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1
Schaefer, Brian. "Universal rights from external reasons." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/4005.
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The thesis is an attempt to find a satisfactorv grounding for universal moral rights. It attempts to ground universal moral rights in a revised version of the framework of moral reasons offered by T.M. Scanlon in What We Owe to Each Oflzer. In doing so it takes on several related projects. It makes a case for why rights generally, and universal rights in particular, are an essential part of a proper moral theory. It then attempts an extended argument in support of why the method of grounding universal rights at which I eventuallv arrive is superior to competitors. The argument encompasses both why I believe that universal rights need to be grounded in an objective meta-ethcs, and why I take the sort of irrealist cognitivism advanced by Scanlon to be the most promising form of moral objectivism. The argument is admittedly defeasible: it is not so ambitious as to try to eliminate every competing rights theory, but it purports to be strong enough to show that my theory enjoys significant adivantages over manv others. In the course of making this argument I align myself with the natural law tradition, and claim that mv position is best understood as a new natural law theory. The thesis goes on to defend many elements of the Scanlonian picture of moral reasons, but also to revise that picture in important ways, particularly by arguing that Scanlon’s contractualism is best understood to be underpinned bv an account of the sacred offered by Ronald Dworkin, and that some moral reasons are reasons we all share. The final chapter of the thesis shows how rights are derived from Scanlonian reasons, and particularly how universal rights are derived from shared reasons.
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Smith, R. H. "Moral equality and rights : a specificationist account of rights in conflict." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2015. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1463364/.
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This thesis explores the philosophical nature of the relationship between equality, individual rights, and human dignity, and seeks a normative framework for resolving seemingly incommensurable conflicts of fundamental rights. Part I explores theories of individual partiality, and the potential for consonance between contemporary egalitarian rights theory and a specificationist methodology for the resolution of incommensurable value conflicts. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 put forward an interpretation of human dignity based upon particular conceptions of individual moral equality and partiality; while chapter 5 moves on to explore the relationship between egalitarian rights theory and specification theory, with a view to providing a theoretical framework for resolving seemingly incommensurable conflicts of rights. Part II comprises three in-depth chapters providing close legal analyses of contemporary constitutional rights conflicts, demonstrating how the normative understanding of the nature of rights and their conflicts gained in Part I can inform the way we think about real life value conflicts. Chapters 6 explores the conflict in liberal values between religious liberty and women’s equal dignity; Chapter 7 considers the normative implications of BRCA genetic patenting for human dignity; and Chapter 8 investigates the recent US Supreme Court decision to strike down the equal protection clauses of the US Voting Rights Act 1965 as unconstitutional, and explores the role the past ought to play in the justification of contemporary rights. These case studies apply an egalitarian-specificationist methodology to the critical analysis of contemporary conflicts of constitutional rights, with a view to critiquing the normative implications of our current approach to resolving seemingly irreconcilable conflicts of fundamental rights today.
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Ang, Steven. "The moral dimensions of intellectual property rights." Thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2011. http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/9008.
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The Moral Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights explores the various aspects of IPRs in which moral evaluation and claims play a role. According to R M Hare, moral concepts and reasoning are characterized by the universalization of prescriptions. Universalization links the various dimensions in a way that rationally forces us to revise the moral basis of the various claims we make for, about and of IPRs, and ultimately provides grounds for their reform. The method of reflective equilibrium is focused in the first place on Hare’s meta- ethics, to derive a reformulation which is herein called fundamental prescriptivism. This requires a foundational set of moral principles to work. Our expectation that moral principles and values must serve to guide us, and resolve conflict between us, with objective rational force, provides the basis for adopting such a set of fundamental prescriptions. These sum up in the equal right to freedom and well- being as the ultimate basis for moral evaluation of our institutions. An implication of this right is that property in IPR systems must be balanced with participation rights (moral and legal) of the public to a public domain which allows individuals to have access to, and use, objects of intellectual property. When, in seeking reflective equilibrium, this is applied to the various aspects of IPRs, the result is an exploration of the inter-connectedness of following: justification of IPRs based on this equal right to freedom and well-being; explanation of the function of, and justification for, the presence of moral concepts and terms in national and international IPR rules; the commitments implied by use of these moral ideas for our obligations in respect of the way we enjoy, exploit and enforce our IPRs, and, ultimately, our duty to reform of IPRs in ways that respects the participation rights implied by this principle.
4
Kariyawasam, Kanchana. "Moral rights protection in a copyright system /." [St. Lucia, Qld.], 2001. http://www.library.uq.edu.au/pdfserve.php?image=thesisabs/absthe16318.pdf.
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Corlett, Jay Angelo. "Moral Compatibilism: Rights, responsibility, punishment and compensation." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/185747.
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The moral status of collectives is an important problem for any plausible moral, social and political philosophy. Are collectives proper subjects of moral rights and moral responsibility (liability) ascriptions? Is it morally justified for the state to punish collectives for criminal offenses, or for the state to force collectives to pay compensation for tort offenses? Moral Individualism denies that collectives are properly ascribed properties such as moral rights, moral liability, and punishability, while Moral Collectivism affirms that some collectives may be legitimately ascribed all such moral properties. I argue for a compatibilist position: "Moral Compatibilism." Using a hybrid interest/choice model of collective moral rights, I argue that it is justified to attribute moral rights to some collectives (prototypically, numerically large nations and corporations). Furthermore, I argue that it is morally unjustified for the state to impose sanctions on collectives. For a necessary condition of the state's imposing sanctions on collectives (in a morally justified way) is that the object of the imposed sanction is a morally liable agent. But collectives, though they can (ideally) be morally liable for their doings, are typically not structured such that they are morally liable agents. Collectives--even highly organized ones--do not typically satisfy some of the conditions jointly necessary for moral liability. It is not clear that they are intentional, epistemic, and voluntary agents. This distinction between what a collective can become and what it typically is in regards to intentionality, voluntariness, etc., is crucial. Yet it is not made by others working in this area. The arguments of this dissertation have important theoretical and practical implications for action theory, moral, social, legal, political philosophy, and business ethics. It in no way follows from my arguments that collectives cannot be restructured so that they can satisfy the conditions of moral liability and become justified objects of state sanction when they act negligently or criminally. In fact, I argue that it is the moral obligation of persons in society to restructure their social institutions so that such collectives become morally liable agents (at least to some meaningful extent). This poses a challenge to moral, social and political philosophers to think of how such collectives might be restructured so that the state may legitimately impose sanctions on them to the extent that they are morally liable agents.
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Jardstam, Karin. "The Stranger’s Case : Refugees and Moral Rights." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-162370.
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Using the events in Sweden in the autumn of 2015 as a practical example, this paper examines the question of whether there are circumstances when it is morally permissible for rich, democratic states to close their borders to asylum-seekers. To lay a common ground, the author starts by looking at the right of asylum-seekers, who a refugee is, and what obligations a host country have towards them. Thus, after looking at general human rights, and how they apply to the right to seek asylum, the author turns to the question of who a refugee is, and the difference between refugees according to the 1951 Geneva Convention, and people who are in need of subsidiary protection, before choosing to use UNHCR’s wider definition of a refugee. While acknowledging that refugees have specific rights that other persons in need of protection do not, all asylum-seekers are entitled to not be sent back to a place of danger (which is the principle of non-refoulement). Though both groups are entitled to stay on in the country, the temporary status for those in need of subsidiary protection raises some questions about integration and their standing in society and therefore the question of membership rights is discussed before the author returns to the events in Sweden in 2015 and argues that there are circumstances when it is morally acceptable for a country to close its borders to refugees, but that there are limitations when this can be done and for how long. Finally, it is argued that a system that prevents countries from having to – or choosing to – close their borders to refugees is needed. The author discusses whether the grounds for such a system could be found in the work that UNHCR does, and if the DAC agreement can be used as a model for fair distribution.
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Cronin, Kieran James. "The value of the language of rights in Christian ethics, with particular reference to reproductive rights." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/19662.
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McCarron, Gary. "Animals as moral others obligation in the context of animal emancipation /." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape15/PQDD_0011/NQ33541.pdf.
