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Journal articles on the topic 'MONOPOLY MARKETS'

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Published: 10 December 2022

Last updated: 28 January 2023

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1

Hardiani, Hardiani, and Etik Umiyati. "Dampak Pemberian Subsidi Produksi Terhadap Keseimbangan Pasar pada Pasar Persaingan Sempurna dan Pasar Monopoli." Jurnal Perspektif Pembiayaan dan Pembangunan Daerah 3, no. 2 (December 20, 2015): 59–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.22437/ppd.v3i2.3505.

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Abstract. This study aimed to analyze: (1) the impact of subsidies on the market equilibriumin perfect competition and monopoly markets (2) the impact of subsidies on the efficiency of markets, surplus buyer-seller on the market perfect competition and monopoly market. Research using method of experimental economics. The simulated market in the form of a) a perfectly competitive market with goods subsidized and non-subsidized goods; b) a monopoly market with goods subsidized and non-subsidized goods. Data were analyzed at each simulation and the market structure of each type of goods. The result showed that: (1) Empirical equilibrium price higher than the market monopoly of perfect competition and the higher the subsidy conditions than non-subsidized either on transaction systems double action or decentralization; (2) market with subsidized monopoly has a level of market efficiency is better than a perfectly competitive market both with and without subsidies; (3) The allocation of the surplus on the market almost entirely monopoly enjoyed by the seller. In contrast to the perfectly competitive market, relatively more surplus enjoyed by the buyer, but the difference is not too great. Keywords: experimental economics, monopoly market, perfect competition market, subsidies Abstrak. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis: (1) dampak subsidi terhadap keseimbangan pasar pada pasar persaingan sempurna dan pasar monopoli (2) dampak subsidi terhadap efisiensi pasar, surplus pembeli-penjual pada pasar persaingan sempurna dan pasar monopoli. Penelitian menggunakan metode percobaan ekonomi. Pasar disimulasi dalam bentuk a) pasar persaingan sempurna dengan barang non subsidi dan barang subsidi desentralisasi; b) pasar monopoli dengan barang non subsidi dan barang subsidi desentralisasi. Data yang diperoleh dianalisis pada masing-masing simulasi struktur pasar dan pada masing-masing jenis barang. Dari hasil penelitian didapatkan bahwa: (1) Harga keseimbangan empiris lebih tinggi pada pasar monopoli dibandingkan persaingan sempurna dan lebih tinggi pada kondisi subsidi dibandingkan non-subsidi baik pada sistem transaksi double action ataupun desentralisasi; (2) Pasar monopoli dengan subsidi memiliki tingkat efisiensi pasar lebih baik dibandingkan pasar persaingan sempurna baik dengan subsidi maupun tanpa subsidi; (3) Alokasi surplus pada pasar monopoli hampir seluruhnya dinikmati oleh penjual. Sebaliknya pada pasar persaingan sempurna, surplus relatif lebih banyak dinikmati oleh pembeli, tetapi dengan selisih yang tidak terlalu besar. Kata Kunci: Ekonomi Percobaan, Pasar Monopoli, Pasar Persaingan Sempurna, Subsidi

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2

Bresnahan, Timothy F., and Peter C. Reiss. "Entry in Monopoly Markets." Review of Economic Studies 57, no. 4 (October 1990): 531. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2298085.

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3

Tang, Zhiyuan, and Luyao Wang. "A Study on the Correlation between Korean Monopoly Markets and Monopoly Companies: Analysis through the Inefficientness of Monopoly Markets and Monopoly Companies." Northeast Asian Business and Economics Association 2, no. 1 (May 30, 2021): 31–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.51156/jnabe.2021.2.1.31.

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4

Bose, Arup, and Barnali Gupta. "Mixed markets in bilateral monopoly." Journal of Economics 110, no. 2 (October 10, 2012): 141–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0310-8.

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5

Braido, Luis H. B., and Felipe L. Shalders. "Monopoly rents in contestable markets." Economics Letters 130 (May 2015): 89–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.008.

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6

Jiao, Huifang, Xuan Wang, Chi To Ng, and Lijun Ma. "Pricing and Return Policies in a Competitive Market: A Consumer-Valuation Based Analysis with Valuation Uncertainties." Sustainability 13, no. 3 (January 29, 2021): 1432. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su13031432.

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In this study, we develop a series of consumer-valuation-based models to investigate the pricing and return policies of the sellers in a competitive e-commerce market. Differing from the competition models in literature, a novel two-dimensional valuation structure is built, which considers the valuations of a consumer on two products and the valuation differentiation of all consumers on each product. We consider both monopoly and duopoly (competitive) markets. In each market, two models are respectively developed, one with and one without the return policies. We derive the solutions for the four models, and conduct some analytical and numerical investigations. The results show that return policy with a partial refund is always chosen by the sellers in both monopoly and duopoly markets. Return policy benefits the seller in a monopoly market, but may not benefit the sellers in a duopoly market. In the duopoly models, one seller can be considered as a monopoly seller who meets a new competitor. Our results show that the monopoly seller will reduce its price by no more than 20% when there comes a competitor, and, counter-intuitively, it will meanwhile adopt a severer return policy to the consumers.

