Journal articles: 'Naturalised Epistemology'

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Beed, C. "Naturalised epistemology and economics." Cambridge Journal of Economics 29, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 99–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/bei013.

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Moraes de Assis, Saulo. "Por um naturalismo moderado?; For a moderate naturalism?" Sofia 11, no. 2 (August 1, 2022): e11231861. http://dx.doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v11i2.31861.

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Neste artigo, discutiremos o naturalismo de Alvin Goldman em relação à questão da normatividade da epistemologia. Para isso, revisamos a apresentação que este autor faz do conhecimento e da justificação entendidas sob um enfoque naturalista. Pretende-se entender como Goldman incorpora elementos da epistemologia especulativa tradicional ao seu ponto de vista naturalista. Apresentamos algumas distinções, feitas pelo próprio Goldman, a fim de esclarecer as diferentes abordagens que uma postura naturalista na epistemologia pode ter e discutir sua formulação de um naturalismo moderado. No final, procuramos apresentar algumas fragilidades dessa pretensão para pensar sobre a questão de se um naturalismo moderado é necessário. Abstract In this paper, we will discuss Alvin Goldman's naturalism in relation to the question of the normativity of epistemology. For this, we review the presentation that this author makes of knowledge and justification understood under a naturalistic approach. It is intended to understand how Goldman incorporates elements of traditional speculative epistemology to his naturalistic point of view. We present some distinctions, made by Goldman himself, in order to clarify the different approaches that a naturalist stance in epistemology can take and to discuss his formulation of a moderate naturalism. In the end, we try to present some weaknesses of this pretension to think about the question of whether a moderate naturalism is necessary.

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H, Jales Ribeiro. "The Roots of the Concept of Naturalised Epistemology: Russell and Quine." Philosophy International Journal 5, no. 4 (October 10, 2022): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.23880/phij-16000272.

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In this article, contrary to the traditional and still very current interpretations, it is shown how Russell’s philosophy, from the 1920s onwards, was on the path to Quine’s concept of naturalised epistemology, and why Russell, if he had been confronted with such a concept, could not have subscribed to it. With this objective, a re-reading of this philosophy, from the abovementioned era, is proposed, which makes evident his involvement with the problems of naturalism and behaviourism and, especially, with the respective limitations.

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Omoge, Michael. "Naturalised modal epistemology and quasi-realism." South African Journal of Philosophy 40, no. 3 (July 3, 2021): 229–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2021.1949556.

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Haack, Susan. "Il buono, il brutto e il cattivo. Disambiguare il naturalismo di Quine." RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA, no. 1 (March 2009): 75–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/sf2009-001006.

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- Quine's ‘epistemology naturalised' has been profoundly influential, but it is also highly ambiguous. Quine seems at times to claim only that epistemology is not a purely a priori enterprise but an empirical study, continuous with the sciences of cognition; at others, that epistemological questions can be turned over to the sciences to resolve; and on other occasions, that epistemological questions are misconceived and should be replaced by scientific investigation into cognition. What is argued here is that the first and most modest version of Quine's epistemological naturalism is potentially fruitful, the second and more ambitious indefensible, and the third and most ambitious not only false but disastrous.

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Zanet, Giancarlo. "Naturalizzazione, mente e conoscenza." RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA, no. 1 (March 2009): 151–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/sf2009-001009.

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- A controversial issue regarding Quine's naturalised epistemology is that it may involve some form of reductionism. This article focuses on one of these forms, analysing the interplay of his philosophy of mind and epistemology. It aims to show that if we take into proper consideration the way in which the version of anomalous monism embraced affects his conception of mental states like sensations and propositional attitudes, Quine's philosophy of mind should be regarded as anti-reductionist. Through a discussion of his theory of perception, I try to argue that what is entailed by it is, in a sense only partially accepted by Quine himself, that neither perception nor observational language can be strictly reduced to their stimulatory conditions. By pointing out the relevance that Quine attributes to the mechanism of empathy as a means for ascribing propositional attitudes, a further interesting argument is provided to underline that, within a naturalized epistemology, there is room for a non-reductive description of mind in some ways close to the results of the hermeneutic tradition.

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KARUVELIL, Benny. "Naturalised Epistemology and the Quinean-Chomskyan Debate Revisited." Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 71, no. 4 (December 31, 2009): 751–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/tvf.71.4.2045822.

