Journal articles on the topic 'Metaphysical philosophy'
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Kim, Kwangsu. "Philosophy and science in Adam Smith’s ‘History of Astronomy’." History of the Human Sciences 30, no. 3 (July 2017): 107–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0952695117700055.
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This article casts light on the intimate relationship between metaphysics and science in Adam Smith’s thought. Understanding this relationship can help in resolving an enduring dispute or misreading concerning the status and role of natural theology and the ‘invisible hand’ doctrine. In Smith’s scientific realism, ontological issues are necessary prerequisites for scientific inquiry, and metaphysical ideas thus play an organizing and regulatory role. Smith also recognized the importance of scientifically informed metaphysics in science’s historical development. In this sense, for Smith, the metaphysico-scientific link (i.e. metaphysically coherent conjecture), was a basic criterion of scientific validation by Inference to the Best Explanation. Furthermore, Smith’s comments implicitly suggest that in scientific progress there is a dialectic between metaphysics and science. These themes are illustrated primarily through his writings on the history of astronomy.
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Fios, Frederikus. "Critics to Metaphysics by Modern Philosophers: A Discourse on Human Beings in Reality." Humaniora 7, no. 1 (January 30, 2016): 108. http://dx.doi.org/10.21512/humaniora.v7i1.3493.
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We have entered the 21st century that is popularly known as the era of the development of modern science and technology. Philosophy provides naming for contemporary era as postmodern era. But do we suddenly come to this day and age? No! Because humans are homo viator, persona that does pilgrimage in history, space and time. Philosophy has expanded periodically in the long course of history. Since the days of classical antiquity, philosophy comes with a patterned metaphysical paradigm. This paradigm survives very long in the stage history of philosophy as maintained by many philosophers who hold fast to the philosophical-epistemic claim that philosophy should be (das sollen) metaphysical. Classical Greek philosopher, Aristotle was a philosopher who claims metaphysics as the initial philosophy. Then, Immanuel Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Marx even Habermas offer appropriate shades of metaphysical philosophy versus spirit of the age. Modern philosophers offer a new paradigm in the way of doing philosophy. The new spirit of modern philosophers declared as if giving criticism on traditional western metaphysics (since Aristotle) that are considered irrelevant. This paper intends to show the argument between traditional metaphysical and modern philosophers who criticize metaphysics. The author will make a philosophical synthesis to obtain enlightenment to the position of human beings in the space of time. Using the method of Hegelian dialectic (thesis-antiteses-synthesis), this topic will be developed and assessed in accordance with the interests of this paper.
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Chakravartty, Anjan. "Inferência metafísica e a experiência do observável." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 21, no. 2 (December 14, 2017): 189–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n2p189.
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Some strongly empiricist views of scientific knowledge advocate a rejection of metaphysics. On such views, scientific knowledge is described strictly in terms of knowledge of the observable world, demarcated by human sensory abilities, and no metaphysical considerations need arise. This paper argues that even these views require some recourse to metaphysics in order to derive knowledge from experience. Central here is the notion of metaphysical inference, which admits of different “magnitudes”, thus generating a spectrum of putative knowledge with more substantially empirical beliefs at one end, and more metaphysically imbued beliefs at the other. Given that metaphysical inference is required even concerning knowledge of the observable, the empiricist hope of avoiding metaphysics altogether is futile: knowledge of the observable simply involves metaphysical inferences that are of smaller magnitudes than others. Metaphysical inferences are required not only to distinguish veridical from non-veridical experience and to determine the quality of empirical information, but also in order to explain how we construct experience (through categorizations and classifications of objects, events, processes, and properties), how we extrapolate from empirical evidence to generalize about observable phenomena, and how we use this evidence to test and confirm hypotheses and theories.
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Brooks, Thom. "Reply to Redding, Rosen and Wood." Hegel Bulletin 33, no. 02 (2012): 23–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200000483.
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Hegel'sPhilosophy of Rightis more than a major work of political and legal philosophy; it is a battleground for two different interpretive approaches. MyHegel's Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Rightargues that these approaches are mistaken about their differences and that one approach offers a more compelling interpretation ofHegel's Philosophy of Rightthan the other. I will briefly outline my defence of the systematic reading of thePhilosophy of Rightbefore replying to the constructive criticisms raised by Redding, Rosen and Wood.There are two different interpretative approaches to understanding Hegel'sPhilosophy of Right. These are the metaphysical and the non-metaphysical readings. The former often highlight Hegel's insistence that some political states may be considered more ‘true’ or ‘actual’ than others. This reading also often emphasises the special place of religion in Hegel's philosophical system, for example. In contrast, the non-metaphysical reading argues that such an interpretation is not only unattractive, but perhaps even unnecessary because Hegel's views on ‘actuality’ and ‘actualization’ are less controversial than traditional metaphysical readings of Hegel's philosophy have claimed. Commentators must choose between these competing camps and interpretations of Hegel's work are conceived within these approaches. Importantly, each reading claims that its approach best captures Hegel's philosophical importance. But would Hegel endorse either the metaphysical or non-metaphysical reading?The problem is that this debate rests on a central misconception about Hegel's philosophy. The debate is characterized as a disagreement about the role and perhaps the very existence of metaphysics in Hegel's philosophy. But this is a false impression. It is virtually nowhere in doubt that metaphysics is present in Hegel's philosophy, including hisPhilosophy of Right. Therefore, the debate between a ‘metaphysical’ and ‘non-metaphysical’ reading of Hegel's works is not a debate about whether these works contain metaphysics. The characterization of the debate invites a false impression about what is at stake.
