenas em razão do caráter peculiar dos aspectos da realidade dos quais se ocupa. O objetivo da presente dissertação é objetar a este tese. Cabe ao defensor do Cognitivismo Descritivista delimitar a região da realidade da qual tratam atribuições de valor. É por referência a ela que o cognitivista deve explicar os traços distintivos do juízo de valor. Há duas alternativas disponíveis: ou juízos de valor dizem respeito a um reino de fatos que transcendem a realidade natural ou dizem respeito a fatos naturais. No primeiro capítulo argumento que o Cognitivismo em sua forma Não-Naturalista não pode dar conta da covariação do valor. A covariação consiste no fato de diferenças em valor sempre são acompanhadas de diferenças não-avaliativas. Esta é uma restrição à qual nossas atribuições de valor se conformam, mas não podemos dar sentido a ela se assumimos a verdade do Cognitivismo Não-Naturalista. O Cognitivismo Descritivista deve, portanto, assumir uma forma Naturalista. No segundo capítulo argumento a única razão para preferir o Cognitivismo Naturalista a caracterizações alternativas do juízo de valor consiste no fato de que essa tese promete dar conta da objetividade de atribuições de valor segundo certa concepção de objetividade Segundo esta concepção só são objetivos aqueles aspectos da realidade acessíveis em abstração de qualquer perspectiva particular, incluída aí a perspectiva caracterizada pela propensão a certas respostas comportamentais e afetivas que adquirimos ao longo de nossa educação moral. Argumento que esta concepção de objetividade não se sustenta e que, portanto, não temos nenhuma razão para adotar o Cognitivismo Naturalista. No terceiro capítulo argumento que, mesmo que tivéssemos alguma razão para supor que atribuições de valor consistem na descrição de aspectos naturais da realidade, esta caracterização do juízo de valor também falha em dar conta de um traço distintivo de tais juízos, qual seja, a restrição à terceirização de juízos de valor. A restrição à terceirização consiste no fato de que o parecer de pretensos especialistas em valor não pode fornecer razão para aceitar certo juízo de valor. Usualmente o parecer de especialistas pode fornecer razão para adotar juízos descritivos, e se assumimos que atribuições de valor descrevem aspectos naturais da realidade não podemos dar conta dessa restrição. Concluo que devemos recusar o Cognitivismo Descritivista.Descriptive Evaluative Cognitivism is the thesis according to which ascriptions of value aim at describing features of reality. According to this thesis, to be valuable is just to instantiate some property or to take part in some relation. The effort of evaluative reflection and discussion is conceived as an effort to adjust our evaluative convictions to reality, and if we succeed in this effort we obtain evaluative knowledge. Ascriptions of value distinguish themselves from other descriptive propositions in virtue of the peculiar character of the features of reality they aim to describe. The goal of this dissertation is to present an objection to this thesis. The defender of Descriptive Cognitivism must specify the domain of reality ascriptions of value are about. It is by reference to it that the cognitivist must explain the distinctive traits of value judgments. There are two available options: either value judgments are about a domain of facts that transcends natural reality, or they are about natural facts. In the first chapter I argue that Cognitivism in its Non-naturalistic form cannot account for the covariation of value. Covariation consists in the fact that differences in value are always accompanied by non-evaluative differences. Our ascriptions of value comply with this constraint, but we cannot make sense of it if we assume that Non-naturalist Cognitivism is correct. Descriptive Cognitivism must, therefore, adopt a Naturalistic form. In the second chapter I argue that the only reason to prefer Naturalist Cognitivism to alternative characterizations of value judgments is the fact that it can account for the objectivity of value ascriptions according to a certain conception of objectivity According to this conception, only those features of reality accessible in abstraction from any particular perspective, including the perspective characterized by the propensity to certain behavioral and affective responses that we acquire during our moral education, are objective. I argue that this conception of objectivity does not hold and that, therefore, we have no reason to accept Naturalist Cognitivism. In the third chapter I argue that even if we had some reason to suppose that ascriptions of value consist in the description of natural aspects of reality, this characterization of value judgments also fails to account for a distinctive feature of such judgments - the restriction on the outsourcing of value judgments. The restriction on outsourcing consists in the fact that the opinion of would-be value experts cannot provide a reason to accept a certain value judgment. Usually the expert opinion can provide a reason to accept descriptive judgments, and if we assume that ascriptions of value describe natural features of reality, then we cannot account for this restriction. I conclude that we must reject Descriptive Cognitivism.