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O'Neill, P. B. "Moral rights in Australia : the case for legislative protection." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 1997. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/36895/1/36895_O%27Neill_1997.pdf.
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'Moral rights' should not be thought of as a system of ethical or moral principles, rather, they are personal rights of the author of a literary, artistic, musical or like work which proponents of moral rights protection argue arise from the intimate bond between the author of such a work and the work itself. Focus in the common law countries has always been on the economic rights associated with a copyright work and how those economic rights could be best protected and exploited by the copyright owner: 'The common law, however, has always placed more emphasis on the preservation of property interests than on some intangible concept like personality rights which are difficult to calculate in economic terms. The common law has always been more utilitarian and pragmatic in nature than its European counterparts. The legal rights of individuals are protected negatively - that is, you have a compensatory remedy rather than rights per se. ' 1
Within the Australian legal system the economic rights are the exclusive rights contained in section 31 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and include the right to reproduce the work, publish the work, make a broadcast, make an adaptation of the work (among others). The focus on economic rights is reflected in the ultimate form which the Copyright Act has taken in Australia. That is, the Act affords substantial opportunities to the copyright owner to exploit the work with concomitant protection of those economic or pecuniary rights. By contrast, however, there is minimal protection offered to any moral or personal rights that the original creator of the work may claim to possess.
For many moral rights advocates, the call for legislative protection of moral rights has been premised on the basis that a balance between economic rights and moral rights does not currently exist within the copyright field. The opponents of legislative protection allege that the introduction of moral rights would unduly upset the current system, posing threatening implications for investors in the culture industries. 2 This is the environment in Australia in which the moral rights debate has developed. Initially moral rights were seen as being essentially a foreign or alien concept to the system of copyright law in Australia. The past twenty years has seen an increasing focus upon moral rights by the artistic industries, legal academics, the Copyright Law Review Committee and various government bodies.
Moral rights have been given some form of recognition and protection in over sixty countries in the world. Even the well-spring of Australian law, that being the English legal system, has enacted legislation which not only recognises moral rights but provides protection for these rights. In addition, other countries with a common law heritage such as Canada, New Zealand, India, South Africa and Nigeria have similarly enacted some form of protection for moral rights.3 Despite this, Australia since becoming a member State of the Berne Convention in 1928 has consistently refused to enact laws which specifically recognise moral rights and provide legislative protection for these rights. Despite the change in views of countries such as New Zealand4 and the United Kingdom5 , Australia has remained somewhat isolationist in its persistence in refusing to provide specific protection for moral rights. It appears, however, that the winds of change have been gaining increasing force in Australia, particularly within the last five years.
This dissertation will define and analyse the concept of 'moral rights'. The nature of moral rights, including the rights of attribution, the right of integrity, the right of divulgation (disclosure) and the right of withdrawal, will be considered. The history of the moral rights debate in Australia will be discussed including Australia's obligations as a member of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works ("the Berne Convention") will be considered. The experience of other common law jurisdictions in recognising moral rights and the means adopted to protect moral rights and the efficacy of the means of protection selected will also be examined.
This paper will focus upon the question whether moral rights are sufficiently protected within the Australian legal system by the present framework of various common law causes of action and statutory provisions contained in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the various State Fair Trading Acts.6 The case for and against greater recognition and protection of moral rights will be examined. In 1994 the AttorneyGeneral's Department published a discussion paper which recommended the introduction of specific moral rights protection in Australia via amendments to the Copyright Act 1968
(Cth).7 The recommendations of the Discussion Paper will be considered as will recent developments in the moral rights debate in Australia.
This paper concludes that there has been insufficient recognition and protection of moral rights within the Australian legal system. The combination of common law causes of action and statutory provisions in the Australian legal system, in the absence of specific legislative provisions protecting moral rights, are not sufficient to comply with Australia's treaty obligations under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. There is an unmet need for greater recognition and protection of moral rights within the Australian legal system and this paper recommends this occur via amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) to incorporate specific provisions protecting moral rights.
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Lõhmus, Katri. "Caring autonomy : rethinking the right to autonomy under the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/7798.
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This thesis sets out an argument against the present interpretation of the concept of autonomy under the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) Article 8 jurisprudence and proposes a new reading of the concept that is rooted in an acknowledgment and appreciation of human interdependence. Following the prevailing political, legal and socio-cultural ideas and ideals about autonomy, the ECtHR has chosen to furnish its recent Article 8 case law according to the values characteristic of the notion of individual autonomy – independence, selfsufficiency, and the ability to conduct one’s life in a manner of one’s own choosing. Adopting this individualistic view on autonomy, the ECtHR sets normative standards for behaviour that the thesis challenges as being detrimental for the quality of interpersonal relationships. The work draws on sociological theory to argue that in modern individualised societies people are increasingly tied to each other – one has to be socially sensitive and to be able to relate to others and to obligate oneself, in order to manage and organise the complexities of everyday life. This also means that there are attendant obligations between individuals to be sensitive towards, and care for, each other. It is argued that an effective exercise of one’s autonomy becomes necessarily dependent on the existence of caring and trusting relationships. This in turn requires the ECtHR to adopt an appropriate conceptualisation of autonomy that embraces this knowledge and gives full effect to it. The concept of caring autonomy is proposed as a replacement for an individualistic concept of autonomy. It will be argued that this concept captures better the essentiality of human interdependence and the morality it calls for. The implications of this for the future direction of the ECtHR jurisprudence are also considered.
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Martin, Elisabeth. "Young people's use of rights discourse in their moral judgements." Thesis, Nottingham Trent University, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.271204.
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Cheng-Davies, Tania. "Avoiding another Bonfire of the Vanities : the right to object to destruction under moral rights doctrine." Thesis, University of Bristol, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1983/1683ab07-2360-487b-bad1-a2fb431d02da.
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At the heart of the research underpinning this thesis is the question of why moral rights doctrine in common law jurisdictions ignores the possibility of creators having a legitimate claim to protection when faced with the destruction of their creative works. It is a question rarely examined or analysed in depth by the courts or legal commentators. The thesis posits that this lacuna in the doctrine undermines its threefold role as protector of a creator’s personality rights, a buttress against the erosion of cultural heritage, and a counterbalance to the overtly utilitarian and commercial nature of the copyright regime in common law countries. The thesis also critically examines the standard arguments raised against the recognition of such a right for creators. In the process, the research engages with a variety of sources from without the common law, namely, the ontology of art, the Roman concept of Iniuria, and anthropological studies on the concept of honour: sources not previously examined and applied in the context of this question. The research question is examined in the context of the United Kingdom’s utilitarian copyright regime, whose weak moral rights doctrine arguably undermines the nation’s artistic and cultural heritage. Lessons are sought from an appraisal of the cultural settings and moral rights regimes in other common law countries: Singapore, US, Australia and India. The underlying interdisciplinary and comparative law methods employed in the research ultimately aim to construct a case for the United Kingdom to embrace a widening of its moral rights, allowing its creators to object to the destruction of their works.
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Banks, Catherine, and n/a. "Lost in Translation: A History of Moral Rights in Australian Law." Griffith University. Griffith Law School, 2005. http://www4.gu.edu.au:8080/adt-root/public/adt-QGU20061006.114720.
