Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Monism'
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Stetter, John Jack Roger. "Spinoza's substance monism contextualized." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris 8, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019PA080042.
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L'adhésion de Spinoza à la doctrine du monisme de la substance constitue le fondement de sa philosophie. Cependant, la manière dont nous pouvons comprendre cette doctrine est loin d'être évidente. Les problèmes dans son interprétation comprennent la difficulté à caractériser le rapport entre la substance et ses modes, la validité de l’argument spinoziste pour établir le monisme, et la cohérence de maintenir qu’il peut y avoir des idées fausses alors que toute idée est en Dieu.Nous soutenons ici que l’examen du contexte philosophique de l’élaboration du monisme de la substance et l’examen des contextes philosophiques entourant la réception du monisme de Spinoza, particulièrement en langue anglaise, fournissent des ressources importantes pour résoudre les difficultés susmentionnées. En effet, la réception de Spinoza en langue anglaise a été très peu étudiée jusqu’à présent. Or la réception de Spinoza en langue anglaise passe principalement par les controverses qui entourent la doctrine du monisme de la substance.Nous commençons en analysant la notion de substance dans le cadre aristotélicien, et nous montrons comment le pluralisme des substances a été progressivement fragilisé avant Spinoza. Après avoir ensuite inspecté l'argument spinoziste pour le monisme, nous analysons des interprétations du monisme avancées par ses premiers commentateurs, tels que F. Lamy. Par la suite, nous développons une historiographie inédite de la réception de Spinoza en langue anglaise et nous mettons en évidence les ressources fournies par ses commentateurs anglophones pour résoudre des difficultés interprétatives dans la théorie spinoziste du monisme de la substanceSpinoza’s substance monism constitutes the bedrock of Spinoza’s philosophy as put forth in the Ethics. As the record shows, it is not evident how we are to make sense of the details of the Spinozistic view. Difficulties in its interpretation include characterizing the relationship between substance and mode, assessing the validity of the argument for substance monism, and conceiving how there can be “inadequate” ideas if all ideas are in God.Resources for addressing the above-mentioned interpretative difficulties are yielded by an inquiry into the philosophical contexts underlying both the elaboration of the doctrine of substance monism as well as various prominent reactions to Spinoza’s monistic position, particularly in the English-language literature. Indeed, English-language Spinoza commentators have been overwhelmingly drawn to discuss Spinoza’s metaphysics, yet little research on the history of Spinozism in English has been undertaken.Thus, I begin with an inspection of the notion of substance in the Aristotelian context to which Spinoza is heir. This discussion is framed around a reading of Aristotle’s Categories and an assessment of Aristotle’s views on substance, along with a reconstruction of Descartes’ views on substance as put forth in the Meditations and the Principles of Philosophy. After then discussing Spinoza’s argument for monism, I analyze several interpretations of his first readers, such as F. Lamy, before proposing a new historiography of Spinoza scholarship and reactions to Spinoza’s substance monism in the English-speaking world, such as found in the work of Coleridge or the British Idealists
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Carpenter, George Peter. "Neutral monism against the qualiophiles." Thesis, Keele University, 2018. http://eprints.keele.ac.uk/5447/.
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This thesis argues for an austere form of monism that incorporates aspects of panpsychism and physicalism, with the aim of putting naturalist epistemology on a secure footing. I criticise panpsychism for failing to live up to its promises of defending what we ordinarily think of as consciousness against physicalism, and criticise the metaphysical presuppositions of its current highprofile proponents. These presuppositions are contrasted with more recent approaches in philosophy of science. The mind‐body problem itself endures these assaults, however, and I criticise physicalists who claim their position is the more common‐sensical, along with naturalists who think they can avoid metaphysics. Both tendencies are represented by phenomenal concept strategists, whose position comes to seem extreme over the course of two chapters. I then offer my own solution to the mind‐body problem. My position seeks a dialectical reconciliation between the possibility of directly experiencing reality, associated with anti‐physicalist mysticism, and physical reductionism. I therefore take time to establish both the historical novelty of physicalism, and aspects of continuity which it may share with its predecessors.
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Garner, Jeremy. "In defense of (extreme) monism." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2016. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/35616/.
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There are broadly speaking two varieties of views regarding the nature of coincident entities such as statues and the pieces of matter which constitute them. According to Monists, (some) coincident entities are identical while according to pluralists coincident entities are always distinct. The aim of this thesis is to defend the view that many cases of coincidence, including cases of temporary coincidence, are instances of identity. First, I will argue that pluralism ought to be rejected because it faces serious philosophical challenges monism avoids. Next, I will argue that monism can adequately resist the three most common Leibniz law arguments levied against the plausibility that (some) coincident objects are identical. Specifically I will argue that the best monist response to the modal Leibniz law is to adopt a counterpart theoretic account of de re modality to justify the claim that modal contexts are referentially opaque. Next, I will show how monists can resist the linguistic version of LLA by either denying the truth (or falsity) of one of the relevant premises, or by denying the validity of the argument in question. Finally I will argue that the best monist response to the temporal version of LLA is to adopt a stage theoretic account of persistence which can offer a unified account of what Michael Rea has called the 'the problems of material constitution'.
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Beckman, Emma. "Superveniens och dess plats inom anomal monism : En analys av debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Religion and Culture, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-8770.
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Denna uppsats analyserar den medvetandefilosofiska debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim rörande Davidsons tes om det mentalas superveniens på det fysiska. Tesen utgör ett element i Davidsons generella teori om relationen mellan det mentala och det fysiska; anomal monism. Författaren frågar sig om Kim har rätt i att tesen om mental superveniens inte är tillräcklig för att garantera det mentala kausal kraft. I uppsatsen analyseras de båda filosofernas ståndpunkter i debatten med speciell tonvikt på deras respektive definitioner av superveniensbegreppet. Med utgångspunkt i detta argumenterar författarinnan att Kim i viss utsträckning kan sägas ha missförstått Davidsons superveniens-begrepp. Kim har definierat "svag" respektive "stark" och velat tolka Davidsons superveniens som tillhörande den sistnämnda sorten. Uppsatsförfattaren intar en ståndpunkt motsatt Kims och menar att Davidsons superveniensbegrepp snarare bör förstås som en variant av svag superveniens, men konstaterar samtidigt att det inte är helt säkert att dennes superveniens alls kan inordnas i någon av dessa kategorier; dessa refererar till "möjliga världar", vilka Davidson vägrar acceptera.
This paper analyses the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim concerning Davidsons idea of the supervenience of the mental upon the physical. This thought is part of Davidson's general theory of the relation between mind and body; anomalous monism. The author asks wherther Kim is right that mental supervenience is insufficient to gurantee the mental causal power. The paper analyses the standpoints of both philosophers, especially regarding their definitions of "supervenience" and argues that Kim, to some extent, can be said to have misunderstood Davidson's notion of supervenience. Kim has offered definitons of "weak" and "strong" supervenience and interpreted Davidsons supervenience as being of the kind last mentioned. The author takes a standpoint opposite of Kim's and argues that Davidson's notion of supervenience is better understood as weak supervenience, but at the same time notes that it is by no means obvious that Davidsons supervenience can be said to belong to either of these categories since these refer to "possible worlds", which Davidson refuses to accept.
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Oliveira, Marcio Francisco Teixeira de. "O Deus de Espinosa: substância una ou múltipla? Um estudo sobre a possibilidade do monismo." Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2014. http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=8444.
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Esta pesquisa terá como objetivo compreender a tese do monismo, isto é, a tese de que existe uma única substância cuja unidade é garantida pela compatibilidade entre sua natureza absolutamente infinita e a multiplicidade real dos seus infinitos atributos. Mas o monismo não é aceito por todos os intérpretes como não problemático, o que, se comprovado, levaria o sistema de Espinosa à ruína. No primeiro capítulo, através da crítica de um destes intérpretes, Ferdinand Alquié, será colocado o problema do monismo. De acordo com este intérprete, Espinosa não consegue estabelecer racionalmente a possibilidade da substância absoluta. Veremos que, não conseguindo conceber como os infinitos atributos podem constituir a essência de uma substância que seja única, Alquié conclui que a tese do monismo é incompatível com a estrutura argumentativa do primeiro livro da Ética. Após a exposição do problema do monismo apresentado a partir de Alquié, será realizada uma tentativa de resgatar a coerência interna da obra de Espinosa. Este estudo visará explicitar os conceitos de substância e atributo, procurando acompanhar as duas etapas da construção do monismo ao longo das onze primeiras proposições da Ética, a saber: (1) a prova de que há uma única substância por atributo; (2) a prova de que há uma única substância para todos os atributos. Para avançar na compreensão dos problemas ontológicos envolvidos na construção do monismo, e de como a posição de Espinosa só pode ser compreendida a partir de uma transformação profunda dos conceitos herdados do cartesianismo, a pesquisa privilegiará as interpretações magistrais propostas por Martial Gueroult (Spinoza, I, Dieu; Aubier-Montaigne, Paris, 1968) e Gilles Deleuze (Spinoza et le problème de l'expression; Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1968). Estes intérpretes realizam cada um ao seu modo uma genealogia da substância absolutamente infinita e apresentam soluções que permitem pensar a tese do monismo como coerente. Estas soluções serão apresentadas e avaliadas para que se saiba em que medida elas conseguem expor o problema do monismo e solucioná-lo de maneira plausível.This work has the purpose to comprehend the monisms thesis, i.e. the thesis that only one substance exists which unity is secured by the compatibility between its absolute and infinite nature, and the real multiplicity of its infinite attributes. But the monism is not accepted as not problematic by all the interpreters, which, if confirmed, would lead Spinozas system to ruin. In the first chapter, the monisms problem will be presented through the critic of one of those interpreters, Ferdinand Alquié. According to him, Spinoza cannot establish, rationally, the possibility of the absolute substance. We will see that, Alquié, not being able to conceive how the infinite attributes can constitute the essence of a substance that is unique, concludes that the monisms thesis is incompatible with the argumentative structure of the first book of the Ethic. After the explanation of the monisms problem, presented from Alquié, we will try to recover the internal coherence of Spinozas work. This study aim to make explicit the concepts of substance and attribute, looking to follow the two stages of the monisms construction along the first eleven propositions of the Ethic, that is: (1) the proof that exists one unique substance per attribute; (2) the proof that exists only one substance for all attributes. To advance in the ontological problems involved in the monisms construction, and how Spinozas position can only be comprehended through a profound transformation of the concepts inherited by the cartesianism, the research will favour the masterly interpretations propounded by Martial Gueroult (Spinoza, I, Dieu; Aubier-Montaigne, Paris, 1968) and Gilles Deleuze (Spinoza et le problème de l'expression; Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1968). These interpreters carry out each in its own fashion a genealogy of the absolutely infinite substance and present solutions that allow us to think the monism as coherent. Such solutions will be presented and evaluated, aiming to know to what extent they can show the problem of the monism and solve it in a plausible way.
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Pósleman, Cristina. "Lenguaje y realidad. Entre el monismo anómalo y la fórmula monismo = pluralismo." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2015. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/119270.
