Academic literature on the topic 'Natural Ontological Attitude'
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Journal articles on the topic "Natural Ontological Attitude"
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Rouse, Joseph. "Arguing for the Natural Ontological Attitude." PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988, no. 1 (January 1988): 294–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1988.1.192996.
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Brandon, E. P. "California Unnatural: On Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude." Philosophical Quarterly 47, no. 187 (April 1997): 232–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00058.
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McArthur, Dan. "Deflationary Metaphysics, Social Constructivism, and the Natural Ontological Attitude." Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (2004): 221–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2004_1.
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Kukla, André. "Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45, no. 4 (December 1, 1994): 955–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/45.4.955.
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Alspector-Kelly, Marc. "The NOAer's Dilemma: Constructive Empiricism and the Natural Ontological Attitude." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, no. 3 (September 2003): 307–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2003.10716545.
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Faced with interminable combat over some piece of philosophical terrain, someone will inevitably suggest that the contested ground is nothing more than a philosophically manufactured mirage that is therefore not worth fighting for. Arthur Fine has long advocated such a response — the ‘Natural Ontological Attitude,’ or NOA — to the realism debate in the philosophy of science. Notwithstanding theprima facieincompatibility between the realist's and anti-realist's positions, Fine suggests that there is in fact enough common ground for NOA to stand on its own as a minimal alternative, one that enjoys the advantage of being free of the philosophical burdens of its overweight contenders.Notwithstanding Fine's claim to have identified a position that is neither realist nor anti-realist, critics charge that NOA, as Fine describes it, is a realist position. I endorse this criticism below, with attention to the relation between NOA and Bas van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism (CE). I show that Fine's repudiation of the globalism he identifies in realism (and in anti-realism) does not insulate him from that charge.
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Abela, Paul. "Is Less Always More? An Argument Against the Natural Ontological Attitude." Philosophical Quarterly 46, no. 182 (January 1996): 72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2956307.
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Testoni, Ines, Dorella Ancona, and Lucia Ronconi. "The Ontological Representation of Death." OMEGA - Journal of Death and Dying 71, no. 1 (March 10, 2015): 60–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0030222814568289.
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Since the borders between natural life and death have been blurred by technique, in Western societies discussions and practices regarding death have became infinite. The studies in this area include all the most important topics of psychology, sociology, and philosophy. From a psychological point of view, the research has created many instruments for measuring death anxiety, fear, threat, depression, meaning of life, and among them, the profiles on death attitude are innumerable. This research presents the validation of a new attitude scale, which conjoins psychological dimensions and philosophical ones. This scale may be useful because the ontological idea of death has not yet been considered in research. The hypothesis is that it is different to believe that death is absolute annihilation than to be sure that it is a passage or a transformation of one’s personal identity. The hypothetical difference results in a greater inner suffering caused by the former idea. In order to measure this possibility, we analyzed the correlation between Testoni Death Representation Scale and Beck Hopelessness Scale, Suicide Resilience Inventory-25, and Reasons for Living Inventory. The results confirm the hypothesis, showing that the representation of death as total annihilation is positively correlated to hopelessness and negatively correlated to resilience.
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Broekman, Jan M. "“Verbal and nonverbal” in semiotics." Semiotica 2017, no. 216 (May 24, 2017): 19–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sem-2017-0036.
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AbstractThe “verbal–nonverbal” distinction is mostly used in everyday language and its “‘naïve-natural’ attitude” (Husserl). It confirms the idea that a word/verb, as a component of human expressivity, is the basic unit of language. Theories of Peirce, Saumjan, and Searle highlight how a different, predominantly “‘non-naïve’-natural attitude” is required to understand the distinction and its position in the semiotic toolkit. To support this conclusion, Husserl unfolds a methodological approach of varying attitudes and attitude-changes, including important diversifications of ontology. A consequence is the need for an interregional ontological approach, which in this article leads to a consideration of social psychology (Lewin) and quantum theory (Bohm) because both underline that words and meanings are forces in fields, and by no means isolated single units. Word and meaning are to be understood as forces, and meaning-making as well as interpretation a matter of force field considerations. Semiotics should thus cherish dynamic features, whereby the “verbal–nonverbal” distinction teaches us at a “non-naïve” attitude level, that a word/verb is always a non-word/verb as well. The greatness of semiotics is in the understanding of such dynamic and continuously creative inversions.
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de Moura, Carlos Alberto Ribeiro. "Vérité mondaine et vérité phénoménologique." Phainomenon 30, no. 1 (December 1, 2020): 3–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2020-0001.