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7

Shastitko, A., and N. Pavlova. "Antitrust in bilateral monopoly." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 8 (August 20, 2017): 75–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2017-8-75-91.

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The existing practice of implementing antitrust law to bilateral monopolies in Russia shows signs of inconsistency. Traditional theoretical approaches differ in their estimations of the characteristics and attainability of equilibrium on such markets, but overall more or less converge on the idea of antitrust regulation of such markets to be unjustified. But approaching the problem in the context of transaction cost economics, taking into account the externalities appearing both upstream and downstream from the bilateral monopoly market in case of a suboptimal result, leads to viewing the antitrust authority as a discrete institutional alternative of internalizing such externalities by creating the incentives to develop a hybrid governance mechanism for transactions between the sides of contractual relationship characterized by sufficiently high switching costs. Taking into account the wide occurrence of bilateral monopolies in the Russian economy, the choice of a uniform approach to regulation is critical in terms of creating transparent legal environment and adjusting companies’ incentives.

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8

He, Ye, Siming Guo, Yu Wang, Yujia Zhao, Weidong Zhu, Fangyuan Xu, Chun Sing Lai, and Ahmed F. Zobaa. "An Agent-Based Bidding Simulation Framework to Recognize Monopoly Behavior in Power Markets." Energies 16, no. 1 (December 30, 2022): 434. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en16010434.

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Although many countries prefer deregulated power markets as a means of containing power costs, a monopoly may still exist. In this study, an agent-based bidding simulation framework is proposed to detect whether there will be a monopoly in the power market. A security-constrained unit commitment (SCUC) is conducted to clear the power market. Using the characteristics that the agent can fully explore in a certain environment and the Q-learning algorithm, each power producer in the power market is modeled as an agent, and the agent selects a quotation strategy that can improve profits based on historical bidding information. The numerical results show that in a power market with monopoly potential among the power producers, the profits of the power producers will not converge, and the locational marginal price will eventually become unacceptable. Whereas, in a power market without monopoly potential, power producers will maintain competition and the market remains active and healthy.

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9

Mayer-Foulkes, David. "Monopoly in a Competitive Setting." PANORAMA ECONÓMICO 14, no. 27 (November 30, 2018): 32. http://dx.doi.org/10.29201/pe-ipn.v14i27.208.

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A production market with given preferences, technology and compe tition technology is vulnerable if it admits both perfect competition and monopoly or oligopoly. Under decreasing returns, sunk costs combined with a potential for monopoly profits provide a sufficient basis for vulnerability. A large agent can establish monopoly by installing enough productive capacity. The monopolist deters entry by threatening to oversupply the market. The threat is credible if the future discount rate is low enough and if enough small players enter the market in the absence of punishment. Financial institutions can capture vulnerable markets for profit, reducing competition, efficiency and equity.

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10

Feng, Zhenhua, Таосин Лиу, Владимир Мазалов, Vladimir Mazalov, and Jie Zheng. "Pricing of Platforms in Two-Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Agents and Limited Market Size." Mathematical Game Theory and Applications 10, no. 1 (January 28, 2019): 83–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.17076/mgta1_5.

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We study a two-sided market represented by network platforms and heterogeneous agents. Our setup departs from Armstrong (2006)’s monopoly model by assuming both (1) a continuum of agents of limited size on each side of the market and (2) heterogeneous utility of agents with Hotelling specification. We show that the monopoly’s optimal pricing strategy always results in a corner solution in terms of the equilibrium market share. We also solve for the social planner’s optimization problem and obtain a similar corner solution result. In addition, the exact values for the equilibrium in the case of duopoly for a two-sided market on two platforms are obtained.

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11

Ferrara, Elia. "Monopoly Power in Platform Dominated Markets." STUDI ECONOMICI, no. 118 (August 2017): 69–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/ste2016-118005.

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12

Prager, Robin A. "Firm Behavior in Franchise Monopoly Markets." RAND Journal of Economics 21, no. 2 (1990): 211. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555419.

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13

Goering, Gregory E., and Michael K. Pippenger. "Durable Goods Monopoly and Forward Markets." International Journal of the Economics of Business 9, no. 2 (July 2002): 271–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13571510210135005a.

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14

APPELBAUM, ELIE, and CHIN LIM. "MONOPOLY AND EX-POST CONTESTABLE MARKETS." Australian Economic Papers 29, no. 54 (June 1990): 128–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8454.1990.tb00477.x.

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15

Subramanian, Dilip. "From monopoly power to deregulated markets." Contributions to Indian Sociology 48, no. 1 (December 4, 2013): 73–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0069966713502422.

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16

Scitovsky, Tibor. "The Benefits of Asymmetric Markets." Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, no. 1 (February 1, 1990): 135–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.4.1.135.

