Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Monadology'

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior
O presente trabalho se propÃe a apresentar o itinerÃrio filosÃfico seguido por Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) destacando o quanto sua âgnoseologiaâ pretende superar a lÃgica dedutiva e sistemÃtica das ciÃncias e alcanÃar a lÃgica fragmentÃria da realidade atual sem encobrir todos os elementos que a constituem. O pensador lanÃa na introduÃÃo crÃtica-epistemolÃgica de sua obra Origem do Drama Barroco AlemÃo e em sua Passagens conceitos como os de alegoria, monadologia, montagem, apresentaÃÃo, dentre outros, em uma perspectiva filosÃfica que de forma inovadora e original tenta ressaltar a necessidade de levantarmos questÃes referentes ao primado do fragmentÃrio sobre o sistemÃtico no Ãmbito dos mÃtodos e das teorias filosÃficas de nosso tempo. Ressaltando as particularidades de tal proposta epistemolÃgica, e como esta se aplica no todo de sua filosofia apresentaremos o quanto sua crÃtica se direciona para o positivismo, o historicismo, e principalmente Ãs concepÃÃes filosÃficas oriundas do idealismo absoluto. Contra tal perspectiva o pensador aplica a lÃgica do fragmento, da descontinuidade, na construÃÃo de suas Teses sobre o conceito de histÃria destacando o quanto à emergente a necessidade de se fundar uma filosofia contrÃria ao procedimento lÃgico-dedutivo e matemÃtico por estes se realizarem de forma resumida e didÃtica, deixando de lado o problema da expressÃo do singular. Por fim, o presente trabalho pretende demonstrar o quanto o mÃtodo filosÃfico de Benjamin se baseia em uma apresentaÃÃo contemplativa da verdade posta a partir de uma configuraÃÃo descontÃnua e intencional na qual os fenÃmenos sÃo salvos sem perderem sua particularidade.
This paper aims to present the philosophical itinerary followed by Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) highlighting how their "gnoseology" aims to overcome the systematic deductive logic and science and achieve fragmentary logic of current reality without cover all elements that form. The Thinker launches in the introduction-epistemological critique of his work Origin of German Baroque Drama and its Cheap concepts like allegory, monadology, assembly, presentation, among others, in a philosophical perspective that in an innovative and original attempts to highlight the need for we raise questions regarding the primacy of fragmentary on systematic within the methods and philosophical theories of our time. Emphasizing the particularities of such epistemological proposal, and how it applies in all of his philosophy present how his criticism is directed to the positivism, historicism, and especially the philosophical conceptions derived from the absolute idealism. Against such a perspective thinker applies the logic of the fragment, the discontinuity in the construction of his Theses on the Philosophy of History is emerging as highlighting the need to establish a philosophy contrary to procedure and logical-deductive mathematical for these are held in a summarized and didactic, leaving aside the problem of singular expression. Finally, the present work aims to demonstrate how the philosophical method Benjamin is based on a presentation called contemplative truth from a discontinuous and intentional setting in which phenomena are saved without losing their distinctiveness.

Leibniz considered that scepticism and confusion engendered by the disputes of different sects or schools of metaphysics were obstacles to the progress of knowledge in philosophy. His solution was to adopt an eclectic method with the aim of uncovering the truth hidden beneath the dispute of schools. Leibniz's project was, having in mind the eclectic method, to synthesise a union between old pre-modern philosophy, based on formal and final causes, and new modern philosophy which gave preference to efficient causes. The result of his efforts is summarised in the Monadology. But the question remains: to what degree was Leibniz successful in this enterprise? An objective of this thesis is to investigate whether philosophical tradition can justify or support some of the arguments that are at the basis of Leibniz's system (for example, monads have no window to the exterior world, a phrase that summarises the structure of Monadology). I shall demonstrate how Leibniz reflects the concerns and the positions of his key predecessors. Thus, the aim of the thesis is to explore key antecedents to Leibniz's central doctrines. The thesis argues that Leibniz carried out a logical development of some principles in the eclectic system of Plotinus, which resulted in the structure of Monadology. Whether Leibniz's project was successful or not will depend on how we view those principles.

