Journal articles: 'Monopoly theory'

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Paino, Maria, and Jeffrey Chin. "MONOPOLY and Critical Theory." Simulation & Gaming 42, no. 5 (March 14, 2011): 571–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1046878110391022.

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BONANNO, G. "MONOPOLY EQUILIBRIA AND CATASTROPHE THEORY." Australian Economic Papers 26, no. 49 (December 1987): 197–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8454.1987.tb00503.x.

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Baran, Paul A., and Paul M. Sweezy. "Two Letters on Monopoly Capital Theory." Monthly Review 62, no. 7 (December 4, 2010): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.14452/mr-062-07-2010-11_4.

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Zhang, Wei-Bin. "An Integration of Neoclassical Growth Theory and Economic Structural Change with Monopolistic Competition Theory." Business and Economic Research 11, no. 2 (April 6, 2021): 145. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ber.v11i2.18380.

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Wealth accumulation is a deterministic factor mechanism of national economic growth. Neoclassical growth theory is basically concerned with capital and wealth accumulation in perfectly competitive market. Global markets are characterized by a great variety of markets. Nevertheless, there only a few rigorous models of wealth accumulation with other types of markets within neoclassical growth framework. This study attempts to contribute literature of economic growth by introducing monopolistic competition and monopoly into neoclassical growth theory. The model is based on a few well-established economic theories. The model is constructed within framework of the Solow-Uzawa two-sector neoclassical growth model. The description of to monopolistic competition is influenced by the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition. The modelling of monopoly is based on monopoly theory. We model behavior of the household with Zhang’s utility function and concepts of current income and disposable income. The unique contribution of this research is to integrate these theories in a comprehensive framework. We construct the basic model and then analyze properties of the model. The existence of a unique equilibrium point is identified by simulation. The effects of changes in some parameters comparative static analyses in some parameters.

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Tarbuck, Ken. "Monopoly capital revisited." Critique 23, no. 1 (January 1995): 101–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03017609508413388.

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Corell and Herzog. "The Theory of Factions in Monopoly Capital." World Review of Political Economy 10, no. 3 (2019): 316. http://dx.doi.org/10.13169/worlrevipoliecon.10.3.0316.

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STEVENS, BENJAMIN H., and C. PETER RYDELL. "SPATIAL DEMAND THEORY AND MONOPOLY PRICE POLICY." Papers in Regional Science 17, no. 1 (January 14, 2005): 195–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1435-5597.1966.tb01349.x.

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Dudey, Marc. "On the Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly Theory." Journal of Political Economy 103, no. 4 (August 1995): 893–902. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/262007.

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Foster, John Bellamy. "Monopoly Capital Theory and Stagiation: A Comment." Review of Radical Political Economics 17, no. 1-2 (March 1985): 221–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/048661348501700112.

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Latham, Roger, and Frances Perivancic. "Monopoly, rent-seeking, and second best theory." Public Choice 70, no. 2 (May 1991): 225–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00124484.

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김성구. "The Theory of State Monopoly Capitalism and Marx's Crisis Theory." MARXISM 21 14, no. 2 (May 2017): 12–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.26587/marx.14.2.201705.001.

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Waldman, Michael. "Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets." Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 1 (February 1, 2003): 131–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533003321164985.

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The early 1970s witnessed three major advances in durable-goods theory — Swan, Peter. 1970. “Durability of Consumption Goods.” American Economic Review. December, 60:5, pp. 884–94. Swan, Peter. 1971. “The Durability of Goods and Regulation of Monopoly.” Bell Journal of Economics. Spring, 2:1, pp. 347–57. and Sieper, E. and Peter Swan. 1973. “Monopoly and Competition in the Market for Durable Goods.” Review of Economic Studies. July, 40:3, pp. 333–51. on optimal durability, Coase, Ronald. 1972. “Durability and Monopoly.” Journal of Law and Economics. April, 15:1, pp. 143–49. on time inconsistency, and Akerlof, George. 1970. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. August, 84:3, pp. 488–500. on adverse selection. This paper surveys durable goods theory starting with these three contributions, where much of the focus is on recent literature and on models that explain real-world phenomena. In addition to the ideas found in the contributions of Swan, Coase, and Akerlof, topics covered include why producers sometimes practice “planned obsolescence,” the role of adverse selection in new-car leasing, and reasons for aftermarket monopolization.