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Economists are often so mesmerized by the magic of perfect competition that they neglect or fail to notice other, equally important achievements of the real market economy around us, most of which seem to result from monopoly tempered by competition and competition tempered by monopoly. Here, we drop the one assumption underlying general equilibrium theory that does perhaps the most violence to reality: that all economic agents possess all the market information relevant to the transactions they enter or contemplate entering into. Knowledge is power, and those on the better informed side of the market can exploit the people on its other side. Such power is the main source of monopoly power, its exploitation yields monopoly profit, and rivalry among market participants who wield such power is the main form of monopolistic competition. The root cause of the unequal distribution of knowledge between buyers and sellers is the division of labor, which causes everybody to know more than others about their own specialty and less about other people's specialties than others know about them. The farther the division of labor proceeds, the wider becomes the gulf between the specialist's knowledge and the nonspecialist's ignorance of each specialty. Such disparity in the knowledge and preparedness of buyers and sellers to deal with each other and to stand up to each other is an important and unavoidable feature of today's market economy, which has received surprisingly little attention.

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17

Rozanova, N. "Network Competition as Determinant of Contemporary Markets’ Configuration." World Economy and International Relations 60, no. 4 (2016): 13–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2016-60-4-13-20.

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The latest phenomena in the area of industrial economics have turned out to be beyond the traditional models of industrial organization theory. This theory deals with the four basic market structures, namely that of free competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly and monopoly, with a common evolutionary pattern from competition to monopoly. However, contemporary technological competition has engendered a brand-new type of market structure. Some key features of it are outlined in the article with the stress on contemporary trends in network market development that have arisen under the influence of digitalization. The traditional approach to network market is through escalation effect, when network spillovers exist either in technology or in demand, and companies or IT platforms should gain a benchmark mass of clients, as fast as possible, in order to have the whole market. All other consumers have tendency to buy the leader’s product; thus, the market becomes a natural monopoly of the leader (at least, natural oligopoly). With the advancement in ICT technology, especially with digitalization, a new configuration of network market structure is being developed. Niche players are gaining their positions. It is arisen a multiple offer of ICT products. Market is becoming more and more fragmented. Network products evolve from substitutes into complements. The market drives from natural monopoly (oligopoly) into a very competitive structure. The author examines the mechanisms and results of network market transformation in contemporary digital era. Unlike the previous period when network services were provided separately, the newest tendencies, starting from TV, demonstrate that the frontiers among network markets become blurred, the separation between markets and particular ICT products vanishes/ So far, the formerly independent network markets are being transformed into shapeless segments of a single and indivisible multimedia area. In this integrated area any ICT provider obtains an opportunity to successfully compete with any other. The differences between various electronic devices, between ICT, broadcasting and address services, and even non-ICT products disappear. Network market evolves from a very concentrated and monopolized structure into a fragmented competitive industry with tough price competition. This brand new structure could be titled as concentric (ring) market, or a center-periphery model. The relationships within it mean unknown possibilities and challenges both for market participants and governments.

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18

Dewata, Mukti Fajar Nur. "PROBLEMATIKA PENGUKURAN PANGSA PASAR." Jurnal Yudisial 10, no. 3 (December 29, 2017): 295. http://dx.doi.org/10.29123/jy.v10i3.287.

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ABSTRAKPutusan Nomor 09/KPPU-L/2009 menilai telah terdapat bukti yang sah dan meyakinkan bahwa PT CI telah melanggar Undang-Undang Nomor 5 Tahun 1999 tentang Larangan Praktik Monopoli dan Persaingan Usaha Tidak Sehat. Adapun pasal yang dilanggar adalah Pasal 17 ayat (1) yang memuat ketentuan mengenai larangan bagi pelaku usaha untuk melakukan penguasaan pasar, dan Pasal 25 ayat (1) yang memuat ketentuan terkait dengan posisi dominan. Putusan KPPU tersebut kemudian dibatalkan oleh Mahkamah Agung melalui Putusan Nomor 502 K/PDT.SUS/2010 yang menyatakan bahwa PT CI tidak terbukti melanggar pasal-pasal tersebut. Penelitian ini mengkaji mengenai perdebatan penafsiran klausul tentang penguasaan atas produksi dan pemasaran sehingga mengakibatkan monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat, dan perbedaan pengukuran pangsa pasar yang dijadikan dasar oleh KPPU dan Mahkamah Agung sehingga menghasilkan putusan yang berbeda. Penelitian ini dilakukan secara yuridis normatif yang mengkaji berbagai bahan hukum, serta dianalisis secara deskriptif komparatif. Temuan penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa ada perbedaan cara penafsiran teks Undang-Undang Anti Monopoli antara KPPU dan Mahkamah Agung. KPPU menggunakan standar pangsa pasar di kota tertentu di mana PT CI membuka usaha, Mahkamah Agung menggunakan standar pangsa pasar dengan wilayah nasional.Kata kunci: persaingan usaha, monopoli, pengukuran pangsa pasar, posisi dominan.ABSTRACTDecision of Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (KPPU) Number 09/KPPU-L/2009 stated that there were valid and convincing evidences that PT CI has violated Law Number 5 of 1999 regarding Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition Article 17 paragraph (1) regarding the prohibition for business actors to control the markets, and Article 25 paragraph (1) containing provisions relating to dominant position. The decision was subsequently annulled by the Supreme Court by the Decision Number 502 K/PDT.SUS/2010 stating that PT CI was not proven to have violated those articles. This research examines as follows: first, debate on interpretation of clauses about the control of production and markets resulting in monopoly and unfair business competition, second, differences in measurement of market share applied by the KPPU and the Supreme Court as underpinning two different decisions. This analysis was conducted using the method of normative juridical approach by examining various law materials, and analyzing through descriptive comparative method. The result of this analysis showed that there is a difference in ways of interpreting the text of Anti-monopoly Law between the KPPU and the Supreme Court. The KPPU used market share standards in certain cities where PT CI opened a business while Supreme Court used market share standards in national territory.Keywords: business competition, monopoly, market share measurement, dominant position.