Comment définir la déroutante pensée de Bonaventure ? Étienne Gilson y voyait à l’œuvre une « logique de l’analogie », tandis que Hans Urs von Balthasar la présentait comme une « monadologie sans harmonie préétablie ». Dans les deux cas, c’est l’expressionnisme du Docteur séraphique qui se trouve mis en valeur : les créatures représentent leur Créateur par tout leur être, et le Créateur lui-même exprime ses créatures. Toutefois, cet expressionnisme universel et divin n’est que la face visible d’une structure dynamique et tripartite plus vaste que l’on peut appeler, en s’appuyant sur d’importantes déclarations de Bonaventure, la logique de la ressemblance. S’émancipant des restrictions et des interdits dionysiens et augustiniens, Bonaventure a étendu le champ sémantique et conceptuel de similitudo en réunissant sous ce vocable toutes les entités « mineures », c’est-à-dire tous les êtres dépendant radicalement d’une origine qu’ils expriment et vers laquelle ils reconduisent ou sont reconduits : le Fils, les créatures images, les créatures vestiges, les espèces sensibles, etc. Dans ce dispositif dont l’homme et le Christ occupent le centre, c’est la réconciliation du ciel et de la terre, de Dieu et du monde, de la théologie et de la métaphysique, que Bonaventure donne à voir
Bonaventure’s puzzling thought seems to challenge any attempt to define it. Étienne Gilson saw it as a « logic of analogy », while Hans Urs von Balthasar summed it up as a « monadology without preestablished harmony ». Both of them thus emphasize the seraphic Doctor’s expressionism : each creature represents its Creator through its whole being, and the Creator himself expresses his creatures. However, this universal and divine expressionism is but the visible side of a dynamic and threefold structure that we suggest to call, according to several Bonaventure’s important texts, the logic of resemblance. Liberating himself from Dionysian and Augustinian restrictions and proscriptions, Bonaventure broadened the semantic and conceptual field of similitudo by gathering in this noun all « minor » entities, i.e. all beings that completely depend on an origin that they express and towards which they lead or are led back : these are the Son, the image creatures, the vestige creatures, the sensible likenesses (species), etc. Throughout this device, whose center is occupied by the human being and Christ, Bonaventure makes us see the reconciliation of heaven with earth, of the world with God, of theology with metaphysics

ROQUE, Joaquim Iarley Brito. Continuidade e descontinuidade: a lógica do fragmento na filosofia de Walter Benjamin. 2013. 114f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2013.
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This paper aims to present the philosophical itinerary followed by Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) highlighting how their "gnoseology" aims to overcome the systematic deductive logic and science and achieve fragmentary logic of current reality without cover all elements that form. The Thinker launches in the introduction-epistemological critique of his work Origin of German Baroque Drama and its Cheap concepts like allegory, monadology, assembly, presentation, among others, in a philosophical perspective that in an innovative and original attempts to highlight the need for we raise questions regarding the primacy of fragmentary on systematic within the methods and philosophical theories of our time. Emphasizing the particularities of such epistemological proposal, and how it applies in all of his philosophy present how his criticism is directed to the positivism, historicism, and especially the philosophical conceptions derived from the absolute idealism. Against such a perspective thinker applies the logic of the fragment, the discontinuity in the construction of his Theses on the Philosophy of History is emerging as highlighting the need to establish a philosophy contrary to procedure and logical-deductive mathematical for these are held in a summarized and didactic, leaving aside the problem of singular expression. Finally, the present work aims to demonstrate how the philosophical method Benjamin is based on a presentation called contemplative truth from a discontinuous and intentional setting in which phenomena are saved without losing their distinctiveness.
O presente trabalho se propõe a apresentar o itinerário filosófico seguido por Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) destacando o quanto sua “gnoseologia” pretende superar a lógica dedutiva e sistemática das ciências e alcançar a lógica fragmentária da realidade atual sem encobrir todos os elementos que a constituem. O pensador lança na introdução crítica-epistemológica de sua obra Origem do Drama Barroco Alemão e em sua Passagens conceitos como os de alegoria, monadologia, montagem, apresentação, dentre outros, em uma perspectiva filosófica que de forma inovadora e original tenta ressaltar a necessidade de levantarmos questões referentes ao primado do fragmentário sobre o sistemático no âmbito dos métodos e das teorias filosóficas de nosso tempo. Ressaltando as particularidades de tal proposta epistemológica, e como esta se aplica no todo de sua filosofia apresentaremos o quanto sua crítica se direciona para o positivismo, o historicismo, e principalmente às concepções filosóficas oriundas do idealismo absoluto. Contra tal perspectiva o pensador aplica a lógica do fragmento, da descontinuidade, na construção de suas Teses sobre o conceito de história destacando o quanto é emergente a necessidade de se fundar uma filosofia contrária ao procedimento lógico-dedutivo e matemático por estes se realizarem de forma resumida e didática, deixando de lado o problema da expressão do singular. Por fim, o presente trabalho pretende demonstrar o quanto o método filosófico de Benjamin se baseia em uma apresentação contemplativa da verdade posta a partir de uma configuração descontínua e intencional na qual os fenômenos são salvos sem perderem sua particularidade.

