Journal articles on the topic 'Monism'
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Kebede, Messay. "Beyond Dualism and Monism: Bergson's Slanted Being." Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 24, no. 2 (December 21, 2016): 106–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2016.773.
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There is an old but still unresolved debate pertaining to the question of Bergsonian monism or dualism. Scholars who think that Bergson is ultimately monist clash with those who claim that he has consistently maintained a dualist position. Others speak of contradiction and point out his failure to reconcile dualism with monism. What feeds on the debate is Bergson’s undeniable change of direction: while his first book is flagrantly dualist, his second book takes a sharp turn toward monism. Without denying the intricacy generated by the change of direction, this paper argues that the originality of his position is overlooked every time that the problem is presented in terms of Bergson being dualist or monist. Notably, it contends that Bergson’s third book, Creative Evolution, overcomes both dualism and monism by removing their contradiction through a durational or slanted approach to Being.
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Aprianto, Ary. "Relevansi Monisme dan Dualisme Bagi Pemberlakuan Perjanjian Internasional di Indonesia." Jurnal Konstitusi 19, no. 3 (August 30, 2022): 580. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/jk1934.
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The application of treaty is still influenced by different views on the approach chosen by Indonesia, whether monism or dualism. By using normative method, this study questions the relevance of monism-incorporation and dualism-transformation approaches in determining the application of treaty. Two key aspects will be reviewed, namely parliamentary approval and the drafting of national regulations to implement treaty. It concludes that the dichotomy of monism and dualism has various limitations, and is irrelevant for determining the application of treaty. Parliamentary approval is required for treaty application, both in monist and dualist countries. Several dualist countries have even sought parliamentary approval before ratification can take place. The formulation of national regulations is common in monist and dualist countries. Not to fulfill theoretical demands in line with the monism and dualism approaches, but to ensure harmonization and the ability of state to carry out its obligations.
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Ferreira, Gerrit, and Anel Ferreira-Snyman. "The Incorporation of Public International Law into Municipal Law and Regional Law against the Background of the Dichotomy between Monism and Dualism." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 17, no. 4 (April 11, 2017): 1496. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2014/v17i4a2171.
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Monism and dualism represent two different approaches towards the relationship between public international law and municipal law. While the former views public international law and municipal law as a single legal system, the latter regards these two areas of law as separate and distinct legal systems that exist alongside each other. However, not all legal systems are clearly either monist or dualist. The dichotomy between monism and dualism no longer only concerns the relationship between public international law and municipal law, but also increasingly affects the relationship between public international law and regional law. This contribution discusses the application of the monist and dualist approaches by the South African Constitutional Court in the Glenister case and the European Court of Justice in the Kadi and Hungary cases in order to illustrate the practical application of the dichotomy between monism and dualism in a municipal system and on a regional level.
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Araújo, Paulo Roberto Falcão. "Monismo versus pluralismo de valores." Ítaca, no. 20 (March 20, 2012): 190–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.59488/itaca.v0i20.212.
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Resumo: Este artigo visa identificar os principais aspectos que estruturam o monismo e o pluralismo de valores. Para tanto, foi necessário percorrer certos problemas metafísicos, lógicos, éticos e de psicologia moral que ajudam a estabelecer os reais pontos de atrito entre esses dois posicionamentos. A investigação metafísica nos levou para o problema da incomensurabilidade dos valores que, acreditamos, é o coração do pluralismo de valores.Palavras-chave: monismo de valores, pluralismo de valores, incomensurabilidade dos valores, conflito de valoresAbstract: This paper aims to identify the main aspects which organize monism of values and the pluralism of values. To do this was necessary go through some Metaphysic, Logic, Ethic, Moral Psychology's problems. These help to provide the true conflict points between monism and pluralism of values. The metaphysical investigation conducted us to incommensurability of values problem which, we believe, is the pluralism of values's core.Keywords: monism of values, pluralism of values, incommensurability of values, conflict of values
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Lloyd, Peter B. "Modelling Consciousness within Mental Monism: An Automata-Theoretic Approach." Entropy 22, no. 6 (June 22, 2020): 698. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e22060698.
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Models of consciousness are usually developed within physical monist or dualistic frameworks, in which the structure and dynamics of the mind are derived from the workings of the physical brain. Little attention has been given to modelling consciousness within a mental monist framework, deriving the structure and dynamics of the mental world from primitive mental constituents only—with no neural substrate. Mental monism is gaining attention as a candidate solution to Chalmers’ Hard Problem on philosophical grounds, and it is therefore timely to examine possible formal models of consciousness within it. Here, I argue that the austere ontology of mental monism places certain constraints on possible models of consciousness, and propose a minimal set of hypotheses that a model of consciousness (within mental monism) should respect. From those hypotheses, it would be possible to construct many formal models that permit universal computation in the mental world, through cellular automata. We need further hypotheses to define transition rules for particular models, and I propose a transition rule with the unusual property of deep copying in the time dimension.
