Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Moral philosophy'
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Agam-Segal, Reshef. "Cora Diamond's Moral Philosophy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.486964.
Full textJohnston, P. "Wittgenstein and moral philosophy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.375906.
Full textMarkey, Bren April. "Feminist methodologies in moral philosophy." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9107.
Full textUpton, H. R. "Moral theories and applied philosophy." Thesis, Swansea University, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.639288.
Full textTang, Siu-Fu. "Modernity and Xunzi's moral philosophy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.442907.
Full textTurner, Jonathan. "Political theory as moral philosophy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2018. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9b47b083-30aa-411d-a100-29aee7c34a3b.
Full textDoggett, Tyler 1976. "Moral properties and moral imagination." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28836.
Full textIncludes bibliographical references (p. 71-73).
"Moral Realism" is about an argument against moral realism, why it is unsound, and what emerges from that. The argument is that if there were moral properties, they would be queerly related to non-moral properties and this is sufficient reason to think there are no moral properties. The argument is unsound for two reasons. The first emerges from consideration of sensational properties like being in pain or being in ecstasy-they bear the queer relation to non-sensational properties. The second emerges from consideration of vice properties like being an instance of greediness-they are not queerly related to non-moral properties. Analogies between moral and sensational properties are discussed. A disanalogy between the moral and sensational is important to "The Explanatory Gap" which discusses Levine's notion of an explanatory gap, relates it to the queer relation discussed in "Moral Realism," and criticizes one use to which it is put. The criticism emerges from consideration of the disanalogy between the moral and sensational: our moral imagination is considerably more limited than our sensational imagination. That there are limits to our moral imagination is interesting. "Imaginative Resistance" solves an old puzzle from Hume about the limits of our imaginative capacities, for example, the inability of some people (myself, for example) to imagine that baseless killing is morally permissible. Both the puzzle and solution illuminate the natures of imagination and possibility and the relation between them.
by Tyler Doggett.
Ph.D.
Schaefer, G. Owen. "Moral enhancement and moral disagreement." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:cf152e03-a7a0-4877-b519-bd90dd253e89.
Full textPryke, Miriam Jean Vivien Eve. "Being reasonably moral : Prichard and the mistake of moral philosophy." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2015. http://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/being-reasonably-moral(3232777f-b36b-432e-8339-01c932d7cf32).html.
Full textPalatnik, Nataliya. "Kant's Science of the Moral World and Moral Objectivity." Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:23845444.
Full textPhilosophy
Thomas, Geoffrey. "The moral philosophy of T.H. Green." Oxford [Oxfordshire] : New York : Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1987. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0638/87031328-d.html.
Full textO'Connor, Patricia Jo. "The moral philosophy of Iris Murdoch." Thesis, University of Exeter, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.253061.
Full textMillar, Jason L. "Affecting moral judgment." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/27715.
Full textHagen, Daniel Scott. "Moral expertise and moral education : a Socratic account." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/84417.
Full textCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 97-101).
What is virtue and can it be taught? These questions preoccupied Socrates and this dissertation offers a Socratic answer to them. In Chapter 1 ("Virtue as Expert Moral Knowledge") I develop and defend a novel interpretation of the Socratic thesis that virtue is a kind of knowledge. I argue that the relevant kind of knowledge of interest to Socrates is expert moral knowledge or moral expertise-a complex epistemic state that integrates practical knowledge, theoretical knowledge, and self-knowledge. This account unifies several seemingly disparate epistemological threads that run through Plato's Socratic dialogues, it helps us resolve other interpretive questions surrounding Socrates and Socratic philosophy, and it is philosophically attractive in its own right. In Chapter 2 ("Socrates the Educator and Socratic Education") I confront a puzzle about Socrates' status as a teacher. It's natural to think of him as one, yet (1) Socrates persistently denies that he is or ever was anyone's teacher, (2) he seems to think knowledge of some sort is necessary for being a teacher while disavowing knowledge himself, and (3) he argues on occasion that virtue-the thing he took to be most important of all-cannot be taught. I use the account from Chapter 1 to resolve this puzzle. I conclude the chapter by considering some of the further benefits of Socratic education and some of the limitations it faces. In Chapter 3 ("Moral Deference and Moral Development") I explore the interaction between expertise and education by examining Socratic policies regarding each. In particular, I consider how Socrates thinks we ought to interact with moral experts, and I consider how he thinks we ought to promote our own moral development (in light of the account of virtue from Chapter 1). I argue that while there appears to be a trade-off between deference and development, Socrates' characteristic method of inquiry, elenchus, offers a way to reconcile the two. I bookend the chapter with a discussion of some recent work in moral epistemology on the puzzle of pure moral deference. The Socratic perspective on deference and development supplies a new diagnosis of this puzzle.
by Daniel Scott Hagen.