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Kleiner, Andreas, and Alejandro Manelli. "Strong Duality in Monopoly Pricing." Econometrica 87, no. 4 (2019): 1391–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta15735.

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The main result in Daskalakis, Deckelbaum, and Tzamos (2017) establishes strong duality in the monopoly problem with an argument based on transportation theory. We provide a short, alternative proof using linear programming.

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Sherman, Roger, and Kenneth E. Train. "Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly." Southern Economic Journal 59, no. 4 (April 1993): 859. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1059767.

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Button, Kenneth, and Kenneth E. Train. "Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly." Economic Journal 103, no. 418 (May 1993): 753. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2234556.

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Dugger, W. M. "Monopoly Capital Theory: Hilferding and Twentieth-Century Capitalism." History of Political Economy 24, no. 4 (December 1, 1992): 973–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-24-4-973.

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Norton, B. "The Theory of Monopoly Capitalism and Classical Economics." History of Political Economy 27, no. 4 (December 1, 1995): 737–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-27-4-737.

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Waterson, Michael. "RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY." Journal of Economic Surveys 1, no. 1-2 (March 1987): 59–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.1987.tb00024.x.

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Knieps, G. "Optimal regulation: The economic theory of natural monopoly." Information Economics and Policy 5, no. 3 (October 1993): 269–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-6245(93)90014-8.

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Costea, Diana. "A critique of mises’s theory of monopoly prices." Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 6, no. 3 (September 2003): 47–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12113-003-1023-1.

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Hsu, Song-ken. "Simple monopoly price theory in a spatial market." Annals of Regional Science 40, no. 3 (May 24, 2006): 531–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00168-006-0075-5.

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Hudzik, Jan. "Teoria i historia monopolu na władzę w demokracji." Studia Politologiczne 2020, no. 55 (March 21, 2020): 78–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.33896/spolit.2020.55.4.

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This article concerns the sources and mechanisms of the monopolisation of power in democracy. Where do the claims of people’s representatives for exclusive rights to rule come from? The author pleads two arguments and try to prove them in both the history of theoretical frameworks of democracy and its political adaptations. The first argument is that these claims are provoked by the very idea of democracy – they are its structural component which decides on its pharmakonic action, because – that’s the second argument – it (the idea) is based on the construction of oppositional concepts like egalitarianism vs. elitism, power of the people vs. power of capital and their derivatives. That’s why democracy, as a cure for – in respect of gaining – equality, freedom and justice, can poison these values to death simultaneously. It creates inequalities and discriminates separated people. Every substantial content of its formal values is fatal to it. It tends to move to some kind of authoritarianism, fundamentalism or totalitarianism.

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Grisáková, Nora, and Peter Štetka. "Application of optimal control theory on optimal advertising expenditure in monopoly." SHS Web of Conferences 83 (2020): 01017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/20208301017.

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Presented paper is being focused on Optimal control theory, Variation Calculus and its economic application. Aim of this research paper is to shortly describe Optimal control and Variation Calculus and to present how can we deal with these type of issues. The last part of this paper is presenting possible economic application of Optimal control, based on the maximization of profit in monopoly while introducing new product on the market. Our control variable is the advertising rate, which affects the profit of monopoly through advertising expenditures and as a state variable was the market share defined.

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Andriyani, Fitri, Rahma Rosaliana Saraswati, Dina Melasari, Agustiani Putri, and Dadan Sumardani. "Monopoly Learning Media: Education Media in Structure and Function of Plant Tissue Theory." JURNAL PEMBELAJARAN DAN BIOLOGI NUKLEUS 6, no. 1 (March 31, 2020): 81–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.36987/jpbn.v6i1.1559.

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Material structure and function of plant tissue is one of the most difficult material for students to understand. This is because studying this material in detail requires aids (microscopes) whose observations are not necessarily easily understood by students. In addition, so far the learning media and methods used are less varied. Based on the above statement, we need a learning media that can increase student interest and student understanding in learning the structure and function of plant tissue. So this study aims to develop a monopolistic educational learning media on the structure and function of plant tissue in class VIII of SMPN. This development research refers to the ADDIE model (Analyze, Design, Development, Implement, Evaluation). The monopoly game structure and plant network developed consists of several game equipment including: a monopoly board, a set of ownership rights cards, a set of public and opportunity fund cards, a set of money - dice, and a game guide. As for the pawns in this game are the students themselves. Based on the material expert validation test, it was found that the percentage of material suitability in the monopoly of the structure and function of plant tissue was 70.83% or quite decent. Meanwhile, for the media expert validation test the percentage of eligibility was 63.33% or quite decent. Based on the validation test obtained an average of 67.08% or if interpreted then the monopoly of the plant's structure and tissue is quite feasible.

