Journal articles on the topic 'Moral judgment, development, utilitarian reasoning'

Abstract:This article challenges recent calls for moral bioenhancement—the use of biomedical means, including pharmacological and genetic methods, to increase the moral value of our actions or characters. It responds to those who take a practical interest in moral bioenhancement. I argue that moral bioenhancement is unlikely to be a good response to the extinction threats of climate change and weapons of mass destruction. Rather than alleviating those problems, it is likely to aggravate them. We should expect biomedical means to generate piecemeal enhancements of human morality. These predictably strengthen some contributors to moral judgment while leaving others comparatively unaffected. This unbalanced enhancement differs from the manner of improvement that typically results from sustained reflection. It is likely to make its subjects worse rather than better at moral reasoning.

The ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) has been implicated as a critical neural substrate mediating the influence of emotion on moral reasoning. It has been shown that the vmPFC is especially important for making moral judgments about “high-conflict” moral dilemmas involving direct personal actions, that is, scenarios that pit compelling utilitarian considerations of aggregate welfare against the highly emotionally aversive act of directly causing harm to others [Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., et al. Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature, 446, 908–911, 2007]. The current study was designed to elucidate further the role of the vmPFC in high-conflict moral judgments, including those that involve indirect personal actions, such as indirectly causing harm to one's kin to save a group of strangers. We found that patients with vmPFC lesions were more likely than brain-damaged and healthy comparison participants to endorse utilitarian outcomes on high-conflict dilemmas regardless of whether the dilemmas (1) entailed direct versus indirect personal harms and (2) were presented from the Self versus Other perspective. In addition, all groups were more likely to endorse utilitarian outcomes in the Other perspective as compared with the Self perspective. These results provide important extensions of previous work, and the findings align with the proposal that the vmPFC is critical for reasoning about moral dilemmas in which anticipating the social-emotional consequences of an action (e.g., guilt or remorse) is crucial for normal moral judgments [Greene, J. D. Why are VMPFC patients more utilitarian?: A dual-process theory of moral judgment explains. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 322–323, 2007; Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., et al. Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature, 446, 908–911, 2007].

Abstract:Moral imagination is a reasoning process thought to counter the organizational factors that corrupt ethical judgment. We describe the psychology of moral imagination as composed of the four decision processes identified by Rest (1986), i.e., moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral intention, and moral behavior. We examine each process in depth, distilling extant psychological research and indicating organizational implications. The conclusion offers suggestions for future research.The majority of men are subjective toward themselves and objective toward all others—terribly objective sometimes—but the real task is in fact to be objective toward one’s self and subjective toward all others.

Abstract Significant importance has been attributed to moral judgment with regard to the moral and complex personal development of an individual. The study is focused on the moral thinking of university students, being interested in whether or not and to what extent does the university students´ specialization of study affect their moral judgment. A total of 180 students participated in the survey, half of them with technical specialization and the other half with humane disciplines. The Moral Judgment Test was used as a research tool for measuring their moral reasoning. The results showed a significant relation between the students´ moral reasoning and study specialization. Students with humane study specialization showed a much higher level of moral reasoning, referring to an input in the discussion on the method of developing university students´ moral competences.

Objective. Moral judgments are based on decisions that take into account the representation of norms and law, values, functionality and situations themselves. Morality has been studied with “hypothetic moral dilemmas”, in order to identify the type of outcome and the process behind moral reasoning. But judgments by themselves are not enough to establish differences in the type of resolution or the relationship with other cognitive processes. The present paper aimed to compare performance in tasks of utility maximization, cognitive control, and moral judgments, taking into account sex and other sociodemographic variables. Method. Seventy-three university students participated (50 women, 20 men and 3 with unreported gender, the average age was 19.53 years (SD = 1.68 years). The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was used to identify behaviors of utility maximization. In addition, we used the switch costs and the web application of moral machine tasks. Results. A difference between variables of the IGT, but no differences in the switch costs task were found. Conclusion. Regarding moral judgment, males gave more value to respect norms than females. Some variables of the IGT task support outcomes related to differences between sexes. Results are congruent with differences shown in existing literature.

The “veil of ignorance” is a moral reasoning device designed to promote impartial decision making by denying decision makers access to potentially biasing information about who will benefit most or least from the available options. Veil-of-ignorance reasoning was originally applied by philosophers and economists to foundational questions concerning the overall organization of society. Here, we apply veil-of-ignorance reasoning in a more focused way to specific moral dilemmas, all of which involve a tension between the greater good and competing moral concerns. Across 7 experiments (n = 6,261), 4 preregistered, we find that veil-of-ignorance reasoning favors the greater good. Participants first engaged in veil-of-ignorance reasoning about a specific dilemma, asking themselves what they would want if they did not know who among those affected they would be. Participants then responded to a more conventional version of the same dilemma with a moral judgment, a policy preference, or an economic choice. Participants who first engaged in veil-of-ignorance reasoning subsequently made more utilitarian choices in response to a classic philosophical dilemma, a medical dilemma, a real donation decision between a more vs. less effective charity, and a policy decision concerning the social dilemma of autonomous vehicles. These effects depend on the impartial thinking induced by veil-of-ignorance reasoning and cannot be explained by anchoring, probabilistic reasoning, or generic perspective taking. These studies indicate that veil-of-ignorance reasoning may be a useful tool for decision makers who wish to make more impartial and/or socially beneficial choices.

The present study investigates whether epistemic cognition in moral domain (dubbed metaethical cognition) develops analogously to epistemic reasoning regarding empirical knowledge. The study’s conceptual framework distinguishes two main areas of metaethical cognition (beliefs about the nature of moral judgments and conceptions of the process of moral judgment formation), and three metaethical stances (intuitionism, subjectivism, and transsubjectivism). In a sample of 200 adolescents ( M 1/4 16.18 years, SD 1/4 2.41), these metaethical stances could be reliably identified by means of a semistructured interview procedure. Adolescents’ metaethical stance was related to age, cross-sectionally as well as longitudinally. Furthermore, significant differences in metaethical cognition were found between high school students and an expert group of university students with special training in moral philosophy. Overall, metaethical and epistemic stances were correlated substantially. Findings demonstrate that metaethical reasoning development is a structural analogue of epistemic development regarding factual knowledge. Implications for studies on moral development and for research addressing the domain specificity of epistemic reasoning development are discussed.

Moral judgment constitutes an important aspect of adults’ social interactions. How do adults’ moral judgments develop? We discuss work from cognitive and social psychology on adults’ moral judgment, and we review developmental research to illuminate its origins. Work in these fields shows that adults make nuanced moral judgments based on a number of factors, including harm aversion, and that the origins of such judgments lie early in development. We begin by reviewing evidence showing that distress signals can cue moral judgments but are not necessary for moral judgment to occur. Next, we discuss findings demonstrating that both children and adults distinguish moral violations from violations of social norms, and we highlight the influence of both moral rules and social norms on moral judgment. We also discuss the influence of actors’ intentions on moral judgment. Finally, we offer some closing thoughts on potential similarities between moral cognition and reasoning about other ideologies.

The purpose of this exploratory study was to investigate the effect of a curricular application of the integrative ethical education (IEE) model and its effect on first-year college students’ ethical development. Using a pretest posttest design, participants’ moral judgment and reasoning were measured before and after they participated in an IEE-based academic course and compared using descriptive analysis. Results revealed that participants’ moral judgment and reasoning increased while participating in the program. These results provide initial support for the use of IEE-based curricula and academic experiences to promote college students’ ethical development. Implications for communication education and future research are discussed.