Ph.D.
Harman, Elizabeth 1975. "Moral Status." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/17645.
Full textIncludes bibliographical references.
Chapters One through Three present the following view: (i) I explain moral status as follows: something has moral status just in case we have reasons not to cause harms to it simply in virtue of the badness of the harms for it. (ii) Moral status is not a matter of degree. (iii) A living thing has moral status just in case it is ever conscious. (iv) If something has moral status, then the strength of a moral reason not to harm it is proportional to the severity of the harm. In this view, all humans and animals that are ever conscious have moral status. Future consciousness is sufficient for present moral status. An embryo of any species that will actually be conscious in the future, presently has moral status. Living humans who were conscious but are not and never will be again do have moral status. Any being that dies before it is ever conscious lacks moral status, regardless of its potential. Mere potentiality to be a person is not sufficient for moral status. However, a being's potential future affects the severity of certain harms. There are stronger reasons to avoid causing the deaths of humans than to avoid causing the deaths of cats, because humans lose more in death than cats do. Chapters One through Three present the above view. I argue that this view can resolve certain apparent tensions within two different attractive combinations of views, and on this basis I argue that the above view should be adopted.
(cont.) Chapter Four, "Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?" proposes a solution to the puzzle of actions that appear to be wrong in virtue of harming a particular individual, but where the individual would not have existed if the action had not been performed, so the individual is not made worse off by the action. Chapter Five, "Ethics Without Ethical Theory," defends part of the methodology of Chapters One through Four by defending the view that we can justifiably reach important substantive ethical conclusions without commitment to a particular ethical theory, or to a particular meta-ethical view.
by Elizabeth Harman.
Ph.D.
CHAN, Hok Nam. "Reconstructing Xunzi's moral knowledge." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2008. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/philo_etd/3.
Full textShafer-Landau, Russell Scott. "Moral indeterminacy." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/185898.
Full textStapelbroek, Koenraad Henricus. "Moral philosophy in Galiani's early political economy." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.616050.
Full textDavies, Christopher. "'Carrying the fire' : Cormac McCarthy's moral philosophy." Thesis, Rhodes University, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002260.
Full textThomas, Bradley Charles. "The Non-moral Basis of Cognitive Biases of Moral Intuitions." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2008. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/44.
Full textHaberman, Bonna Devora. "The intentionality view of moral experience : creating a moral philosophy of education." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1986. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10019609/.
Full textCantrell, Michael A. Evans C. Stephen. "Kierkegaard and modern moral philosophy conceptual unintelligibility, moral obligations and divine commands /." Waco, Tex. : Baylor University, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2104/5297.
Full textYoung, Benjamin Scott. "Moral Friction, Moral Phenomenology, and the Improviser." Scholar Commons, 2012. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4264.
Full textSimak, Douglas B. "Acts, agents and moral assessment." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/30995.
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Philosophy, Department of
Graduate
Levy, David K. "On moral understanding." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2004. http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/1054/.
Full textSim, Julius William. "Moral requirement and supererogation." Thesis, Keele University, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.309766.
Full textCharette, Pierre. "Nature, reasons, and moral meaningfulness." Thesis, McGill University, 2008. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=21923.