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In this paper we propose to put in tension the approaches of Donald Davidson and Gilles Deleuze, belonging respectively to the analytical and continental philosophy. The aim is to remain in some of the tense areas arising around the question of to what extent language determines or is determined by the real. We propose to consider how both authors jointly address the condition of social and creative language, and thus offer us two ways to address dualistic thinking –from Davidson’s anomalous monism and Deleuze’s monism as synonymous with pluralism– and to promote democratization of language use. Two lines which, in our perception, have not yet been sufficiently worked out regarding their deep relations.En esta ponencia nos proponemos poner en tensión los enfoques de Donald Davidson y Gilles Deleuze, pertenecientes respectivamente a la filosofía analítica y a la continental. El objetivo es detenernos en algunas zonas de tensión suscitadas alrededorde la pregunta sobre en qué medida el lenguaje determina o es determinado por loreal. Vamos a considerar cómo ambos autores abordan conjuntamente la condición desocial y de creativo del lenguaje, y de esta manera nos ofrecen dos vías para enfrentardesde el monismo anómalo davidsoniano y el monismo como sinónimo de pluralismode Deleuze al pensamiento dualista, así como para promover la democratización del uso del lenguaje. Dos líneas que, según nuestra percepción, no han sido aún losuficientemente trabajadas en sus profundas articulaciones.
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Ahmad, Saeedah. "James and Russell on neutral monism." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1994. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/106905/.
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This thesis evaluates and compares two versions of neutral monism, one developed by William James and the other by Bertrand Russell. Both argued against Cartesianism in favour of a "subjectless given" as the basic stuff which constitutes both mind and matter. My evaluation will demonstrate that James’s and Russell's supposedly neutral entities are not neutral as their exponents claim because they fail to satisfy important criteria set for a theory to be genuinely neutral. There are two fundamental elements within my discussion of the neutral entities. Firstly, I shall demonstrate that although James's initial repudiation of dualistic epistemology of subject and object, knower and known, led him to avoid metaphysical dualism of mental and physical, in Cartesian sense, by committing him to the view that there is one kind of entity called "experience", his final analysis admitted an internal distinction within the supposedly simple neutral entities. I shall call this covert dualism. Accepting James’s radical empiricism as an archetype, Russell’s early commitment to neutral monism led him to assert three distinctive kinds of entities, sensation (neutral), image (subjective) and unperceived (objective), and was therefore not complete as that of James. In order to bring his theory in line with James, Russell, in his mature version, entirely repudiated the dualistic view of perception which, following Moore, he accepted, to reject idealism. Russell declared percept as the neutral entity, which is both mental and material at once. But by re-introducing epistemological dualism, as James did, Russell admitted that a percept is not simple but complete bundle of compresent qualities and relations. 1 shall argue that like James’ his theory also collapses into covert dualism. Secondly, I shall argue that to produce a genuinely explanatory theory of neutral entities James and Russell exploited science to justify their theories. In course of their analysis they produced various arguments which has been considered as circular. An attempt will be made to show that the apparent circularity of their analysis is really part of a sophisticated programme, now known as bootstrapping. The notion of a bootstrap strategy has recently been developed in philosophy of science, and suggests a way in which the same evidence can be used to generate both a general and specific hypothesis. The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapters one, two and four are largely exegetical and chronological, and discuss the development of neutral monism especially in James and Russell’s philosophy together with the general characteristics of the theory as distinguished from other theories explaining mind and matter. Chapters three, five and six critically analyse James’s and Russell’s versions respectively to show their theories collapse into covert dualism. In chapter seven we argue that the alleged circularities in their theory are non- viscious and their employment of a bootstrap strategy introduced a profound innovation in epistemology.
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Lim, Daniel. "Necessitarian dualism : carving a path between Type-B physicalism and property dualism." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.609290.
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Earle, Philippa Helen. "Monism and hybridity in Milton's literary forms." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/33661.
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A prevailing scholarly view holds that John Milton’s monism (his belief that matter and spirit are inseparable) is a reaction to seventeenth-century determinism. My thesis, however, posits that Milton’s monism in fact emerges from his exploration of literary form. Chapter one traces the classical roots of the philosophy and its compatibility with Genesis. It posits the comprehensiveness of monist philosophy and highlights the vitalist (or animate) implications of ancient monist theories for literary form. Spoken or written words, Democritus suggests, correspond to the material building blocks or “elements” of the universe: the construction of literary form is analogous to the creation of the cosmos. Indeed, Lucretius’ letter-atom analogy suggests that the process of creating literary form is essentially identical to the atomic method underlying the composition of other material forms in the universe. Greek atomist thought, the chapter proposes, finds a striking parallel in Jewish mystical beliefs about creation. It is with the letters of the divine name that the Lord was said to have created the universe. I argue that, for Milton, Aristotle is most influential in expressing a vitalist conception of literary form, for in his philosophy, soul generates voice, which manifests itself in writing. Milton acknowledges the association between words and atoms, between letters and primordial substance, and between voice, or breath, and spirit in his monist materialism; after all, in Genesis, God creates by utterance. Examining the relation of vitalism to Aristotelian poetics, I suggest the relevance of the concept to Milton’s hybrid literary forms. Then, analysing the material nature of voice in Milton’s works, I posit in chapter two that Milton’s polemical pamphlets underscore the sense of spirit in writing that we find in the poetry. That literary forms can be perceived to embody soul because they evoke voice is evident also from Milton’s Art of Logic (1672). I suggest in chapter three that Logic is saturated with materialism because the Aristotelian sources on which Milton’s Ramist logic is based express material monism. Milton’s Logic and Areopagitica (1644) provide further evidence of his thinking about the vital potential of literary form through the logical construction of texts, a continued interest, I argue, which ultimately engenders his mature monism. Milton use of dream narratives in Paradise Lost, I propose, suggests that reality varies materially by degrees. The parts that reality comprises become more distinct after the Fall, when Milton’s dream narratives, and his cosmology, changes. Before the Fall, the poet imagines that Earth orbits the sun, and that the sun orbits heaven at the centre of the cosmos, a formation, I explain, that has striking resemblance to modern knowledge of the solar system. With careful attention to the dreams of Paradise Lost, I have determined that monism, for Milton, encompasses the workings of intellect, and in the final chapter, I argue that this principle is central to understanding Paradise Regained. The Son’s method of survival in the wilderness becomes the means by which paradise (the spiritual reality) is regained. Understanding his own nature permits the Son of God physiologically to sustain himself through dreaming; the intellectual achievement alters the material nature of his body so that he is sustained by spiritual food. Monism is at the very heart of Paradise Regained. It is a monist methodology of literary form which enables the poet across his oeuvre truly to represent the nature of reality.
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Hamilton, John. "Russell and the metaphysics of neutral monism." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2013. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/46483/.
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My overall aim in this thesis is to elucidate the precise nature of Russell's mature 'neutral monist' metaphysic. I show how an understanding of it has been hampered by pervasive misunderstandings. The approach I take is an historical one, and my account reveals that, after his adoption of neutral monism in 1918, there were no radical changes in his worldview, and certainly no lurch from a supposed quasi-phenomenalistic system prior to 1921, to a causal theory of perception after 1927. Instead, the earlier system is not as phenomenalistic as is sometimes supposed and his later philosophy is a development, not a repudiation, of the themes in the earlier. Russell sought to show how his metaphysic dovetails with the outcome of modern physics in his 1927 book The Analysis of Matter. I seek to show how a proper understanding of modern physics indeed leads to Russellian conclusions. I also discuss the implications of quantum mechanics for metaphysics – a task which Russell could not have performed when he wrote The Analysis of Matter, since QM was still very much in a state of flux. I show how Russell moved from empiricism to a naturalistic position in the theory of knowledge,and in doing so supplied a definitive solution to Hume's scepticism. Once again, the usual perception of him as an “empiricist” fails to do justice to the complexity and subtlety of his philosophy. Finally, I argue that Russell's solution to the mind-body problem is the only one with any chance whatsoever of being true. In all this I seek to show how Russell's philosophy has been unjustly neglected in contemporary debates and how it can provide elegant solutions to contemporary philosophical puzzles in the philosophy of science, epistemology and the mind-body problem.
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McFarland, Neill A. "An examination of the pantheistic monism of Shankara and Radhakrishnan." Lynchburg, Va. : Liberty University, 1995. http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu.
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Leite, Edilene de Souza [UNESP]. "Meditação e monismo de triplo aspecto." Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/150197.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
Pesquisas sobre meditação em muitos campos de investigação cresceram amplamente no Ocidente no último século, principalmente por causa de seus benefícios. No entanto, não há um conceito bem definido do que é meditação. Há uma diversidade de técnicas e tradições de culturas diferentes que a cultivam, de tal forma que podemos encontrá-la em todos os continentes. No campo científico, a maioria dos pesquisadores procura pelas relações da meditação e atividades cerebrais, contribuindo para investigações sobre a consciência e para filosofia da mente, e ajudando a abordar debates não resolvidos sobre percepção, atenção e processos de aprendizagem. Neste trabalho enfrentamos o desafio de abordar filosoficamente a meditação, considerando a variedade de abordagens disponíveis e a diversidade de achados empíricos. Revisamos teorias e interpretações sobre a natureza da mente, e abordamos a hipótese de Walach (2014) que a meditação seria uma capacidade epistêmica da consciência que acessa uma realidade objetiva. Partindo do Monismo de Triplo Aspecto de proposto por Pereira Jr. (2013, 2015) assumimos que a marca da consciência é o sentimento, e resgatamos os antigos argumentos budistas de Nagarjuna sobre o sofrimento para conceber a meditação como uma experiência que é sobre o sentimento. Sugerimos também ao final da dissertação que a intuição pode ser vista como uma maneira de conhecer o mundo por meio de práticas de meditação.
Research on meditation in many fields of investigation has been widely growing in the Occident in the last century, mainly because of its benefits. However, there isn‘t a well-defined concept of what is meditation and there is a vast quantity of technics and traditions from different cultures that cultivate it, in a way that we can find it in every continent. On the scientific field, most of the researchers are looking for the relations of meditation and brain activities, contributing to investigations on consciousness and to the philosophy of the mind, helping to approach unsolved debates about perception, attention, and learning processes. In this work we present the challenge of working with meditation, considering the many approaches available and the diversity of empirical findings. We review theories and interpretations about the nature of the mind and address a hypothesis by Walach (2014) that meditation would be an epistemic capacity of the consciousness that accesses an objective reality. Starting up from Monism of Triple Aspect proposed by Pereira Jr. (2013, 2015) we assume that the mark of consciousness is feeling, and rescue the ancient Buddhist arguments of Nagarjuna about suffering to conceive meditation as an experience that is about feeling. We also suggest by the end of the dissertation that intuition can be regarded as a way of knowing about the world by means of meditation practices.
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Singletary, Jason Cole. "Schaffer's Priority Monism and the Problem of Junky Possible Worlds." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1429525481.
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Taylor, Jamie Nathan. "Weak Priority Monism : a new theory of the fundamental." Thesis, Durham University, 2018. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/12967/.