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THOMAS, EMILY. "Anne Conway as a Priority Monist: A Reply to Gordon-Roth." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6, no. 3 (2020): 275–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.1.
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AbstractFor early modern metaphysician Anne Conway, the world comprises creatures. In some sense, Conway is a monist about creatures: all creatures are one. Yet, as Jessica Gordon-Roth (2018) has astutely pointed out, that monism can be understood in very different ways. One might read Conway as an ‘existence pluralist’: creatures are all composed of the same type of substance, but many substances exist. Alternatively, one might read Conway as an ‘existence monist’: there is only one created substance. Gordon-Roth has done the scholarship a great favor by illuminating these issues in Conway. However, this article takes issue with Gordon-Roth's further view that Conway ‘oscillates’ between the extremes of existence pluralism and monism. In its place, I argue we should read Conway as a priority monist: the whole of creation is ontologically prior to its parts.
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Vardoulakis, Dimitris. "Agonistic Equality in Rancière and Spinoza." Synthesis: an Anglophone Journal of Comparative Literary Studies, no. 9 (May 1, 2016): 14. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/syn.16222.
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Jacques Rancière’s conception of equality as an axiomatic presupposition of the political is important, because it bypasses the tradition which defines equality in terms of Aristotle’s conception of geometric equality. In this paper, I show that Rancière’s theory both espouses a monism, according to which inequality implies equality, and relies on a concept of the free will, which is incompatible with monism. I highlight this tension by bringing Rancière’s theory into conversation with the great monist of the philosophical tradition, Baruch Spinoza.
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BRAND-BALLARD, JEFFREY. "Why One Basic Principle?" Utilitas 19, no. 2 (June 2007): 220–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820807002488.
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Principle monists believe that our moral duties, such as fidelity and non-maleficence, can be justified in terms of one basic moral principle. Principle pluralists disagree, some suggesting that only an excessive taste for simplicity or a desire to mimic natural science could lead one to endorse monism. InIdeal Code, Real World(Oxford, 2000), Brad Hooker defends a monist theory, employing the method of reflective equilibrium to unify the moral duties under a version of rule consequentialism. Hooker's arguments have drawn powerful criticisms from pluralists such as Alan Thomas, Phillip Montague and Philip Stratton-Lake. Against these critics, I argue that Hooker's monism enjoys certain practical advantages associated with the simplicity of a single basic principle. These advantages are often overlooked because they appear primarily in cases of second-order deliberation, in which one must decide whether our basic moral duties support a certain derivative duty. I argue that these advantages of monism over pluralism are analogous to the advantages that generalists claim over moral particularism. Because pluralists are generalists, I conclude that they are in an awkward dialectical position to dismiss Hooker's monism for the reasons they usually offer.
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Edwards, Jim. "Explanation in Psychology: Functional Support for Anomalous Monism." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27 (March 1990): 45–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100005038.
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Donald Davidson finds folk-psychological explanations anomalous due to the open-ended and constitutive conception of rationality which they employ, and yet monist because they invoke an ontology of only physical events. An eliminative materialist who thinks that the beliefs and desires of folk-psychology are mere pre-scientific fictions cannot accept these claims, but he could accept anomalous monism construed as an analysis, merely, of the ideological and ontological presumptions of folk-psychology. Of course, eliminative materialism is itself only a guess, a marker for material explanations we do not have, but it is made plausible by, inter alia, whatever difficulties we have in interpreting intentional folk-explanations realistically. And surely anomalous monism does require further explanation if it is to be accepted realistically and not dismissed as an analysis of a folk-idiom which is to be construed instrumentally at best. Some further explanation is needed of how beliefs, desires, etc. can form rational patterns which have ‘no echo in physical theory’ and yet those beliefs, desires etc. be physical events. To this end I propose to graft on to anomalous monism a modest version of functionalism.
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Parekh, Bhikhu. "Vico and Montesquieu: Limits of Pluralist Imagination." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 25 (1999): 55–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1999.10716830.
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From Plato onward, western moral and political philosophy has been dominated by a monist impulse manifest in a search for the best way of life, the best form of government, the perfect society, the highest human faculty, the highest or the best religion, the single most reliable way to acquire knowledge of the world, and so on. In ethics it has taken the form of moral monism or the view that one way of life can be rationally shown to be the highest or truly human. This view has commanded the allegiance of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Locke, Mill, Marx, and others. Because monism despises neglected human faculties, virtues, and ways of life and has been a source of much violence and oppression, we cannot hope to provide a coherent theory of human liberation and freedom without developing a coherent theory of moral and cultural pluralism. Although moral monism was challenged from the very beginning by the Sophists, the skeptics, and others, a systematic critique of it was not mounted until the eighteenth century by such writers as Vico, Montesquieu, Montaigne, Herder, and others, who stressed the inevitability and even the desirability of cultural diversity.
