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Journal articles on the topic 'Metaphysical modality'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 15 February 2022

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1

GODMAN, MARION, ANTONELLA MALLOZZI, and DAVID PAPINEAU. "Essential Properties Are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6, no. 3 (2020): 316–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.48.

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AbstractThis article aims to build a bridge between two areas of philosophical research: the structure of kinds and metaphysical modality. Our central thesis is that kinds typically involve super-explanatory properties, and that these properties are therefore metaphysically essential to natural kinds. Philosophers of science who work on kinds tend to emphasize their complexity, and are generally resistant to any suggestion that they have essences. The complexities are real enough, but they should not be allowed to obscure the way that kinds are typically unified by certain core properties. We show how this unifying role offers a natural account of why certain properties are metaphysically essential to kinds.

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Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani. "Epistemicism and modality." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46, no. 4-5 (August 2016): 803–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1201878.

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AbstractWhat kind of semantics should someone who accepts the epistemicist theory of vagueness defended in Timothy Williamson's Vagueness (1994) give a definiteness operator? To impose some interesting constraints on acceptable answers to this question, I will assume that the object language also contains a metaphysical necessity operator and a metaphysical actuality operator. I will suggest that the answer is to be found by working within a three-dimensional model theory. I will provide sketches of two ways of extracting an epistemicist semantics from that model theory, one of which I will find to be more plausible than the other.

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3

Deng, Duen-Min. "On the Alleged Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality." Philosophia 44, no. 2 (March 24, 2016): 479–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9699-6.

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4

FURTADO, FERNANDO. "S5-denying Approach to Relativized Metaphysical Modality." Manuscrito 43, no. 1 (March 2020): 1–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v32n1.ff.

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5

Gaultier, Benoit. "Thought Experiments and Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality." Grazer Philosophische Studien 93, no. 4 (November 7, 2016): 525–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-09303001.

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According to Timothy Williamson, philosophy is not a mere conceptual investigation and does not involve a specific cognitive ability, different in nature from those involved in acquiring scientific or ordinary knowledge of the world. The author holds that Williamson does not succeed in explaining how it is possible for us to acquire, through thought experiments, the type of knowledge that, according to him, philosophy predominantly aims to acquire—namely, knowledge of metaphysical modality. More specifically, the author considers in detail Russell’s stopped clock and Locke’s prince and the cobbler thought experiments, and argues that Williamson has not shown how the kind of thought experiment of which they are instances, and which is typically encountered in philosophy, can be the instrument of knowledge of metaphysical modality that he takes this kind of thought experiment to be. More positively, the author advances that the modal conclusions of such thought experiments are drawn through conceptual investigation.

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Williamson, Timothy. "I *-ARMCHAIR PHILOSOPHY, METAPHYSICAL MODALITY AND COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 105, no. 1 (June 2005): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00100.x.

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7

Ditter, Andreas. "The Reduction of Necessity to Essence." Mind 129, no. 514 (September 4, 2019): 351–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz045.

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Abstract In ‘Essence and Modality’, Kit Fine (1994) proposes that for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all objects. Call this view Fine’s Thesis. This paper is a study of Fine’s Thesis in the context of Fine’s logic of essence (LE). Fine himself has offered his most elaborate defence of the thesis in the context of LE. His defence rests on the widely shared assumption that metaphysical necessity obeys the laws of the modal logic S5. In order to get S5 for metaphysical necessity, he assumes a controversial principle about the nature of all objects. I will show that the addition of this principle to his original system E5 leads to inconsistency with an independently plausible principle about essence. In response, I develop a theory that avoids this inconsistency while allowing us to maintain S5 for metaphysical necessity. However, I conclude that our investigation of Fine’s Thesis in the context of LE motivates the revisionary conclusion that metaphysical necessity obeys the principles of the modal logic S4, but not those of S5. I argue that this constitutes a distinctively essentialist challenge to the received view that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5.