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In this PhD dissertation, I am defending a new version of Priority Monism, which I call Weak Priority Monism: that the Cosmos is fundamental and is identical to the collective plurality of its proper parts. This distinguishes it from the version of Priority Monism defended by Jonathan Schaffer, in that, unlike him, I accept the thesis composition as identity. I argue that Weak Priority Monism is preferable to Schaffer's monism as not only can all the arguments for his version of monism be also utilised by the weak priority monist, but they also have two decisive advantages over Schafferian Priority Monism (i.e. what I call Strong Priority Monism). Firstly, they are able to explain how the Cosmos can ground all its proper parts in 'weak' junky worlds; and secondly, they have a novel solution to the problem of heterogeneity which is superior to any solution available to Schaffer. In accepting composition as identity, however, Weak Priority Monism is a controversial view. It might be thought, for one, that composition as identity entails that the irreflexivity of grounding/dependence is violated: as if some things are identical to the mereological fusion they are grounded in, then it would seemingly be the case that those things grounded themselves. However, I will show that this is not necessarily the case, and that we can make sense of some plurality of things collectively grounding each of those things in the plurality, without it being the case that each of those things ground themselves. Indeed, as I shall argue, there is still a distinction between the fundamental and derivative, even if turns out that all the proper parts of the Cosmos taken collectively are fundamental. Weak Priority Monism then, as we shall see, is a promising new position on what is fundamental.
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Pennell, Phillip AV. "Schaffer and Monism: Validating the Priority of the Whole." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1222.
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Stedman, Jeffrey N. "Perfectionism, value pluralism, and the human good." Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2006. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3215294.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2006.Title from first page of PDF file (viewed July 24, 2006). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 264-269).
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Sanford, Marcus Raymond. "Light on two sides a biblical context for Christopher Alexander's Tao of building /." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1987. http://www.tren.com.
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Pedace, Karina. "La normatividad de lo mental y el rol de la segunda persona. Tras las huellas de Donald Davidson." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2012. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112802.
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The Normativity of the Mental and the Role of the Second Person’s Standpoint. On Davidson’s Footsteps”. I offer in this paper an elucidation of the normativity of the mental in terms of the second person’s standpoint, with the hope of opening a conceptual horizon that will allow us to go beyond Donald Davidson. Aiming at this, the paper is structured as follows. In the first part I present Davidson’s original response to the mind/body problem and reconstruct his argument in favour of the irreducibility of mental concepts thesis. In the second part I deal with the feature that the peculiarity of the mental bears in his system, that is, normativity. In the third section I explore and assess the davidsonian treatment of the first, second and third person standpoints with the aim of finally narrowing down my proposal.En este trabajo ofrezco una elucidación de la normatividad de lo mental en términos de la perspectiva de segunda persona, con la esperanza de abrir un horizonte conceptual que nos permita ir más allá de Donald Davidson. A tal efecto, el artículo tiene la siguiente estructura. En la primera parte presento su original respuesta al problema mente/cuerpo y reconstruyo su argumentación a favor de la tesis de la irreducibilidad de los conceptos mentales. En la segunda parte me ocupo del rasgo que, en su sistema, porta la peculiaridad de lo mental, a saber: la normatividad. En la tercera sección exploro y evalúo el tratamiento davidsoniano de las perspectivas de primera, segunda y tercera persona con vistas a precisar, finalmente, mi propuesta.
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Chen, Fei. "Essai sur l'articulation des sources du droit dans l'approche du droit de propriété." Thesis, Paris 1, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA010328.
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Le droit de propriété est le fondement du système social occidental tant au niveau juridique qu'au niveau idéologique. Pourtant, la vénération de ce droit implique l'existence de la pensée binaire qui engendre une concurrence (pour ne pas dire confrontation) permanente : privé-public, individualisme-collectivisme, moi-autrui. C'est ainsi qu’il est difficile de comprendre l'existence d'une pensée sinisée dans laquelle la notion du droit de propriété fait défaut. Quand les règles du droit deviennent un support des règles du rite alors que le but du droit ne consiste plus en la recherche de la justice mais de l'harmonie, un autre mode de pensée est dès lors apparu. Ce mode de pensée, négligé pendant longtemps par les théoriciens attire néanmoins de plus en plus l’attention aujourd'hui. Mais en quoi consiste-t-il ? Quels effet pourrait-il donner au droit de propriété? Est-il possible de l'articuler avec la pensée binaire dans le domaine juridique ? Cette thèse essaye de traiter ces questions dans l’approche du droit comparéThe property law is the foundation of Western social system both at the legal level and at the ideological level. However, the veneration of this category of law implies the existence of binary theories creating permanent competition (if not using the word "confrontation") : Private-public, individualism-collectivism, me-others... Thus, it is difficult to understand the existence of a Sinitic thought in which the concept of property is lacking. That is why when the regulation of law become a carrier of the rules of the rite, while the purpose of the law is no longer the pursuit of justice but of harmony, another way of thinking has therefore appeared. This way of thinking, long neglected by theorists, nevertheless attracts more and more attention today : But what does it consist of ? What effects it could give to the property rights ? Is it possible to articulate with binary thinking in the legal field ? This thesis attempts to address these issues in the approach of comparative law
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Darius, Fábio Augusto. "De corpo, alma e espírito: apontamentos históricos e teológicos acerca do tema santificação na obra holística de Ellen White." Faculdades EST, 2014. http://tede.est.edu.br/tede/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=538.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível SuperiorA presente pesquisa aborda historicamente a construção e o desenvolvimento prático e teórico da teologia holística de Ellen White legada à Igreja Adventista do Sétimo Dia. Ellen White, viveu no momento em que seu país, os Estados Unidos da América, estavam se firmando enquanto nação e morreu precisamente quando ele buscava a hegemonia mundial. Assim, passando pelos turbulentos anos da Secessão e incorporando o espírito pragmático estadunidense cresceu e se firmou com sua pátria. Autodidata, ajudou a fundar uma das igrejas originais daquele país, fruto da união do pensamento heterogêneo de várias congregações protestantes. Seu trabalho destaca-se pela afirmação e vivência das crenças bíblicas que compõem a fé brônzea adventista. Contudo, de seu compêndio, extraído de milhares de páginas produzidas ao longo de sete décadas dedicadas à igreja, destaca-se indubitavelmente a interrelação indissociável entre corpo e espírito. A partir deste paradigma, para ela, esses dois entes formam a alma, que tendo porção corpórea, é mortal. Eis pois o que é o ser humano: uma alma mortal em busca de imortalidade, apenas alcançada pelos redimidos depois da volta de Jesus, um evento literal a ser percebido em breve a maior esperança do adventista ainda hoje. Em Ellen White, como deverá ser percebido ao longo do trabalho, visto a serena e equilibrada relação entre corpo e espírito, há uma fervorosa defesa e ao mesmo tempo fremente ataque àqueles que ao contrário desta perspectiva tida por ela cristã, apelam à filosofia clássica. É no escopo dessa teologia carnal por ela dita bíblica que deve estar o ser humano alinhado. Assim, manter um regime alimentar saudável, fazer exercícios físicos regulares, zelar pela educação integral e vivenciar a natureza configuram-se exercícios em busca da espiritualidade plena, que aliados à vida de piedade e oração levam a santificação tema central de seus escritos. O primeiro capítulo da tese analisa historicamente os Estados Unidos e Europa à época de Ellen White; o segundo aborda a construção histórica e social da crença na mortalidade da alma centro deste trabalho, enquanto o terceiro e último trata da abordagem holística whiteana do corpo e espírito com vistas a plenitude de alma.
The present research addresses historically the construction and development of practical and theoretical holistic theology of Ellen White bequeathed to the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Ellen White lived at the time in which her country, the United States of America, were firmed while nation and died precisely when it sought the world hegemony. Thus, passing through turbulent years of Secession and incorporating the spirit pragmatic American she grew and lean on with her homeland. Self-taught, she helped to found one of the original churches of this country, the fruit of the union of heterogeneous thought of various protestant congregations. Her work stands for affirmation and experience of biblical beliefs that comprise the Adventist brazen faith. However, her compendium, extracted from thousands of pages produced over the course of seven decades devoted to church, stands out clearly the inseparable intercorrelation between body and spirit. From this paradigm, for her, these two bodies form the soul, that having body portion is deadly. This is then what is the human being: a mortal soul in search of immortality, only achieved by redeemed after the coming of Jesus, a literal event to be soon perceived - the greatest hope of the Adventist still today. In Ellen White, as should be perceived along the work, since the serene and balanced relationship between body and spirit, there is a fervent defense and at the same time thrilled attack to those who unlike this perspective taken by her Christian, call for classical philosophy. It is in the scope of this carnal theology dictated by her biblical that it must be the human being aligned. Thus, to maintain a healthy diet, doing regular physical exercises, ensure the integral education and experience the nature, configure exercises in search of full spirituality which allied to the life of piety and prayer lead to sanctification - central theme of her writings. The first chapter of the thesis analyzes historically the United States and Europe at the time of Ellen White; the second deals with the historical and social construction of the belief in the mortality of the soul - center of this work, while the third and last is the holistic whitean approach of body and spirit with views to the fullness of soul.
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Cornell, David Michael. "Why there is only one thing : a defence of ontological monism." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2013. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/4939/.
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In this dissertation I will present and defend Ontological Monism: the thesis which states that there is only a single concrete object in existence – the world itself. According to this view, the world is mereologically simple; it has no proper parts. Because of this, monism may initially strike one as being absurd, for it may be thought that it is simply obvious that there is a plurality of concrete objects. There are trees, rocks, cats and larks; there are galaxies, planets, leptons and quarks. If monism denies this then it is blatantly false and, worse, patently absurd, or so one may think. It is true, I concede, that monism denies the existence of all these things. But it is false, I claim, that this renders it absurd. It is the purpose of this thesis to show that monism is actually a coherent, plausible and attractive metaphysical view. Indeed, it is the purpose of this thesis to convince the reader that monism is true. The thesis will progress in a number of stages. I will begin in §1 by looking at the metaphysics of composite objects. Specifically, I will be revisiting Peter van Inwagen’s Special Composition Question; the question which asks when two or more material objects compose a further material object. In §2, §3, and §4, I will consider various responses to this question, and conclude that the correct answer to the SCQ is ‘never’. That is, I will argue for compositional nihilism, the view that there are no composite objects at all. In §5 I will present a number of arguments to show that monism represents the best form of nihilism. If you’re a nihilist, you should also be a monist, or so I will claim. In §6 I will provide some independent support for the possibility of there being spatially extended, yet mereologically simple objects. In §7 I will explain, in detail, how the monist can explain the appearance of plurality given that there is, in fact, only singularity. I will introduce, explain, and defend a new type of property: irreducible structured distributional properties. Armed with this type of property, the monist can provide a satisfying explanation of why it seems as though there are many things, when there is in fact only one. In §8 I will address some objections that have been presented against monism, and show how they are best overcome.