Full textL' "anthropologie de la vie morale", ou "anthropologie morale", consiste en une approche de la philosophie morale initiée, au sein de la tradition analytique, par Peter Strawson, et développée, de façons différentes et indépendantes, par David Wiggins ainsi que par Daniel Dennett. Je tiens les anthropologies morales respectives de Wiggins et de Dennett pour complémentaires, et je propose leur synthèse au sein d'un cadre doctrinal dennettien. Le cadre doctrinal en question inclut la définition d'un langage "rationellement acceptable". Les descriptions et comptes rendus énoncés dans ce langage sont interprétés ontologiquement à la lumière de l'ontologie de Dennett, et les énoncés candidats au statut de connaissance sont évalués selon son épistémologie, dont j'affirme qu'elle inclut la thèse de l' "anthropocentricité". Cette thèse, également défendue par Wiggins, confère aux comptes rendus philosophiques auxquelles elle est directement liée, un caractère de validation. Aussi les anthropologies morales respectives de Wiggins et de Dennett valident-elles toutes deux, en grande partie, la vie morale ordinaire. L'anthropologie morale montre comment la constitution dispositionnelle de l'espèce humaine sous-détermine (c'est-à-dire conditionne et contraint, sans pour autant déterminer) les standards de correction par référence auxquels nous évaluons moralement la conduite, les sentiments et les jugements, y compris les jugements portant sur la "signification morale". L'anthropologie morale de Wiggins propose une théorie largement humienne de la nature humaine, ainsi qu' une description pénétrante de la moralité, et des préoccupations, motifs, buts, besoins, aspirations et expectatives "inaliénables" qui y sont attachés, et qui en tant que tels la valident. L'anthropologie morale de Dennett propose une théorie évolutionniste de la nature humaine, et la relie à un compte rendu compatibiliste de la responsabilité morale, du libr
Lerm, Jessica. "Moral reasons of our own." Doctoral thesis, University of Cape Town, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/16555.
Full textThis thesis examines the idea of the second-personal reason, as advocated by Stephen Darwall in his influential book, The Second-Person Standpoint. A second-personal reason is a reason that exists not in the world, nor in a single individual's mind, but in the relationship between two (or more) people: second-personal reasons are reasons given to a first person by a second. The idea of second-personality is gaining ground in contemporary Metaethics - as well as in Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind - and this thesis aims to give a novel presentation of Darwall's Second-Personal metaethic that makes clear just why it is so popular. As I will present it, Darwall's Second-Personal account is a fresh kind of metaethic that promises to give us the 'best of both worlds', enjoying all the benefits of traditional metaethics, such as Realism and Neo-Kantianism, while simultaneously overcoming their respective defects. However, I go on to argue that Darwall's Second-Personal account ultimately fails. Contrary to initial appearances, Darwall's Second-Personal account does not present any significant advances, and, whatever advantages it does appear to possess, it possesses only by virtue of its covert, illicit appeal to Realism. In particular, I argue that we have no grounds for believing that there are indeed such things as second-personal reasons in the first place. After all, who are you to tell me what to do? In response to this criticism, I offer a new, different reading of Darwall's Second-Personal account, according to which it is not to be read as one amongst other metaethics, such as Realism or Neo-Kantianism. It is, rather, to be read as an entirely different approach to Metaethics. Taking my inspiration from Gilbert Ryle, I cash this out in terms of the Second-Personal account's reacting to the category-mistakenness of traditional Metaethics, by reconceiving moral reasons as belonging to a different kind of category altogether. When we understand morality correctly, as belonging to its proper category, then it follows that moral reasons are indeed second-personal. They are moral reasons of our own.
Almeida, Michael James. "The impossibility of moral conflicts /." The Ohio State University, 1988. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487591658173621.
Full textGibb, Michael. "The moral relationship." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:ecabe256-8462-40d6-a94b-8940ee4530d6.
Full textAltman, Megan Emily. "Heidegger and the Problem of Modern Moral Philosophy." Scholar Commons, 2015. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5845.
Full textBates, Vincent Cecil. "Moral Concepts in the Philosophy of Music Education." Diss., Tucson, Arizona : University of Arizona, 2005. http://etd.library.arizona.edu/etd/GetFileServlet?file=file:///data1/pdf/etd/azu%5Fetd%5F1082%5F1%5Fm.pdf&type=application/pdf.
Full textApeldoorn, Laurens van. "Human agency in Hobbes's moral and political philosophy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.543598.
Full textSmith, Michael Andrew. "Motivation and moral realism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.335725.
Full textCullity, Garrett. "The moral demands of affluence." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.316739.
Full textSmith, Steven. "Metaphysical realism and moral realism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.358535.
Full textDenham, Alison Edwina. "Metaphor and the moral imagination." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.314928.
Full textTorres, Jennifer M. "Virtuous Self-Love and Moral Competition." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2014. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/981.
Full textTropman, Elizabeth L. "Moral realism and the new intuitionism." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2006. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3230540.
Full textTitle from PDF t.p. (viewed Dec. 4, 2008). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-08, Section: A, page: 3013. Adviser: David C. McCarty.
Stewart, Todd M. "Should there be a moral epistemology." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/289799.
