Academic literature on the topic 'Moral conviction'

This review covers theory and research on the psychological characteristics and consequences of attitudes that are experienced as moral convictions, that is, attitudes that people perceive as grounded in a fundamental distinction between right and wrong. Morally convicted attitudes represent something psychologically distinct from other constructs (e.g., strong but nonmoral attitudes or religious beliefs), are perceived as universally and objectively true, and are comparatively immune to authority or peer influence. Variance in moral conviction also predicts important social and political consequences. Stronger moral conviction about a given attitude object, for example, is associated with greater intolerance of attitude dissimilarity, resistance to procedural solutions for conflict about that issue, and increased political engagement and volunteerism in that attitude domain. Finally, we review recent research that explores the processes that lead to attitude moralization; we integrate these efforts and conclude with a new domain theory of attitude moralization.

Partisan bias and hostility have increased substantially over the last few decades in the American electorate, and previous work shows that partisan strength and sorting help drive this trend. Drawing on insights from moral psychology, however, we posit that partisan moral convictions heighten affective polarization beyond the effects of partisanship, increasing partisan animosity and copartisan favoritism. Testing this theory using data from two national samples and novel measures of affective polarization in everyday life, we find that people who tend to moralize politics display more partisan bias, distance and hostility, irrespective of partisan strength. These results shed light on a different moral divide that separates the American public and raise key normative questions about moral conviction and electoral politics.

When science is marshaled to support one side or another in policy debates, people can react to that information differently depending on whether it supports their own position. They tend to find fault in unfavorable information and accept favorable information less critically. This may especially be the case when individuals’ positions are held with moral conviction—that is, when their position is not only their preferred position, but when it is the position that they feel to be morally correct. I examine three areas in which allowing moral convictions to influence reactions to scientific information may actually threaten the social benefits of science: promoting science misperceptions, eroding the credibility of scientists as sources of information, and eroding evaluations of science as a process. I argue that dealing with the influence of moral conviction over scientific interpretation will require acknowledgement that the social benefits of science are not self-evident and that they depend on public buy-in.

People are more likely to become politically engaged (e.g., vote, engage in activism) when issues are associated with strong moral convictions. The goal of this research was to understand the underlying motivations that lead to this well-replicated effect. Specifically, to what extent is moralized political engagement motivated by proscriptive concerns (e.g., perceived harms, anticipated regret), prescriptive concerns (e.g., perceived benefits, anticipated pride), or some combination of these processes? And are the motivational pathways between moral conviction and political engagement the same or different for liberals and conservatives? Two studies (combined N = 2,069) found that regardless of political orientation, the association between moral conviction and political engagement was mediated by the perceived benefits of preferred but not the perceived harms of non-preferred policy outcomes, and by both anticipated pride and regret, findings that replicated in two contexts: legalizing same-sex marriage and allowing concealed weapons on college campuses.

Scientific study of dogmatism began over fifty years ago with the establishment of the first scale and its criterion related validity. Now measured by a more psychometrically sound scale dogmatism has been linked to intolerance, egocentrism, and an unwillingness or inability to understand opposing viewpoints. Moral conviction derives from a separate literature base, but like dogmatism, has been linked to intolerance. The combination of high-dogmatism and high-moral conviction could have a profound effect on decision making related to social justice, thereby impacting others. An on-line survey measured whether participants would vote yes or no for gay marriage in Kansas and yes or no for the mandated teaching of creationism in public schools, and provided scales for moral conviction and dogmatism. It was hypothesized that dogmatism, moral conviction, and consideration of the opposition viewpoint would discriminate voting on both issues. Support for both hypotheses was found in two significant discriminant functional analyses. For both issues participants scoring higher in measures of dogmatism and moral conviction also gave less consideration to the opposition view in deciding how to vote. Present research offered support for a relationship between dogmatism and religiosity and established correlations between moral conviction and dogmatism. If people who are particularly dogmatic and also think a given issue is moral are less likely to consider other viewpoints even in decisions that would impact those others, implications for justice are dire. Future research may aim at ensuring more tolerance in lawmaking through interventions aimed at educating around moral issues or reducing dogmatism among those highest in dogmatism.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Wichita State University, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Dept. of Psychology