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Flanagan, Christy L. "The paradox of Feuerbach Luther and religious naturalism /." Tallahassee, Florida : Florida State University, 2009. http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/available/etd-08072009-143212/.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2009.Advisor: John Kelsay, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of Religion. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed on May 25, 2010). Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 204 pages. Includes bibliographical references.
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Tiefensee, Christine Marx Johannes. "Moral realism : a critical analysis of metaethical naturalism /." Marburg : Tectum Verlag, 2008. http://opac.nebis.ch/cgi-bin/showAbstract.pl?u20=9783828895348.
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Dawes, Gregory W., and n/a. "Theism and explanation : a defence of scientific naturalism." University of Otago. Department of Philosophy, 2007. http://adt.otago.ac.nz./public/adt-NZDU20070815.134617.
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The modern sciences are characterised by a methodological atheism. Even though religions offer what appear to be explanations of various facts about the world, such proposed explanations are not taken seriously within the sciences. Even if no natural explanation were available, it would be assumed that one exists. Is this merely a sign of atheistic prejudice, as some critics suggest? Or are there good reasons to exclude from science explanations that invoke a supernatural agent? My answer to this question has two parts. On the one hand, I concede the bare possibility that talk of divine action could constitute a potential explanation of some state of affairs, while noting that the conditions under which this would be true are unlikely ever to be fulfilled. On the other hand, I argue that a proposed explanation of this kind would rate poorly, when measured against our usual standards of explanatory virtue. Even if it were the only proposed explanation on offer, we would have good reason to seek an alternative.
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Fama, Melissa. "Naturalism and nonsense, quine and Wittgenstein on ethics." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ67813.pdf.
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Wilkinson, Anna. "Issues in ethical naturalism : motivation, explanation and semantics." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.505344.
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This thesis addresses themes in Ethical Naturalism. I present the distinctive position occupied by contemporary Ethical Naturalist moral realism and raise three problems that are taken to raise problems for that view. Chapters 1 and 2 address the difficulty for ethical naturalism that is created for ethical naturalism by moral motivation. I present an influential argument that aims to show that the motivational account the ethical naturalist endorses is implausible. In chapter 2 I address some possible responses to that argument, for the ethical naturalist. In chapter 3, I tum to moral explanation. In that chapter I describe an important argument that aims to establish that moral facts as postulated by ethical naturalism are explanatorily irrelevant. Chapter 4 evaluates the attempts made by ethical naturalism to show that it can meet the explanatory challenge. In chapter 5 I recount an argument that aims to undermine ethical naturalism by showing that it cannot produce naturalistic moral definitions. I describe the strategy that the ethical naturalist typically takes to meet this charge and present an important objection to that strategy. In chapter 6 I assess possible responses to this argument, for the ethical naturalist. Finally, I draw some conclusions on how these issues impact on the wider plausibility of ethical naturalism.
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Taschian, Helen. "Naturalism and Libertinism in Seventeenth-Century Italian Painting." Thesis, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2014. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3612041.
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The work of Caravaggio, which was recognized as revolutionary in his own time and exerted a profound influence on seventeenth century painting all over Europe, has prompted a wide range of interpretations among modern art historians. Some, emphasizing the controversy generated by his religious pictures, have seen him as a daringly irreverent artist, while others have found his unidealized "naturalistic" style fundamentally well-suited to the spirit of the Catholic Counter-Reformation. Some detect a boldly overt homoeroticism in many of his pictures, while others claim not to see it at all. Some understand him to have worked in an unprecedentedly direct, almost visceral way, while others emphasize his sympathy with new directions in the sciences or the intellectual sophistication with which he played his naturalistic style against the precedents of classical and earlier Renaissance art.
Caravaggio's difficult personality has also lent itself to different readings. Some see him as a sociopath, if not a psychopath, while others see him calculatedly performing the role of social rebel in a manner that looks forward to the self-consciously dissident posturings of modern artists. Some art-historians have been led to conclude that he had highly-developed non-conformist values and tendencies that could be described as "libertine" in at least some of the varied senses in which that word was used during his time.
The aim of this dissertation is to discuss the relation of Caravaggio's work and personal example to his immediate art-historical and cultural context, but also to trace their influence on an ever-more-disparate group of artists active in the seventeenth century in order to see whether his style, sometimes characterized as "Baroque Naturalism," actually implied a set of values beyond its efficacy as an artistic strategy, whether a commitment to it implied or was understood to imply a non-conformist or libertine orientation that might be a matter of deep conviction on the part of the artist or a position felt to be appropriate to certain themes or in certain contexts.
