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Journal articles on the topic 'Mind-body dualism'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 20 February 2023

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1

Balogun, Babalola Joseph, and Richard Taye Oyelakin. "An African Perspective on the Nature of Mind: Reflections on Yoruba Contextual Dualism." Culture and Dialogue 10, no. 2 (November 29, 2022): 102–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24683949-12340116.

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Abstract The problem of the nature of mind has lingered for a long time. Generated by the question of whether the mind is an independently existing entity or merely an aspect of bodily events and processes, the problem of the nature of mind has divided Western philosophers into two opposing camps, namely dualism and physicalism. Contemporary discourse of the nature of minds, within the Western philosophical tradition, continues to privilege physicalism over dualism, because it avoids the theoretical impasse engendered by the dualist inability to account for how two radically different entities manage to interact with each other. Although physicalism avoids the dualist pitfalls, it, however, encounters the problem of plausibly accounting for the possibility of conscious experience without commitment to the dualist ontology of a realm different from the body. In this article, we provide an African (Yoruba) perspective to the question of the nature of mind as an alternative to the Western perspective represented by dualist and physicalist theories. We develop a variant of dualism called “contextual dualism,” which accepts the dualist basic tenet of the duality of body and mind but diverges from it by permitting that some physical organs of the body also function in the capacity of the mind. Using ethnological analysis and the Yoruba linguistic hermeneutics as theoretical frameworks, the paper argues that the difference between when a physical organ functions as body and when it functions as mind is revealed in Yoruba language through their contexts of use. The paper concludes that contextual dualism drives a reconciliatory wedge between mainstream dualism and physicalism.

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Yablo, Stephen. "The Real Distinction Between Mind and Body." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 16 (1990): 149–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1990.10717225.

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….it [is] wholly irrational to regard as doubtful matters that are perceived clearly and distinctly by the understanding in its purity, on account of mere prejudices of the senses and hypotheses in which there is an element of the unknown.Descartes, Geometrical Exposition of the MeditationsSubstance dualism, once a main preoccupation of Western metaphysics, has fallen strangely out of view; today’s mental/physical dualisms are dualisms of fact, property, or event. So if someone claims to find a difference between minds and bodies per se, it is not initially clear what he is maintaining. Maybe this is because one no longer recognizes ‘minds’ as entities in their own right, or ‘substances.’ However, selves - the things we refer to by use of ‘I’ - are surely substances, and it does little violence to the intention behind mind/body dualism to interpret it as a dualism of bodies and selves. If the substance dualist’s meaning remains obscure, that is because it can mean several different things to say that selves are not bodies.

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Martínková, Irena. "Body Ecology: Avoiding body–mind dualism." Loisir et Société / Society and Leisure 40, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 101–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07053436.2017.1281528.

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4

Burgmer, Pascal, and Matthias Forstmann. "Mind-Body Dualism and Health Revisited." Social Psychology 49, no. 4 (July 2018): 219–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000344.

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Abstract. Does a sound mind require a sound body? Whether or not lay people subscribe to this notion depends on their belief in mind-body dualism and critically shapes their health-related behaviors. Six studies (N = 1,710) revisit the relation between dualism and health. We replicate the negative correlation between belief in dualism and health behavior (Study 1) and extend it to behavior in the field (Study 2). Studies 3a and 3b investigate how belief in dualism shapes intuitions about the material origin of psychological well-being, while Studies 4a and 4b examine how these intuitions determine health-related outcomes. In sum, construing minds as different from bodies entails the intuition that mental well-being has little material substrate which in turn attenuates health-sustaining behaviors.

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Grankvist, Gunne, Petri Kajonius, and Bjorn Persson. "The Relationship between Mind-Body Dualism and Personal Values." International Journal of Psychological Studies 8, no. 2 (May 22, 2016): 126. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijps.v8n2p126.

