Academic literature on the topic 'Military operations, Naval – German'

The purpose of the article was to present, in the proverbial nutshell, the issues related to the military situation in the 1950s and 1960s during the so-called Cold War in the Baltic Sea, based on the materials of the Naval Reconnaissance Unit of the Polish People’s Republic. These materials were very important for analytical teams preparing concepts for operations in the Northern European Theater of Operations, as well as ensuring the security of the maritime borders of the Warsaw Pact countries. The 1950s and 1960s were characterized by a wide range of reconnaissance activities as a consequence of the changing reality in the Baltic Sea. The naval potential of both NATO countries, especially Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), was expanded, thus the other side began to create the People’s Navy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), as well as to strengthen the combat potential of the naval forces of the People’s Republic of Poland. At the same time, the cooperation of allied fleets of the Warsaw Pact countries was improved, and for this purpose, staff exercises were conducted on maps and in the Baltic Sea. In retrospect, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact appreciated the military importance of the Danish Straits and the Baltic Sea. In the following years, efforts were made to improve the concepts of naval forces in these waters.

The outbreak of the Second World War showed from 1 September 1939 an extremely important role of aviation. On the first day of military operations, however, not only the Luftwaffe units operated on the Baltic Sea, but also units of the German naval aviation, giving seriously to the defenders of the Coast. This article presents the activities of these individuals in the light of previously unknown archives

The author discusses the causes, the special forms and the consequences of piracy in the coastal waters of Somalia. She debates the reasons for the decision of the European Union to launch a military operation against piracy. In spite of the fact that the German constitution prohibits the use of armed forces for the prevention of criminal acts German naval forces are taking part in the European military operation „Atalanta“.

This analyzes the significance of Novaya Zemlya in the course of military operations in the Arctic during World War II. Data on the deployment of troops in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and nearby islands are provided based on an analysis of archive documents. The military history of the archipelago is examined from the creation of the Belomorskaya military flotilla in 1941 until its disbandment in April 1945. Minor importance of the region at the initial stage of the war is replaced by an increase in the activity of the German naval forces in 1942, especially submarines. The result of this was the expansion of military operations in the Arctic Sea theater, expressed in enemy attacks on polar stations and sea convoys. In response, the Soviet command created a naval base on Novaya Zemlya and increased the fleet’s ship composition. By the end of the war, there was a qualitative and quantitative increase in military infrastructure. The natural and climatic factor had a huge impact on the conduct of military operations, because of it the main combat activity of the warring parties directly depended on the polar summer and navigation period. The experience of the main Department of the Northern Sea route in the development of the region in the 1930s was taken into account. The author concluded that the possession of Novaya Zemlya was key both for the control of navigation and for the possession of the entire surrounding region. Despite all efforts, the enemy still failed to disrupt Maritime navigation in the Arctic, and to break the courageous resistance of military seamen and employees of the Main Administration of the Northern Sea Way.

The end of hostilities on the European continent brought a hot war to a close but started the Cold War. Differences in the approach to many political and military issues of the future world created a divide among the allies. Each of them wanted to play a dominant role in the new reality. The possession of dreadful new weapons, nuclear weapons, singled out two of the most important “players” in the new world – namely, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. They were quickly identified as “superpowers”. The European continent, battered by World War II, was divided into two almost equal parts (arrangements in Tehran between Great Britain and the USSR, confirmed in Yalta), with the border running through the German territory. The dynamics of political changes in Europe led to the formation of the so-called Treaty of Dunkirk. At that time the Baltic Sea was the lens in which political and military events on the European continent focused. When the temperature in the East-West relations was rising, conceptual work began on the use of NATO and Warsaw Pact naval forces in the Baltic Sea. That work was subsequently verified during exercises that both sides conducted in this water region. The Baltic Straits were the proverbial “apple of one’s eye” – controlled by NATO naval forces but craved for by the naval forces of the United Baltic Fleet, seeking to take them over. And that was the most important problem of the Cold War: what to do and how to move the naval forces of the United Baltic Fleet to the North Sea. NATO, on the other hand, contemplated what to do and how to prevent that undertaking from happening. The Warsaw Pact’s concepts included the conquest of the Baltic Straits, occupation of the Jutland Peninsula, and launch of sea and land operations in the west direction. It was also assumed that NATO naval forces could carry out operations from the sea to the coast of the Polish People’s Republic and to that of the German Democratic Republic. Therefore, those variants were analyzed and exercised within the United Baltic Fleet and under the so-called combined forces (land and air). This article has been prepared based on Polish and foreign literature as well as archival materials from the Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance in Gdańsk, the Archives of New Records in Warsaw, and the Naval Archives in Gdynia.