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Li, Boda. "Monopoly Characteristics and Policy Analysis of China's Online Retail Market." BCP Business & Management 13 (November 16, 2021): 87–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v13i.54.

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The network retail industry has been in a highly centralized pattern. According to the relevant concepts in the traditional industrial organization theory, this highly concentrated market needs regulation. Behind the rapid development of industry is the hidden worry that is constantly exposed. In 2011, Taobao announced a substantial increase in annual fees and software service fees, which caused conflicts with small and medium sellers. In the price war in Jingdong, it may have been sold at a price lower than the cost. The traditional industrial organization theory usually thinks that the monopoly market structure is not good. Because of its pricing model based on its own marginal cost and marginal income, it will cause welfare losses to consumers, resulting in low market efficiency and unnecessary losses. This paper first expounds the basic connotation and judgment criteria of monopoly, analyzes the monopoly and characteristics of online retail industry in the "Internet +" era, and finally puts forward some governance strategies for the monopoly problems existing in the current online retail industry.

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Meyer, F. V. "Book Review: Transnational Monopoly Capitalism." Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 3, no. 1 (January 1989): 69–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/02601079x8900300109.

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Transnational Monopoly Capitalism: Keith Cowling and Roger Sugden; Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, Brighton, 1987, pp. 178, ISBN 0-7450-0191-2 (cloth) £22.50 and 0-7450-0267-6 (Pbk) £8.95. Trade Theory and Policy: Ali M. El-Agraa; Macmillan Press, London, 1984, pp. 118, ISBN 0-333-36020-6, £33.00. The Stability of the International Monetary System: W.M. Scammell; Macmillan Education Ltd., London, 1987, pp. 162, ISBN 0-333-38577-2 (hardcover) £20.00 and 0-333-38578-0 (Pbk) £6.95. The Economics of the Common Market, Sixth Edition: Dennis Swann; Pelican Books, London, 1988, pp. 326, ISBN 0-14-022781-4, £6.95.

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Shvalagina, K. I. "The evolution of secularization theory: from monopoly to crisis." Ukrainian Religious Studies, no. 45 (March 7, 2008): 31–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.32420/2008.45.1893.

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Secularization theory is one of those intellectual products that determine the understanding of religion, its status in society, and the changes that take place between faith and unbelief, between church and state, for quite some time. Constituted in the United States in the mid-twentieth century, this theory has found many followers both in America and in Europe, even in the USSR. Its validity and integrity, evidentiality and obviousness did not cause any doubt either to scholars or to religious and statesmen. It was clear that society is liberated from the influence of religion and the church, is rapidly secularized, which will inevitably lead to the transformation of religion into a marginal phenomenon, and eventually - to its extinction. But the predictions that were made with unqualified certainty did not come true, as the development of the religious environment at the end of the XX and the beginning of the XXI century showed. Not only has religion not lost its significance for the modern man, but he is also actively returning to the public sphere. In line with such objective changes, secularization theory undergoes significant transformations, evolving from a monopoly that it has had for almost half a century, to a crisis, and eventually to its antipode, a theory of desecularization.

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Salvadori, Neri, and Rodolfo Signorino. "Adam Smith on Monopoly Theory. Making good a lacuna." Scottish Journal of Political Economy 61, no. 2 (March 6, 2014): 178–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12040.

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Bandura, Olexandr, and Valeriia Tkachova. "Quantitative indexes for direct control of monopolies on different hierarchical levels of economy." Ekonomìčna teorìâ 2022, no. 2 (June 30, 2022): 67–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/etet2022.02.067.