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This thesis is a history of moral rights in Australian law. It traces the historical discourse about moral rights in Australian law and demonstrates how that discourse has shaped the meaning moral rights have come to assume in their current form under the current regime contained in the Copyright Amendment (Moral Rijghts) Act 2000. This history examines the reception and later production of a moral rights discourse in Australian law, and reveals that the historical discourse about Australian moral rights was dominated by the three themes; foreignness, international obligation and economic impact. I contend these three themes fundamentally shaped moral rights as they now appear in the moral rights regime. As the history unfolds, it will become clear that the moral rights regime was organised around a specific repertoire of arguments and imaginings, and it is this discourse that informs this thesis. My argument is pursued in three stages. Section One of the thesis provides the historical detail of the moral rights trajectory in Australian jurisprudence, and reveals, within that history, the emergence of three dominant themes, which are pursued in subsequent detail. In addition to the history, this section also provides detailed discussion of the legislative provisions in order to illustrate moral rights as a product of the history, and it highlights some of the shortcomings of the regime and provides some background for the case study in Section Two. Section Two of the thesis interrogates the structure of the moral rights regime by applying the Act's provisions to the case study of indigenous creators, thus providing a contemporary example of how these rights may work in practice, as the result of the historical discourse. Thus this section sets the scene for final part of the thesis, which delves further into the historical discourse. Section Part Three follows the themes of the moral rights debate as they emerged historically. Reconceptualizing the moral rights discourse in this way helps to explain why the debates about moral rights took a particular course and produced the outcomes it did. The starting point for these discussions is a detailed examination of the themes of foreignness, international obligation and economic impact, and follows these themes as they evolved chronologically. In particular, the discussion reveals that the debates about moral rights effectively fall into two eras. The first era (1928-1988) centred around the question of whether Australia should introduce moral rights and the debates about the appropriateness of the reception. At the commencement of the second era (1988-2000) the question shifted to what form moral rights should take. This then provides a backdrop with which to understand why specific discussions about moral rights were sidelined during the years of debates leading up to the legislation; in particular, the subject and the object; which form the fulcrum of a moral rights action. This is an essential part of the history because it explains why the subject and the object came to be imagined and constructed in such a narrow and limited way and clarifies why the moral rights provisions appear manifestly ineffective, particularly for indigenous creators and their communities. This thesis contributes to legal history in three important ways. First, it provides a detailed account of a discourse about moral rights in Australian law, and in doing so challenges the long held assumptions about their reception and production. Second, it highlights the importance of history to legal discourse. Just as regulatory regimes, institutions, and rules are integral to the law, so too are the informal practices, discourses and contexts on which they were based. Third, it reminds the reader that history is a signpost, and this history of moral rights demonstrates that the way this law was derived, imagined and constructed has significance for the social, cultural and legal context in which that process takes place.
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Banks, Catherine. "Lost in Translation: A History of Moral Rights in Australian Law." Thesis, Griffith University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10072/365849.
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This thesis is a history of moral rights in Australian law. It traces the historical discourse about moral rights in Australian law and demonstrates how that discourse has shaped the meaning moral rights have come to assume in their current form under the current regime contained in the Copyright Amendment (Moral Rijghts) Act 2000. This history examines the reception and Inter production of a moral rights discourse in Australian law, and reveals that the historical discourse about Australian moral tights was dominated by the three themes; foreignness, international obligation and economic impact. I contend these three themes fundamentally shaped moral rights as they now appear in the moral rights regime. As the history unfolds, it will become clear that the moral rights regime was organised around a specific repertoire of arguments and imaginings, and it is this discourse that informs this thesis. My argument is pursued in three stages. Section One of the thesis provides the historical detail of the moral rights trajectory in Australian jurisprudence, and reveals, within that history, the emergence of three dominant themes, which are pursued in subsequent detail. In addition to the history, this section also provides detailed discussion of the legislative provisions in order to illustrate moral rights as a product of the history, and it highlights some of the shortcomings of the regime and provides some background for the case study in Section Two. Section Two of the thesis interrogates the structure of the moral rights regime by applying the Act's provisions to the case study of indigenous creators, thus providing a contemporary example of how these rights may work in practice, as the result of the historical discourse. Thus this section sets the scene for final part of the thesis, which delves further into the historical discourse. Section Part Three follows the themes of the moral rights debate as they emerged historically. Reconceptualizing the moral tights discourse in this way helps to explain why the debates about moral rights took a particular course and produced the outcomes it did. The starting point for these discussions is a detailed examination of the themes of foreignness, international obligation and economic impact, and follows these themes as they evolved chronologically. In particular, the discussion reveals that the debates about moral rights effectively fall into two eras. The first era (1928-1988) centred around the question of whether Australia should introduce moral rights and the debates about the appropriateness of the reception. At the commencement of the second era (1988-2000) the question shifted to what form moral rights should take. This then provides a backdrop with which to understand why specific discussions about moral rights were sidelined during the years of debates leading up to the legislation; in particular, the subject and the object; which form the fulcrum of a moral rights action. This is an essential part of the history because it explains why the subject and the object came to be imagined and constructed in such a narrow and limited way and clarifies why the moral rights provisions appear manifestly ineffective, particularly for indigenous creators and their communities. This thesis contributes to legal history in three important ways. First, it provides a detailed account of a discourse about moral rights in Australian law, and in doing so challenges the long held assumptions about their reception and production. Second, it highlights the importance of history to legal discourse. Just as regulatory regimes, institutions, and rules are integral to the law, so too are the informal practices, discourses and contexts on which they were based. Third, it reminds the reader that history is a signpost, and this history of moral rights demonstrates that the way this law was derived, imagined and constructed has significance for the social, cultural and legal context in which that process takes place.Thesis (PhD Doctorate)
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Griffith Law School
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Bowie, R. "The primacy of dignity and human rights education." Thesis, University of Kent, 2011. http://create.canterbury.ac.uk/10488/.
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Human rights education (HRE) is a growing pedagogical force that lacks conceptual theorisation and awareness of an emerging postsecular context. This hampers the extent to which it can accomplish its aims of encouraging friendship between people of different religious and philosophical traditions while advancing a universal culture of rights. The thesis analyses the role of religion within HRE literature, both at an international and theoretical level, and in the curriculum documents for English schools, finding parallel weaknesses resulting from this shallow theoretical base. The thesis contributes to HRE literature with a distinctive analysis of the foundational concept of dignity and the meaning-giving narratives that contributed to the concept’s development. It unravels the complexities surrounding an often mentioned but seldom explained concept, identifying relationships between inherent worth, human flourishing and societal recognition. It demonstrates that taking an inclusive approach to this conceptual framework allows for two crucial ingredients in contemporary society: different meaning-giving narratives may be held, while a common ethical understanding of rights based on dignity is adhered to. It argues that the concept of dignity is a foundation for a particular pedagogical approach that advances a commitment to the inherent worth of the human person. The approach consists of two reflexive elements: a self-reflective enquiry into the faiths and philosophies of the individual learners and a dialogue with and for others. These elements are essential if the colonial mistakes of earlier human rights movements are to be avoided, and they identify the significance of religious education in HRE. A proposal for a recontextualised form of HRE that is theologically and religiously literate presents a distinctive offering to guide policy and practice. The proposal acknowledges the overlap between educational movement and theological thought and makes specific reference to contributions from contemporary Catholic thinking. The thesis aims to motivate further research to carry forward the HRE proposal and develop new thinking about postsecular education.
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Doreleyers, April Elizabeth. "Perceptions of First-Generation Canadians on Rights and Deservingness of Healthcare for Canadian Newcomers." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/39271.
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The present thesis provides insight into the social context in which the perceptions that first-generation Canadians have towards access to healthcare for newcomers may emerge. The study was completed in Ottawa-Gatineau in March and April of 2016 and covered the perspectives of nine people, across eight semi-structured interviews. Following the review of the literature and theoretical framework, the present work highlights the role that first-generation Canadians’ moral worlds play into how they perceive access to healthcare for Canadian newcomers. On the subject of perceptions of first-generation Canadians, this research goes beyond the practical concerns faced by newcomers and delves into people’s moralities as these relate to the interpretation of rights and deservingness of access to subsidized healthcare. In grasping the different ways that health and healthcare are understood, as well as individual perceptions of the granting healthcare to newcomers to Canada, my thesis makes visible moral elements that can help to understand how rights to healthcare can be configured and reconfigured across various contexts.
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Etinson, Adam. "Human rights and the problem of ethnocentrism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:c1a851e2-cca5-4ccc-9c62-97d0ead23392.