This article derives from a master’s thesis about the consequences of World War I in the Azores archipelago that included a chapter dedicated to the U.S. Navy facilities at Ponta Delgada on the island of São Miguel. With its two U.S. Marine Corps units, U.S. Naval Base 13 defended the port, a British wireless station near Ponta Delgada, and support structures for the assigned or passing naval units. This article offers a vision of Naval Base 13 as a U.S./Europe border during World War I that was critical to the protection of British and American military and commercial shipping and denying Germany any base of operations in the region from which to launch attacks on Allied forces.

This article examines the Allied blockade around the Canary Islands as a response to the German cruiser war, since the crossroads of trade routes from the South Atlantic that took place in the Canary Islands allowed the German commerce-raiders to ensure, on the one hand, the encounter with numerous enemy merchant ships, objectives of this economic war and, on the other hand, the aid of the numerous German merchant ships that were in their ports, especially as colliers. The immediate Allied action to block the ports in the Canary Islands took advantage of the undisputed hegemony of Great Britain in the archipelago: the British control of the main infrastructures and port and communication services was added by the joint diplomatic pressure of the British and French, although it was the clear superiority of the British naval forces and the vigilance of their cruisers that most contributed to limiting assistance to German commerce-raiders. Primary and secondary sources, diplomatic and military, both British and Spanish, and also French, shed light on the diplomatic and strategic dimension of a blockade in which the British Admiralty managed to end the threat of German commerce-raiders between August 1914 and March of 1915, and limit the operations of the following German auxiliary cruisers, which briefly operated in the eastern central Atlantic in the early months of 1916.

Abstract This article examines cross-national coordination on foreign and security policy among political parties of the same family. Drawing on resource dependence theory, it presents a case study of German political parties and their transnational activities on the controversial EU military operation to combat human trafficking in the Mediterranean Sea, EU Naval Force Mediterranean. The article finds evidence for transnational information exchange and coordination among the opposition parties, radical left and the greens, but less so among the government party, social democrats. The degree of transnational party activities can be understood by not only the extent to which parties share a common view in the first place but also the different resource needs of the government and opposition parties.

Across the territories that comprised the British Empire, the Second World War caused many migrations, some great and some small, but all traumatic and formative for the people involved. Civilians, both local and expatriate, fled in great numbers from the threat of German or Japanese invasion; in some colonies civilians were evacuated from cities threatened by bombing or deemed militarily important; hundreds of thousands of servicemen and women moved around the world and spend significant periods of time in foreign lands – African troops resided in Asia, Indians in the East Indies and Middle East, and British servicemen and women found themselves billeted all over the Empire. Also, forming a fascinating subcategory, were the many thousands of American service personnel who served in British colonial territories. After reviewing the phenomenon of migration within the British Empire during the war, this article focuses on a case study – the experience of British (and some Australian) service personnel based in Ceylon for a range of military purposes, including office work, jungle training, and naval operations. It examines the methods used to acclimatize young service personnel, often going abroad for the first time in their lives, to the strangeness of a foreign, ‘exotic’ land. It describes the impressions the people and environment left on these wartime immigrants, before considering the recreational provisions made for them, and the sexual opportunities that sometimes arose. The article concludes that the experience of these European migrants deserves study as much as the experience of non-European servicemen and women, which has received significant attention in the scholarly literature relating to the Empire at war.