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19

Andrew Muller, R., Stuart Mestelman, John Spraggon, and Rob Godby. "Can Double Auctions Control Monopoly and Monopsony Power in Emissions Trading Markets?" Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 44, no. 1 (July 2002): 70–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2001.1195.

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20

Bandura, Olexandr, and Valeriia Tkachova. "Quantitative indexes for direct control of monopolies on different hierarchical levels of economy." Ekonomìčna teorìâ 2022, no. 2 (June 30, 2022): 67–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/etet2022.02.067.

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The evidence base of proving that a monopoly uses its market power is a problem that has no unambiguous solution. Lack of clarity in antitrust legislation is a long term problem. A part of the problem is impossibility to elaborate a theory and quantitative indexes for a monopoly control, which would be used for juridical practice. This paper presents an attempt to solve this problem proposing new quantitative indexes of a monopoly control. To do this, we used the cumulative market imperfection model of macroeconomic dynamics (CMI-model) that is based on comparison of perfect and imperfect competition both for separate markets and economy as a whole. Within framework of the model there is a possibility to calculate natural (competitive) price that correspond to perfect competition even, if such competition never was establish in real market. Difference between natural and actual market price characterizes the rate of market imperfection and could be used for the monopoly power estimation. We proposed two types of quantitative indexes to control a monopoly. First type estimates the value of monopoly power, second type – impact degree of this power. It makes us possible to control monopoly on different hierarchical levels: firm, sector of economy, economy as a whole. Besides, there are some more competitive advantages of proposed indexes: 1)monitor indexes in dynamics, i.e. we are able to estimate in real time both the fact of a monopoly power usage and impact degree of this power; 2) to separate innovative component from production cost of monopolist; 3) to demonstrate the monopoly power impact on period and amplitude of economic cycle; 4) to control monopoly in a permanent mode, actually “on-line”, but not in a discrete mode as it could be done in standard methods. Additionally, proposed indexes do not require confidential information about firm’s activity.

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21

Malina, Michael. "Some Thoughts on Monopoly, Markets, and Mergers." California Law Review 75, no. 3 (May 1987): 997. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3480664.

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22

Eldor, Rafael, and Itzhak Zilcha. "Discriminating Monopoly, Forward Markets and International Trade." International Economic Review 28, no. 2 (June 1987): 459. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2526737.

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23

Peteraf, Margaret A., and Randal Reed. "Pricing and Performance in Monopoly Airline Markets." Journal of Law and Economics 37, no. 1 (April 1994): 193–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467311.

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24

Kehoe, Michael R. "Quality Uncertainty and Price in Monopoly Markets." Journal of Industrial Economics 44, no. 1 (March 1996): 25. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2950558.

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25

Pindyck, Robert S. "On monopoly power in extractive resource markets." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 14, no. 2 (June 1987): 128–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(87)90011-8.

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26

Zhang, Wei-Bin. "An Integration of Neoclassical Growth Theory and Economic Structural Change with Monopolistic Competition Theory." Business and Economic Research 11, no. 2 (April 6, 2021): 145. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ber.v11i2.18380.

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Wealth accumulation is a deterministic factor mechanism of national economic growth. Neoclassical growth theory is basically concerned with capital and wealth accumulation in perfectly competitive market. Global markets are characterized by a great variety of markets. Nevertheless, there only a few rigorous models of wealth accumulation with other types of markets within neoclassical growth framework. This study attempts to contribute literature of economic growth by introducing monopolistic competition and monopoly into neoclassical growth theory. The model is based on a few well-established economic theories. The model is constructed within framework of the Solow-Uzawa two-sector neoclassical growth model. The description of to monopolistic competition is influenced by the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition. The modelling of monopoly is based on monopoly theory. We model behavior of the household with Zhang’s utility function and concepts of current income and disposable income. The unique contribution of this research is to integrate these theories in a comprehensive framework. We construct the basic model and then analyze properties of the model. The existence of a unique equilibrium point is identified by simulation. The effects of changes in some parameters comparative static analyses in some parameters.