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REMHOF, JUSTIN. "Nietzsche: Metaphysician." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7, no. 1 (2021): 117–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.42.
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AbstractPerhaps the most fundamental disagreement concerning Nietzsche's view of metaphysics is that some commentators believe Nietzsche has a positive, systematic metaphysical project, and others deny this. Those who deny it hold that Nietzsche believes metaphysics has a special problem, that is, a distinctively problematic feature that distinguishes metaphysics from other areas of philosophy. In this paper, I investigate important features of Nietzsche's metametaphysics in order to argue that Nietzsche does not, in fact, think metaphysics has a special problem. The result is that, against a long-standing view held in the literature, we should be reading Nietzsche as a metaphysician.
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Rossmanith, Anna. "Metafizyczne uzasadnienie filozofii społecznej Wincentego Lutosławskiego." Kwartalnik Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społecznego. Studia i Prace, no. 3 (November 28, 2016): 153–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.33119/kkessip.2016.3.6.
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The text concentrates on metaphysical justification of Wincenty Lutosławski's social philosophy. The author outlines Lutosławski's views on metaphysics, particularly on self and their relation to his social philosophy thus providing metaphysical justification to democracy, nation, social relations, solidarity, peace and rebirth of humanity.
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Rödl, Sebastian. "Das metaphysische Unternehmen." Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67, no. 1 (March 5, 2019): 98–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2019-0007.
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Abstract In Barry Stroud’s book Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction, the eponymous dissatisfaction is said to be due to our inability to obtain certainty about the correspondence between the world and our ways of thinking it. In Stroud’s terms, this dissatisfaction is caused by the failure of the metaphysical enterprise. Beginning with Aristotle’s metaphysics, this paper discusses Stroud’s misunderstanding which stems from his particular construal of the object of metaphysics: There is no metaphysical enterprise and thus, there can be no metaphysical dissatisfaction.
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Priest, Stephen. "Husserl's Concept of Being: From Phenomenology to Metaphysics." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 44 (March 1999): 209–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100006731.
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Western philosophy since Kant has been essentially operating within a Kantian anti-metaphysical paradigm. German-language philosophy, and a fortiori Husserl's phenomenology, is no exception to this. Here I argue that despite his putative eschewal of metaphysics in the phenomenological reduction or epoché Husserl deploys an ontological, even fundamental ontological, vocabulary and may be read as a metaphysician malgre lui. To the extent to which this interpretation is viable, one escape route from the critical paradigm would seem to be opened up.
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Kosykhin, Vitaly G., and Svetlana M. Malkina. "Metaphysics and Realism." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, no. 2 (2021): 216–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158237.
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The article deals with the problem of the return of metaphysics within the framework of the ontological turn of philosophy and the situation of post-metaphysical thinking. The conditions for the possibility of modern metaphysical discourse in the projects of empirical metaphysics and historical ontology are revealed. Historical ontology as a meta-reflexion of philosophy over its own historical foundations is able to bridge the gap between the epistemological static nature of transcendental subjectivity and the ontological dynamism of the growth of scientific knowledge about reality by comprehending the conditions of interaction between science and metaphysics in conditions of post-metaphysical thinking and realistic reversal of ontology. Philosophical knowledge in the context of the ontological turn and the associated return of metaphysics becomes focused not so much on the sharp demarcation of science and metaphysics and postulating the incommensurability of their ontologies, but on identifying mutually enriching areas of research that could give a new impetus to their development.
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Ghimire, Janardan. "METAPHYSICS IN THE BHAGAVAD GITA COMPARED WITH THE WESTERN PHILOSOPHIES: A HERMENEUTIC GAZE." Researcher: A Research Journal of Culture and Society 3, no. 3 (October 31, 2018): 33–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/researcher.v3i3.21548.
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This article is an outcome of hermeneutical research carried out on the Bhagavad Gita, a core eastern text of Vedic philosophy. The main purpose of this article is to explore philosophical insights embedded in this historical scripture and help the readers to gain its greater understanding and insights. It also searches metaphysical principles consisted in the Bhagavad Gita and provides answer of the questions: what metaphysical principles can be seen in the Bhagavad Gita? How can it be interpreted? How the metaphysical principles of the Bhagavad Gita associates/disassociates with western theories of philosophy? Considering the questions, the Bhagavad Gita provides theory of creation, cycle of creation and destruction and discusses about Brahma element that is seed of creative principles, Atma, Paramatta, the God. It also includes theory of being (existence). In comparison with western philosophy, it comprises wider and in-depth metaphysical principles. In order to interpret metaphysical principles, this article elaborates general introduction of the Bhagavad Gita, general concept of metaphysics and metaphysical principle can be seen in the Bhagavad Gita. It also searches associations/ disassociations of metaphysical principles of the Bhagavad Gita with metaphysics of western schools of thought. Finally, it draws implication and conclusion.Researcher: A Research Journal of Culture and SocietyVol. 3, No. 3, January 2018, Page: 33-46
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Tegtmeyer, Henning. "Habermas over genealogie, metafysica en godsdienst." Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 113, no. 2 (July 1, 2021): 263–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/antw2021.2.006.tegt.