Making morally sensitive decisions and evaluations pervade many human everyday activities. Philosophers, economists, psychologists and behavioural scientists researching such decision-making typically explore the principles, processes and predictors that constitute human moral decision-making. Crucially, very little research has explored the theoretical and methodological development (supported by empirical evidence) of utilitarian theories of moral decision-making. Accordingly, in this critical review article, we invite the reader on a moral journey from Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism to the veil of ignorance reasoning, via a recent theoretical proposal emphasising utilitarian moral behaviour—perspective-taking accessibility (PT accessibility). PT accessibility research revealed that providing participants with access to all situational perspectives in moral scenarios, eliminates (previously reported in the literature) inconsistency between their moral judgements and choices. Moreover, in contrast to any previous theoretical and methodological accounts, moral scenarios/tasks with full PT accessibility provide the participants with unbiased even odds (neither risk averse nor risk seeking) and impartiality. We conclude that the proposed by Martin et al. PT Accessibility (a new type of veil of ignorance with even odds that do not trigger self-interest, risk related preferences or decision biases) is necessary in order to measure humans’ prosocial utilitarian behaviour and promote its societal benefits.

In recent years, the theoretical work of Gilligan in women's psychological development has led to the development of the concept of moral orientation or moral voice in contrast to the concept of moral reasoning or moral judgment developed by Kohlberg. These concepts have been of particular interest in gender studies, especially as applied to adolescence. These concepts of moral orientation and moral reasoning are being increasingly employed in healthcare ethics studies in a wide variety of settings. The recent work has included studies of physicians, nurses, dentists, veterinarians, social workers, teachers of medical ethics, and hospital ethics committees. However, the study of moral development in healthcare providers has been hampered because collecting the necessary data from healthcare workers has been labor intensive and extremely time consuming. More efficient methods are needed.

Evidence-based practice suggests the best approach to improving professionalism in practice is ethics curricula. However, recent research has demonstrated that millennium graduates do not advocate for patients or assert themselves during moral conflicts. The aim of this article is the exploration of evaluation techniques to evaluate one measurable outcome of ethics curricula: moral reasoning. A review of literature, published between 1995 and 2013, demonstrated that the moral orientations of care and justice as conceptualized by Gilligan and Kohlberg are utilized by nursing students to solve ethical dilemmas. Data obtained by means of reflective journaling, Ethics of Care Interview (ECI) and Defining Issues Test (DIT), would objectively measure the interrelated pathways of care-based and justice-based moral reasoning. In conclusion, educators have an ethical responsibility to foster students' ability to exercise sound clinical judgment, and support their professional development. It is recommended that educators design authentic assessments to demonstrate student's improvement of moral reasoning.

First and foremost, this paper provides a short historical reminder of the emergence of the field of psychology of development of moral reasoning. In the second part of the paper, the author offers a problem-oriented overview of the field, that is, one possible classification of particular groups of problems for empirical research. This overview does not only point out to the problems that were more and that were less studied (e.g.. evaluative moral judgment and reasoning, distinguishing between moral and extra-moral rules and norms) and to those that were relatively neglected (i.e. understanding moral situations), but also to the problems that psychologists did not even recognize as research problems. Such are the problems of development of moral concepts, meaning of moral words etc. Finally, the author also points out to the fact that this classification could be taken as one way to define the field, that is, the way to determine the boundaries of its subject of studying.

At present there is great interest in moral education to achieve a straight democracy, a healthy coexistence between all actors and social minorities and a lasting peace. What has guided this research partially effective development of moral reasoning skills. Also, because this subject shows limited field explorations and void effective interventions in Mexico. In particular, this research showed the following hypothesis: effective complementarity discursive exposure Kohlberg's theory to the discussion of moral dilemmas. The Moral Judgment Test was applied as pretest to 19 undergraduates, as intermediate test and final test. There were two phases: the first was on discussion of moral dilemmas, at the rate of seven sessions, one per week; the second one was made through a session and expository reading on the theory of moral judgment. The results showed a decline of moral judgment in the first intervention phase and a significant increase after the second phase.

Artificial intelligence has quickly integrated into human society and its moral decision-making has also begun to slowly seep into our lives. The significance of moral judgment research on artificial intelligence behavior is becoming increasingly prominent. The present research aims at examining how people make moral judgments about the behavior of artificial intelligence agents in a trolley dilemma where people are usually driven by controlled cognitive processes, and in a footbridge dilemma where people are usually driven by automatic emotional responses. Through three experiments (n = 626), we found that in the trolley dilemma (Experiment 1), the agent type rather than the actual action influenced people’s moral judgments. Specifically, participants rated AI agents’ behavior as more immoral and deserving of more blame than humans’ behavior. Conversely, in the footbridge dilemma (Experiment 2), the actual action rather than the agent type influenced people’s moral judgments. Specifically, participants rated action (a utilitarian act) as less moral and permissible and more morally wrong and blameworthy than inaction (a deontological act). A mixed-design experiment provided a pattern of results consistent with Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (Experiment 3). This suggests that in different types of moral dilemmas, people adapt different modes of moral judgment to artificial intelligence, this may be explained by that when people make moral judgments in different types of moral dilemmas, they are engaging different processing systems.

Previous studies have explored the differences in moral judgments under normal situations and acute stress using the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST). The present study examined whether anticipatory stress (i.e., induced by an anticipated speech) could elicit similar effects and further explored the mediation of emotional responses between acute stress and moral judgments with a process-dissociation approach. Fifty-three undergraduate students (20 males and 33 females) were randomly assigned to the stress and control groups. In the first stage, they were instructed to prepare a public speech (the stress group) or just recall events during the previous vacation (the control group). In the second stage, they reported emotional valence and arousal for each moral dilemma in a set of 12 moral dilemmas, followed by judgments on moral acceptability of the agent’s action. The manipulation check confirmed that anticipatory stress was reliably induced, as indicated in both self-reported and physiological data. The traditional dilemma analysis revealed that participants in the stress group would make fewer utilitarian judgments than those in the control group. The process dissociation (PD) analyses further revealed that the stress group exhibited higher deontological inclinations than the control group, but no significant differences in utilitarian inclinations. Emotional valence played a mediating role in the association between stress and deontological inclinations. To sum up, our study extended the investigation of the relationship between acute stress and moral judgment to anticipatory stress, clarified its distinct impact on deontological and utilitarian inclinations, and revealed the mediating effect of emotional valence.

Kohlberg’s moral development theory focuses on the thinking process that occurs when one makes a moral decision. Kohlberg had identified three stages of moral development: Pre-conventional, Conventional, and post-conventional. Moral reasoning, as perceived to be a factor in the decision-making, is a rational act guided by moral principles. It is a subjective evaluation related to practical reasoning, where one justifies the idea based on how a person views various thing. Moreover, decisions rely on reasoning; moral reasoning is related to making a congruent decision when a person creates preference takes more courage in deciding whom to elect during elections. Voting preferences can be affected by certain factors such as peer influence, media influence, family influence, and church/religious community. Political leader preference is described as a judgment based on evaluations and observations through interaction with political content. It may also refer to a political or philosophical opinion on an individual pertained to be a candidate for leadership. Like the Senior High School (SHS) students, some new voters are easily swayed by some politicians. The purpose of this study is to determine the level of moral reasoning and the degree of preference for a political leader of SHS students when grouped according to sex, family monthly income, age, and church ministry involvement. Specifically, it also compares the degree of preference for political leaders when grouped according to variables and correlates moral reasoning and preference for political leaders. Likewise, it explores other factors that influence the political leaders’ preference.

The moral reasoning of 189 undergraduate students from the College of Education, Kuwait University was studied, using the Defining Issues Test (DIT) by Rest (1990). The subjects ranged in age from 18 to 26 years (mean age =20.83). The results revealed that the sample reasoned predominantly at stage 4. Principled Morality Percentage Score (P%-score) was found to be below the norms reported in the literature for this group. There were no gender differences in moral reasoning. However, formal education did have a significant effect on moral judgment scores. In the light of this cross-cultural study as well as of other similar studies, a series of questions related to the understanding of moral development has been raised for further examination.

