Relevant bibliographies by topics / Metaphysical indeterminacy

Academic literature on the topic 'Metaphysical indeterminacy'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Metaphysical indeterminacy"

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Eklund, Matti. "Metaphysical Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy." Metaphysica 14, no. 2 (April 30, 2013): 165–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-013-0119-0.

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Vogt, Katja Maria. "No More This than That." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45 (2021): 57–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/msp202111416.

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In the terms of ancient epistemology, Pyrrho is a dogmatist, not a skeptic, simply on account of putting forward a metaphysical theory. His most contested claim is that things are indifferent, unmeasured, and indeterminate—or, on a competing reconstruction, that things are indifferentiable, unmeasurable, and indeterminable. This paper argues that Pyrrho’s position, which I call Pyrrhonian Indeterminacy, belongs to a rich tradition of revisionist metaphysics that includes ancient atomism, flux metaphysics, Plato’s analysis of becoming, and today’s discussions of indeterminacy and vagueness. This tradition, my argument continues, makes room for a kind of metaphysics that proceeds in epistemological terms. Pyrrho’s indeterminacy claim says that things are indeterminate insofar as they do not have features by reference to which we can determine them to be such-and-such. We should not waver or be inclined to see things one way or another—we should see things, and describe them, as “no more this than that.”
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Calosi, Claudio, and Jessica Wilson. "Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy." Philosophical Studies 176, no. 10 (July 28, 2018): 2599–627. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1143-2.

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Skow, Bradford. "DEEP METAPHYSICAL INDETERMINACY." Philosophical Quarterly 60, no. 241 (June 10, 2010): 851–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.672.x.

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Bĕlohrad, Radim. "The Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vague Identity." KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 34, no. 3 (September 1, 2020): 23–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340303.

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Abstract This paper focuses on Jessica Wilson's determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy and its relationship to the concept of vague identity. The determinable-based account comprises a distinction between meta-level and object-level accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy. I first argue that the distinction cannot be clearly applied to some theories. In particular, I argue that even though Wilson categorizes the constitution account of metaphysical indeterminacy as a meta-level account, from one perspective it can be defensibly regarded as an object-level account, because it is bound to posit genuinely indeterminate states of affairs and provides an explanation of boundary indeterminacy that is structurally analogous to the explanation provided by Wilson's object-level account. This interim conclusion is important, because it has been argued that the constitution account, when applied to some more complex types of boundary indeterminacy, cannot avoid commitment to vague identity, in spite of the declarations of some of its proponents. The ultimate goal of this paper is to argue that, contrary to Wilson's claims, the determinable-based account must embrace vague identity too.
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Williams, J. Robert G. "Ontic Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy." Philosophy Compass 3, no. 4 (July 2008): 763–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00151.x.

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Darby, George. "Quantum Mechanics and Metaphysical Indeterminacy." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88, no. 2 (August 13, 2009): 227–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048400903097786.

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Bokulich, Alisa. "Metaphysical Indeterminacy, Properties, and Quantum Theory." Res Philosophica 91, no. 3 (2014): 449–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2014.91.3.11.

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Barnes, Elizabeth. "Arguments Against Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vagueness." Philosophy Compass 5, no. 11 (October 29, 2010): 953–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00348.x.

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Torza, Alessandro. "Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy and worldly incompleteness." Synthese 197, no. 10 (October 4, 2017): 4251–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1581-y.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Metaphysical indeterminacy"

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Warom, Carl Michael. "Sort of but sort of not : the theory of metaphysical indeterminacy." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2015. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/9127/.

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This thesis is an investigation into metaphysical indeterminacy. The project initially aims to scope out the available options for token theories, and to clarify the choice between them in a systematic manner. Following a meta-theoretical excursion concerning the target and motivation for such theorizing, I then move on to provide a comparative and systematic framework for the discussion of the nature of indeterminacy. That model’s utility is then exemplified by its ability to distinguish some variants of Supervaluationism. Finally, some of the foregoing is utilized to reply to some arguments that seek to derive metaphysical indeterminacy from semantic indeterminacy. The project then moves on to discuss distinctively metaphysical indeterminacy, and it is shown how the previous model can be straightforwardly fleshed out to model the options. I subsequently move on to critically engage with three extant substantive proposals from the literature about the nature of metaphysical indeterminacy.
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de, Araujo Eric William Matteson. "Different Samenesses: Essays on Non-Standard Views of Identity." The Ohio State University, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1609750647774928.

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Lazarou, Michael. "Vindicating Vague Objects." Thesis, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2440/123625.

