Relevant bibliographies by topics / MONOPOLY MARKETS

Academic literature on the topic 'MONOPOLY MARKETS'

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Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "MONOPOLY MARKETS"

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Hardiani, Hardiani, and Etik Umiyati. "Dampak Pemberian Subsidi Produksi Terhadap Keseimbangan Pasar pada Pasar Persaingan Sempurna dan Pasar Monopoli." Jurnal Perspektif Pembiayaan dan Pembangunan Daerah 3, no. 2 (December 20, 2015): 59–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.22437/ppd.v3i2.3505.

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Abstract. This study aimed to analyze: (1) the impact of subsidies on the market equilibriumin perfect competition and monopoly markets (2) the impact of subsidies on the efficiency of markets, surplus buyer-seller on the market perfect competition and monopoly market. Research using method of experimental economics. The simulated market in the form of a) a perfectly competitive market with goods subsidized and non-subsidized goods; b) a monopoly market with goods subsidized and non-subsidized goods. Data were analyzed at each simulation and the market structure of each type of goods. The result showed that: (1) Empirical equilibrium price higher than the market monopoly of perfect competition and the higher the subsidy conditions than non-subsidized either on transaction systems double action or decentralization; (2) market with subsidized monopoly has a level of market efficiency is better than a perfectly competitive market both with and without subsidies; (3) The allocation of the surplus on the market almost entirely monopoly enjoyed by the seller. In contrast to the perfectly competitive market, relatively more surplus enjoyed by the buyer, but the difference is not too great. Keywords: experimental economics, monopoly market, perfect competition market, subsidies Abstrak. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis: (1) dampak subsidi terhadap keseimbangan pasar pada pasar persaingan sempurna dan pasar monopoli (2) dampak subsidi terhadap efisiensi pasar, surplus pembeli-penjual pada pasar persaingan sempurna dan pasar monopoli. Penelitian menggunakan metode percobaan ekonomi. Pasar disimulasi dalam bentuk a) pasar persaingan sempurna dengan barang non subsidi dan barang subsidi desentralisasi; b) pasar monopoli dengan barang non subsidi dan barang subsidi desentralisasi. Data yang diperoleh dianalisis pada masing-masing simulasi struktur pasar dan pada masing-masing jenis barang. Dari hasil penelitian didapatkan bahwa: (1) Harga keseimbangan empiris lebih tinggi pada pasar monopoli dibandingkan persaingan sempurna dan lebih tinggi pada kondisi subsidi dibandingkan non-subsidi baik pada sistem transaksi double action ataupun desentralisasi; (2) Pasar monopoli dengan subsidi memiliki tingkat efisiensi pasar lebih baik dibandingkan pasar persaingan sempurna baik dengan subsidi maupun tanpa subsidi; (3) Alokasi surplus pada pasar monopoli hampir seluruhnya dinikmati oleh penjual. Sebaliknya pada pasar persaingan sempurna, surplus relatif lebih banyak dinikmati oleh pembeli, tetapi dengan selisih yang tidak terlalu besar. Kata Kunci: Ekonomi Percobaan, Pasar Monopoli, Pasar Persaingan Sempurna, Subsidi
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Bresnahan, Timothy F., and Peter C. Reiss. "Entry in Monopoly Markets." Review of Economic Studies 57, no. 4 (October 1990): 531. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2298085.

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Tang, Zhiyuan, and Luyao Wang. "A Study on the Correlation between Korean Monopoly Markets and Monopoly Companies: Analysis through the Inefficientness of Monopoly Markets and Monopoly Companies." Northeast Asian Business and Economics Association 2, no. 1 (May 30, 2021): 31–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.51156/jnabe.2021.2.1.31.

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Bose, Arup, and Barnali Gupta. "Mixed markets in bilateral monopoly." Journal of Economics 110, no. 2 (October 10, 2012): 141–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0310-8.

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Braido, Luis H. B., and Felipe L. Shalders. "Monopoly rents in contestable markets." Economics Letters 130 (May 2015): 89–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.008.

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Jiao, Huifang, Xuan Wang, Chi To Ng, and Lijun Ma. "Pricing and Return Policies in a Competitive Market: A Consumer-Valuation Based Analysis with Valuation Uncertainties." Sustainability 13, no. 3 (January 29, 2021): 1432. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su13031432.