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Campbell, Jennifer. "Irreducible Freedom in Nature." Philosophy 89, no. 2 (October 25, 2013): 301–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819113000752.

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AbstractI provide a novel response to scepticism concerning freedom and moral responsibility. This involves my extension to freedom of John McDowell's liberal natural approach to ethics and epistemology. I trace the source of the sceptical problem to an overly restrictive, brute conception of nature, where reality is equated with what figures, directly or indirectly, in natural scientific explanation. I challenge the all encompassing explanatory pretensions of restrictive naturalism, advocating a re-conception of nature such that it already incorporates reasons. This allows for an explanation of free actions which is not ultimately brute, but irreducibly normative. Against the backdrop of liberal naturalism I conceive freedom as an emergent capacity to respond to reasons which arises from the acquisition of language. I claim that freedom is a rational causal power to originate actions based within a naturalised ontology, which has sufficient depth to justify moral responsibility without begging ontological or epistemological questions.

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Lemos, John. "A Defense of Naturalistic Naturalized Epistemology." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 35, no. 105 (January 8, 2003): 49–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2003.1052.

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Naturalistic naturalized epistemology combines ontological naturalism with naturalized epistemology. Ontological naturalism is the view that nothing exists other than spatio-temporal beings embedded within a space-time framework. Naturalized epistemology is a view about the nature of knowledge characterized by its commitment to externalism and the idea that knowledge consists in beliefs reliably generated by cognitive mechanisms operating in a suitable environment. Alvin Plantinga has provided a much discussed evolutionary biological argument against naturalistic naturalized epistemology. In this article I defend naturalistic naturalized epistemology by refuting Plantinga's replies to two important criticisms of his argument.

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Sans Pinillos, Alger, and Anna Estany. "Concerning the Epistemology of Design: The Role of the Eco-Cognitive Model of Abduction in Pragmatism." Philosophies 8, no. 2 (March 29, 2023): 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8020033.

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Design has usually been linked to art and applied in scenarios related to everyday life. Even when design has, on occasion, made its way into the world of academia, it has always been closely linked to art and scenarios related everyday life. At last, however, the idea of design has reached the field of epistemology: an area within the very heart of philosophy that has always focused, in theory, on the foundations of knowledge. Consequently, design is being studied from different approaches interested in the foundation of knowledge, theoretical and practical. This is one of the reasons why abduction and pragmatism have been considered relevant from a design perspective. This paper first shows the main features of abduction and pragmatism, describes their evolution and considers their mutual implications. Second, the epistemology of design is analysed considering its most relevant characteristics. Third, the connection between abduction and, on the one hand, pragmatism and, on the other, design epistemology is addressed. Finally, the role of abductive inference in grounding a real epistemology for design theory from the naturalised cognitive perspective of abduction is outlined. The central proposition is that this approach is essential as a methodological innovation, as it allows us to analyse both the inquiry process and the design process as interdependent when dealing with practical problems of a social and cultural nature. This approach allows us to analyse how human actions determine changes in the theoretical framework from which we make our inquiry. In short, the world is an open-ended project that humans design through our daily inquiry.

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Watson, Jamie Carlin. "DILEMMA ARGUMENTS AGAINST NATURALISM." Episteme 11, no. 2 (November 4, 2013): 229–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2013.41.

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AbstractAlbert Casullo (2000, 2003) and Shane Oakley (2011) argue that dilemma arguments against epistemic naturalism, such as those offered by Laurence BonJour (1998) and Harvey Siegel (1984), are such that, whatever strength they have against naturalism applies equally to moderate rationalist accounts of a priori justification. They conclude that dilemma arguments are, therefore, insufficient for establishing an advantage for moderate rationalism over naturalized epistemology. I argue that both Casullo's and Oakley's criticisms depend on an illicit assumption, namely, that dilemma arguments presuppose a meta-justificatory demand that naturalists provide non-circular support for their basic sources of evidence. I argue that this assumption is not necessary for the force of dilemma arguments, and I construct a version that avoids this misreading. I conclude that, although there remain strategies for responding to dilemma arguments, they constitute a challenge naturalists must take seriously.

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Moreland, J. P. "A Critical Assessment of Shafer-Landau’s Ethical Non-Naturalism." Religions 14, no. 4 (April 18, 2023): 546. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14040546.