In 2022, the Swiss branch of the international publishing house Springer published a book, a collection of papers entitled Military Geoscience: A Multifaceted Approach to the Study of Warfare. It consists of selected contributions by international researchers in the field of military geoscience, presented at the 13th International Conference on Military Geosciences, held in Padua in June 2019. The first paper is by the editors, Aldin Bondesan and Judy Ehlen, and provides a brief overview of understanding the concept of military geoscience as an application of geology and geography to the military domain, and the historical development of the discipline. It should also be pointed out that the International Conferences on Military Geosciences (ICMG), which organises this biennial international conference, has over the past two decades also covered other aspects, such as conflict archaeology. The publication is further divided into three parts. The first part comprises three contributions covering military geoscience up to the 20th century. The first paper, by Chris Fuhriman and Jason Ridgeway, provides an insights into the Battle of Marathon through topography visualisation. The geography of the Marathon field, the valley between Mt. Cotroni and Mt. Agrieliki, allowed the Greek defenders to nullify the advantage of the Persian cavalry and archers, who were unable to develop their full potential. This is followed by a paper by Judy Ehlen, who explores the geological background of the Anglo-British coastal fortification system along the English Channel, focusing on the Portsmouth area of Hampshire. The author thus points out that changes in artillery technology and naval tactics between the 16th and 19th centuries necessitated changes in the construction of coastal fortifications, both in terms of the form of the fortifications and the method of construction, including the choice of basic building materials, as well as the siting of the fortifications in space. The next article is then dedicated to the Monte Baldo Fortress in north-eastern Italy, between Lake Garda and the Adige River. In his article, Francesco Premi analyses the presence of the fortress in the transition area between the Germanic world and the Mediterranean, and the importance of this part of Italy (at the southernmost part of the pre-Alpine mountains) in military history, as reflected in the large number of important military and war relics and monuments. The second part of the book, which is the most comprehensive, focuses on the two World Wars and consists of nine papers. The first paper in this part provides an analysis of the operation of trench warfare training camps in the Aube region of France. The group of authors, Jérôme Brenot, Yves Desfossés, Robin Perarnau, Marc Lozano and Alain Devos, initially note that static warfare training camps have not received much attention so far. Using aerial photography of the region dating from 1948 and surviving World War II photographic material, they identified some 20 sites where soldiers of the Entente forces were trained for front-line service in trenches. Combined archaeological and sociological fieldwork followed, confirming the presence of these camps, both through preserved remains and the collective memory. The second paper in this volume also concerns the survey on trenches, located in northern Italy in the Venezia Tridentina Veneto area in northern Italy. The authors Luigi Magnini, Giulia Rovera, Armando De Guio and Giovanni Azzalin thus use digital classification methods and archaeology to determine how Italian and Austro-Hungarian First World War trenches have been preserved or, in case they have disappeared, why this was the case, both from the point of view of the natural features as well as from the anthropological point of view of the restoration of the pre-war settings. The next paper, by Paolo Macini and Paolo Sammuri, analyses the activities of the miners and pioneers of the Italian Corps of Engineers during the First World War, in particular with regard to innovative approaches to underground mine warfare. In the Dolomites, the Italian engineers, using various listening devices, drilling machinery and geophysical methods, developed a system for drilling underground mine chambers, which they intended to use and actually used to destroy parts of Austro-Hungarian positions. The paper by Elena Dai Prà, Nicola Gabellieri and Matteo Boschian Bailo concerns the Italian Army's operations during the First World War. It focuses on the use of tactical maps with emphasis on typological classification, the use of symbols, and digital cartography. The authors thus analysed the tactical maps of the Italian Third Army, which were being constantly updated by plotting the changes in positions and tactical movements of both sides. These changes were examined both in terms of the use of new symbols and the analysis of the movements. This is followed by a geographical presentation of the Italian Army's activities during the First World War. The authors Paolo Plini, Sabina Di Franco and Rosamaria Salvatori have thus collected 21,856 toponyms by analysing documents and maps. The locations were also geolocated to give an overview of the places where the Italian Army operated during the First World War. The analysis initially revealed the complexity of the events on the battlefields, but also that the sources had misidentified the places of operation, as toponyms were misidentified, especially in the case of homonyms. Consequently, the area of operation was misidentified as well. In this respect, the case of Vipava was highlighted, which can refer to both a river and a settlement. The following paper is the first on the Second World War. It is the article by H. A. P. Smith on Italian prisoners of war in South Africa. The author outlines the circumstances in which Italian soldiers arrived to and lived in the southern African continent, and the contribution they made to the local environment and the society, and the remnants of their presence preserved to the present day. In their article, William W. Doe III and Michael R. Czaja analyse the history, geography and significance of Camp Hale in the state of Colorado. In doing so, they focus on the analysis of the military organization and its impact on the local community. Camp Hale was thus the first military installation of the U.S. Army, designated to test and train U.S. soldiers in mountain and alpine warfare. It was here that the U.S. 10th Mountain Division was formed, which concluded its war path on Slovenian soil. The Division's presence in this former camp, which was in military use also after the war until 1965, and in the surrounding area is still visible through numerous monuments. This is followed by a paper by Hermann Häusler, who deals with German military geography and geology on the Eastern Front of the Second World War. A good year before the German attack on the Soviet Union, German and Austrian military geologists began an analysis of the topography, population and infrastructure of the European part of the Soviet Union, which led to a series of publications, including maps showing the suitability of the terrain for military operations. During the war, military geological teams then followed the frontline units and carried out geotechnical tasks such as water supply, construction of fortifications, supply of building materials for transport infrastructure, and analysis of the suitability of the terrain for all-terrain driving of tracked and other vehicles. The same author also authored a paper in the next chapter, this time focusing on the activities of German military geologists in the Adriatic area. Similarly to his first contribution, the author presents the work of military geologists in northern Italy and north-western Slovenia. He also focuses on the construction of fortification systems in northern Italy and presents the work of karst hunters in the Operational Zone of the Adriatic Littoral. Part 3 covers the 21st century with five different papers (chapters). The first paper by Alexander K. Stewart deals with the operations of the U.S. Army specialised teams in Afghanistan. These Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) carried out a specialised form of counter-guerrilla warfare in which they sought to improve the conditions for the development of local communities through agricultural assistance to the local population. In this way, they were also counteracting support for the Taliban. The author notes that, in the decade after the programme's launch, the project had only a 19% success rate. However, he stresses that such forms of civil-military cooperation should be present in future operations. The next chapter, by Francis A. Galgan, analyses the activities of modern pirates through military-geographical or geological methods. Pirates, who pose a major international security threat, are present in four regions of the world: South and South-East Asia, East Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. Building on the data on pirate attacks between 1997 and 2017, the author shows the temporal and spatial patterns of pirate activities, as well as the influence of the geography of coastal areas on their activities. This is followed by another chapter with a maritime topic. Mark Stephen Blaine discusses the geography of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Through a presentation of international law, the strategic importance of the sea (sea lanes, natural resources) and the overlapping territorial claims of China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia, the author shows the increasing level of conflict in the area and calls for the utmost efforts to be made to prevent the outbreak of hostilities or war. M. H. Bulmer's paper analyses the Turkish Armed Forces' activities in Syria from the perspective of military geology. The author focuses on the Kurdish forces' defence projects, which mainly involved the construction of gun trenches, observation towers or points, tunnels and underground facilities, as well as on the Turkish armed forces' actions against this military infrastructure. This involved both mountain and underground warfare activities. While these defensive infrastructures proved to be successful during the guerrilla warfare period, direct Turkish attacks on these installations demonstrated their vulnerability. The last chapter deals with the current operational needs and limitations of military geosciences from the perspective of the Austrian Armed Forces. Friedrich Teichmann points out that the global operational interest of states determines the need for accurate geo-data as well as geo-support in case of rapidly evolving requirements. In this context, geoscience must respond to new forms of threats, both asymmetric and cyber, at a time when resources for geospatial services are limited, which also requires greater synergy and an innovative approach to finding solutions among multiple stakeholders. This also includes increased digitisation, including the use of satellite and other space technologies. The number of chapters in the publication illustrates the breadth and depth of military geoscience, as well as the relevance of geoscience to past, present and future conflicts or military operations and missions. The current military operations in Ukraine demonstrate the need to take into account the geo-geological realities of the environment and that terrain remains one of the decisive factors for success on the battlefield, irrespective of the technological developments in military engineering and technology. This can also be an incentive for Slovenian researchers and the Slovenian Armed Forces to increase research activities in the field of military geosciences, especially in view of the rich military and war history in the geographically and geologically diverse territory of Slovenia.