Notre travail vise à étudier les Max-Phil, textes inédits de Kurt Gödel, dans lesquels il développe sa pensée philosophique. Nous nous intéressons plus spécifiquement à la question du réalisme conceptuel, position déjà défendue dans ses écrits publiés selon laquelle les concepts existent indépendamment de nos définitions et constructions. L’objectif est de montrer qu’une interprétation cohérente de ces textes encore peu connus est possible. Pour ce faire, nous proposons une interprétation de certains passages, interprétation hypothétique mais susceptible d’apporter de nouveaux éléments à des questions laissées sans réponse par les textes publiés, telles celles relatives au réalisme conceptuel. Cette dernière position ne peut être comprise que par un éclairage de la notion de concept chez Gödel. Les concepts sont des entités logiques objectives, au cœur du projet d’une théorie des concepts conçue comme une logique intentionnelle et inspirée de la scientia generalis de Leibniz. L’analyse des Max-Phil souligne que la notion de concept et la primauté du réalisme conceptuel sur le réalisme mathématique ne peuvent se comprendre qu’à la lumière du cadre métaphysique que se donne Gödel, à savoir d’une monadologie d’inspiration leibnizienne. Les Max-Phil offrent ainsi des indices sur la façon dont Gödel reprend et modifie la monadologie de Leibniz, afin, notamment, d’y inscrire les concepts. L’examen de ce cadre métaphysique tend également à éclaircir les rapports entre les concepts objectifs, les concepts subjectifs (tels que nous les connaissons), et les symboles (par lesquels nous exprimons les concepts), mais aussi les rapports entre logique et mathématiques
Our work aims at studying the unpublished texts of Kurt Gödel, known as the Max-Phil, in which the author develops his philosophical thought. This study follows the specific issue of conceptual realism which is adopted by Gödel in his published texts (during his lifetime or posthumously), and according to which concepts are independent of our definitions and constructions. We want to show that a consistent interpretation of the Max-Phil is possible. To do so, we propose an interpretation of some excerpts, which, even if it is only hypothetical, can give new elements in order to answer open questions of the published texts, e.g. questions about conceptual realism. This last position is not understandable without explaining Gödel’s notion of concept. For him, concepts are logical and objective entities, and they are at the core of a theory of concepts, which is conceived as an intensional logic, following Leibniz’s scientia generalis. The analysis of the Max-Phil underlines that we can understand the notion of concept and the primacy of conceptual realism over mathematical realism only in the light of Gödel’s metaphysical frame, i.e. of a monadology inspired by Leibniz. Thus the Max-Phil shows how Gödel reinvestigates Leibnizian monadology, and offers some clues on the modifications he makes on it in order to include concepts. The examination of this metaphysical frame tends to elucidate the relationships between objective concepts, subjective concepts (as we know them) and symbols (through which we express concepts), and also the relationship between logic and mathematics