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<p>Dualists view the mind and the body as two fundamental different “things”, equally real and independent of each other. Cartesian thought, or substance dualism, maintains that the mind and body are two different substances, the non-physical and the physical, and a causal relationship is assumed to exist between them. Physicalism, on the other hand, is the idea that everything that exists is either physical or totally dependent of and determined by physical items. Hence, all mental states are fundamentally physical states. In the current study we investigated to what degree Swedish university students’ beliefs in mind-body dualism is explained by the importance they attach to personal values. A self-report inventory was used to measure their beliefs and values. Students who held stronger dualistic beliefs attach less importance to the power value (i.e., the effort to achieve social status, prestige, and control or dominance over people and resources). This finding shows that the strength in laypeople’s beliefs in dualism is partially explained by the importance they attach to personal values.</p>

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Badham, Paul. "A Case for Mind-Body Dualism." Modern Churchman 34, no. 3 (January 1993): 19–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.3828/mc.34.3.19.

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7

Bardina, S. M. "Psychopharmacologyconstructing emotions: Prozacversus mind-body dualism." Sociology of Power 29, no. 3 (September 2017): 41–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/2074-0492-2017-3-41-58.

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8

Jenkins, Laura. "Corporeal Ontology: Beyond Mind-Body Dualism?" Politics 25, no. 1 (February 2005): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2005.00223.x.

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The definition and boundaries of the political have received considerable attention in recent times in political science, perhaps as a result of the wavering confidence in the scientific status of the knowledge that the discipline creates. However, a conspicuous absence continues to haunt mainstream political science, one that if rectified threatens, in some ways, to broaden both the nature of the political still further and to challenge the very division of knowledge into the social and natural sciences. This absence is the human body and this article seeks to ask after its exclusion and to suggest that its exclusion is both political and needs rectifying. I argue that the exclusion of the body in political science is a consequence of an inadequate ontological short cut, which is accepted (mostly) unquestioningly by political analysts and which has severe epistemological and methodological consequences. I suggest that a more reflective consideration of the body and its dynamic interplay with the mind could offer the discipline a greater understanding of the human subject, as well as alter power-knowledge relations.

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9

Deutscher, Max. "Simulacra, Enactment and Feeling." Philosophy 63, no. 246 (October 1988): 515–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100043837.

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The general context of this writing is that of finding exits both from dualism and from reductive physicalism. Dualism—the attitude of seeing and taking things according to a fixed absolute distinction, with mind as invisible, conscious ‘containing’ the thought, feeling and sensation ‘hidden’ by body. Reductive physicalism—the attempt to grasp and be satisfied with body as left over by dualism's rape of its mentality, dualism's refusal to recognize the distinctiveness of point of view, as requiring a bodily mentality. Physicalism finally supplants an ‘inner life’ within the bodily vacancy after all, as in traditional dualist image, but now understands that ‘inner’, ‘conscious’ life in the terms pertaining to processes in the brain, rather than as deeds, passions, thoughts, reasoning as within the general ‘imaginary’ of our several minds.

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10

DIKA, TAREK R. "The Origins of Cartesian Dualism." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6, no. 3 (2020): 335–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.47.

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AbstractIn the recently discovered Cambridge manuscript, widely regarded as an early draft of Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes does not describe the mind as a ‘purely spiritual’ force ‘distinct from the whole body’. This has led some readers to speculate that Descartes did not embrace mind-body dualism in the Cambridge manuscript. In this article, I offer a detailed interpretation of Descartes's mind-body dualism in the established Charles Adam and Paul Tannery edition of Rules, and argue that, while differences between the Cambridge manuscript and the established version of Rules are significant, the relevant passages in the Cambridge manuscript preclude interpretation along both materialist and hylomorphic lines. I then offer an account of the development of Descartes's mind-body dualism between the Cambridge manuscript and the established version of Rules. What the Cambridge manuscript reveals is not Descartes before dualism, but rather Cartesian dualism in its barest form.

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Hodge, K. Mitch. "Descartes' Mistake: How Afterlife Beliefs Challenge the Assumption that Humans are Intuitive Cartesian Substance Dualists." Journal of Cognition and Culture 8, no. 3-4 (2008): 387–415. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853708x358236.