This thesis assesses British naval and military co-operation in the form of combined operations during the Nine Years War, 1688-1697, and the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713. The operational history of the joint actions is related and used to drive forward the determination of two inter-related themes. These are, how combined operations might be defined as an instrument of warfare during this period; and secondly, the place of such operations within the military component of Britain's wartime Grand Strategy. With respect to the former, previous definitions embodying the benchmarks of objectives and composition of force are set against the history and built upon to incorporate three further categories of definition: theatre of war, bureaucratic control and command structure. As a result, it is argued that no blanket definition for combined operations can be arrived at, but that any one of the five categories can provide insights into combined operations as an instrument of warfare. The second theme places the strategic objectives of these operations within the context of British war policy and explores their relationship to the 'Maritime' and 'Continental' strategic traditions. While it becomes clear that combined operations were thought to possess neither an independent nor a war-winning strategic capability, they do appear to have consistently filled a role in Grand Strategy which acted either simultaneously or separately in support of the naval and military strategic interests. With the categories for definition and a strategic role established for such joint army-navy ventures, the thesis concludes by considering whether during these wars there were any factors common to the more successful, and conversely to the failing, combined operations. Although a pattern or mould for a successful combined operation cannot be established, it is shown that the origins of the developed historical practice of this type of warfare - demonstrated to such effect later in the eighteenth century - can be traced in the two wars considered in this study.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Middle East Technical University, 2004.
Keywords: Air Defense, Naval Task Group, Formation, Weapon Target Allocation Problem, Military Operations Research, Quadratic Assignment, Location.

This dissertation relates to the dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe, First Sea Lord from November 1916 to December 1917, by Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, at the behest of the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. The dismissal was peremptory and effected without rational explanation, despite Jellicoe having largely fulfilled his primary mission of combating the German U-boat threat to British merchant shipping. The outcome of the war may well have been affected if the level of shipping losses sustained through U-boat attack in April 1917 had continued unabated. The central argument of the dissertation is that the dismissal was unjustified. As an adjunct, it argues that the received view of certain historians that Jellicoe was not successful as First Sea Lord is unwarranted and originates from severe post war critism of Jellicoe by those with a vested interest in justifying the dismissal, notably Lloyd George. Supporting these arguments, the following assertions are made. Firstly, given the legacy Jellicoe inherited when joining the Admiralty, through the strategies adopted, organisational changes made and initiatives undertaken in anti-submarine weapons development, the progress made in countering the U-boat threat was notable. Secondly, the universal criticism directed at the Admiralty over the perceived delay in introducing a general convoy system for merchant shipping is not sustainable having regard to primary source documentation. Thirdly, incidents that occurred during the latter part of 1917, and suggested as being factors which contributed to the dismissal, can be discounted. Fourthly, Lloyd George conspired to involve General Haig, Commander of the British Forces France, and the press baron, Lord Northcliffe, in his efforts to mitigate any potential controversy that might result from Jellicoe's removal from office. Finally, the arguments made by a number of commentators that the Admiralty performed better under Jellicoe's successor, Admiral Wemyss, is misconceived.