Weber’s discussion of ethics in his famous lecture (and then essay) Politics as a Vocation (1919) clearly indicates that two possible ethical stances, the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, are rooted in ‘distinct and irreconcilably opposed principles’. Throughout Politics as a Vocation, it is the ethic of responsibility that appears to be endorsed by Weber as suited for political life. Yet, Weber concludes his essay by claiming that a combined ethic is ideal for a political vocation. This makes Weber’s position regarding the ideal ethical stance for a man who has a ‘true political calling’ appear contradictory: the ethics are opposites but somehow to be combined. Commentators have mostly concluded that, for Weber, the ethic of responsibility is the ideal ethic for politics. That appears further in accord with the fact that a key concern of the speech in its historical context was to warn political students of the dangers associated with an ethic of conviction. Weber, as a realist, was especially critical of a stance that disregarded the corrupted nature of the world, which the ethic of responsibility alone seems to accept. Politicians with single-minded convictions were responsible for Germany’s political stalemate, supporting the fact that the ethic of conviction should not be deemed acceptable in politics. And yet there is much this position neglects by opting for only one of the two ethics, by concluding that only the ethic of responsibility is appropriate for political vocation. My thesis offers something different; something I admit is ambitious. What I propose is the synthesis of the opposition, of finding a way to combine the two irreconcilably opposed ethics.

Moral outrage is an emotional, cognitive, and behavioral response to moral violations, resulting in a desire to punish the transgressor. Previous research has examined moral outrage toward transgressive behaviors, but no studies have examined the potential for moral outrage to be roused by another’s beliefs alone. Do people experience moral outrage at one another’s thoughts? If so, how do they punish someone who has roused their outrage but has “done nothing wrong”? In Study 1 (n = 209), I examined moral outrage reactions at people’s unacceptable beliefs on three topics (pedophilia, sexual assault, fraud) by comparing moral outrage elicited by people holding an indefensible belief (e.g., “sexual assault is no big deal”) but doing absolutely nothing to express or further that belief, versus people acting on these beliefs to various degrees (e.g., talking about it on social media, or assaulting someone themselves). Results indicated that people can become morally outraged at outrageous beliefs alone, and to a similar degree as at actual outrageous behaviors. In Study 2 (n = 327), I investigated whether the pattern would generalize from extreme beliefs most people would find outrageous to ideologically divided issues. Specifically, I examined the consequences of experiencing moral outrage when the target’s beliefs violated participants’ own moral convictions about abortion rights. Study 2 also investigated how participants punished the transgressor in a workplace setting, which is consequential and relevant to the fraught current political climate. Participants read a hypothetical male co-worker’s controversial and outrageous Facebook post, rated their feelings of moral outrage at the co-worker, and finally indicated how likely they would be to punish the co-worker directly (e.g., confrontation), indirectly (e.g., exclusion), or by avoiding him. Transgressive beliefs not only elicited more moral outrage when compared to control conditions, but transgressive beliefs elicited moral outrage to a similar degree as transgressive behaviors. Further, moral outrage at both beliefs and actions encouraged people to be more punitive toward the transgressor in direct ways (as seen in previous research), but also in indirect ways (such as social exclusion) or just by avoiding the transgressor. Finally, across both studies, I also found that participants’ intellectual humility (i.e., the degree to which a person recognizes that their beliefs and attitudes might be incorrect) predicted the intensity of their moral outrage: the intellectually humble reported overall lower levels of moral outrage than the intellectually arrogant. Implications for these findings for workplace discrimination and the study of moral outrage are discussed.