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AbstractThis article presents arguments and evidence that run counter to the widespread assumption among scholars that humans are intuitive Cartesian substance dualists. With regard to afterlife beliefs, the hypothesis of Cartesian substance dualism as the intuitive folk position fails to have the explanatory power with which its proponents endow it. It is argued that the embedded corollary assumptions of the intuitive Cartesian substance dualist position (that the mind and body are different substances, that the mind and soul are intensionally identical, and that the mind is the sole source of identity) are not compatible with cultural representations such as mythologies, funerary rites, iconography and doctrine as well as empirical evidence concerning intuitive folk reasoning about the mind and body concerning the afterlife. Finally, the article suggests an alternative and more parsimonious explanation for understanding intuitive folk representations of the afterlife.

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12

McKay, Noah. "Problems with the “Problems” with Psychophysical Causation." Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal 12 (2019): 32–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/stance2019123.

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In this essay, I defend a mind-body dualism, according to which human minds are immaterial substances that exercise non-redundant causal powers over bodies, against the notorious problem of psychophysical causation. I explicate and reply to three formulations of the problem: (i) the claim that, on dualism, psychophysical causation is inconsistent with physical causal closure, (ii) the claim that psychophysical causation on the dualist view is intolerably mysterious, and (iii) Jaegwon Kim’s claim that dualism fails to account for causal pairings. Ultimately, I conclude that these objections fail and that dualist interactionism is no more problematic or mysterious than physical causation.

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McKay, Noah. "Problems with the "Problems" with Psychophysical Causation." Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal 12, no. 1 (September 25, 2019): 32–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.33043/s.12.1.32-43.

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In this essay, I defend a mind-body dualism, according to which human minds are immaterial substances that exercise non-redundant causal powers over bodies, against the notorious problem of psychophysical causation. I explicate and reply to three formulations of the problem: (i) the claim that, on dualism, psychophysical causation is inconsistent with physical causal closure, (ii) the claim that psychophysical causation on the dualist view is intolerably mysterious, and (iii) Jaegwon Kim’s claim that dualism fails to account for causal pairings. Ultimately, I conclude that these objections fail and that dualist interactionism is no more problematic or mysterious than physical causation.

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Lin, Chien-Te. "Rethinking mind-body dualism: a Buddhist take on the mind-body problem." Contemporary Buddhism 14, no. 2 (November 2013): 239–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14639947.2013.832081.

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15

Mohammed, Akomolafe Akinola. "A Critique of Descartes’ Mind-Body Dualism." Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy 6, no. 1 (June 1, 2012): 95–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.25138/6.1.a.7.

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16

Maxwell, Nicholas. "The Mind–Body Problem and Explanatory Dualism." Philosophy 75, no. 1 (January 2000): 49–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003181910000005x.

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An important part of the mind–brain problem arises because consciousness seems inherently resistant to scientific explanation. The solution to this dilemma is to recognize, first, that scientific explanation can only render comprehensible a selected aspect of what there is, and second, that there is a mode of explanation, the personalistic, different from, irreducible to, but as viable as, scientific explanation, in terms of which consciousness can be understood. The problem of explaining why experiential or mental aspects of brain processes or things should be correlated with certain physical processes or things is a non-problem because there is no kind of explanation possible in terms of which an explanation could be couched. A physical theory, amplified to include the experiential, might be predictive but would, necessarily, cease to be explanatory; and an amplified personalistic explanation could not succeed either. There is, in short, an explanation as to why there cannot be an explanation of correlations between physical and mental aspects of processes going on inside our heads. Despite this, there are important, as yet unsolved but solvable problems of knowledge and understanding concerning such correlations. The central serious task for research is to discover how the two explanatory accounts of what goes on inside our heads, physical and personal, are inter-related.

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Richert, Rebekah, and Paul Harris. "Dualism Revisited: Body vs. Mind vs. Soul." Journal of Cognition and Culture 8, no. 1-2 (2008): 99–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156770908x289224.