The relationship between moral reasoning and leadership style has received considerable attention for decades, however this has been not fully explicated as different leadership styles elist different ethical values. What constitutes moral behaviour is conflicting and subjective. This study examines public leaders’ degree of moral judgment associated with leadership styles in a public sector organization. To test the hypothesized relationship, data were collected using questionnaire survey distributed to 550 workers out which 300 were found worthy to be used. The Defining Issues Test (DIT2) and the Multifactor leadership questionnaire (MLQ X5) were completed by leaders and subordinates respectively. The PLS path analysis of the structural model indicates significant statistical relationship between cognitive moral development (CMD) and transactional leadership style (TSL) ( β= -0.214, P< 0.012). However, we argue that cognitive moral development is amiable to the individual qualities of the leader that might necessitate the application of particular leadership style and behaviour. We also found collaboration evidence that leaders high in cognitive moral development are perceived more as transformational leaders by their subordinates. Finally, we suggest that the dichotomies between moral reasoning and leadership style are hinged more on individual leadership values and motivational beliefs.

Abstract. In this review we make a simple theoretical argument which is that for theory development, computational modeling, and general frameworks for understanding moral psychology researchers should build on domain-general principles from reasoning, judgment, and decision-making research. Our approach is radical with respect to typical models that exist in moral psychology that tend to propose complex innate moral grammars and even evolutionarily guided moral principles. In support of our argument we show that by using a simple value-based decision model we can capture a range of core moral behaviors. Crucially, the argument we propose is that moral situations per se do not require anything specialized or different from other situations in which we have to make decisions, inferences, and judgments in order to figure out how to act.

Introduction: Since both components critical thinking and moral reasoning are considered to be major phenomena, the development of which is a priority of all world education policies, they are paid a lot of attention in foreign countries. However, foreign studies have only made a little mention of examining their relationship and integrity as well as until recently, each dimension has been examined separately in Slovakia and there is no piece of evidence showing the relationship between them. Based on this, we have formulated the following scientific problem: Is there a relationship between critical thinking and moral reasoning? Methods and respondents: The basic measurement tool of our research was the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal used to determine the level of critical thinking. The level of moral reasoning was investigated by Lind´s Moral Competence Test. The examined sample consisted of the available selection of the 2nd and 3rd year teacher study programme students for lower and upper secondary education at the University of Prešov in Prešov (N = 241) and the testing itself was realized in the academic year 2020/2021. Results: Our research shows that the average value of the gross score in critical thinking of the teacher students is M = 43.26 (SD = 5.09) and the achieved average numeric value of moral judgment expressed by the C-score is M = 21.15 (SD = 12.88). Based on the Pearson Correlation results, we were discussing whether the calculated value of the correlation coefficient indicates the relationship between critical thinking and moral reasoning and whether there is a relationship between moral reasoning and individual cognitive components of critical thinking and the results of the research show interesting findings about the relationship between critical and moral reasoning of teacher students. Conclusion: The conclusions of the research lead us to redesign the undergraduate training of future teachers in the context of the World Economic Forum challenges and the support for minds of the future according to H. Gardner - critical, creative, disciplined, ethical and tolerant - as a critical and moral integrity.

Most all popular moral reasoning or moral judgment tests are based on presenting subjects with two or more hypothetical moral dilemmas and asking them to make judgments on the moral quality of arguments supporting and questioning a protagonist’s decision (e.g., the Moral Competence Test by G. Lind). Although these tests have been insightful by tapping some aspect of individuals’ moral-cognitive schemas, moral maturity, or moral development, they also have limitations. Hypothetical moral dilemmas may be too abstract and impersonal, thus failing to create enough emotional salience. Learning more about real-life personally recalled moral dilemmas may reveal more about the individual’s moral mind and experiences. Objective. The current study was conducted to learn more about the personally experienced moral dilemmas, and how they relate to subjects’ level of moral competence and gender. Method. Subjects were asked to recall the most challenging personal moral dilemma; subjects completed the MCT test to measure moral competence. Results. Among some of the findings was that for both, men and women, higher moral competence scores were positively correlated with recalling personal moral dilemmas where the choice had to be made between some altruistic (care for others) and selfish actions. For men, it was the risk of compromising one’s status, whereas for women it was the risk of personal safety.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of personal and moral intensity variables on specific processes, namely, ethical recognition, ethical judgment and ethical intention, involved in the ethical decision making (EDM) of accounting professionals.Design/methodology/approachA structured questionnaire containing four vignettes of ethical dilemmas is used in the paper to obtain data from 329 accounting professionals. The data are analyzed using Pearson correlation matrix, independent samplet-test, one-way analyses of variance and multiple regression estimation techniques.FindingsThe findings of the paper suggest that age, economic status, upbringing, moral idealism and relativism, magnitude of consequence and social consensus are significant determinants of the EDM process of accounting professionals.Practical implicationsThe paper provides evidence to guide accounting regulatory bodies on ways to strengthen extant measures that ensure strict compliance with ethics codes among accounting professionals in Nigeria.Originality/valueThe paper provides support for Kohlberg’s cognitive reasoning and moral development theory and Rest’s EDM theoretical model, which will aid the development of a structured curriculum for accounting ethics instruction in Nigeria, as hitherto, there is yet to be a provision for a stand-alone ethics course in the undergraduate accounting programs in Nigeria.

The paper presents results of an empirical study of adolescents' concepts of responsibility in different types of moral dilemmas characterized by violations of moral norms. The study proved that the type of moral dilemma and the context of interaction of its participants determine the adolescents' readiness to recognize the responsibility of the main character of the dilemma for violating the norm. In dilemmas of asocial type adolescents are more willing to recognize the responsibility of the offender whose behavior leads to obvious damage for one of the participants in the interaction. As for prosocial dilemmas and dilemmas of confronting norms, adolescents tend to deny the responsibility of the offender. The paper provides a comparative analysis of empirically identified types of adolescent concepts of responsibility, including the differentiated responsibility with egoistic orientation, high responsibility, low responsibility and ‘polar’ responsibility. The authors highlight the ambiguity of the relationship between adolescents’ evaluation of behavior, their readiness to recognize responsibility in moral transgression, and their judgment about the necessity of punishment. The paper concludes with the discussion concerning the relationship between the level of development of moral judgments/moral reasoning and the concepts of responsibility in adolescents.

The development of moral competence is affected by both internal and external factors and has been researched by many scientists. The present study investigated a) whether the five factors of personality, gender and geographical area would affect ones’ moral competence, b) whether the personality factors Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness and Agreeableness would be correlated positively with moral competence in everyday life, whereas Extraversion and Neuroticism would be correlated negatively with morality, c) if there will be differences in students’ moral competence exhibited in everyday life and that expressed in PE/sports framework and d) whether type of school, factors of personality, as well as moral competence exhibited in sports-framework would all be significant factors for the interpretation of a student’s moral competence. The sample consisted of 331 junior high students (7th and 8th graders) (Mage = 12.47, SD = 0.740), who were given the Moral Competence Test Greek Version (Mouratidou et al. 2003), the Moral Judgment Test in Physical Education(Mouratidou et al. 2008), and the Inventory of Child Individual Differences (Besevegkis & Pavlopoulos 1998). The results indicated that of the five-factor personality model only Conscientiousness can affect moral reasoning ability in everyday life and that the type of school can account for less than 5% of variance when predicting moral competence in high school students.