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In this study, we develop a series of consumer-valuation-based models to investigate the pricing and return policies of the sellers in a competitive e-commerce market. Differing from the competition models in literature, a novel two-dimensional valuation structure is built, which considers the valuations of a consumer on two products and the valuation differentiation of all consumers on each product. We consider both monopoly and duopoly (competitive) markets. In each market, two models are respectively developed, one with and one without the return policies. We derive the solutions for the four models, and conduct some analytical and numerical investigations. The results show that return policy with a partial refund is always chosen by the sellers in both monopoly and duopoly markets. Return policy benefits the seller in a monopoly market, but may not benefit the sellers in a duopoly market. In the duopoly models, one seller can be considered as a monopoly seller who meets a new competitor. Our results show that the monopoly seller will reduce its price by no more than 20% when there comes a competitor, and, counter-intuitively, it will meanwhile adopt a severer return policy to the consumers.
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Shastitko, A., and N. Pavlova. "Antitrust in bilateral monopoly." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 8 (August 20, 2017): 75–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2017-8-75-91.

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The existing practice of implementing antitrust law to bilateral monopolies in Russia shows signs of inconsistency. Traditional theoretical approaches differ in their estimations of the characteristics and attainability of equilibrium on such markets, but overall more or less converge on the idea of antitrust regulation of such markets to be unjustified. But approaching the problem in the context of transaction cost economics, taking into account the externalities appearing both upstream and downstream from the bilateral monopoly market in case of a suboptimal result, leads to viewing the antitrust authority as a discrete institutional alternative of internalizing such externalities by creating the incentives to develop a hybrid governance mechanism for transactions between the sides of contractual relationship characterized by sufficiently high switching costs. Taking into account the wide occurrence of bilateral monopolies in the Russian economy, the choice of a uniform approach to regulation is critical in terms of creating transparent legal environment and adjusting companies’ incentives.
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He, Ye, Siming Guo, Yu Wang, Yujia Zhao, Weidong Zhu, Fangyuan Xu, Chun Sing Lai, and Ahmed F. Zobaa. "An Agent-Based Bidding Simulation Framework to Recognize Monopoly Behavior in Power Markets." Energies 16, no. 1 (December 30, 2022): 434. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en16010434.

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Although many countries prefer deregulated power markets as a means of containing power costs, a monopoly may still exist. In this study, an agent-based bidding simulation framework is proposed to detect whether there will be a monopoly in the power market. A security-constrained unit commitment (SCUC) is conducted to clear the power market. Using the characteristics that the agent can fully explore in a certain environment and the Q-learning algorithm, each power producer in the power market is modeled as an agent, and the agent selects a quotation strategy that can improve profits based on historical bidding information. The numerical results show that in a power market with monopoly potential among the power producers, the profits of the power producers will not converge, and the locational marginal price will eventually become unacceptable. Whereas, in a power market without monopoly potential, power producers will maintain competition and the market remains active and healthy.
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Mayer-Foulkes, David. "Monopoly in a Competitive Setting." PANORAMA ECONÓMICO 14, no. 27 (November 30, 2018): 32. http://dx.doi.org/10.29201/pe-ipn.v14i27.208.

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A production market with given preferences, technology and compe tition technology is vulnerable if it admits both perfect competition and monopoly or oligopoly. Under decreasing returns, sunk costs combined with a potential for monopoly profits provide a sufficient basis for vulnerability. A large agent can establish monopoly by installing enough productive capacity. The monopolist deters entry by threatening to oversupply the market. The threat is credible if the future discount rate is low enough and if enough small players enter the market in the absence of punishment. Financial institutions can capture vulnerable markets for profit, reducing competition, efficiency and equity.
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Feng, Zhenhua, Таосин Лиу, Владимир Мазалов, Vladimir Mazalov, and Jie Zheng. "Pricing of Platforms in Two-Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Agents and Limited Market Size." Mathematical Game Theory and Applications 10, no. 1 (January 28, 2019): 83–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.17076/mgta1_5.