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AbstractA large, diverse sample of adults was interviewed about their conception of the ontological and functional properties of the mind as compared to the soul. The existence of the mind was generally tied to the human lifecycle of conception, birth, growth and death, and was primarily associated with cognitive as opposed to spiritual functions. In contrast, the existence of the soul was less systematically tied to the lifecycle and frequently associated with spiritual as opposed to cognitive functions. Participants were also asked about three ethical issues: stem cell research, life support for patients in a persistent vegetative state and cloning. As expected, participants' beliefs about the ontology and function of the soul were linked to their judgments about these ethical issues whereas their beliefs about the mind were unrelated. Overall, the findings show that many adults do not espouse a simple body-mind dualism, and any tendency toward such dualism is unlikely to explain their beliefs in an afterlife. Instead, afterlife beliefs appear to be associated with the idea of an immaterial essence, potentially dissociable from the biology of life and death.

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WILLIAMS, CLIFFORD. "Topic neutrality and the mind–body problem." Religious Studies 36, no. 2 (June 2000): 203–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500005199.

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In a previous paper I argued that there is conceptual parity between Christian materialism and Christian dualism because nonmatter is neutral with respect to thinking and feeling – it might do these but it also might not. This undermines the explanatory power of immaterial souls. J. P. Moreland responded by saying that dualists reject this neutral conception of souls: souls are not generic immaterial substances, but consist of a special kind of nonmatter, namely, nonmatter whose essence it is to think and feel. I reply that conceptual parity can still be maintained: Christian materialists can claim that brains are not neutral either, but consist of a special kind of matter, namely, thinking and feeling matter. So there is parity whether one adopts a topic-neutral approach or an essentialist approach.

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19

Gorham, Geoffrey. "Mind-Body Dualism and the Harvey-Descartes Controversy." Journal of the History of Ideas 55, no. 2 (April 1994): 211. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2709897.

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20

Barrett, Jeffrey A. "A Quantum-Mechanical Argument for Mind–Body Dualism." Erkenntnis 65, no. 1 (October 17, 2006): 97–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9016-z.

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21

Money, John. "Mind-body dualism and the unity of bodymind." Behavioral Science 1, no. 3 (January 17, 2007): 212–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830010304.

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22

Ventriglio, A., and D. Bhugra. "Descartes' dogma and damage to Western psychiatry." Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences 24, no. 5 (July 30, 2015): 368–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2045796015000608.

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René Descartes described the concept of mind–body dualism in the 16th century. This concept has been called his error but we prefer to call it his dogma because the error was recognised much later. We studied the original writings translated by various scholars. We believe that his dogma has caused tremendous amount of damage to Western psychiatry. This dualism has created boundaries between mind and body but as we know they are inextricably interlinked and influence each other. This has affected clinical practice and has increased the dichotomy between psychiatric services and the physical health care services in the West at least. This dualism has also contributed to stigma against mental illness, the mentally ill and the psychiatric services. We propose that it is time to abandon this mind–body dualism and to look at the whole patient and their illness experiences as is done in some other health care systems such as Ayurveda.

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23

Baab, Florian. "Vater des Substanzdualismus? Eine kontextuelle Analyse von Descartes’ Thesen zum Geist-Materie-Verhältnis." Philosophisches Jahrbuch 123, no. 2 (2016): 352–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0031-8183-2016-2-352.

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Abstract. The fact that Descartes describes mind and body as two fundamentally different entities has mostly led to the view that he has to be seen not only as the father of modern Philosophy, but also as the father of substance dualism. Against this commonsense view, I will argue that Descartes’ dualism does not primarily aim to prove an ontological, but a transcendental distinction between mind and body as a constitutional fact of human existence. As a consequence, Descartes’ dualism has to be seen as a kind of perspectivism: Depending on one’s point of view, the human mind can, according to Descartes, be seen as part of a union with the body, as self-consciousness (“ego cogito”) or, from a naturalistic point of view, as a natural function that has its correlate in the human brain.