The first chapter examines Caravaggio himself, while the second discusses three artists—Giovanni Baglione, Orazio Gentileschi, and Guido Reni—who knew him personally and responded to his work as it burst so dramatically on the scene in the very first years of the century. The third chapter discussed three artists who were active shortly afterward, whose engagement with Caravaggio testifies to a wider field of influence: Valentin de Boulogne, Domenico Fetti, and Guido Cagnacci. The final chapter sets two very different artists—Salvator Rosa and Nicolas Poussin—side by side in order to expose both the radically different responses to Caravaggio's legacy and the diverse senses in which the word "libertine" must be understood.
While the evidence does seem to suggest that at least some artists utilized Caravaggesque naturalism in order to invoke a well-defined "alternative tradition," one that was understood to imply a certain range of values, very few committed themselves to his approach strictly or for very long. Poussin rejected it emphatically. Yet Poussin, too, deliberately positioned himself on the margins of the Roman art world in order to cultivate a distinctive approach to art, one that seems to have been consciously based on deeply-held philosophical convictions. The lesson seems to be that Caravaggio's example made it possible for later artists to develop strategies with which to express their dissent from the prevailing values and practices of their time, and that even if their work did not look like his, they were indebted to him.
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Lahti, David Christopher. "An appraisal of naturalism in contemporary meta-ethics." Thesis, Open University, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.262758.
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Tiefensee, Christine. "Moral realism a critical analysis of metaethical naturalism." Marburg Tectum-Verl, 2005. http://d-nb.info/987403958/04.
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Chan, Lok-Chi. "Metaphysical Naturalism and the Ignorance of Categorical Properties." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/16555.
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The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the connections between metaphysical naturalism and the categorical ignorance thesis – offered by Rae Langton (1998), David Lewis (2009), Frank Jackson (1998), and Simon Blackburn (1990) – and determine whether the latter will challenge the former. According to metaphysical naturalism, the actual world contains only metaphysically natural things. According to the categorical ignorance thesis, all we can know about things are their dispositional properties, but the categorical properties that bear these properties remain in principle unknowable. In this dissertation, I will determine whether the ignorance of categorical properties – as Rae Langton (1998), David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson (2007), John Foster (1993) and Alyssa Ney (2007) argue (or worry about) – is consistent with metaphysical naturalism (or physicalism), and whether it will lead to a scepticism about the metaphysical naturalness of categorical properties, which will, in turn, significantly decrease the probability that metaphysical naturalism is true. Being attracted to metaphysical naturalism, the categorical ignorance thesis, and also the philosophical position that the two theses are consistent, I will argue that the answer to the former question is yes, and that the answer to the latter question is no. Russellian Monism, an influential doctrine in philosophy of mind that is relevant to the topic, will also be considered. According to the doctrine, our first-person experiences are constituted by their categorical bases in some manner that is not (solely) via the dispositions borne by these bases. Some philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell (1992/1927a, 1927b), thus consider categorical properties to be knowable through our acquaintance with those experiences. On the other side, some philosophers, such as Daniel Stoljar (2001a, 2001b, 2006), David Chalmers (1996), and Galen Strawson (2013), argue that Russellian Monism is compatible with metaphysical naturalism (or physicalism). In this dissertation, I will determine whether the acquaintance view put forward by some Russellian Monists, understood as an objection to the categorical ignorance thesis, is true and whether it is compatible with metaphysical naturalism; I will argue that the answers to both questions are no.
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Oldfield, Edwin. "The Panpsychist Worldview : Challenging the Naturalism-Theism Dichotomy." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Teologiska institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-384578.
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The discussion of worldviews is today dominated by two worldviews, Theism and Naturalism, each with its own advantages and problems. Theism has the advantage of accommodating the individual with existential answers whilst having problems with integrating more recent scientific understandings of the universe. Naturalism on the other hand does well by our developments of science, the problem being instead that this understanding meets difficulty in answering some of the essentials of our existence: questions of mentality and morality. These two views differ fundamentally in stances of ontology and epistemology, and seem not in any foreseeable future to be reconcilable. To deal with this issue, Panpsychism is presented here as the worldview that can accommodate for both existential issues and scientific understanding.
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Pagliaro, Heitor de Carvalho. "Convencionalismo e naturalismo em Rousseau." Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2013. http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/3102.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
This dissertation investigates the concept of law in Rousseau, analyzing if he defends the idea of natural law or if he is a conventionalist. Some commentators, like Robert Derathé, conceive Rousseau as a naturalist, as opposed to others, like Charles Vaughan, who think that he is a conventionalist. Here we will critically assess those positions and will try to se if they exclude each other or if Rousseau can be read, somehow, as defending fundamental aspects of those two positions.