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Morais, Eduardo José de Azevedo Charters Fuentes. "Identidade, diferenciação e metafísica de eventos." Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2015. http://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/handle/tede/8439.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
The metaphysical discussion over causality and identity of events, in the aim of the physicalism, emerges in the context of the collapse of behaviorism. Whilst the paradigms of logical positivism dominated philosophy, the behaviorism dominated psychology. The rupture with the positivism was marked by the work of Willard V. O. Quine. The critics from the two dogmas of empiricism and the proposal of a radical translation allowed emergence of the theses of indetermination of meaning and inscrutability of reference. As alternative to empiricism, Quine recurs to ontological simplification and holism about theory, but considering the primacy of experience, he proposes a shift towards pragmatism. However, Quine’s pragmatism was founded in a behavioristic perspective on the acquisition of linguistic competences, and behaviorism didn’t stood as paradigm for the explanation of mentalist vocabulary. Quine had a great influence in the work and life of Donald Davidson. The ontological economy and the holism of theory marked Davidson’s work in his choice of events as basic entities and his approach to meaning in Truth and Meaning through a theory of truth. While in articles as Action, Reason and Causes Davidson develops an approach to the causal role of events in intention and action, stating that reasons are causes, in The Logical Form of Action Sentences and Causal Relations, he searches for the adequate logical forms of describing events and singular causal statements in order to establish an identity of events. The following metaphysical positions support, in Individuation of Events, a causal individuation criterion for events, and in Events as Particulars and Eternal vs Ephemeral Events, Davidson defends that events are spatiotemporal and unrepeatable particulars, finalizing a metaphysical discussion over of events that will enable him to approach the problem of the mind-body relation, in the anomalous monism argument. Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism presented in Mental Events proposes the thesis of monism – identity between physical events and mental events –, and anomalism of the mental – events do not fall under strict causal laws. To support these theses Davidson formulates three principles, whose conjunction gives us a non-reductionist version of token physicalism and, therefore, permits us to conciliate the mentalist vocabulary with the structure of physicalist language. In this sense, anomalous monism supports a supervenience theory of the mental. Despite the critics made to anomalous monism, as the epiphenomenalism accusation, the theory only crumbles in its initial presuppositions that is that of a priori causality and identity. Thus, the frailest aspects of the argument consist in the difficulty of tracking and identify in experience neural events with mental events, and in the formulation of strict laws. Those questions depend, respectively, on the advancement of neurosciences and physics. The present work, by the name of “Identity, Differentiation and Metaphysics of Events”, consists on an approach to metaphysics of events, in the context of the physicalism of tokens, more specifically to the Donald Davidson’s argument of the anomalous monism that argues for the identity of physical events and mental events and the causal role of mental events. It pretends, therefore, to coordinate the metaphysical discussion of events with Davidson’s anomalous monism.
A discussão metafísica sobre a causalidade e a identidade de eventos, no âmbito do fisicalismo, surge no contexto do colapso do behaviorismo. Porquanto os paradigmas do positivismo-lógico dominaram a filosofia, o behaviorismo dominou a psicologia. A ruptura com o positivismo é marcada pela obra de Willard V. O. Quine: a crítica aos dois dogmas do empirismo e a proposta de uma tradução radical, permitiu erguer as teses da indetermi-nação do significado e inescrutabilidade da referência. Como alternativa ao empirismo, Quine recorre à simplificação ontológica e ao holismo da teoria, mas com a primazia da experiência, propondo assim uma guinada rumo ao pragmatismo. Contudo, o pragmatismo de Quine era fundamentado numa perspectiva behaviorista para a aquisição de competên-cias linguísticas, e o behaviorismo não se firmou como paradigma para a explicação da vocabulário mentalista. Quine teve grande influência no trabalho e vida de Donald Davidson. A economia ontológica e o holismo da teoria marcam a obra de Davidson através da escolha de eventos como entidades básicas e da proposta de problematização do significado, em Verdade e Significado, através de uma teoria da verdade. Enquanto que em artigos como Action, Reasons and Causes Davidson desenvolve uma abordagem ao papel causal de eventos na intenção e na ação, afirmando que razões são causas, em The Logical Form of Action Sentences e Causal Relations, ele explora as formas lógicas adequadas para descrever eventos e para declarações causais singulares e para estabelecer uma identidade de eventos. As posições metafísicas daqui decorrentes sustentam, em Individuation of Events, um critério de individuação causal de eventos e em Events as Particulars e Eternal vs Ephemeral Events, Davidson sustenta que eventos são particulares espaciotemporais irrepetíveis, finalizando uma discussão metafísica de eventos que lhe permitirá abordar o problema da relação corpo-mente, no argumento do monismo anômalo. O monismo anômalo de Davidson, apresentado em Mental Events propõe as teses do monismo – identidade entre eventos físicos e eventos mentais –, e do anomalismo do mental – eventos mentais falham em cair sob leis causais estritas. Para suportar essas teses, Davidson formula três princípios cuja conjunção nos dá uma versão não reducionista do fisicalismo de ocorrências, que, portanto, permite conciliar o vocabulário mentalista com a estrutura linguística fisicalista. Assim, o monismo anômalo suporta uma teoria da superveniência do mental. Apesar do monismo anômalo sofrer algumas críticas, como a acusação de epifenomenalismo, a teoria só sucumbe nos seus pressupostos iniciais, ou seja, a causalidade e a identidade a priori. Os aspetos mais frágeis do argumento consistem na dificuldade de rastrear e identificar, na experiência, eventos neurais com eventos mentais, e na formulação de leis estritas. Questões estas que dependem, respetivamente, do avanço das neurociências e desenvolvimento da física. O presente trabalho, pelo nome de “Identidade, Diferenciação e Metafísica de Eventos”, consiste numa abordagem à metafísica de eventos, no contexto do fisicalismo de ocorrências, mais especificamente do argumento do monismo anômalo de Davidson, que afirma a identidade entre eventos físicos e eventos mentais, assim como o papel causal de eventos mentais. Pretende, portanto, coordenar a discussão metafísica de eventos com o monismo anômalo de Davidson.
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Turégano, Mansilla Isabel. "Transnational Law or the Need to Overcome Monism and Dualism in Legal Theory." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/116647.
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Law in a transnational context loses the features with which it has been configured since modernity. Classic distinctions between national and international, public and private, substantive and procedural, legal and political, social and legal lose their rigidity in a context of norms, orders, institutions and agents that interact and overlap in diverse and changing ways. A legal theory capable of explaining and evaluating this overflowing legal reality is lacking. A theoretical reflection on international law is not enough. Transnationalism appeals to a plurality of legal actors and spaces that interact to create, interpret and enforce rules which they mutually identify with. Transnationalism does not only refer to the global or the supranational, but to the interdependence of both with the local and transit spaces. And this translates into a change of focus or perspective that is required of each legal agent: management of the interrelation between diverse orders aimed to create spaces for approach, contestation and innovation is a normative requirement and it must be weighed against other legal values. Concepts to which legal theory must focus its attention change their meaning. The work refers to four of those concepts that I consider essential: social group or community, relations between orders and interlegality, coercion and normative diversity. The last part of the paper addresses the way in which these necessary changes have a place in our theories elaborated from the perspective of the great traditions of legal philosophy. What legal positivism, socio-legal theory and legal realism have in common might be an appropriate approach to the review of our discipline.El derecho, en un contexto transnacional, pierde los rasgos con los que lo hemos configurado desde la modernidad. Las clásicas distinciones entre lo nacional y lo internacional, lo público y lo privado, lo sustantivo y lo procedimental, lo jurídico y lo político, lo social y lo jurídico abandonan su rigidez en un entramado de normas, órdenes, instituciones y agentes que se entremezclan y superponen de modos diversos y cambiantes. Carecemos de una teoría del derecho capaz de explicar y evaluar esta realidad jurídica desbordante. No es suficiente una reflexión teórica sobre el derecho internacional. Lo transnacional apela a una pluralidad de actores y de espacios jurídicos que interaccionan para crear, interpretar y ejecutar normas con las que se identifican mutuamente. Lo transnacional no se refiere solo a lo global o a lo supranacional, sino a la interdependencia de ambos con lo local y los espacios de tránsito. Ello se traduce en un cambio de enfoque o de perspectiva que se exige a cada operador jurídico: la gestión de la interrelación entre órdenes diversos orientada a la creación de espacios para la aproximación, la contestación y la innovación es una exigencia normativa y debe ser ponderada con el resto de valores jurídicos. A partir de ahí cambia el significado de los conceptos a los que ha de orientar su atención la teoría jurídica. El trabajo se refiere a cuatro de dichos conceptos que considero esenciales: grupo social o comunidad, relaciones entre órdenes e interlegalidad, coerción y diversidad normativa. El modo en que los cambios necesarios tienen cabida en la teoría elaborada desde las grandes tradiciones de la iusfilosofía es abordado en la última parte del trabajo, considerando que lo que tienen en común el positivismo jurídico, la teoría socio-jurídica y el realismo jurídico puede ser una aproximación adecuada para la revisión de nuestra disciplina.
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Bohn, Einar Duenger. "Composition as identity a study in ontology and philosophical logic /." Amherst, Mass. : University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2009. http://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/92/.
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Cadiet, Nicolas. "L’individu dans tous ses états." Thesis, Université de Lorraine, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017LORR0216/document.
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L’ontologie contemporaine, héritière de l’ancienne querelle des universaux et des contestations empiristes de la substance, se débat aujourd’hui dans les controverses sur l’individu et l’universel. Qu’est-ce qu’un individu ? Qu’est-ce qui est individuel, qu’est-ce qui en fait un individu ? Le point de départ méthodique de la philosophie analytique, l’analyse du langage, pose côte à côte les universels, les particuliers, les propriétés, les événements etc. On tâche alors de donner de toutes ces notions un compte-rendu systématique. Mais les difficultés rencontrées suggèrent, plutôt que de partir du langage, d’analyser l’objet de notre expérience commune, le particulier concret, pour se donner de ces réalités qui sont la première donnée de notre connaissance une notion satisfaisante, c’est-à-dire qui rende compte de nos perceptions et souffre la confrontation avec les problématiques contemporaines. C’est l’objet de ce travail. On trouve dans la conjonction des propriétés d’unité et de distinction une caractérisation des individus qui permet de résoudre les paradoxes posés par des théories antiques ou contemporaines telles que les divers monismes (de l’acte ou de la puissance), la question du principe d’individuation, les difficultés liées à la désignation de l’individu, la dissolution de la notion de corps matériel dans la théorie quantique, etc. Ces deux propriétés pouvant être possédées à divers degrés suggèrent de parcourir la hiérarchie des êtres en suivant l’échelle qu’elles constituent, jusqu’à l’individu par excellence d’ici-bas, la personne, dont on saisit au passage qu’elle ne peut se réduire à la simple conscience de soi ou égologie. Mais quelques considérations sur la vie politique montrent que l’individu qu’est la personne humaine ne réalise pas au maximum la raison d’individu : elle est encore trop dépendante. On peut tâcher dès lors de se représenter ce que peut être l’Individu qui se tient au sommet de cette échelle, l’individu souverain, en qui la simplicité et l’indépendance ontologiques atteignent le degré souverain. Ce parcours de l’individuation dans tous ses états permet de vérifier à quel point les concepts antiques de l’aristotélisme – substance, matière et forme, nature – demeurent pertinentsContemporary ontology follows the old controversies about universals and particular beings. What is an individual ? What is it to be an individual ? In virtue of which principle is an thing an individual ? The methods of analytic philosophy begins with an analysis of language, and tries to give a systematic explanation of concepts like universal, particular, feature, event, and so on.But the encountered difficulties suggest rather to study the object of our common experience, the concrete particular in order to give a satisfactory account of our perceptions that succeeds in confronting contemporary problematics. That is the aim of this work. We may through the features of unity and division characterize what an individual is and resolve the paradoxes laid by ancient and contemporary theories : monism, problem of the principle of individuation, reference to individuals, quantum mechanics, and so on.These two features may be more or less possessed. The person occupies the top of the scale among the objects that we commonly meet. Our analysis shows that the person cannot be the mere self-consciousness. It must be a substance endowed with reason. Nevertheless it doesn’t fit the perfect realization of the concept of individual. There is place for another being which completely fulfills thesovereign independence that the features of simplicity and division means.This journey through the various states of individuals give by the way a proof of the relevance of aristotelian concepts like substance, matter, form, nature, even in contemporary ontology
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Fischborn, Marcelo. "POR QUE (E POR QUE NÃO) REJEITAR O MONISMO ANÔMALO." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2014. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9128.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível SuperiorAnomalous monism is a theory in the philosophy of mind put forth by Donald Davidson in the 1970s. Although influential at the time, it received numerous criticisms, and it is now widely rejected. The present Master s Dissertation argues for a revision of the reasons for which anomalous monism should be rejected. According to a well known objection in the literature, anomalous monism entails the thesis of property epiphenomenalism, and should be rejected because this consequence is unacceptable. It is proposed that this objection is inadequate in its two crucial steps. First, property epiphenomenalism does not seem to follow from anomalous monism, and, second, there seems to be no sufficient reason for a decisive rejection of property epiphenomenalism. Despite this, there are alternative reasons for rejecting anomalous monism, which concern the justification of the monist thesis. At least one of the premises Davidson takes to support it appears to be false, and, additionally, the very possibility of the monism at issue is threatened by problems in the ontology of events it assumes.