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AbstractHusserlian phenomenology has been interpreted as a method of knowledge that can be applied to different domains and which would compete with other methods to give us a better understanding of the “real”, the “man” or “society”. Moreover, “phenomenological idealism” has been presented as an “ontological” or “metaphysical” thesis, in the pre-critical sense of the term. The goal of this study is to suggest that these two theses imply the tacit identification of the natural attitude and the phenomenological one, avoiding the difference between the objects to which these attitudes relate. Therefore, a phenomenological truth does not anticipate any opinion about the “world”.
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Silva, Bruno Malavolta e. "Qual o argumento para a Atitude Ontológica Natural?" Principia: an international journal of epistemology 23, no. 2 (December 16, 2019): 175–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p175.
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Arthur Fine presented the Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) as a third alternative between scientific realism and anti-realism by identifying a core position contained in both and rejecting any philosophical addition to this core. At first, Fine’s proposal was understood as offering a doxastic middle ground between believing in the truth of a theory and believing in its empirical adequacy. In this reading, NOA was widely disregarded after Alan Musgrave’s criticisms of it, which characterized Fine’s proposal as a form of realism. After that, NOA was reinterpreted as a local variety of realism focused in changing the attitude used to settle the scientific realism debate, by rejecting global philosophies with an approach external to science, and by considering only the scientific evidence with a contextualist mood. Although this reading clarifies how to understand NOA, there is still no consensus about what is Fine’s argument to support it. I organize the four main interpretations of Fine’s defense and point their main flaws. Finally, I develop some clarifications about NOA in order to solve the flaws of the preceding interpretations, defending that NOA is based upon a prevalence of the epistemic values actually used in scientific practice.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Natural Ontological Attitude"
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Robertson, Daniel James. "The Natural Ontological Attitude from a Physicist's Perspective: Towards Quantum Realism." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Humanities, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/6346.
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The debate between Arthur Fine and Alan Musgrave is well known amongst those involved in the scientific realism debate and centres upon two papers that are quite often found together in philosophy of science anthologies. Reading them like this gives the very strong impression the Musgrave is the victor which is the commonly held view. In this thesis, I wish to overturn this view by placing Fine's paper in context, namely as part of a larger work on the history and philosophy of quantum physics. Fine's book, The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism and Quantum Theory, gives us good reason to believe that quantum physics significantly undermines the whole scientific realism debate, and as such, has strongly influenced Fine's development of the Natural Ontological Attitude, which is as Fine believes a middle ground between realism and anti-realism. The present thesis evaluates the Natural Ontological Attitude from a physicist's perspective and defends Fine against Musgrave's reply to the extent that it demonstrates that Musgrave would do well to read Fine's paper in context.
That said, just as Fine in his youth hoped that a quantum realist position will one day be found, so I also possess this aspiration; and so, despite my concluding that Fine is justified in holding to NOA, I argue furthermore that NOA is but a precursor to a potential quantum structural realist position. After showing that structural realism is worthy of consideration by using it to counter Fine's objections to scientific realism, I analyse the results of quantum physics in an attempt to understand what it can tell us about reality in the quantum realm. Eliminativist Ontic Structural Realism holds great promise as a quantum realism contender, and as such, it inspired the questions regarding individuality and reality that are discussed in the final main chapter. I thus resuscitate hope that the cause of the quantum realist is not yet lost.
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Johnson, Peter. "The constants of nature : a realist account." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.321556.
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Santos, Sanqueilo de Lima. "A objetividade natural espiritualizada em Ideen II de Husserl." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2013. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/11624.