1734 var Emanuel Swedenborg en hårt arbetande, rationalistisk vetenskapsman i tidens anda. Detta år utgav han ett av sina mest ambitiösa vetenskapliga och naturfilosofiska verk, Principia Rerum Naturalium. Han försökte här skapa en cosmologia generalis – enallomfattande kosmologisk beskrivning från elementarpartiklarnas uppkomst och konstruktionupp till stjärnornas och planeternas formande. Denna uppsats utreder den ontologiska grundenför Swedenborgs naturfilosofi och lyfter fram tidigare ofta förbisedda aspekter, som hansspekulationer om multiversum. Swedenborgs kosmologi visar sig vara starkt påverkad av ennaturfilosofisk tradition från Gottfried Leibniz.

Cette thèse présente la pensée bonaventurienne comme une monadologie. Toutefois, le principe de cette monadologie n'est pas l'unité indivisible de la monade, comme dans la monadologie leibnizienne, mais la ressemblance avec une tri-unité, à savoir la Trinité créatrice, dont tous les êtres dépendent et que tous expriment à leur manière les uns aux autres. De même, le cadre de cette expression ne doit rien à une harmonie préétablie, mais relève d'une hiérarchie qui, si elle s'ordonne à la Trinité, comprise comme modèle exemplaire de tous les êtres créés qui en sont les images, nécessite l'engagement d'un sujet libre qui peut s'y refuser. De plus, suite à cette étude, nous avons été conduits à repenser les relations entre philosophie et théologie dans la pensée du maître franciscain, à y constater l'existence d'une philosophie, la spécificité de sa rhétorique et la caractérisation de son éthique comme philosophie première. Pour cette démonstration, nous avons usé de l'archéologie foucaldienne : d'une part, pour remettre en cause certaines interprétations, aussi bien anciennes que contemporaines, philosophiques que théologiques ; d'autre part, de façon à présenter le discours monadologique qui articule le sujet et l'objet en tant que monades, comme solution à la problématique archéologique à laquelle revient méthodologiquement l'articulation du sujet, de l'objet et du discours. Enfin, dans la mesure où Bonaventure n'a pas écrit de traité monadologique et que sa monadologie n'est que la résultante de sa pensée et de ses conditions d'exercice, nous avons été amenés, selon une finalité propre à la méthode archéologique, à réécrire cette monadologie. C'est pourquoi cette thèse s'intitule, non pas la monadologie de saint Bonaventure, mais la monadologie bonaventurienne
This thesis describes the bonaventurian doctrine as a monadology. However, the premise of this monadology is not that of an inseparable unity of the monad, as is the case in the leibnizian monadology, but rather a likeness to a three-unity, being the creative Trinity on which the whole of mankind relies, yet each individual may assert in their own way. In this same fashion the framework of that assertion, is not the result of some kind of pre-established harmony, but depends on the hierarchy, which while commanded by the Trinity, itself identifiable as the exemplary model of all mankind and to that given image requires nonetheless, the capable of denial. Moreover, in the light of such sense of between philosophy and theology in the mind of Master Franciscan, by recognising the specificity of the rhetoric and the characterization of his ethic as primary philosophy. For this demonstration, we have made use of the foucaldian archaeology : in part, as a means to question particular interpretations, be they dated contemporary philosophical or theological ; moreover, introducing the monodological speech, which is both central to subject and object as the monads, providing a solution to the archaeological questioning about which the central issues relating to subject, object and speech reappear systematically. Finally, as far as Bonaventure did not write a treaty of monadology and as far as its monadology is only the resultant of its thought and its conditions of exercise, we were brought, according to an end appropriate for the archaeological method, to rewrite this monadology. That is why this thesis is entitled, not saint Bonaventure's monadology, but monadology bonaventurian