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Abstract Habermas on genealogy, metaphysics and religion Habermas’s impressive history of philosophy presents itself both as a comprehensive account of the history of Western philosophy from its beginning to the 19th century and as a genealogy of post-metaphysical thinking. In this paper I argue that this twofold goal creates a serious methodological problem. I also find Habermas’s understanding of metaphysics unclear and partly misguided. If that is correct it has consequences not only for the very notion of post-metaphysical thinking but also for the understanding of the dialogue between philosophy, religion, and modern secular society that Habermas advocates.
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Sgarbi, Marco. "Metaphysics in Königsberg prior to Kant (1703-1770)." Trans/Form/Ação 33, no. 1 (2010): 31–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0101-31732010000100004.
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The present contribute aims to reconstruct, using the methodology of intellectual history, the broad spectrum of metaphysical doctrines that Kant could know during the years of the formation of his philosophy. The first part deals with the teaching of metaphysics in Königsberg from 1703 to 1770. The second part examines the main characteristics of the metaphysics in the various handbooks, which were taught at the Albertina, in order to have an exhaustive overview of all metaphysical positions.
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Moreira, Felipe G. A. "Overcoming Metametaphysics: Nietzsche and Carnap." Nietzsche-Studien 47, no. 1 (November 1, 2018): 240–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nietzstu-2018-0010.
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Abstract This essay focuses on the similarities between Nietzsche’s and Carnap’s views on metaphysics, without ignoring their obvious differences. The essay argues that Nietzsche and Carnap endorse but interpret differently an overcoming metametaphysics characterized by the conjunction of the following three claims: (O-i) an overcoming of metaphysics ought to be performed; (O-ii) this overcoming is to be performed by adopting a method of linguistic analysis that is suspicious of the metaphysical use of language and that interprets such use through a different use of language which aims to avoid metaphysics; and (O-iii) this overcoming contributes to the political task of resisting “diseased” metaphysical practices and promoting “healthy” non-metaphysical practices.
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Harding, Brian. "Metaphysical Speculation and its Applicability to a Mode of Living." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 9 (December 31, 2004): 81–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/bpjam.9.04har.
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This paper argues that Boethius’ De Consolatione Philosophiae presents theoretical metaphysical speculation as having a direct bearing on the life of the metaphysician. Boethius accomplishes this through his depiction of Lady Philosophy’s ‘therapy’ wherein complex metaphysical arguments are utilized to pull Boethius out of his depression, returning him to what she calls his true self. I begin the paper by contextualizing this discussion in terms of the debate as to whether or not the ‘philosophic life’ of pagan antiquity is present in medieval thought. I then turn to a discussion of the therapeutic metaphysical arguments of Lady Philosophy and their effects on Boethius’ mental and emotional state. I conclude the essay by listing some questions raised and directions for further study.
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Nizhnikov, Sergei Anatol'evich, and Argen Ishenbekovich Kadyrov. "SIGNIFICANCE OF METAPHYSICS’ CRITICISM IN M. HEIDEGGER'S CREATIVITY." Metafizika, no. 1 (December 15, 2020): 38–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2224-7580-2020-1-38-46.
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Despite various interpretations of Heidegger's philosophy, he is undeniably a deep critic of the metaphysical tradition in European philosophy. His task of overcoming metaphysics once again aroused interest in the fundamental issues of life in the era of the total dominance of private sciences. In the article, the authors explore the concept of metaphysics and its criticism in the work of M. Heidegger, as well as subsequent interpretations, in particular by O. Peggeler (“New Ways with Heidegger”, 1992). Criticism of metaphysics was a necessary condition for overcoming it to build a fundamental ontology. Having experienced the influence of Nietzsche, Heidegger does not remain a Nietzschean, because he considers him the last metaphysician to be overcome. In this regard, Peggeler recognizes Heidegger's main work not as “Being and Time”, but as “Reports to Philosophy” (1936), where he sought to reveal the primary sources of the concept of metaphysics. Heidegger's views regarding the interpretation of the development of metaphysics in different historical eras are specially considered.
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Jensen, Jeppe Sinding. "Religion, Philosophy, Scholarship and the Muddles Thereof." Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 28, no. 1 (December 2, 2016): 39–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700682-12341355.
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For many centuries, the relations between philosophy and religion were very close—at times indistinguishable. That is not so in the modern secular academy, which houses philosophy along with the study of religion but without noticeable mutual relations between the two. Kevin Schilbrack has ably dealt with that situation in his latest publication ‘Philosophy and the Study of Religion’. Schilbrack’s diagnoses are acute and most scholars in the study of religion will consider them worth heeding—except, most likely, his calls for more metaphysical concerns based on ideas of ‘unmediated experience’. His arguments proceed from current philosophical positions and theories of situated cognition and his appeals are quite convincing. However, they do have one remarkable drawback as this critic sees it: That metaphysics move from the ontological realm to the epistemic (!). That is no mean feat, because as no one really seems to know what metaphysics are in this ‘post-metaphysic age’, Schilbrack’s proposal seems to indicate that metaphysics now become humanly approachable and intellectually tractable. As such, they could justifiably become an integral part of the study of religion—as could philosophy.
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Copleston, Frederick. "Ayer and World Views." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30 (September 1991): 63–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100007682.