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Storm, Jason Ānanda Josephson. "Monism and the Religion of Science." Nova Religio 25, no. 2 (November 1, 2021): 12–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nr.2021.25.2.12.
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Monism was not just a philosophical outlook, but also an early twentieth-century new religious movement. Founded by the internationally renowned evolutionary theorist Ernst Haeckel, it was supposed to be a “Religion of Science” that repudiated matter-mind dualism in favor of reverence for a divinized Mother Nature. This article traces the genesis of the German Monist League and how it was transplanted to the United States by the publisher, Paul Carus. Although readers of this journal are likely to know about new religions that embrace “pseudoscience,” the surprise is that Monism had followers with significant scientific renown including multiple Nobel Prize-winning scientists, famous philosophers of science, and even a celebrated sociologist. Scholars of secularism or science and religion will want to know about how Haeckel and his followers constructed a hybrid Scientific Faith or Secular Church that this article demonstrates went on to provide the foundation for professionalizing American philosophy.
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Sisko, John E., and Yale Weiss. "A Fourth Alternative in Interpreting Parmenides." Phronesis 60, no. 1 (December 15, 2015): 40–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341278.
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According to current interpretations of Parmenides, he either embraces a token-monism of things, or a type-monism of the nature of each kind of thing, or a generous monism, accepting a token-monism of things of a specific type, necessary being. These interpretations share a common flaw: they fail to secure commensurability between Parmenides’ alētheia and doxa. We effect this by arguing that Parmenides champions a metaphysically refined form of material monism, a type-monism of things; that light and night are allomorphs of what-is (to eon); and that the key features of what-is are entailed by the theory of material monism.
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Kreines, James. "Fundamentality without Metaphysical Monism: Response to Critics of Reason in the World." Hegel Bulletin 39, no. 1 (October 17, 2016): 138–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2016.31.
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AbstractThis article is a reply to comments by Franz Knappik and Robert Stern on my book, Reason in the World: Hegel’s Metaphysics and its Philosophical Appeal. Issues addressed include the systematicity of Hegel’s philosophy, the prioritizing of metaphysical over epistemological questions in his arguments, Hegel’s response to Kant’s Antinomy of Pure Reason, and my conclusion that there are senses in which Hegel’s own position is both ambitiously metaphysical and also monist, but that the monism present there is epistemological, and the ambitious metaphysics is non-monist.
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MacInnis, Luke. "Two Concepts of Monism: Axiomatic and Asymptotic." Review of Politics 77, no. 4 (2015): 603–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670515000595.
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AbstractAccording to Isaiah Berlin's influential characterization, value monism holds that there are discoverable, axiomatic ethical principles from which all ethical knowledge may be derived, that ethical reasoning is algorithmic and mechanical, and that it seeks permanent, “final solutions” to all ethical conflicts. Berlin's account of monism oversimplifies and distorts the idea of monism and its relation to liberal values. There is a fundamentally distinct conception of monism, “asymptotic” monism, that is not only compatible with liberty and liberal toleration but is required by these values. I present this alternative through an exposition and defense of Immanuel Kant's monistic conception of ethics and public law, where it finds full expression. Berlin's warnings that monism tends to support political despotism ignore the distinctive character of Kant's asymptotic monism.
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Perrine, Timothy. "On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism." Logos & Episteme 11, no. 1 (2020): 77–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20201115.
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Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the epistemic value of things other than knowledge. Such arguments, if successful, would establish Epistemic Value Pluralism is true and Epistemic Value Monism is false. This paper critically examines those arguments, finding them wanting. However, I develop an argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism that succeeds which turns on general reflection on the nature of value.
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Fischborn, Marcelo. "Anomaly stands." Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia 25, no. 1 (May 9, 2024): e65267. http://dx.doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2024v25i1:e65267.
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Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism has been repeatedly criticized since its initial defense in the paper Mental Events, which was published in 1970. Despite the widespread rejection, there seems to be no agreement on why anomalous monism fails. This paper systematizes two strong objections to anomalous monism. First, Davidson’s argument for monism requires the problematic assumption that physics can provide strict causal laws for causal relations in general. Second, Davidson’s monism requires an ontology of events for which no satisfactory criterion of identity has been provided. Despite these problems, the paper argues that the theses on the anomalism and irreducibility of the mental remain acceptable, despite the difficulty of reconstructing precisely the arguments Davidson uses to defend them.
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Sider, T. "Against monism." Analysis 67, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/67.1.1.
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Kenig Curd, Patricia. "Parmenidean Monism." Phronesis 36, no. 3 (1991): 241–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852891321052688.
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Sider, Theodore. "Against monism." Analysis 67, no. 293 (January 2007): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00641.x.
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Kriegel, Uriah. "Kantian Monism." Philosophical Papers 41, no. 1 (March 2012): 23–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2012.662806.
