Books on the topic 'MONOPOLY MARKETS'

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1

Fudenberg, Drew. Monopoly and credibility in asset markets: An example. Cambridge, Mass: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989.

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2

Olson, Wayne P. From monopoly to markets: Milestones along the road. Columbus, Ohio: National Regulatory Research Institute, The Ohio State University, 1998.

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3

Jacoby, Hanan. Monopoly power and distribution in fragmented markets: The case of groundwater. Washington, D.C: World Bank, Development Research Group, Rural Development, 2001.

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4

Cornered: The new monopoly capitalism and the economics of destruction. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons, 2010.

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5

Constantatos, Christos. Monopoly and market coverage in a vertically differentiated market. Ottawa: Carleton University. Department of Economics, 1989.

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6

Burns, Philip. Is the gas supply market a natural monopoly? [London]: Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, 1996.

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7

Brevnov, Boris. From monopoly to market maker?: Reforming Russia's power sector. Cambridge, MA: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2000.

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8

Arvan, Lanny. Monopsony, factor prices, and community development. Champaign: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1988.

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9

T, Hirsch Barry. Classic monopsony or new monopsony?: Searching for evidence in nursing labor markets. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2004.

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10

Ameringer, Carl F. The health care revolution: From medical monopoly to market competition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.

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11

McKenzie, Richard B. In defense of monopoly: How market power fosters creative production. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008.

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12

McKenzie, Richard B. In defense of monopoly: How market power fosters creative production. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008.

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13

Manning, Alan. Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 2003.

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14

Monopsony in motion: Imperfect competition in labor markets. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2003.

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15

Manning, Alan. Monopsony in motion: Imperfect competition in labor markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.

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16

Sullivan, Daniel Gerard. Monopsony power in the market for nurses. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1989.

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17

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos. From Walrasian oligopolies to natural monopoly: An evolutionary model of market structure. St. Andrews: Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews, 1998.

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18

Alos-Ferrer, C. From Walrasian oligopolies to natural monopoly: An evolutionary model of market structure. St. Andrews: St. Salvator's College, 1998.

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19

Hallock, Kevin F. Seniority and monopsony in the academic labour market: Comment. Princeton: Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section, 1994.

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20

Alan, Manning. The plant size-place effect: Agglomeration and monopsony in labour markets. London: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2007.

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21

Walter, Bagehot. Lombard Street: A description of the money market : with the addition of The currency monopoly. Philadelphia, PA: Orion Editions, 1991.

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22

Staiger, Douglas. Is there monopsony in the labor market?: Evidence from a natural experiment. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999.

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23

Labor and monopoly capital: The degradation of work in the twentieth century. 2nd ed. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998.

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24

Ransom, Michael R. Sex differences in pay in a "new monopsony" model of the labor market. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2005.

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25

Fejø, Jens. Monopoly law and market: Studies of EC competition law with US American antitrust law as a frame of reference and supported by basic market economics. Deventer, Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990.

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26

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Monopsony issues in agriculture: Buying power of processors in our nation's agricultural markets : hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, first session, October 30, 2003. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2004.

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27

Spencely, G. F. R. State, Markets and Monopoly. Elgar Publishing Limited, Edward, 1999.

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28

Murgai, Rinku, Hanan G. Jacoby, and Ur Saeed Rehman. Monopoly Power and Distribution in Fragmented Markets: The Case of Groundwater. The World Bank, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2628.

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29

Monopoly Rules: How to Find, Capture, and Control the Most Lucrative Markets in Any Business. Crown Business, 2005.

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30

Monopoly Rules: How to Find, Capture and Control the World's Most Lucrative Markets in Any Business. Kogan Page, Limited, 2007.

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31

Lynn, Barry C. Cornered: The New Monopoly Capitalism and the Economics of Destruction. Wiley, 2011.

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32

Castillo, Daniel. Creating a Market Bureaucracy: The Case of a Railway Market. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815761.003.0003.