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I focus on the ethical non-naturalism of Russ Shafer-Landau. First, I spend a good bit of time specifying the nature of two versions of naturalism and arguing that one is embraced ubiquitously—more importantly, should be embraced—by contemporary naturalists. I do so because if I am right about this, before we investigate the details of Shafer-Landau’s ethical non-naturalism, there will be a significant burden of proof for him to meet. In my view, that burden is strong enough to justify the claim that a critic’s epistemic task is merely to provide undercutting defeaters for Shafer-Landau’s position, and not to proffer rebutting defeaters, though I will attempt to supply both. After presenting a crucial characterization of contemporary naturalism followed by a critique of naturalist emergent properties, I state and critique Shafer-Landau’s ontology followed by the same for his epistemology. Both will be evaluated with a particular focus on their plausibility to support his ethical non-naturalism.

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Clough, Sharyn. "Having It All: Naturalized Normativity in Feminist Science Studies." Hypatia 19, no. 1 (2004): 102–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2004.tb01270.x.

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The relationship between facts and values—in particular, naturalism and normativity—poses an ongoing challenge for feminist science studies. Some have argued that the fact/value holism of W.V. Quine's naturalized epistemology holds promise. I argue that Quinean epistemology, while appropriately naturalized, might weaken the normative force of feminist claims. I then show that Quinean epistemic themes are unnecessary for feminist science studies. The empirical nature of our work provides us with all the naturalized normativity we need.

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Valcarenghi, Emerson Carlos. "Filosofia analítica tradicional vs. filosofia naturalista/experimental, intuição conceitual vs. conceptômetro: quem vence a disputa?" Analytica - Revista de Filosofia 20, no. 2 (November 24, 2017): 81–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.35920/arf.v20i2.13938.

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Abstract: In the present paper, I argue against a naturalistic conception of epistemology. I do this by showing, among other things, that conceptual intuition, which constitutes the proper method of the analytic conception of epistemology, is methodologically superior to the best method available to naturalistic epistemology.Resumo: Nós argumentamos aqui contra uma concepção naturalista de epistemologia. Nós o fazemos mostrando, entre outras coisas, que a intuição conceitual, que é o método próprio da concepção analítica de epistemologia, é superior metodologicamente ao melhor método disponível à epistemologia naturalista.

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Kim, Jeagwon. "Czym jest „epistemologia znaturalizowana”?" Roczniki Filozoficzne 64, no. 3 (2016): 115–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rf.2016.64.3-5.

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Bell, Martin, and Marie McGinn. "Naturalism and Scepticism." Philosophy 65, no. 254 (October 1990): 399–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100064652.

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In this paper we argue that a dominant view of Humean naturalism involves a fundamental misconception of Hume's naturalist project. We shall show that the naturalist project as Hume conceives it is philosophically much more interesting than the form of naturalism commonly attributed to him. We shall also argue, however, that Hume's commitment to principles of empiricist epistemology prevented him from bringing his naturalist project to a satisfactory conclusion. Finally, we shall suggest that Wittgenstein shares Hume's conception of a philosophically satisfactory form of naturalism, and that, unencumbered by empiricist doctrines, Wittgenstein was able to provide the sort of undogmatic unravelling of the sceptical problem that eluded Hume.

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Grandy, Richard E. "Epistemology Naturalized and "Epistemology Naturalized"." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994): 341–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1994.tb00293.x.

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Michaelian, Kourken. "Privileged Standpoints/Reliable Processes." Hypatia 23, no. 1 (March 2008): 65–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2008.tb01166.x.

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This article attempts to reconcile Sandra Harding's postmodernist standpoint theory with process reliabilism in first-order epistemology and naturalism in metaepistemology. Postmodernist standpoint theory is best understood as consisting of an applied epistemological component and a metaepistemological component. Naturalist metaepistemology and the metaepistemological component of postmodernist standpoint theory have produced complementary views of knowledge as a socially and naturally located phenomenon and have converged on a common concept of objectivity. The applied epistemological claims of postmodernist standpoint theory usefully can be construed as applications of process reliabilist first-order epistemology. Postmodernist standpoint theory, reliabilism, and naturalism thus form a coherent package of views in metaepistemology, first-order epistemology, and applied epistemology.

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Walker, Margaret Urban. "Naturalizing, Normativity, and Using What “We” Know in Ethics." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 26 (2000): 75–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2000.10717549.