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As we all know, in Freddie Ayer's famous book Language, Truth and Logic metaphysics received short shrift. Metaphysical assertions were dismissed as being all nonsensical (LTL, 2nd edn, 41). In the work in question Ayer clearly tended to equate metaphysics with what Professor W. H. Walsh was to describe as ‘transcendent’ (as distinct from ‘immanent’) metaphysics (Walsh, 1963). This tendency is also discernible, I think, in the 1949 debate between Ayer and myself on logical positivism. After all, my defence of metaphysics was largely prompted and certainly strengthened by what I believed to be the religious relevance of metaphysical philosophy. A lot of what Aristotle would have described as ‘first philosophy’ and what some later philosophers would have classified as ‘ontology’ Ayer would have called ‘philosophical analysis’. What he was primarily concerned with undermining was any claim by metaphysicians to be able to extend our knowledge of what exists, of the Absolute or God for example, by metaphysical arguments.
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Borda, Michał, and Rafał Tetela. "Kilka uwag o aktualności filozofii metafizycznej." Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne, no. 31 (September 14, 2018): 179–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pst.2017.31.08.
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The article discusses the characteristics of a philosophical and cultural dispute with metaphysics and about metaphysics itself. The criticism of metaphysics and its revival in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is discussed here. In the first part, the most important philosophical directions dealing with issues of metaphysics are presented: metaphysical idealism, anti-metaphysical positivism and neo-positivism, analytic philosophy versus metaphysics on the example of L. Wittgenstein, the revision of the metaphysical tradition and new investigations in metaphysics. The second part of the article concerns the picture of natural metaphysics including the mathematical-empirical method of researching the world. In the conclusion of the article, a thesis is put forward on searching for new metaphysics which will include a wider sphere of rationality and existential and spiritual experience.
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Cruickshank, Justin. "Solidarity, critique and techno-science: Evaluating Rorty’s pragmatism, Freire’s critical pedagogy and Vattimo’s philosophical hermeneutics." Human Affairs 30, no. 4 (October 27, 2020): 577–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2020-0051.
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AbstractThe critique of metaphysics can often entail a critique of liberalism. Rorty sought a revolutionary paradigm shift in philosophy and the broader humanities, by linking the rejection of metaphysics to a justification for liberal democracy and reformism. He believed that the recognition of socio-historical contingency concerning interpretations of fundamental values and of truth, combined with a humanities education, would create a sense of solidarity that would motivate reforms. Freire argues that a dialogic form of education is as important as the humanities’ content. For Freire, people liberated by a critical education based on dialogue rather than a passive reception of information, can develop a radical critique of capitalism. Vattimo argues that while Heidegger saw techno-science as being the final phase in metaphysical domination, the contemporary development of information and communications technology creates a ‘Babel-like’ pluralism that undermines the ‘violence’ of metaphysic’s totalising thought. This can allow for the development of a post-metaphysical ‘weak communism’ that improves social justice. Rorty and Freire help to show that it is education, rather than technological developments, that can motivate a post-metaphysical politics of solidarity, and Vattimo and Freire are correct to argue that replacing reformism with radical critique is needed for social justice, although Vattimo’s weak communism only provides limited social justice.
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Marshall, Colin. "Never Mind the Intuitive Intellect: Applying Kant’s Categories to Noumena." Kantian Review 23, no. 1 (February 23, 2018): 27–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s136941541700036x.
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AbstractAccording to strong metaphysical readings of Kant, Kant accepts noumenal substances and causes. Against such readings, Markus Kohl has recently argued that, for Kant, (a) an intuitive intellect is a decisive measure for reality, but (b) an intuitive intellect would not represent noumena as substances or causes. Against Kohl, I argue that the intuitive intellect might indirectly represent noumenal substances and causes, which is enough to save the strong metaphysical reading. In addition, I show how Kant’s apparently anti-metaphysical statements about the content of the categories can be read in a metaphysically friendly way.
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Hendel, Giovanna. "Supervenience, Metaphysical Reduction, and Metaphysics of Properties." Southern Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 1 (March 2001): 99–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2001.tb01808.x.
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Doyle, Tsarina. "Reconciling the Phenomenology and Metaphysics of Value." Idealistic Studies 46, no. 3 (2016): 277–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies201882170.
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This paper aims to reconcile the phenomenology and metaphysics of value by proposing a cognitivist and metaphysically committed account of evaluation and value inspired, in part, by the phenomenological arguments of J. N. Findlay in relation to value. By the phenomenology of value I mean the affective—commendatory—character of evaluations such as when I describe something as good or bad, worthwhile or not worthwhile. Whilst this—subjective—aspect of evaluation is largely uncontested, there is much disagreement about the cognitive and metaphysical status of our evaluations. The disagreement centers round two problems, which I call the intentionality problem and the metaphysical problem, respectively. These problems address whether evaluative feelings refer beyond themselves to objects and, if they do, about the character of the object to which they are directed. By drawing on and reconstructing an argument by Findlay, I argue that the affective character of evaluative experience has an intentional structure that takes the form of a judgement that is merited, or not, by its object. However, unlike Findlay, I offer a metaphysically-laden account of the distinction between evaluation and value by arguing that value properties are mind-independent dispositions that are realized in human cognitively-structured affectivity.