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Despite its prominence as a pejorative term in moral and political philosophy, the phenomenon of ethnocentrism has escaped the focused attention of moral and political philosophers. Little sustained effort has been devoted to its in-depth analysis. This thesis attempts to fill in that gap in the philosophical literature, with a particular focus on the analysis of ethnocentrism as a problem, or rather a set of problems, facing the theory and practice of human rights. The thesis begins by drawing a core distinction between ethnocentrism as a moral phenomenon (i.e., a form of moral partiality), on the one hand, and as an epistemological phenomenon (i.e., a mode of judgment), on the other. After singling out the epistemological aspect of ethnocentrism as its main focus, the thesis argues for four interlocking claims. The first claim is that ethnocentrism represents an unwarranted mode of judgment, and thus an epistemic hazard that ought to be avoided if at all possible (Chapter One, §3). This claim is defended at length against the version of political constructivism advanced by John Rawls, which, by grounding political argument exclusively in ideas and values embedded in a common public culture, implicitly justifies a form of ethnocentrism (Chapter Two). The second claim is that moral argument cannot avoid ethnocentrism by grounding itself, as some have thought, in judgments upon which there is broad moral consensus, or rather by avoiding any appeal to judgments that are the subject of marked dissensus (Chapter Three and Chapter Four). Thirdly, the thesis argues that ethnocentrism is, if avoidable, only so to a limited extent (Chapter Six, §2). And fourthly, it offers an outline of how this limited form of avoidance might work (Chapter Five and Chapter Six, §3).
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Biasetti, Pierfrancesco. "Lo spazio dei diritti nelle teorie morali. Ricerche normative." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Padova, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3422507.
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In this work I will evaluate the functions of rights within the moral discourse, and I will point out the benefits and the characteristics of a moral theory that takes rights seriously. In the first chapter I will sketch a definition of rights as a moral category that can be distinguished from categories such as the ones of juridical rights and natural rights. In the second chapter, I will propose a hohfeldian analysis of the normative syntax of rights, and I will focus on the key problem of the relation between rights and duties. The issue I will deal with in the third chapter is the general function of specific rights. On this matter I will draw an hybrid solution between the orthodox proposals of the so-called interest and choice theories, and the more recent approaches provided by the past ten years literature. In the fourth and fifth chapters topics such as the conflict of rights, their violations and infringements will allow me to go deeper in the context and premises of the model of moral theory that I will take into account in the last section of this work. In the sixth chapter I will give an answer to the central questions of this research, and I will also provide a general model of abstract rights, by shading light on their original normative functions. I will use this model to investigate the possibility of justifying a moral theory on its ground, and I will compare this kind of theory with other theories structured upon different categories of normative objects – like duties and goals.In questo lavoro cercherò di valutare quali siano le funzioni dei diritti nel contesto del discorso morale, e di individuare le caratteristiche e i vantaggi posseduti da una teoria morale che prenda i diritti sul serio. Nella primo capitolo isolerò una definizione di diritti come categoria morale – moral rights – originale rispetto ad altre declinazioni di questo concetto – in particolare, rispetto ai diritti giuridici e ai diritti naturali. Nel secondo capitolo proporrò un'analisi di matrice hohfeldiana della sintassi normativa dei diritti soffermandomi sul nodo concettuale della relazione tra diritti e doveri. La questione che affronterò nel terzo capitolo sarà quella della funzione generale dei diritti, ed elaborerò una soluzione ibrida tra le proposte ortodosse basate sulle cosiddette teorie dell'interesse e della scelta, e i più recenti approcci forniti dalla letteratura degli ultimi dieci anni. I temi del conflitto tra diritti, della loro violazione e dell'infrazione mi permetteranno di approfondire nel quarto e nel quinto capitolo il contesto e le premesse del modello di teoria morale cui farò riferimento nell'ultima sezione di questo lavoro, quella in cui cercherò di rispondere alle domande centrali della ricerca. Nel sesto capitolo fornirò infatti un modello generale di diritti, mettendone in luce le funzioni normative originali. Adopererò questo modello per vagliare le possibilità di giustificare, a partire da esso, una teoria morale, e confronterò questo tipo di teoria con alternative strutturate a partire da diverse categorie di oggetti normativi – come i doveri e gli scopi.
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Møller, Kai. "A constitutional doctrine of freedom : on the moral structure of constitutional rights." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.550861.
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The thesis proposes a substantive moral, reconstructive theory of the practice of constitutional rights law as it has emerged in the last 60 years in various jurisdictions all over the world. In a nutshell, this practice is characterised by an extremely broad approach to the interests protected as prima facie rights combined with a far-reaching limitability of those rights under a balancing or proportionality approach. It thus stands in striking contrast to the conceptions of rights endorsed by philosophers who almost unanimously regard rights as protecting a limited range of very important interests and enjoying some special normative force. Having set out the project in Chapter One, the following three chapters develop a theory of the prima facie stage of rights. Chapter Two identifies the value of personal autonomy - positive freedom - as explaining better than its main rival, negative freedom, the core features of the practice. Chapter Three builds on this result and defends a particular conception of autonomy - the protected interests conception - as cohering best with the practice. This conception regards autonomy as including certain interests which can be ranked according to their importance for the self-conception of the agent. Chapter Four develops a theory of the prima facie stage of constitutional rights by arguing that constitutional rights protect comprehensively the autonomy interests of the right-holder. Chapters Five to Seven deal with the justification stage of rights. Chapter Five develops a theory of the justifiability and, related, the standard of judicial review, arguing that constitutional rights are violated when a policy fails to set up a reasonable - as opposed to the one correct - specification of the spheres of autonomy of equal citizens. Chapters Six and Seven draw on this result to provide theories of the main doctrinal tools at the justification stage, namely balancing and proportionality. Chapter Six proposes a theory of the resolution of conflicts of autonomy interests and thus clarifies the concept of balancing. Chapter Seven integrates the results of the previous chapters into a theory of proportionality, arguing that this principle provides lawyers with an attractive tool for the structured resolution of conflicts of autonomy interests and thus also constitutional rights cases.
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Almawla, Hanan Mohamed. "Moral rights in the conflict-of-laws : alternatives to the copyright qualifications." Thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2012. http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/8730.
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This thesis examines the intersection between authors' moral rights and conflict-of-laws. The research question has been triggered by two important, interlinked factors. The first is that the currently applicable choice-of-law rules to moral rights are the same as those applicable to copyright. The second concerns the fact that moral rights are different from copyright - both in their nature and in the interest they aim to protect. Since these two factors coincide, it is questionable whether it ought to be the case that moral rights are subjected to the same choice-of-law rules as are applicable to copyright. The thesis therefore aims to discover whether the currently applicable choice-oflaw rules available in the context of moral rights are suitable for achieving the goals and objectives of conflict-of-laws. In the course of this thesis, I evaluate the potential validity of detaching moral rights from copyright in conflict-oflaws and instead attaching it to the characterization model of general personality rights. The research question is mainly addressed from the perspective of Rome I and Rome II Regulations. However, as there is no EU harmonization concerning general personality rights in conflict-of-laws, the examination will be directed towards France and England as examples of civil and common law traditions. Moreover, reference will also be made to CLIP and ALI principles by reason of comparison.
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Munro, Lyle. "Confronting cruelty : moral orthodoxy and the challenge of the animal rights movement /." Leiden : Brill, 2005. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb412622038.
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Lennhammer, Emma. "Rights out of Reach? : Justifications of Intellectual Property Rights in Relation to the Fulfilment of Socioeconomic Human Rights." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Teologiska institutionen, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-411879.
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In this thesis, three perspectives on the justification of intellectual property rights are investigated in the light of conflicting socioeconomic human rights. This is done by using a comparative method, where the perspectives chosen are reviewed through the lense of rights as legitimate claims, as well as accessibility of rights. The purpose is to review as to how the ownership of ideas and inventions can be justified in relation to the socioeconomic challenges faced in many parts of the world. The principal research question is: How can intellectual property rights be justified and how can it be evaluated against the backdrop of socioeconomic rights and moral obligations? To answer this question, I posed three sub-questions: First, how are intellectual property rights justified in the existing research chosen as an entry point for this thesis? Drawn from this, how can the justification of intellectual property rights be understood as a moral concern in a socioeconomically unequal world? Taking a cue from this, what questions need to be answered to better understand the transnational moral obligations linked to intellectual property rights? By reviewing the perspectives presented on the justification of intellectual property rights, I make three concluding statements — intellectual property rights cannot be justified in cases where they affect other individuals’ socioeconomic rights negatively; excessive benefits gained for creators is not morally reasonable; and the unequal distribution of power and opportunities in relation to transnational moral responsibilities need to be recognised.