The purpose of this essay is to discuss relationality in G.W Leibnizs Monadologie (1714). In general terms this essay analyzes the notion of individuation in relation to the concept of monads. The analysis proposes a question regarding the body in this individuation, and what consequences follows for the understanding of the relation between the single individual and other individuals. It will be shown that the irreducibility of having a body transcendens something like ownness, subjectivity, personality and individuation, and this is explained through the pre-established harmony between the monads – where the plurality of monads is detected before the monads singularity. To widen this investigation of relationality between the monads, I will turn to Edmund Husserls phenomenological operation for solving the egological problem of solipsism in Cartesian Meditations (1929). In his meditations, Husserl uses the monad as a self-conscious ego with peculiar ownness. After having outlined the relevant characteristics of Husserl phenomenological methodical operation, I turn to Deleuzes non-phenomenological reading of Leibniz in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1988). In Deleuzes reading Leibniz is ascribed a transcendental philosophy which bears on the event rather than the phenomenon. The purpose is to develop a discussion between Leibniz, Husserl and Deleuze about relationality in relation to the concept of monads, and about the different ways in which we can approach this subject.

Dankbar nimmt man nun aus den Händen italienischer Forscher eine vergleichende begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung über die ersten Übersetzungen der Monadologie von Leibniz in die Hand. Deren Übersetzung las das Publikum nämlich früher als das Original, das 1714 entstand. Diese Schrift bestimmte - neben der 1710 veröffentlichten Theodizee - die frühe Wirkung von Leibniz, allerdings eben nicht in der originalen (französischen) Form, denn diese wurde erst 1840 in einer Leibniz-Ausgabe des Hegel-Schülers Johann Eduard Erdmann publiziert. Schon im Jahre 1720 jedoch erschien eine deutsche Übersetzung der Monadologie von Heinrich Köhler, gefolgt im Jahre 1721 von einer anonymen Übersetzung ins Lateinische, veröffentlicht in den Leipziger Acta Eruditorum. Was Antonio Lamarra, Roberto Palaia und Pietro Pimpinella vorlegen, ist ein Vergleich der beiden frühen Übersetzungen mit dem Original.

Dankbar nimmt man nun aus den Händen italienischer Forscher eine vergleichende begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung über die ersten Übersetzungen der Monadologie von Leibniz in die Hand. Deren Übersetzung las das Publikum nämlich früher als das Original, das 1714 entstand. Diese Schrift bestimmte - neben der 1710 veröffentlichten Theodizee - die frühe Wirkung von Leibniz, allerdings eben nicht in der originalen (französischen) Form, denn diese wurde erst 1840 in einer Leibniz-Ausgabe des Hegel-Schülers Johann Eduard Erdmann publiziert. Schon im Jahre 1720 jedoch erschien eine deutsche Übersetzung der Monadologie von Heinrich Köhler, gefolgt im Jahre 1721 von einer anonymen Übersetzung ins Lateinische, veröffentlicht in den Leipziger Acta Eruditorum. Was Antonio Lamarra, Roberto Palaia und Pietro Pimpinella vorlegen, ist ein Vergleich der beiden frühen Übersetzungen mit dem Original.