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Ciprotti, Nicola, and Luca Moretti. "Logical Pluralism is Compatible with Monism about Metaphysical Modality." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87, no. 2 (June 2009): 275–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048400802340626.

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9

Austin, Christopher J. "Contemporary Hylomorphisms: On the Matter of Form." Ancient Philosophy Today 2, no. 2 (October 2020): 113–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/anph.2020.0032.

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As there is currently a neo-Aristotelian revival currently taking place within contemporary metaphysics and dispositions, or causal powers are now being routinely utilised in theories of causality and modality, more attention is beginning to be paid to a central Aristotelian concern: the metaphysics of substantial unity, and the doctrine of hylomorphism. In this paper, I distinguish two strands of hylomorphism present in the contemporary literature and argue that not only does each engender unique conceptual difficulties, but neither adequately captures the metaphysics of Aristotelian hylomorphism. Thus both strands of contemporary hylomorphism, I argue, fundamentally misunderstand what substantial unity amounts to in the hylomorphic framework – namely, the metaphysical inseparability of matter and form.

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Rayo, Agustin. "Essence Without Fundamentality." THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30, no. 3 (November 12, 2015): 349–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.14472.

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Modality and Explanatory Reasoning</span><span>, Boris Kment argues that a single notion of essence can be used to play two distinct theoretical roles. He thinks there is an important connec- tion between essence and metaphysical necessity, on the one hand, and between essence and metaphysical explanation, on the other. </span></p><p><span>In this paper I will argue that it is not clear that a single notion of essence should be used to perform both these jobs. For whereas the project of giving metaphysical explanations requires a notion of essence that distinguishes between truths that are more or less “funda- mental” in a metaphysical sense, the project of shedding light on metaphysical necessity does not.

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Moore, A. W. "Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction: Modality and Value, by Barry Stroud." Mind 120, no. 480 (October 1, 2011): 1309–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzs018.

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12

Allen, Sophie R. "From Possibility to Properties? Or from Properties to Possibility?" Philosophy 92, no. 1 (December 1, 2016): 21–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819116000577.

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AbstractThis paper contrasts two metaphysical accounts of modality and properties: Modal Realism which treats possible entities as primitive; and Strong Dispositionalism in which metaphysical possibility and necessity are determined by actually existing dispositions or powers. I argue that Strong Dispositionalism loses its initial advantages of simplicity and parsimony over Modal Realism as it is extended and amended to account for metaphysical rather than just causal necessity. Furthermore, to avoid objections to its material and formal adequacy, Strong Dispositionalism requires a richer fundamental ontology which it cannot explicate without appealing either to possible worlds or to an account of counterfactual truth conditions, both of which Strong Dispositionalism was intended to replace.

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13

Wilkinson, Timothy. "The Presidential Address I-Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105, no. 1 (September 2004): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2004.00162.x.

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Jaszczolt, K. M. "Human Imprints of Real Time: from Semantics to Metaphysics." Philosophia 48, no. 5 (March 10, 2020): 1855–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00190-w.

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Abstract Investigation into the reality of time can be pursued within the ontological domain or it can also span human thought and natural language. I propose to approach time by correlating three domains of inquiry: metaphysical time (M), the human concept of time (E), and temporal reference in natural language (L), entertaining the possibility of what I call a ‘horizontal reduction’ (L > E > M) and ‘vertical reduction’. I present a view of temporalityL/E as epistemic modality, drawing on evidence from the L domain and its correlates in the E and M domains. On this view, the human concept of time is a complex, ‘molecular’ concept and can be broken down into primitive concepts that are modal in nature, featuring as degrees of epistemic commitment to representations of states of affairs. I present evidence from tensed and tenseless languages (endorsing the L > E path) and point out its compatibility with the view of real time as metaphysical modality (endorsing the E > M path).

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15

Vetter, Barbara. "Williamsonian modal epistemology, possibility-based." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46, no. 4-5 (August 2016): 766–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1170652.