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The provenance of “naturalized epistemology,” so called, is too recent for the hand of Quine not to be still heavily upon it. But like its older relative, “naturalism,” it is an idea rich enough to be coveted, and protean enough to be claimed, by diverse comers with different things in mind. While Quine's version of naturalized epistemology of science inevitably furnishes the backdrop for current discussion of naturalizing moral epistemology, it is important to pause over what “naturalized epistemology” can and should mean in ethics. To what extent is Quine's example of an epistemologyofscience that helps itselfto sciencethe model for understanding knowledge of and in morality? Does it require a view of moral knowledge as reducible to, or in a fundamental way furnished by, science? Or a view of moral theory as sciencelike in some way? I argue that the appropriate analogy is instead a holistic and reflexive epistemology of morality that helps itself to moral judgments and standards seen as answerable to the experience of the kinds of shared lives they make possible and necessary. This approach neither privileges nor rejects wholesale what scientific inquiries might have to say.

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Sørensen, Marie Louise Stig. "Material Culture and Typology." Current Swedish Archaeology 5, no. 1 (June 10, 2021): 179–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.37718/csa.1997.12.

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The active and discursive nature of material culture is the subject of this paper. It will, however, be approached from the point of view of typology and in particular the debate about the 'Swedish Typology’ (Gräslund 1974). Typology is probably the archaeological method or theory through which the discipline has most explicitly stated its view on the nature of the archaeological object. Inspired by the idea of naturalised epistemology as the basis for understanding how knowledge is constructed within the sciences (as discussed by Thomas 1996: 194), it is here argued that what we do, as archaeologists, is of importance rather than the theorising about our actions. Through a discussion of typology as expressed in archaeological practice, this paper will propose that the relationship between the object and typology is much simpler and more complex than our habitual use of the concept tends to suggest. It is proposed that the creation of typologies reveals the quite decisive influence which the object has upon the archaeological constructions. Typologies, moreover, are intimately connected to prehistoric production strategies. It is the relationship between these two dimensions of typologies, that we must understand in order to fully realise their potentials and understand their roles in archaeological practice.

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Goldstick, Daniel. "Epistemology Naturalized?" Philosophical Forum 50, no. 4 (October 21, 2019): 493–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phil.12235.

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Meeker, Kevin. "Is Hume's Epistemology Internalist or Externalist?" Dialogue 40, no. 1 (2001): 125–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300049088.

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RésuméLes philosophes distinguent souvent entre les théories internalistes et externalistes de la connaissance. Après avoir expliqué cette distinction, je défends l'idée que la théorie de la connaissance de Hume doit préférablement être vue comme étant de type internaliste. En outre, je soutiens que la version humienne de l'internalisme consolide une interprétation sceptique de Hume plutôt qu'une interprétation naturaliste. Mon objectif n'est pas seulement d'adresser un nouveau défi aux interprétations naturalistes de Hume, mais aussi d'inviter à une étude plus approfondie de plusieurs questions qui méritent l'attention si nous devons développer une compréhension adéquate de la théorie de la connaissance de cet auteur.

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Coleman, Jules L. "Naturalized Jurisprudence and Naturalized Epistemology." Philosophical Topics 29, no. 1 (2001): 113–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2001291/211.

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Roth, Paul. "The Epistemology of “Epistemology Naturalized”." Dialectica 53, no. 2 (May 23, 2005): 87–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1999.tb00066.x.

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Brown, Harold I. "Normative epistemology and naturalized epistemology∗." Inquiry 31, no. 1 (January 1988): 53–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201748808602138.

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Bonjour, Laurence. "Against Naturalized Epistemology." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994): 283–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1994.tb00290.x.

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Grandy, Richard E. "Information-based epistemology, ecological epistemology and epistemology naturalized." Synthese 70, no. 2 (February 1987): 191–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00413935.

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Rolla, Giovanni. "Contra intuições." Filosofia Unisinos 22, no. 1 (March 15, 2021): 21–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.221.03.