The foster family is the primary agent of socialization in which the child’s personality without parental care is formed and shaped. In the existing social system, in which moral and social values are devalued, a particular challenge and task for today’s family is the moral devel- opment and moral education of its youngest members. The theoretical part of the paper not only presents the most important theoretical postulates and implications concerning moral development, but it also presents the characteristics of children without parental care as a par- ticularly sensitive target group. The foster care institution is presented as a temporary, alterna- tive, socially organized form of protection intended for children without parental care. In the empirical part of the paper, we study the influence of socio-demographic factors that describe the foster family and the child in foster care at the stage of moral judgment of the child pro- tected by this form of protection. The research was conducted to determine the relationship between the specific socio-demographic factors of the foster family and the foster child with the stage of moral reasoning of the child protected by this form of protection. The results of the research found in the empirical part of the paper indicate that the socio-demographic factors of the foster parent and the child are reflected only at certain stages of the child’s moral reasoning at foster care in the positive or negative direction, while at other stages, the correla- tions of the positive and negative directions were not obtained. The results obtained testify to the great heterogeneity of the foster care network and the individual specificities of children deprived of parental care, which implies the need and requirement to respect these specifics and to raise the criteria in the assessment of families who are motivated to foster care and to provide better foster carers training in order to meet one of the most important tasks, i.e. the moral development of the children they are directly caring for. Considering, on the one hand, the axiological dimension that moral education plays in the formation of the moral character of children and young people, the role that the current family arrangement as the primary agent of socialization plays in the moral development of children and, on the other hand, very little research on the moral development of children without parental care, through the realization of this research, we have recognized the contribution to the actualization of this problem of individual and social significance.

The popular in the modern timespragmatic approach, creates in teaching instrumental attitude to professional tasks execution. It means that reaching goals, on utilitarian level,leads to more effective actions. The positive social sciencestake another approach, basing on the usual human inner drive to be happy. Such being takes place when a person realizes well-being for others and for oneself, following hope, which direction is pointed out by freedom, dignity and human responsibility. The main purpose of the article is to reveal the evidence that create pedeutology of the XXI century as a science of strong teaching profession: its values, meaningfulness and beauty. It has been pointed out to agathological and arthrological aspect of pedeutology. The first one refers to doing good deeds. It is represented by optimal pupil development, which therefore should become a priority in teacher’s professional actions. In reference to the above, the instrumental and vocational teaching context has been characterized. The second aspect refers to the teacher’s moral capabilities, called the virtues. A virtue is a central knowledgeable category of positive social sciences. According to this issue, the utility of the virtue theory has been presented in for the pedeutological thought. The extraordinary attention has been put upon the virtue of hope, reasoning its inevitability in the process of upbringing in the XXI century.

Educational institutions play a key role in shaping a modern civil culture in society around the world, because without adequate civil education it is inconceivable to implement quality civilian control over special services. Civil education is a necessary process of learning practical knowledge and skills and shaping competencies for personal development and improvement, for structuring a democratic society, for laws, rights and responsibilities that provide opportunities for real participation in public life. Training for human rights and civil liability and duty, the position of a pupil-citizen, by adopting the principles and values that serve as the foundation and organization of democracy and the republic, the knowledge of the institutions and the laws by developing the rules in the social and political life, exercise and ability to properly justify. So they would find meaning in the individual and the collective responsibilities in their active citizenship. Civil education contributes to the development of a critical spirit, but through the exercise of arguments for reasoning and more accurate decision-making, reasoning and judgment. Through educational institutions, young citizens are prepared to conduct dialogue, debate, resolve conflicts, and embrace forms of civil communication and interaction with special services. This is a basic approach to the basic concepts - man and citizen. Within even the small city, through the education of democratic citizenship, new moral values are being built and active participation in the civil processes of the small community is taking place. The duty of adolescents to become aware of citizens' rights and obligations, norms of conduct and values in a democratic society, as well as the promotion of the role of special services in the Republic of Bulgaria, will prepare them for training and stability as active citizens of the world. Civil education forms a citizen. Civil society, as a public way of life, can function properly only on the basis of an adequate knowledge of the laws of the Republic of Bulgaria and the moral-legal will applying this knowledge in real life. Civil society is the sphere of social activity that focuses on the degree of socio-economic development of society and directly determines the state. The typing of the state has its objective basis in the typography of civil society. Each civil society is a system of human needs and means to meet them, labor, socio-economic, legal and other subject-practical and conscious-volitional relations, as well as a system of human rights organizations and various social institutions. The duty of the national education system to civil society is to build the citizen - the bearer of national self-awareness, civil culture, moral and moral-legal will. Only such a citizen will, in the course of his life, reproduce civil society in accordance with the national idea.

How is disobedience required under international criminal law? How do war crimes trials demand and seek to cultivate disobedience as a response to atrocity? It is widely recognized that international law may require disobedience as a response to domestic authorities that order or legalize war crimes, yet this obligation to disobey is commonly conceptualized as a kind of byproduct of efforts to establish compliance with international norms. Drawing on empirical and theoretical scholarship analyzing “crimes of obedience,” this article investigates the demand for disobedience as articulated in international legal conventions and in war crimes trials dealing with lower-level soldiers and civilian authorities. It argues that disobedience is an important response to war crimes and that the capacity to disobey abusive authorities does not follow logically or inevitably from a commitment to obey laws that criminalize their abuses. In international criminal law, the obligation to disobey abusive authorities has been articulated in ways that require the exercise of critical judgment, as well as moral and political agency, in order to overcome various pressures to obey domestic authority. Prominent theoretical explanations of compliance with international law not only neglect the importance of such skills, but call for strategies that are in tension with their development. Closer attention to the role of exemplary disobedience in the legal reasoning animating war crimes prosecutions, I suggest, could strengthen the pedagogical role of legal institutions as a response to criminal obedience and as interventions in the politics of memory.

AbstractCorruption is an age-old issue. Although various mitigation measures have been developed over time, it persistently exists and transforms with the dynamic business environment. The development of corruption is linked to the skills of criminals to cover their tracks. Control mechanisms and other lines of defense are insignificant when persons of power override, bully or collaborate to carry out corruption. Since humans are perceived to be rational, educating individuals on the evils of corruption with its apparent negative connotations would have been a logical approach to disrupting corruption. However, the growing trend of corruption reflects otherwise. Human behavior is subjective and based on a person–situation complexity, relationships and associations around human life. This pilot study assesses the decisions of individuals based on various corruption scenarios, using 20 questions modeled around Corruption Dimensions and Prisoner’s Dilemma. Of the respondents, 92% had formal exposure to anti-corruption-related studies. Most respondents responded negatively to corruption-related scenarios in the Corruption Dimensions, with noted bias in their criticism when it involved a politician as compared with a businessman. Similarly, the Prisoner’s Dilemma questions also reflected selective reasoning when comparing those with personal relationships as compared with acquaintances. The strength of the evidence, the independence of the judiciary, the ability to escape, the reluctance to self-incriminate and the personal benefits affect the judgment of the respondents. However, in situations involving environmental issues, respondents selected to confess regardless of the situation stating that it was the right thing to do. Education creates awareness on individual rights, options and, to a certain extent, the moral and legal obligations. However, the subjectivity of the person’s associations and lifelong experience also plays a major role in the decision-making process.

