Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Military Indonesia'
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1
O'Hare, Martin. "The Indonesian military in Irian Jaya." [Canberra : Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National Univerity], 1991. http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/ohare2/%5Fma.html.
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O'Hare, Martin. "The Indonesian military in Irian Jaya." Thesis, [Canberra : Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National Univerity], 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/144273.
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Kardi, Koesnadi. "Innovations in basic flight training for the Indonesian Air Force." Thesis, Monterey, California : Naval Postgraduate School, 1990. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA246564.
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Thesis (M.S. in Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 1990.Thesis Advisor(s): Crawford, Alice. Second Reader: McGonigal, Richard A. "December 1990." Description based on title screen as viewed on March 31, 2010. DTIC Identifier(s): Military Training, Indonesia, Air Force, Pilot Training, T-34C Aircraft, USN-UPT (United States Navy Undergraduate Pilot Training), IAF-UPT (Indonesian Air Force Undergraduate Pilot Training). Author(s) subject terms: Basic Flight Training, Innovation, Curriculum Recommendation, Undergraduate Pilot Training (IAF-UPT). Includes bibliographical references (p. 104-106). Also available in print.
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Wright, Naomi. "The military and transition in Indonesia, 1998-1999 /." Title page, contents and abstract only, 1999. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09AR/09arw9524.pdf.
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Hui, Chiu-kit Eddie, and 許趙傑. "Military professionalism and praetorianism in Thailand and Indonesia." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1993. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31950280.
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Hui, Chiu-kit Eddie. "Military professionalism and praetorianism in Thailand and Indonesia." [Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong], 1993. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B13457123.
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Han, Nackhoon. "The Troubled Relationship between Suharto and the Indonesian Armed Forces from the Mid 1960s to the Early 1990s." Fogler Library, University of Maine, 2007. http://www.library.umaine.edu/theses/pdf/HanN2007.pdf.
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Lee, Terence C. "The causes of military insubordination : explaining military organizational behavior in China, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/10742.
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Lamb, Thomas George. "Civil military relations in Indonesia : the evolution and dissolution of concordance." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Political Science, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/9424.
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Theoretical work on civil military relations has traditionally emphasised the separation of the military from the civilian spheres as the best means of insulating against military intervention. Rebecca Schiff's concordance model challenges this basic assumption by arguing that intervention can be prevented by the presence of agreement amongst the military, the political leadership and the citizenry, on four specific indicators; the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method and military style. Schiff's theory has been used to explore the post 1945 relationship that has existed between Indonesian army, citizenry and political leadership. The thesis argues, in line with Schiff's theory that the Indonesian army's participation in society and politics has been determined by its unique history and culture. Schiff's theory has been further applied to Indonesia to trace the gradual development of a concordance. The evidence from the Indonesian case indicates that Schiff's argument is undermined by its static nature due to the inability of her model to account for change within each of the partners. Schiff's theory overlooks the need for the partners to be coherent in order for agreement to form. In the case of this study Schiff's theory has been adapted to take into account change within the actors, introducing a dynamic element to the model. It is contended that the concordance which did eventually emerge was significantly different in nature to that defined by Schiff, namely and enforced concordance. This enforced concord endured until 1998, when a fundamental change within the nature of the partners led to Suharto's downfall. It is argued further that the case of Indonesia demonstrates the need for her
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Parakala, Prabhakar. "Military regimes, security doctrines, and foreign policy : Brazil, Indonesia, and Ghana." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.281944.
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Khairan, Ab Razak bin Mohd. "The influence of Islam in the military: comparative study of Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan." Thesis, Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/1663.
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Approved for public release, distribution is unlimitedIslam permeated throughout the military institutions of Malaysia, Pakistan and Indonesia and replaced the Western and foreign military cultures the military had inherited due to society becoming Islamized following the revival of Islam. The implementation of true Islamic model practices and values differ slightly from country to country depending first on the level of piousness of its existing military personnel, new personnel input and the military leadership. The second factor is the degree of motivational drive of the head of state in encouraging Islam. Islamized military institutions are also faced with the challenges created as a result of sects and schools that emerge in the form of Islamic parties and extremist groups. The argument will be that Islamic teachings in military affairs can result in peace, solidarity and solve the Civil-Military Relations (CMR) problems. In the final analysis, guided moderate Islamic influence' bring harmony to CMR in Malaysia, while the uncoordinated influence of Islam in the Indonesian military made the CMR problematic. It is different in Pakistan because the strong influence of Islam has encouraged the generals to wrest political power from civilians.
Lieutenant Colonel, Royal Malaysian Air Force
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葉詠儀。 and Wing-yee Yip. "A comparative study of the pro-democracy student movements in Indonesia 1998 and China 1989." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1999. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B42574894.
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Yip, Wing-yee. "A comparative study of the pro-democracy student movements in Indonesia 1998 and China 1989." Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 1999. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B42574894.