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We study a two-sided market represented by network platforms and heterogeneous agents. Our setup departs from Armstrong (2006)’s monopoly model by assuming both (1) a continuum of agents of limited size on each side of the market and (2) heterogeneous utility of agents with Hotelling specification. We show that the monopoly’s optimal pricing strategy always results in a corner solution in terms of the equilibrium market share. We also solve for the social planner’s optimization problem and obtain a similar corner solution result. In addition, the exact values for the equilibrium in the case of duopoly for a two-sided market on two platforms are obtained.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "MONOPOLY MARKETS"

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Dhavala, Kishore. "Essays on Emissions Trading Markets." FIU Digital Commons, 2012. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/733.

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This dissertation is a collection of three economics essays on different aspects of carbon emission trading markets. The first essay analyzes the dynamic optimal emission control strategies of two nations. With a potential to become the largest buyer under the Kyoto Protocol, the US is assumed to be a monopsony, whereas with a large number of tradable permits on hand Russia is assumed to be a monopoly. Optimal costs of emission control programs are estimated for both the countries under four different market scenarios: non-cooperative no trade, US monopsony, Russia monopoly, and cooperative trading. The US monopsony scenario is found to be the most Pareto cost efficient. The Pareto efficient outcome, however, would require the US to make side payments to Russia, which will even out the differences in the cost savings from cooperative behavior. The second essay analyzes the price dynamics of the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a voluntary emissions trading market. By examining the volatility in market returns using AR-GARCH and Markov switching models, the study associates the market price fluctuations with two different political regimes of the US government. Further, the study also identifies a high volatility in the returns few months before the market collapse. Three possible regulatory and market-based forces are identified as probable causes of market volatility and its ultimate collapse. Organizers of other voluntary markets in the US and worldwide may closely watch for these regime switching forces in order to overcome emission market crashes. The third essay compares excess skewness and kurtosis in carbon prices between CCX and EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) Phase I and II markets, by examining the tail behavior when market expectations exceed the threshold level. Dynamic extreme value theory is used to find out the mean price exceedence of the threshold levels and estimate the risk loss. The calculated risk measures suggest that CCX and EU ETS Phase I are extremely immature markets for a risk investor, whereas EU ETS Phase II is a more stable market that could develop as a mature carbon market in future years.
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Baranski, Andrzej. "Essays in Multilateral Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly with Quality Upgrades." The Ohio State University, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1437219564.

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Miki, Sayako. "Merchants, markets, and the monopoly of the East India Company : the salt trade in Bengal under colonial control, c.1790-1836." Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.416867.

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Norén, Pontus. "Svensk Bilprovning : Omregleringarna och dess effekter." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Ekonomisk-historiska institutionen, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-325510.

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The Swedish motor-vehicle inspection has worked very well and was monopolized in 1965. After the monopolization, the company AB Svensk Bilprovning was formed and had a monopoly until 2010 when the bourgeois government deregulated the monopoly for the motor-vehicle inspection services. It had been discussed earlier around the 1990s but the planned deregulation of the service did not occur. The main reason for the deregulation was for the service to act on a competitive market which would improve it in several aspects. One of the main aspects were the availability. The deregulation in 2010 had positive effects and mainly the availability increased throughout Sweden. In year 2014 the social-democratic party were not satisfied before or after deregulation even though it improved the service. The bourgeois on the other hand were very satisfied of the results.
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Delaney, Nathan. "Copper Capitalism: The Making of a Transatlantic Market in Metals, 1870-1930." Case Western Reserve University School of Graduate Studies / OhioLINK, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=case1526067114476348.

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Muniz, Filho Marcos Marinho. "A organização industrial das bolsas de valores: uma resenha da literatura e o caso brasileiro." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/16592.