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Monnoyeur, Françoise. "The Substance-attributes Relationship in Cartesian Dualism." Journal of Philosophical Research 43 (2018): 177–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr201882124.

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In their book on Descartes’s Changing Mind, Peter Machamer and J. E. McGuire argue that Descartes discarded dualism to embrace a kind of monism. Descartes famously proposed that there are two separate substances, mind and body, with distinct attributes of thought and extension (Principles of Philosophy). According to Machamer and McGuire, because of the limitations of our intellect, we cannot have insight into the nature of either substance. After reviewing their argument in some detail, I will argue that Descartes did not relinquish his favorite doctrine but may have actually fooled himself about the nature of his dualism. It is my contention that the problem with Cartesian dualism stems from the definition of mind and body as substances and the role of their respective attributes—thought and extension—in the definition of substances.

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Gut, Arkadiusz, Andrew Lambert, Oleg Gorbaniuk, and Robert Mirski. "Folk Beliefs about Soul and Mind: Cross-Cultural Comparison of Folk Intuitions about the Ontology of the Person." Journal of Cognition and Culture 21, no. 3-4 (October 14, 2021): 346–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12340116.

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Abstract The present study addressed two related problems: The status of the concept of the soul in folk psychological conceptualizations across cultures, and the nature of mind-body dualism within Chinese folk psychology. We compared folk intuitions about three concepts – mind, body, and soul – among adults from China (N=257) and Poland (N=225). The questionnaire study comprised of questions about the functional and ontological nature of the three entities. The results show that the mind and soul are conceptualized differently in the two countries: The Chinese appear to think of the soul similarly to how they view the mind (importantly, they still seem to see it as separate from the body), while Poles differentiate it both in ontological and functional respects. The study provides important insights into cross-cultural differences in conceptualizing the soul as well as into the nature of Chinese mind-body dualism.

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Mehta, Neeta. "Mind-body dualism: A critique from a health perspectiveFNx08." Mens Sana Monographs 9, no. 1 (2011): 202. http://dx.doi.org/10.4103/0973-1229.77436.

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Slingerland, Edward, and Maciej Chudek. "The Prevalence of Mind-Body Dualism in Early China." Cognitive Science 35, no. 5 (June 9, 2011): 997–1007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01186.x.

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Honderich, Ted. "YOUR BEING CONSCIOUS: MIND-BODY DUALISM, AND OBJECTIVE PHYSICALISM." Think 14, no. 41 (2015): 31–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175615000202.

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Descartes believed not only that I think therefore I am but also that consciousness is not physical, unlike the brain. That makes consciousness different, which evidently it is, but also incapable of causing arm movements, which is unbelievable. Abstract functionalism is in the same boat. Disagreement between these and more ideas and theories surely has much to do with not talking about the same thing, no adequate initial clarification of the subject matter. We can get such a thing from a database. Consciousness is therefore something's being actual. What that comes to on further reflection is that it has characteristics that add up to its being subjectively physical – and partly outside a brain and partly inside. This theory of consciousness, Actualism, also passes other tests, including individuality and freedom.

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D'Oro, Giuseppina. "Collingwood's “solution” to the problem of mind-body dualism." Philosophia 32, no. 1-4 (May 2005): 349–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02641630.

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BENDELOW, GILLIAN, and SIMON WILLIAMS. "Pain and the Mind-Body Dualism: A Sociological Approach." Body & Society 1, no. 2 (June 1995): 83–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1357034x95001002004.

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Dings, Roy, and Leon de Bruin. "Going Beyond Mind–Body Dualism Requires Revising the Self." AJOB Neuroscience 5, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 48–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2014.951781.

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MORELAND, J. P. "Topic neutrality and the parity thesis: a surrejoinder to Williams." Religious Studies 37, no. 1 (March 2001): 93–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500005515.