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AbstractWilliamsonian modal epistemology (WME) is characterized by two commitments: realism about modality, and anti-exceptionalism about our modal knowledge. Williamson's own counterfactual-based modal epistemology is the best known implementation of WME, but not the only option that is available. I sketch and defend an alternative implementation which takes our knowledge of metaphysical modality to arise, not from knowledge of counterfactuals, but from our knowledge of ordinary possibility statements of the form ‘x can F’. I defend this view against a criticism indicated in Williamson's own work, and argue that it is better connected to the semantics of modal language.

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Proudchenko, Elena, Ludmila Melnikoa, and Anna Kryzhanovskaja. "Metaphysical Language Game and the Word-play Modality in V.Nabokov’s Novelism and Poetry." SHS Web of Conferences 69 (2019): 00091. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/20196900091.

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This article discusses the unique linguistic consciousness of V. Nabokov, formed in a multilingual environment. The method of philosophical interpretation of the text was used in V. Nabokov’s works analysis. It is revealed that in the multicultural environment V. Nabokov created an artful, nonstandard language by means of the original language game and word making and affecting, perhaps unconsciously, the logical and philosophical concept of Wittgenstein’s “language game”. The language of V. Nabokov’s poetry is defined as a way to destroy the experienced, but unwittingly resurrected, i.e., what can be considered experience and memories, and at the same time self-creation through poetry.However, early criticism of Nabokov-Sirin’s poetry is rather skeptical about the author’s ability to touch or express etaphysical aspects of life.

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17

Galvan, Sergio. "Actualistic Foundation of Possibilism." Metaphysica 21, no. 2 (October 25, 2020): 255–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0021.

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AbstractIn this article I defend a form of classical possibilism with an actualist foundation. As a matter of fact, I believe that this position is more in keeping with the classical metaphysical tradition. According to this form of possibilism, I construe possible objects as possible non-existing objects of an existing producing power. Consequently, they are nothing vis-à -vis the modality of their own actual being, although they do exist with regard to the modality of the producing power’s being. The actualist requirement prescribed by the Frege-Quinean criterion of the quantification domain is thus fulfilled; indeed, really possible objects are not actual objects, but their possibility is actual.

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Haze, Tristan Grøtvedt. "Apriority and Essential Truth." Metaphysica 21, no. 1 (April 28, 2020): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-0007.

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AbstractThere is a line of thought, neglected in recent philosophy, according to which a priori knowable truths such as those of logic and mathematics have their special epistemic status in virtue of a certain tight connection between their meaning and their truth. Historical associations notwithstanding, this view does not mandate any kind of problematic deflationism about meaning, modality or essence. On the contrary, we should be upfront about it being a highly debatable metaphysical idea, while nonetheless insisting that it be given due consideration. From this standpoint, I suggest that the Finean distinction between essence and modality allows us to refine the view. While liberal about meaning, modality and essence, the view is not without bite: it is reasonable to suppose that it is able to ward off philosophical confusions stemming from the undue assimilation of a priori to empirical knowledge.

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19

Patrone, Fabio. "Two Geometrical Models for Pixelism." Metaphysica 21, no. 1 (April 28, 2020): 99–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-0002.

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AbstractPixelism is the combination of three metaphysical thesis, namely a radical form of exdurantism, mereological nihilism and counterpart theory. Pixelism is a theory that evaluates all the metaphysical phenomena of persistence, composition and modality in a homogeneous and consistent manner. In a pixel world, there is no identity over time and over possible worlds and nothing persists over more than an instant or a world. Entities can be univocally identified by a five-coordinates system (the three spatial dimensions, the temporal one and the possible worlds), and their relation is a counterpart relation both in different worlds and at different times or different regions of space. In this paper I will provide two models for pixelism: the first one takes pixels to be hypercubes, i. e. four-dimensional cubes, the acceptance of which is conditional on the acceptance of extended simples. The second one considers pixels as points in a four-dimensional space.