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The Brazilian capital market is not representative of the size of its economy. In recent years, the growth observed on its industry, services, agro, and other sgments was not accompanied by the financial market. The vertical structure and the monopoly position of BM&F Bovespa, the only stock exchange in activity in the Brazilian Market, goes against the current scenario in international markets. The advent of electronification and the actions of regulators provided international markets to operate in environments with multiple exchanges, encouraging competition and bringing benefits to the end investor, such as the reduction of explicit and implicit costs, improved services, product diversity, etc. Recent papers show the benefit of the order flow fragmentation, and can be used as references in encouraging the rupture of the monopoly that exists today in Brazil.
O mercado de capitais brasileiro não é representativo do tamanho de sua economia. Nos últimos anos, o crescimento observado nas áreas de serviços, indústria, agronegócio, e outras, não foi acompanhado pelo mercado financeiro. A estrutura verticalizada e o posicionamento monopolista da BM&F Bovespa, única bolsa de valores em atuação no mercado local, vão de encontro ao cenário encontrado em mercados internacionais. O advento da eletronificação e a atuação dos agentes reguladores proporcionaram que os mercados internacionais operassem em ambientes com múltiplas bolsas, incentivando a competitividade e trazendo benefícios para o investidor final, como redução de custos explícitos e implícitos, melhoria dos serviços prestados, diversidade de produtos, etc. Artigos recentes comprovam o benefício da fragmentação de ordens, e podem ser usados como referência no incentivo à quebra do monopólio que existe hoje no mercado brasileiro.
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Gustavsson, Peter, and Joel Häggquist. "CSR på en avreglerad marknad : Socialt ansvarstagande som konkurrensfördel." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-56663.

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Bakgrund: Den statliga utredningen En framtida spelreglering presenterades under december 2008. Ett förslag i utredningen är att delar av monopolet på den svenska spelmarknaden i framtiden kan komma att konkurrensutsättas.

Syfte: Denna studie syftar till att undersöka hur det sociala ansvarstagandet påverkas och i vilken omfattning CSR kan utgöra en konkurrensfördel på en avreglerad marknad.

Genomförande: Vi har använt oss av en kvalitativ undersökningsmetod där Svenska Spel, Ladbrokes och Betssons CSR - arbete studeras. Utöver sekundärdata har det empiriska materialet kompletterats genom intervjuer med varje företag.

Resultat: En avreglerad marknad behöver inte innebära att företagens sociala ansvarstagande minskar i samhället. Att integrera CSR i företagsstrategin är ett viktigt led i att nå acceptans bland intressenterna på marknaden. För ett lyckat CSR – arbete menar vi att företagens interna resurser måste användas med hänsyn till flertalet faktorer i den omgivande miljön.


Background: During the end of 2008 the Swedish government published a submission for comment regarding the future legislation of the Swedish gambling industry. The investigation suggests that new entrants may be allowed to enter the Swedish market.

Aim: The purpose of this thesis is to determine if and how the social responsibility is affected when a market is deregulated, and if CSR is a possible tool for creating competitive advantage.

Completion: The study is based on a qualitative method and examines the gambling companies Svenska Spel, Ladbrokes and Betsson. We conducted questionnaire studies among the examined gambling companies to enhance the secondary data.

Findings: Our findings suggest that there is a good possibility for social responsibility to maintain a strong position in a deregulated market. CSR integration with the corporate strategy is an important step concerning acceptance among the company’s stakeholders.

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Svanborg, Maria, and Johan Nordfeldt. "Omregleringen av det svenska apoteksmonopolet : Finns det teoretiskt och historiskt stöd för att regeringens mål kommer att uppfyllas?" Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Institutionen för ekonomi och företagande, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-7282.

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Research Question: Does the pharmacy market seem to change in accordance with the goals stipulated by the government due to the reregulation? This leads to the following sub-questions: Does it seem like the availability of medical drugs for consumers increase? Does it seem like service for consumers get enhanced? Does it seem like the supply of services for consumers increase? Does it seem like the costs of medical drugs are maintained? Purpose: The purpose of this study is to evaluate if the trends resulting from the reregulation of the pharmacy monopoly correspond to the goals stipulated by the government. The purpose is furthermore to compare the reregulation of other Swedish markets and the reregulation of the pharmacy market in other Nordic countries in order to heed their lessons. Method: This study uses method triangulation, with a questionnaire directed to pharmacy customers forming the quantitative basis and interviews with specialists regarding the pharmacy market, forming the qualitative. The study also draws heavily on historic data regarding reregulation of Swedish markets and reregulation of the pharmacy market in other Nordic countries. Conclusions: Availability of medical drugs has increased and will presumably continue to do so.  Service quality has increased somewhat and will presumably continue to do so. Supply of services has increased and it will presumably continue to do so. The cost of medical drugs will only increase if it is required in order to satisfy the other goals.
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Frys, Lucien. "Three Essays in Market Design." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/19367.