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The EU expects European governments to abolish their old state railway monopolies and establish a market, with private companies competing for customers. We analyse the long process through which the Swedish state constructed a market for railway traffic in Sweden, by shaping such market elements as market actors; supply and demand; and the process of exchange, competition, and products. We identify extensive attempts at constructing and shaping market actors and organizing markets connected to the train transport market, such as the markets for maintenance and vehicles. The resulting market is similar to an elaborate bureaucracy, with a great number of organizational elements in the form of rules, hierarchy, membership, monitoring, and sanctions, in which the degree of organization is probably greater than in the former state monopoly firm.
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33

Hacker, Jacob S., Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Paul Pierson, and Kathleen Thelen, eds. The American Political Economy. Cambridge University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.

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This volume brings together leading political scientists to explore the distinctive features of the American political economy. The introductory chapter provides a comparatively informed framework for analyzing the interplay of markets and politics in the United States, focusing on three key factors: uniquely fragmented and decentralized political institutions; an interest group landscape characterized by weak labor organizations and powerful, parochial business groups; and an entrenched legacy of ethno-racial divisions embedded in both government and markets. Subsequent chapters look at the fundamental dynamics that result, including the place of the courts in multi-venue politics, the political economy of labor, sectional conflict within and across cities and regions, the consolidation of financial markets and corporate monopoly and monopsony power, and the ongoing rise of the knowledge economy. Together, the chapters provide a revealing new map of the politics of democratic capitalism in the United States.
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34

Publications, LandMark. Market Power and Monopoly. Independently Published, 2017.

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35

Petit, Nicolas. Big Tech and the Digital Economy. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198837701.001.0001.

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To date, world antitrust and regulatory agencies have invariably described large technology companies—such as Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Apple, and Facebook—as dominant, bottleneck or gatekeeping companies comparable to the textbook monopolists of the early twentieth century. They have proceeded on this basis to discipline their business activities with unprecedented financial penalties and other regulatory obligations. This “techlash” is the subject of this book. Proceeding from the observation that big tech firms engage in both monopoly and oligopoly competition across digital markets, the book introduces a theory of moligopoly competition. It suggests that rivalry-spirited antitrust and regulatory laws are both conceptually and methodologically impervious to the competitive pressure that bears on big tech firms, resulting in a risk of well-intended but irrelevant policy intervention. The book proposes a refocusing of competition policy towards certain types of tipped markets where digital firms extract monopoly rents, and careful adoption of regulation toward other social harms generated by big tech’s business models.
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36

Gross, Robert N. Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190644574.003.0001.

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The introduction sets up the problem public officials faced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. How should they, and the public schools they administered, respond to rapidly increasing attendance in private, Catholic schools? How, in a nation seemingly committed to mass public education, did private, Catholic schooling expand? In the broader economic language popular both at the time and today, how did educational competition and markets emerge in the twentieth century given the strong support for a public school monopoly a century earlier? The book’s central argument is that the structures that enable school choice to flourish today owe their origins—over a century ago—as much to public policy as to private initiative.
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37

Ameringer, Carl F. Health Care Revolution: From Medical Monopoly to Market Competition. University of California Press, 2008.

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38

Ameringer, Carl F. Health Care Revolution: From Medical Monopoly to Market Competition. University of California Press, 2008.

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39

Alexandrowicz, C. H. The Discriminatory Clause in South Asian Treaties in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (1957). Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198766070.003.0010.

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The division of Indian and other South Asian markets among the various European nationalities led to vital changes of territorial sovereignty. The corresponding process of commercial, political, and military manoeuvering was accompanied by treaty making which formalised the initial power positions, and the relevant clauses and stipulations reflected the consecutive stages of the struggle. As soon as some of the European powers or agencies obtained from their Asian counterparts preferential treatment coupled with prohibitions directed against other European nationalities, all of them plunged into retaliatory practices, each attempting to secure the maximum of concessions or the establishment of a monopoly for itself. This chapter examines the various discriminatory or prohibitory clauses included in some treaties and the type or pattern of stipulation adopted by the contracting parties.
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40

Gross, Robert N. Public vs. Private. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190644574.001.0001.