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Trogdon, Kelly. "Priority monism." Philosophy Compass 12, no. 11 (September 26, 2017): e12458. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12458.
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Loptson, Peter. "Spinozist monism." Philosophia 18, no. 1 (April 1988): 19–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02380123.
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Syahril, Syahril. "Monisme Termodifikasi sebagai Sistim Alternatif Pemberlakuan Hukum Internasional dalam Praktek Ketatanegaraan Indonesia." Pagaruyuang Law Journal 5, no. 2 (January 31, 2022): 194–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.31869/plj.v5i2.4892.
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Pemberlakuan hukum internasional ke dalam hukum nasional merupakan salah satu pilar penting dalam hukum tata negara. Aliran mainstream memperlihatkan dua sistem yang digunakan dalam praktek yaitu monism dan dualism di mana negara Indonesia lebih cenderung kepada sistim yang disebut terakhir. Namun demikian, terdapat pendekatan lain yang juga perlu untuk dipertimbangkan sebagai bagian praktek ketata negaraan Indonesia yang masih jarang atau belum dibahas, yaitu monism termodifikasi. Tulisan ini merupakan hasil penelitian yuridis normatif yang membahas keberadaan dan praktek monism termodifikasi melalui pendekatan deskriptif dan interpretatif. Temuan penelitian menunjukkan bahwa praktek ketatanegaraan berada di antara sistim monism dan dualism bergantung kepada situasi dan kondisi. Oleh karenanya, dapatlah diajukan suatu sistim alternatif yang mengakomodir keduanya yang memunculkan konsep monism termodifikasi sehingga dapat menjadi alternatif sistim pemberlakuan hukum internasional di Indonesia
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Belvedere, Carlos. "LA CRÍTICA DE LA ONTOLOGÍA. TRES ARGUMENTOS DE MICHEL HENRY." Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, no. 14 (February 3, 2021): 31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/rif.14.2017.29632.
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La crítica de la ontología ocupa un lugar preponderante en la filosofía de Michel Henry. No obstante, los términos en que se expresa son diversos según los contextos argumentales en que se despliegan. En este trabajo distingo tres argumentos con los que Henry cuestiona la ontología en distintas obras y períodos de su filosofía; a saber: (1) la crítica del monismo ontológico; (2) la crítica del monismo fenomenológico; (3) la crítica de la ontología. Una vez expuestos, indago el modo en que estos argumentos han sido tratados en la bibliografía secundaria. Concluyo con algunas reflexiones en cuanto al alcance de las variaciones terminológicas y argumentativas propias de estos tres argumentos y expresando una preferencia personal por la tercera y última formulación.The critique of ontology is preponderant in the philosophy of Michel Henry. However, the terms in which it is expressed are diverse according to the different lines of argument. In my paper I distinguish three arguments with which Henry challenges ontology in three different works and periods of his philosophy; namely: (1) the critique of ontological monism; (2) the critique of phenomenological monism; (3) the critique of ontology. Once exposed those arguments, I describe how they have been received in the secondary literature. I conclude with some reflections on the terminological and argumentative variations characteristic of these three arguments and I express my personal preference for the third, last formulation.
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Bandur, Hironimus. "Islamisasi dan Kristenisasi di Manggarai: Mengendus Jejak Monisme Moral Pada Muslim & Katolik di Manggarai." Jurnal Alternatif Wacana Ilmiah Interkultural 10, no. 1 (April 13, 2021): 113–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.60130/ja.v10i1.46.
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Reading the socio-historical phenomenon of moral monism in Manggarai, must be started from the expansion of Islamization and Christianization. Islamization and Christianization had an effect on the growth of Islamism and Catholicism. The main character of Islamization and Catholicism is the claim of the exclusive truth. Each of them claimed that their religion only is the most true and logic, therefore it must be adhered, then the other one is wrong and ilogic, therefore it must be left. This preaching reinforced the concept of moral monism to each individual. In this paper, the author found that the history of Islamization and Christianization in Manggarai had formed the monism moral in religious life, however, moral monism in Islamism is different from moral monism in Catholicism. The phenomenon of moral monism in religious teaching can disrupt Muslim and Catholic relations, including the Manggaraian. Prevention efforts must be made by various social elements such as the local government, the religious teachers, and Moslim-Catholic community in Manggarai. The response of the great Catholic and Moslem figures: Pope Francis and Grand Shaykh Ahmad Thayyip in the UAE, that is included, Abu Dhabi Document would be implemented in religious life.
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Le Bihan, Baptiste. "Priority Monism Beyond Spacetime." Metaphysica 19, no. 1 (March 26, 2018): 95–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mp-2018-0005.