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Diese Arbeit besteht aus drei unabhängigen Kapiteln. Jedes von ihnen untersucht, wie die Gestaltung von Allokationsregeln das Ergebnis eines Marktes beeinflussen kann. Das erste Kapitel untersucht die Folgen der Beschränkung der Mechanismen, die einem Monopsonisten zur Verfügung stehen, auf Mechanismen, die allen Verkäufern den selben Preis anbietet. Ich zeige, dass dies Beschränkung nicht immer verhindert, dass er Informationen der Verkäufer extrahiert und den Preis damit anpasst. Das zweite Kapitel befasst sich mit der Verteilung von Studentenwohnheimplätzen. Die Studenten dürfen eigene Präferenzen bezüglich eines Wohnheimplatzes sowie zur Zuteilung ihrer Freunde angeben. Ich zeige, dass der random serial dictatorship modifiziert werden kann, um diese neuen Präferenzen zu ermöglichen. Die beiden vorgeschlagenen Lösungen haben schwache Anreizeigenschaften, wenn die Studierenden kooperieren können. Ich zeige jedoch, dass dieses Problem für den ersten Lösungsvorschlag verschwindet, wenn der Markt groß und wettbewerbsfähig ist. Schließlich wird im letzten Kapitel untersucht, wie die Gestaltung von Aufnahmeprüfungen an Universitäten die Zusammensetzung von Gymnasien und Universitäten beeinflussen kann. Das Kapitel vergleicht zwei Aufnahmeprüfungen. In der ersten, werden die besten Schüler jedes Gymnasiums ausgewählt, während in der anderen die insgesamt besten Studenten ausgewählt werden. Wenn der Test verrauscht ist oder wenn die Peer-Effekte für die guten Schüler niedrig sind, schickt der erst Test bessere Studenten in der Universität und fordert Vielfalt in Gymnasien.
The three chapters of this thesis are independent. Each of them investigates how the design of allocation rules may shape the outcome of a market. The first chapter studies the consequences of restricting the mechanisms available to a monopsonist to uniform price posting mechanisms. I show that it doesn't always prevent him to extract meaningful information from the sellers before posting the price. I also show that conditioning this offer on the transaction achieving a minimal quantity facilitates this task. Finally, I address the welfare and the implementation issues and apply the results to takeover operations. The second chapter studies the allocation of houses to students, when students have preferences over the houses they receive and over their friends' allocation. I show that the random serial dictatorship can be modified to accommodate this new set-up. The two solutions proposed have weak incentive properties if students can cooperate. However, I show that this problem disappears for one of them if the market is large and competitive. Finally, the last chapter studies how the design of entrance university exams can be used to influence the composition of high schools and universities. It shows that if the test is noisy or if the peer effects for the good students are low, giving the university's slots to the best students of each high school selects better students than giving them to the best students overall and desegregates high schools.
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Sakharna, V. "Can Startup Resist the Corporation or Not?" Thesis, Київський національний університет технологій та дизайну, 2017. https://er.knutd.edu.ua/handle/123456789/8361.

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Books on the topic "MONOPOLY MARKETS"

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Fudenberg, Drew. Monopoly and credibility in asset markets: An example. Cambridge, Mass: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989.

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Olson, Wayne P. From monopoly to markets: Milestones along the road. Columbus, Ohio: National Regulatory Research Institute, The Ohio State University, 1998.

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Jacoby, Hanan. Monopoly power and distribution in fragmented markets: The case of groundwater. Washington, D.C: World Bank, Development Research Group, Rural Development, 2001.

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Cornered: The new monopoly capitalism and the economics of destruction. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons, 2010.

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Constantatos, Christos. Monopoly and market coverage in a vertically differentiated market. Ottawa: Carleton University. Department of Economics, 1989.

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Burns, Philip. Is the gas supply market a natural monopoly? [London]: Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, 1996.