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Sanzhenakov, Alexander. "On the capability of Aristotle’s ethics to become the first philosophy." ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition 13, no. 2 (2019): 648–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/1995-4328-2019-13-2-648-656.
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The article is devoted to the analysis of the problem of the relationship of ethics and metaphysics. The majority of the researchers believe that metaphysics precedes and determines ethics. It means that key concepts of ethics are based on the concepts of metaphysics. In Aristotle’s philosophy such metaphysical concepts are the “essence”, “form” and “activity” or “actuality”. The difficult question is whether ethics can be the first philosophy. The author identifies four criteria that Aristotle’s ethics must meet in order to be the first philosophy. Ethics must (1) deal with the first principles and causes, (2) give the universal knowledge, (3) deal with the most valuable subject, (4) be a commander discipline. It is obvious that the part of ethics that concerns moral virtues does not meet these criteria. However, the first philosophy is closer to that part of ethics, which concerns the intellectual virtues, and especially it concerns sophia – the highest virtues of the rational part of the soul. In this case, we can speak about merging of ethical and metaphysical discourses.
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Christofidou, Andrea. "Descartes: A Metaphysical Solution to the Mind–Body Relation and the Intellect's Clear and Distinct Conception of the Union." Philosophy 94, no. 1 (August 23, 2018): 87–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819118000323.
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AbstractFirst, I offer a solution to the metaphysical problem of the mind–body relation, drawing on the fact of its distinctness in kind. Secondly, I demonstrate how, contrary to what is denied, Descartes’ metaphysical commitments allow for the intellect's clear and distinct conception of the mind–body union. Central to my two-fold defence is a novel account of the metaphysics of Descartes’ Causal Principle: its neutrality, and the unanalysable, fundamental nature of causality. Without the presupposition, and uniqueness of the mind-body union there can be no mind-body interaction; this throws new light on current concerns in metaphysics and philosophy of mind.
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Stoliarova, Olga. "The return of metaphysics as a subject matter of historical ontology: analytical review." Digital Scholar Philosopher s Lab 4, no. 1 (2021): 126–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.32326/2618-9267-2021-4-1-126-143.
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The article (the publication consists of two parts) presents an analytical and historiographical overview of the problems that are substantively related to the question of the role, meaning and historical fate of metaphysics. The author focuses on the phenomenon of the return of metaphysics to the philosophy of our time. This phenomenon is proposed to be analyzed from the viewpoint of historical ontology, which deals with the ontological presuppositions of knowledge and their historical dynamics. In the first part, the author highlights two directions of the historical development of metaphysical problems, one of which expresses the immediate metaphysical position, and the other represents the criticism of this position. The author associates criticism of metaphysics with the development of science and the philosophy of science. The author shows the difference between the “analytical” and “continental” approaches to metaphysical problems. The consideration of metaphysics as a historical phenomenon is associated with Hegel’s metaphilosophical historicism. The alternative, non-historical, consideration of metaphysics is placed in the context of empiricism and positivism. The concepts of scientific realism are defined as a kind of positivistically restricted analytical metaphysics. The author highlights three points of growth of post-positivist philosophy and pays special attention to the relationship between post-positivist philosophy of science, history of science, metaphilosophical history of ideas, and sociology of science. The author traces the gradual formation of theoretical conditions for the rehabilitation of metaphysics in these research fields. The author demonstrates that the historicization of Kant’s “transcendental subject” creates a specific epistemological perspective that joins historicism with contextualism. Within this perspective, the question of the ontological presuppositions of empirical (primarily scientific) knowledge, their development and change becomes of great importance.
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Eklund, Matti. "Metaphysical Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy." Metaphysica 14, no. 2 (April 30, 2013): 165–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-013-0119-0.
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Simpson, Daniel J. "Reframing Aquinas on Art and Morality." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92, no. 2 (2018): 295–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq2018313147.
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Can a work of art be defective aesthetically as art because it is defective morally? Étienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain both develop Thomistic accounts of the arts based on Aquinas’s distinction between the virtues of art and prudence, but they answer this question differently. Although their answers diverge, I will argue that both accounts make a crucial assumption about the metaphysics of goodness that Aquinas denies: that moral and aesthetic goodness are distinct species, not inseparable modes, of metaphysical goodness. I propose a new way to develop a Thomistic account of the arts that begins with Aquinas’s treatment of the three inseparable modes of metaphysical goodness: the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. This foundation seems metaphysically, methodologically, and explanatorily prior to the accounts of Gilson and Maritain, because art is a virtue, and virtue is related to goodness, and goodness is “divided” into three inseparable modes.
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Kreines, James. "Fundamentality without Metaphysical Monism: Response to Critics of Reason in the World." Hegel Bulletin 39, no. 1 (October 17, 2016): 138–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2016.31.
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AbstractThis article is a reply to comments by Franz Knappik and Robert Stern on my book, Reason in the World: Hegel’s Metaphysics and its Philosophical Appeal. Issues addressed include the systematicity of Hegel’s philosophy, the prioritizing of metaphysical over epistemological questions in his arguments, Hegel’s response to Kant’s Antinomy of Pure Reason, and my conclusion that there are senses in which Hegel’s own position is both ambitiously metaphysical and also monist, but that the monism present there is epistemological, and the ambitious metaphysics is non-monist.