Back to Husserl: Reclaiming the Traditional Philosophical Context ofthe Phenomenological ‘Problem’ of the Other: Leibniz’s Monadology”. The internalmotivation that led Husserl to revise his early view of the pure Ego as empty ofessential content is traced to the end of explicating his reformulation of phenomenologyas the egology of the concrete transcendental Ego. The necessity ofrecasting transcendental phenomenology as a transcendental idealism that followsfrom this reformulation is presented and the appearance of transcendentalsolipsism of this idealism exposed as unfounded. That the ground of this exposureis Husserl’s phenomenological appropriation of Leibniz’s metaphysical insightsinto the problem of accounting for the plurality of monads, and, therefore, not theCartesian problem of the other mind, is presented as the key to reclaiming thetraditional philosophical context of the phenomenological problem of the other.
La motivación interna que llevó a Husserl a revisar su visión tempranadel Ego puro como vacío de contenido esencial puede rastrearse con el fin de explicarsu reformulación de la fenomenología como la egología del Ego trascendentalconcreto. Este artículo presenta la necesidad de replantear la fenomenologíatrascendental como un idealismo trascendental que se sigue de esta reformulación,y se expone como infundada la apariencia de solipsismo trascendentalde este idealismo. El presente artículo también se ocupa de mostrar que la basepara esta exposición es la apropiación fenomenológica que hace Husserl de laspenetrantes intuiciones metafísicas de Leibniz en torno al problema de cómoexplicar la pluralidad de mónadas, y, por lo tanto, no el problema cartesianode la otra mente. Esto es considerado clave para reclamar el contexto filosóficotradicional del problema fenomenológico del otro.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2014.
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A questão sobre o que torna um sistema filosófico uma monadologia é esclarecedora e importante, uma vez que ajuda a entender algumas ideias e abre caminhos para maneiras alternativas de pensar a substancialidade, distinta das rotas norteadoras do pensamento ocidental, oriundas de Aristóteles e Descartes. Essa é a proposta deste trabalho: analisar as bases da monadologia de Leibniz como intuição para a formação de uma ideia geral sobre sistemas compostos por mônadas. Nesse âmbito, a concepção leibniziana das mônadas expressa uma rota específica na qual relações são anteriores às substâncias e tudo está conectado em um mundo onde a modalidade fundamental é a compossibilidade. Leibniz pensa suas mônadas organizadas de modo que cada uma, de certa maneira, prefigura todas as outras. No contraste com ele, as ideias de pensadores como Tarde, Whitehead, Latour, Schaffer e Quine, provam reter importantes elementos de uma monadologia enquanto rejeitam algumas dessas assunções específicas a Leibniz. Desse modo, elas permitem um diálogo conceitual com Leibniz, ao mesmo tempo indicando um outro caminho para a articulação dos pressupostos centrais de uma monadologia. O que emerge é uma monadologia em um sentido amplo que seria independente da maneira específica que Leibniz entendia suas mônadas. Cinco características fundamentais para a ideia de uma monadologia em geral são apresentadas e discutidas. Essas podem ser usadas para comparar diferentes sistemas de mônadas e posteriormente, entender melhor as opções concebidas por Leibniz. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT
The issue concerning what makes a philosophical system a monadology is both enlightening and important, for it sheds new light into some ideas and paves the way for alternative ways to think of substantiality, different from the Western thought guiding ways of Aristotle and Descartes. That is the aim of this work: to analyze the foundations of Leibniz’s monadology as intuition for the development of a general idea about systems composed of monads. In that respect, the Leibnizian conception of monads show a specific way in which relations are prior to substances and everything is connected together in a world where the fundamental modality is that of compossibility. Leibniz thinks of his monads as concerted, in a way that each one somehow prefigures all the others. In contrast to Leibniz, the ideas of thinkers such as Tarde, Whitehead, Latour, Schaffer, and Quine prove to retain important elements of a monadology while rejecting some of these assumptions specific to Leibniz. As such, they allow a conceptual dialogue with Leibniz, at the same time indicating another way for the articulation of the central tenets of a monadology. What emerges is a monadology in a broad sense that would be independent from the specific manner Leibniz understood his monads. Five characteristics, imperative to the idea of a monadology in general, are presented and discussed. These characteristics can be used to compare different systems of monads and, in turn, to further understand the options devised by Leibniz.

Orientador: Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques
Banca: José Carlos Bruni
Banca: Marco Aurélio Werle
Resumo: Partindo do sistema leibniziano e tomando como fio condutor a questão da geração da vida, pretendemos indicar os motivos filosóficos que levaram Leibniz a apoiar os biólogos pré-formacionistas do século XVII. A idéia de embutimento (ou encaixamento) de um novo ser dentro do seu progenitor, defendida pela teoria pré-formacionista, traz como que um exemplo do mundo monádico leibniziano, no qual todos os acontecimentos futuros, inclusive a geração de novos seres, foram já estabelecidos por Deus no momento da criação. As investigações microscópicas desenvolvidas por biólogos da época, especialmente por Leeuwenhoeck, descrevem um mundo até então desconhecido e trazem uma comprovação experimental da concepção teórica leibniziana.
Abstract: Coming from the Leibniz's system and taking as thread the question of the generation of the life, we intend to indicate the philosophical reasons that had taken Leibniz to support the preformationist biologists from the 17th century. The idea of inlaying (or fitting) of a new being into its ancestor, defended by the preformationist theory, brings an example about Leibniz's monads world, in which all the future events, also the generation of new beings, already had been established by God at the moment of the creation. Microscopic researches developed by biologists at this time, especially by Leeuwenhoek, describe an unknown world until then, and bring an experimental evidence of Leibniz's theoretical conception.
Mestre