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Baghdassarian, Anoush. "Negotiating Human Rights Abuses through the Moral Foundations Theory: An Attempt to Understand the Moral Motivations behind the Male Guardianship System in Saudi Arabia, Female Genital Modification, and Child Marriage." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2017. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1473.
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The idea that there are universal human rights that can, and should, be enforced has been an increasingly wide-spread and popular belief, as well as a controversial one. Concerns of cultural relativism contrasted with stances of universalism spark an impassioned debate that permeates the dialogue of human rights today in all spheres: social, academic, and even those professional spheres that are tasked with creating and enforcing the laws regarding these issues. What does psychology have to say about this? After all, if it is a universal phenomenon, it must span across time, culture, and difference, and there must be trends in our human nature or similarities in our psychology that allow us to claim universality. One psychological theory, the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) can help shed light on this issue. MFT holds that universally, as human beings, we share five grounds of moral foundations on which we make our judgments and take action: Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Authority/Submissiveness, Sanctity/Degradation, and Loyalty/Betrayal. While we are all born with the capability to act and reason on these, our cultures shape us to emphasize different foundations and it is in that shift that conflict arises. What one group sees as right, and based in moral justification, another sees as wrong and as a violation of human rights. This paper attempts to use MFT to understand the moral foundations underlying three case studies of practices internationally seen as human rights abuses, female genital modification, child marriage, and male guardianship in Saudi Arabia, and provides suggestions for methods of effective intervention based in MFT.
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Frerichs, Sabine. "From Social Rights to Economic Incentives? The Moral (Re)construction of Welfare Capitalism." Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315524337.
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The notion of "welfare capitalism" refers to a political-economic regime that integrates the functions of a capitalist market economy with the functions of a democratic welfare state. The term is commonly used by Esping-Andersen (1990) in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, but it is also linked to Marshall's (1950, p.14) idea of three generations of rights, which all form part of modern citizenship: civil rights, political rights, and social rights. The question that this chapter seeks to address is how social rights, which Esping-Andersen and Marshall understood as the apex of the democratic welfare state, remain bound to the logic of the capitalist market economy. Employing the perspective of the economic sociology of law, it will be argued that the transformation of welfare capitalism over the last few decades has led to a reinterpretation of social rights in the light of economic incentives. To make this point, changes in the financial structure of the welfare state, both on its revenue and expenditure side, will be connected with changes in the moral discourse on citizens' rights and duties, which is increasingly informed by economic arguments.
The chapter first outlines the analytical framework that connects the language of social rights with the concept of welfare capitalism. In the perspective of the economic sociology of law, scholarship in comparative and critical political economy can be fruitfully integrated and related with the moral-economy approach, which is particularly suited to document a loss of entitlements, or accustomed social rights. The following analysis is divided into two parts. The chapter first turns to the revenue side of the welfare state and explores the moral economy of taxation, emphasising changes over time and across different welfare regimes. What we can, by and large, observe, is a move from "contribution tax" to "exchange tax", or a renegotiation between social rights and property rights. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the expenditure side of the welfare state and the moral economy of debt, again focusing on the overall patterns of development. Accordingly, we are not only witnessing a transition "from welfare to workfare" but also "from welfare to debtfare", which replaces unconditional social rights or welfare benefits with activation in the labour market and the credit market. The chapter concludes by interpreting the above developments in the light of the social contract, or social compromise, underlying welfare capitalism.
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Anker, Christien van den. "Justice in one world : a moral argument for global institutional change." Thesis, University of Essex, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.336927.
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Gero, Jesse. "Moral Injury and the Puzzle of Immunity-Violation." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2010. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/73.
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The First Amendment gives U.S. citizens a Hohfeldian legal immunity that disables Congress from removing citizens’ legal liberty to criticize the government. Any attempt by Congress to remove this liberty would fail, but such an attempt would still wrong citizens. The familiar concept of claim-violation does not fully account for this wrong. Claims name actions that ought not be performed and are violated when those actions are performed. Immunities names actions that cannot be performed. Congress would wrong citizens not by doing something it ought not do but by attempting and failing to do something it cannot do. Using elements of Jean Hampton’s expressive theory of punishment, I analyze Congress’ attempt (and other similar acts) as an expressive act that denies the existence of immunities. Congress’ immunity-“contradiction” would wrong U.S. citizens by denying the value that generates the immunity, by causing damage to the acknowledgement of the citizens’ value, and by threatening the existence of the immunity.
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Brown, Stephen Paul. "The moral justification of retributive punishment by reference to the notion of balance." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.286880.
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Urbano, Ryan. "Global Poverty as a Moral Problem: Thomas Pogge on Global Justice and Human Rights." Thesis, Linköping University, Centre for Applied Ethics, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-11962.
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Global poverty is a pressing moral issue that necessitates serious moral reflection. It is inextricably connected with the issue of global justice. In today’s world where there are obvious extreme economic inequalities that impoverishes millions of people in many poor countries, the need for a sound principle of global justice is morally necessary. This thesis proposes Thomas Pogge’s idea of cosmopolitan justice as a feasible and relevant theory which can help and guide in alleviating severe worldwide poverty. Pogge emphasizes the stringent negative duty not to impose, sustain and profit from a global order that deprives the poor of their basic necessities necessary for them to lead a worthwhile human life. Many people are not aware that in participating in an unjust global order, they seriously harm the global poor more than their failure to provide assistance for the poor’s basic needs. So the greater responsibility of restructuring global order in order to meet the demands of global justice lies mainly in the hands of developed nations and their citizens who have profited from the present global arrangement and who have more than adequate means to help those who are deeply affected by extreme global economic inequalities. The stronger obligation not to harm the global poor must be performed by those who make decisions and policies at the global institutional level. They are the ones who decide the fate of the global poor and they are the ones who can easily change the rules underlying the present global order. The first step to poverty eradication and the overseeing that continuous efforts are exerted to realize this aim of helping the global poor are theirs to perform immediately. This task is not optional. It is urgent and a moral necessity.
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Sundara, Rajan Mira T. "Moral rights and creative freedom : a study of post-Communist law reform in Russia." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2003. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:122cdd46-230a-42a3-b163-59e60c128dbb.
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This thesis explores the relationship between law reform and social transformation in post-socialist countries. It deals with the doctrine of the moral right of the author, an aspect of copyright law that seeks to protect the personal interests of an author or artist in his creative work. The thesis argues that moral rights can make an important contribution to democratisation in the post-socialist world. The doctrine of moral rights helps to provide adequate and appropriate protection for creative freedom, an unequalled source of diversity and integrity in the realm of ideas - the very essence of democratic values. In spite of their importance for post-socialist countries, moral rights have not been a focus of copyright reform. Rather, new copyright laws reflect the pressure to conform to international standards, especially those set by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO considers copyright to be an area of commercial regulation with crucial implications for the international trade regime; its personal and cultural aspects, especially moral rights, are viewed with suspicion. As a result, moral rights have not been emphasised in post-socialist law reform, and, more generally, there has been little investigation of their implications for the special needs of transitional and economically less-developed countries. To illustrate this situation, the thesis undertakes a detailed study of moral rights in Russia. It shows that Soviet Russia had developed legal protection for moral rights in its copyright law. However, the extreme censorship practices of an autocratic state meant that moral rights had little practical value for authors and artists. Instead, their potential contribution to creative freedom remained virtually unrealised. In post-Communist times, law reform has focussed on bringing Russian copyright law into line with WTO requirements. However, given the importance of creative freedom for social change in post-Communist Russia and the special suitability of moral rights doctrine to protecting creativity, Russia should now reconsider its treatment of moral rights. This thesis argues that moral rights should be an integral part of copyright law and policy in all post-socialist countries. It goes on to suggest that the development of moral rights after socialism will be facilitated by new conceptual approaches to the doctrine. In particular, a consideration of the manipulative treatment of authors and artists, and the passive role of copyright law in socialist society shows moral rights to be closely aligned with freedom of creativity. The thesis proposes a "new" model of moral rights for post-socialist societies, based on the close relationship between the moral rights of authors and the human right to free creative expression. This model is not only relevant to the post-socialist world; it also provides a new way of looking at moral rights in the international community, which faces an authentic, though largely unacknowledged, need to affirm the humanistic values inherent in culture and creativity.