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Brevnov, Boris. From monopoly to market maker?: Reforming Russia's power sector. Cambridge, MA: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2000.

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Arvan, Lanny. Monopsony, factor prices, and community development. Champaign: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1988.

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T, Hirsch Barry. Classic monopsony or new monopsony?: Searching for evidence in nursing labor markets. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2004.

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Ameringer, Carl F. The health care revolution: From medical monopoly to market competition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.

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Book chapters on the topic "MONOPOLY MARKETS"

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Huggett, Renée. "Competition and Monopoly." In Markets, 44–49. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11600-3_8.

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Hill, Berkeley. "Markets and competition." In An introduction to economics: concepts for students of agriculture and the rural sector, 51–71. 5th ed. Wallingford: CABI, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1079/9781800620063.0004.

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Abstract Following an introduction into the functions of the price system and a general description of markets, this chapter examines three market models in more detail: first, perfect competition viewed from the levels of the individual agricultural producer and of the whole industry; secondly, monopoly; and thirdly, monopsony. The use of monopoly power in agriculture is discussed, as well as different types of price movements in agriculture.
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Mulder, Machiel. "Natural Monopoly in Transport and Distribution." In Regulation of Energy Markets, 133–85. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58319-4_6.

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Mulder, Machiel. "Natural Monopoly in Transport and Distribution." In Regulation of Energy Markets, 145–201. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16571-9_6.

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Moon, Dong-Joo. "The Equilibrium of Monopoly Service Markets." In Congestion-Prone Services Under Quality Competition, 181–208. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20189-9_8.

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Genberg, Hans, Thomas Helbling, and Salih Neftci. "Monopoly Power in Swiss Financial Markets." In Competitiveness in Banking, 283–305. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48846-7_16.

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Veljanovski, Cento. "Merger and Monopoly Policies in the UK." In Mergers, Markets and Public Policy, 133–62. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0387-9_6.

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Katz, Michael L., and Carl Shapiro. "Antitrust in Software Markets." In Competition, Innovation and the Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace, 29–81. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4407-0_3.

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Kulawczuk, Przemysław. "The Purchase of a Monopoly: France Telecom Acquires TPSA." In Acquisition Strategies in European Emerging Markets, 133–46. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230286542_10.

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Imsirovic, Adi. "From Monopoly to Competition (Oil Markets Going Global)." In Trading and Price Discovery for Crude Oils, 55–69. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71718-6_5.

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Conference papers on the topic "MONOPOLY MARKETS"

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Tellidou, A. C., and A. G. Bakirtzis. "Agent-Based Analysis of Monopoly Power in Electricity Markets." In 2007 International Conference on Intelligent Systems Applications to Power Systems. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isap.2007.4441606.

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Peleckis, Kęstutis, Valentina Peleckienė, and Kęstutis Peleckis. "International Business Negotiations: Search of the Balance and the Equilibrium of Negotiating Powers, under Distorting Market Conditions of Competition (Monopsony, Oligopsony and Monopoly Cases)." In Contemporary Issues in Business, Management and Education. Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/cbme.2017.041.

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Certain challenges arise in business negotiations when competition in the market is more or less distorted. This can take place in various markets conditions. In such situations great possibilities open up to the development of international business relations as overclocking new market participants can provide additional alternatives for companies and organizations or other business units, by reducing the negative impact of competition distortions for the balance of negotiating power of participants in negotiations. In the development and implementation of effective international business negotiation strategy, it is important to identify the balance of negotiating power of major participants in negotiations in order to make more efficient use of the potential of business negotiations – the negotiating powers. The aim of this article is to analyze in complex the unfolding theory and practice of development and implementation of international business negotiations and negotiating strategies under distorting market competition conditions, to reveal opportunities on development and implementing improvements of these strategies in cases of monopsony, oligopsony and monopoly. Object of the research is the search of balance on negotiating powers in international business negotiations under conditions of distorted competition in the market. The scientific problem - negotiation theory lacks measures for assessment and balancing the negotiating powers of negotiation’s participants under distorted market competition.
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Bedley, Mike. "Optimizing the Cost-Effectiveness of an Industrial Natural Gas Cogeneration Facility in a Regulated Electric Utility Environment." In ASME 2002 Citrus Engineering Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/cec2002-4805.