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Pietsch, Samuel, and sam pietsch@gmail com. "Australia's military intervention in East Timor, 1999." The Australian National University. School of Social Sciences, 2009. http://thesis.anu.edu.au./public/adt-ANU20091214.122004.
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This thesis argues that the Australian military intervention in East Timor in 1999 was motivated primarily by the need to defend Australias own strategic interests. It was an act of Australian imperialism understood from a Marxist perspective, and was consistent with longstanding strategic policy in the region.¶
Australian policy makers have long been concerned about the security threat posed by a small and weak neighbouring state in the territory of East Timor. This led to the deployment of Australian troops to the territory in World War Two. In 1974 Australia supported Indonesias invasion of the territory in order to prevent it from becoming a strategic liability in the context of Cold War geopolitics. But, as an indirect result of the Asian financial crisis, by September 1999 the Indonesian governments control over the territory had become untenable. Indonesias political upheaval also raised the spectre of the Balkanisation of the Indonesian archipelago, and East Timor thus became the focal point for Australian fears about an arc of instability that arose in this period.¶
Australias insertion of military forces into East Timor in 1999 served its own strategic priorities by ensuring an orderly transfer of sovereignty took place, avoiding a destabilising power vacuum as the country transitioned to independence. It also guaranteed that Australias economic and strategic interests in the new nation could not be ignored by the United Nations or the East Timorese themselves. There are therefore underlying consistencies in Australias policy on East Timor stretching back several decades. Despite changing contexts, and hence radically different policy responses, Australia acted throughout this time to prevent political and strategic instability in East Timor.¶
In addition, the intervention reinforced Australias standing as a major power in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. The 1999 deployment therefore helped facilitate a string of subsequent Australian interventions in Pacific island nations, both by providing a model for action and by building a public consensus in favour of the use of military intervention as a policy tool.¶
This interpretation of events challenges the consensus among existing academic accounts. Australias support of Indonesias invasion and occupation of East Timor from 1974 was frequently criticised as favouring realpolitik over ethical considerations. But the 1999 intervention, which ostensibly ended severe violence and secured national independence for the territory, drew widespread support, both from the public and academic commentators. It has generally been seen as a break with previous Australian policy, and as driven by political forces outside the normal foreign policy process. Moreover, it has been almost universally regarded as a triumph for moral conduct in international affairs, and even as a redemptive moment for the Australian national conscience. Viewing the intervention as part of the longstanding strategy of Australian imperialism casts doubt on such positive evaluations.
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Said, Salim. "The genesis of power : civil-military relations in Indonesia during the revolution for independence, 1945-1949." The Ohio State University, 1986. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu148726460321841.
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Khairan, Ab Razak bin Mohd. "The influence of Islam in the military : comparitive study of Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan /." Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2004. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/04Mar%5FKhairan.pdf.
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Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Civil-Military Relations))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2004.Thesis advisor(s): Gaye Christoffersen, Seyyed Vali R. Nasr. Includes bibliographical references (p. 115-120). Also available online.
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Turner, Barry John, and barry turner@rmit edu au. "Nasution total people's resistance and organicist thinking in Indonesia." Swinburne University of Technology, 2005. http://adt.lib.swin.edu.au./public/adt-VSWT20060227.095349.
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This thesis argues that General Abdul Haris Nasution, the most influential military strategist
that Indonesia has produced, developed an elective affinity between his strategies for 'people�s
resistance' and an organicist vision of the proper relations between the state (including the
military) and society that led to the Indonesian Army�s formulation of a unique, pervasive and
highly durable means of military intervention in politics, the economy and society.
Organicism is a stream of political thinking that views state and society as a single organic
unity. Corporatist / functional modes of interest representation are often associated with
organicist thinking.
Nasution�s 'people�s resistance' strategies emerged during the armed struggle for national
independence (from the Dutch) in the second half of the 1940s. The thesis argues that unlike the
'people�s war' strategies that emanated from the political left at roughly the same time,
Nasution�s concepts were designed to uphold organic 'traditional' authority structures and
depoliticise the national struggle. Associated with these strategies was a system of territorial
commands that shadowed and supervised the aristocratically led civilian administration.
The form of military intervention that grew out of this elective affinity reached its peak during
the New Order regime of former President Suharto (1966 � 1998), when the army used its
'people�s resistance' doctrines and their associated territorial commands to control the
population and the regime championed state-sanctioned corporatist / functional modes of
interest representation.
The identification of this elective affinity is a major point of departure from previous political
biographies of Nasution. Another is the emphasis placed on Nasution�s family and personal life,
particularly in the early chapters.
This thesis explains how personal and family influences encouraged Nasution towards organicist
thinking. It identifies how, in the early 1950s, Nasution idealised his 'people�s resistance'
strategies and the support given to him during the armed struggle by organic 'traditional'
authority figures. It shows how Nasution�s elective affinity between organicist thinking and
'people�s resistance' infused the interventionist doctrines that the army began to develop in the
mid-to-late 1950s.