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Americans today choose from a dizzying array of schools, loosely lumped into categories of “public” and “private.” How did these distinctions emerge in the first place, and what do they tell us about the more general relationship in the United States between public authority and private enterprise? Public vs. Private describes how nineteenth-century public policies fostered the rise of modern school choice. In the late nineteenth century, American Catholics began constructing rival, urban parochial school systems, an enormous and dramatic undertaking that challenged public school systems’ near-monopoly of education. In a nation deeply committed to public education, mass attendance in Catholic private schools produced immense conflict. States quickly sought ways to regulate this burgeoning private sector and the competition it produced, even attempting to abolish private education altogether in the 1920s. Ultimately, however, Public vs. Private shows how the public policies that resulted produced a stable educational marketplace, where school choice flourished. The creation of systematic alternatives to public schools was as much a product of public power as of private initiative. As ever more policies today seek to unleash market forces in education, Public vs. Private concludes that Americans would do well to learn from the historical relationship between government, markets, and schools.
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41

Hayek, Friedrich A. von. End of the U. S. Dollar Monopoly Toward Free Market. Audio-Forum, 1985.

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42

In Defense of Monopoly: How Market Power Fosters Creative Production. University of Michigan Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/book.67371.

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43

McKenzie, Richard B., and Dwight R. Lee. In Defense of Monopoly: How Market Power Fosters Creative Production. University of Michigan Press, 2019.

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44

In Defense of Monopoly: How Market Power Fosters Creative Production. University of Michigan Press, 2007.

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45

Maurer, Stephen M. Intellectual Property Incentives. Edited by Rochelle Dreyfuss and Justine Pila. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198758457.013.30.

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Classical proofs for the efficiency of markets do not apply to innovation. Since the 1960s, economists have worked to construct a theoretical framework for deciding when patent incentives do and do not make society better off. This chapter reviews the literature’s main findings and asks how well the legal system implements them. It begins by reviewing how patents balance the benefits of faster innovation against the burden of monopoly. It then shows how these arguments change in more complicated models where patents must also coordinate effort across multiple independent inventors. It also asks how faithfully current patent doctrines implement economists’ insights in practice. It explores how our patents framework is extended to other bodies of law, including copyright, trademark, and competitions policy. Finally, it concludes with proposals for aligning current IP law more closely with theory.
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46

Alan, Manning. Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets. Princeton University Press, 2013.

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47

Manning, Alan. Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets. Princeton University Press, 2005.

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48

Alan, Manning. Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets. Princeton University Press, 2013.

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49

Stoneman, Paul, Eleonora Bartoloni, and Maurizio Baussola. Product Innovation and Welfare. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198816676.003.0012.

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This chapter addresses the impact of product innovation on economic welfare, initially defined as the sum of consumer and producer surpluses. In a static framework, it is shown how product innovation can increase welfare via additions to consumer surplus and increased firm profits; and an estimate that the value of the increase for a typical product innovation might equal 2.5 per cent of the innovator’s revenue is reported from the literature. Problems with measuring welfare by the sum of consumer and producer surplus are raised, especially because of changes in the producers’ incentives to innovate. In an intertemporal framework, it is further shown that the optimal diffusion path could arise under either monopoly supply or competitive supply, depending on buyers’ price expectations formation processes. It is also argued that variety itself may generate welfare, and whether free markets would generate optimal variety is discussed. The literature suggests not.
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50

Rothbard, Murray Newton. Monopoly and Competition (Intro to Free Market Econ Ser 1 Cassette/313). Audio-Forum, 1985.

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