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This paper intends to offer a critical evaluation of the role played by intuitions in the mainstream methodology in traditional analytic epistemology. The criticism directed to what I call methodology of evaluation by intuitions shows that epistemologists often idealize the reliability of intuitions when assessing a theory against potential counterexamples, ignoring that the disposition to answer intuitively to a case of concept attribution is bounded to the familiar dimension in which the relevant conceptual competence emerges. Thus, the reliability of intuitions does not necessarily extend to far-fetched cases. Given that the assessment by our intuitions is not sufficient to decide for or against an epistemological theory, I offer a sketch for a pragmatic and naturalized conception of theoretical decision-making in epistemology.Key-words: Intuitions, Analytic epistemology, Conceptual abilities, Naturalism, Pragmatism.

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Shin, Myeong-Kyeong. "Characterizing Naturalized Epistemology of Science Possessed by Korean Pre-Service Elementary Teachers." Journal of Social Sciences Research, no. 52 (January 25, 2019): 444–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.32861/jssr.52.444.449.

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This study aimed at exploring how pre-service teachers possessed naturalized epistemology of science. The epistemology of science has been major topics of investigation in science education research targeting pre-service and in-service teacher education. How science works including scientific investigation for achieving science knowledge was well known item in school science. The role of scientific epistemology would play in science classroom. Therefore improving teachers’ perspectives and designing advanced teaching-learning sequences along them have been substantial parts of the science education reform. Such efforts have been active when a new epistemological position emerged such as naturalized epistemology. Through this research Korean pre-service teachers’ understanding of the naturalized epistemology was explored. The questionnaire to explore pre-service teachers’ epistemological beliefs was adopted majorly focusing on naturalized epistemology of science knowledge. They were administrated to forty per-service elementary teachers. The questionnaire is composed of items using a Likert scale. According to the finding, Korean elementary teacher candidates in this study had more agreement for naturalized epistemology than for traditional one.

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Copp, David. "Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 26 (2000): 30–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2000.10717548.

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Ethical naturalism is the doctrine that moral properties, such as moral goodness, justice, rightness, wrongness, and the like, are among the “natural” properties that things can have. It is the doctrine that moral properties are “natural” and that morality is in this sense an aspect of “nature.” Accordingly, it is a view about the semantics and metaphysics of moral discourse. For example, a utilitarian naturalist might propose that wrongness is the property an action could have of being such as to undermine overall happiness, where happiness is taken to be a psychological property. Unfortunately, it is unclear what the naturalist means by a “natural” property. For my purposes in this paper, I shall assume that natural properties are such that our knowledge of them is fundamentally empirical, grounded in observation. More precisely, a property is “natural” just in case any synthetic proposition about its instantiation can be known only a posteriori, or with the aid of experience.

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Judycki, Stanisław. "O celach filozoficznej teorii poznania. Uwagi w związku z książką Adama Groblera „Epistemologia. Sandwiczowa teoria wiedzy”." Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 17, no. 3 (November 15, 2022): 35–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1895-8001.17.3.5.

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The article concerns the epistemological views of Adam Grobler contained in his book Epistemologia (2019). The first part of the article lists the basic goals that were set for the philosophical theory of knowledge, namely, distinguishing types of knowledge, discovering the essence of knowledge, describing and assessing human epistemic situation in the world, considering the most general idea of knowledge, confronting the issue of global skepticism, grounding human knowledge, considering the issue of starting point in philosophy, showing the genesis of human knowledge (Kant, Husserl), considering the phenomenon–reality opposition and the opposition of categories of being and categories of thinking, abandoning the maximalistic epistemology in favour of naturalized epistemology. In the second part of the text, Adam Grobler’s epistemological position is diagnosed as (pragmatically motivated) skepticism.

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Kim, Jaegwon. "What Is "Naturalized Epistemology?"." Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 381. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214082.

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Foley, Richard. "Quine and Naturalized Epistemology." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994): 243–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1994.tb00288.x.

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Winblad, Douglas G. "Skepticism and naturalized epistemology." Philosophia 19, no. 2-3 (October 1989): 99–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02380690.

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GIBSON, ROGER F. "STROUD ON NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY." Metaphilosophy 20, no. 1 (January 1989): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1989.tb00402.x.

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Portugal, Agnaldo. "Abrantes, o Naturalismo e o Teísmo." Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea 6, no. 1 (December 10, 2018): 73–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v6i1.20225.