In recent years the Indonesian Army has distanced itself from corporatist / functional forms of
interest representation and has largely retreated from an active involvement in politics.
Nevertheless, the thesis identifies a continuing adherence within the Army leadership to
Nasution�s system of territorial commands and concepts of 'people�s resistance' that cannot
readily be reconciled with democratic processes.
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Situmorang, Mangadar. "Intrastate conflicts and international humanitarian intervention: case studies in Indonesia." Thesis, Curtin University, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/822.
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The differences in the international responses to the violent conflicts in East Timor (1998–1999), Maluku (1999–2003) and Aceh (1998–2005) are examined in this research. Given the growing acceptance of the significance of the use of military force for humanitarian purposes, the humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh might prima facie have justified humanitarian intervention similar to that in East Timor. By analysing the differences from the Indonesia’s domestic political point of view it is clear that the conscience-shocking situation caused by the violent conflicts was not the compelling factor for the international community to militarily intervene. The deployment of a multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET) was decided only after the UN and foreign major countries believed that such military intervention would not jeopardize the ongoing process of democratization in Indonesia. This suggested that Indonesia’s domestic circumstance was central to whether a similar measure in Maluku and Aceh would take place or not. Due to the reformasi (political reform) in Indonesia within which the independence of East Timor took place, two main changes within Indonesian politics, namely the growing sentiment of anti-international intervention and the continuing democratization process, helped to ensure that humanitarian intervention in the two other regions did not happen.These two conditions were fortified by the increasingly consolidated democratic politics which brought the communal conflict in Maluku to the Malino Peace Agreement. The emergence of a stronger and democratic government in Indonesia, furthermore, made cooperation with the international community possible in seeking a peaceful resolution to the armed conflict in Aceh. By involving the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) agreed to the Helsinki peace agreement and accepted the role of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to secure its implementation. Thus, a strong democratic government made an international military intervention for humanitarian purposes unnecessary.
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Situmorang, Mangadar. "Intrastate conflicts and international humanitarian intervention: case studies in Indonesia." Curtin University of Technology, Dept. of Social Sciences, 2007. http://espace.library.curtin.edu.au:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=18582.
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The differences in the international responses to the violent conflicts in East Timor (1998–1999), Maluku (1999–2003) and Aceh (1998–2005) are examined in this research. Given the growing acceptance of the significance of the use of military force for humanitarian purposes, the humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh might prima facie have justified humanitarian intervention similar to that in East Timor. By analysing the differences from the Indonesia’s domestic political point of view it is clear that the conscience-shocking situation caused by the violent conflicts was not the compelling factor for the international community to militarily intervene. The deployment of a multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET) was decided only after the UN and foreign major countries believed that such military intervention would not jeopardize the ongoing process of democratization in Indonesia. This suggested that Indonesia’s domestic circumstance was central to whether a similar measure in Maluku and Aceh would take place or not. Due to the reformasi (political reform) in Indonesia within which the independence of East Timor took place, two main changes within Indonesian politics, namely the growing sentiment of anti-international intervention and the continuing democratization process, helped to ensure that humanitarian intervention in the two other regions did not happen.These two conditions were fortified by the increasingly consolidated democratic politics which brought the communal conflict in Maluku to the Malino Peace Agreement. The emergence of a stronger and democratic government in Indonesia, furthermore, made cooperation with the international community possible in seeking a peaceful resolution to the armed conflict in Aceh. By involving the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) agreed to the Helsinki peace agreement and accepted the role of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to secure its implementation. Thus, a strong democratic government made an international military intervention for humanitarian purposes unnecessary.
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SAI, Khaing Myo Tun. "Politics of Development in Myanmar (1988-2009): Comparison with Indonesia under Suharto's New Order." 名古屋大学大学院国際開発研究科, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2237/14549.
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Kilcullen, David J. Politics Australian Defence Force Academy UNSW. "The political consequences of military operations in Indonesia 1945-99 : a fieldwork analysis of the political power-diffusion effects of guerilla conflict." Awarded by:University of New South Wales - Australian Defence Force Academy. School of Politics, 2000. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/38709.