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The effort to go through the various forms of intentionality, in the constitution of objects of nature and spirit, is the goal for which they were produced in the complex descriptions Ideas II (1913 - 1922). The concept of regional ontology, which is treated Ideas I (1913) from the standpoint of its more general principles, is applied to particular problems in Ideen II, to demonstrate that reality and the characteristic features of each kind of objectivity (natural and spiritual) depend on intentionality. This is essential both to be donated, and to be recognized in its own ontological status. Our work focused on spiritual objectivity, and found himself thus engaged with themes that are present in the Cartesian Meditations (1931). The approach of spiritual objectivity depends on the exposure of the distinction between causality and motivation. Given the importance of the second, also requires more detailed analysis of the concepts of the spiritual world, empathy, intersubjectivity and expression. In the constitution of spiritual objectivity, its actually admits "predicates meaning" unlike natural objectivity. And our hypothesis is that the level of transcendental spirit, stated by Husserl, can only be sustained by a sense of ego, apparently secondary, whose predispositions of consciousness has essential debt with the body (Leib) and attitudes of parallelism
O esforço de percorrer as várias formas de intencionalidade, presentes na constituição dos objetos da natureza e do espírito, é a meta para a qual foram produzidas as complexas descrições em Ideias II (1913 1922). O conceito de ontologia regional, que é tratado Ideias I (1913) do ponto de vista dos seus princípios mais gerais, é aplicado a problemas particulares em Ideen II, no sentido de demonstrar que a realidade e os traços característicos de cada espécie de objetividade (natural e espiritual) dependem da intencionalidade. Essa é indispensável tanto para serem doados, quanto para serem reconhecidos em seu estatuto ontológico próprio. O nosso trabalho se concentrou na objetividade espiritual, e se viu, dessa forma, comprometido com temas que estão presentes nas Meditações Cartesianas (1931). A abordagem da objetividade espiritual depende da exposição da distinção entre causalidade e motivação. Pela importância da segunda, também exige a análise mais detalhada das noções de mundo espiritual, empatia, intersubjetividade e expressão. Na constituição das objetividades espirituais, a sua realidade admite predicados de significação , ao contrário da objetividade natural. E nossa hipótese é a de que o nível transcendental do espírito, afirmado por Husserl, só se sustenta mediante uma noção, aparentemente secundária, de ego, cujas predisposições de consciência contém uma dívida essencial com o corpo-próprio (Leib) e com o paralelismo das atitudes
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Joseph, Jacques. "Vědecký realismus a přirozený svět." Master's thesis, 2012. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-309313.
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Jacques Joseph Scientific Realism and the Natural World M.A. thesis Abstract The main topic of this work is the relation between the natural world and the world of the natural sciences, and furthermore the relation of both these worlds to our conception of an external reality "as it really is". The core of the work is rooted mainly in the Anglo-American analytical philosophy of science, namely the debate concerning scientific realism, with a section dedicated to Husserl's conception of the relation between the natural world and natural sciences (as described in his Krisis). The goal of this work is to show scientific realism as broken beyond repair, and to then offer an alternative. The problems that plague realism run deep into its roots, many of which it shares with its opponents, the new alternative theory therefore needs to be completely different. This work suggests the "Natural ontological attitude" (NOA) presented by Arthur Fine, a theory that tries to salvage the intuitions that made realism seem so attractive. NOA is then developped, using texts by W. V. O. Quine and D. Davidson, as a minimalistic metaphysics based strongly on language that still manages to provide a relation to an extra-linguistic reality.
Book chapters on the topic "Natural Ontological Attitude"
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"3. Arguing for the Natural Ontological Attitude." In Engaging Science, 90–100. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/9781501718625-005.
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Gendreau, Bernard A. "The Cautionary Ontological Approach To Technology of Gabriel Marcel." In The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, 1–12. Philosophy Documentation Center, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/wcp20-paideia199839699.
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I present the arguments of Gabriel Marcel which are intended to overcome the potentially negative impact of technology on the human. Marcel is concerned with forgetting or rejecting human nature. His perspective is metaphysical. He is concerned with the attitude of the "mere technician" who is so immersed in technology that the values which promote him as an authentic person with human dignity are discredited, omitted, denied, minimized, overshadowed, or displaced. He reviews the various losses in ontological values which curtail the full realization of the human person in his dignity. The impact of technology leads too often to a loss of the sense of the mystery of being and self, authenticity and integrity, the concrete and the existential, truth and dialogue, freedom and lover, humanity and community, fidelity and creativity, the natural and the transcendent, commitment and virtue, respect of the self and responsiveness to others, and especially of the spiritual and the sacred. Thus, the task of the philosopher is to be a watchman, un veilleur, on the alert for a hopeful resolution of the human predicament.
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Del Lucchese, Filippo. "Aristotle." In Monstrosity and Philosophy, 93–129. Edinburgh University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474456203.003.0005.
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This chapter argues that Aristotle’s enquiry on the nature and meaning of monstrosity is rooted in his positive attitude toward the knowledge of lower nature, which enjoy the same status of the science of higher beings. Heavens and earth are thus connected through the divine principle that is active throughout the whole nature. Gods thus become author of, but also responsible for, what happens in nature, and Aristotle’s argument provides the ground for every future theodicy. Monstrosity plays a major role in this philosophical approach. Aristotle develops the opposition between the normal and the abnormal development, through the concept of accidental necessity, namely the necessity that is at stake in natural processes that not always happen in the same way. Monsters are of pivotal importance in this ontological picture, because of their paradoxical ambiguity. On the one hand, they are the sign and symptom or a resistant nature, which opposes itself to Aristotle’s major ontological invention, namely the form and the final cause. On the other hand, without this hyatus between formal perfection and actual reality, nature would not exist in the way we experience it: there would be no diversity, no better and worse, no normal and monstrous. Monstrosity is necessary for Aristotle to explain nature and its ontological structure based on the substitition of dynamic forms and ends to both the static ideas of Plato and the exclusively material reality of atomists.