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The evidence base of proving that a monopoly uses its market power is a problem that has no unambiguous solution. Lack of clarity in antitrust legislation is a long term problem. A part of the problem is impossibility to elaborate a theory and quantitative indexes for a monopoly control, which would be used for juridical practice. This paper presents an attempt to solve this problem proposing new quantitative indexes of a monopoly control. To do this, we used the cumulative market imperfection model of macroeconomic dynamics (CMI-model) that is based on comparison of perfect and imperfect competition both for separate markets and economy as a whole. Within framework of the model there is a possibility to calculate natural (competitive) price that correspond to perfect competition even, if such competition never was establish in real market. Difference between natural and actual market price characterizes the rate of market imperfection and could be used for the monopoly power estimation. We proposed two types of quantitative indexes to control a monopoly. First type estimates the value of monopoly power, second type – impact degree of this power. It makes us possible to control monopoly on different hierarchical levels: firm, sector of economy, economy as a whole. Besides, there are some more competitive advantages of proposed indexes: 1)monitor indexes in dynamics, i.e. we are able to estimate in real time both the fact of a monopoly power usage and impact degree of this power; 2) to separate innovative component from production cost of monopolist; 3) to demonstrate the monopoly power impact on period and amplitude of economic cycle; 4) to control monopoly in a permanent mode, actually “on-line”, but not in a discrete mode as it could be done in standard methods. Additionally, proposed indexes do not require confidential information about firm’s activity.

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Post, Charles. "Exploring Working-Class Consciousness: A Critique of the Theory of the ‘Labour-Aristocracy’*." Historical Materialism 18, no. 4 (2010): 3–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156920610x550596.

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AbstractThe notion of the labour-aristocracy is one of the oldest Marxian explanations of working-class conservatism and reformism. Despite its continued appeal to scholars and activists on the Left, there is no single, coherent theory of the labour-aristocracy. While all versions argue working-class conservatism and reformism reflects the politics of a privileged layer of workers who share in ‘monopoly’ super-profits, they differ on the sources of those super-profits: national dominance of the world-market in the nineteenth century (Marx and Engels), imperialist investments in the ‘colonial world’/global South (Lenin and Zinoviev), or corporate monopoly in the twentieth century (Elbaum and Seltzer). The existence of a privileged layer of workers who share monopoly super-profits with the capitalist class cannot be empirically verified. This essay presents evidence that British capital’s dominance of key-branches of global capitalist production in the Victorian period, imperialist investment and corporate market-power can not explain wage-differentials among workers globally or nationally, and that relatively well-paid workers have and continue to play a leading rôle in radical and revolutionary working-class organisations and struggles. An alternative explanation of working-class radicalism, reformism, and conservatism will be the subject of a subsequent essay.

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Marchese, Carla. "Do intellectual property rights involve a private power to tax." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 34, no. 2 (October 1, 2019): 209–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569119x15682726799586.

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This article criticises the standard approach to intellectual property rights, interpreted as property rights conferring a monopolistic position, by showing that a public good is not a suitable basis for a private monopoly and that the bundle of rights included in an intellectual property right is so different from those enjoyed under a standard monopoly as to suggest that a different mechanism is at work, that is, a private power to tax has been granted. To highlight how this novel approach works, mainstream economic models of economic growth based on research and development, whether protected or not by intellectual property rights, are revisited. The theory of taxation is then recalled to show that taxes involved by intellectual property rights can range from an amount equal to the monopoly profit to Lindahl taxes. Finally, the principles of taxation elaborated by economic theory are examined for clues to improving the design of intellectual property rights.

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Peleckis, Kęstutis, Valentina Peleckienė, Kęstutis K. Peleckis, Giedrė Lapinskienė, and Zlatko Nedelko. "Preparation of International Business Negotiation Strategies: Competitive Assessment Aspects in The Market Power System." SHS Web of Conferences 74 (2020): 06024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/20207406024.

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The existence of exclusive rights to produce or supply services means a monopoly. Often it is called a natural monopoly. Exclusive rights are granted for a long period of time, which should encourage major investments in infrastructure, the development of which is unlikely to occur without a guaranteed market. But sometimes exclusive rights are used in situations where there is no natural monopoly. Exclusive rights are, in many respects, one of the main routes to market. Exclusive rights may allow monopoly pricing and other market power tools. Regulatory measures used by competition authorities alone do not make it possible to avoid such a situation, as they often show a very low success rate in preventing market power from being used to protect consumers. The purpose of this article is to analyze the theory and practice of preparing negotiating strategies in a complex way, to reveal opportunities to develop and implement these negotiating strategies, taking into account competition policy actions. The subject of the study is the preparation of negotiation strategies taking into account competition policy actions in the market. The research problem of the article there is not enough tools in the negotiation theory to help develop negotiation strategies in line with competition policy actions.

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Foster, John Bellamy, and Grzegorz Konat. "The Present as History' and the Theory of Monopoly Capital." Monthly Review 69, no. 9 (February 1, 2018): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.14452/mr-069-09-2018-02_1.