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
Partindo do sistema leibniziano e tomando como fio condutor a questão da geração da vida, pretendemos indicar os motivos filosóficos que levaram Leibniz a apoiar os biólogos pré-formacionistas do século XVII. A idéia de embutimento (ou encaixamento) de um novo ser dentro do seu progenitor, defendida pela teoria pré-formacionista, traz como que um exemplo do mundo monádico leibniziano, no qual todos os acontecimentos futuros, inclusive a geração de novos seres, foram já estabelecidos por Deus no momento da criação. As investigações microscópicas desenvolvidas por biólogos da época, especialmente por Leeuwenhoeck, descrevem um mundo até então desconhecido e trazem uma comprovação experimental da concepção teórica leibniziana.
Coming from the Leibniz`s system and taking as thread the question of the generation of the life, we intend to indicate the philosophical reasons that had taken Leibniz to support the preformationist biologists from the 17th century. The idea of inlaying (or fitting) of a new being into its ancestor, defended by the preformationist theory, brings an example about Leibniz`s monads world, in which all the future events, also the generation of new beings, already had been established by God at the moment of the creation. Microscopic researches developed by biologists at this time, especially by Leeuwenhoek, describe an unknown world until then, and bring an experimental evidence of Leibniz`s theoretical conception.

The subject of this work is the analysis of the content of the fictional and essayistic production from the writer Jorge Luis Borges, mainly that one made during the 1930s and 1940s and thematizing metaphysical subjects. The aim is to investigate if is there a philosophical project underlying it, and what are the general lines of this project. The introduction includes brief remarks about the importance of the work of Borges to Western thought in the second half of the twentieth century. The first chapter discusses the limitations that are imposed to a philosophical project included in a fictional work, and of its critical efficacy. The next chapter investigates the metaphysical essays Borges wrote during the period in analysis, searching for their philosophical roots. This effort focuses on interpretations by Borges of the systems built by George Berkeley, David Hume and Francis Herbert Bradley, and leads to the discussion of the refutation of the conception of time that permeates British idealism, promoted by the writer through the application of the principle of the indiscernibility. The borgian refutation of time, however, undermines the notion of personal identity, which is self-evident. The third and final chapter shows up that Borges tried to solve this paradox by means of a critical plunge in Gottfried Leibniz´s philosophical system, no longer by means of the essayistic discourse , but through fictional prose. Accordingly, the final chapter includes an outline of the method by which Borges, drawing on the resources of modal fictional discourse, contests speeches such as philosophy itself, supposed to have higher truth- value. It includes, as well, the review of those short stories written by Borges which reverberate leibnizian categories, in order to show the application of that method and hence the meaning of those narratives, which is, according to our hypothesis, to display, each under a different point of view, the fundamental contradiction of Leibniz´s conceptual system. This contradiction is that, despite all the efforts of the philosopher in safeguarding human freedom before a perfect and infinite mathematical cosmology, and of the assertion of the independence of the individual monad, the human condition which emerges from this order is humiliating for men, reducing them to a single piece in a stiff cosmic system.
A presente dissertação tem por objeto o conteúdo da produção ficcional e ensaística do escritor Jorge Luis Borges, mais especificamente aquela composta durante as décadas de 1930 e 1940 e que tocam ou tematizam temas metafísicos. O objetivo é investigar se existe ali, subjacente, um projeto filosófico, e quais são as linhas gerais desse projeto. A introdução inclui breves considerações a respeito da importância da obra de Borges para o pensamento ocidental da segunda metade do século XX. O primeiro capítulo discute as limitações que se impõem a um projeto filosófico inscrito numa obra ficcional, e o horizonte de sua eficácia crítica. No capítulo seguinte, investigam-se os ensaios metafísicos que o escritor redigiu ao longo do período analisado, em busca de suas raízes filosóficas. Esse esforço concentra-se nas interpretações feitas por Borges dos sistemas edificados por Georges Berkeley, David Hume e Francis Herbert Bradley, e conduz à discussão da refutação, promovida pelo escritor por meio da aplicação do princípio dos indiscerníveis, da concepção de tempo que permeia a corrente idealista britânica. A refutação borgiana do tempo traz consigo, no entanto, o solapamento da noção de identidade pessoal, noção que, no entanto, é autoevidente. Tal paradoxo, demonstra-se no terceiro e último capítulo, Borges tentará resolvê-lo por meio de um mergulho crítico no sistema de Gottfried Leibniz, não mais pela via do discurso ensaístico, mas por meio da prosa ficcional. Nesse sentido, o capítulo final inclui um esboço do método pelo qual Borges, valendo-se dos recursos modais do discurso ficcional, coloca em discussão discursos de valor veritativo pretensamente superior, como é o caso da filosofia; bem como a resenha de contos escritos por Borges que ecoam categorias integrantes do sistema de Leibniz, com o objetivo de evidenciar a aplicação desse método e, por conseguinte, o sentido daquelas narrativas, que é, segundo nossa hipótese, de exibir, cada qual sob um ponto de vista diferente, a contradição fundamental do organismo conceitual leibniziano. Essa contradição consiste em que, malgrado todos os esforços do filósofo em resguardar a liberdade humana diante de uma cosmologia matemática perfeita e infinita, e não obstante a afirmação da independência individual da mônada, a condição humana que decorre dessa ordem é humilhante e nulificadora para o homem, pois o reduz a uma simples peça de um rígido sistema cósmico.
Mestre em Filosofia