O monismo anômalo é uma teoria em filosofia da mente proposta por Donald Davidson na década de 1970. Embora influente na época, essa teoria recebeu inúmeras críticas e é atualmente amplamente rejeitada. A presente dissertação argumenta em favor de uma revisão das razões pelas quais o monismo anômalo deve ser rejeitado. De acordo com uma objeção bem conhecida na literatura, o monismo anômalo implica a tese do epifenomenismo de propriedades e deve ser rejeitado porque essa consequência é inaceitável. Propõe-se que essa objeção é inadequada em seus dois passos cruciais. Em primeiro lugar, o epifenomenismo de propriedades não parece se seguir do monismo anômalo, e, em segundo, não parece haver razões suficientes para uma rejeição decisiva do epifenomenismo de propriedades. Apesar disso, há razões alternativas para se rejeitar o monismo anômalo, que dizem respeito à justificação da tese monista. Pelo menos uma das premissas que Davidson empregou em sua defesa parece falsa, e, adicionalmente, a própria possibilidade do monismo em questão é ameaçada por dificuldades na ontologia de eventos que pressupõe.
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Lima, Orion Ferreira [UNESP]. "Uma discussão do problema mente-corpo em Descartes e Espinosa, a partir da neurofilosofia de Antonio Damásio." Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/91749.
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lima_of_me_mar.pdf: 846690 bytes, checksum: ed40e178108a6ffad7e27c7594d500fb (MD5)Neste trabalho nos propomos a analisar a consciência a partir da perspectiva neurobiológica de Antonio Damásio. Para isso, sugerimos um percurso investigativo que se inicia com uma abordagem histórico-filosófica. Destacamos neste contexto, a noção cartesiana do dualismo substancial, caracterizada por se conceber mente e corpo como realmente distintos. Contrariamente a essa concepção, apresentamos o monismo naturalista de Espinosa, que procurou compreender a mente e o corpo como partes integrantes da natureza. Em seguida, procuramos apresentar uma possível aproximação entre o monismo naturalista de Espinosa e a abordagem neurobiológica de Damásio. Para Damásio (1996, 2000, 2004), a consciência emerge em uma rede neural integrada, a partir das interações entre cérebro, corpo e ambiente. Apesar de possuir suas bases biológicas, a consciência não se reduz a elas. Formas inovadoras e complexas vão surgindo, na medida em que os processos de interação com o ambiente se ampliam. Procuramos mostrar que a consciência, seja ela elementar (proto-self) ou complexa (consciência ampliada) tem por finalidade contribuir para a manutenção e preservação da vida.
In this work I analyze consciousness from the neurobiological perspective of Antonio Damásio. The investigation begins with a historical review of philosophical approaches to the mind-body problem. I focus on the Cartesian notion of substantial dualism, characterized for conceiving mind and body as really different and separated entities. Contrary to this conception, the naturalistic monism of Espinosa understands mind and body as parts of nature. After this review, I look for a possible approximation between the naturalistic monism of Espinosa and the neurobiological approach of Damásio. For Damásio (1996, 2000, 2004), consciousness emerges, in an integrated neural net, from the interaction of brain, body and environment. Although possessing a biological basis, consciousness cannot be reduced to biology. Innovative and complex forms appear in the processes of interaction of the brain with the body and environment. In my discussion of Damásio I suggest that consciousness, either elementary (proto-self) or complex (extended conscience), has the purpose of contributing to the maintenance and preservation of life.
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Bell, Joanna. "Against monism and in favour of an anatomical approach to administrative law." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2017. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:3c68caf0-7364-4d35-b750-9bcd86f93bd1.
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This thesis is an exercise in arguing for an 'anatomical approach to administrative law'. In doing so the thesis aims to show, broadly, two main things. Firstly, that if we pull administrative law apart and examine the basic legal and normative structures in play we see that those structures are both complex and varied in three core senses: administrative law doctrine interacts with an array of different administrative schemes, administrative law doctrine intervenes to protect a variety of different values and interests and administrative law is concerned with legal relationships of different kinds. Secondly, that by pulling apart administrative law in this way it becomes possible to construct understandings of particular doctrines within it which are capable of capturing the legal and normative complexities with which judges must grapple in giving effect to them. The later chapters of the thesis will make use of three case studies of central doctrines within administrative law - procedural fairness, legitimate expectations and standing - through which to demonstrate this. Throughout this thesis the anatomical approach to administrative law for which the thesis argues is juxtaposed to an alternative approach: 'monism'. A scholar making use of a monistic approach would proceed by seeking to identify some singular 'organising concept' which is capable of unifying administrative law. A core aim of this thesis is to demonstrate, through an exploration of one important, and increasingly influential, monistic approach to administrative law (the 'public interest conception'), why administrative law is not amenable to analysis of this kind. The basic legal and normative components which make up administrative law, it is argued, are too complex and varied for the subject to be adequately analysed through the lens of a singular 'master idea or principle'.
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Kahn, David. "Milton's monistic faith : tradition and translation in the minor poetry." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f6e2a08d-413f-4107-9eb6-290c5a83e879.
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Faith for Milton is primarily a matter of man's access to God. Such access entails God's involvement in mankind. Faith is that which guarantees that God is accessible to men and also that God actively participates in the lives of his people. Milton's work exhibits a preoccupation with such a concept of faith, and wavers through the course of his life between dualist and monist formulations. Monistic faith suggests that God is directly accessible to man, while dualistic faith means that God may only be accessible in a mediated way. In the course of his career, Milton proceeded from an early dualistic faith to the declared monism of De Doctrina Christiana. This thesis examines the monistic impulse within Milton's poetry, focusing on the poems written during his mid-career (c. 1637-1653) when his outlook on faith turned. The thesis finds that although Milton expresses his monism in increasingly clear terms, he is never quite able to eliminate dualistic implications or tendencies from his faith. The thesis focuses on two strategies which Milton employs in his attempts to define a monistic world view and a monistic faith, namely, tradition and translation. These strategies represent points of confrontation between dualism and monism. They both assert monistic continuity in the face of dualist disjunction. Tradition attempts to overcome the disjunction perceptible between two remote events in time. It incorporates both the recovery of lost history as well as geographical and linguistic translation. Translation (taken as separate from tradition) attempts to overcome the disjunction between languages. It manages, however unsuccessfully, to carry meaning over from a source text to a target text while simultaneously altering every single word in the source text. Both these strategies thus provide textual and linguistic means for examining Milton's faith or his sense of divine access. This thesis examines Milton's deployment of tradition by means of a close consideration of Lycidas as well as several other early poems. It examines his 1648 and 1653 psalm translations and the unique manner in which they reveal Milton's understanding of faith. The thesis concludes that Milton's monistic faith never quite breaks free of the dualist tendencies against which it struggles.
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Halverson, Daniel Lee. ""Monographs on the Universe": Ernst Haeckel's Evolutionary Monism in American Context, 1866-83." Case Western Reserve University School of Graduate Studies / OhioLINK, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=case1491568531968955.
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Foresman, Galen A. "A Practical Distinction in Value Theory: Qualitative and Quantitative Accounts." Bowling Green, Ohio : Bowling Green State University, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=bgsu1219682227.
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Pereira, Roy Jawahar Joseph. "The Chemistry of Attention: Neuro-Quantum approaches to Consciousness." Thesis, Boston College, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/3714.
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Thesis advisor: Ronald K. TacelliThis dissertation arose from concerns that the prevalent philosophy of materialism which reduces everything to matter has inadvertently contributed to the ecological destruction of the planet, and an impoverished understanding of human nature. Conceptual arguments and empirical data cry out for a philosophy beyond materialism (or its current avatar Physicalism) that moves us beyond 17th century classical science, making use of 20th century quantum science to better understand our world. Such a new philosophy would embed a new scientific paradigm that incorporates both the first person point of view and the third person "no point of view."The main issue I engage in this dissertation is whether consciousness can be explained by Physicalism. While functionalism, the dominant theory of Physicalism, answers many questions related to consciousness, it leaves major ones unanswered. I offer a critique of Physicalism using conceptual arguments and empirical data encompassing what I call the "chemistry of attention." I also offer innovative proposals toward a philosophical approach I term "Aspect Monism" that builds on earlier monist philosophies (Spinoza) while incorporating dualistic features, suggesting that this new approach would better account for consciousness. The proximate history of Physicalism to either explain the mind away or reduce it to the brain from Behaviorism through Identity Theory to Functionalism is laid out as well as the difficulty in establishing the boundaries of Physicalism.The project utilizes conceptual arguments to critique Physicalism in three areas of concern: What is left out? What is assumed? What is causing methodological confusion? The areas of qualia, cognition, intentionality, meaning and personhood are left out. This is demonstrated, in part, by various thought experiments like the inverted spectrum argument, the Chinese nation argument, the zombies' argument, the knowledge argument and the Chinese room argument. The problem of causal closure of the physical is that which is assumed. The ambiguity with respect to method is that which causes confusion.Empirical data from the neurosciences (EEG, ERP, fMRI experiments during meditation; OCD and phobia treatment; placebo and nocebo effect) are used to critically analyze Physicalism with respect to mental states and causation and the analysis of such data points to a close relationship between attention and changes in the brain, and subsequently to the collapse of Physicalism into Epiphenomenalism. Such a metaphysical approach to consciousness is suggested from, and provides a home for, the neurophysical approaches to the origins of consciousness. I present a neuro-quantum perspective using Stapp and Penrose-Hameroff who suggest these origins via neuroscience and quantum physics.As we search for a new scientific paradigm and consequently a new metaphysics that takes into consideration the objective and the subjective, and the inner and the outer, a new philosophy and a new scientific paradigm which incorporates both the first person point of view and the third person "no point of view" data is the need of the hour
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Philosophy
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Martinsson, Linnea. "The Intelligible Necessitation of Consciousness : From ”panpsychism” to autopoietic enactivism." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-186946.