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.本文從儒家倫理學與西方效益論、美務論、德行論等三種倫理學理論中，抽繹出自我保存、自我發展、自由意志、能力卓越、關係和諧等五項倫理判準，用以考量複製人的倫理問題。基本上，本文主張「自我保存」是支持複製人的最有力論證，雖然此一論證仍有其缺陷。若以自我保存作為唯一的論據，仍有所不足，但它仍然是一個最低要求（minimum requirement）的論證。若就發展而言，可分就多樣化和性質優化兩種發展來考量。複製人基本上是一相反多樣化、差異化的研究方案，不過它仍可因為保存瀕臨滅亡的家庭、種族等而間接有助於多樣化。至於性質優化則需經由自由意志的努力方能成為道德的。此外，自由意志、卓越化和和諧化等判準看來，複製人仍存在看許多倫理問題，將在本文中一一分析。The new ethical situation created by new discoveries in bio-engineering needs the establishment of ethical criteria in order to judge the morality or immorality of a specific act in, for example, human cloning. But, in Chinese ethical tradition, especially in the Confucian one, much attention has been paid to normalize sexual behavior and no ethical consideration was done on reproduction outside human sexuality. Even this is the case, the general ethical principles established by Confucianism and other ethical traditions are still valid when applied to the newly emerging technological ethical issues. Therefore, in this paper, I would first derive from Confucian ethics and Western utilitarian ethics, obligation ethics and virtue ethics, five ethical criteria, restructured in a hierarchical order, for judging the ethical issues of human cloning. These criteria are: the criterion of conservation, the criterion of development, the criterion of free will, the criterion of excellence, the criterion of harmony.Basically, the author of this paper sustain the position that only the criterion of conservation gives us the most supportive argument for doing human cloning, even if this argument is still defective. This means that we can clone a member of family or race in order to conserve it from total perishing or extermination. The criterion of conservation, articulated in Modern Western philosophy and also in Chinese culture, if not morally perfect in itself, serves the technical act of human cloning as the minimum requirement.The criterion of development could be considered in two ways: differential variability and qualitative betterment. Considered from the side of differential variability, the technique of human cloning could be considered as a project of anti-differentiation or anti-variation. Still it could contribute to development only through conservation, of the otherwise perishing races or families for example. As to the qualitative betterment, it should be always achieved through volitional effort and not merely through biological genetic engineering.All human action should be mediated by free will in order to become moral. This should be taken into account also in the human cloning experimentation. But this does not mean, if supported by conservation argument and motivated by altruistic reasons, human cloning cannot be performed without the consent of the future cloning, unable to give consent because of inexistence for the time being. In this case, cloning could be ethically done, taking into account the moral example of donation of organs of the dead in accident, donation agreed by his/her parents rather than by the accident-victim. But this reasoning does not apply in the case of cloning motivated by commercial interest. But even if this kind of experimentation could be morally accepted, there is still a complementary condition: that there is no pre-visible danger, pain or discomfort caused by the experimentation.Up from the criterion of free will, we enter into the domain properly human and moral. It is on this level, and also on the levels of arguments from excellence and harmony, that we find most of the ethical difficulties of human cloning. For example, in the case of criterion of excellence, all moral excellence are morally valuable when resulted from the decision of human free will and volitional effort. No one could be morally legitimate to conduct human cloning by reason of producing a human being with better human qualities. All human qualities are social and historically determined. One quality considered as good in one time could become bad in another. The biological experimentation conducted under the pretext of producing better human race could be just a sign of tyranny, as in the case of Hitler.As I see it, many actual arguments against human cloning are based upon a social interpretation of the criterion of harmony. For example, that human cloning might be subversive to actual human sexual relationship, parenthood and family system. In my view,although ethical relationship is surely to be disturbed by human cloning, still this is not a sufficient argument against doing it. Because, for example, the argument of conservation could be more urgent and stronger. For me the most important consideration here is the interest of the child. It is of higher interest for the child that he/she be born with the love and care of his parents rather than becoming an object of human technological adventure.Argument of conservation, being supportive of human cloning, could be realized and concretized through an ethical committee authorized by relevant laws to decide in which case and under what condition a particular case of human cloning could be interpreted as suitable for the criterion of conservation. But this enters the domain of legal institution and exceeds our ethical concern in this paper.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 56 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

AbstractA potential underlying mechanism associated with the difficulties in social interactions in Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) concerns the abnormal development of moral reasoning. The present study examined utilitarian and deontological judgments in impersonal and personal moral dilemmas, comparing 66 individuals with ASD and 61 typically developing (TD) individuals between 6 and 18 years. Utilitarian judgments decreased with age. This decline was much more gradual for personal dilemmas in the ASD than in the TD group. ASD individuals rated utilitarian judgments as more appropriate but felt less calm, consistent with the Empathy Imbalance hypothesis. Utilitarian judgments were associated with social interaction difficulties in ASD. These findings identify possible social therapeutic targets for more efficient coping strategies in individuals with ASD.

In the trolley problem, a well-known moral dilemma, the intuitive process is believed to increase deontological judgments, while deliberative reasoning is thought to promote utilitarian decisions. Therefore, based on the dual-process model, there seems to be an attempt to save several lives at the expense of a few others in a deliberative manner. This study examines the validity of this argument. To this end, we manipulate decision-making time in the standard trolley dilemma to compare differences among 119 Japanese female undergraduates under three conditions: intuitive judgment, deliberative judgment, and judgment after a group discussion. The current results demonstrate that utilitarian judgments decreased from 52.9% in the intuition condition to 43.7% in the deliberation condition and 37.0% after the discussion. Additional analysis suggests that the decrease in utilitarian judgments may be related to psychological unwillingness to assume responsibility for the lives of others rather than to an increase in deontological judgments. Finally, these results are discussed from an adaptationist perspective.

Moral judgment can be highly affected by the action and intention factors on a behavior level. Previous neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the intention factor can modulate both the affective and cognitive processing of moral judgment. The present event-related potentials (ERP) study examined how the action factor modulated the neural dynamics of moral judgment under a newly developed moral dilemma paradigm including three different conditions: harm caused by action (i.e., doing harm), harm caused by omission (i.e., allowing harm), and no harm. Behavior data showed that participants preferred utilitarian judgments and spent less time on the allowing harm condition than for the doing harm condition. ERP results revealed that, compared with the doing harm and no harm dilemmas, the allowing harm dilemmas elicited an enhanced N450 response associated with cognitive control and/or cognitive effort processes, but attenuated a late positive potentials (LPP) response associated with top-down control of attention and cognitive “rational” control processes. Such LPP amplitude differences were positively correlated with the C-score of the moral competence test which indexed the cognitive aspect of moral judgment competency. These findings suggested that people have a strong omission bias, and such an action factor modulates the conscious reasoning process during moral judgment, including the cognitive control and/or cognitive effort, and attentional allocation processes.

The process dissociation procedure (PDP) for moral cognition was created to separately measure two dispositions of moral judgment based on the dual-process theory of moral reasoning: deontological and utilitarian inclinations. In this paper we raise some concerns from a psychometrics perspective regarding the structure, reliability, and validity of the moral PDP as a measure of individual differences. Using two simulation studies as well as a real sample of N = 1,010, we investigate the psychometric properties of the moral PDP. We present novel evidence showing that (1) some correlations between PDP parameters are mathematical artifacts, and as such cannot be taken as evidence in support of a theory, (2) there are severe response inconsistencies within dilemma batteries, and (3) reliability estimates for these scores seem to be far below the accepted standards. We discuss some potential theoretical and content-related reasons for these statistical issues and their implications. We conclude that in their current form, PDP measures of utilitarian and deontological tendencies are sub-optimal for assessing individual differences.

Many theories have shaped the concept of morality and its development by anchoring it in the realm of the social systems and values of each culture. This review discusses the current formulation of moral theories that attempt to explain cultural factors affecting moral judgment and reasoning. It aims to survey key criticisms that emerged in the past decades. In both cases, we highlight examples of cultural differences in morality, to show that there are cultural patterns of moral cognition in Westerners’ individualistic culture and Easterners’ collectivist culture. It suggests a paradigmatic change in this field by proposing pluralist “moralities” thought to be universal and rooted in the human evolutionary past. Notwithstanding, cultures vary substantially in their promotion and transmission of a multitude of moral reasonings and judgments. Depending on history, religious beliefs, social ecology, and institutional regulations (e.g., kinship structure and economic markets), each society develops a moral system emphasizing several moral orientations. This variability raises questions for normative theories of morality from a cross-cultural perspective. Consequently, we shed light on future descriptive work on morality to identify the cultural characteristics likely to impact the expression or development of reasoning, justification, argumentation, and moral judgment in Westerners’ individualistic culture and Easterners’ collectivist culture.

Abstract In Utilitarianism, Mill defers to Alexander Bain's expertise on the subject of moral judgment to answer common criticisms of the creed. First, we do not blame people or label them immoral when they are less than ideal. Judgments of immorality are commonly reserved for substandard behavior, not suboptimal comportment. Second, we do not commonly insist on full neutrality in benevolence. Indeed, some philosophers argue that we are obliged to exhibit partiality, insofar as it is demanded by our roles as friends, parents, or children. My primary aim in this essay is to explicate Bain's theory of moral judgment and explain how Mill used Bain's psychological doctrines to inform his development of an indirect utilitarian moral philosophy, immune to the criticisms described above.