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20

Livanios, Vassilis. "Dispositionality and Symmetry Structures." Metaphysica 19, no. 2 (August 28, 2018): 201–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mp-2018-0010.

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Abstract A number of metaphysicians and philosophers of science have raised the issue of the modality of the fundamental structures of the world. Although the debate so far has been largely focused on the (alleged) inherent causal character of fundamental structures, one aspect of it has naturally taken its place as part of the dispositional/categorical debate. In this paper, I focus on the latter in the case of the fundamental symmetry structures. After putting forward the necessary metaphysical presuppositions for the debate to make sense, I offer an argument which undermines the plausibility of a dispositionalist account of fundamental symmetry structures.

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21

Eaker, Erin. "Kripke’s sole route to the necessary a posteriori." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44, no. 3-4 (August 2014): 388–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2014.952105.

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In ‘Kripke on epistemic and metaphysical possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori’, Scott Soames identifies two arguments for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths in Naming and Necessity (NN). He argues that Kripke’s second argument relies on either of two principles, each of which leads to contradiction. He also claims that it has led to ‘two-dimensionalist’ approaches to the necessary a posteriori which are fundamentally at odds with the insights about meaning and modality expressed in NN. I argue that the alleged second argument is not in NN. I identify the mistakes that lead to Soames’ misinterpretation.

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RAIDL, ERIC. "COMPLETENESS FOR COUNTER-DOXA CONDITIONALS – USING RANKING SEMANTICS." Review of Symbolic Logic 12, no. 4 (October 30, 2018): 861–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020318000199.

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AbstractStandard conditionals $\varphi > \psi$, by which I roughly mean variably strict conditionals à la Stalnaker and Lewis, are trivially true for impossible antecedents. This article investigates three modifications in a doxastic setting. For the neutral conditional, all impossible-antecedent conditionals are false, for the doxastic conditional they are only true if the consequent is absolutely necessary, and for the metaphysical conditional only if the consequent is ‘model-implied’ by the antecedent. I motivate these conditionals logically, and also doxastically by properties of conditional belief and belief revision. For this I show that the Lewisian hierarchy of conditional logics can be reproduced within ranking semantics, provided we slightly stretch the notion of a ranking function. Given this, acceptance of a conditional can be interpreted as a conditional belief. The epistemic and the neutral conditional deviate from Lewis’ weakest system $V$, in that ID ($\varphi > \varphi$) or even CN ($\varphi > \top$) are dropped, and new axioms appear. The logic of the metaphysical conditional is completely axiomatised by $V$ to which we add the known Kripke axioms T5 for the outer modality. Related completeness results for variations of the ranking semantics are obtained as corollaries.

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Behrendt, Hauke. "Inklusion zwischen Potenzialität und Latenz: Soziale Teilhabe als dispositionelle Eigenschaft." Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 73, no. 4 (December 15, 2019): 533–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.3196/004433019827816815.

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The purpose of this paper is to defend an understanding of social participation that spells out inclusion as a dispositional property. I assume that an agent must occupy at least one position within a social order so that he is leastways partially included. The fact that a social position is open to someone means that he has the opportunity to take it. However, disputed is how "having the opportunity" should be understood exactly. My thesis, which I will develop and defend in the context of this article, is: Since the appropriate application context decides whether the role characteristics of an agent actually become manifest, participation is a dispositional property. Therefore, a role is not open to someone only if he cannot claim a certain status for himself, even though he is in the relevant context. It is thus not a logical or metaphysical modality, but a normative modality that is relevant in terms of the openness of a role. Hence, social participation consists in a normative status that takes effect when certain conditions occure.

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Redding, Paul. "Hegel’s Treatment of Predication Considered in the Light of a Logic for the Actual World." Hegel Bulletin 40, no. 1 (March 6, 2018): 51–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2018.4.