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Problem Investigated. This dissertation is a study of the political effects of low-intensity warfare in Indonesia since 1945. In particular, it examines the interaction between general principles and contextual variables in guerrilla conflict, to determine whether such conflict causes the diffusion of political power. Analysis of insurgent movements indicates that power structures within a guerrilla group tend to be regionalised, diffuse and based on multiple centres of roughly equal authority. Conversely, studies of counter-insurgency (COIN) techniques indicate that successful COIN depends on effective political control over the local population. This tends to be exercised by regional or local military commanders rather than by central authority. Based on this, the author???s initial analysis indicated that one should expect to see a diffusion of political authority from central leaders (whether civilian or military) to regional military leaders, when a society is engaged in the conduct of either COIN or guerrilla warfare. The problem investigated in this dissertation can therefore be stated thus: To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing factors does low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect? Procedures Followed. The procedure followed was a diachronic, qualitative, fieldwork-based analysis of two principle case studies: the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-1962 and the campaign in East Timor 1974-1999. Principle research tools were: ??? Semi-structured, formal, informal and group interviews. ??? Analysis of official and private archives in Australia, Indonesia, the Netherlands and the UK. ??? Participant observation using anthropological fieldwork techniques. ??? Geographical analysis using transects, basemapping and overhead imagery. ??? Demographic analysis using historical data, cartographic records and surveys. Research was conducted in Australia, Indonesia (Jakarta and Bandung), the Netherlands (The Hague and Amsterdam) and the United Kingdom (London, Winchester, Salisbury and Warminster). Fieldwork was conducted over three periods in West Java (1994, 1995 and 1996) and one period in East Timor (1999-2000). General Results Obtained. The two principal case studies were the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-62 and the campaign in East Timor since 1974. The fieldwork data showed that low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 did indeed demonstrate the political power-diffusion effect posited by the author. This effect was triggered by the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, which itself flowed from crises generated by processes of modernisation and change within Indonesian society from traditional hierarchies to modern forms of social organisation. These crises were also affected by events at the systemic and regional levels of analysis ??? the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies by Japan, the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis and increasing economic and media globalisation. They resulted in a breakdown or weakening of formal power structures, allowing informal power structures to dominate. This in turn allowed local elites with economic, social or religious influence and with coercive power over the population, to develop political and military power at the local level while being subject to little control from higher levels. This process, then, represented a power diffusion from central and civilian leadership levels to local leaders with coercive means ??? most often military or insurgent leaders. Having been triggered by guerrilla operations, however, the direction and process by which such power diffusion operated was heavily influenced by contextual variables, of which the most important were geographical factors, political culture, traditional authority structures and the interaction of external variables at different levels of analysis. Topographical isolation, poor infrastructure, severe terrain, scattered population groupings and strong influence by traditional hierarchies tend to accelerate and exacerbate the loss of central control. Conversely good infrastructure, large population centres, good communications and a high degree of influence by nation-state and systemic levels of analysis ??? particularly through economic and governmental institutionalisation ??? tend to slow such diffusion. Moreover, while power may be diffusing at one level of analysis (e.g. nation-state) it may be centralising at another (e.g. into the hands of military leaders at local level). Analysis of the Malayan Emergency indicates that, in a comparable non-Indonesian historical example, the same general tendency to political power diffusion was evident and that the same broad contextual variables mediated it. However, it would be premature to conclude that the process observed in Indonesia is generally applicable. The nature and relative importance of contextual factors is likely to vary between examples and hence additional research on non-Indonesian examples would be necessary before such a conclusion could be drawn. Further research on a current instance of guerrilla operations in Indonesia is also essential before the broader contemporary applicability of these findings can be reliably demonstrated. Major Conclusions Reached. Based on the above, the theses developed to answer the initial problem can be stated thus: The command and control (C2) structures inherent in traditional, dispersed rural guerrilla movements that lack access to mass media or electronic communications tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders. If COIN or Internal Security Operations are conducted, two factors will operate. First, there will be an increase in the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Second, where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, there will be an increase in control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders. Where the central government is civilian or has interests divergent from the military???s, the first of these factors will dominate. Where the government is military or has interests largely identical to those of the military, the second factor will be dominant. The process of power diffusion can thus be summarised as follows: A crisis driven by processes of societal change or by external causes, leads to the outbreak of violence, one facet of which may include guerrilla operations. If guerrilla operations do occur, the C2 structures inherent in such operations give a high degree of autonomy and independence to local military leaders. The same (or a contemporaneous) crisis produces a breakdown of formal power structures, causing organisations to fall back upon informal power structures. The nature of these informal power structures is determined by geography, political culture, patterns of traditional authority within the society and the degree of interaction of systemic/regional factors with local events. Thus the guerrilla operations and the concomitant breakdown in formal power structures form the trigger for political power diffusion. The precise nature and progress of this diffusion is then determined by contextual variables.
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Frazee, Amy E. "Military Civilian Relations in Post-Revolutionary Transition: The Transformation of East Asian States and the Future of Egypt." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/409.
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There are several theories involving civil-military relations that have been established since the Cold War. Shaped by the political transitions of Europe and Latin America, how do these theories apply to the Third Wave of democratizations? How does a more contemporary analysis of theory help understand more contemporary insurgencies such as the Arab Spring?
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Cheong, Keng Soon. "The declining socio-political role of the Indonesian military." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 1998. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA358923.
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Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, December 1998."December 1998." Thesis advisor(s): Mary Callahan. Includes bibliographical references (p. 111-114). Also available online.
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Hasan, Noorhaidi. "Laskar Jihad : Islam, militancy, and the quest for identity in post-new order Indonesia /." Ithaca, NY : Southeast Asia Program Publ, 2006. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0803/2008530106.html.