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Sia, Santiago. "Faith, Reason and Metaphysical Thinking: A Process Response to Fides et Ratio." E-Theologos. Theological revue of Greek Catholic Theological Faculty 2, no. 2 (January 1, 2011): 123–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/v10154-011-0012-3.
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Faith, Reason and Metaphysical Thinking: A Process Response to Fides et Ratio Metaphysics has been subjected to much criticism from various quarters, including philosophy. The document Fides et Ratio affirms and defends its significance for religious belief. Strongly supporting the link between faith and reason, it endorses the tradition of using philosophy, with specific reference to metaphysics, to express, develop and defend theological doctrines. The encyclical also discusses the importance of metaphysics for one's philosophical outlook in life.
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CAMERON, ROSS P. "What’s Metaphysical About Metaphysical Necessity?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79, no. 1 (July 2009): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00264.x.
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Aryal, Yubraj. "Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Metaphysical Voluntarism." Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry 2, no. 4 (2006): 22–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphilnepal20062418.
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Bozovic, Miran. "The philosophy of metaphysical egoism." Theoria, Beograd 50, no. 2 (2007): 19–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo0702019b.
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Although it is George Berkeley who is usually said to have constructed perhaps the most fantastic of all metaphysical systems in the history of philosophy, nevertheless a few years before his Principles and Dialogues an even bolder and more astonishing metaphysical theory was developed in France by the so-called ?egoists?. In the eighteenth century French, the term ?go?sme (or ?gomisme) was used not only in the ethical sense, that is, to describe the selfish, self-centered behavior of those who think and speak only of themselves and believe themselves to be more important than other people, but also in the metaphysical sense, that is, to denote the extremist view that only oneself exists. All our knowledge of the early eighteenth-century egoist philosophers is based on second-hand accounts.
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Gamwell, Franklin I. "An Incoherence in Process and Reality." Process Studies 49, no. 1 (2020): 5–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/process20204911.
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The incoherence is between Whitehead’s definition of “speculative philosophy” in the first section of Process and Reality's opening chapter which defines metaphysics as transcendental and important moments in later chapters of the book, where he asserts that metaphysical formulations are generalizations of empirical or contingent features. In explicating this inconsistency, the article attends to Whitehead’s definition of metaphysical in distinction from cosmological features, his understandings of the “aeroplane” metaphor, the ontological principle, and especially the initial aim. The article argues that Whitehead’s account of these, and especially the initial aim, should be deleted from neoclassical metaphysics.
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Cooper, David E. "Visions of Philosophy." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 65 (October 2009): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246109990026.
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Characterizations of philosophy abound. It is ‘the queen of the sciences’, a grand and sweeping metaphysical endeavour; or, less regally, it is a sort of deep anthropology or ‘descriptive metaphysics’, uncovering the general presuppositions or conceptual schemes that lurk beneath our words and thoughts. A different set of images portray philosophy as a type of therapy, or as a spiritual exercise, a way of life to be followed, or even as a special branch of poetry or politics. Then there is a group of characterizations that include philosophy as linguistic analysis, as phenomenological description, as conceptual geography, or as genealogy in the sense proposed by Nietzsche and later taken up by Foucault.
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Ditter, Andreas. "The Reduction of Necessity to Essence." Mind 129, no. 514 (September 4, 2019): 351–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz045.
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Abstract In ‘Essence and Modality’, Kit Fine (1994) proposes that for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all objects. Call this view Fine’s Thesis. This paper is a study of Fine’s Thesis in the context of Fine’s logic of essence (LE). Fine himself has offered his most elaborate defence of the thesis in the context of LE. His defence rests on the widely shared assumption that metaphysical necessity obeys the laws of the modal logic S5. In order to get S5 for metaphysical necessity, he assumes a controversial principle about the nature of all objects. I will show that the addition of this principle to his original system E5 leads to inconsistency with an independently plausible principle about essence. In response, I develop a theory that avoids this inconsistency while allowing us to maintain S5 for metaphysical necessity. However, I conclude that our investigation of Fine’s Thesis in the context of LE motivates the revisionary conclusion that metaphysical necessity obeys the principles of the modal logic S4, but not those of S5. I argue that this constitutes a distinctively essentialist challenge to the received view that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5.
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Menshikova, Anna. "Metaphysics of Language Categories in “Linguistic Kantianism” and Analytical Philosophy." Ideas and Ideals 13, no. 2-2 (June 15, 2021): 431–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.17212/2075-0862-2021-13.2.2-431-444.
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This paper considers the Kantian philosophical tradition in western language philosophy of the XXth century, describes the ways of its influence and argues the existence of the “Kantian language philosophy tradition” as a continuous stage to be a certain evolutionary line in the history of philosophy. By now one ignores the influence of Kantian philosophy upon “those not pee linguistic turn” and does not esteem I. Kant as a philosopher of language, nor counts his influence in this sphere. The mode of this influence is uncertain and represents various views from synthesis to direct evolution. To discover this issue the author of this paper tries to find a metaphysic core element in language ontology, inherited by the analytic philosophers from I. Kant’s writings; conducts a comparative research of the aforementioned authors’ papers, extracts derived from I. Kant core metaphysical aspect in language ontology and a textological analysis, historical reconstruction. The researchers ignore historical and ontological links between language philosophy, Kantian and the analytical tradition due to a philological development of academic linguistics in the late XIXth – XXth centuries. Following the Kantian tradition in philosophy theories of the analytic philosophers (particularly W. Qwine and P. Strawson) contain the metaphysical core in language ontology, primarily in its syncretic essence of logical, semantic and utterly linguistic categories (i. e. the scheme of concepts, sense, universals, etc.). Syncretism of logical and linguistic essence in terms is also typical for the Kantian philosophy and characterizes the Kantian philosophy to be a source for the linguistic one, and a fully expressed the “Kantian language philosophy tradition”.