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27

Wrenn, Mary V. "Surplus Absorption and Waste in Neoliberal Monopoly Capitalism." Monthly Review 68, no. 3 (July 5, 2016): 63. http://dx.doi.org/10.14452/mr-068-03-2016-07_5.

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The central problem in advanced monopoly capitalism is not one of scarce resources clashing against innate, insatiable wants. Rather, it is one of an abundance of production clashing against saturated consumption and investment markets. In order to absorb potential economic output and forestall excess capacity, business interests must continuously search for new markets to exploit or entice existing customers who stand ready to buy the latest product, iteration, or service, and to induce new investment. The key to business survival in a capitalist economy is continual expansion of market share and reach: grow or die.… The efforts applied to this relentless drive undermine the conventional wisdom of market-determined pricing—for were a competitive price system in place, the funds for these expenditures would not exist. As I will show, the resources and funds expended in this quixotic endeavor to grow can be broadly referred to as the "economic surplus."Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

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Marichova, Aneta. "Efficiency of the construction market and need for government regulation." Ovidius University Annals of Constanta - Series Civil Engineering 19, no. 1 (December 20, 2017): 37–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ouacsce-2017-0004.

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Abstract For a long time in economic theory and practice, regulation is only linked to the need for state intervention in monopolistic markets, by developing uniform, simple regulatory rules to limit and control the monopoly power, the monopoly price, mergers and acquisitions between companies in the same industry and others. In recent years the prevailing opinion that government regulation is particularly necessary in oligopolistic markets where there are several leading, dominant companies that can influence the price, quantity and quality of the product offered. However, this regulatory policy should not apply to common rules and taking into account the specifics of the market/industry, market structure (concentration level) of the various market segments and the relevant economic activity. The aim of the study: 1) Evaluation of the efficiency of the construction market, 2) Demonstrate the need for government intervention, 3) Guidelines for the implementation of the regulatory function of the government.

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Waldman, Michael. "Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets." Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 1 (February 1, 2003): 131–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533003321164985.

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The early 1970s witnessed three major advances in durable-goods theory — Swan, Peter. 1970. “Durability of Consumption Goods.” American Economic Review. December, 60:5, pp. 884–94. Swan, Peter. 1971. “The Durability of Goods and Regulation of Monopoly.” Bell Journal of Economics. Spring, 2:1, pp. 347–57. and Sieper, E. and Peter Swan. 1973. “Monopoly and Competition in the Market for Durable Goods.” Review of Economic Studies. July, 40:3, pp. 333–51. on optimal durability, Coase, Ronald. 1972. “Durability and Monopoly.” Journal of Law and Economics. April, 15:1, pp. 143–49. on time inconsistency, and Akerlof, George. 1970. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. August, 84:3, pp. 488–500. on adverse selection. This paper surveys durable goods theory starting with these three contributions, where much of the focus is on recent literature and on models that explain real-world phenomena. In addition to the ideas found in the contributions of Swan, Coase, and Akerlof, topics covered include why producers sometimes practice “planned obsolescence,” the role of adverse selection in new-car leasing, and reasons for aftermarket monopolization.

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Aguirre, Iñaki, Simon Cowan, and John Vickers. "Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature." American Economic Review 100, no. 4 (September 1, 2010): 1601–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1601.

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This paper presents a general analysis of the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare and output when all markets are served. Sufficient conditions—involving straightforward comparisons of the curvatures of the direct and inverse demand functions in the different markets—are presented for discrimination to have negative or positive effects on social welfare and output. (JEL D42)

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31

MORHUNOVA, Tetiana. "Features and grounds of legal liability for abuse of monopoly (dominant) position in the market." Economics. Finances. Law, no. 9/1 (September 25, 2020): 27–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.37634/efp.2020.9(1).5.