AbstractThis chapter argues not only that there is no European Sonderweg (or ‘special way’) when it comes to the law of state immunity but that there ought not to be one. Debates within The Hague Conference on Private International Law in the late 1990s and those leading to the adoption of the 2002 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States, as well as the development of the EU Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and Enforcement, as amended in 2015, all demonstrate that state immunity was not meant to be limited by such treaties but ‘safeguarded’. Likewise, there is no proof that regional European customary law limits state immunity when it comes to ius cogens violations, as Italy and (partly) Greece are the only European states denying state immunity in such cases while the European Court of Human Rights has, time and again, upheld a broad concept of state immunity. It therefore seems unlikely that in the foreseeable future a specific European customary law norm on state immunity will develop, especially given the lack of participation in such practice by those states most concerned by the matter, including Germany. This chapter considers the possible legal implications of the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court for European military operations (if such operations went beyond peacekeeping). These implications would mainly depend on the question of attribution: if one where to assume that acts undertaken within the framework of military operations led by the EU were to be, at least also, attributable to the troop-contributing member states, the respective troop-contributing state would be entitled to enjoy state immunity exactly to the same degree as in any kind of unilateral military operations. Additionally, some possible perspectives beyond Sentenza 238/2014 are examined, in particular concerning the redress awarded by domestic courts ‘as long as’ neither the German nor the international system grant equivalent protection to the victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed during World War II. In the author’s opinion, strengthening the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, bringing interstate cases for damages before the International Court of Justice, as well as providing for claims commissions where individual compensation might be sought for violations of international humanitarian law would be more useful and appropriate mechanisms than denying state immunity.

AbstractIran’s grand strategy revolves around three key pillars: regime’s survival, security, stability (S3). Viewing the United States, and to a lesser extent Israel, as enduring state threats aiming to disrupt S3, Tehran has increasingly prioritized asymmetric tactics in its defense doctrine. This approach aims to deter adversaries’ kinetic and non-kinetic operations while also positioning Iran to attain regional power status. The integration of AI into defense is seen as a force multiplier. Although Iran’s incorporation of AI into its defense capabilities and infrastructure remains in progress and lacks clarity, the regime is extensively focusing on enhancing its missile systems, proxy forces, Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and naval power with AI technologies. Beyond state deterrence, Iran’s 360-degree defense doctrine places emphasis on safeguarding national critical infrastructure and ensuring domestic stability, both of which have recently been bolstered through AI. The defense infrastructure in Iran operates through a multi-layered approach, predominantly involving the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Army, and the Ministry of Defense. Each entity maintains low-profile research and development (R&D) facilities aimed at advancing AI capabilities or integrating AI technologies into existing systems. Given Iran’s practice of denial and deception (D&D) techniques in its defense technology investments, the exact budget allocated for AI remains undisclosed. However, notwithstanding the opacity surrounding defense AI R&D and budgetary allocation, all defense academies currently engage in training students and recruiting researchers in military applications of AI, a testament to Iran’s vision to progressively integrate AI into its arsenals in the future.

In the vast literature concerning the German attack on Allied maritime communications in the Atlantic theater during the Second World War, one particular factor has received little to no consideration – the potential threat that German aircraft carriers posed to Allied naval operations and the passage of maritime traffic in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. While ultimately the Kriegmarine never fielded an operational carrier, such a development could not be discounted at the time. This chapter addresses what the British knew about the German effort and what implications this had on British strategy, naval planning, and fleet deployments. In covering these aspects, this chapter by Marcus Faulkner fills an existing gap concerning the Admiralty's perception and contributes to understanding the complexity of the maritime threat Britain faced during the war. It also illustrates the problems involved in evaluating enemy military capabilities and intentions on the basis of a very limited intelligence picture. This in turn helps historians understand why the Admiralty remained so apprehensive of the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet until 1943.

The breaking of the German teleprinter cipher that led to the construction of the Colossus computer was the culmination of a series of triumphs for British codebreakers. British interception of other countries’ radio communications had begun in earnest during the First World War. The War Office ‘censored’ diplomatic communications passing through the hands of the international telegraph companies, setting up a codebreaking operation to decipher the secret messages. The British Army intercepted German military wireless communications with a great deal of success. E. W. B. Gill, one of the army officers involved in decoding the messages, recalled that ‘the orderly Teutonic mind was especially suited for devising schemes which any child could unravel’. One of the most notable successes for the British cryptanalysts came in December 1916 when the commander of the German Middle-East signals operation sent a drunken message to all his operators wishing them a Merry Christmas. With little other activity taking place over the Christmas period, the same isolated and clearly identical message was sent out in six different codes, only one of which, until this point, the British had managed to break. The army codebreaking operation became known as MI1b and was commanded by Major Malcolm Hay, a noted historian and eminent academic. It enjoyed a somewhat fractious relationship with its junior counterpart in the Admiralty, formally the Naval Intelligence Department 25 (NID25) but much better known as Room 40, after the office in the Old Admiralty Buildings in Whitehall that it occupied. The navy codebreaking organisation had an even more successful war than MI1b, recruiting a number of the future employees of Britain’s Second World War codebreaking centre at Bletchley Park, including Dillwyn ‘Dilly’ Knox, Frank Birch, Nigel de Grey, and Alastair Denniston, who by the end of the war was head of Room 40. Among the many successes of the Royal Navy codebreakers was the breaking of the Zimmermann telegram, which showed that Germany had asked Mexico to join an alliance against the United States, offering Mexico’s ‘lost territory’ in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona in return, and brought the United States into the war.