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Panpsychism, the view that fundamental physical entities are basic phenomenal subjects, is motivated by a commitment to explaining human subjects of experience, as well as by a rejection of the possibility that phenomenal properties are arbitrarily necessitated – human subjects of experience are thought to only be possible if prefigured by more basic phenomenal subjecthood. In this paper I will consider autopoietic enactivism as an alternative to panpsychism when it comes to explaining human subjects of experience on the basis of subjective precursors. Both of the theories theorise possible subjective precursors but panpsychism (which will be referred to as panphenomenal monism) is mostly based on speculative, unobservable, fundamental phenomenal subjecthood. Autopoietic enactivism does not require that there is fundamental phenomenal subjecthood. Instead it describes emergent individuals with subjective behaviour at the biological level. This involves a form of bodily subjecthood that may be pre-phenomenal. If autopoietic enactivism involves describing phenomenal subjecthood as possible on the basis of bodily subjecthood, it is not describing an arbitrary but an intelligible necessitation, because phenomenal subjecthood, then, is understandable on the basis of some other subjecthood. However, that other subjecthood is not fundamental. Since autopoietic enactivism does not require fundamental phenomenal subjecthood it is compatible with the NFM (The No Fundamental Mentality Constraint) which means that it is seamlessly compatible with a form of physicalism that panpsychism is not compatible with. The fundamental question that panpsychists start out with is The Hard Problem of Consciousness, a version of the problem of experience that may contain an unnecessarily wide, or even insurmountable, gap between two types of mutually exclusive properties – phenomenal and physical properties. Autopoietic enactivism has a corresponding problem that is tied to a common denominator between phenomenal and physical properties, namely biological life. The enactivist's Body-Body Problem involves an explanatory gap between the living body and the lived body. Since the phenomenal and the physical are united in (at least some) biological life, life is a relevant starting point for investigation regarding the problem of consciousness. I will argue that autopoietic enactivism offers a way of understanding the intelligible necessitation of the known subjects of experience on the basis of emergent, and not necessarily fundamental, subjective precursors. Moreover, I will briefly show how autopoietic enactivism also is compatible with panprotopsychism, a view closely related to panpsychism. My argument in favor of autopoietic enactivism, and against the need for fundamental phenomenal subjecthood, may lead undecided pan(proto)psychists to choose panprotopsychism over panpsychism.
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Norris, Stuart K. "Self-justification as the basic motivation of humanity a model of brain-mind-soul identity illustrating a compatibility of modern concepts of materialism with the Christian gospel /." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1993. http://www.tren.com.
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Chan, Lok-Chi. "Metaphysical Naturalism and the Ignorance of Categorical Properties." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/16555.
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The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the connections between metaphysical naturalism and the categorical ignorance thesis – offered by Rae Langton (1998), David Lewis (2009), Frank Jackson (1998), and Simon Blackburn (1990) – and determine whether the latter will challenge the former. According to metaphysical naturalism, the actual world contains only metaphysically natural things. According to the categorical ignorance thesis, all we can know about things are their dispositional properties, but the categorical properties that bear these properties remain in principle unknowable. In this dissertation, I will determine whether the ignorance of categorical properties – as Rae Langton (1998), David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson (2007), John Foster (1993) and Alyssa Ney (2007) argue (or worry about) – is consistent with metaphysical naturalism (or physicalism), and whether it will lead to a scepticism about the metaphysical naturalness of categorical properties, which will, in turn, significantly decrease the probability that metaphysical naturalism is true. Being attracted to metaphysical naturalism, the categorical ignorance thesis, and also the philosophical position that the two theses are consistent, I will argue that the answer to the former question is yes, and that the answer to the latter question is no. Russellian Monism, an influential doctrine in philosophy of mind that is relevant to the topic, will also be considered. According to the doctrine, our first-person experiences are constituted by their categorical bases in some manner that is not (solely) via the dispositions borne by these bases. Some philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell (1992/1927a, 1927b), thus consider categorical properties to be knowable through our acquaintance with those experiences. On the other side, some philosophers, such as Daniel Stoljar (2001a, 2001b, 2006), David Chalmers (1996), and Galen Strawson (2013), argue that Russellian Monism is compatible with metaphysical naturalism (or physicalism). In this dissertation, I will determine whether the acquaintance view put forward by some Russellian Monists, understood as an objection to the categorical ignorance thesis, is true and whether it is compatible with metaphysical naturalism; I will argue that the answers to both questions are no.
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Essaga, Victor Stéphane. "Les sources du droit des hydrocarbures en Afrique." Thesis, Paris 1, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA01D015.
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La lex petrolea est l’ensemble des règles constituées au fil du temps par les acteurs impliqués dans l’exploration, le développement et l’exploitation des hydrocarbures. Consignée et régulièrement actualisée par la doctrine anglo-saxonne, elle forme le point d’Archimède à partir duquel les travaux universitaires déclinent ce qui devrait être considéré comme le droit des hydrocarbures. Toutefois, présentée comme une déclinaison de la lex mercatoria, ou ensemble des règles des marchands constituées de façon coutumière, la lex petrolea ne semble pas épuiser les caractéristiques véritables du droit des hydrocarbures, notamment en Afrique. Elle se décline davantage comme un ensemble de normes de sources plurielles (arbitrales,contractuelles, législatives), sans cohérence d’ensemble et surtout sans singularisation du rôle des acteurs qui ont pourtant des statuts juridiques et économiques différents. Les États, d’une part, sont certes mus par des intérêts patrimoniaux légitimes, mais aussi par des intérêts géoéconomiques, voire politiques. Les investisseurs énergétiques, d’autre part, sont exclusivement motivés par le gain du lucre, et cette relation génère un droit des hydrocarbures conséquent. Afin de renouveler la doctrine juridique relative à cette activité, il est proposé une approche nouvelle basée sur les théories respectives et complémentaires du monisme juridique, d’une part, et du relationnisme juridique, d’autre part. Les normes structurant la lex petrolea ne deviennent un droit des hydrocarbures que par la co-conception, l’application et la validation de celles-ci par l’État, en relation avec les investisseurs privés étrangers. Ces normes juridiques, aussitôt établies, sont plus ou moins appliquées, immergées qu’elles sont au sein de la relation particulière nouée entre les États et leurs cocontractants. Le lien contractuel débouche sur une relation juridique plus vaste, structurée autour de normes écrites, de pratiques des acteurs et tout simplement d’une relation génératrice d’un droit des hydrocarbures supérieur aux normes écrites identifiables. L’intervention systématique d’un tiers, soit l’administration sur plusieurs formes dans l’exécution des obligations des parties, soit l’arbitre en cas de contentieux, permet la construction, l’entretien et le maintien durable des relations juridiques entre les parties. Celles-ci aménagent ainsi un cadre symbolique de leurs relations, sous l’emprise et la maîtrise totale de l’État, en tant que propriétaire des ressources extractives. C’est ce que nous avons appelé, en conclusion de l’étude, le monisme relationniste du droit des hydrocarbures africainThe lex petrolea is the set of rules established over time by actors involved in the exploration, development and exploitation of hydrocarbons. Recorded and regularly updated by Anglo-Saxon doctrine, it constitutes Archimedes' point from which academic work declines what should be considered hydrocarbon law. It is more likely to be interpreted as a set of norms of plural sources (arbitral, contractual, legislative), without any overall coherence and, above all, without distinguishing the role of actors who nevertheless have a different legal and economic status. On the one hand, States are certainly driven by legitimate patrimonial interests, but also by geo-economic and even political interests. Energy investors on the other hand are exclusively motivated by the gain of profit, and this relationship generates a significant hydrocarbon law. In order to renew the legal doctrine of this activity, a new approach is proposed based on the respective and complementary theories of legal monism on the one hand and legal relationalism on the other. Once legal norms are established, they are more or less applied, immersed in the special relationship between States and their contracting partners. The contractual relationship leads to a broader legal relationship structured around written standards, shareholder practices and simply around a relationship that generates a hydrocarbon law that goes beyond identifiable written standards. The systematic intervention of a third party, either the administration in several forms in the execution of the obligations of the parties, or the arbitrator in the event of litigation, allows the construction, upkeep and permanent maintenance of legal relations between the parties. They thus create a symbolic framework for their relations, under the influence and total control of the State, as the owner of the extractive resources. This is what we have called in conclusion to the study the relational monism of African hydrocarbon law
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Maass, Alexandra. "La religion du corps en Californie." Thesis, Paris 4, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA040134.
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Le corps moderne est à la fois l’objet de rêves et d’interdits, un lieu de conflits, d’inégalités et d’investissements, mais il représente avant tout la quête contemporaine de la beauté ainsi que le rêve scientifique de la jeunesse et de l’immortalité. Le corps en Californie tient une place tellement importante qu’il n’est pas exagéré de parler de religion. La religion du corps crée dans un premier temps un lien vers le Divin puisque le corps est soit opposé à l’esprit soit il constitue un moyen d’accéder à la divinité, comme chez les orientaux. De la conception grecque antique à la version orientale, sans oublier de parler de la place du corps dans l’histoire californienne et de sa relation à un Dieu, nous nous rendrons compte que le corps considéré comme lien vers le Divin cède petit à petit sa place à une appropriation personnelle poussée à la fois par le narcissisme des années soixante puis par des impératifs normatifs. Le californien est alors à la quête de nouvelles expériences dont le médium est le corps, tout en étant à la recherche d’une perfection physique. Cela a donné vie à un vaste marché, créant ainsi une compatibilité entre la religion du corps et son aspect mercantile. Ce lien ne s’arrête pas seulement aux produits, ni à l’industrie que génère un tel marché, car le corps est devenu un investissement à capitaliser. Comme dans toute religion, il y a une part de fanatisme et de dérive dont il faut mesurer l’impact. L’ultime question est celle du rôle de la science dans l’évolution du corps. Cette nouvelle religion du corps, remplace doucement le lien premier vers le Divin, amenant l’homme vers plus de maîtrise, de connaissance et de contrôle sur son destinThe body’s new frontier is both an esthetic and scientific quest, with the wild dream of reaching an ideal beauty and immortality - or at least living better and longer. In California, the body and its cult are so important therefore we can safely say that it is a religion. This religion of the body is primarily linked to the Divine since in the classical point of view, the body is either linked to sin or is a way to reach God, as the oriental religions believe. From ancient Greece to the oriental influences, not forgetting how the body is perceived in California’s history and its relationship to the Divine, we will slowly become aware that this link is somehow being overshadowed by a personal appropriation of the body both triggered by the 1960’s narcissism and social norms. The typical californian seeks experiment and pushes boundaries using the body as a medium, while striving to reach physical perfection. Of course this cannot go without the growing of a massive market, hence the connexion between the religion of the body and its mercantile aspect. That link not only reflects the amount of products and services as well as the whole industry behind them, it also brings forward the fact that the body is considered as an object one has to invest in and capitalize on both the future and the present moment. As in all types of religion, there is a part of fanaticism and going astray. Its impact cannot be overlooked. The ultimate question is the role of science in the body’s evolution. What has become the new scientific religion of the body slowly replaces the initial link to the Divine, bringing mankind towards more knowledge, mastery, and control over its destiny
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Mukherjee, Shomik. "Sketching the human self : a synthesis of insights gained by heeding the experience of breath and voice." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2017. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=235513.