Cette thèse est une étude exploratoire de non-conformistes moraux, au sujet de la/les motivation/s pour la non-conformité morale parmi un nombre de différents non-conformistes moraux. La non-conformité morale est un comportement dans lequel la personne agit contrairement à son groupe immédiat estimant que le comportement du groupe est moralement répréhensible. Les résultats ont montré que le type de non-conformité morale peut être divisé en six groupes, avec des motivations différentes ; L'intervenant, L'activiste, Le "lanceurs d'alerte" , L'objecteur de conscience, Le "végétaliens", et Le "faire-son-devoir". Tous ces groupes ont leur propre motivations et situations favorisant le comportement de non-conformisme. La conclusion est qu'il est difficile de promouvoir un comportement en général, car chaque type de non-conformiste moral semble avoir des motivations et des situations de déclenchement différentes. Ces conclusions reposent sur des questionnaires ouverts et des entretiens avec des répondants de différents âges, nationalités et classes sociales. Les nationalités étaient chinoises, suédoises, françaises et britanniques, mais il convient de noter que l'analyse ne montrait aucun schéma fondé sur la culture nationale. L'analyse de leurs réponses a été effectuée avec une méthode phénoménologique, Meaning Constitution Analysis, (MCA)
This thesis is an explorative investigation of moral non-conforming, and the motivation of moral non-conformers. A moral non-conformist is a person who, for moral reasons refuse to behave like the group behaves, as he/she believes the group behaves immorally. The results showed that moral non-conformity can be divided into six groups : The intervening, The activists, The Whistle-blowers, The conscientious objectors, and Duty. All these groups have their own motivation that promote their moral non-conforming behaviour. The conclusion must therefore be that there are no general motivations which promote moral non-conformity, but every moral non-conformer has their own motivation and trigger situation to permit their behaviour. These conclusions are based on open questionnaires and interviews with respondents of different ages, nationalities, and social economic status. The nationalities are Chinese, British, French and Swedish, but it is worth noticing that nothing in the analysis showed a pattern based on national culture. The analysis was made with the phenomenological method ; Meaning Constitution Analysis

Dans l’exercice de son office, le juge est en permanence aux prises avec la loi et sa conscience. Cette réalité n’est pas propre à notre temps. Elle est une donnée constante de l’histoire judiciaire. Et selon les époques, la conscience du juge n’a pas toujours occupé la même place. Cette oscillation de la place de la conscience dans l’acte de juger témoigne à la fois d’un souci de justice et d’un souci éthique. Malgré les tentatives des doctrines positivistes et légicentristes d’atténuer, voire d’évacuer la question de la conscience du juge de la sphère judiciaire, elle demeure entière, et bien plus encore aujourd’hui avec la complexité de plus en plus grande de certaines affaires judiciaires. Le droit et la conscience sont un couple viscéralement lié mais malheureusement un couple en « difficulté », où le droit ne triomphe pas toujours et où la conscience n’a pas toujours bonne presse au regard de la dimension subjective qui la caractérise et à laquelle elle est très souvent réduite. Si cette question a fait l’objet jusqu’ici d’une abondante littérature tant en droit français qu’en droit canonique, il nous semble qu’elle a été essentiellement abordée soit sous l’angle du droit séculier soit sous l’angle exclusivement du droit canonique. A notre connaissance aucune étude comparative n’a été faite sur ce sujet. D’où l’intérêt de notre étude. Nous proposons donc dans cette investigation une étude comparée de la conscience du juge en droit pénal français et en droit canonique à travers respectivement les concepts d’intime conviction et de certitude morale. En droit pénal français, les juges et les jurés conformément à l’art. 353 CPP, doivent juger en se référant à leur intime conviction tandis que dans la législation canonique le juge ne peut, quel que soit le litige, prononcer sa sentence qu’après avoir acquis conformément au c. 1608, CIC/83 la certitude morale sur la vérité des faits. L’« intime conviction » en droit français et la certitude morale en droit canonique sont deux formes de la manifestation de la conscience du juge. Nous nous interrogeons donc de savoir si la certitude morale est en droit canonique ce que l’intime conviction en droit pénal français. À travers cette étude comparée nous voulons soustraire le jugement selon la conscience des caricatures dont il fait l’objet et mettre en évidence la complexité de l’office du juge. Au cœur du débat sur la conscience du juge c’est l’office tout entier du juge qui est en jeu. Juger est un art qui mobilise toute la personne du juge et met en évidence son autorité à travers une perspicacité et une prudence ritualisées. La conscience du juge – dont la manifestation se décline sous les vocables d’intime conviction et de certitude morale respectivement dans les systèmes juridiques français et canonique et dont le risque d’arbitraire est si communément appréhendé par l’opinion – est un gage de justice et de vérité pour autant qu’elle soit soumise à l’épreuve du rituel judiciaire. Si notre société contemporaine se rebiffe à l’idée de conscience – renvoyée d’emblée à la sphère exclusivement morale et subjective – notre investigation a pour finalité de démontrer que la conscience du juge telle que comprise dans les législations canonique et française revêt un sens technique précis qui ne saurait être enfermé dans une quelconque normativité
In the exercise of his office, the judge is constantly struggling with the law and his conscience. This reality is not peculiar to our time. It is a constant in judicial history. According to the times in history, the judge's conscience has not always occupied the same place. This oscillation of the place of consciousness in the act of judging shows both a concern for justice and an ethical concern. Despite the attempts of positivist and law-centrist doctrines to mitigate or even dispel the question of the judge's consciousness of the judicial sphere; it remains intact, even more so today with the increasing complexity of certain cases. The ‘righteous’ and the ‘conscientious’ are a viscerally linked couple but unfortunately it is a couple in "difficulty", where the law does not always triumph and where the conscience does not always have good press with regard to the subjective dimension which characterizes it and to which it is very often reduced. If this question has so far been the subject of an abundant literature in both French and Canon law, I believe that it has been essentially approached either from the angle of secular law or exclusively Canon law. To our knowledge, no comparative study has been made on this subject. Hence the interest of our study. We therefore propose in this investigation a comparative study of the judge's conscience in both French criminal law and Canon law through respectively the concepts of ‘intimate conviction’ and ‘moral certainty’. In French criminal law, judges and jurors, in accordance with art. 353 CPP must judge by referring to their intimate conviction whereas in the Canon law the judge cannot; whatever the litigation pronounce in his sentence that after having acquired according to c. 1608, CIC/83 "moral certainty" about the truth of the facts. "Intimate conviction" in French law and "moral certainty" in Canon law are two forms of manifestation of the judge's conscience. We therefore wonder whether "moral certainty" is in canon law what the "conviction" is in French criminal law. Through this comparative study we wish to subtract the judgment according to the consciousness of the caricatures of which it is the object, and to highlight the complexity of the office of the judge. At the heart of the debate about the conscience of the judge is the entire office of the judge that is at stake. Judging is an art that mobilizes the whole person of the judge and highlights his authority through a ritualized perspicacity and prudence. The conscience of the judge - whose manifestation is expressed under the terms of intimate conviction and moral certainty respectively in the French and canonical legal systems and whose risk of arbitrariness is so commonly apprehended by the public - is a pledge of justice and truth as much as it is subject to the test of judicial ritual. If our contemporary society rebels to the idea of consciousness – seen as an outset to the exclusively moral and subjective sphere -, our investigation aims to demonstrate that the conscience of the judge as understood in the canonical and French legislation has a precise technical meaning, which cannot be locked in any normativity