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Hertog, Hans den. "De militair-geneeskundige verzorging in Atjeh, 1873-1904 /." Amsterdam : Thesis publ, 1991. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb355022019.
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Sardjana, I. Gede Wajan. "Civil military relations : the role of ABRI in Indonesian socio-political life /\c I. Gede Wajan Sardjana." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 1995. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA302922.
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Thesis (M.S. in International Resource Planning and Management) Naval Postgraduate School, June 1995.Thesis advisor(s): Thomas C. Bruneau, Sterling D. Sessions. "June 1995." Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.
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Lorenz, Philip [Verfasser], and Aurel [Verfasser] Croissant. "Principals, Partners and Pawns: Indonesian Civil Society Organizations and Civilian Control of the Military / Philip Lorenz, Aurel Croissant." Heidelberg : Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg, 2015. http://d-nb.info/1181242053/34.
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Heiduk, Felix. "Staatszerfall als Herrschaftsstrategie Indonesien zwischen Desintegration und Demokratisierungsblockade am Beispiel des Aceh-Konflikts." Baden-Baden Nomos, 2007. http://d-nb.info/999628062/04.
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Aminuddin, Muhammad Faishal [Verfasser], and Aurel [Akademischer Betreuer] Croissant. "Military Retirees in Politics: A Study on the Rise of Purnawirawan in Indonesian Political Parties 1998-2014 / Muhammad Faishal Aminuddin ; Betreuer: Aurel Croissant." Heidelberg : Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg, 2019. http://d-nb.info/1184886911/34.
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Nainggolan, Poltak Partogi [Verfasser], and Jürgen [Akademischer Betreuer] Rüland. "The Indonesian military response to reform in democratic transition : : a comparative analysis of three civilian regimes 1998-2004 = Das indonesische Militär und Reformprozesse in der demokratischen Transitionsphase : eine vergleichende Studie der drei zivilen Regierungen in den Jahren 1998 - 2004." Freiburg : Universität, 2011. http://d-nb.info/1123461449/34.
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Sebastian, Leonard C. "Indonesian national security and defence planning." Phd thesis, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/144343.
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Honna, Jun. "The military and democratisation in Indonesia : the developing civil-military discourse during the late Soeharto era." Phd thesis, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/144947.
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Wang, Xie-fan, and 王榭凡. "The relationship between the role of the military and political changes in Indonesia." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/10445176332188704644.
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碩士國立中山大學
中國與亞太區域研究所
100
Since the independence of Indonesia in 1945, Indonesia has experienced several changes during the last sixty years and is now moving towards democratization. Of these political changes, Indonesia''s civil-military relationship has always played a key role. During the era of Cold War, Indonesia’s military were fighting against colonial power and facing the ideological confrontation. As political changes are going on, the military is asked to get out of political system in Indonesia. During the war of Independence, Indonesia’s military played a role to save the country, they fought against the Dutch under the belief of nationalism. Indonesia''s parliamentary democracy in the 1950s caused political disorder. Sukarno’s leftist ideology has also caused the military unrest. With both internal and external factors, military coup happened in September 1965, which result in the region of authoritarian rule of Suharto. During the Suharto era, Indonesia''s military penetrated in political, economic and social areas in Indonesia. The military became the supreme power that controlled the country. Indonesia''s economic growth was claimed to be as a source of legitimacy for Suharto’s regime. Indonesia’s economy was almost collapsed of the financial crisis in 1997. As Mr.Suharto is losing his ruling legitimacy in Indonesia, it’s made Suharto step down in May 1998. Indonesia’s military then began to change. Indonesia has experienced four presidential elections, and regarded as a democratic state. But, if Indonesia wants to achieve a true civilian control over the military still, further military professionalism has to be done.
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Pietsch, Samuel. "Australia's military intervention in East Timor, 1999." Phd thesis, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/49347.
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This thesis argues that the Australian military intervention in East Timor in 1999 was motivated primarily by the need to defend Australia’s own strategic interests. It was an act of Australian imperialism understood from a Marxist perspective, and was consistent with longstanding strategic policy in the region. ...¶ Australia’s insertion of military forces into East Timor in 1999 served its own strategic priorities by ensuring an orderly transfer of sovereignty took place, avoiding a destabilising power vacuum as the country transitioned to independence. It also guaranteed that Australia’s economic and strategic interests in the new nation could not be ignored by the United Nations or the East Timorese themselves. There are therefore underlying consistencies in Australia’s policy on East Timor stretching back several decades. Despite changing contexts, and hence radically different policy responses, Australia acted throughout this time to prevent political and strategic instability in East Timor.¶ ...
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Woo, Jongseok. "Security threats and the military's domestic political role a comparative study of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia /." Thesis, 2007. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/261226609.html.
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Baker, Nicola. "The dynamics of contested spaces : the defence policies of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia." Phd thesis, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/147614.