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Murphy, Anthony John. "Values, rights and foxes : a sociological study of the moral discourse of fox hunting." Thesis, Brunel University, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.429237.
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Gough, Allison J. "Raising the moral conscience : the Atlantic Movement for African-American civil rights 1833-1919 /." The Ohio State University, 2000. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1488199501405819.
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Mendoza, Jose, and Jose Mendoza. "On Immigration Enforcement and Expulsion Strategies: A Moral and Political Defense of Immigrant Rights." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/12538.
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Recently, Christopher Heath Wellman has proposed an innovative argument that appears to resolve, at least with respect to immigration, the tension between democratic autonomy (i.e. a people's right to self-determination) and human rights (i.e. respect for individual freedom and universal equality). Wellman argues, from a traditionally liberal point of view, that a legitimate state (i.e. a state that respects human rights) is entitled to self-determination and that part of the definition of being self-determined is having the presumptive right to unilaterally control immigration. In other words, Wellman claims that a state's unilateral right to control immigration can be made compatible with liberal commitments to individual freedom and universal equality.
I aim to raise a novel objection against Wellman's argument, which I hope will also challenge philosophers to think differently about the immigration issue as a whole. My position is that even if Wellman's conclusion is correct, that a state's right to self-determination can be made compatible with human rights, the presumptive right that this generates for a legitimate state to unilaterally control immigration is, at best, limited only to admission and exclusion policies (i.e. to questions about who can be let in and who can be kept out). Wellman's conclusion, however, does not hold for strategies of immigration enforcement and expulsion (i.e. to the questions about how these policies may be enforced or what sort of deportation procedures a state is justified in using).
And, in fact, I argue that under Wellman's account, a legitimate state would be restricted in deploying certain strategies of immigration enforcement and expulsion.
My conclusion is that with respect to immigration enforcement and expulsion strategies, the presumptive right is on the side of the immigrant and not the state. This means that if a legitimate state wishes to control immigration, it is the state who holds the burden of proof to show that not only its immigration policies but also its enforcement and expulsion strategies do not violate prior commitments to individual liberty and universal equality. This, I contend, provides a moral and political baseline justification for immigrant rights, which I refer to as a minimalist defense of immigrant rights.
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Loff, Beatrice. "Health and human rights : case studies in the potential contribution of a human rights framework to the analysis of health questions." Monash University, Dept. of Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine, 2004. http://arrow.monash.edu.au/hdl/1959.1/5291.
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Letourneau, Lyne. "Animal protection law in Great Britain : in search of the existing moral orthodoxy." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2000. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk/R?func=search-advanced-go&find_code1=WSN&request1=AAIU602287.
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Omnipresent in Western society, the idea of progress is commonly advanced in relation to the development of animal protection law in Great Britain. Essentially, it is argued that the law now recognises that animals are worthy of moral consideration in their own right, that is, that they count or matter morally. From the concept of "animal as object" to that of "animal as person", indeed, the history of Western philosophical thinking bears witness to a progressive acknowledgement of animals (or, at least, of some animals) as full members of the moral community, along with all human beings. However, as political theorist Robert Garner argues in his book Animals, Politics and Morality, public policy is never simply a product of moral principles. Rather, influenced by pressure groups, it is the result of a process based on negotiation and compromise. That being the case, in the present thesis, I ask whether Great Britain has truly been the scene of moral progress through the development of animal protection law and to what extent one may speak of moral progress at all in relation to this area of law. Is animal protection law in Great Britain moving away from the traditional moral position that animals are exclusively means to human ends, thereby granting moral standing and equal moral status to animals The answer to this question lies with identifying the philosophical conception of the relations between humans and animals which is expressed through the body of animal protection law in this country. For animals' moral status within the law ensues directly from it. In the first chapter, following the great influence the position plays in the contemporary debate over our moral treatment of animals, I use Tom Regan's theory of animal rights to assess whether animal protection law in Great Britain reflects a conception of human-animal relations that is consistent with a recognition that animals possess moral rights. In the second chapter, I defend the view that animal protection law in Great Britain does not reflect utilitarianism - a position that has been popularised in animal ethics by moral philosopher Peter Singer. In the third chapter, building on the distinctive features of animal protection law in Great Britain which have emerged from the analysis in Chapters I and II, I contend that the law reflects "group egoism" - a form of consequentialism which falls between ethical egoism and utilitarianism. To be sure, what comes forth as the dominant position underlying animal protection law in Great Britain is that human beings protect animals only to the extent to which benefit is provided to them in return, or, at the very least, to the extent that so doing does not impinge on their interests in animal use. Does this position represent any kind of moral progress In the context of changing human attitudes towards animals and the development of animal protection law, I argue that it does. However, this moral progress carries no recognition that animals are worthy of moral consideration in their own right, that is, that they count or matter morally. Far from doing away with the traditional position that animals are exclusively means to human ends, animal protection law in Great Britain fits in with this way of thinking and grants to animals an instrumental value only.
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Hassan, Eduardo Amin Menezes. "A institucionalização da ética na administração pública: consequência da complementaridade entre moral e direito." Faculdade de Direito, 2013. http://repositorio.ufba.br/ri/handle/ri/15292.
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O presente trabalho tem por objeto o estudo da relação complementar entre a moral e o direito, discutindo-se a possibilidade de a moral ser ou não alicerce para os direitos fundamentais, bem como a institucionalização da ética na administração pública. São abordadas definições de ética,desde Aristóteles com sua ética das virtudes, passando por Kant e sua teoria da moral, Habermas e a ética discursiva, além de Bauman com a ética pós-moderna. Entrementes, será traçado um histórico desde o direito prudencial até a contemporaneidade, relacionando direito e moral em diversos momentos da evolução social, passando pelo processo de positivação do direito, pelo distanciamento entre direito e moral em Luhmann, que desenvolveu a teoria do sistema autopoiético, culminando com o problema da legitimidade do direito. Ademais, discorrer-se-á sobre a teoria do agir comunicativo, o procedimentalismo e a teoria do discurso de Habermas e seus fundamentos para o direito, destrinchando os princípios que fundamentam essa teoria, isto é, o princípio do discurso, o princípio da moral e o princípio democrático. Ver-se-ão definições de direito, ética e moral, além de explicações sobre suas semelhanças e diferenças. Será demonstrado como funciona a teoria da ética discursiva e sua relação com o direito. Não se deixará de abordar a importância de elementos morais no conceito de direito, bem como da distinção entre normas morais e normas jurídicas. O trabalho questiona a possibilidade de a moral, que se complementa com o direito, ser fundamento para os direitos fundamentais. Até chegar-se a esta resposta foi necessário abordar conceitos de direitos fundamentais e suas características. O direito e a moral se complementam, embora fundados em princípios diferentes. Destarte, será respondido se os direitos fundamentais são alicerçados pela moral, tratando-se da influência dos direitos fundamentais na Administração Pública. Culmina-se este trabalho na institucionalização da ética na Administração Pública, questionando-se sobre a utilidade do código de ética, bem como sobre a aplicação ou não de preceitos constitucionais, como o devido processo legal, nos processos éticos desenvolvidos dentro do conselho de ética, além de resgatar algumas diferenças entre direito e moral para explicar como se dá essa institucionalização jurídica da ética na Administração Pública. Serão tratados, ainda, o princípio da moralidade administrativa e a criação de códigos de éticas no campo da gestão pública brasileira, exemplificado com o código de ética da alta conduta da administração pública do Município de Salvador.
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Bådagård, William. "A Critique of Anna Stilz' Fair-use Proviso : The normative significance of future generations in matters of territorial rights." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-416345.