AbstractThe present article investigates how economic experts and laypersons deal with issues of fairness in the economic area. Most economic experts follow an ethic that can be described as both, deductive and utilitarian. The ethical judgment of an economic system as a whole or a specific economic measure follows its economic consequences. Measures that increase economic wealth are also judged as fair. The putative motives of individuals or institutions are neglected. To the contrary, laypeople follow an ethic that is both, deontic and intuitive. Ethical judgments are heavily influenced by the motives of the acting individuals and institutions. Questions of efficiency are rather neglected. Laypeople tend to accept those measures which are perceived as fair. Using a number of empirical examples we show how these differences in moral reasoning can explain the huge gap between experts and laypeople in their acceptance of different economic policies.

The goal of this research was to investigate the differences in moral reasoning among students of social, biomedical and technical sciences. The sample included 300 students of both genders (154 male and 146 female students). In order to investigate students’ moral reasoning, we used a modified version of the DIT developed by Rest. Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, which claims that there are six stages of moral development which are grouped into three levels of morality, was used as the theoretical foundation for the test. The results of the study show that there is a statistically significant difference at the postconventional level of moral judgment depending on the group of sciences: the level of postconventional moral reasoning is higher among the students of social and biomedical sciences than among the students of technical sciences. When it comes to the conventional level of moral reasoning, which is the modal level for the adult population, differences have not been observed. With regards to the individual stages of moral development, the results show that there are statistically significant differences in moral reasoning at stage 3, stage 4, stage 5A, stage 5B and stage 6. Stage 3 is more prominent among students of social and technical sciences than in students of biomedical sciences. Stage 4 and Stage 5A are higher in students of biomedical and social sciences than in technical science students. Stage 5B and stage 6 are more prevalent in biomedical sciences students than in students of the other two groups of sciences. Findings are discussed from the point of view of cognitive approach to morality and the contribution of educational and social factors to the moral development process of a person.

Abstract Introduction There is a paramount need for moral development for pharmacists and pharmacy students to practice the patient-centered profession. We aimed to explore the current situational judgment utilizing ethical reasoning among undergraduate pharmacy students. Methods A set of ten ethical dilemmas, representing potential real-life situations that the students come across in the university and may face in the future as a pharmacist were developed by a team of students, academic staff, and stakeholders. These ethical dilemmas were validated, checked for accuracy, and piloted. An online questionnaire was created consisting of these ten scenarios as open-ended questions and administered to fourth year and fifth year PharmD students in a public university located at the city of Mecca, Saudi Arabia, asking them how they would react in that situation. Responses of the participants were analyzed using thematic analysis independently by four researchers and inter-rater agreement were achieved through consensus. Results Out of 205, 186 students completed the questionnaire with a response rate of 90.7%. Analysis and resulted in the generation of 32 codes, which were then categorized into seven overarching themes: student engagement, social and professional responsibility, academic integrity, legal obligation, moral obligation, signposting, and moral engagement and patient safety. Conclusions Undergraduate pharmacy students experience complex state of mind in connection with ethical reasoning. The participants’ situational judgment were driven by cultural norm, authority, and responsibility. Student engagement is also affected by the state of mind and feelings of mutual trust, perceived cultural influence and peer pressure. The students were prone to seek help from university administrators or teachers when faced with situations in which they were helpless.

This study aims to find a new approach to ethical development of accounting profession: antecedents of the behavior of accounting students moral perspective of cognitive models rest. The research was conducted by using a purposive sampling method with the requirements of accounting students who are taking courses in auditing. This study obtained a sample of accounting students at four universities in the city of Padang. Number of questionnaires distributed to respondents as much as 120 sheets and questionnaires that can be analyzed further as many as 96 sheets. Data analysis was performed by multiple regression method using the SPSS program. These results indicate that the first hypothesis (a), moral thinking no significant effect on moral sensitivity, moral considerations, and moral character (b), moral reasoning significantly affect the moral motivation. The second hypothesis (a), the orientation of ethics significant effect on moral considerations, (b) the orientation of ethics no significant effect on moral sensitivity, moral motivation, and moral character. The third hypothesis: gender no significantly influence the moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation and moral character. The four hypothesis (a) cumulative grade point average significantly influence the moral sensitivity, (b) grade point average no significant effect on moral judgment, moral motivation and moral character.

IntroductionDigitalization in intelligent manufacturing leads to the development of Industry 4.0/5.0 and human-cyber-physical systems. As many production technologies rely on teaming of human workers and intelligent cyber-physical systems such as industrial robots, human-robot collaboration is an intensively investigated topic in this transdisciplinary research area. To design industrial robots in a human-centered way, psychological knowledge concerning judgment and decision-making needs to be gained and integrated.MethodThis paper reports results from an experimental study (N = 222, 2 × 4 within-subjects design) using eight moral dilemmas framed in the context of human-robot-collaboration to examine the influence of spatial distance of an industrial robot and humans (no direct contact, different tasks vs. no direct contact, same task vs. handing-over contact, same task vs. direct contact, same task) on moral decisions. Additionally, the type of dilemma was varied, with every four dilemmas depicting a life-or-death and an injury scenario. Participants responded on a four-point-response scale which actions they would take indicating deontological or utilitarian moral decision-making.ResultsResults show a large effect of the proximity of the cooperation between robots and humans. The closer the collaboration the more a human tends to choose utilitarian moral choices.DiscussionIt is argued that this effect might stem from an adaptation of human rationality to the robot or overreliance and shift of responsibility to the robot team partner.

Purpose: This article presents the theoretical framework, research design, methodology, and main findings of the comparative measurement of ethical–moral competences of 15-year-old upper secondary students in Shanghai, under the ETiK-International-Shanghai project. Design/Approach/Methods: By dividing the ethical–moral competences into the categories of basic ethical–moral knowledge, ethical–moral judgment competence, and competence in developing ethical–moral action plans, a survey of 2,036 students was conducted, using a reliable and valid testing instrument. Findings: In general, 15-year-olds from homes with more educational resources perform higher in all three scales across all countries taken under consideration in our study. Furthermore, school practices, teaching, as well as quantity and quality of instruction play a very important role in the moral education process and especially in developing students’ proficiency levels of ethical–moral knowledge, reasoning competence, as well as students’ high abilities in developing moral action plans. When relevant educational background factors are held constant, Chinese students show lower average scores on basic ethical–moral knowledge and moral judgment competence. With exception of the tested Vienna students, all other European samples scored better than the Chinese students—also on the test for developing ethical–moral action plans. However, Chinese students are especially able to display outstanding empathy when dealing with suffering, misfortune, and sorrow, as well as in their willingness to help others. Originality/Value: The findings of this article can foster thinking about which topics should be further discussed to improve the ethical–moral knowledge and competences of Chinese students and highlight requirements for the further development of moral education in China at the levels of teaching, curriculum, teacher education, and research.