Thesis advisor: Dominic Doyle
Moral, aesthetic, and religious pluralism has become a source of disagreement and friction in the modern world. Within the context of modernity and precipitated by the American and French revolutions, liberal democracy has aimed to organize the social and political life of societies in which their inhabitants sustain different, distant, and sometimes contradictory conceptions of the good life. Liberal secular principles have been the framework used to protect fundamental values such us freedom, equality, and mutual respect. In order to preserve the stability of a plural society, liberalism insists that moral and religious convictions must remain a private matter. Democracy and tolerance, it was argued, would be best preserved if religious convictions were removed from the public/political conversation. Yet the debate about the appropriate relationship between religion and politics regularly resurfaces among political and moral philosophers, social theorists, and theologians
Thesis (STL) — Boston College, 2010
Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry
Discipline: Sacred Theology

Peut-on enseigner les valeurs à l'école ? Si par enseignement on entend une action intentionnelle visant la transmission d'une connaissance, alors la mise en acte des valeurs ne saurait être érigée comme un objet d'enseignement stricto sensu : l'action morale ne saurait être conçue comme l'obéissance à des règles, même si après coup il est possible de la considèrer comme étant en accord ou non avec une norme morale. Telle est la thèse qui est ici présentée. Après un 1er chapitre consacré à une revue sur la question, l'auteur présente, sous la forme d'une opposition, 2 conceptions de la pensée morale principalement autour de Rawls vs Arendt, Aristote et Wittgenstein. Le 3è chapitre présente le cadre méthodologique de la recherche proprement dite : 11 enseignants de l'école élémentaire sont d'abord interrogés sur leurs convictions éthiques et sur les valeurs qu'ils cherchent à promouvoir dans leur pratique ; une observation de leurs pratiques effectives permet de les interroger de nouveau en vue d'identifier les valeurs curriculaires. Les 3 chapitres suivants sont consacrés à l'analyse de ces matériaux empiriques privilégiant chacun un axe d'analyse : liberté, égalité et rapport à l'autre. Ces analyses font apparaître à la fois une forte homogénéité des discours quant aux valeurs déclarées, et de fortes divergences quant aux valeurs curriculaires. Ce non recouvrement permet de mettre en défaut le principe même d'une éducation morale fondée sur le seul discours qui est discuté dans le 7e chapitre. Le dernier chapitre, sur la base d'une typologie de styles éthico-pédagogiques, permet à la fois de synthétiser ses précédents résultats et d'asseoir la thèse d'un lien nécessaire entre action pédagogique et valeurs morales. Ainsi, si la valeur en tant que cadre de référence morale peut être exigée universellement, c'est à la seule vertu du sujet conçue comme une sorte d'appel immanent à agir de telle sorte, que la réponse au problème moral peut être renvoyée.