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Eldredge, Niles. "Toward Hierarchy: Trends and Tensions in Evolutionary Theory." In Unfinished Synthesis. Oxford University Press, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195036336.003.0008.
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Is the synthesis a complete and satisfactory evolutionary theory? It would be a trivial and derogatory exercise indeed to depict the synthesis in utterly simplistic terms and then turn around and conclude that it is incomplete and unsatisfactory. Though I have subjected the synthesis to a series of purifying distillations through the course of this book so far, I have in mind by no means solely Mayr’s (1980, p. 1) two-sentence summary of the synthesis as I pose the question of just how complete, workable, and satisfactory a theory of the evolutionary process it is. No serious student of evolutionary theory could ever claim that the modem synthesis is “just population genetics.” Many more phenomena are included than the statics and dynamics of genetic change in populations. What does seem to be true of the synthesis in general is that it focuses its concerns on a certain range of biological entities and attendant processes, and espouses attitudes and ontological positions on others that appear (to me) to exclude the latter from effective integration into the theory per se. Specifically, the synthesis focuses on genes; their replication, recombination, and mutation; and the fate of allelic variation within populations. But species—certainly not the sole province of population genetics—are very much a part of the synthesis, if equivocally so. If it is true that most evolutionary phenomena considered by the synthesis are construed, at least in principle, to be explicable in terms of the dynamics of selection and drift of allelic variation in populations, it is not because other sorts of phenomena, such as macroevolutionary trends, are alleged not to exist. The synthesis takes the (on the whole commendable) attitude of the Missourian who must be shown. We have a highly corroborated theory of the origin, maintenance, and modification of adaptations—through pure, narrowly defined natural selection. The burden of demonstration lies on anyone who would maintain either that some other process builds such (organismic) adaptation or that an additional process (or more than one) is also at work in evolution. Certainly the entire discussion on levels of selection, a discussion to which I return in this chapter, is structured in this general sort of way.
Conference papers on the topic "Natural Ontological Attitude"
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Guseynov, Aleksandr, and Viktoriya Shipovskaya. "Development of scientific images about radicalization of protest activity of personality." In Safety psychology and psychological safety: problems of interaction between theorists and practitioners. «Publishing company «World of science», LLC, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.15862/53mnnpk20-02.
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The analysis of theories and models of radicalization existing in psychology and sociology is given. The complexity and transitivity of the world, the emerging methodological trends in psychology, the change of postmodern discourse to metamodernism require new psychological approaches to a research of this phenomenon, which can take into account the role of cultural factors and anthropological turn, as well as space and time as ontological constants of reality. Theoretical: theoretical and methodological analysis of scientific literature, comparison, generalization, interpretation. The paper summarizes a number of empirical studies of the authors related to the problems of extremism. The goal is to consider the evolution of ideas about the radicalization of protest activity and substantiate the high relevance of the subject-being approach to explain the problem of extremism. The authors distinguish six main theories and models that reveal the nature of radicalization: the theory of anomy (R. Merton), the theory of "relative deprivation" (T. Garr), the concept of an authoritarian personality (A. Adorno), a model of social identity in collective activity (M. Van Zomeren ), the model of radicalization (R. Borum), the model of radicalization (F. Mohaddam). The authors note the demand for a metamodern methodological strategy, which makes it possible to record personal transformations and construct new images of a person. The authors come to the conclusion that the substantive differences in approaches lie in the influence quantity of external determinants causing the emergence of radical attitudes. In the development of the theme of extremism, the main ones are the principle of the unity of the personality and its being, the methodological principle of subjectivity and the principle of uncertainty, which reveal additional nuances of the phenomenon that increases cognitive capabilities. The conditions of the subject-being approach are considered and the concept of protest activity is presented, based on the notions of "existential personal identity", "subjective activity", "subjectivity", revealing the reasons for negative transformation of personality, considering extremism as a violation of the developing configuration of identity. The subject-being approach to the personality is recognized as the most efficient theoretical and methodological basis for researching this problem, since it allows us to overcome the deficiency of the content given by the deterministic interpretation of radicalization.