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In an important paper, Clifford Williams advanced a Lockean-style argument to justify the parity thesis, viz., that there is no intellectual advantage to Christian physicalism or Christian dualism. In an article in Religious Studies I offered a critique of Williams's parity thesis and he has published a rejoinder to me in the same journal centring on my rejection of topic neutrality as an appropriate way to set up the mind–body debate. In this surrejoinder to Williams, I present his three main arguments and respond to each: (1) The dualist rejection of topic neutrality is flawed because it expresses a conceptual approach to the mind–body problem instead of the preferable empirical approach. The latter favours physicalism and, in any case, clearly supports topic neutrality. (2) If the dualist rejects the first argument, then a second parity thesis can be advanced in which an essentialist view of soul and the brain are presented in which each is essentially a thinking and feeling entity. Thus, an essentialist parity thesis is preserved. (3) If the dualist rejects the second argument, a new topic neutrality emerges in the dialectic, so topic neutrality is unavoidable. Against the first argument, I claim that Williams makes two central confusions that undermine his case and that he fails to show how the mind–body debate can be settled empirically. Against the second argument, I claim that it leaves Williams vulnerable to a topic-neutral approach to God and it merely proffers a verbal shift with a new dualism between normal and ‘special’ matter. Against the third argument, I point out that it misrepresents the dualist viewpoint and leads to two counterintuitive features that follow from topic neutrality.

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Taliaferro, Charles. "Dualism and the Problem of Individuation." Religious Studies 22, no. 2 (June 1986): 263–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500018254.

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H. D. Lewis once remarked he did not think ‘any case for immortality can get off the ground if we fail to make a case for dualism’. Lewis vigorously defended both mind body dualism, the theory that minds (or persons) are nonphysical, spatially unextended things in causal interaction with physical, spatially extended things, as well as the conceivability of an after life. Lewis defended the intelligibility of supposing distinct, individual persons continue existing after bodily death, possibly even after all physical objects pass out of existence. Prominent philosophers such as Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Locke, Liebniz, and Reid have subscribed to both the truth of dualism and belief in continued personal existence after bodily death. Descartes' work might even be construed as reversing the order of Lewis' dictum. For Descartes, the case for dualism ‘gets off the ground’ because of the conceivability of an afterlife. Briefly put, Descartes sought to establish that a person (or mind) is distinct from physical objects on the basis of it being metaphysically possible for a person to exist without his or her body, indeed without there being any physical objects whatever. If A can exist without B, then A is not identical with B. Thus, if it is possible for God to bring it about that I exist and there be no physical objects, I am not a physical object. The purpose of this article is not to develop a case for dualism, nor to query whether the case for immortality can get off the ground assuming nondualist theories of the self. I hope instead to assess a popular objection to dualism, and consequently to a dualist conception of the afterlife, which could be termed the problem of individuation.

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Putri, Retno Daru Dewi G. S. "Penolakan Konsep Ketubuhan Patriarkis di dalam Proses Menjadi Perempuan Melalui Pemikiran Merleau-Ponty dan Simone De Beauvoir." Jurnal Filsafat 28, no. 2 (August 31, 2018): 200. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/jf.31812.

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Descartes’ dualism of mind and body implies relationship of mind and body in the articulation of human thinking. While seemingly reflects both men and women, this concept of dualism has in practice changed due to the existing social construction that differentiate human based on their sex. The ongoing social discrimination against women implies philosophy’s deficiency in addressing human universal issues. In addressing this issue, this research emplyos Merleau-Ponty’s notion of embodied perception and Beauvoir’s conception on ambiguity to argue on the importance of women’s body freedom in understanding the world’s phenomenons around them. The application of these concepts is proposed to provide an independent mode of becoming a woman and to offer a philosophical solution for women’s issues.

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Rangarajan, Sudarsan. "The Mind-Body Dualism in Cyrano de Bergerac: Anticipating Artaud." French Review 95, no. 2 (2021): 189–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/tfr.2021.0271.

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Yoo, Jae-Bong. "The Mind-Body Problem in Education: Beyond Dualism and Physicalism." Korean Society for the Study of Moral Education 32, no. 1 (March 31, 2020): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.17715/jme.2020.3.32.1.1.