Este trabalho investiga a concepção de direito em Rousseau, buscando analisar se o autor é jusnaturalista ou convencionalista. Alguns comentadores, como Robert Derathé, afirmam ser Rousseau jusnaturalista, enquanto que outros, como Charles Vaughan, dizem ser convencionalista. Este trabalho avalia criticamente algumas posições, procurando ver se essa distinção é excludente ou se Rousseau pode ser lido, de alguma forma, mantendo pontos fundamentais dessas duas posições.
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Carvalho, Daniel Filipe. "Nietzsche e o naturalismo: a crÃtica ao ascetismo cientÃfico." Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2009. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=5381.
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CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel SuperiorO objetivo deste trabalho à compreender a crÃtica do filÃsofo alemÃo Friedrich Nietzsche ao naturalismo cientÃfico. Nietzsche, a partir da obra Humano, demasiado humano, revela um interesse crescente pelas pesquisas cientÃficas, estabelecendo um projeto filosÃfico de cunho naturalista, ou seja, em consonÃncia com os mÃtodos das ciÃncias. Ao longo de sua produÃÃo intelectual, contudo, esta atitude inicial em relaÃÃo Ãs ciÃncias serà problematizada, de tal modo que as obras que se seguem a AlÃm do bem e do mal, apresentarÃo um fulminante ataque à empresa cientÃfica moderna. Este trabalho procura mostrar que esta crÃtica nietzscheana se articula a partir da compreensÃo das ciÃncias modernas como herdeiras do ideal epistemolÃgico grego, da crenÃa no valor supremo da verdade, a vontade de verdade, e de que esta crenÃa compromete o prÃprio empreendimento cientÃfico com uma interpretaÃÃo metafÃsico-moral da existÃncia. Sugerimos, entÃo, que a crÃtica de Nietzsche nÃo implica a recusa em bloco do empreendimento cientÃfico, mas procura desvelar os problemas que se escondem por trÃs das interpretaÃÃes cientÃficas na medida em que elas se coadunam a este valor moral, e que a recusa deste valor, ou melhor, sua superaÃÃo, possibilitaria a realizaÃÃo de um naturalismo pleno, que assumisse o carÃter irredutivelmente interpretativo de suas teorias e proposiÃÃes sobre o mundo.
The aim of this work is to understand the criticism of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche to scientific naturalism. Nietzsche, from the book Human, all too human, shows a growing interest in scientific research, establishing a philosophical project of naturalist bias, i.e, in line with the methods of science. Throughout his intellectual production, however, this initial attitude with regard to science will be aim of reflection, so that the works following the book Beyond good and evil, provide a scathing attack on the modern scientific enterprise. This paper seeks to show that this Nietzscheâs criticism is articulated from the understanding of modern sciences as heirs of the Greek epistemological ideal, the belief in the supreme value of truth, the will to truth, and that this belief undermines the scientific enterprise itself with an metaphysical and moral interpretation of the existence. We suggest, then, that Nietzscheâs criticism does not imply refusal to the whole scientific enterprise, but demand to reveal the problems hidden behind the scientific interpretations as they are in line with this moral value, and that the refusal of this value or, rather, its overrun, allow the achievement of a fully realized naturalism, which assumes the character irreducibly interpretative of its theories and propositions about the world.
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Lima, Filho Maxwell Morais de. "Naturalismo biológico: a solução dualista de John Searle para o problema mente-corpo." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFC, 2010. http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/26077.
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LIMA FILHO, Maxwell Morais de. Naturalismo biológico: a solução dualista de John Searle para o problema mente-corpo. 2010. 111f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2010.Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-09-25T16:18:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_mmlimafilho.pdf: 892023 bytes, checksum: 131fe0da09ffcc192f087ebe8de7f10f (MD5)
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The objective of this work is to propose a classification of John Searle‟s biological naturalism in one of theoretical conceptions of Philosophy of Mind. In order to do that, I will present a panoramic vision of principal theories and a presentation of theses of biological naturalism in order to compare this with those. Searle himself resist to label the biological naturalism since, according him, all theories of tradition in Philosophy of Mind start from a mistaken assumption, that is, the conceptual dualism, according to which there is a mutual exclusion between the physical and mental categories: the physical is not mental, and mental is not physical. For Searle, mental phenomena are biological and, therefore, physical. However, this does not mean that there is an ontological reduction of mental to physical, because there is an ontological distinction between these two levels – first-person ontology and third-person ontology, respectively. The problem is that with such ontological distinction, Searle ends up creating a new kind of dualism, that instead of countering the physical to the mental, opposes the objective (third-person ontology) to the subjective (first-person ontology). By defending the ontological physicalism and, at the same time, to endorse that mental events are real, causally effective and ontologically irreducible, Searle‟s conception converges at many points with the non-reductive physicalism and property dualism. I will compare the biological naturalism with both theories and – at the end – I will have subsidies to argue why classify it in one and not the other.