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AbstractOne prominent feature of analytic metaphysics in the second half of the twentieth century was the revival of metaphysical debate over modality, and in this paper I suggest that a particular position that emerged within this debate, ‘modal actualism’, bears a striking resemblance to the way that Hegel discusses modal notions in the final chapter of Book 2 of the Science of Logic, ‘Wirklichkeit’ or ‘Actuality’. Modal actualists opposed David Lewis’s counter-intuitive claims about the existence of alternate possible worlds, and aimed to reconcile the reality of alternate possibilities with the common-sense idea of the actual world as all there is. Like Hegel in the chapter ‘Actuality’, they thus argue that possible alternatives to the actual world must, somehow, exist within the actual world. Here I approach these issues via the ideas of John N. Findlay who, in the 1950s, had attempted to reintroduce Hegel into an Anglophone philosophical culture, but who also influenced the later development of modal actualism via his influence on the modal logician, Arthur Prior. Like certain actualists, Findlay distinguished between two modes of predication in order to distinguish, but relate, judgements about the actual from those about the possible. This predicative dualism is strikingly similar to the way Hegel distinguishes two types of predication in his treatment of judgement in Book 3 of the Science of Logic. Reading Hegel’s dualistic account of judgement structure against this background enables us to see how it was meant to provide a logical framework for the ‘actualist’ metaphysics he earlier sketched in the chapter, ‘Actuality’.

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Penz, Yuri, and Ana Maria Tramunt Ibaños. "Tardis & Tame: an Essay on Natural Language Meaning and Metaphysics." Scripta 24, no. 51 (September 23, 2020): 71–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.5752/p.2358-3428.2020v24n51p71-102.

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This paper theoretically approaches the relationship between the instances of time and space as far as natural language conveys their manifestation, focusing on meaning, majorly represented by the subdiscipline of Semantics, along with some insights on Syntax and Pragmatics. The outset-designed ontology is mainly composed by categories of TAME (tense, aspect, mood and evidentiality/eventology) instantiated by linguistic phenomena that yelds anchoring, displacement and aboutness properties. To achieve this wide range of linguistic manifestations the scope takes over the verbal semantics of Brazilian Portuguese (henceforth BrP), pursuing to manage the lexical nature of entries in this language and its metaphysical counterpart in meaning. This sort of approach intends to illustrate the proper balance for the formal device of a semantic component regarding these language parameters on TAME and their principles correlation on human language by means of this paper intends to coin as TARDIS. This paper presents three sections such as: a) theoretical, introducing the properties of each category of TAME, throughout history of Linguistics and Semantics; b) methodological, characterizing the lexical/metaphysical dualism for Formal Semantic approaches and their correlation to time and space and some other non-logical privileged concepts entertained by semantic knowledge; c) epistemological and analytical, considering BrP as parameters for TARDIS’ properties conveyed by natural language meaning throughout different categories of TAME and its correlation to some principles which seem to regard human cognition, focusing mainly on modality.

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Fellmann, Ferdinand. "Das Ende der Kultur: Wie Georg Simmel den Begriff der Kultur soziologisch dekonstruiert." Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 2015/1-2: Simmel 2015, no. 1-2 (2015): 79–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000106694.

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In this paper I claim that the metaphysical concept of culture has come to an end. Among the European authors Georg Simmel is the foremost who has deconstructed the myth of culture as a substantial totality beyond relations or prior to them. Two tenets of research have prepared the end of all-inclusive culture: First, Simmel’s formal access that considers society as the modality of interactions and relations between individuals, thus overcoming the social evolutionism of Auguste Comte; second, his critical exegesis of idealistic philosophy of history, thus leaving behind the Hegelian tradition. Although Simmel adheres in some statements to the out-dated idea of morphological unity, his sociological and epistemological thinking paved the way for the concept of social identity as a network of series connected loosely by contiguity. This type of connection is confirmed by the present feeling of life as individual self-invention according to changing situations.