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SUH, BYUNG-HOON. "STRUCTURE AND THE POLITICAL ACTOR: AN INTERACTIVE PERSPECTIVE FOR IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMY IN FOUR MILITARY REGIMES (BRAZIL, CHILE, INDONESIA, THAILAND)." Thesis, 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/1911/19060.
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In an attempt to understand why the military tends to commit a coup in reaction to the rise of leftist popular forces, and why the military officers in the post-coup period are inclined to implement politico-economic policies which most benefit the business elite at the expense of the economically underprivileged classes, this study proposed the Interactive Model.
This model critically examines the explanatory effectiveness of the structuralist approach, such as the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian model and Middle-Class Coup (or, Veto-Coup) hypothesis, in solving the above mentioned questions, but does not underrate its theoretical usefulness. In this study, which is primarily based on the voluntaristic approach focusing on the creative role of political actor, a synthetical framework of analysis is introduced.
Regarding the officer corps as the prime political actor, the Interactive Model claims that the officers' political will, ideology, and commitment to their corporate interests play the most decisive role in bringing about radical political change like coup and the post-coup regime transformations. In the meantime, structural factors, such as political disorder, deteriorating class conflicts, and belief in economic rationality, are believed to indirectly influence the political actor. Four countries, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, and Thailand, were comparatively studied in this study.
As coup-maker, officers are found to have violently reacted to the rise of the Left primarily because leftist forces posed a threat to their corporate interests. In the post-coup period, officers in power, as the state-manager, usually sided with the dominant economic powers, but tension often arises between the two. This study argues that these conflicting phenomena need to be understood with reference to the state-manager's ideology and political interest.
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布羅托. "Navigating The Indonesia’s Military Reform, 1998-2014." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/2c3xbn.
Full textAbstract:
博士國立政治大學
亞太研究英語博士學位學程(IDAS)
106
This dissertation studies military’s withdrawal from politics. It examines military reform in Indonesia which aiming at withdrawing the Indonesian armed forces, currently known as Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI, from politics following the fall of Suharto in 1998. It seeks to explain the driving force of the progress of military reform in Indonesia and asks the question of: why has the reform been progressing differently from one agenda to another? It focuses on three agendas of reform, which are: the establishment of normative democratic control over TNI, the disbandment of TNI’s business activities, and the reorganization of TNI’s territorial command structure. It argues that variation in the progress of reform in those three agendas is closely related to military interests. The relatively successful establishment of normative democratic control over the armed forces has been mostly driven by the primacy of national interests within the brass, while the struggling disbandment of military’s business activities is rooted at factional/personal interests within TNI, and the complete failure in the abandonment of territorial command structure is related to strong organizational interests of TNI. This dissertation adopts a within-case comparison to answer the puzzle and focusing on Indonesia which represents the transplacement model of democratization in the third wave of democratization. Since transplacement involves coalition between reformers within the old and the new elites, it allows a process of negotiation in the transition. Hence, it creates a variation of the progress of the reform. Since this dissertation focuses on a single case studies, with three sub-cases, this dissertation is lacking of the power to generalization. However, it allows an in-depth analysis of the case using a process-tracing method. To conduct a proper process-tracing, this dissertation engages in various types of sources such as official documents, meetings’ notes, transcripts of in-depth interviews, personal communications, reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and secondary sources from newspapers’ reports. This dissertation concludes that the progress of the reform, in the case of Indonesia, varies according to the interests of the armed forces, and interaction between those interests and other variables such as the interests of civilian groups. It suggests that the organizational interests of the armed forces are the most influential variable to define the progress. Strong organizational interests would lead to a stall in the reform. The case of territorial command structure as well as, to a lesser degree, the second phase of the normative democratic control over the armed forces suggests this claim. In the absence of organizational interests, the existence of strong factional/personal interests would lead to problems in the advancement of the reform. The case of disbandment of military informal business activities supports this claim. Finally, the progress of the reform would be relatively smooth in the absence of those two interests and in the guidance of national interests.
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Kasim, Yandry Kurniawan, and 楊專. "The Indonesian Military Reform 1998-2009:Securitization and Desecuritization Dynamics." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/71831504633770099555.