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AbstractI will defend two claims. First, Schaffer’s priority monism is in tension with many research programs in quantum gravity. Second, priority monism can be modified into a view more amenable to this physics. The first claim is grounded in the fact that promising approaches to quantum gravity such as loop quantum gravity or string theory deny the fundamental reality of spacetime. Since fundamental spacetime plays an important role in Schaffer’s priority monism by being identified with the fundamental structure, namely the cosmos, the disappearance of spacetime in these views might undermine classical priority monism. My second claim is that priority monism can avoid this issue with two moves: first, in dropping one of its core assumption, namely that the fundamental structure is spatio-temporal, second, by identifying the connection between the non-spatio-temporal structure and the derivative spatio-temporal structure with mereological composition.
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Fives, Allyn. "The unnoticed monism of Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear." Philosophy & Social Criticism 46, no. 1 (May 27, 2019): 45–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453719849717.
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Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear, a political and philosophical standpoint that emerges in her mature work, has ostensibly two defining characteristics. It is a sceptical approach that puts cruelty first among the vices. For that reason, it is considered to be both set apart from mainstream liberalism, in particular the liberalism of J. S. Mill and John Rawls, but also an important source of influence for political realists and nonideal theorists. However, I argue here that, in putting cruelty first among the vices, Shklar also offers a value monist approach to political thought, one that she shares with Mill and Rawls as well. Each claims to have identified the general rule for the resolution of moral conflicts, although they disagree about what that rule is. Therefore, Shklar’s mature work combines scepticism with value monism. As such, it represents a radical departure from the value pluralist (and sceptical) approach to moral conflict evident in her early work. Her commentators have not noticed either her mature monism or the move away from her earlier value pluralism, and this is explained by a tendency to see her mature work as offering simply a sceptical alternative to mainstream liberalism.
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Kernohan, Andrew. "Psychology: Autonomous or Anomalous?" Dialogue 24, no. 3 (1985): 427–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300040300.
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In a recent series of papers, Donald Davidson has put forward a challenging and original philosophy of mind which he has called anomalous monism. Anomalous monism has certain similarities to another recent and deservedly popular position: functionalist cognitive psychology. Both functionalism, in its materialist versions, and anomalous monism require token-token psychophysical identities rather than type-type ones. (Token identities are identities between individual events; type identities represent a stronger claim of identities between interesting sorts of events.) Both deny that psychology can be translated into, or scientifically reduced to, neurophysiology. Both are mentalistic theories, allowing psychology to make use of intentional descriptions in its theorizing. Anomalous monism uses a belief/desire/action psychology; cognitive science makes use of information-bearing states. But these similarities must not be allowed to conceal an essential difference between the two positions. Cognitive psychology claims to be a science, making interesting, lawlike generalizations for the purpose of explaining mental activity. Anomalous monism denies that psychology is a science by denying that psychological laws can be formulated. Davidson has other ideas for psychology connected with his work on meaning and truth. Hence, the title of one of his essays on anomalous monism is “Psychology as Philosophy”.
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Gorev, Alexander. "Existence and Being as a Whole in Interpretations of Parmenides’ Poem." Ideas and Ideals 15, no. 1-1 (March 28, 2023): 74–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.17212/2075-0862-2023-15.1.1-74-86.
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The article discusses two main existing options for interpreting the concept of being in Parmenides’ poem. The first option is more traditional: quantitative monism, where existence is the only form of being. The second option is more modern: the predicative monism, where there are many types of being, but each of them is strictly defined by its essence. Both options are illustrated by the example of modern works by M.N. Wol’f, as well as in the example of a new translation by E.V. Afonasin. The close connection of the two variants is shown, almost inextricable, judging by the text of the poem, which allows for various translations. The article discusses the fundamental options for reading the ‘οὖλον’ (dense / whole), ‘µουνογενές’ (only-begotten / homogeneous) and the number of possible commas in the fragment ‘ὁµοῦ πᾶν ἕν συνεχές’, which affects the result of counting the types of being. Based on the work of I.V. Berestov, the article shows that both interpretations have a common basis in the form of the concept of the whole. The whole can be considered both as one, which corresponds to quantitative monism, and as an absolute whole, having many parts, each of which is a separate relative whole: the being, which corresponds to predicative monism. This common ground allows us to consider both interpretations of Parmenides’ concept of being together. The author insists on just such an examination of the poem in order to come to a more definite conclusion about the nature of being. There is no contradictory opposition between these options, which would lead to a contradiction when they are considered together. It is noted that the whole is the one and at the same time indivisible, which does not negate the mandatory presence of its parts, which are separated from each other. Thanks to the concept of the whole, one can see the mutual interweaving of predicative (essential) monism, quantitative (existential) monism, and even, if desired, holistic (substantial) monism. Holistic monism assumes the whole as the only substance underlying the entire universe.
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Levine, Michael P. "MONISM AND PANTHEISM." Southern Journal of Philosophy 30, no. 4 (December 1992): 95–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1992.tb00648.x.
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Levin, Yakir. "Spinoza’s Substance Monism." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 15, no. 1 (April 5, 2012): 368–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01501015.