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In this thesis I (1) identify some problems in the Popperian scientific method; (2) develop, as an alternative, and to a level of usability, a phenomenological method of knowing; (3) use this method to make a series of inferences about the nature of the human self; (4) compare and contrast my inferences with those of other scholars working on the same themes; and (5) let some of my inferences suggest ways of developing the method further. I show (1:1) how the scientific method is underpinned by a paradigm of ontic dualism; (1:2) how this paradigm has led to a certain conception of the human self; and (1:3) how this conception has led to the normalization of harmful ways of acting in the world, and thus to a planet made up of living beings who cannot find a steady fit with each other's life-ways. I develop an alternative method by building on the work of (2:1) Goethe, (2:2) Holdrege, (2:3) Ellis and (2:4) Heidegger. In essence this method consists of recalling and making inferences from one's experience. (3:1) I undertook a set of six activities (sometimes spoken of as 'Sufism'). (3:2) I try to understand my findings in the light of the ideas of four scholars: the teacher who leads these activities, Murshid Saadi, eleventhcentury polymath ibn Sina, anthropologist Tim Ingold and philosopher David Abram. (3:3) I make fifteen inferences about the human self, falling into seven themes: monism, mood, willing, perceiving, speaking, growing, and substantiveness. (4) Comparing and contrasting my conclusions with those of other scholars suggests that they are valid. (5) I develop the method further by incorporating into it the delineation of classes of phenomena and the delineation of patterns of phenomenal change. I end by discussing some implications for ethical human life-ways.
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Sundström, Lars. "Geniet och sexualiteten : En analys av Ivar Lo-Johanssons syn på hur uppfostran reglerarde ungas sexualitet, med utgångspunkt i romanen Geniet." Thesis, Stockholms universitet, Institutionen för kultur och estetik, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-157530.
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Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka hur Ivar Lo-Johansson menar att synen på uppfostran reglerar hur de ungas sexualitet formas, med utgångspunkt i gestaltningen av huvudpersonens utveckling i romanen Geniet. Uppsatsen analyserar hur denna uppfostran utifrån en sexualmoralisk syn på onani och avhållsamhet enligt Lo-Johansson påverkar individens identitet till sexuell isolering, ensamhet och jag-dyrkan. Ett perspektiv han argumenterar för utifrån sin sexualteori i boken Monism.Det underlag som används för att analysera sexualitet och identitetsskapande utifrån ett teoretiskt perspektiv är Michel Foucaults Sexualitetens historia. 1. Viljan att veta. Distinktion mellan sex och sexualitet samt pedagogiseringen av barnets kön är perspektiv som uppmärksammas. Freuds texter om kön, onani, kärlek och sexualitet i Sexualiteten tas med utifrån Lo-Johanssons påstådda påverkan av psykoanalys och utifrån de motiv som behandlas i analysen. Angående onanin som en fråga i sig och kopplad till en historisk diskurs hänvisas till Thomas W. Laqueurs Solitary Sex, A Cultural History of Masturbation.Analysens huvudsakliga metod består i en närläsning av Geniet. Det görs också en parallell läsning av Lo-Johanssons essäsamling Monism för att analysera hans gestaltning av Geniets huvudperson i förhållande till hans framställning om sin sexualteori om den sexuella monismen.Analysen visar att Lo-Johanssons syfte med Geniet inte väckte de frågor han avsåg. Ungdomarna som var med kände inte igen sig. Lo-Johanssons egen pubertet kom att ljuda i bakgrunden som ett långt utdraget personligt ackord. Det som kom att diskuteras var hans kvinnosyn, att man måste släppa till flickorna, mer än den anklagelse mot uppfostran han hade i fokus. Han tog en extrem individ – med narcissistiska problem- som utgångspunkt för en generell samhällsfråga som fick den frågan att komma i skymundan. Sexualteorin han förespråkade fick inget fotfäste.
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Su, Matthew. "The Ghost of the Machine: An analysis of the conceptual pressure toward dualism in Descartes and its modern manifestations." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2021. https://hdl.handle.net/2123/29236.
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This thesis explores the conceptual shift between the pre-Cartesian Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysical synthesis and the dualistic synthesis of Descartes, and the effect of this change on the 'hard problem' of consciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind. Part 1 tracks the conceptual pressures toward dualism generated by pre-Cartesian developments and Descartes’ own mechanistic and physico-mathematical sympathies. The theoretical costs and benefits of abandoning the Aristotelian-Scholastic synthesis are identified. Part 2 covers in detail the consequences of dualism for Descartes’ view of nature, and argues that the very terms on which he proposes dualism gives rise to a fatal interaction problem. In Part 3, important parallels are explored between Descartes’ drive toward dualism and the contemporary discourse around David Chalmers' 'Structure-and-Dynamics Argument for Dualism,' which modernises conceptual pressures similar to those which led Descartes to dualism and therefore generates similar theoretical problems for the contemporary naturalistic project. Drawing upon the analysis of what was lost in the adoption of Cartesianism, I make some thematic suggestions as to what a satisfying relief of the conceptual pressure generated by the ‘Structure-and-dynamics’ concept of the physical might look like.
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Černá, Karolína. "Vztah mezinárodního a evropského práva." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2010. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-76033.
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The Diploma Thesis deals with the relationship between International and European law in the context of actual events. The main aim is to analyse this relationship on the particular case of Yassin Abdullah Kadi by means of the wide scale of expert opinions and discussions. The main aim will be achieved through several partial aims (theoretical definition of essential conceptions relating to the theme, description of particular UN resolutions and their implementation into European law, analysis of the judgements of EU judicial authorities in the Kadi case).
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Oliveira, Jadson Correia de. "O constitucionalismo dialógico e as audiências públicas: uma análise sistêmica do monismo plural brasileiro." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2017. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/20588.
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This thesis analyzes the establishment of a dialogical constitutional jurisdiction through public hearings, that is, the materialization of a constitution with the participation of other actors, in order to encourage the social participation in the Brazilian constitutional jurisdiction. The investigation begins by making a correlate study among the constitutionalist movements, the appearance of the first constitutions and the social participation in the interpretation of these constitutions. The thesis is developed through the constitutional models along with a strong social participation, especially the American and the Israeli ones, as well as through both the American popular constitutionalism and the dialogical constitutionalism, respectively. Both theories aim to remove the judicial protagonism of the constitutional interpretation, while at the same time they conceive an effectively political and constitutional growth society. Next, the thesis analyzes the New Latin American Constitutionalism, its historical milestones, characteristics and differences with Neo-constitutionalism. Special attention was given to the study of the Colombian, Venezuelan and Bolivian constitutions. In the Andean constitutionalist movement, the defense of Legal Pluralism and the Plurinational State stand out, since they propose the autonomy of the originating peoples before the modern State and the equivalence between both the origin state and the native rights of those originating peoples. Later, in a specific chapter, the thesis approaches the influence of the New Latin American Constitutionalism in Brazil and signals, as an alternative, the holding of public hearings by the STF - the Brazilian Supreme Court - making a study of the theme from Niklas Luhmann's Theory of Systems and the concept of Constitutional Patriotism defended by Habermas. The investigation points out that public hearings serve as an instrument of social participation able to allow the cognitive opening of constitutional jurisdiction in order to asimilate social expectations under the cloak of its own legal code. Thus, although the Brazilian constitution of 1988 is clearly neo-constitutionalist and multicultural, this does not mean that its implementation will not respect the anthropological and social characteristics of Brazil. It is concluded, then, that the strong social participation does not require the presence of a pluralism or only takes place in a Plurinational State, even because, like the Andean European states, they were formed by the linking up of several originating peoples, such as the case of Spain, without, however, idealizing the necessity of the characteristics pointed out by the proponents of the New Latin American Constitutionalism
A tese analisa o estabelecimento de uma jurisdição constitucional dialógica por meio da realização de audiências públicas, isto é, da concretização de uma constituição com a participação de outros atores, com vistas a fortalecer a participação social na jurisdição constitucional brasileira. A investigação inicia fazendo uma correlação entre os movimentos constitucionalistas, o surgimento das primeiras constituições e a participação social na interpretação das constituições. Avança para tratar dos modelos constitucionais que coadunam com uma forte participação social, em especial, o estadunidense e o israelense, através do constitucionalismo popular norte-americano e do constitucionalismo dialógico, respectivamente. Ambas as teorias procuram retirar o protagonismo judicial da interpretação constitucional, ao mesmo tempo em que idealizam uma sociedade efetivamente política e constitucionalmente, amadurecida. Em seguida, a tese analisa o Novo Constitucionalismo Latino-Americano, seus marcos históricos, características e diferenças com o Neoconstitucionalismo. Receberam especial atenção no estudo as constituições colombiana, venezuelana e boliviana. No movimento constitucionalista andino, destacam-se a defesa do Pluralismo Jurídico e do Estado Plurinacional, uma vez que propõem a autonomia dos povos originários perante o Estado e a equivalência entre o direito de origem estatal e o oriundo desses mesmos povos originários. Adiante, em capítulo específico, a tese aborda a influência do Novo Constitucionalismo Latino-Americano no Brasil e sinaliza, como alternativa, a realização de audiências públicas pelo STF, fazendo um estudo do tema a partir da Teoria dos Sistemas de Niklas Luhmann e do conceito de Patriotismo Constitucional defendido por Habermas. A investigação aponta que as audiências públicas servem como um instrumento de participação social aptas a permitir a abertura cognitiva da jurisdição constitucional a fim de absorver as expectativas sociais sob o manto do seu próprio código jurídico. Dessa forma, muito embora a constituição brasileira de 1988 seja nitidamente de traços neoconstitucionalistas e multicultural, isso não significa dizer que a sua concretização não respeitará características antropológicas e sociais do Brasil. Conclui-se, então, que a forte participação social não exige a presença de um pluralismo ou só se realiza num Estado Plurinacional, até mesmo porque, estados europeus, assim como os andinos, foram formados pela soma de vários povos originários, como é o caso da Espanha, sem, contudo, idealizarem a necessidade das características apontadas pelos defensores do Novo Constitucionalismo Latino-Americano
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Lima, Orion Ferreira. "Uma discussão do problema mente-corpo em Descartes e Espinosa, a partir da neurofilosofia de Antonio Damásio /." Marília : [s.n.], 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/91749.