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Kanon, Marcin. "Problematyczność stosowania metafizyki do pozytywizmu prawniczego na przykładzie tezy o społecznym źródle prawa." Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica 19, no. 2 (2020): 241–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.15290/mhi.2020.19.02.12.
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The aim of this article is to present a legal positivist social source thesis in the context of classical metaphysical reflection. Author uses the method of analysing the source texts and abstracts theses that can be considered as metaphysical. Metaphysical theses divide into existential and essential. They are expressed directly by an author or possible to reconstruct. Reasoning was based on convenience that universality of metaphysics should be considered temporally. The thesis about the evolution of ways of understanding reality, along with the development of mankind, is one of the cardinal assumptions of positivism in general. Based on this historiosophical rule, August Comte draws further conclusions about a possible modern philosophy for the future. The denial of metaphysics leads to cursory, perhaps unconscious, acceptance of the theses that have already been developed in the history of philosophy. The reflections are essentially focused on the issue of ontological status of society. Its understanding determines the understanding of social facts and seems to have an impact on social source thesis. The main part of the reflection is placed in a historical context. It enables to examine some aspects that are difficult to consider nowadays. One of the conclusions is that metaphysics to which positivism opposes is dominant in 19th century philosophy, but in general only one of many schools of thought. Since there is no specific literature on that matter, author signalize problems considering them generally.
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Amini, Mahdi. "The Relationship Between Beauty and Metaphysics in the Theory of Saint Tomas Aquinas." European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies 6, no. 2 (June 10, 2017): 341. http://dx.doi.org/10.26417/ejms.v6i2.p341-341.
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Metaphysics and beauty are very important and challenging issues in philosophy that have been always noteworthy of philosophers. The relationship between these issues and the condition of these in philosophers's philosophical system is very different and various and every philosopher try to describe this in a specific way. It seems that there are very deep relationship between metaphysics and beauty in the philosophical system of philosophers that metaphysics is a fundamental subject in their philosophical system, because they explain their philosophical issue base on their metaphysical theory. Scholastic philosophers and philosophers of the middle Ages who were affected by Greek philosophy and lived in the Christian World are one group of that philosophers, however this relationship could be different. Saint Thomas Aquinas was a Catholic Priest in the Dominican Order and one of the most important medieval philosophers and theologians who have considered his theory base on metaphysics and theology. So, in this article I try by philosophical analysis method to show how metaphysics and beauty are connected in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. The results of this Article show that we cannot separate metaphysics and beauty in philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, so study on metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas is required as a prior condition for study on beauty.
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Teixeira, William De Jesus. "THE METAPHYSICS OF AUGUSTINE AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE CARTESIAN SCIENCE." Cadernos Espinosanos, no. 37 (December 28, 2017): 291–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.2447-9012.espinosa.2017.137402.
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The aim of this paper is to show to what extent Descartes can be situated within the Augustinian metaphysical tradition and to what extent he has departed from it. To this end, we will argue that Descartes has borrowed his main Meditations’ arguments from Augustine’s philosophy. However, in spite of all factual and textual evidence we will provide against the originality of Descartes’ metaphysical discussions, it will be stressed, on the other hand, that in borrowing not only the cogito argument, but also some general features of his philosophy from Augustine’s works, Descartes intends to frame a metaphysics which will be the ground on his new mechanistic physics. Having this in mind, we will hold that no claim can be put forward against the originality and far-reaching scope of Descartes’ philosophical intentions. Indeed, Descartes’ purpose is to build a new science under a metaphysics, even though this metaphysics is the Augustianian one.
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Maundrell, Richard. "From Rupert Lodge to Sweat Lodge." Dialogue 34, no. 4 (1995): 747–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300011094.
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This book is presented as “a study in ethno-metaphysics,” an exploration of the worldview of Canada's Native peoples. In offering this as a work of philosophy rather than of cultural anthropology or Native spirituality, authors Rabb and McPherson take as their point of departure anthropologist A. I. Hallowell's claim that a cultural worldview is a “cognitive orientation” from which a set of metaphysical claims might be deduced—even if it is not consciously recognized as such by those who live within it (p. 3). In other words, the guiding premise of this work is that something recognizable and significant as a metaphysical theory can be massaged out of the cultural belief-systems of Canada's Native peoples.
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Dasgupta, Shamik. "Metaphysical Rationalism." Noûs 50, no. 2 (November 19, 2014): 379–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12082.
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Price, Huw. "Metaphysical Pluralism." Journal of Philosophy 89, no. 8 (August 1992): 387. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2940741.
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Smart, J. J. C. "Metaphysical illusions." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84, no. 2 (June 2006): 167–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048400600758912.
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Jalobeanu, Dana. "On Metaphysics and Method, Or How to Read Francis Bacon’s Novum organum." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, no. 3 (2021): 98–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158347.