Outer space as a warfighting domain is intimately linked to contemporary armed conflict at sea. Satellites and space objects are increasingly used in support of operational and tactical naval missions. Thus, states have turned toward counterspace operations to gain space superiority and deny military use of this domain to the enemy. These activities include offensive counterspace capabilities, such as direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons (DA-ASAT), electronic warfare, directed energy, and cyber, to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy rival space systems. The Outer Space Treaty prohibits states from placing weapons of mass destruction into orbit around the Earth, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space. But it does not prohibit using space as a medium for delivering nuclear weapons or the use of DA-ASAT weapons against space objects. During naval conflict, enemy military satellites and other space objects are always lawful targets. Civilian and dual-use space satellites may be attacked if they are used by the enemy to conduct or sustain military operations but targeting them requires a proportionality analysis. Consideration must also be given to the potential harmful effects of space debris when attacking satellites.

The Industrial Revolution of the 19th century had a profound effect on the way the wars were fought. Historians often refer to the American Civil War (1861-65) as the first genuine modern war. History has shown that the effects of technological advances in industry are processes which follow the revolution in the history of war. Napoleon's military campaigns formed the basis of formal military education and lidership in the Western world. Wars as a social phenomenon were more effective through the use of the first modern railways, roads, and warships, which in most military operations changed the doctrine and tactics of warfare and the deployment of military forces on the battlefield. The first and second generation of modern warfare was dominated by the massive use of military force, and numerous armies. This generation of warfare culminates in the Renaissance with the wars of the french emperor and one of the famoust strategic military leaders in that time, Napoleon Bonaparte. The third generation of warfare was a product of the First World War and was generally developed by the German army and was better known as “Blitzkrieg” or maneuver warfare. The strategic military leader in this generation of warfare was Adolf Hitler. The fourth generation of warfare is an evolved form of rebellion that uses all available networks: political, economic, social, and military, in order to create an imaginary image of the adversary. Also, the fifth generation of warfare is defined as contactless warfare, which states and destroys a specific goal without the physical presence of a human. This generation of warfare begins with long-range artillery and naval firearms and longrange missile systems and has been studied since the US terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Strategic leadership in the fourth and fifth generation of warfare have been most developed by US military strategic leaders especially after the US terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. World-class warriors are strategic leaders which have moved beyond tactical and operational competence in the employment of the future force. They understand and implement a full spectrum of operations at the strategic level to include theater and campaign strategy, joint force, interagency in multinational operations. At the end, the military strategic leaders are using all spectrum of military elements of national political 208 power and technology in the execution of the national security strategy. The aim of this paper is to analyze the historical development of strategic lidership in warfare throughout history, taking into account the comprehensive social changes that have taken place in the world over the last two centuries. Keywords: historical development, strategic lidership, generations of warfare, strategy, tactics

Environmentally clean and green energy is becoming increasingly a requirement of electric power delivery systems. The focus on energy security and terrorism makes an indigenous, sustainable and distributed energy resource increasingly attractive. Distributed wind power has been shown to be a good and economic means for generating clean power in good wind sites, even on an intermittent basis. However, the best wind sites are located offshore where deeper water makes current large bladed windmills uneconomic. A low cost and patently unique modular wind power technology, designated a Wind Amplified Rotor Platform (WARP™) system technology, has been investigated which projects attractive technical and economic benefits when tension leg deployed in deeper water sites where big rotor windmills are impractical. Under marine offshore use these designated e-Sea WARP™ units may include integral gas turbines or fuel cells. The latter may cogenerate with WARP windpower generated hydrogen fuel stored in onboard buoyancy tanks to supply ondemand electric energy which may be shown to be under $.02/kWhr to under $.04/kWhr. Electrical loads from electric utilities, military facilities or on-board naval operations may be serviced. Large environmental, economic, and strategic benefits may be realized by use of this technology for commercial and/or naval/coast guard sentry operations. In essence, e-Sea WARP™ systems may provide sustainable ultra-clean on-demand electricity to onboard naval systems or to nearby energy demand centers on shore by submarine cable from normally excellent wind sites miles from shore at sea.