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Introduction. Issues of legal liability for abuse of monopoly (dominant) position in the market are quite relevant in connection with the dynamic development of legislation, as well as given the active law enforcement practice of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine. In the current conditions, the necessary guarantee of stable development and functioning of domestic commodity markets and economic entities operating in them is the effective counteraction to the negative manifestations of monopoly. Among modern types of violations of the legislation on protection of economic competition by business entities, abuse of monopoly (dominant) position in the market is quite common. The purpose of the paper is to investigate the features and grounds for legal liability for abuse of monopoly (dominant) position in the market. Results. The criteria and conditions of monopoly position of business entities in a certain market are shown. The types of actions that constitute an abuse of the monopoly (dominant) position in the market and the types of prohibitions of this abuse are indicated. The results are summarized and the main directions of work of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine are outlined. Important aspects of prosecution for violation of the legislation on protection of economic competition and the process of determining the monopoly (dominant) position of the subject in the market are highlighted. The most common types of abuse of monopoly (dominant) position in the market and the relevant types of legal liability are considered. The grounds for legal liability for abuse of monopoly position in the market, the object and subject of this offense are identified. Conclusion. The abuse of monopoly (dominant) position in the market should be considered as actions or omissions of the economic entity that holds a monopoly (dominant) position in the market, which have led or may lead to the prevention, elimination or restriction of competition. For committing an offense in the form of abuse of monopoly (dominant) position, the legislation provides for the application of legal liability of the following types: economic, legal and administrative, which can be applied in the form of fines and compulsory division. The basis for legal liability for abuse of monopoly position in the market is the establishment of factual, legal and procedural grounds. The purpose of legal liability for abuse of monopoly (dominant) position in the market is to prevent such negative manifestations in the economic sphere as unfair competition. Continuous development and improvement of legislation on protection of economic competition in combination with economic and organizational measures contributes to the creation of unified system and effective mechanism for combating the abuse of monopoly (dominant) position in the market, including through prosecution. The key function of the Antimonopoly Committee is not to fill the budget with fines, but to effectively protect economic competition, including through active advocacy for competition in Ukraine.

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Stanikūnas, Rimantas. "ANALYSIS OF THE LIBERALIZATION OF THE FIXED TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION MARKET IN LITHUANIA." Ekonomika 87 (January 1, 2009): 44–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/ekon.2009.0.1046.

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This paper deals with the analysis of a relevant issue, regarding the liberalisation of the fixed telephone communication. The paper also deals with the characteristic features of monopoly markets, evaluates market power, both before liberalisation of fixed telephone communication and following the removal of monopoly powers. The paper includes an extensive discussion of the evaluation of barriers preventing entry in the market. It also determines the market power of Lietuvos telekomas (Teo LT AB) fixed telephone communication, based on various market concentration indicators. The purpose of the article is to present the analysis of the liberalization of the fixed telephone communication market in Lithuania and to reveal the inter-coherence of theoretical and practical elements of the liberalization.

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Vasilev, Aleksandar. "Are labor unions important for business cycle fluctuations? Lessons from Bulgaria." Eurasian Economic Review 10, no. 1 (September 9, 2019): 143–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40822-019-00139-9.

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Abstract In this paper, we investigate the quantitative importance of collective bargaining agreements for the observed fluctuations in Bulgarian labor markets. Following Maffezzoli (Rev Econ Dyn 4:860–892, 2001), we introduce a monopoly union into a real-business-cycle model with government sector. We calibrate the model to Bulgarian data for the period following the introduction of the currency board arrangement (1999–2018), and compare and contrast it to a model without unions. We find that the sequential bargaining procedure between the monopoly union and the stand-in firm produces an important internal propagation mechanism within the theoretical setup, which allows the monopoly model to fit data better than the alternative framework with perfectly-competitive labor markets.

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Markina, Yu. "Western Media Monopolies and Diversification of Production in the Media: Methodological Disputes." Scientific Research and Development. Modern Communication Studies 9, no. 5 (September 24, 2020): 74–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/2587-9103-2020-74-81.

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The article deals with the problem of media monopoly market impact upon merging and acquisition processes, diversification being the core of Big Business strategic management. This problem of monopolized markets indirectly influences media texts contents. Examples of ambivalent deals in Western mass media and examples of contradictory methodological discussions of these processes are scrutinized. The conclusions are drawn about ambivalent gist of monopolization in periods of scientific and technological revolutions. The purpose of this article is to consider a number of economic and sociocultural conflicts in the process of merging media enterprises and structures that claim a monopoly or oligopoly place in the market.

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Pindyck, Robert S. "The Measurement of Monopoly Power in Dynamic Markets." Journal of Law and Economics 28, no. 1 (April 1985): 193–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467080.

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Easterbrook, Frank H. "Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures Markets." Journal of Business 59, S2 (January 1986): S103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/296341.

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Becker, Klaus G., and Eleanor T. Von Ende. "Sub-Game Perfect Equilibria in Natural Monopoly Markets." Atlantic Economic Journal 34, no. 3 (August 11, 2006): 365–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11293-006-9022-1.

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Caravaggio, Andrea, and Mauro Sodini. "Monopoly with differentiated final goods and heterogeneous markets." Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 130 (January 2020): 109429. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2019.109429.

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Săvoiu, Gheorghe, and Alexander Vilgelm. "Diversification versus concentration analysis in specific economic activities for assessing spatial differentiation within local markets." E3S Web of Conferences 301 (2021): 04002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202130104002.