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Gaudemard, Lynda. "Descartes’s Conception of Mind Through the Prism of Imagination: Cartesian Substance Dualism Questioned." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100, no. 2 (June 5, 2018): 146–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/agph-2018-2002.

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Abstract: The aim of this article is to clarify an aspect of Descartes’s conception of mind that seriously impacts on the standard objections against Cartesian Dualism. By a close reading of Descartes’s writings on imagination, I argue that the capacity to imagine does not inhere as a mode in the mind itself, but only in the embodied mind, that is, a mind that is not united to the body does not possess the faculty to imagine. As a mode considered as a general property, and not as an instance of it, belongs to the essence of the substance, and as imagination (like sensation) arises from the mind-body union, then the problem arises of knowing to what extent a Cartesian embodied mind is separable from the body.

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Mazarian, Alireza. "Modest Dualism and Individuation of Mind." Metaphysica 22, no. 1 (March 19, 2021): 63–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0019.

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Abstract A persistent tradition in metaphysics of mind insists that there is a substantial difference between mind and body. Avicenna’s numerous arguments, for a millennium, have encouraged the view that minds are essentially immaterial substances. In the first part, I redesign and offer five versions of such arguments and then I criticize them. First argument (indivisibility) would be vulnerable in terms of two counterexamples. Second argument (universals) confuses existence with location. Third argument (bodily tools) is less problematic than the first two, though I will say a few words about why it may also not be convincing. Fourth argument (infinity) may not support substance dualism, because, I think, abundance is very different from infinity. Fifth argument (senescence) depends on empirically incorrect premises. Hence, it seems that no Avicennian argument can reasonably save substance dualism.

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Shah, Shriddha. "Body, Habit, Custom and Labour." Social Change 47, no. 2 (June 2017): 189–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0049085717696391.

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Theories in the modern age in philosophy, as well as in the discourse of the social sciences, are pervaded with the presuppositions of the dualisms of mind and world, theory and practice, private and public. These theoretical dualisms make it impossible to have an account of the interconnected nature of the experience of individuals and societies. The philosophical theoretical vocabulary to take account of the relations between these dualisms has been effaced with the legacy of Cartesian dualism. I argue that through a conceptual analysis of the body, as has been posited by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and the related concepts of habit, custom and labour, we can reclaim some concepts that allow a mediation of these dualisms. In this article, I make a conceptual analysis of the epistemic, metaphysical and social–political interrelations between these concepts and argue for the relational role they play in our philosophical theoretical discourse.

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Thakchoe, Sonam. "Buddhist Philosophy of Mind: Nāgārjuna's Critique of Mind-Body Dualism from His Rebirth Arguments." Philosophy East and West 69, no. 3 (2019): 807–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pew.2019.0064.

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姜, 春雨. "The Transcendence of Merleau-Ponty’s Self-Body View over Cartesian Mind-Body Dualism." Advances in Philosophy 12, no. 02 (2023): 352–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.12677/acpp.2023.122062.

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Prueitt, Catherine. "Human Being, Bodily Being: Phenomenology from Classical India, by Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad." Mind 129, no. 516 (September 8, 2019): 1291–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz052.

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Abstract In the matter of the body, even comparative language—the very use of English today—is soaked through and through with the Cartesian version of the intuition of dualism: the idea that we are fundamentally a mind and a body that must be either related ingeniously, or else reduced to one another. Instead, by deliberately looking at genres that pertain to other aspects of being human, I seek to go deeper into texts that simply start elsewhere than with intuitions of dualism, even while being engrossed in the category of the experiential ‘body’ (in all its translational variety in Sanskrit and Pali). (Ram-Prasad 2018, p. 11)

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Loureiro, Felipe. "Sailing to Byzantium - Icons, Apparatuses and The Mind-Body Problem." Caderno Virtual de Turismo 21, no. 1 (April 30, 2021): 121. http://dx.doi.org/10.18472/cvt.21n1.2021.1924.