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Orientador: Alfredo Pereira JuniorBanca: Adrian Oscar Montoya
Banca: João de Fernandes Teixeira
Resumo: Neste trabalho nos propomos a analisar a consciência a partir da perspectiva neurobiológica de Antonio Damásio. Para isso, sugerimos um percurso investigativo que se inicia com uma abordagem histórico-filosófica. Destacamos neste contexto, a noção cartesiana do dualismo substancial, caracterizada por se conceber mente e corpo como realmente distintos. Contrariamente a essa concepção, apresentamos o monismo naturalista de Espinosa, que procurou compreender a mente e o corpo como partes integrantes da natureza. Em seguida, procuramos apresentar uma possível aproximação entre o monismo naturalista de Espinosa e a abordagem neurobiológica de Damásio. Para Damásio (1996, 2000, 2004), a consciência emerge em uma rede neural integrada, a partir das interações entre cérebro, corpo e ambiente. Apesar de possuir suas bases biológicas, a consciência não se reduz a elas. Formas inovadoras e complexas vão surgindo, na medida em que os processos de interação com o ambiente se ampliam. Procuramos mostrar que a consciência, seja ela elementar (proto-self) ou complexa (consciência ampliada) tem por finalidade contribuir para a manutenção e preservação da vida.
Abstract: In this work I analyze consciousness from the neurobiological perspective of Antonio Damásio. The investigation begins with a historical review of philosophical approaches to the mind-body problem. I focus on the Cartesian notion of substantial dualism, characterized for conceiving mind and body as really different and separated entities. Contrary to this conception, the naturalistic monism of Espinosa understands mind and body as parts of nature. After this review, I look for a possible approximation between the naturalistic monism of Espinosa and the neurobiological approach of Damásio. For Damásio (1996, 2000, 2004), consciousness emerges, in an integrated neural net, from the interaction of brain, body and environment. Although possessing a biological basis, consciousness cannot be reduced to biology. Innovative and complex forms appear in the processes of interaction of the brain with the body and environment. In my discussion of Damásio I suggest that consciousness, either elementary (proto-self) or complex (extended conscience), has the purpose of contributing to the maintenance and preservation of life.
Mestre
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Pearce, Charles Christopher Augur. "Ecclesiology and the law : monism and dualism in the religious polities of England and old-Prussian protestantism." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.621409.
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Šudoma, Ondřej. "Struktura statutárních a dozorčích orgánů akciové společnosti." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2013. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-198027.
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The subject of the thesis is analysis of executive and supervisory bodies of joint-stock companies based on the legislation effective since 1st January 2014. The goal is to describe the structure of such bodies, their establishment, competence and guidelines for action. By comparing with the former legislation, it aims to find the differences, new institutes a possibilities brought by the recodification of private law and thus evaluate their effect and possible future influence. The thesis also points out some potentially controversial parts and defects of the new legislation.
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POMILIO, LUCA. "From Physicalism to Experience and Return." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Genova, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11567/1048161.
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This dissertation is mainly devoted to analytic metaphysics and philosophy of mind. In a nutshell, it pursues two main goals. First off, a clarificatory goal: the dissertation states and clarifies both physicalism (that is, the ontolological claim according to which everything is nothing over and above basic physical entities) and some anti-physicalist arguments known as conceivability arguments (viz. arguments against physicalism which are based on premises about the coinceivability of certain scenarios; more precisely, scenarios which turn out to be controversially linked to conscious experience). Second, the thesis tries to develop and defend a relatively new kind of physicalism named Russellian physicalism (since it is partly inspired by some of Bertrand Russell's insights on these issues). To be precise, Russellian physicalism is the conjunction of physicalism and Russellian monism, a theory recently rose to prominence and holding that some fundamental entities metaphysically constituting conscious experiences are such that physics is silent (in a certain relevant sense) about them. My main conclusion is that Russellian physicalism is an highly recommendable theoretical option, since it is both genuinely physicalist and immune to anti-physicalist conceivability arguments.
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Bjorgvinsson, David Thor. "Theoretical and practical intersection of international law and domestic law." Thesis, Strasbourg, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013STRAA032.
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Cette étude fait valoir, par l’incorporation du droit international et son application dans le système national islandais, illustré par les jugements de la Cour suprême d’Islande, que les limites posées par l’approche dualiste traditionnelle, tels que présentés communément dans la littérature académique islandaise, ont été poussées à leur extrême. On affirme que le principe de dualité des juridictions, tel qu’il est défini dans la littérature juridique, ne décrit pas de façon adéquate le lien réel et important entre le droit international et la loi nationale comme cela apparaît dans les « techniques d’incorporation interprétatives » effectivement utilisées par les cours islandaises. Notre étude fait valoir que l’impact substantif et normatif du droit international non incorporé comporte des éléments de l’approche moniste, se révèle plus complexe et excède de loin la simple description générale du principe dualisteThis study argues that, by the incorporation of international law into the Icelandic national system and its application on the domestic level, in particular as it appears in the judgments of the Supreme Court of Iceland, the limits set by the traditional dualist approach, as commonly presented in Icelandic academic literature, have been stretched to its outer limits. It is argued that the dualist principle, as defined and described in the legal literature, does not adequately describe the real and substantive relationship between international law and national law as it appears in the „interpretive incorporation techniques“ actually used by the Icelandic courts. It is argued that the real substantive and normative impact of unincorporated international law bears clear elements of the monist approach and is more complicated and far exceeds what is implied in the general description of and reference to the dualist principle
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Cavalcanti, Rosalia Andrade. "Corpos reinventados: a questão dos gêneros em Freud." Universidade Católica de Pernambuco, 2009. http://www.unicap.br/tede//tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=497.
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O presente trabalho analisa o arcabouço teórico que fundamenta o modelo fálico-edípico freudiano, a fim de refletir em que medida reproduz a divisão sexual e binária, com suas implicações hierarquizantes e assimétricas. Inicialmente, examinamos os pressupostos filosóficos, científicos e políticos
que possibilitaram a invenção do modelo da diferença sexual, produzindo lugares específicos para o gênero feminino e masculino. Em seguida, avaliamos as repercussões oriundas do monismo sexual e fálico na reinvenção dos corpos sexuados. E, por fim, nos debruçamos sobre a construção do
modelo fálico-edípico, buscando aproximações com o monismo e o dimorfismo sexual, bem como suas imbricações na produção das subjetividades. Para tanto, realizamos uma pesquisa e análise bibliográfica da obra de Freud, bem
como da Psicanálise contemporânea a partir de autores que procuram problematizar as implicações da utilização do referencial fálico-edípico como eixo central de subjetivação e de erotização, tais como: Joel Birman, Márcia Arán, Regina Néri e Silvia Nunes. Da mesma forma, estabelecemos um diálogo profícuo com os autores Thomas Laqueur, Michel Foucault e Judith Butler no que concerne à criação das categorias de sexo e gênero. Esperamos que nosso trabalho amplie a discussão e o conhecimento sobre as questões
referentes à problemática de sexo e gênero, na contemporaneidade, oferecendo subsídios aos profissionais que lidam direta ou indiretamente com o temaThe present paper analyses the theoretical framework that subsidizes the phallic-oedipal Freudian model in order to consider to what extent it reproduces sexual and binary divisions, with its hierarchical and asymmetrical implications. Initially, we have examined philosophical, scientific and political assumptions that permitted the invention of the sexual difference model, producing specific roles to feminine and masculine genders. Afterwards, we have evaluated repercussions from the sexual and phallic monism on the reinvention of sexed bodies. And, finally, we have focused on the construction of the phallic-oedipal model, searching for approximations with monism and sexual dimorphism, as well as its imbrications on subjectivities production. To do so, we have carried out a bibliographical research and analysis of Freudian work and contemporary psychoanalysis by authors who seek to question the implications of the phallicoedipal model utilization as a central axis for subjectivity and eroticization, such as Joel Birman, Márcia Arán, Regina Néri and Silvia Nunes. In the same way, we have established a productive dialogue with authors such as Thomas Laqueur, Michel Foucault and Judith Butler with regards to the creation of sex and gender categories. We expect our work to broaden discussion and knowledge on questions related to sex and gender problematic in contemporaneity, offering support to professionals who deal with those themes directly or indirectly
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Joubert, Pieter. "Trichotomous therapy : a proposed pastoral paradigm / Pieter Joubert." Thesis, North-West University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10394/489.
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The relationship between Psychology and Theology has become an issue of increasing
concern in recent years for the Christian community. With the growing complexities of
cultural differences, the moral decline of society and its drift away from a Christian
worldview, the pastoral ministry seems to be as challenging as ever.
The problem about the relationship between theology and psychology is that there is
growing confusion in today's Christian community about the best way to help people
overcome their personal problems of living. In this regard some scholars believe that
Christians should only submit to Biblical counselling, while others support psychotherapy, as
long as it is integrated with Biblical principles and has a firm Scriptural foundation.
In researching the literature on the subject, it was found that various theoretical models
have been defined and described as attempts to scientifically justify the union of the
above mentioned two points of view.
In this thesis the viewpoints of four prominent groups of scholars about the subject are
described and analysed in order to determine to what extent will it be possible to identify
common denominators amongst their different models and to eventually establish if it is
possible to formulate a synthesis about the commonalities so defined.
The integration models of the following four prominent groups of authors about the
subject were analysed: (1) Larry Crabb (1977); (2) William T. Kirwan (1993), (3) John D.
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Carter & Bruce Narramore (1979) and (4) Eric L. Johnson & Stanton L. Jones, eds., (2000).
These scholar's contributions were chosen for analysis because, from the research about
the subject, it was found that these 4 groups of authors made some of the most
significant scientific contributions about the integration of theology with psychology.
Before attempting to formulate a pastoral paradigm out of a synthesis of the
contributions of the aforementioned scholars, it was fundamentally important to
distinguish between the 3 prominent views of man. Some scholars argue that man is a
monistic being, while others defend a dichotomous view of man as consisting of a body and
a soul. A third significant view describes man as consisting of three significant parts,
namely a body, a soul and a spirit.
In this thesis it was argued that the trichotomous view of man was the most correct way
of defining the fundamental composition of man.
According to the researcher an understanding of the trichotomous nature of man is
important as it serves as a theological basis for pastoral counselling in order to clearly
communicate the precise truths of the believer's union with Christ.
In the last part of the thesis a practical pastoral paradigm was proposed based on the
trichotomous view of man in which psychology and theology can be harmoniously integrated
by means of a meta-systemic approach. The first phase of the paradigm focused on a
model within which Psychotherapy can be applied while the second phase described
Spirituotherapy as a model within which pastoral counselling can be applied.Thesis (Ph.D. (Pastoral))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2005.
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Bäcklund, Jimmy Ulf Anti-Krister. "Reciprok egoism, skeptisk empirism och modern fysikalism : Titelförslag på några principer och diskurs kring dessas korrelation." Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-96930.
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Denna essä är en ontologisk och epistemologisk undersökning av bland annat etiska och medvetandefilosofiska implikationer av en konsekvent fysikalistisk hållning. I detta kontrasteras mot en transcendentalistisk hållning, som den av T. M. Scanlon, den skeptiska empirismen av David Hume, reciprokt baserade moraliska system (e.g. J. L. Mackies självreferentiella altruism) samt en medvetandesyn i linje med Galen Strawsons kriterier för en realistisk fysikalism som i min mening löser alla så kallade psykofysiska problem.This paper contains an ontological and epistemic analysis of the implication of a consistently physicalist view of reality. This in polemic contrast with transcendentalist positions as that of T. M. Scanlon. I follow along the lines of a sceptical empiricism that I ascribe to Hume and from which, I argue, consistently follows guidelines as set by for example J. L. Mackie and Galen Strawson on topics of self-referential altruism and realistic physicalism respectively.