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Drage, Matthew. "Of mountains, lakes and essences: John Teasdale and the transmission of mindfulness." History of the Human Sciences 31, no. 4 (October 2018): 107–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0952695118790429.

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In this article I examine an important episode in the growth of ‘mindfulness’ as a biomedical modality in Britain: the formation and establishment of Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) by John Teasdale and his colleagues Mark Williams and Zindel Segal. My study, focusing on Teasdale’s contribution, combines ethnographic, oral historical and archival research to understand how mindfulness was disseminated or, to use a term sometimes used by mindfulness practitioners themselves, ‘transmitted’. Drawing on theoretical support from Max Weber, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, I argue that transmission had a very specific form within the Buddhistic milieu that Teasdale occupied and within which he developed MBCT. To ‘transmit’ mindfulness was to transmit an experiential essence; a type of subjectivity that was seen as perennial, universal and radically distinct from its historical context. In tracing the recurring metaphysical, metaphorical and visual tropes of mindfulness and its transmission, I attempt to understand how Teasdale was embedded in both local and global networks of discourse and practice, and how his life and work contributed and depended upon an assemblage whose elements (institutional, technical, conceptual, textual) straddled empiricist psychology and religious mysticism. I also examine how authority, experience and knowledge were closely interwoven in the birth of British mindfulness, coming together to form an affectively compelling ‘diagram’ that shaped the way mindfulness was practiced and disseminated. In doing so, I aim to open up the possibility of studying the history of the human sciences from a new perspective: one which places an emphasis on the emotional impetus generated by metaphysical assumptions.

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JASZCZOLT, K. M. "Time, perspective and semantic representation." Language and Cognition 10, no. 1 (May 5, 2017): 26–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2017.7.

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abstractI discuss the perspectival nature of temporality in discourse and argue that the human concept of time can no more be dissociated from the perspectival thought than the concept of the self can. The corollary of this observation is that perspectival temporality can no more be excluded from the semantic representation than the notion of the self can: neither can be reduced to the bare referent for the purpose of semantic representation if the latter is to retain cognitive plausibility. I present such a semantic qua conceptual approach to temporal reference developed within my theory of Default Semantics. I build upon my theory of time as epistemic modality according to which, on the level of conceptual qua semantic building blocks, temporality reduces to degrees of detachment from the certainty of the here and the now. I also address the questions of temporal asymmetry between the past and the future, and the relation between metaphysical time (timeM), psychological time (timeE, where ‘E’ marks the domain of epistemological enquiry), and time in natural language (timeL), concluding that the perspective-infused timeE and timeL are compatible with timeM of mathematical models of spacetime: all are definable through possibility and perspectivity.

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Divers, John, and Jade Fletcher. "(Once again) Lewis on the analysis of modality." Synthese 197, no. 11 (January 31, 2018): 4645–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1698-7.

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Abstract We propose a novel interpretation of Lewis on the analysis of modality that is constructed from primary sources, comprehensive and unprecedented (in toto). Our guiding precepts are to distinguish semantics from metaphysics, while respecting the inter-relations between them, and to discern whatever may be special, semantically or metaphysically, about the modal case. Following detailed presentation (Sect. 2), we amplify and advocate our interpretation by providing a conforming genealogy of Lewis’s theory of modality (Sect. 3) and applying it to construct a detailed and newly illuminating version of the Lewisian theory of modality de re (Sect. 4).

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Yablo, Stephen, and Graeme Forbes. "The Metaphysics of Modality." Journal of Philosophy 85, no. 6 (June 1988): 329. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2026723.

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Simons, Peter, and Graeme Forbes. "The Metaphysics of Modality." Noûs 22, no. 3 (September 1988): 465. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2215714.

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32

Brown, Mark A., and Graeme Forbes. "The Metaphysics of Modality." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, no. 3 (March 1990): 615. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2108170.

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Bricker, Phillip, and Graeme Forbes. "The Metaphysics of Modality." Philosophical Review 97, no. 1 (January 1988): 127. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185109.