The violation of societal shared convictions is a phenomenon which can occur in different situations of daily living. Previous research investigated this phenomenon in various domains (e.g., morality and competence) separately while neglecting the similarities. This dissertation’s basic assumption is that violations of societal shared convictions in various domains lead to the same state, namely a legitimacy crisis, as the construct of legitimacy is closely related to social norms and values. A legitimacy crisis is an individual’s perception that his or her actions or characteristics are not or less appropriate as they are discrepant to the societal shared convictions in the given situation. Based on the general assumption that legitimacy crises go beyond existing theories on the violation of societal shared convictions, this work contributes to three general issues: First, it provides a theoretical integration into and continuation of overarching theoretical frameworks of legitimacy, discrepancy and threat. Second, it conducts an empirical examination of legitimacy crises throughout the two main domains of morality and competence, focusing especially on the mediating function of legitimacy crises between the discrepancy and subsequent consequences. Third, it contributes a theoretical development and empirical examination of emotional and behavioral consequences of legitimacy crises across the two main domains of morality and competence. To address these issues, this dissertation discusses the general meaning of legitimacy in the context of social and organizational psychology research and especially the different perspectives on legitimacy, thereby working out a deeper understanding of the self and legitimacy. Furthermore, this work demonstrates that experiencing legitimacy crises is threatening for one´s self as it followed by specific emotional and behavioral reactions. To empirically investigate the theoretical considerations, nine studies in various domains with different methods (scenarios, recall, face-to-face interactions and field studies) were conducted. The four studies in Chapter 4, four studies generally focus on the construct of legitimacy crises in the context of morality and competence, and examine the mediating function of a legitimacy crisis on the emotional and behavioral consequences. While participants in the first two studies worked on a scenario about a psychology intern in a hospital, participants in the last two studies dealt with unmoral behavior (in-basket exercise and a recall task about an unmoral behavior). Independent from the domain, all four studies of Chapter 4 provide evidence that legitimacy crises are judgments of a perceived violation of societal shared convictions. The results show the expected mediating function of legitimacy crises between the perception of the violation of societal shared convictions and moral emotions (guilt and shame). Whereas feelings of guilt led to an increase of moral behavior, feelings of shame decreased moral behavior. As an example for the moral domain, Chapter 5 takes a closer look on the role of bystanders in the context of social exclusion. Bystanders’ inactions violate the social norms of inclusion and equality. Until now, research on social exclusion has focused primarily on targets and perpetrators, demonstrating that both experience social exclusion situations as threatening. This chapter wants to expand this knowledge and improve the understanding of the psychological processes of bystanders to potentially facilitate interventions for social exclusion situations. The results of three studies with varying methods (recall and face-to-face interaction paradigm) strengthen the general findings of Chapter 4. Bystanders who evaluate their inaction as less appropriate report more feelings of shame and guilt which lead to more social defense reactions compared to targets. To extend the general findings on competence in Chapter 4, Chapter 6 exemplarily examines leaders who perceive that they are not able to meet the expectations of the leadership role in two field studies. The findings demonstrate that leaders, who perceived to be violating the societal expectations towards their role as leader, evaluated their actions as less appropriate thereby eliciting a higher extent of job insecurity that led to more silence behavior. Moreover, the results show that leader silence and follower silence are negatively related, especially when the leader is perceived as unjust. In line with the findings of Chapter 4 and 5, the construct of legitimacy crises is also a relevant mediator in the context of leadership. In general, the theoretical considerations and the empirical findings of this dissertation demonstrate the important role of the construct of legitimacy crises in various domains and emphasize its mediating function between the violation of societal shared convictions and the subsequent emotional and behavioral reactions. The findings provide theoretical and practical implications. To understand the underlying process of discrepancies with normative standards, the Self-Standards Model and the construct of legitimacy crises provide an important theoretical framework, which works independent from the specific domain. Understanding legitimacy crises provides starting points for the development of interventions for people experiencing legitimacy crises