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Although our culture has apparently become increasingly immaterial in the last few decades, Victor Buchli argues that “the immaterial is always produced materially”, and that “This apparent paradox, (…) is its generative power and what girds the productive dualisms of social life and sustains the metaphysics that secure our given ontologies” (Buchli, 2016, p. vii-viii). Likewise, Vilém Flusser argues that societies are shaped by the medium that dominates the organization of their cultures - the idea of History, for instance, would be derived from the linear structure of texts. Thus, a culture organized with and through electronic apparatuses – and the apparently immaterial images they produce – would then replicate their inner structure. However, since most of us do not understand how these apparatuses work, we usually settle with a simplified description: apparatuses are a combination of software and hardware, a new dualism that actualizes the ages-old mind/body dichotomy and plays an essential role in contemporary ontologies. Drawing from Buchli and Flusser, the paper argues that it is possible to trace enlightening parallels between the digital apparatuses that shape contemporary culture and the role of religious icons in late Antiquity, focusing on the ontological structures anchored in these apparently widely different media.Keywords: apparatuses; technical images; icons; immateriality.

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Wong, Kevin W. "Pairing Problems: Causal and Christological." Perichoresis 19, no. 2 (June 1, 2021): 99–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/perc-2021-0013.

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Abstract Trenton Merricks has objected to dualist conceptions of the Incarnation in a similar way to Jaegwon Kim’s pairing problem. On the original pairing problem, so argues Kim, we lack a pairing relationship between bodies and souls such that body A is causally paired with soul A and not soul B. Merricks, on the other hand, argues that whatever relations dualists propose that do pair bodies and souls together (e.g. causal relations) are relations that God the Son has with all bodies whatsoever via his divine attributes (e.g. God the Son could cause motion in any and all bodies via his omnipotence). So if we count these relations as sufficient for embodiment, then dualism implies that God the Son is embodied in all bodies whatsoever. I shall argue that while the original pairing problem might be easily answerable, the Christological pairing problem is not and that dualists must shift some of their focus from the defense of the soul’s existence to explicating the nature of the mind-body relationship.

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Perkins, Joanna. "Beyond Intellectual Slut Shaming: Traversing Cartesian Dualism, Shame, and Self-Blame in the Neoliberalized Post-Structuralist Critical Classroom." Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 17, no. 3 (October 12, 2016): 182–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532708616672672.

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In this article, I conceptualize what I am calling “intellectual slut shaming” and illustrate how such an experience is a naturalized part of neoliberal subjectivity and knowledge production in academia. I will review how Cartesian and neoliberal subjects share several parallel structures, including mind–body dualism, and show how mind–body dualism is connected to the neoliberal experience of intellectual slut shaming. I then turn to one of Descartes’ critical contemporaries, Spinoza, for a powerful critique and expansion of the Cartesian subject. I explore Spinoza’s method of affirmation and how this might be used to ease intellectual slut shaming in the neoliberalist context. To engage in such an affirmative method, I turn to my own autoethnographic accounts in the neoliberal university classroom.

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Salvy, Sarah-Jeanne. "Psychological interventions in prostate cancer: a farewell to mind–body dualism." Prostate Cancer and Prostatic Diseases 24, no. 3 (April 5, 2021): 587–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41391-021-00350-3.

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Joubert, Callie. "Medicine and mind-body dualism: a reply to mehta′s critique." Mens Sana Monographs 12, no. 1 (2014): 104. http://dx.doi.org/10.4103/0973-1229.130318.

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Shokhin, Vladimir K. "Theism, the Postmodernist Burial of Metaphysics, and Indian Mind-Body Dualism." Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 5 (2009): 527–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil200926553.

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O'Leary-Hawthorne, John, and Jeffrey K. McDonough. "Numbers, Minds, and Bodies: A Fresh Look at Mind-Body Dualism." Nous 32, S12 (October 1998): 349–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.15.

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Baxter, Lynne, and Christina Hughes. "Tongue Sandwiches and Bagel Days: Sex, Food and Mind-Body Dualism." Gender, Work and Organization 11, no. 4 (July 2004): 363–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0432.2004.00238.x.

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