The creation of the Duqm Naval Dockyard (DND) Joint Venture between Babcock International Group and the Oman Drydock Company (ODC) in November 2016 was quickly followed by company incorporation in June 2017. DND combines the well-honed skill sets of ODC and Babcock to establish a focussed warship repair and maintenance facility within the broader commercial Port of Duqm. The latter serves as a secure logistics and supply hub in a deep water port adjacent to the dockyard. Thus, in one location, Duqm provides the facilities of both a naval base and a naval dockyard. This combination has been successfully tested through a number of contracts to date, and the UK-Omani bilateral defence exercise, Saif Sareea, in the autumn of 2018, successfully tested the UK’s concept of ‘Defence Hub Duqm’. In the last 6 months, both the UK , and the US Governments have signed Defence and Strategic agreements with the Sultanate which specifically mention the importance of a repair and logistics hub at Duqm. The dockyard has state of the art infrastructure, with two graving docks capable of docking Ultra Large Crude Carriers and Warships. Since June 2017, DND has completed a number of successful and complex repairs on warships and auxiliaries from both the USN and the RN, including the complex drydocking and repair of a US Military Sealift Command aluminium catamaran. DND is now being looked at by a number of navies as an ideal maintenance and repair hub for their operations in the Middle East and beyond. A deep-water, purpose built facility, Duqm sits astride the ‘Global Energy Interstate’ of the Indian Ocean and Gulf. Ships utilising Duqm can access the Straits of Hormuz, the Bab El Mendaab and Gulf of Aden, and the East African seaboard with ease. Equally, ships at Duqm have easy access to the Gulf of Arabia without being tied to maintenance and repair facilities within the Gulf itself. The location of the port also offers unrivalled force protection and security for visiting warships. Looking ahead, the intention for both ODC and DND is to embark on a shipbuilding programme at the repair yard, to include the construction of offshore support vessels and warships. This will be the first such facility in the Sultanate, and aligns with the latter’s Five Pillars of Economic Diversification , in which Duqm (and SEZAD) will play such an important part.

Abstract Surveillance and reconnaissance play a very important role in military and civil aspects. They are the key factors in military tactics and in the event of civilian calamities. In case of naval warfare, the submarines which are operating under deep water are required to carry out open land mass surveillance in an efficient manner without reaching to the water surface nor revealing their presence and position. This research paper proposes the conceptualized design to develop an autonomous unmanned octocopter system which is capable of being launched from an underwater platform such as submarines, with the help of a tethered launching mechanism known as octopod, to carry out surveillance, reconnaissance and payload delivery. In this paper, we present a novel method for development of UAV with special application on aerial survey from underwater platforms. A variety of design options which are investigated from various trade studies to evaluate the performance along with design configuration to satisfy the specific requirements are also presented in this paper.

In order to accomplish missions, naval ships must be able to stay at sea for a prolonged period of time in specific areas without having the opportunity to reach the shore for replenishment. Thus navy ships are equipped to perform Underway replenishment (UNREP) (US Navy) or replenishment at sea (RAS) (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation / Commonwealth of Nations) with fuel, ammunition, provisions, and spare parts. Replenishment at sea represents another potential collision situation at sea as a result of operating within short distances of the ships involved in this operations. Ongoing safely replenishment at sea operations involve highly skilled personnel on both ships such as: the very best of helmsmanship for keeping a steady course and the officer of the watch to bring the ship into position and match speed. As the two ships close each other, the hydrodynamic forces will both change and increase noticeably. Knowing the hydrodynamic interaction loads between the vessels engaged in RAS operations is highly advantageous. ,,Mircea cel B?tr?n" Naval Academy (MBNA) uses a top notch "Integrated simulator for driving of watercraft" that meets the Standard Certification No. 2.14 for Maritime Simulator Systems, adopted in January 2011 for training and development of practical skills of teams onboard naval ships in order to safely perform replenishment at sea operations. Using "Integrated simulator for driving of watercraft" capabilities, underway replenishment operations can be performed with the use of two ship model types: delivery ships and receiving ships. The parameters of refuelling underway are: the admissible course and speed deviation of the receiving ship, the admissible deviation of the phone and distance (P&D) line angle from the normal to the plane parallel to the centreline plane of the receiving ship, the maximum length of the P&D line and the maximum break force of the span wire. RAS module of the simulator is used for training of undergraduate students and also embarked personnel onboard Romanian Navy ships. The aim of this paper is to present how practical skills and competences neccesary for military personnel onboard ships engaged in replenishment at sea operations can be achieved through simulated exercises in different hydrometeorological conditions.

Future naval operations will increasingly incorporate Maritime Unmanned Systems (MUS). Embedding autonomous MUS in a military organization has its challenges. To overcome these challenges the Royal Netherlands Navy has started the development of a general system of systems architecture, GENIUS. A general outline and functions are described in this paper as well as the current state and its future configurations in the Royal Netherlands Navy.