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In Spinoza’s substance monism, radically different attributes constitute the essence of one and the same substance qua a strongly unified whole. Showing how this is possible poses a formidable Cartesian challenge to Spinoza’s metaphysics. In this paper I suggest a reconstruction of Spinoza’s notion of substance that meets this challenge and explains a major feature of this notion. I then show how this reconstruction can be used to resolve two fundamental problems of the Cartesian framework that pertain to Spinoza’s metaphysics. On this basis, I then explain two further major features of Spinoza’s notion of substance. While my suggested reconstruction has all these advantages and accords well with Spinoza’s conceptual framework, it goes beyond what he explicitly says concerning substance monism. It is in the spirit of his metaphysical framework rather than in its letter. Thus, all I intend to show is that Spinoza has the conceptual resources for coming to terms with some of the deep problems that beset his metaphysics.
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Banks, Erik C. "Neutral monism reconsidered." Philosophical Psychology 23, no. 2 (April 2010): 173–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515081003690418.
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Benovsky, Jiri. "Dual-Aspect Monism." Philosophical Investigations 39, no. 4 (November 19, 2015): 335–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phin.12122.
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Trogdon, Kelly. "Monism and Intrinsicality." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87, no. 1 (January 8, 2009): 127–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048400802215497.
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Van Gelder, Tim. "Monism, Dualism, Pluralism." Mind and Language 13, no. 1 (March 1998): 76–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00066.
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Brzović, Zdenka, and Predrag Šustar. "Postgenomics function monism." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 80 (April 2020): 101243. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2019.101243.
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Schofield, Malcolm. "PARMENIDES AND MONISM." Classical Review 48, no. 2 (October 1998): 347–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009840x9868001x.
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Crane, Tim. "Dualism, monism, physicalism." Mind & Society 1, no. 2 (September 2000): 73–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02512314.
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Hawkesworth, Mary. "Beyond Methodological Monism." Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 7, no. 3 (1987): 5–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1554477x.1987.9970491.
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Cornell, David M. "Taking monism seriously." Philosophical Studies 173, no. 9 (January 7, 2016): 2397–415. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0620-0.
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Ogorodnikov, V. P. "Monism or Pluralism?" Rossiiskii Gumanitarnyi Zhurnal 4, no. 1 (2015): 50. http://dx.doi.org/10.15643/libartrus-2015.1.7.
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Johnson, Casey Rebecca. "Investigating illocutionary monism." Synthese 196, no. 3 (August 2, 2017): 1151–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1508-7.
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Knappik, Franz. "And Yet He is a Monist: Comments on James Kreines, Reason in the World." Hegel Bulletin 39, no. 1 (October 17, 2016): 121–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2016.30.
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AbstractI critically discuss Kreines’s arguments against readings on which Hegel holds some version of metaphysical monism. In section 1, I address Kreines’s claim that Hegel’s revised version of Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Dialectic implies a rejection of metaphysical monism. I argue both that the argument that Kreines ascribes to Hegel does not itself rule out monism, and that there are serious exegetical problems with the way Kreines understands Hegel’s diagnosis of the antinomies and his critique of the metaphysics of the understanding. In section 2, I discuss additional reasons that Kreines gives for seeing Hegel as rejecting metaphysical monism. In particular, I argue that Hegel is much more optimistic about the intelligibility of nature than Kreines thinks: to a substantial degree, the basic structure of nature, including the laws of mechanics, is open to explanations that are ultimately based on a monistic principle.
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Kleeberg, Bernhard. "God-Nature Progressing: Natural Theology in German Monism." Science in Context 20, no. 3 (August 14, 2007): 537–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026988970700141x.
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ArgumentDuring the 1860s Ernst Haeckel, German zoologist and one of the foremost popularizers of Darwinism, proposed a natural philosophy called “Monism.” Based on developmental thinking, natural selection, and sound natural laws, the scientific Weltanschauung of Monism was to supersede Christian religion in all its accounts of nature. Haeckel's new scientific religion, this essay argues, fused the religious joys of reveling in the beauty of “mother nature” with the assurance of progress based on scientific certainty. Even though Haeckel and his followers polemicized against dualistic and teleological interpretations of nature, and despite their fierce struggle against the Christian churches, Monism cannot conceal its roots. All central arguments of natural theology reappear – albeit sometimes in causal or reductionist phrasing. Haeckel's aesthetics of nature in particular shows his indebtedness to the concept of a divine economy of nature. His Monism is an evolutionary and pantheistic natural theology.
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Saito, Kohei. "Lukács’s Theory of Metabolism as a Foundation of Ecosocialist Realism." New German Critique 50, no. 2 (August 1, 2023): 101–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/0094033x-10459968.