This paper reviews eight highly-rated books on Moral Theology to find a common ground for an ethics education program for undergraduate students. Using James Rest’s four domains of moral functioning as its frame of reference, it examined the substantive contents and determined the extent of their alignment with identified learning outcomes for an undergraduate ethics course. Although they differed in the elements of approach and method, it is evident that in terms of their overall substantive content, the eight books adequately covered what is widely considered as the foundation stones of Catholic morality. Nonetheless, it is clear that their usefulness as “tool, tutor, and guide” for ethics education would largely have to depend on the professional competence, intended outcomes, pedagogical skills/strategies, and personal qualities of the facilitator. References Armstrong, Mary Beth, Edward Ketz & Dwigth Owsenc. 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Introduction The term monster might have its roots in the Latin word monere (to warn), but it has since evolved to have various symbolic meanings, from a terrifying mythical creature to a person of extreme cruelty. No matter the flexibility in use, the term is mostly meant to be derogatory (Asma). As Gilmore puts it, monsters “embody all that is dangerous and horrible in the human imagination” (1). However, it may be argued that monsters sometimes perform the much-needed work of defining and policing our norms (Mittman and Hensel). Since their archetype is predisposed to transgressing boundaries of human integrity (Gilmore), they help establish deviation between human and in-human. Their cognition and action are considered ‘other’ (Kearney) and a means with which people can understand what is right and wrong, and what is divergent from appropriate ways of being. The term monster need not even refer to the werewolves, ogres, vampires, zombies and the like that strike fear in audiences through their ‘immoral, heinous or unjust’ appearance or behaviours. Rather, the term monster can be, and has been, readily applied as a metaphor to describe the unthinkable, unethical, and brutal actions of human beings (Beville 5). Inadvertently, “through their bodies, words, and deeds, monsters show us ourselves” (Mittman and Hensel 2), or what we consider monstrous about ourselves. Therefore, humans acting in ways that deviate from societal norms and standards can be viewed as monstrous. This is evident in the representations of public relations practitioners in media offerings. In the practice of public relations, ethical standards are advocated as the norm, and deviating from them considered unprofessional (Fawkes), and as we contend: monstrous. However, the practice has long suffered a negative stereotypical perception of being deceptive, and with public relations roles receiving less screen time than shows and films about lawyers, accountants, teachers and the like, these few derogatory depictions can distort how audiences view the occupation (Johnston). Depictions of professions (lawyers, cops, journalists, etc.) tend to be cliché, but our contention is that fewer depictions of public relations practitioners on screen further limit the possibility for diverse depictions. The media can have a socialising impact and can influence audiences to view the content they consume as a reflection of the real world around them (Chandler). Television, in particular, with its capacity to prompt heuristic processing in audiences (Shurm), has messages that can be easily decoded by people of various literacies as they become immersed in the viewing experiences (Gerbner and Gross). These messages gain potency because, despite being set in fictional worlds, they can be understood as reflective of the world and audiences’ experiences of it (Gerbner and Gross). Tsetsura, Bentley, and Newcomb add that popular stories recounted in the media have authoritative power and can offer patterns of meaning that shape individual perceptions. Admittedly, as Stuart Hall suggests, media offerings can be encoded with ideologies and representations that are considered appropriate according to the dominant elite, but these may not necessarily be decoded as preferred meanings. In other words, those exposed to stories of monstrous public relations practitioners can agree with such a position, oppose this viewpoint, or remain neutral, but this is dependent on individual experiences. Without other frames of reference, it could be that viewers of negative portrayals of public relations accept the encoded representation that inevitably does a disservice to the profession. When the representations of the field of public relations suggest, inaccurately, that the industry is dominated by men (Johnston), and women practitioners are shown as slick dressers who control and care little about ethics (Dennison), the distortions can adversely impact on the identities of public relations practitioners and on how they are collectively viewed (Tsetsura et al.). Public relations practitioners view this portrayal as the ‘other’ and tend to distance the ideal self from it, continuing to be stuck in the dichotomy of saints and sinners (Fawkes). Our observation of television offerings such as Scandal, Flack, Call My Agent!, Absolutely Fabulous, Sex and the City, You’re the Worst, and Emily in Paris reveals how television programmes continue to perpetuate the negative stereotypes about public relations practice, where practitioners are anything but ethical—therefore monstrous. The characters, mostly well-groomed women, are shown as debased, liars and cheaters who will subvert ethical standards for personal and professional gain. Portrayals of Public Relations Practitioners in Television and Media According to Miller, the eight archetypical traits identified in media representations of public relations practitioners are: ditzy, obsequious, cynical, manipulative, money-minded, isolated, accomplished, or unfulfilled. In later research, Yoon and Black found that television representations of public relations tended to suggest that people in these roles were heartless, manipulative bullies, while Lambert and White contend that the depiction of the profession has improved to be more positive, but nonetheless continues to do a disservice to the practice by presenting female workers, especially, as “shallow but loveable” (18). We too find that public relations practitioners continue to be portrayed as morally ambiguous characters who are willing to break ethical codes of conduct to suit the needs of their clients. We discuss three themes prevalent as popular tropes in television programmes that characterise public relations practitioners as monstrous. To Be or Not to Be a Slick and Skilful Liar? Most television programmes present public relations practitioners as slick and skilful liars, who are shown as well-groomed and authoritative, convinced that they are lying only to protect their clients. In fact, in most cases the characters are shown to not only believe but also advocate to their juniors that ‘a little bit of lying’ is almost necessary to maintain client relationships and ensure campaign success. For example, in the British drama Flack, the main character of Robyn (played by Anna Paquin) is heard advising her prodigy “just assume we are lying to everyone”. The programmes also feature characters who are in dilemma about the monstrous expectations from their roles, struggling to accept that that they engage in deception as part of their jobs. However, most of them are presented as somewhat of an ugly duckling or the modest character in the programme, who is not always rational or in an explicit position of power. For example, Emily from Emily in Paris (played by Lily Collins), while working as a social media manager, regularly questions the approaches taken by the firm she works for. Her boss Sylvie Grateux (played by Philippine Leroy-Beaulieu), who embodies the status quo, is constantly disapproving of Emily’s lack of sophisticated self-presentation, among other aspects. In the episode ‘Faux Amis’, Sylvie quips “it’s not you personally. It’s everything you stand for. You’re the enemy of luxury because luxury is defined by sophistication and taste, not emilyinparis”. Similarly, in the first episode of Call My Agent!, Samuel Kerr (played by Alain Rimoux), the head of a film publicity firm, solves the conundrum faced by his anxious junior Gabriel (played by Grégory Montel) by suggesting that he lie to his client about the real reason why she lost the film. When a modestly dressed Gabriel questions how he can lie to someone he cares for, Samuel, towering over him in an impeccable suit and a confident demeanour, advises “who said anything about lying? Don’t lie. Simply don’t tell her the truth”. However, the subtext here is that the lie is to protect the client from unnecessary hurt and in doing so nurtures the client relationship. So, it lets the audience decide the morality of lying here. It may be argued that moral ambiguity may not necessarily be monstrous. Such grey characters are often crafted because they allow audiences to relate more readily to themselves by encouraging what Hawkins refers to as mental play. Audiences are less interested in the black and white of morality and veer towards shows such as Call My Agent! where storylines hone in on the need to do bad for the greater good. In these ways, public relations practitioners still transgress moral standards but are less likely to be considered monstrous because the impact and effect on others is utilitarian in nature. It is also interesting to note that in these programmes physical appearance is made to play a crucial role in showcasing the power and prestige of the senior public relations practitioner. This focus on attire can tend to further perpetuate unfavourable stereotypes about public relations practitioners being high income earners (Grandien) who are styled with branded apparel but lacking in substance and morals (Fröhlich and Peters). Promiscuous Women The urge to attract audiences to a female character can also lead to developing and cementing unfavourable stereotypes of public relations practitioners as uninhibited women who live on blurred lines between personal and professional. These characters are not portrayed as inherently bad, but instead are found to indulge in lives of excess. In her definition of the monstrous, Arumugam suggests that excess and insatiable appetites direct the monster’s behaviour, and Kearney outlines that this uncontainable excess is what signals the difference between humans and others. Such excess is readily identifiable in the character of Patsy Stone (played by Joanna Lumley) in Absolutely Fabulous. She is an alcoholic, regularly uses recreational drugs, is highly promiscuous, and chain-smokes throughout the series. She is depicted as prone to