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Since Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in 1978, the electric utility industry has experienced many significant changes — legal, structural and technical. For purposes of this discussion, one of the more important changes that resulted was the installation of substantial electric generating capacity via “cogeneration” at industrial facilities nationwide. PURPA defined, and created by law, entities known as “qualifying facilities” or “QFs”, and established a framework in which they were allowed to compete with utilities in both the wholesale electric market (by sales for resale) and retail electric markets (by self-generation). The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct92) took PURPA one step further, allow additional entities — such as Exempt Wholesale Generators (EWG), marketers and brokers — to participate in the wholesale electric markets, forever changing the once monopolistic structure of the electric industry. Importantly, from a legal, structural and technical standpoint, QFs continue to enjoy advantages over other generators - both utility and non-utility. The legal and structural framework continue to favor QFs and technically, the equipment available for cogeneration facilities is significantly more efficient, reliable and environmentally friendly than in the past. Cogeneration can be a very cost-effective option for large energy users, providing in many instances the only alternative to purchasing electricity from the monopoly utility. Paper published with permission.
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Li, Lixiang, and Yueting Chai. "A Model of Monopoly E-Marketplaces with Inter- and Intra-Group Externalities in Two-Sided Markets." In 2010 International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2010.5576675.

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Tsyganov, V. V. "Market Incentives for Transport Monopoly." In 2018 Eleventh International Conference "Management of large-scale system development" (MLSD 2018). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mlsd.2018.8551768.

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Barbosa, Fábio C. "Competition Into Brazilian and North American Freight Rail Systems: A Comparative Regulatory Assessment." In 2018 Joint Rail Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/jrc2018-6138.

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Competition is the driving force of any economic system, as it creates a challenging environment for service suppliers to provide affordable and reliable services to customers. Rail systems are an important element of the logistic chain, as they provide a unique service category (generally transporting large volumes at low unit costs) to shippers that otherwise would not be serviced by other modes — the so called captive shippers. In this scenario, competition is essential to guarantee the required service levels (availability and reliability), followed by competitive rates, which ultimately may influence shippers’ business competitiveness, both regionally and globally. Brazil and some North American countries (Canada, Mexico and United States), have a common feature, i.e. continental territories allied with the economic exploitation of bulky activities (industrial, mineral and agricultural), and, hence, depend strongly on heavy haul rail systems. These countries have been performing a continuous effort on improving competition practices into their rail systems, which are translated into important, and sometimes controversial, regulatory measures. These initiatives require a tenuous equilibrium, as they are supposed to provide the required competitive service at affordable rates for shippers, as well as a sustainable (financial and operational) environment to rail carriers, to guarantee the required return on long term investments and avoid compromising medium and long term rail network efficiency. This challenging task for rail market stakeholders (rail carriers, shippers and regulators) is far from a consensus. Rail companies claim that, as a capital intensive sector, governmental regulatory intervention into the rail system may inhibit their ability to invest the required funds to provide and expand rail capacity, as well as the maintenance of the required safety levels. Shippers, on the other hand, state that rail systems operate within a strong market concentration (originally formatted or due to subsequent merges and acquisitions) that give some rail carriers a disproportionate market power, that resembles a monopoly, which ultimately leaves a significant contingent of the so called captive shippers with just one freight rail carrier option, sometimes subjected to excessive rates, and, in some special instances (into offer restricted rail markets, for example), are responsible for the unavailability of rail services into the required volumes. In this context, there is currently a controversial debate regarding the effectiveness of competitive regulatory remedies into freight rail systems. This debate includes both market oriented rail systems (Canadian and U.S.), as well as rail contractual granted ones (Brazilian and Mexican). In the formers, the systems are mostly owned and operated by the private sector, and inter and intra modal options may theoretically provide the required competition level, while in the latter, rail systems have been broken into separate pieces and granted to the private sector under a concession arrangement, followed by an exclusive right to serve their territories, with trackage rights provisions, to be exerted by third parties, under previously defined circumstances and subjected to contractual agreements among rail operators. In both systems, competitive regulatory actions may be desirable and effective, as far as they may address the technical-operational-economic boundary conditions of each particular rail system. This work is supposed to present, into a review format, sourced from an extensive research into available international technical literature, and gathered as a unique document, an overview of the Brazilian and North American freight rail competition scenario, followed by a technical and unbiased effectiveness’ assessment of current (existing) and proposed competitive regulatory freight rail initiatives into Brazil, Canada, Mexico and United States, highlighting their strengths and eventually their weaknesses.
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Shen, Tiesong, Zhongkai Xiong, and Bingshan Wu. "Pricing strategy of product supplementary service in monopoly market." In 2011 8th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM 2011). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icsssm.2011.5959393.