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The Anthropocene is characterized by the definitive failure of the Promethean dream of capitalism about the absolute domination over nature. As a response to the deepening of global ecological crisis, new philosophical discussions have emerged that pivot around the ontological relationship between humans and nature in the Anthropocene. In this context, Marxian ecology that draws upon Marx’s concept of “metabolic rift” is often accused of its outdated “Cartesian dualism” of Society and Nature. Against “hybridism” and “monism,” which have become increasingly dominant in critical theory of nature thanks to Bruno Latour and Noel Castree, this article examines the legacy of Lukács’s theory of “metabolism” in order to defend the contemporary validity of Marxian ecology. Although Lukács is also often criticized for his exclusion of nature from his dialectical analysis of society in History and Class Consciousness, this article shows that there is nothing wrong with categorically separating society and nature. A careful analysis of Lukács’s little-known manuscript Tailism and the Dialectic demonstrates that “ontological monism” and “methodological dualism” are unique to his historical materialism. Based on this distinction, Lukács convincingly argues that the one-sided monist understanding of the social and the natural falls into fetishism, and this is exactly why his “methodological dualism” is essential to any ecosocialist critique of capitalism.
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Murzi, Mauro. "A Defence of Pluralism in the Debate about Natural Kinds: Case Study from the Classification of Celestial Objects." Forum Philosophicum 12, no. 2 (November 1, 2007): 359–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2007.1202.27.
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I reconsider the monism/pluralism debate about natural kinds. Monism claims that there is a privileged division of reality into natural kinds, while pluralism states that there are many ways of classifying objects according to different purposes. I compare three different monistic accounts of natural kinds with the pluralism advocated by promiscuous realism. The analysis of some examples of the classification of celestial objects suggest that there are indeed different legitimate ways of classifying things according to different purposes; contrary to monism, the boundaries between kinds are not fixed. These results show that promiscuous realism is a better account of natural kind.
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Yalowitz, Steven. "Causation in the Argument for Anomalous Monism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28, no. 2 (June 1998): 183–226. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1998.10717489.
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Donald Davidson has two central aims in his celebrated paper ‘Mental Events.’ First, he argues for the impossibility of ‘strict … laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained’ (ME, 208). I shall call the resulting view ‘mental anomalism.’ Second, he argues, based partially on this impossibility, for a version of monism which holds that every (causally interacting) mental event is token-identical with some physical event. This second aim puts constraints on how the argument for mental anomalism can plausibly proceed. That argument cannot assume anything that presupposes monism or adversely affects the argument for it. When elaborated, this constraint by itself rules out otherwise attractive conceptions of how the argument for mental anomalism works. More generally, in order to be compelling, the overall argument for anomalous monism ought not to incorporate excessively controversial presuppositions even if they do not themselves beg any questions about monism. The argument needs to be built upon relatively intuitive premises.
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Jambak, Fabian, Didin Baharuddin, and Neng Erna Sry Denasty. "National Law and International Law in Indonesian (Between Monism or Dualism)." Budi Luhur Journal of Strategic & Global Studies 2, no. 1 (January 31, 2024): 35–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.36080/jsgs.v2i1.29.
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Abstrak: Rangkaian sejarah panjang perdebatan hubungan hukum nasional dengan hukum internasional menunjukan tidak mudahnya mentranformasikan hukum nasional yang mengakomodir keduanya. Monisme dan dualisme di Indonesia dipraktekan secara bergantian sesuai dengan kebutuhan dalam peradilan dalam memutuskan suatu perkara. Prakteknya disesuaikan dengan keyakinan dalam menilai suatu peristiwa hukum perlu ditranformasikan menjadi hukum nasional atau tidak, walaupun secara doktrin Indonesia menganut monisme sebagaimana diamatkan oleh Pasal 11 Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. Kontradiksi dari keduanya menyebabkan Indonesia belum secara tegas dan konsisten dalam melaksanakan konstitusi. Metode deskritif historis dengan periodesasi: Orde Lama, Orde Baru dan Orde Reformasi digunakan untuk memberikan gambaran dan pemahaman bahwa dengan rangkaian sejarah dapat menunjukan secara jelas mengenai hubungan hukum nasional dengan hukum internasional di Indonesia. Ketegasan sikap pemerintah Indonessia menjadi titik tolok penting dalam menentukan pilihan demi terwujudnya kepastian hukum, perlindungan terhadap hak asasi manusi dan menguatkan lembaga peradilan dalam memutuskan suatu perkara terhadap sengketa yang melibatkan entitas internasional. Abstract: The long history of the debate on the relationship between national law and international law shows that it is not easy to transform national law to accommodate both. Monism and dualism in Indonesia are practiced alternately according to the needs of the judiciary in deciding a case. The practice is adjusted to the belief in assessing a legal event needs to be transformed into national law or not, although doctrinally Indonesia adheres to monism as stated by Article 11 of the 1945 Constitution. The contradiction between the two causes Indonesia to not firmly and consistently implement the constitution. Historical descriptive method with periodization: Old Order, New Order and Reform Order is used to provide an overview and understanding that with a series of history can show clearly about the relationship between national law and international law in Indonesia. The firmness of the Indonesian government's stance is an important benchmark in making choices for the realization of legal certainty, protection of human rights and strengthening the judiciary in deciding a case against disputes involving international entities.