O objetivo deste trabalho é propor uma classificação do naturalismo biológico de John Searle em uma das concepções teóricas de Filosofia da Mente. Para tanto, apresentarei uma visão panorâmica das principais teorias e uma exposição das teses que compõem o naturalismo biológico, com o intuito de comparar este com aquelas. O próprio Searle resiste em rotular o naturalismo biológico, já que, segundo ele, todas as teorias da tradição em Filosofia da Mente partem de um pressuposto equivocado, a saber, o dualismo conceitual, segundo o qual há uma exclusão mútua entre as categorias física e mental: o físico é não mental, e o mental é não físico. Para Searle, fenômenos mentais são biológicos e, portanto, são físicos. No entanto, isso não significa que há uma redução ontológica do mental ao físico, pois existe uma distinção ontológica entre esses dois níveis – ontologia de primeira pessoa e ontologia de terceira pessoa, respectivamente. O problema é que com tal distinção ontológica, Searle acaba por criar um novo tipo de dualismo, que em vez de contrapor o físico ao mental, contrapõe o objetivo (ontologia de terceira pessoa) ao subjetivo (ontologia de primeira pessoa). Por defender o fisicalismo ontológico e, ao mesmo tempo, endossar que os eventos mentais são reais, causalmente eficazes e ontologicamente irredutíveis, a concepção de Searle converge em muitos pontos com o fisicalismo não-redutivo e com o dualismo de propriedade. Compararei o naturalismo biológico com ambas as teorias e, ao final, terei subsídios para argumentar o porquê de classificá-lo em uma delas e não na outra.
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Uzai, Junior Paulo. "A relação mente-corpo em John Searle /." Marília, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/143454.
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Orientador: Jonas Gonçalves CoelhoBanca: Marcos Antônio Alves
Banca: Leonardo Ferreira Almada
Resumo: Há mais de três décadas, o filósofo estadunidense John Rogers Searle voltou-se para as questões de filosofia da mente, donde apresenta sua solução para os variados problemas acerca da natureza do mental. Sua primeiro incursão se deu com o livro Intentionality, onde seu principal objetivo não era, num primeiro momento, solucionar problemas referentes a essa questão, mas sim oferecer uma fundamentação conceitual mais sólido para sua teoria dos atos de fala. Contudo, a partir deste livro Searle se volta decisivamente para questões propriamente de filosofia da mente. Um de seus principais focos é a relação entre mente-corpo, onde ele acredita que a solução teórico-cenceitual para tal questão não é tão difícil quanto pensamos. Porém ele não deixa de abordar uma série de outros temas afins que julga de extrema importância na consolidação de seu escopo teórico, tal como o problema da causação mental e a subjetividade humana. Dessa forma, a presente dissertação tem por objetivo principal apresentar, discutir e avaliar criticamente a solução que Searle propõe a esses quatro problemas centrais da filosofia da mente: relação mente-corpo, causação mental, subjetividade e intencionalidade. Os três primeiros capítulos têm por objetivo mostrar como Searle enxerga essas questões, ou seja, o que ele julga estar errado na filosofia da mente e qual seria a solução mais adequada. No capítulo quatro iremos apresentar as principais críticas à solução de John Searle, focando-nos numa abordagem temá... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo)
Abstract: There is more than thirty years, the American philosopher John Rogers Searle turned around to the questions of philosophy of mind, whence presents his solution to varied problems about the nature of mental. His first incursion occurred with the book Intentionality, where your main objective was not to solve, at first, problems relating to this issue, but rather to offer a theoretical grounding more solid to his theory of speech acts. However, from this book Searle turns to questions specifically of philosophy of mind. One of his main focus is the relationship between mind-body, where he believes that the solution theoretical-conceptual for that question is not so difficult as we thought. Nevertheless he is not leave of to broach a number of other related topics that he considers of utmost importance in the consolidation of his theoretical scope, such as the causation mental problem and the human subjectivity. Thereby, the present dissertation have for main objective to show, to discuss and critically evaluate the solution that Searle proposes these four central problems of the philosophy of mind: mind-body relationship, mental causation, subjectivity and intentionality. The first three chapters aims to show as Searle see these questions, in other words, what he believes to be wrong in philosophy of mind and what would be the most appropriate solution. In chapter four, we will go to show the main critics to John Searle's solution, focusing in a thematic approach. Thus we will ... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)
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