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In this essay, I will examine the theory of territorial rights developed by Anna Stilz. The overarching project of hers is to defend a system of territorially sovereign states, the defense of which is grounded in the natural rights of individuals to personal autonomy and self-preservation. She begins her theoretic project by arguing for the plausibility of the preinstitutional occupancy right, intended to grant individuals usage-rights over the earth, existing irrespective of social or moral conventions, formally defined as follows: “Occupancy Rights. A person has a preinstitutional right to occupy a particular area if (1) access to spaces in that area is fundamental to his located life plans and (2) his connection to the territory was established without any wrongdoing on his part, involving (at a minimum) no expulsion or wrongful interference with prior occupants or infringement of others’ claims to an equitable distribution of geographical space.” The condition of equitable distribution expresses a concern for proportionality. It seems as if Stilz believes that no territorial holding will be legitimate unless it is of an appropriate scale, with regard to the holdings of others. This condition is referred to by Stilz as the fair-use proviso. The fair-use proviso concerns the occupancy claims made by individuals. Stilz also introduces conditions for a legitimate global distribution of territory, named as the full proviso. Stilz’ defines the full proviso as follows: (conditions for a legitimate global distribution of territory): “The full proviso hold that a just distribution of the earth’s spaces must (i) satisfy everyone’s basic territorial interests and (ii) grant groups with shared practice-based interests the right to use geographical space in ways that reflect these interests, so long as the groups are of sufficient size, and so far as this is institutionally feasible.” For an individual occupancy claim to be legitimate is simply that it is consistent with the conditions for a legitimate global distribution of territory, i.e. the full proviso. The full proviso and the fair-use proviso are thus inseparable parts of a whole. In what follows, if not specified otherwise, I will alternate in referring to the fair-use proviso as the fair-use proviso or simply the proviso. The full proviso will always be italicized when discussed. The purpose of this essay is to investigate whether the fair-use proviso is satisfying in the face of some criticism. In completing this task, I will draw on an objection put forth by Lea Ypi. The objection as formulated by her is not in direct response to Stilz, however I believe we might draw on her work to formulate a powerful objection from scarcity to Stilz’ fair-use proviso. The question at stake in this essay is thus if the objection of scarcity is successful against Stilz’ fair-use proviso.
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Costa, Débora Souto. "O abandono afetivo e o dano moral à luz do princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana." Universidade Catolica de Salvador, 2012. http://ri.ucsal.br:8080/jspui/handle/123456730/98.
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O estudo do abandono afetivo é relevante, posto que se apresenta perante uma grande parcela da população, ensejando, na maior parte das vezes, efeitos desastrosos e impactantes perante a sociedade. É tema relevante, eis que interessa a vários ramos das ciências humanas aplicadas, tais como os direitos humanos, os direitos fundamentais constitucionalmente garantidos, o direito civil, a psicologia e a sociologia. A Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos consagrou a proteção à saúde, à família e ao afeto, enquanto direito à convivência familiar, como direito humano. A Constituição Federal Brasileira assimilou esta vertente e incluiu estes direitos no capítulo dos direitos e garantias fundamentais. O presente trabalho pretende discutir a relação do direito fundamental à saúde com os Direitos humanos e seu reflexo na família. A estratégia metodológica escolhida é de natureza qualitativa, com a revisão de literatura científica e doutrinária. A análise da produção de artigos, monografias e dissertações, a revisão de decisões judiciais em várias instâncias dos tribunais pátrios, além de estudo de casos trazidos pela psicologia para o campo do direito. Os resultados indicam que é premente a implementação de políticas públicas capazes de conscientizar a população das nefastas consequências pessoais e sociais do abandono afetivo. Apesar do interesse social em derredor do tema e da crescente corrente de discussão doutrinária e jurisprudencial, os Tribunais Superiores ainda não se detiveram diante da problemática com a atenção que a mesma requer, estimulando, desta feita, o pesquisador a debruçar-se com mais afinco sobre tal matéria.
The study of the affective abandonment he is excellent, rank that if presents before a great parcel of the population, trying, to a great extent, disastrous and impactantes effect before the society. It is excellent subject, here it is that it interests some branches of sciences applied human beings, such as the human rights, the basic rights constitutionally guaranteed, the civil law, psychology and sociology. The Universal Declaration of the Human Rights consecrated the protection to the health, the family and the affection, while right to the familiar convivência, as right human being. The Brazilian Federal Constitution assimilated this source and included these basic rights in the chapter of the rights and guarantees. The present work intends to argue the relation of the basic right to the health with the human Rights and its consequence in the family. The chosen metodológica strategy was of qualitative nature, with the revision of scientific and doctrinal literature. The analysis of the article production, monographs and dissertações, the revision of sentences in some instances of the native courts, beyond study of cases brought for psychology for the field of the right. The results indicate that the implementation of public politics capable is pressing to acquire knowledge the population of the ominous personal and social consequences of the affective abandonment. Although the social interest in around of the subject and the increasing chain of doctrinal and jurisprudencial quarrel, the Superior Courts had been lingered not yet ahead of the problematic one with the attention that the same one requires, stimulating, of this making, the researcher to lean over itself with more tenacity on such substance
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Bouma, Rolf. "Of ravens and lilies the moral considerability of non-human creation /." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1996. http://www.tren.com.
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Andersson, Anna-Karin. "Libertarianism and Potential Agents : A Libertarian View of the Moral Rights of Foetuses and Children." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-6997.
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This essay advances a libertarian theory of moral rights, which responds effectively to some serious objections that have been raised against libertarianism. I show how libertarianism can explain children’s rights to certain physical integrity and aid. I defend strong moral rights of human, pre-natal organisms, infants and children against all agents to certain non-interference with their physical integrity. I also argue that parents’ moral obligation to aid their offspring follows from a moral principle that prohibits agents to actively harm rights-bearers. Since this is the core principle of all versions of libertarianism, we gain simplicity and coherence. In chapter two, I explain my theory’s similarities and differences to a libertarian theory of moral rights advanced by Robert Nozick in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia. I explain the structure and coherence of negative moral rights as advanced by Nozick. Then, I discuss what these negative rights are rights to, and the criteria for being a rights-bearer. In chapter three, I formulate a clear distinction between active and passive behaviour, and discuss the moral importance of foreseeing consequences of one’s active interventions. In chapter four, I claim that some pre-natal human organisms, human infants, and children, are rights-bearers. I formulate a morally relevant characterization of potentiality, and argue that possession of such potentiality is sufficient to have negative rights against all agents. In chapter five, I discuss whether potential moral subjects, in addition, have positive moral rights against all agents to means sufficient to develop into actual moral subjects. I argue that this suggestion brings some difficulties when applied to rights-conflicts. In chapter six, I argue that potential moral subjects’ rights to means necessary to develop into actual moral subjects can be defended in terms of merely negative rights. By adopting the view advanced in this chapter, we get a simple, coherent theory. It avoids the difficulties in the view advanced in chapter five, while keeping its intuitively plausible features. In chapter seven, I discuss whether the entitlement theory is contradictory and morally repugnant. I argue that my version of the entitlement theory is not.
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Peddicord, Richard A. "A studied ambiguity: Catholic moral teaching on the question of gay and lesbian rights legislation." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/10125.
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Rodd, R. A. "Biology, ethics and animals." Thesis, Open University, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.377940.
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Roche, Patricia. "Simone Weil on rights language and force." Thesis, McGill University, 1992. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=61342.
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This thesis is an exercise in the retrieval of a critique of the moral language of rights. Grounded in her account of moral agency and her analysis of force, Simone Weil's critique of rights language goes beyond, although it contains, the Marxist view of rights language as ideological, as masking power relations. Weil argued not only that humans are unable to extract themselves from social and economic relations in order to appear equal on the political level, but also they are unable to extract themselves from the consequences of force. The thesis clarifies the Weilian appeal to examine in detail the consequences of force as a precondition to justice. Failure to conduct such an examination Weil views as a flight from reality, a consolation. Weil argued that facing the consequences of force is a virtue and requires the exercise of attention, a pivotal concept of her paradigm of renunciation. Weil's ethical category of affliction represents the psycho-social dimensions of extreme forms of victimization. Weil distinguished three objects of violation that compose reification: the body, self-interpretation and relatedness. The capacity to articulate, Weil argues, is impaired by practices which result in affliction. The recognition of muteness engenders understanding of the depth of violation. The impact of the muteness of the afflicted on the public sphere, discourse, and conceptions of justice is disclosed by the ethical category of affliction. The category of affliction discloses, not the absent voice but, the absence of a voice.