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de Luca, João Carlos. "Brazilian Petroleum Exploration and Production: From Monopoly to Free Market." In Offshore Technology Conference. Offshore Technology Conference, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.4043/15051-ms.

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Golban, Liliana. "Modification of Wald and Savage Decision Criteria for Monopoly Market." In International Conference Risk in Contemporary Economy. Dunarea de Jos University of Galati, Romania Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.35219/rce2067053239.

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Wang, Gang. "Optimal advance selling strategies using coupons in a monopoly market." In 2011 8th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM 2011). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icsssm.2011.5959410.

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Reports on the topic "MONOPOLY MARKETS"

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Genakos, Christos, Kai-Uwe Kühn, and John Van Reenen. Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from Computer Markets. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17172.

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Olson, W. P. From monopoly to markets: Milestones along the road. Occasional paper {number_sign}25. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), August 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/291019.

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Gans, Joshua. AI Adoption in a Monopoly Market. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w29995.

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Dube, Arindrajit, Jeff Jacobs, Suresh Naidu, and Siddharth Suri. Monopsony in Online Labor Markets. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24416.

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Boyer, Marcel. Comments on competition policy and labour markets. CIRANO, February 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.54932/iqio1721.

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Traditionally, labour concerns have not been top-of-mind when considering competition policy, but the current approach to wage-fixing, anti-poaching, and anti-mobility agreements between firms has been one of the main reasons behind recent Parliamentary attention to competition policy and labour markets. Key stakeholders in academic and policy circles have called for more robust enforcement regarding monopsony / oligopsony power in labour markets, when assessing mergers and acquisitions for example, as well as regarding market power in labour representation (unions) and certification as entry barriers in labour markets. The objective here is to identify the numerous challenges and pitfalls in assessing the level of competition on labour markets, both supply and demand, and in addressing remedies if necessary.
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Yeh, Chen, Claudia Macaluso, and Brad J. Hershbein. Monopsony in the U.S. Labor Market. W.E. Upjohn Institute, March 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.17848/wp22-364.

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Sullivan, Daniel. Monopsony Power in the Market for Nurses. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3031.

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Dodini, Samuel, Michael Lovenheim, Kjell Salvanes, and Alexander Willén. Monopsony, Job Tasks, and Labor Market Concentration. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30823.

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Allegretto, Sylvia A., and Dave Graham-Squire. Monopsony in Professional Labor Markets: Hospital System Concentration and Nurse Wages. Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series, January 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.36687/inetwp197.

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Rolling waves of consolidation have significantly decreased the number of hospital systems in the U.S. potentially affecting industry quality, prices, efficiency, wages and more. This research concerns the growth in hospital system consolidation in local labor markets and its effect on registered nurse wages. We first use a nonparametric preprocessing data step via matching methods to define MSA-specific samples of workers analogous to nurses outside of the hospital sector. This step enables an accounting of heterogeneous MSA-specific baseline wage growth, and yields a standardized measure of nurse wage growth across MSAs used to set up a multi-site quasi-experiment. We then run a parsimonious linear model; market size matters, for every 0.1 increase in consolidation in smaller-MSAs, real hourly nurse wage growth decreased by $0.70 (p-value of 0.038). Though not the primary aim of this study, a secondary finding is that real hourly wages for nurses grew less than that of comparable workers by $4.08.
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Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús, Federico Mandelman, Yang Yu, and Francesco Zanetti. The “Matthew Effect” and Market Concentration: Search Complementarities and Monopsony Power. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w28495.

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