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Diversification and concentration represent essential two opposite trends in many economic phenomena. Monopoly and monopsony are the natural limits in any market's analysis and describe together the range or the amplitude of offer and demand in economics. A lot of statistical indicators or coefficients, quantifying the diversification versus concentration phenomenon (D vs. C), can reveal a market, optimal or not, full or empty, etc. The paper sheds the light on the relatively little explored concept of economic evolution from concentration to diversification across local markets, providing novel evidence on underlining the dominance of diversification process within regions. This paper has applied statistical structure variable-based methods for assessing spatial differentiation degree within housing construction economic activity in macroregion Siberia for the sample period from 2000:Q1 to 2020:Q4. We present empirical elasticities using the multivariate OLS model that summarize the diversification economic response to the increasing processes of urbanization and localization across the Siberian regions. Some final remarks offer a distinct profile of this Russian macroregion under the influence of demographical variability.

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Korsakaite, Diana, Darius Bieksa, and Egle Bieksiene. "Third-party access in district heating: Lithuanian case analysis." Competition and Regulation in Network Industries 19, no. 3-4 (September 2018): 218–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1783591719837410.

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Transition from monopoly to competition-based markets is widely recognized processes around the globe when it comes to achieving efficient electricity and gas trade thus presenting direct benefits to the final energy consumers. But when talking about smaller infrastructures like district heating (DH) market is still viewed as a natural monopoly. This article presents Lithuanian case to open up existing municipal infrastructure to third-party access in order to complete fuel switch in DH generation faster and to increase efficiency of the entire system through competitive pressure. The article presents the set of circumstances in DH sector back in 2010; focuses on regulatory framework, which was developed and introduced through two phases in Lithuania; and formulates impacts of the reorganization of DH sector from vertically integrated monopoly to single buyer model for de-monopolized generation.

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Ujah, Nacasius U., Jorge Brusa, and Collins E. Okafor. "The influence of earnings management and bank structure on bank performance." Managerial Finance 43, no. 7 (July 10, 2017): 761–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-12-2015-0329.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of bank structure and earnings management on bank performance in international markets. Specifically, the authors empirically examine non-foreign banks in the following emerging countries: Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, and South Africa. Design/methodology/approach A review of loan loss portfolio and bank’s power structure is examined to formulate testable conjectures. The authors used data collected from Bankscope for the aforementioned countries. The data range is from 1997 to 2009. Findings The results suggest that: first, bank market structure and earnings management have a significantly negative influence on bank performance. Second, the negative influence is more pronounced in banks with higher level of concentration and earnings management. Practical implications The evidence suggest that banks with monopoly power have a greater incentive to establish lending relationships, and monopoly enhancing regulation in the financial sector at the time of the Civil War contributed to industrialization in the USA. The evidence in the emerging market suggest that monopoly power (bank structure) and propensity to manage earnings leads to lower bank performance. As such, helping bankers in understanding the effect of their bank structure in relation to their performance. Originality/value To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study that explores the determinants of managed earnings and bank structure on bank performance in emerging markets.

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Evstigneeva, L., and R. Evstigneev. "Metamorphoses of Financial Capital." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 8 (August 20, 2013): 106–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-8-106-122.

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Financial capital is considered as a precondition of forming an integral market system. Based on financial capital a vertical market model is taking shape. It includes the following leading markets: strategic markets of financial capital, finance and money markets, markets of physical (cluster) capital, markets of social (consumers) capital. Markets of financial capital build the world reproduction model of synergetic character. Sustainability of the world market is maintained within the framework of the following types of big financial capital systems: cooperation of industrial and banking capital (Hilferding), international banks (Keynes), state monopoly of GDP (well known as far back, as in the USSR period). One can consider this framework as a political form of general equilibrium of the global market. A systemic function of financial capital is gathering power for ensuring endogenous evolution of economy and society on the principles of market self-organization. The authors believe this is the only way out of a deadlock for our economy and society.

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Durán-Martínez, Angélica. "Drugs Around the Corner: Domestic Drug Markets and Violence in Colombia and Mexico." Latin American Politics and Society 57, no. 3 (2015): 122–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2015.00274.x.

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AbstractOver the past decade, drug consumption has increased in Colombia and Mexico, countries traditionally concerned with drug production and trafficking. Governments and observers have associated this growth with spikes in violence. Drawing on drug consumption surveys and fieldwork in four cities, this study argues that contrary to this perception, there is no automatic connection between domestic drug markets and violence. Violence depends on whether large drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) control low-level street dealers and on whether those DTOs have a market monopoly at the local level. When dealers are independent, violence might be sporadic, but when DTOs control dealers, violence can explode (given competition between DTOs) or implode (if one organization holds a monopoly). Control over dealers provides DTOs not only income but also informants and armed muscle. This article also shows that domestic drug markets are not new, and have grown incrementally in the past two decades.

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Shut'ko, Larisa. "Controlled Development of Dichotomies Competition and Monopolies in the Conditions of Digitalization «New Economy»." Scientific Research and Development. Economics 10, no. 4 (August 19, 2022): 4–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/2587-9111-2022-10-4-4-11.