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Edgington, Dorothy, and Graeme Forbes. "The Metaphysics of Modality." Philosophical Quarterly 38, no. 152 (July 1988): 365. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2220135.

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35

MUMFORD, STEPHEN. "Miracles: metaphysics and modality." Religious Studies 37, no. 2 (June 2001): 191–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412501005595.

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It is argued that miracles are best understood as natural events with supernatural causes and that such causal interaction is logically possible. Such miracles may, or may not, involve violations of natural laws. If violations of laws are possible, Humean supervenience views of laws are best avoided. Where miracles violate laws, it shows that what is naturally impossible may be actual and what is naturally necessary may not be actual. Whether or not miracles actually occur, this demonstrates that the nomic modalities differ from the logical. The theory contrasts favourably with competitors and allows, contrary to an interpretation of Aquinas, that Creation would have been a miracle.

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Wilson, Alastair. "Modality: Metaphysics, Logic and Epistemology." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89, no. 4 (December 2011): 755–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.592541.

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Силантьева and Margarita Silanteva. "Communication as a Way to Broadcast an Intentional Experience of Local Cultures." Modern Communication Studies 5, no. 4 (August 17, 2016): 49–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/20975.

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Handling of modern communication studies to theoretical and methodological achievments of philosophy of culture is the result of the desire for a holistic vision of the interaction of heterogeneous structures, united in the act of communication. This makes it possible, based on the dialectics of the general, special and individual, as well as relying on the ideas of existential dialectic and personalism, to formulate some principles of a dynamic understanding of the communication process and to identify the conditions of its performance. This approach considers “unity of understanding,” “non-empty” communicative act, taken at the same time in the linguistic and extra-linguistic (ethnopsychological, historical, cognitive, semantic, sociological aspects, etc.) measurements. The functional approach to the study of linguistic measurement of communicative act (distinguishing physical and logical types of existence), in conjunction with antisubstantialism allows to highlight the role of abstract, “metaphysical” concepts (universals) for solving linguistic and communicative tasks. Analysis of the communicative act in the semantic dimension allows us to consider it as a unique communicative event, which has a universal structure, through the allocation of dynamic components of this process, which is a kind of superposition, the interference part of concepts (rhizome). This rhizome unity of concepts not only provides the informational content of the message, but also induces a concomitant “background” knowledge (assessment, links and hyperlinks, intention, modality, imperatives, etc.) that make up the pragmatic level of existence of the concept. Intentional aspect of communication, orienting communicators to “essence”, “purpose” and “meaning” (in the dynamic sense) refers to the Other as a reality and at the same time as open project; sets the “horizon” of communicative events, thus creating a space of dialogue as a space of culture and setting field of open universals that define the possibility of an agreement. The importance of this approach for the sphere of international relations can not be overestimated.

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38

Swinburne, Richard. "Response to Essays on Are We Bodies or Souls?" Roczniki Filozoficzne 69, no. 1 (March 18, 2021): 119–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rf21691-11.

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This paper consists of my responses to the comments by nine commentators on my book Are we Bodies or Souls? It makes twelve separate points, each one relevant to the comments of one or more of the commentators, as follows: (1) I defend my understanding of “knowing the essence” of an object as knowing a set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for an object to be that object; (2) I claim that there cannot be thoughts without a thinker; (3) I argue that my distinction of “mental” from “physical” events in terms of whether anyone has privileged access to whether or not they occur, is a clear one; (4) and (5) I defend my account of metaphysical modality and its role in defending my account of personal identity; (6) I defend my view that Descartes’s argument in favor of the view that humans are essentially souls fails, but that my amended version of that argument succeeds; (7) I claim that my theory acknowledges the closeness of the connection in an earthly life between a human soul and its body; (8) I argue that my Cartesian theory of the soul-body relation is preferable to Aquinas’s theory of that; (9) I argue that a material thing cannot have mental properties; (10) I argue that any set of logically necessary conditions for an object to be the object it is, which together form a logically sufficient condition for this, mutually entails any other such set; (11) I deny that a dualist needs to provide an explanation of how the soul has the capacities that it has; and finally (12) I defend my view that souls have thisness, and claim that that is not a difficulty for the view that God determines which persons will exist.