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Este artigo pretende apresentar e discutir as principais teses de Paulo Abrantes acerca do naturalismo, um dos temas que ele mais desenvolveu em sua trajetória acadêmica. Percorrendo a maior parte de seus textos mais importantes sobre o assunto, o texto se debruça sobre a exposição que Abrantes faz sobre o naturalismo na epistemologia e filosofia da ciência, de um lado, e na filosofia da mente e metafísica, por outro lado. Seu trabalho mostra a grande diversidade de abordagens encontradas sob o título de “naturalista” nessas áreas da pesquisa filosófica. Abrantes aponta para uma distinção básica entre naturalismo metafísico e naturalismo metodológico. Embora aponte para a possibilidade de um naturalismo metodologicamente neutro, ele parece estar mais inclinado a admitir que mesmo o naturalismo metodológico tem de assumir compromissos ontológicos. Em vista do contraste com a metafísica teísta, que ajuda a entender melhor o que unifica os diferentes tipos de naturalismo, o artigo avalia os argumentos em favor do naturalismo metafísico mínimo admitido por Abrantes e propõe que, tanto para se entender o naturalismo em filosofia quanto em ciências naturais, a versão metodológica neutra é a mais recomendada.

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Caruso, Gregg. "Realism, Naturalism, and Pragmatism: A Closer Look at the Views of Quine and Devitt." KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 1, no. 21 (January 1, 2007): 64–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2007-012105.

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Abstract Michael Devitt's views on realism and naturalism have a lot in common with those of W.V. Quine. Both appear to be realists; both accept naturalized epistemology and abandon the old goal of first philosophy; both view philosophy as continuous with the empirical procedures of science and hence view metaphysics as similarly empirical; and both seem to view realism as following from naturalism. Although Quine and Devitt share quite a bit ideologically, I think there is a deeper, more fundamental dissimilarity between the two. I will explore the difference between them in an attempt to bring out the subtle complexities surrounding the issue of realism{complexities, I will argue, Devitt sometimes overlooks. I will also explore a real tension in Quine between his earlier, more pragmatic (or anti-realist) tendencies and his later, more austere realism. I will conclude by defending a more Quinean brand of realism I call internal realism.

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Bengson, John, Terence Cuneo, and Andrew Reisner. "The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism." Journal of Moral Philosophy 17, no. 5 (October 14, 2020): 471–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20202934.

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Abstract The Projectability Challenge states that a metaethical view must explain how ordinary agents can, on the basis of moral experience and reflection, accurately and justifiably apply moral concepts to novel situations. In this paper, we argue for two primary claims. First, paradigm nonnaturalism can satisfactorily answer the projectability challenge. Second, it is unclear whether there is a version of moral naturalism that can satisfactorily answer the challenge. The conclusion we draw is that there is an important respect in which nonnaturalism holds an advantage over its most prominent naturalist rivals. The conclusion is interesting if only because it is widely assumed that naturalism has an easier time handling thorny problems in moral epistemology. We argue that there is at least one such problem of which this assumption is not true.

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Ikbal Salam, Andi Muhammad. "PEMIKIRAN KRITIS MULYADHI TERHADAP BANGUNAN ILMU MODERN." Ri'ayah: Jurnal Sosial dan Keagamaan 5, no. 01 (July 29, 2020): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.32332/riayah.v5i01.2296.

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Mulyadhi Kartanegara memusatkan perhatiannya pada diskursus filsafat Islam yang ide-idenya telah dituangkan ke dalam berbagai bentuk karya ilmiah. Epistemologi integarasi ilmu Mulyadhi Kartanegara menyorot aspek integrasi sumber ilmu dan integrasi metode ilmu. Sumber ilmu menurut Mulyadhi yakni indra, akal dan intuisi, sedangkan ilmuan Barat (materialisme-positivisme) hanya mengakui panca indra sebagai sumber ilmu. Metodologi ilmu dalam epistemologi Mulyadhi yakni, metode observasi atau eksperimen untuk obyek-obyek fisik, metode logis untuk obyek metaempirik, dan metode intuitif (irfani) untuk mengenal obyek secara langsung. Sedang ilmuan modern hanya mengakui metode ilmu observasi atau eksperimen dan menampik metode ilmu yang lain. Selanjutnya, dalam relasi epistemologis dan status ontologis, epistemologi Islam mengakui realitas secara integral-holistik (alam materi, mitzal dan akal dan Tuhan yang merupakn puncak realitas). Kritik Mulyadhi terhadap bangunan ilmu modern adalah tertuju pada rasionalisme-empirik (paradigma Cartesian-Newtonian) yang melahirkan aliran pemikiran: naturalisme, idealisme dan sekulerisme yang bercorak mekanistik dalam memandang realitas semesta. Selanjutnya Mulyadhi melontarkan respon kritisnya pada materialisme melalui islamisasi epistemologis pada aspek klasifikasi ilmu dan metodologi ilmu.