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Strazzoni, Andrea. "Vide Spinozam, or Burchard de Volder between Cartesianism and Heterodoxy." Church History and Religious Culture 100, no. 2-3 (September 3, 2020): 272–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18712428-10002008.
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Abstract In this article, I intervene in a long-standing debate over the alleged assumption and teaching of Spinozist ideas by the Dutch philosopher and scientist Burchard de Volder (1643–1709). I discuss De Volder’s position with respect to three main topics (necessitarianism, substance monism, and biblical interpretation), as well as the use his student Jacob Wittich made of De Volder’s ideas in Wittich’s highly controversial De natura Dei (1711). Eventually, I argue that De Volder was certainly a sympathizer of Spinoza, accepted necessitarianism, and considered Spinoza a reliable interpreter of Descartes in physics, even if he did not accept Spinoza’s monist metaphysics, nor his biblical hermeneutics.
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Labib, Muhsin. "Tasawuf Sunni Ala Sirhindi : “Kawin Paksa” Monisme dan Teologi Asy’Ariyah." Kanz Philosophia : A Journal for Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism 2, no. 1 (June 23, 2012): 201. http://dx.doi.org/10.20871/kpjipm.v2i1.30.
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<div><p><strong>Abstract :</strong> The term monism or wahdah al-wujūd has a long story in Islamic Mysticism or Sufism. It is such that is considered to be the soul of Sufism, an sich. It means that without wahdah al-wujūd, there would be no further discussion on Islamic Mysticism. Besides, the theory of wahdah al-wujūd is rooted in Shi’ite Islam, yet never found in the theology of Ash’arian or any other Sunni tradition. It is very important to have an awareness of what the author has termed ‘failed cloning’ between monism in Shi’ite and dualism in Sunni traditions established by Sirhindi. This is an attempt to uncover the weakness and/or weaknesses of Sirhindi’s methodology, that criticized wahdah al-wujūd and his subsequent misunderstanding of it. Moreover, Sirhindi seemed somewhat confused over the disciplines of mysticism, philosophy, theology and jurisprudence in his arguments and accordingly his mystical construction. To criticize wahdah al-wujūd without having a basic understanding of Ibn ‘Arabi’s works is a fault. Moreover, the construction of mystical dimension of wahdah al-wujūd of Ibn ‘Arabi which had staunchly strengthened and defended by Shadruddin Shirazi (Mulla Sadra) is very difficult to break through by anyone who does not have basic knowledge of either. Thus, Sirhindi should have learned from him (Mulla Sadra) before he criticized Ibn ‘Arabi and his concept wahdah al-wujūd.</p><p><em>Keywords : Tasawuf of Sunni, Sirhindi, Monism, Theology of Asy’Ariyah</em></p><p><strong>Abstrak :</strong> Istilah monisme atau wahdah al-wujūd memiliki kisah yang panjang dalam Mistisisme Islam atau Sufisme. Ia dianggap menjadi jiwa sufisme, an sich, yang berarti bahwa tanpa wahdah al-wujūd, tak akan ada diskusi lebih lanjut mengenai Mistisisme Islam. Selain itu, teori yang berakar dalam tradisi syiah islam, belum pernah ditemukan dalam teologi Asy’ariyah atau dalam tradisi sunni lainnya. Penting untuk memiliki kesadaran terhadap apa yang penulis sebut sebagai “gagal kloning” antara monisme dalam syiah dan dualisme dalam tradisi sunni Sirhindi. Artikel ini berupaya untuk mengungkap kelemahan dan /atau kelemahan dari metodologi Sirhindi yang mengkritik wahdah al-wujūd dan kesalahpahamannya terhadap konsep ini. Terlebih, dalam konstruksi penjelasan mistisisnya, Sirhindi tampak bingung atas disiplin pengetahuan mistisisme, filsafat, teologi dan fiqh. Mengkritik wahdah al-wujūd tanpa memiliki pemahaman dasar terhadap karya Ibn ‘Arabi akan cacat. Terlebih lagi, konstruksi dimensi mistis yang diperkuat oleh Mulla Sadra ini akan sulit diterobos oleh siapapun yang tidak mempunyai pengetahuan dasar tentangnya. Jadi, Sirhindi seharusnya belajar dari Mulla Sadra sebelum mengkritik Ibn ‘Arabi dan konsep wahdah al-wujūd. </p><p><em>Kata kunci : Tasawuf Sunni, Sirhindi, Monisme, Teologi Asy’Ariyah, Mistisisme, Sufisme</em></p></div>