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Liao, S. Matthew. "The right of children to be loved." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.365508.
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Ho, Kin Ting. "On rights and demands : how theorists of rights can benefit from taking demands seriously." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/5892.
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This thesis explores the normative significance of making a rights-backed, authorized demand as a right holder. Rights, I argue, enable their holders to make a special kind of demand which comes with a special force. It is, in other words, one of rights' functions that they are demands-enabling. I single out what sort of demands I am interested in exploring. I also look at how these special demands are normatively significant. I call them rights-backed, authorized demands. They are normatively significant, first, because of the interesting role they play in other agents' practical-reasoning, and , second, because the very making of these demands, as a matter of rights, is empowering in an abstract way. I go on to contrast my view with other ‘demand theories' in existence and conclude that my view is substantively different. In particular, existing demand theories of rights all fail to sufficiently highlight the importance of actual demands, and instead focus on the ‘status' of ‘being in a position' to make demands. I argue that this focus is a fundamental mistake. I also consider how my view can contribute to some related literature on rights. First, I argue that my view highlights a new function which rights have: it has interesting implications on the shape of the long-standing debate between the will and interest theory of rights. Second, I argue that my view provides us with a new way to counter one of the most discussed criticisms of the existence of welfare human rights, which is the argument that rights must correlate with some specific duties as a necessary existence condition, and that human welfare rights fail on this mark. I conclude that if human rights indeed have a demand-related function as I argue, it weakens the intuitive appeal of this criticism.
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Gilbert, James Burkhart. "Animals and morality." Thesis, McGill University, 1992. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=56924.
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This thesis examines questions concerning the place of animals within our moral thought. In particular it is an investigation of the rationale behind extending our ethical systems to encompass the inclusion of animals. The thesis begins with a presentation of a general framework defining rights and their relationship to obligations. It then includes an assessment of whether or not animals, according to the general framework, can properly be called rights bearers. In order to do this, the questions of whether or not animals have value independent of their value to human beings and whether or not animals have interests are examined.Though the thesis concerns itself with animals it is not merely an examination of animal rights. In order to investigate fully the place of animals within our moral thought, many concepts which are central to ethics such as "rights", "equality", "value", and "affinity" are examined. The thesis concludes with the implications its findings have on human actions.
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Clark, Tyrome. "Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Perspectives." UNF Digital Commons, 2016. https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/etd/633.
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This thesis addresses primary concepts in the humanitarian intervention debates. I argue that humanitarian intervention is a perfect duty. The global community has a moral obligation to act decisively in the face of extreme human rights abuses. There are two contrasting theoretical perspectives regarding international relations and humanitarian intervention: statism and cosmopolitanism. These contrasting perspectives contest the relative value of state sovereignty and human rights. Some of the most prominent ethicists in the debate have determined states have a “right” to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of other states to halt severe human rights abuses but there is no “duty”to intervene. These conclusions are largely based upon consequentialist considerations. This thesis argues a deontological perspective is essential. References to events Rwanda, Darfur, and Kosovo are made. There is a critical role for preemptive actions to play in addressing humanitarian crises and calls for global justice.
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Rullo, Erin A. "On the moral relevance of nonhuman animals." Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2008. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/1137.
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This item is only available in print in the UCF Libraries. If this is your Honors Thesis, you can help us make it available online for use by researchers around the world by following the instructions on the distribution consent form at http://library.ucf.edu/Systems/DigitalInitiatives/DigitalCollections/InternetDistributionConsentAgreementForm.pdf You may also contact the project coordinator, Kerri Bottorff, at kerri.bottorff@ucf.edu for more information.Bachelors
Arts and Humanities
Philosophy
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Giullari, Susanna. "Comparing kin support for lone mothers in Italy and England : moral autonomies, kin relations and social rights." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.269233.
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Marazzo, Lucy Moraes de. "Estudo do assédio moral nas organizações e seus impactos." Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2016. https://app.uff.br/riuff/handle/1/3527.
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O assédio moral no ambiente de trabalho é uma conduta que fere frontalmente a dignidade da pessoa humana, pois antes de ser trabalhador, há um cidadão. Diante das inúmeras denúncias registradas na Justiça do Trabalho sobre o assédio moral no ambiente de trabalho, faz-se relevante o estudo desse tema, devido aos impactos negativos que afeta a saúde do trabalhador, a organização e a sociedade. O objetivo geral desta pesquisa é propor ações preventivas para coibir o assédio moral no ambiente organizacional, além dos seguintes objetivos específicos: levantar na literatura, condutas que caracterizam o assédio moral; correlacionar as situações e aspectos identificados, com os preceitos dos Direitos Humanos e Trabalhistas; e verificar, através de instrumentos de coletas de dados, às percepções de especialistas sobre a prática do assédio moral nas organizações. A metodologia utilizada nesse estudo foi a pesquisa exploratória e qualitativa, sendo realizada com 30 (trinta) especialistas que responderam um questionário com 10 atitudes, que foram replicadas, usando 2 (duas) escalas Likert valorativas (frequência e grau de impacto) e uma questão aberta. Observou-se que as atitudes de assédio moral, que foram elencadas no questionário, acontecem com certa Frequência no ambiente de trabalho, confirmando a visão de autores sobre alguns comportamentos que tipificam o assédio moral no ambiente do trabalho. Quanto ao impacto das atitudes de assédio moral, evidenciou-se que quase todas as atitudes demonstraram impacto significado no ambiente organizacional. Além disso, indicaram-se algumas propostas para combater as manifestações do assédio moral no ambiente de trabalho com base na percepção dos especialistas. Recomenda-se, com base nos resultados obtidos, a realização de estudos futuros que enfoquem a questão do assédio moral em determinadas áreas de atuação no serviço público
Moral harassment in the workplace is a conduct that injures head on the dignity of the human person, because before being a worker, he is a citizen. On the numerous complaints registered in labor courts on moral harassment in the workplace is to be relevant to the study of this subject due to the negative impacts that affect workers' health, the organization and society. The overall objective of this research is to propose preventive actions to curb bullying in the organizational environment, plus the following specific objectives: raising the literature behaviors that characterize moral harassment; correlate the situations and issues identified with the precepts of Human and Labor Rights; check through instruments of data collection to the perceptions of experts on the practice of moral harassment in organizations. The methodology used in this study was exploratory and qualitative research, being conducted with thirty (30) experts who replied a questionnaire with 10 actions, which were replicated using two (2) scales evaluative Likert (frequency and degree of impact) and an open question. It was observed that the attitudes of bullying, which were listed in the questionnaire, occur with some frequency in the workplace, confirming the author's view of some behaviors that typify harassment in the work environment. Referring to the impact of bullying attitudes, it showed that almost all the attitudes demonstrated impact significance in the organizational environment. Moreover, some proposals were indicated to combat the manifestations of bullying in the workplace based on the perception of experts. It is recommended, based on the research results, future studies that address the issue of moral harassment in certain areas of activity in public service.
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Cardinale, Richard Nicholas. "Moral Linkage: The Impact of Transnational Networks on the Early Advocacy Campaigns of the U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 1978-1982." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/21017.
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This thesis traces the influence that transnational networks had on the early advocacy campaigns of the U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, from its founding in February 1979 through the Madrid follow-up Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which began in November 1980. An investigation of the organization’s early advocacy strategies reveals how contact between activists in the United States and the Soviet Union helped shape the U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee’s presentation of Soviet human rights abuses to American audiences. U.S. Helsinki Watch utilized nongovernmental contact across transnational networks to advocate for greater human rights protections using a strategy I refer to as “moral linkage.” This strategy reframed the Soviets’ failure to observe such rights as an obstacle to greater cultural, educational and scientific exchanges between states, calling upon private organizations and individuals involved in such exchanges to insist that future cooperation be contingent upon the recognition of these rights.