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The most important principle of the monopoly capital tradition is that of "the present as history"—a focus on the historical specificity that separates the various modes, stages, and phases of production and accumulation, and its application to our understanding of the present.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

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Abbas, Muhammad Z. "Evergreening of pharmaceutical patents: A blithe disregard for the rationale of the patent system." Journal of Generic Medicines: The Business Journal for the Generic Medicines Sector 15, no. 2 (May 16, 2019): 53–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1741134319848797.

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Evergreening of pharmaceutical patents has emerged as a serious challenge for access to affordable drugs as it aims to delay the generic competition by extending the length of the exclusivity period beyond the legitimate patent term without any considerable improvement in therapeutic benefits of the already patented pharmaceutical drug. This paper endeavours to question the legitimacy of the evergreening of pharmaceutical patents. This study applies all the recognized theories in support of the patent system – namely the ‘natural law’ or ‘natural rights’ theory, the ‘reward by monopoly’ theory, the ‘monopoly-profit incentive’ theory, the ‘exchange for secrets’ theory or the ‘contract’ theory, and the ‘prospect’ theory – to the practice of evergreening of drug patents in order to check whether or not any of these theories can be used to justify the practice. The study concludes that the practice of evergreening is not consistent with any of these theories and therefore lacks any plausible justification.

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전희상. "A Critique of the Monopoly Price Theory of Information Commodities." MARXISM 21 7, no. 3 (August 2010): 308–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.26587/marx.7.3.201008.010.

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Deryabina, M. "Reforming Natural Monopolies: Theory and Practice." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 1 (January 20, 2006): 102–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2006-1-102-121.

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The article deals with the new theoretical approaches to natural monopoly. It describes essential features of the appropriate branches of economy. The role of the state in the regulation of natural monopolies in the developed and transition economies is also analyzed. The author compares the advantages and shortcomings of various institutional alternatives of organization of natural monopolies functioning as well as the perspectives of public-private partnership in this sphere. Special attention is paid to the analysis of Russian natural monopolies reforms.

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Zhang, Wei-Bin. "Monopolies and perfect competition in Solow–Uzawa’s general equilibrium growth model." Russian Journal of Industrial Economics 12, no. 4 (January 3, 2020): 405–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.17073/2072-1633-2019-4-405-415.

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The purpose of this study is to introduce monopolies to neoclassical growth theory. This unique contribution attempts to make neoclassical economic growth theory more realistic in modelling the complexity of economic growth and development with different types of market structures. This study is based on a few well-established economic theories in the literature of economics. We frame the model on basis of the Solow–Uzawa two-sector growth model. The modelling of monopoly is based on well-developed monopoly theory. We model behavior of the household with Zhang’s concept of disposable income and utility function. The model endogenously determines profits of monopolies which are equally distributed among the homogeneous population. We build the model and then identify the existence of an equilibrium point by simulation. We conduct comparative static analyses in some parameters.

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Xiang, Qiulan, and Chengmo Zhang. "Coordination Between Tobacco Resource Development and Regional Economy." Tobacco Regulatory Science 7, no. 4 (July 31, 2021): 408–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.18001/trs.7.4.18.

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Objectives: This paper studies the relationship between the development of tobacco resources and the coordination of regional economy under the background of tobacco monopoly. Methods: This paper takes the institutional change theory as the theoretical fulcrum and the cost-benefit analysis as the main line, the correlation between regional economy and the development of tobacco industry is compared. This paper expounds the evolution history and institutional characteristics of China's tobacco monopoly system, and analyzes the changes of production, supply and marketing relationship, institutional characteristics and benefit distribution of the tobacco industry in each period. After the theoretical and empirical analysis of the costs and benefits of China's tobacco monopoly system, this paper studies the role of tobacco resource development in promoting regional economy by comparing the costs and benefits of radical and gradual reform. Results: On the premise of retaining tobacco monopoly, we should take the separation of government and enterprises and the reform of tobacco fiscal and tax system as the breakthrough. This can change the tobacco industry from administrative monopoly to economic monopoly and form tobacco trust. The linkage mechanism of "tax, profit and price" should be established to protect the interests of tobacco farmers. A tobacco auction center shall be established and a third-party tobacco rating agency shall be guided. Conclusion: The net income of the new system is higher than that of the old system. The healthy development of tobacco industry can promote regional economy.