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The purpose of this paper is to offer a preliminary survey of one of the most widely discussed problems in Bacon’s studies: the problem of the interplay between the speculative (i.e., metaphysical) and operative (i.e., methodological) layers of Bacon’s works. I propose to classify the various answers in three categories. In the first category I place attempts claiming that Bacon’s inquiries display his appetitive metaphysics. In the second category are those seeing Bacon’s more “scientific” works as disclosing some of the inner metaphysical layers and presuppositions. The third category see Bacon’s experimental inquiries as attempts to “fix” metaphysics, by redefining concepts of metaphysical origins. In discussing these three categories of interpretative stances I show that we can gain further insights if we take into account recent and less recent trends in philosophy of science, and especially if we think in terms of background theory and bottom-up strategies of concept formation. I offer examples of such procedures in Bacon’s natural and experimental histories and show what we can gain if we apply the same interpretative strategy of focusing on concept-formation to the reading of the Novum organum.
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Pavlas, Petr. "Komeniáni v Karteziánském Zrcadle." Studia Neoaristotelica 16, no. 4 (2019): 41–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studneoar20191646.
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The article picks up the threads of especially Martin Muslow’s 1990s research and describes the distinctiveness of the “relational metaphysics of resemblance” in the middle of the seventeenth century. The late Renaissance metaphysical outlines, carried out in the Comenius circle, are characteristic for their relationality, accent on universal resemblance, providentialism, pansensism, sensualism, triadism – and also for their effort to define metaphysical terms properly. While Comenians share the last – and only the last – feature with Cartesians, they differ in the other features. Therefore, Cartesians and Comenians cannot come to terms in the issue of the proper definitions either. Quite on the contrary, they oppose each other on this issue. By means of Johann Clauberg’s criticism of Georg Ritschel and René Descartes’s only supposedly “mysterious” and “solipsist” second meditation, the article turns a Cartesian mirror to the Comenian metaphysical project. In its light, the definitions of Georg Ritschel, Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld and Jan Amos Comenius turn out to be unacceptable for Cartesians (and also for Thomists and, in part, for Baconians). Despite their superficially Aristotelian-scholastic appearance, their content is notably Paracelsian-Campanellian (with a Timplerian foundation). Even though Comenian definitions of metaphysical terms had been refused and refuted by Cartesians, they experienced a second lifespan in their robust influence on Leibniz and Newton.
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Garber, Daniel. "Bacon’s Metaphysical Method." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, no. 3 (2021): 22–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158340.
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In this paper, I would like to examine the method that Bacon proposes in Novum organum II.1-20 and illustrates with the example of the procedure for discovering the form of heat. One might think of a scientific method as a general schema for research into nature, one that can, in principle, be used independently of the particular conception of the natural world which one adopts, and independently of the particular scientific domain with which one is concerned. Indeed, Bacon himself suggested that as with logic, his method, or as he calls it there his “system of interpreting” is widely applicable to any domain, and not just to natural philosophy. [Novum organum I.127] Now, recent studies of Bacon have emphasized his own natural philosophical commitments, and the underlying conception of nature that runs through his writings. In my essay I argue that the method Bacon illustrates in Novum organum II is deeply connected to this underlying view of nature: far from being a neutral procedure for decoding nature, Bacon’s method is a tool for filling out the details of a natural philosophy built along the broad outlines of the Baconian world view.
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Voltolini, Alberto. "Yet another Theory of the Metaphysical Difference between Genuine Perceptions and Hallucinations." Grazer Philosophische Studien 97, no. 2 (June 3, 2020): 245–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000095.
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In this article, first of all, the author wants to show that a new justification can be provided for the idea, originally maintained in the disjunctivist camp, that genuine perceptions and hallucinations are metaphysically different kinds of mental states, independently of the fact that they all are perceptual experiences. For even if they share their phenomenal character and their representational content is put aside for the purpose of their metaphysical individuation, as some conjunctivists maintain, they still differ in their mode, insofar as they differ in their functional role. Once things are so put at the metaphysical level, moreover, this account of perceptual experiences leaves room for reintroducing content for such experiences from the rear door; namely, as a (metaphysically irrelevant) singular representational content, just as some direct realists have originally suggested. Finally, this move enables the account to explain not only some intuitive data about perceptual experiences, but also to corroborate its viability, even if it does not rely on antiskeptical motivations.
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Hakkarainen, Jani. "Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10, no. 2 (September 2012): 143–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2012.0035.
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In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such as the different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 12 (Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy), paragraphs 15 to 16 (1748). The argument concludes with the contradiction between consistent reasoning (causal, in particular) and believing in the existence of Real (distinct and continued) entities. The problem with the Realist readings of Hume is that they attribute both to Hume. So their Hume is a self-reflectively inconsistent philosopher. I show that the various ways to avoid this problem do not work. Accordingly, this paper suggests a non-Realist interpretation of Hume's philosophy: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgment on Metaphysical Realism. As such, his philosophical attitude is neutral on the divide between materialism and idealism.
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Mitchell. "A Nietzschean Critique of Metaphysical Philosophy." Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48, no. 3 (2017): 347. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jnietstud.48.3.0347.
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Turgeon, Wendy C. "Metaphysical Horizons of Philosophy for Children." Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children 14, no. 2 (1998): 18–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/thinking19981424.
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