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Digitalization as a global challenge for the digital transformation of the “new economy” of the 21st century actualizes the issues of research on managing the development of the dichotomy of competition and monopoly in the space of national markets, regions and countries. It has been determined that digitalization and digital transformation in the "new economy" directly affect the management of the development of the dichotomy of competition and monopoly, determine its trends. Positive and negative trends in manag-ing the development of the dichotomy of competition and monopoly in the Russian economy, their features in comparison with world trends are shown. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that the development of the dichotomy of competition and monop-oly in the "new economy" is considered as a controlled process based on the action of market factors and regulatory influence to achieve the goals of inclusive economic growth. The author's research is based on theoretical and methodological approaches, scientific results contained in the works of foreign and Russian economists on competi-tion and monopoly.

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Genakos, Christos, and Mario Pagliero. "Competition and Pass-Through: Evidence from Isolated Markets." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 14, no. 4 (October 1, 2022): 35–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20200863.

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We measure how pass-through varies with competition in isolated oligopolistic markets with captive consumers. Using daily pricing data from gas stations on small Greek islands, we study how unanticipated and exogenous changes in excise duties are passed through to consumers in markets with different numbers of retailers. We find that pass-through increases from 0.4 in monopoly markets to 1 in markets with four or more competitors and remains constant thereafter. The speed of price adjustment is about 60 percent higher in more competitive markets. Finally, we show that geographic market definitions based on measures of distance across sellers often result in signifi-cant overestimation of the pass-through. (JEL H22, H25, L13, L81)

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Fischer, Carolyn, and Ramanan Laxminarayan. "Monopoly extraction of an exhaustible resource with two markets." Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d`Economique 37, no. 1 (February 2004): 178–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.009_1.x.

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Becker, K., and E. T. von Ende. "Nash and subgame-perfect equilibria for natural monopoly markets." International Advances in Economic Research 4, no. 2 (May 1998): 205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02295499.

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Tavor, T., U. Spiegel, and M. Weber. "Price Control Effectiveness in the Context of a Supply Chain." Review of European Studies 9, no. 1 (February 7, 2017): 189. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/res.v9n1p189.

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The imposition of price controls on a well-functioning competitive market is usually considered harmful to society since it reduces the volume of trade and creates incentives to waste resources. Generally, regulation and control of non-competitive markets in a supply chain environment are very difficult tasks, since the source that maintains and accelerates monopoly induced price increases is unclear.This present paper deals with the case of an entire supply chain with several stations when the economic environment is under a monopoly or duopoly regime and price control in such an environment can be a very useful and corrective policy that may lead to a higher degree of efficiency along with desired redistributional influences.

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Wang, Wenhuan, Jianping Wei, and Dan Wu. "The Optimal Strategy of China’s Plastic Drinking Straws Ban Based on Consumer Heterogeneity and Retailer Competition." Sustainability 14, no. 2 (January 10, 2022): 745. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su14020745.

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The Chinese government has issued a new “Plastic Restriction Ban” requiring that, by the end of 2020, the food and beverage industry across the country bans the use of single-use, nondegradable plastic drinking straws. The governance of plastic drinking straws is a multi-dimensional and complex process. Therefore, based on the heterogeneity of consumers, this paper constructs a tripartite game model (the government, retailers, and consumers) for the governance of plastic drinking straws in China. Under this model, this research derives an optimal strategy in both monopoly and competitive markets, assuming the government has access to two policy tools, fines and subsidies. The research results suggest the following. (1) In monopoly markets, when (a) the fine or subsidy fee is high or (b) the fine or subsidy fee is low and the number of environment-conscious consumers is high, retailers are more inclined to provide biodegradable drinking straws. (2) Consumer heterogeneity has a certain impact on policy results; when there are enough environment-conscious consumers, policy costs can be reduced. (3) For high-quality products, the policy costs in competitive markets is lower than in monopoly markets; for low-quality products, the policy costs in competitive markets is higher than in monopoly markets. Based on the conclusions, this work suggests the government should focus on cultivating consumers’ environmental awareness and tighter control of products quality, in addition to the two policy tools, i.e., fines and subsidies, because these can reduce policy costs. Consumers should be aware of their own importance to China’s Plastic Drinking Straws Ban and adopt a refusal to accept plastic drinking straws and reduce the consumption of disposable plastics to support the policy. Retailers should also realize that proactively catering to consumer and government expectations can bring higher benefits to themselves; this can be achieved by providing high-quality biodegradable straws to support China’s Plastic Drinking Straws Ban. The model of this work could be applied to other corporate activities related to sustainability, such as plastic bags, plastic bottles, etc., and their connection to government policies.

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Young, Benjamin. "Misperception and Cognition in Markets." Games 13, no. 6 (October 28, 2022): 71. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g13060071.

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We consider a market setting where a consumer holds either a naive or sophisticated perception of their preference over products. We introduce the concept of a cognitive equilibrium, in which the consumer can transition between the cognitive states of naiveté and sophistication depending on the degree of exploitation in the market. We compare market outcomes under monopoly and competition. While competition unambiguously improves market outcomes when the consumer’s cognitive state is exogenous, it can strictly lower gains from trade when cognitive states are endogenously determined.

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