Full textAbstract:
碩士淡江大學
國際事務與戰略研究所碩士班
98
This research examines the impact of instability during democratic transition on military reform in Indonesia between 1998 and 2009. By applying securitization theory, which has a root in social constructivist paradigm, this research argues that both the act of securitization and desecuritization have played a certain degree of impact over the progress and/or regress of the Indonesian military reform. Arguably, the use of securitization theory, explanation on securitization – desecuritization dynamics, and the significant role of desecuritization has been never employed in explaining military reform in Indonesia. That would be the main contribution of this research. As its findings, first, this research shows that the act of securitization (enabling emergency measures and the suspension of normal politics) has always been an option when every attempt for desecuritization (removing issues from security agenda) failed. Second, options for desecuritization had always faced constant challenges therefore options for securitization had seemingly become unavoidable. Consequently, this fact has discounted the progress of military reform in the country. Third, the act of desecuritization is not compatible with a weak government whose pursue military support. The act of desecuritization would be in case if the government led by a strong leadership, which is identified by its independency from military support to stay in power. Fourth, however, the Indonesian military reform indeed took a place. Some achievement could be underlined and Indonesia’s position among countries having similar experience could also be set up. Finally, the main message of this research would be: there is no military solution for any domestic unrest. The main problem is not laid in military matter but more in political, economics, and socio-cultural realm. The use of military to solve this problem should be regarded as a series of civilian institutions’ failure to acknowledge the problem, to manage it, to prevent it from becoming escalated, and to solve it within normal political bargaining process. As the last resort, military engagement might be considered as an option. But, it has to be understood that military intervention should be temporary in nature, aimed to end the violence conflict, conducted in order to provide a room for peaceful conflict solution mechanism, and in accordance with just war principles.
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Mietzner, Marcus. "Indonesian civil-military relations : the armed Forces and political Islam in transition, 1997-2004." Phd thesis, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/11024.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis discusses the development of civil-military relations in Indonesia after the fall of the
authoritarian New Order regime in 1998. It argues that despite wide-ranging changes to
Indonesia's political system, the .armed forces continue to play a significant role in politics and
society. Beside the opposition of the officer corps to substantial military reform, this study points
to divisions within Indonesia's civilian elite as a major factor behind the stagnation in the current
civil-military transition.
In order to explain Indonesia's problems in establishing democratic control over its armed
forces, the thesis focuses oil deeply entrenched socio-political structures, the character of the
1998 regime change and difficulties in the process of democratic consolidation. The analysis of
these three areas makes it possible to locate Indonesia's position in comparative schemes of post-authoritarian
civil-military-relations.
Discussing the historical legacy of military politics in Indonesia, the study exposes important
structural and ideological features of the involvement of the armed forces in politics. Structurally,
the territorial command. structure and the practice of self-financing have nurtured a sense of
institutional autonomy in the military that post-1998 governments found difficult to overturn.
Ideologically, the feeling of entitlement to political supremacy, fed by highly derogatory views on
civilian leadership qualities, has survived the fall of Soeharto and continues to shape the political
mindset of the officer corps.
On the civilian side, long-standing divisions between major societal constituencies have
hampered the development of strong political institutions and have offered. the armed forces
opportunities for intervention. This thesis discusses the cleavages within Indonesia's Muslim community, particularly between traditionalist and modernist groups, as one of the most
important sources of conflict in the civilian realm.
The 1998 regime change also posed significant challenges to the civil-military reform process.
Moderate military officers succeeded in negotiating an orderly transfer of power from Soeharto to
his deputy, avoiding the complete breakdown of the authoritarian system. Consequently; residual
elements of the New Order were able to extend their influence into the post-Soeharto polity and
slow down initiatives for reform. The regime change also highlighted the inability of the oppositional civilian elite to seize upon the opportunities presented by Soeharto's demise. Deeply divided and anxious not to alienate Soeharto, key civilian leaders failed to present a democratic
alternative to the faltering regime. When the government finally collapsed, the non-regime elite
found itself excluded from executive and legislative institutions for the first 18 months of the
post-Soeharto era.
The conflict between Indonesia's largest socio-political groups continued throughout the post-authoritarian
transition, allowing the armed forces to repair their image damaged in decades of
repressive rule under the New Order. The constitutional crisis of 2001, during which conflicts
between the executive and the legislature paralysed political life, led to a surge in the reputation
of the armed forces in society and the elite. Subsequently, retired officers emerged as influential
actors in party politics and regional as well as national elections. Ultimately, the rise of Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono to the presidency in 2004 completed the successful adaptation of
Indonesia's armed forces and their personnel to the new democratic framework.
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Temby, Quinton. "Jihadists Assemble: The Rise of Militant Islamism in Southeast Asia." Phd thesis, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/135764.
Full textAbstract:
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States and the Bali bombings in Indonesia the following year, Southeast Asia came under scrutiny for its role in the rise of militant Islamism. Generally, scholarship on militant Islamism in Southeast Asia branched into two approaches: terrorism experts tended to see the problem through the prism of al- Qaeda, with Southeast Asian jihadists following orders from their leaders outside the region; Indonesia specialists, meanwhile, countered this al-Qaeda-centric approach by emphasising the local Indonesian factors driving Southeast Asian jihadism. In this thesis, by contrast, I focus on the regional scale. I find that Southeast Asia, for a time, emerged as one of the most important places in the world for the mobilization of global jihadist attacks against the West due to a historical and geographical process unique to the region. Drawing on the emerging field of assemblage theory, I argue that over time a regional jihadist assemblage formed in Southeast Asia—a cross-border constellation of networks, groups, and material elements—and that it was the mobilization opportunities presented by this assemblage that made Southeast Asia so attractive to global jihadists. Analysing a wealth of original interview and documentary material, I trace the gradual development of this regional assemblage over time and space, from its origins in the cycles of conflict between jihadists and the state in Indonesia in the late 1940s to the crucial role played by Southeast Asians in the attacks of 9/11.