acting deceptively to maintain her vices. In Flack, Robyn is shown as regularly snorting cocaine and having sex with her clients. Those reviewing the show highlight how it will attract those interested in “its dark, acidic sense of humour” (Greene) while others condemn it because it emphasises the “depraved publicist” trope (Knibbs) and call it “one of the worst TV shows ever made” even though it is trying to highlight concerns raised in the MeToo movement about how men need to respect women (McGurk). Female characters such as Robyn, with her willingness to question why a client has not tried to sleep with her, appear to undermine the empowerment of the movement rather than support it, and continue to maintain the archetypes that those working in the field of public relations abhor. Similarly, Samantha Jones (played by Kim Cattrell) of Sex and the City is portrayed as sexually liberated, and in one episode another character describes Samantha’s vagina as “the hottest spot in town: it’s always open”. In many ways Samantha’s sexual behaviour reflects a post-feminist narrative of empowerment, agency, and choice, but it could also be read as a product of being a public relations practitioner frequenting parties and bars as she rubs shoulders with clients, celebrities, and high-profile businesspeople. To this end, Patsy, Samantha, and Robyn glamourise public relations and paint it as simply an extension of their liberated and promiscuous selves, with little care for any expectation of professionalism or work ethic. This is also in stark contrast to the reality, where women often tend to occupy technical roles that see much of their time spent in doing the hard yards of publicity and promotion (Krugler). Making Others Err Public relations practitioners are not just shown as being morally ambiguous themselves, but often quite adept at making others do deceitful acts on their behalf, thus nonchalantly oppressing others to get their way. For example, although lauded for elevating an African-American woman to the lead role despite the show maintaining misrepresentations of race (Lambert), the main character of Olivia Pope (played by Kerry Washington) in the television programme Scandal regularly subverts the law for her clients despite considering herself one of the “good guys” and wearing a “white hat”. Over the course of seven seasons, Olivia Pope is found to rig elections, plant listening devices in political figures’ offices, bribe, threaten, and conduct an affair with the President. In some cases, she calls on the services of her colleague Huck to literally, and figuratively, get rid of the barriers in the way of protecting her clients. For example, in season one’s episode Crash and Burn she asks Huck to torture a suspect for information about a dead client. Her willingness to request such actions of her friend and colleague, regardless of perceived good motivations, reinforces Mittman’s categorisation that monsters are identified by their effect and impact on others. Here, the impact includes the torturing of a suspect and the revisiting of psychological trauma by Huck’s character. Huck struggles to overcome his past as a killer and spends much of the show trying to curb his monstrous tendencies which are often brought on by PR woman Olivia’s requests. Although she is sometimes striving for justice, Olivia’s desire for results can lead her to act monstrously, which inadvertently contributes to the racist and sexist ideologies that have long been associated with monsters and perceptions of the Other. Across time and space, certain ethnic groups, such as those of African descent, have been associated with the demonic (Cohen). Similarly, all that is feminine often needs to be discarded as the monster to conform to the patriarchal order of society (Creed). Therefore, Olivia Pope’s monstrous behaviour not only does a disservice to representations of public relations practitioners, but also inadvertently perpetuates negative and inaccurate stereotypes about women of African American descent. Striving to be Ethical The majority of public relations practitioners are encouraged, and in some cases expected, to conform to ethical guidelines to practice and gain respect, admiration, and in-group status. In New Zealand, those who opt to become members of the Public Relations Institute of New Zealand (PRINZ) are required to abide by the association’s code of ethics. The code stipulates that members are bound to act in ways that serve public interests by ensuring they are honest, disclose conflict of interests, follow the law, act with professionalism, ensure openness and privacy are maintained, and uphold values of loyalty, fairness, and independence (PRINZ). Similarly, the Global Alliance of Public Relations and Communication Management that binds practitioners together identifies nine guiding principles that are to be adhered to to be recognised as acting ethically. These include obeying laws, working in the public’s interest, ensuring freedom of speech and assembly, acting with integrity, and upholding privacy in sensitive matters (to name a few). These governing principles are designed to maintain ethical practice in the field. Of course, the trouble is that not all who claim to practice public relations become members of the local or global governing bodies. This implies that professional associations like PRINZ are not able to enforce ethics across the board. In New Zealand alone, public relations consultants have had to offer financial reparations for acting in defamatory ways online (Fisher), or have been alleged to have bribed an assault victim to prevent the person giving evidence in a court case (Hurley). Some academics have accused the industry of being engaged in organised lying (Peacock), but these are not common, nor are these moral transgressors accepted into ethical bodies that afford practitioners authenticity and legitimacy. In most cases, public relations practitioners view their role as acting as the moral conscience of the organisations they support (Schauster, Neill, Ferrucci, and Tandoc). Furthermore, they rated better than the average adult when it came to solving ethical dilemmas through moral reasoning (Schuaster et al.). Additionally, training of practitioners through guidance of mentors has continued to contribute to the improved ethical ratings of public relations. What these findings suggest is that the monsters of public relations portrayed on our television screens are exaggerations that are not reflective of most of the practice. Women of Substance, But Not Necessarily Power Exploring the role of women in public relations, Topic, Cunha, Reigstad, Jele-Sanchez, and Moreno found that female practitioners were subordinated to their male counterparts but were found to be more inclined to practice two-way communication, offer balanced perspectives, opt to negotiate, and build relationships through cooperation. The competitiveness, independence, and status identified in popular media portrayals were found to be exhibited more by male practitioners, despite there being more women in the public relations industry than men. As Fitch argues, popular culture continues to suggest that men dominate public relations, and their preferred characteristics end up being those elements that permeate the media messages, regardless of instances where the lead character is a woman or the fact that feminist values of “loyalty, ethics, morality, [and] fairness” are advocated by female practitioners in real life (Vardeman-Winter and Place 333). Additionally, even though public relations is a feminised field, female practitioners struggle to break the glass ceiling, with male practitioners dominating executive positions and out-earning women (Pompper). Interestingly, in public relations, power is not just limited due to gender but also area of practice. In her ethnographic study of the New Zealand practice, Sissons found that practitioners who worked in consultancies were relatively powerless vis-à-vis their clients, and often this asymmetry negatively affected the practitioner’s decision-making. This implies that in stark contrast to the immoral, glamourous, and authoritative depiction of public relations women in television programmes, in reality they are mired by the struggles of a gendered occupation. Accordingly, they are not in fact in a position to have monstrous power over and impact on others. Therefore, one of the only elements the shows seem to capture and emphasise is that public relations is an occupation that specialises in image management; but what these shows contribute to is an ideology that women are expected to look and carry themselves in particular ways, ultimately constructing aesthetic standards that can diminish women’s power and self-esteem. Conclusion Miller’s archetypes may be over twenty years old, but the trend towards obsequious, manipulative, and cynical television characters remains. Although there have been identifiable shifts to loveable, yet shallow, public relations practitioners, such as Alexis Rose on Schitt’s Creek, the appeal of monstrous public relations practitioners remains. As Cohen puts it, monsters reveal to audiences “what a member of that society can become when those same dictates are rejected, when the authority of leaders or customs disintegrates and the subordination of individual to hierarchy is lost” (68). In other words, audiences enjoy watching the stories of metaphorical monsters because they exhibit the behaviours that are expected to be repressed in human beings; they depict what happens when the social norms of society are disturbed (Levina and Bui). At the very least, these media representations can act, much as monster narratives do, as a cautionary tale on how not to think and act to remain accepted as part of the in-group rather than being perceived as the Other. As Mittman and Hensel argue, society can learn much from monsters because monsters exist within human beings. According to Cohen, they offer meaning about the world and can teach audiences so they can learn, in this case, how to be better. Although the representations of public relations in television can offer insights into roles that are usually most effective when they are invisible (Chorazy and Harrington), the continued negative stereotypes of public relations practitioners can adversely impact on the industry if people are unaware of the practices of the occupation, because lacking a reference point limits audiences’ opportunities to critically evaluate the media representations. This will certainly harm the occupation by perpetuating existing negative stereotypes of charming and immoral practitioners, and perhaps add to its struggles with gendered identity and professional legitimacy. References Absolutely Fabulous. Created by Jennifer Saunders and Dawn French. 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