Die Verletzung von gesellschaftlich geteilten Überzeugungen ist ein Phänomen, welches in verschiedenen Situationen des täglichen Lebens auftreten kann. Die bisherige Forschung hat dieses Phänomen in unterschiedlichen Bereichen (bspw., Moral und Kompetenz) getrennt betrachtet und mögliche Gemeinsamkeiten vernachlässigt. Diese Dissertation geht davon aus, dass die Verletzung von gesellschaftlich geteilten Überzeugungen in unterschiedlichen Bereichen zu dem gleichen Zustand führt, einer Legitimitätskrise, da gerade das Konzept der Legitimität mit gesellschaftlichen Normen und Werten eng verknüpft ist. Eine Legitimitätskrise ist die Wahrnehmung eines Individuums, dass deren Handlungen oder Eigenschaften in Bezug zu gesellschaftlichen Überzeugungen in einer bestimmten Situation gar nicht oder wenig angemessen sind. Ausgehend von der generellen Annahme, dass Legitimitätskrisen über bestehende Theorien im Rahmen der Verletzung von gesellschaftlichen Überzeugungen hinausgehen, trägt diese Arbeit zu drei generellen Punkten bei: Erstens, eine theoretische Integration und Weiterführung von übergreifenden theoretischen Rahmenmodellen in Bereichen Legitimität, Diskrepanzen und Bedrohungen. Zweitens, eine empirische Untersuchung von Legitimitätskrisen in den beiden zentralen Bereichen Moral und Kompetenz. Drittens, theoretische Entwicklung und empirische Untersuchung von emotionalen und behavioralen Konsequenzen von Legitimitätskrisen in den beiden Bereichen Moral und Kompetenz. Zur Erreichung dieser Punkte wird im Rahmen der Dissertation zunächst die generelle Bedeutung von Legitimität im Kontext sozial und organisationspsychologischer Forschung diskutiert, besonders die verschiedenen Perspektiven von Legitimität. Dies dient vor allem der Herausarbeitung eines tieferen Verständnisses von Selbst und Legitimität. Des Weiteren geht diese Arbeit näher darauf ein, dass Legitimitätskrisen bedrohlich für das eigene Selbst sind und wie Menschen auf der emotionalen und behavioralen Ebene damit umgehen. Zur empirischen Untersuchung dieser theoretischen Überlegungen wurden neun Studien in unterschiedlichen Bereichen mit verschiedenen Methoden (Szenarien, Erinnerung, direkte Interaktionen und Feldstudien) durchgeführt. Kapitel 4 beschäftigt sich in vier Studien mit dem Konstrukt der Legitimitätskrise im Kontext von Moral und Kompetenz. Dabei wird auch die mediierende Funktion auf emotionale und behaviorale Konsequenzen näher untersucht. Während die Teilnehmer in den ersten beiden Studien an einem Szenario über ein Praktikum in einem Krankenhaus arbeiten, beschäftigen sich die Teilnehmer der letzten beiden Studien mit unmoralischen Verhaltensweisen (Postkorbübung und Erinnerungsaufgabe über unmoralisches Verhalten). Unabhängig vom Bereich legen alle vier Studien in Kapitel 4 nahe, dass Legitimitätskrisen Bewertungen einer wahrgenommenen Verletzung von gesellschaftlich geteilten Überzeugungen sind. Die Ergebnisse zeigen die mediierende Funktion von Legitimitätskrisen zwischen der wahrgenommenen Verletzung gesellschaftlich geteilter Überzeugungen und moralischen Emotionen (Schuld und Scham). Während Gefühle von Schuld zu einem Anstieg von moralischem Verhalten führen, reduzieren Gefühle von Scham moralisches Verhalten. Beispielhaft für den moralischen Bereich, beschäftigt sich Kapitel 5 näher mit der Rolle von Bystandern im Rahmen von Sozialem Ausschluss. Das Nichthandeln von Bystandern verletzt dabei soziale Normen von Inklusion und Gleichheit. Die bisherige Forschung hat sich hauptsächlich mit Opfern und Tätern auseinandergesetzt und zeigt, dass beide Situationen Sozialen Ausschlusses als bedrohlich empfinden. Dieses Kapitel möchte den bisherigen Wissensstand erweitern und die Erkenntnisse über die psychologischen Prozesse bei Bystandern verbessern um mögliche Interventionen daraus ableiten zu können. Die Ergebnisse von drei Studien mit ganz unterschiedlichen Methoden (Erinnerung und direkte Interkation) stärken die Befunde aus Kapitel 4. Im Vergleich zu Opfern bewerten Bystander ihr Nichthandeln als weniger angemessen, berichten mehr Scham und Schuld, was wiederum zu mehr sozialen Verteidigungsreaktionen führt. Kapitel 6 vertieft die generellen Erkenntnisse aus Kapitel 4 im Bereich Kompetenz, indem es sich im Rahmen von zwei Feldstudien exemplarisch mit Führungskräften beschäftigt, welche sich nicht in der Lage sehen, die an sie gestellten Anforderungen zu erfüllen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Führungskräfte, die eine Verletzung von gesellschaftlich geteilten Überzeugungen an sich wahrnehmen, ihre Handlungen als weniger angemessen bewerten, was zu einem höheren Ausmaß an Jobunsicherheit führt, dass wiederum Schweigeverhalten erhöht. Außerdem zeigt sich, dass Schweigeverhalten von Führungskräften und Mitarbeitern in einem negativen Zusammenhang steht, vor allem wenn die Führungskraft als ungerecht wahrgenommen wird. Wie in Kapitel 4 und 5 zeigt sich auch hier, dass das Konstrukt der Legitimitätskrisen als relevanter Mediator im Rahmen von Führung angesehen werden kann. Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die theoretischen Überlegungen als auch empirischen Befunde dieser Dissertation zeigen, dass das Konstrukt der Legitimitätskrise in verschiedenen Bereichen eine wichtige Rolle spielt, vor allem die mediierende Funktion zwischen Verletzung gesellschaftlich geteilter Überzeugungen und dem unmittelbar nachfolgenden emotionalen und behavioralen Reaktionen. Aus den Ergebnissen lassen sich theoretische und praktische Implikationen ableiten. Um die zugrundeliegenden Prozesse von Diskrepanzen besser verstehen zu können, bietet das Self-Standards Model und das Konstrukt der Legitimitätskrise ein geeignetes Rahmenmodell, welches unabhängig von dem jeweiligen Bereich funktioniert. Des Weiteren liefern diese Erkenntnisse Ansatzpunkte um Interventionen für Menschen entwickeln zu können, deren Legitimitätswahrnehmung in eine Krise geraten ist