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39

Acquaviva, Ilaria. "Francisco Suárez on Metaphysics of Modality." International Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 1 (2019): 5–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq201912124.

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Hookway, Christopher. "Graeme Forbes., The Metaphysics of Modality." International Studies in Philosophy 21, no. 1 (1989): 80–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil198921191.

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41

Bäck, Allan. "Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality." Ars Disputandi 5, no. 1 (January 2005): 9–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15665399.2005.10819854.

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Chalmers, David J., and David Chalmers. "Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, no. 2 (June 1999): 473. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2653685.

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43

Yablo, Stephen. "The Metaphysics of Modality by Graeme Forbes." Journal of Philosophy 85, no. 6 (1988): 329–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil198885650.

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44

Trainor, Paul. "The Metaphysics of Modality. By Graeme Forbes." Modern Schoolman 66, no. 2 (1989): 156–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/schoolman198966223.

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45

Sakon, Takeshi. "On Takahiro Isashiki’s Metaphysics of Temporal Modality." Kagaku tetsugaku 44, no. 1 (2011): 59–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_59.

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46

Dicken, Paul. "Constructive Empiricism and the Metaphysics of Modality." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 605–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axm020.

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47

Peacocke, Christopher. "The Modality of Freedom." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 (March 1998): 349–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004434.

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The classical problem of free will is one instance of the Integration Challenge. The Integration Challenge in its general form is that of reconciling our metaphysics of any given area with our epistemology for that same area. In the case of free will, the challenge is that of reconciling our seeming first-person knowledge of our exercise of free thought, deliberation, choice and action with a description of what is really going on in the world as characterized in terms of causation, determination, explanation and causal possibility.

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48

Zimmermann, Rainer E. "Philosophical Aspects of Astrobiology Revisited." Philosophies 6, no. 3 (July 2, 2021): 55. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies6030055.

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Given the idea that Life as we know it is nothing but a special form of a generically underlying dynamical structure within the physical Universe, we try to introduce a concept of Life that is not only derived from first principles of fundamental physics, but also metaphysically based on philosophical assumptions about the foundations of the world. After clarifying the terminology somewhat, especially with a view to differentiating reality from modality, we give an example for a mathematical representation of what the substance of reality (in the traditional sense of metaphysics) could actually mean today, discussing twistor theory as an example. We then concentrate on the points of structural emergence by discussing the emergence of dynamical systems and of Life as we know it, respectively. Some further consequences as they relate to meaning are discussed in the end.

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Brower, Jeffrey. "Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Modality: A Reply to Leftow." Modern Schoolman 82, no. 3 (2005): 201–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/schoolman20058238.

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Shikiar, David Alan. "Metaphysics, 9.8, 1050a30—b4: The Identity of Soul and Energeia." Journal of Ancient Philosophy 9, no. 1 (May 20, 2015): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v9i1p41-87.

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I argue that 1050a30—b3 contains an argument in which a series of analogies treating the ‘in’ relation are deployed to constrain how the relation between life and the soul is to be construed, such that, given other reasonable premises, it follows that the soul is identical with the activity life. The interpretation of the ‘in’ relation turns crucially upon the distinction between a subject and a site for an activity, which opens the way for understanding the relation designated as not being that of inherence, which would imply some form of ontological distinction. After establishing the conclusion concerning identity, I explain how the soul may be understood as possessing a modally graded internal structure, each higher-order modality corresponding to a higher level of completion, thinking being the highest grade in human beings. I then show how the identity of soul and living activities affirmed at b2—3 implies the substantial priority of energeia to potentiality affirmed at b3—4.

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