Sieges of the Morea War in the celebratory cycle of Francesco Morosini. Art, topography and military historyThe forty-eight paintings executed between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to celebrate the military campaigns of Francesco Morosini (1619-1694) are an exceptional repertoire of military genre painting. The canvas uses different figurative registers to represent naval battles, cities and territories, siege operations. If the relations with war literature and propaganda prints, which spread across Europe and which had their official “historiographer” in Vincenzo Coronelli in Venice, are evident, equally strong relationships can be established between the paintings, war reports and the plans made on the battlefield by military engineers. This paper deals with the paintings dedicated to the sieges of Corone and Negroponte are examined here.

Military diving operations are routinely conducted in what can be one of the most inhospitable environments on the planet, frequently characterized by zero visibility. The inability to clearly see the immediate operational environment has historically been a serious limitation to manned diving operations — whether the mission is ship husbandry, under water construction, salvage, or scientific research. U.S. Navy diving is an integral part of the nation’s defense strategy with a continuing requirement to conduct manned intervention in the water column. To ensure technical superiority across the entire spectrum of diving operations we must identify, exploit, and de velop technology to advance the state-of-the-art in diving equipment. This can only be achieved by investing in, and supporting, focused research and development with specific goals to further diving capabilities. Under a project sponsored by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Panama City Division (NSWC PCD) has de veloped a prototype see-through head-up display system for a U. S. Navy diving helmet — the Divers Augmented Vision Display (DAVD). The DAVD system uses waveguide optical display modules that couple images from a micro display into a waveguide optic, translate the images through a series of internal reflections, finally exiting toward the diver’s eye providing a magnified, see-through virtual image at a specific distance in front of the diver. The virtual images can be critical information and sensor data including sonar images, ship husbandry and underwater construction schematics, enhanced navigation displays, augmented reality, and text messages. NSWC PCD is the U.S. Navy’s leading laboratory for research, development, testing, evaluation, and technology transition of diver visual display systems; with unique facilities for rapid prototyping and manufacturing, human systems integration and extreme environment testing. Along with NSWC PCD, the Navy Experimental Diving Unit (NEDU), and Naval Diving and Salvage Training Center (NDSTC) are co-located tenant commands at the Naval Support Activity Panama City (NSA PC). This paper provides a brief background on the development of diver head-up display systems, waveguide optical display technology, development of the DAVD prototype, results of diver evaluations, and recommendations for accelerated development of this game changing capability.

From military theorists` perspective, the airspace is an area from which objectives of strategic importance to the enemy can be effectively engaged and neutralized, in order to disorganize the command and control system at strategic level, as well as to diminish the enemy’s operational potential to develop and the tactical effort in the area / areas where military actions are carried out. From this point of view, maintaining control of the airspace is a necessary condition for providing national security, and this can be achieved by constantly updating the doctrine of the air force, the one that manages the use of airborne vectors (aviation, missiles, artillery, drones, etc.) and supports the development of specific infrastructures, research and production elements, as well as modern structures for the educational and training needs of the Air Force. The airspace and going beyond that, the circumterestrial space are areas where there are no physical limitations or obstacles, geographical or relief conditions as found in districts where land forces operate or in the areas of military operations carried out by naval forces. Given the lack of these restrictions, the branch that uses the airspace has a unique feature, namely ubiquity, a characteristic that outlines the special importance of air force and air doctrine in meeting the objectives of military strategy and national security.

According to International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers (STCW), adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), maritime officers must be trained in the field of search and rescue (SAR) operations and ship handling under distress situations. Providing the required competences for maritime students can only be done by both theoretical education and practical training. For the later, providers of maritime education for officers rely of simulators which are most of the time very expensive. The number of seats and the time students can spend inside the simulators is also limited. In this paper, we provide a critical review of a low-cost gaming software with respect to regulations on SAR operation and ship handling. To this end, we study the search and rescue simulation capabilities of the Maritime Search and Rescue Ship Simulator with respect to the SAR and ship handling curricula at the “Mircea cel Batran” Naval Academy. We analyze which subjects from the maritime navigation study program can be covered by the game and how the competences can be gained through individual gaming. The Maritime Search and Rescue Ship Simulator is a PC compatible game that was developed by a partnership between game software companies (Reality Twist and Rondomedia) and German SAR services (Maritime Rescue Coordination Center in Bremen and German Maritime Search and Rescue Service). The game can be used to complement the students training according with their individual needs. The advantage of such games is that they can be installed on personal computers and used for training by students in their study time.

Unprecedented global turbulence in 2022 has demonstrated the need to pay increased attention to naval operations. Enhanced military capability allows naval power projection far beyond home waters. New threats and challenges are emerging from technological advances and new applications, not least the vulnerability of warships and naval facilities to cyber intrusions and cyberattacks. As states implement the programmes they need to protect and promote their interests at sea, there is also likely to be an increase in the number of close tracking incidents. How effective current risk reduction mechanisms will be at dealing with incidents at sea is unclear. This Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of the existing mechanisms and suggests areas for further improvement.