L’œuvre de Banārasīdās (1586-1643), marchand et poète jaina actif dans la région d’Agra, s’appuie sur la pensée du maître digambara Kundakunda (c. IIIe s. de notre ère) pour chanter la véritable nature du soi, intrinsèquement pur, réalité suprême d’un point de vue absolu (niścaya-naya). La condition laïque de Banārasīdās l’oblige pourtant à envisager aussi la religion d’un point de vue conventionnel (vyavahāra-naya), aidé en cela par des échelles de progression spirituelle ménagées par la doctrine jaina et décrites notamment par Nemicandra (Xe siècle). Il est intéressant de suivre en diachronie l’articulation entre les deux points de vue, depuis le Samayasāra, ouvrage fondateur de Kundakunda, jusqu’à Śrīmad Rājacandra, un saint personnage de la fin du XIXe siècle, en s’attardant particulièrement sur les membres du mouvement Adhyātma dont Banārasīdās a été l’un des plus brillants promoteurs
The works of Banārasīdās (1586-1643), a Jain merchant and poet active in the region of Agra, is largely based on the thought of the Digambara philosopher Kundakunda (c. third century). The latter invited to search for the true nature of the self seen as the only reality from an absolute point of view (niścaya-naya). The layman condition of Banārasīdās obliged him to consider also his own religion from a conventional point of view (vyavahāra-naya). He was helped by his discovery of the spiritual scales prepared by the Jain doctrine and described in detail by Nemicandra (tenth century). It is rewarding to look at the articulation between the two points of view in a historical perspective, from the Samayasāra, the major work of Kundakunda, up to Śrīmad Rājacandra, a holy layman of the late nineteenth century, with a particular focus on the members of the Adhyātma movement whose Banārasīdās was one of the most successful instigators