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Sousa, Domingos Francisco de Jesus de. "A ocupação Indonésia e a Resistência Timorense (1975-2002)." Doctoral thesis, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10071/18850.
Full textAbstract:
A tese aqui desenvolvida insere-se no campo da História Contemporânea, tomando como objeto de estudo a Invasão Indonésia e a Resistência Timorense, uma temática que ainda se encontra fresca na memória de muita gente, uma vez que remonta a 1975, ou seja, há pouco mais de 40 anos.
O estudo pretende não só explicar o sucesso da luta timorense, apoiada pelos fatores antropológicos, históricos, sociais, políticos, económicos, culturais e religiosos que desempenharam um papel importante na determinação pela independência, mas também explicitar os trilhos por onde a luta pela independência passou, as motivações intrínsecas e extrínsecas, os vários motivos que a influenciaram e a apoiaram na caminhada de Timor para a independência. Além dos fatores acima mencionados, este estudo explica também o desejo pela liberdade do homem timorense, como demonstraram as sublevações contra o colonialismo, onde foi manifestando o seu protonacionalismo embrionário, que se desenvolveu e foi ganhando forma e sentido à medida que os obstáculos lhe surgiram pela frente. Também se verificou que Timor-Leste nunca poderia atingir o seu objetivo e as suas aspirações caso não tivesse o apoio da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP), a solidariedade internacional e também da Igreja Católica.
Eesta tese, embora circunscrita ao periodo entre 1975 e 2002, também teve em consideração os antecedentes que tiveram impacto na decisão final. Como tal, o estudo procura descrever as consequências do 25 de Abril de 1974 e a sua repercussão na História de Timor-Leste, como, por exemplo, a proclamação da liberdade de escolher o futuro do país, a fundação dos partidos políticos, a coligação e a rutura, a guerra civil, a invasão e a retirada para as montanhas, a mudança estratégica da luta, a unidade nacional e o apartidarismo, a formação das bases de apoio, o cerco de aniquilamento, a formação das frentes clandestina, armada e diplomática. Descreve-se também a capacidade de ajustamento com as realidades que a guerra exigiu, como a "indonesiação", uma guerra que parecia ser apenas timorense, e a sua internacionalização. Destaca-se, ainda, a capacidade, a coragem e a decisão da juventude timorense que, apesar de ser formada nas universidades indonésias, veio a tornar-se o baluarte na luta pela independência contra todas as expectativas.
Falando sobre a guerra, verifica-se que ela foi conduzida pelas ideias que surgiram como diretrizes que orientaram a guerrilha, como foi o caso das teorias de Mao Tsé-Tung.
Neste estudo, tem-se também em conta o papel da Igreja Católica timorense e referem-se também os fatores internos da própria Indonésia que contribuíram para Timor-Leste conseguir a sua independência, tais como as dinâmicas económicas e a crise económica mundial, os acontecimentos políticos e a queda de Suharto, e o papel da solidariedade internacional.This study is related to the field of Modern Contemporaneous History, specifically about the Indonesian Invasion and the East Timor Resistance. This thematic event is still fresh in the memory of many people whose age ranges from forty and above. The study challenges to explain the successful Timorese struggle supported by anthropologic, historic, economic, cultural and religious factors that played a very important role in the determination of the Timorese people for independence. It explains the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations that influenced and supported their plight towards independence. It also explains the earnest motivation of the East Timor people for freedom, as demonstrated by their insurrections against the Portuguese colonialism, and manifested in their history while facing the challenges for an independent state. This project through mainly covers the events from 1975 to 2002, also considers the antecedents that had a significant impact over the final decision on Timorese’s independence from the Indonesian invasion. The study describes the consequences of 25 April1974, and its effects over the Timorese’s modern history like: the proclamation of freedom to choose its own future, the establishment of the political parties, coalition and the rupture, the civil war, invasion, withdrawal to the mountains, the change of the strategic tactics for the struggle, national unity, no partisanship and establishment of the support base, the siege of annihilation/destruction, and the establishment of the armed forces front, the clandestine front and the diplomatic front. It also describes the capacity of the East Timorese fighters to adjust themselves to the reality that the war requires, like Idolization of the war, and its internationalization. It describes too, the capacity, the courage and the struggle of the young Timorese people for freedom against the Indonesian’s regime despite their education in Indonesian universities. It is important to note that the war for independence was conducted with the help of the theories of Mao Tsé-Tung. Remarkable consideration of the role of the Catholic Church in supporting the struggle. This study also shows internal factors inside Indonesian’s society that has significant contribution, in the struggle of the Timorese. Such factors include economic and political crises, the fall of President Suharto and the role of international solidarity.