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40

Papineau, David. "Fiabilismo, inducción y escepticismo." Euphyía - Revista de Filosofía 4, no. 6 (November 3, 2017): 82. http://dx.doi.org/10.33064/6euph66.

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El ensayo que se presenta a continuación constituye el capítulo 5 del libro de David Paipineau (1993) Philosophical Naturalism, Blackwell Ltd. Una versión previa de este texto —a la que aquí se añaden modificaciones sustantivas en lo que concierne a la reconstrucción filosófica de los métodos inductivos— apareció en enero de 1992, en The Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166), 1-20. Agradecemos la gentileza del profesor David Papineau al ceder los derechos para la presente traducción. En este ensayo expone y defiende los lineamientos de una epistemología basada en la fiabilidad como alternativa a la caracterización clásica, cartesiana, del conocimiento (basada en la certeza y en garantías subjetivas). A partir del esbozo de esta epistemología se propone, adoptando una metodología naturalista, una estrategia para responder a las objeciones escépticas en contra de las formas de inferencia no deductivas, en especial la inducción. A diferencia de otros partidarios de esta línea argumentativa, Papineau enfrenta de manera directa la frecuente acusación, por parte de sus antagonistas, de que la epistemología naturalista no responde al reto escéptico sino que sólo cambia de tema. La traducción fue realizada por Marc Jiménez Rolland.

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41

Antony, Louise M. "Naturalized Epistemology, Morality, and the Real World." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 26 (2000): 103–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2000.10717550.

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“Our impartiality is kept for abstract merit and demerit, which none of us ever saw.” -George Eliot, Middlemarch,book 4, chap. 40, 1871.Naturalized epistemology, as I understand it, is the practice of treating knowledge – human or otherwise – as a natural phenomenon, susceptible of investigation by the methods of empirical science. A naturalized approach to the study of knowledge differs saliently from more traditional forms of epistemology in taking the existence of knowledge for granted. Naturalized epistemologists do not concern themselves with skeptical challenges. Nor are naturalized epistemologists much concerned with questions about what counts as “knowledge,” properly speaking. They do not worry if a bird’s natively specified program for star-based navigation is “justified” for the bird, nor if the sub-personal data structures and algorithms posited by cognitive psychologists can be properly counted as “beliefs.” The naturalized epistemologist is interested in the explanation of anything that even appears to be a cognitive achievement, whether or not it passes muster as “knowledge” in some preferred sense.

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42

Turp, Michael-John. "Naturalized Epistemology and the Normative." Forum Philosophicum 13, no. 2 (2008): 335–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/forphil200813226.

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43

FURUTA, Tomohisa. "Naturalized Epistemology and Its Problems." Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 11, no. 2 (2003): 57–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.4288/jafpos1956.11.57.

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44

Johnsen, Bredo C. "How to Read “Epistemology Naturalized”." Journal of Philosophy 102, no. 2 (2005): 78–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil200510221.

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45

Sinclair, Robert. "WHEN NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY TURN NORMATIVE." Southwest Philosophy Review 20, no. 2 (2004): 53–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview200420229.

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46

Duran, Jane, and Ruth Doell. "Naturalized Epistemology, Connectionism and Biology1." Dialectica 47, no. 4 (May 23, 2005): 327–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1993.tb00100.x.

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47

Yanchar, Stephen C., and Kristoffer B. Kristensen. "Notes on a naturalized epistemology." Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 16, no. 2 (1996): 93–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0091153.

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48

Hookway, Christopher. "Naturalized epistemology and epistemic evaluation." Inquiry 37, no. 4 (December 1994): 465–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201749408602368.

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SIEGEL, HARVEY. "NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY AND ?FIRST PHILOSOPHY?" Metaphilosophy 26, no. 1-2 (January 1995): 46–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1995.tb00555.x.

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50

Barnhart, Michael G. "Is Naturalized Epistemology Experientially Vacuous?" Philosophy in the Contemporary World 3, no. 2 (1996): 1–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pcw1996327.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Naturalised Epistemology'

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