AbstractThis chapter introduces the notion of ‘regimes of ethics’ to explore the diverse ways that ethics is articulated in corporate capitalism, particularly in industries that are involved in the extraction of natural resources such as oil and gas. I show how companies draw on corporate social responsibility frameworks as public-facing demonstrations of ethics for stakeholder engagement, while also generating greater company loyalty and pride among employees. While corporate social responsibility (CSR) provides an explicit corporate strategy, the professional codes of ethics that apply to engineering practices in the USA specifically anchor ethics in individual decision-making. Animated by a generally conservative, if not stultifying, ethos, engineering ethics sees practices such as whistleblowing and breaking ranks as epitomising individual ethical action. Co-existing with and sometimes challenging these two formal regimes of ethics are also industry actors’ own moral convictions. This third regime of ethics draws on my ethnographic research in the oil and gas industry in Colorado, USA. By discussing these various articulations of ethics, my aim is to take seriously formal rules and codes as well as industry actors’ own ethical sensibilities. I suggest that rather than existing as entrenched hardened moral worlds, these multiple and competing regimes of ethics indicate the underdetermined nature of ethical life.

This essay concerns aspects of Kimberley Brownlee’s defense of civil disobedience for those who act on conscientious conviction and conscience. Discussion focuses on Brownlee’s treatment of these central concepts. For example, she offers four criteria for identifying a sincere conscientious moral judgment: consistency, universality, non-evasion, and communication and dialogue. This essay argues from examples that the criteria as explained fail to serve the purpose of identifying when normative convictions are conscientious and moral. Then it contrasts her conception of conscience with those of Joseph Butler and Immanuel Kant, considering their merits for her purposes.

This chapter focuses on the concentration of rape cases among confirmed wrongful convictions. How stranger rape differs from date and acquaintance rape with regard to the risk of wrongful conviction is presented. Innocence Project and National Registry of Exonerations data are examined as well as case illustrations. The chapter examines the pressures on law enforcement authorities and the role of primary evidence, secondary evidence, black box investigation methods, the continuum of intentionality, and victim status in stranger rape. In addition, a stranger rape thesis is presented to distinguish the unique challenges faced in the investigation of “stranger rape. The moral outrage associated with stranger rape produces a great demand on police for arrests and convictions yet reliable identification of the perpetrator is compromised in stranger rape.

This chapter sets out the numerous different types of collateral legal consequences (CLCs) facing people with criminal records, including restrictions on employment, housing, welfare, and the vote. It distinguishes CLCs from the myriad informal collateral consequences experienced by offenders. Then it discusses various dimensions along which particular CLCs may be distinguished, such as their content, scope, and duration. It makes the case that CLCs raise serious moral challenges, which require greater attention from moral, legal, and political philosophers than they have received to date. The chapter concludes with an overview of the remainder of the book.

The article is devoted to the problems of spiritual and moral education of schoolchildren through a tolerant attitude towards children with disabilities in conditions of inclusive education in a secondary school. The model of inclusive education is revealed, which is based on the following conviction: tolerance education among schoolchildren in an inclusive education is systematic and complex work, where the participants are teachers, children and their parents, as well as society and its relationship to such children. The difficulties arising during inclusive schooling are represented. However, there are new opportunities for inclusive education for the spiritual and moral education of the younger generation, which have a positive effect on the adaptation in society of children with disabilities, and the spiritual and moral development of healthy children.