Full textSantana, Salomão dos Santos. "Clínica e moral em Nietzsche : psicologia moral como experiência de si." Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2014. https://ri.ufs.br/handle/riufs/5226.
Full textEsta dissertação tem a tarefa de evidenciar o papel da experiência de vida de Nietzsche diante de sua produção filosófica e psicológica. Dando importância como o filósofo se autoentendeu, em seu livro Ecce Homo, nos Fragmentos póstumos e em sua correspondência, e interessando-se por sua Clínica Moral , enquanto fundamento da crítica à moral, a presente pesquisa tem por objetivo demonstrar o que a Filosofia de Nietzsche deve ao seu encontro com a sua vivência e, sobretudo, a doença. Procurou-se mostrar que o filósofo, ao atribuir sua psicologia moral à sua doença, relacionando, assim, como nenhum outro filósofo, vida e obra, explicita que a enfermidade é o nexo entre uma e outra, podendo-se, dessa forma, desdobrar o tema em saúde e doença de Nietzsche para saúde e doença em Nietzsche e, mais, a psicologia em Nietzsche para psicologia de Nietzsche. Evidencia-se, assim, que o primeiro impulso e inspiração para o filosofar nietzschiano surgiu da necessidade de cuidar da própria saúde, transformando toda a sua obra em prontuário médico, uma terapia que ele próprio usou. Entendendo a clínica, espaço onde se procura a cura, como técnica de restaurar o equilíbrio do corpo e considerando o corpo como a essência da natureza (physis) existente, pode-se tomar a filosofia de Nietzsche como o engendramento de uma nova terapia: técnica de manutenção da grande saúde, a partir de uma nova proposta moral; a moral da superação de si.
Lammer-Heindel, Christoffer Spencer. "Does the state have moral duties? State duty-claims and the possibility of institutionally held moral obligations." Diss., University of Iowa, 2012. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3330.
Full textBobro, Marc Elliott. "G.W. Leibniz : personhood, moral agency, and meaningful immortality /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/5695.
Full textRobertson, Simon. "Rejecting moral obligation." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13225.
Full textSartorio, Ana Carolina 1972. "The causal and the moral." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/17580.
Full textIncludes bibliographical references (p. 91-92).
My dissertation is about the following two questions: The causal question: When is something a cause of something else? The moral question: When is someone morally responsible for something? I examine the way in which these questions overlap. I argue that, in some important respects, the relation between the causal and the moral question is tighter than people have taken it to be, but, in other important respects, it is looser than people have taken it to be. The dissertation consists of three chapters. Each of the chapters is a self-contained paper, but the three papers are interconnected in various ways. Chapters 1 and 2 are concerned with how the causal question and the moral question intersect, and Chapter 3 is concerned with how they come apart. In Chapter 1, I lay out a view of causation according to which causing is a particular way of making a difference. I show that an advantage of this view is that it carves up a concept of cause that is particularly well suited for the work causation does in moral theory. In Chapter 2, I argue that a moral asymmetry that exists between actions and omissions has a causal basis. I argue that the conditions under which actions and omissions make us morally responsible are different, and that this is so because the causal powers of actions and omissions are different. In Chapter 3, I argue against the received view about the relation between causation and moral responsibility, according to which being responsible for something requires causing it. I offer an alternative picture according to which causation is a necessary condition for the transmission of responsibility, although not for the existence of responsibility itself.
by Ana Carolina Sartorio.
Ph.D.
Lind, Marcia Susan. "Emotions and Hume's moral theory." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14740.
Full textLawton, Christopher. "Rational argument in moral philosophy : some implications of Gordon Baker's therapeutic conception of philosophy." Thesis, Edge Hill University, 2015. http://repository.edgehill.ac.uk/7777/.
Full textWoodford, Nicole Frances. "Moral luck : control, choice, and virtue." Thesis, University of Hull, 2016. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:15196.
Full textCooper, James A., and res cand@acu edu au. "The Cognitive Anatomy of Moral Understanding and the Moral Education Question: A study in the philosophy of moral education." Australian Catholic University. School of Religious Education, 2008. http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/digitaltheses/public/adt-acuvp180.20112008.
Full textCooper, James. "The cognitive anatomy of moral understanding and the moral education question: A study in the philosophy of moral education." Thesis, Australian Catholic University, 2008. https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/download/16b8d52969ea9ff682a69b61b961d450653f053745b3ce5926b2e3da886f6a5a/1680168/64830_downloaded_stream_55.pdf.
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