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Ayoub, Antoine. "Technologie, matières premières et pétrole : vers un monopole bilatéral?" Articles 53, no. 4 (June 30, 2009): 666–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/800752ar.

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Abstract What is the appropriate economic policy for primary commodity producing developing countries given that industrialized countries are specialized in the production of technological progress? Integrating the concept of product life cycle to the static theory of comparative advantage, Harry Johnson has argued that free trade will, by spreading the technology, dissolve the monopoly in technology, and thus constitutes the only policy capable of transmitting growth from one country to another. This article criticizes this thesis on the following points: 1) A rigorous interpretation of the concept of product life cycle and of the underlying assumptions suggests that only industrialized countries present the necessary conditions for the location of the production of exportable technological progress. 2) It follows that the monopoly of the industrialized countries is not temporary but dynamic and self renewing. 3) Free trade, in this case, will only reinforce the negative effects of this monopoly on international specialization and, therefore, reinforce the disparities between industrialized and developing countries. Given the absence of a supranational authority which could intervene against this monopoly, it is appropriate to consider the limits of the bilateral monopoly policy which the developing countries will apply, based on their primary commodities, and the role that OPEC can play in this context.

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Butcher, Siân. "Appropriating rent from greenfield affordable housing: developer practices in Johannesburg." Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 52, no. 2 (January 7, 2020): 337–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0308518x19895278.

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‘Affordable housing’ for Johannesburg’s growing middle class is a developmentalist imperative and potentially lucrative market. However, few greenfield developers have found this market profitable. Fundamental to those who have, is control over land and its development. This paper puts heterodox urban land rent theory to work vis-à-vis the logics and practices of these developers. I illustrate how greenfield affordable housing developers work to (re)produce differential and monopoly rents in this context. Differential rents rely on investing in cheap land produced through the city’s racialised geography, and controlling land’s development through vertical integration, dynamic negotiations with local government and development finance institutions, and steering money and people into developments. Monopoly rents rely on the power of developers to act together as a class to secure land, give the appearance of competition and lobby the state in their interests. This power is built through racialised control over land and long personal connections. It is also consolidated by the state’s own land development bureaucracy and preference for ‘mega’ developments and recognisable developers. Together, these developer strategies to accrue differential and monopoly rents demonstrate their active role in the everyday making of land and housing markets. They also demand extensions of heterodox urban land rent theory: first, a more articulated understanding of how class monopoly power over land is built through race, and second, a more contingent analysis of capital’s relations to other actors and institutions, especially the state.

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Anderson, Steven T., Daniel Friedman, and Ryan Oprea. "Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment." American Economic Review 100, no. 4 (September 1, 2010): 1778–803. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1778.

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Several impatient investors with private costs Ci face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor i to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, V-Ci. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. A laboratory experiment confirms the model's main qualitative predictions: competition drastically lowers the value at which investment occurs; usually the lowest-cost investor preempts the other investors; observed investment patterns in competition (unlike monopoly) are quite insensitive to changes in the Brownian parameters. Support is more qualified for the prediction that markups decline with cost. (JEL C73, D44, D82, G31)

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Horgos, Lívia. "Thoughts about the Definition of Ius Puniendi in Legal Theory." Belügyi Szemle 69, no. 1 (May 6, 2021): 9–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.38146/bsz.spec.2021.1.1.

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In my paper I deal with the jurisprudential interpretation of ius puniendi by providing a historical overview of theories concerning this notion in a time span of almost 6000 years until it became a state monopoly and the humanization of criminal law. The interpretation of ius puniendi as the legal ground of punishment is based on different principles in different ages. The jurisprudential interpretation becomes less relevant with the birth of the legal state, when ius puniendi is a state monopoly. Nowadays the meaning of ius puniendi has been modified and broadened with new, different elements, since the principle of opportunity plays a more decisive role in the criminal law systems of modern states. In my study I interpret and examine ius puniendi unlike the classical authors of criminal law, i.e. a notion referring to the legal ground of punishment, but in its original meaning, i.e. the right of punishment, because of its modern function. With my work my aim is to answer the question whether the dogmatically elaborated category of ius puniendi has to be incorporated into the substantive and procedural jurisprudence of the 21st century.

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Mishra, Sounaka, B. Arjuna Krishna, and Shijin Rajakrishnan. "Approximability of open k-monopoly problems." Theory of Computing Systems 65, no. 5 (January 14, 2021): 798–814. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00224-020-10027-4.