Walter Benjamin persistently refers to Leibniz’s monad, from his doctoral dissertation (1919), to his last written work, the theses ‘On the Concept of History’ (1940). This dissertation argues that the systematic intent of Benjamin’s early work (1916–1928) can be brought out most clearly by examining Benjamin’s appropriation of Leibnizian metaphysics. The task of this dissertation is to interpret Benjamin’s Leibniz, and to follow the gestures of his text. Benjamin was not interested in presenting a scholarly interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy. Leibniz’s monad had a unique significance for Benjamin’s own philosophical project. In his early work, this project was to determine a method for the philosophical interpretation of art. The core of my dissertation distills what could be called Benjamin’s ‘aesthetic theory.’ According to Benjamin, works of art do not express their truth-content discursively; rather, they express an idea in a configuration of material detail. I argue that Benjamin draws on a Leibnizian concept of expression. One thing expresses another if it preserves the same logical relationships as that which it represents. According to Benjamin, an idea is the most adequate expression of a work: it preserves the configuration of a work’s material content, and represents this configuration (or “constellation” in Benjamin’s terms) in the nexus of predicates in a ‘complete individual concept,’ or idea. The second aspect of this argument is more applied in its focus: Benjamin’s Habilitation thesis describes an elective affinity between Leibniz’s monadic metaphysics and the Baroque Trauerspiel. Benjamin’s analysis of the Baroque dramas and his interpretation of Leibniz are mutually illuminating. The point that legitimates this comparison is not only historical, as both are products of the seventeenth century, but can also be presented as an idea. Both Leibniz’s metaphysics and the Baroque Trauerspiel are engaged in the secularization of history. My argument proceeds in five chapters. In Chapter One, I trace the historical sources of Benjamin’s interpretation of Leibniz. In Chapters Two, Three, and Four, I discuss Benjamin’s monadic theory of ideas. Finally, in Chapter Five, I address Benjamin’s response to Schmitt’s Political Theology. The Epilogue to this dissertation is a reading of Hamlet, which was, in Benjamin’s view, the Baroque Trauerspiel, par excellence. Hamlet’s world is a self-enclosed totality, or monad.