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Foster, John Bellamy. "Monopoly Capital at the Half-Century Mark." Monthly Review 68, no. 3 (July 1, 2016): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.14452/mr-068-03-2016-07_1.

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A half-century after its publication, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy's Monopoly Capital remains the single most influential work in Marxian political economy to emerge in the United States.… In recent years, interest in Baran and Sweezy's magnum opus has revived, primarily for two reasons: (1) the global resurgence of debates over the constellation of issues that their work addressed—including economic stagnation, monopoly, inequality, militarism and imperialism, multinational corporations, economic waste, surplus capital absorption, financial speculation, and plutocracy; and (2) the new, fundamental insights into the book's origins resulting from the publication of its two missing chapters and the public release of Baran and Sweezy's correspondence.… I shall divide this introduction on the influence and development of the argument of Monopoly Capital over the last fifty years into three parts: (1) a brief treatment of the book itself and its historical context; (2) a discussion of responses to Monopoly Capital, and of the development of the tradition that it represented, during its first four decades, up to the Great Financial Crisis that began in 2007; and (3) an assessment of the continuing significance of monopoly capital theory in the context of the historical period stretching from the Great Financial Crisis to the present.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

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Panitch, Leo. "Corporatism: A Growth Industry Reaches the Monopoly Stage." Canadian Journal of Political Science 21, no. 4 (December 1988): 813–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900057474.

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At the end of the 1970s, the corporatism growth industry in political science passed from its competitive stage (articles in journals) to its organized stage (articles collected in books). In the founding text of the new stage, Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, Philippe Schmitter explained that corporatism was not itself a theory capable of generating explanations and predictions. Rather, it was a phenomenon that had to be theorized within one of the major competing paradigms of social structure and social change, which he identified as those associated with Durkheimian and Parsonian “structural differentiation,” the historical materialism of Weberian and Marxist-revisionist “organized capitalism,” and the Marxist political economy tradition wherein he located the theories of the state popular at the time. Yet, it was perhaps inevitable, given the accumulation of academic capital associated with growth industries in the social sciences, that Schmitter's (and others') sound advice would be ignored and that grandiose claims would be made for corporatism as a theory in its own right.

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Smyrnaios, Nikos. "Google as an Information Monopoly." Contemporary French and Francophone Studies 23, no. 4 (August 8, 2019): 442–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17409292.2019.1718980.

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Liu, Yuchengqiu, Xuanran Ye, and Yuyang Zhou. "A Framing Analysis of Chinese and Western Media Coverage of Anti-Internet Enterprise Monopoly in China." Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Studies 4, no. 4 (December 4, 2022): 221–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.32996/jhsss.2022.4.4.28.

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Since the implementation of the Internet anti-monopoly law, different media in different countries have reported it from different angles. In recent years, both Chinese media and Western media have had different reports and opinions due to their stance, culture and perspective. The objective of the study is to compare the differences and commonalities between Chinese and Western media coverage of anti-internet enterprise monopoly in China based on frame theory. This paper classifies the types of coverage in Chinese and Western media into Human Interest Frame, Economic Consequences Frame and Conflict Frame based on frame theory. The aim of this study is to investigate the differences between Chinese and Western media reporting. The results of the study revealed that the differences are drawn from; differences in media systems and differences in news production.

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Guo, Yong, and Angang Hu. "The administrative monopoly in China’s economic transition." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 37, no. 2 (June 1, 2004): 265–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2004.03.005.

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Corruption in transition economies has become the very focus of many recent discussions on politics and economics. However, the existing research has not taken full account of the experience of the gradual transition countries, especially China, and the incentives for rent creation in the transition process. Based on existing studies in this field, this paper addresses a new category of corruption in transition economies. In the context of the rent seeking theory, the authors examine what they regard as a unique type of corruption in China—administrative monopoly (AM), and outline its essence, causes, forms, features, the scale of the rent created, and the dissipation of the rent.

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Foster, John Bellamy. "The Theory of Monopoly Capitalism: An Elaboration of Marxian Political Economy." Labour / Le Travail 20 (1987): 316. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25142923.

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Foster, John Bellamy. "Introduction to the Second Edition of The Theory of Monopoly Capitalism." Monthly Review 65, no. 3 (July 7, 2013): 107. http://dx.doi.org/10.14452/mr-065-03-2013-07_7.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Monopoly theory'

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