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Until recently, vagueness has been seen as a product of representation alone; a byproduct of the limitations of our language or our ability to know the truth. To endorse the contrasting idea that vagueness can come from the world – and to endorse the existence of vague objects – has often been a maligned enterprise. Indeed, proponents of the view have been charged with mistaking features of the world for features of our language or minds, mistaking a question of language and epistemology for a question of metaphysics. Further, even granting the plausibility of such a view, the thesis that vague objects can exist has been laden with commitment to problematic notions such as vague identity and vague existence. This thesis examines the prospects of defending the idea that vague objects exist, vindicating the cogency of such a view and decoupling it from these problematic notions. Chapter 1 begins by examining Gareth Evans’ seminal reductio against vague objects, in which the existence of vague objects is tied to the fate of vague identity. Engaging with the literature that Evans’ paper generated, we show that vague objects need not be committed to a contradictory notion of vague identity; rather, one can defend an account of vague objects without the need for revisionary logics or gerrymandered notions of identity. Chapter 2 extends the investigation of vague objects by considering the Problem of the Many, a powerful paradox which appears to undermine seemingly well-founded mereological principles and intuitions. After evaluating existing solutions to the problem, we show how vague objects can be used to develop a novel solution that is couched within the logical apparatus defended in Chapter 1. We then demonstrate how the novel solution offers a fruitful means of responding to the problem while retaining desired mereological principles. Chapter 3 draws on the discussion in the preceding chapters to defend the cogency of vague objects in the context of contemporary views of metaphysical vagueness. Specifically, we show that defending the existence of vague objects has genuine utility for supporting a defence of the intelligibility of metaphysical vagueness. We end with a brief examination of the prospects of extending the novel account of vague objects developed, and consider how this view may be applied to future investigations in metaphysics.
Thesis (MPhil) -- University of Adelaide, School of Humanities, 2019
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Books on the topic "Metaphysical indeterminacy"

1

Indeterminate identity: Metaphysics and semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.

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Bernstein, Sara. Causal Proportions and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805601.003.0009.

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Both causation and moral responsibility seem to come in degrees, but explaining the metaphysical relationship between them is more complex than theorists have realized. This paper poses an original puzzle about this relationship and uses it to reach three important conclusions. First, certain natural resolutions of the puzzle reveal the existence of a new sort of moral luck called proportionality luck. Second, there is indeterminacy in the type of causal relation deployed in assessments of moral responsibility. Finally—and most importantly—leading theories of causation do not have the ability to capture the sorts of causal differences that matter for moral evaluation of agents’ causal contributions to outcomes.
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Parsons, Terence. Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics. Oxford University Press, USA, 2000.

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Richardson, Henry. Reasons, Indeterminacy, and Compromise. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190247744.003.0009.

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This chapter addresses objections to the book’s account of moral authority. Metaphysically, it may be argued that since what we ought to do is determined by the balance of reasons, there are no moral indeterminacies of the kind the account presupposes. In response, I argue that this objection holds fast to the weighing conception of reasons in a way that ignores the widespread incommensurability of reasons. Psychologically, it will be objected that since people’s actions can be modeled as maximizing their desires, it is not plausible that they will be able to work out their moral disagreements in the way the account assumes. I respond by criticizing this desire-satisfaction psychology as failing to account for end-means reasoning and develop an alternative, more Aristotelian moral psychology that accounts for that, as well as for our commitments and our ability to work out conflicts among our commitments via principled compromises.
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Ciprut, Jose V., Aryeh Botwinick, Vadim Batitsky, and Haim H. Bau. Indeterminacy: The Mapped, the Navigable, and the Uncharted. MIT Press, 2009.

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V, Ciprut Jose, ed. Indeterminacy: The mapped, the navigable, and the uncharted. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008.

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Book chapters on the topic "Metaphysical indeterminacy"

1

Calosi, Claudio, and Jessica M. Wilson. "Metaphysical Indeterminacy in the Multiverse." In Quantum Mechanics and Fundamentality, 375–95. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99642-0_25.

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Torza, Alessandro. "Derivative Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Quantum Physics." In Quantum Mechanics and Fundamentality, 337–50. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99642-0_22.

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Sattig, Thomas. "Mereological Indeterminacy: Metaphysical but Not Fundamental." In Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, 25–42. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7978-5_2.

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Parsons, Terence. "Indeterminacy of Identity of Objects: An Exercise in Metaphysical Aesthetics." In Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine, 213–24. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3933-5_16.

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Antonelli, G. Aldo. "Life on the Range: Quine’s Thesis and Semantic Indeterminacy." In Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers: Themes in Logic, Metaphysics, and Language, 171–89. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18362-6_9.

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Leaman, Oliver N. H. "Transcendental Reasoning and the Indeterminacy of the Human Point of View." In Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 245–64. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2997-5_12.

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Caie, Michael. "Metasemantics and Metaphysical Indeterminacy." In Metasemantics, 55–96. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669592.003.0003.

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Barnes, Elizabeth, and J. Robert G. Williams. "A Theory Of Metaphysical Indeterminacy." In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 103–48. Oxford University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.003.0003.

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Woodward, Richard. "Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vague Existence." In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 183–95. Oxford University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.003.0006.

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Wilson, Jessica M. "Ordinary objects." In Metaphysical Emergence, 191–213. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823742.003.0006.

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Wilson considers whether ordinary (inanimate) objects are either Weakly or Strongly emergent. First, she argues that ordinary objects are at least Weakly emergent: first, by lights of a degrees of freedom (DOF)-based account, reflecting that quantum DOF are eliminated from those of ordinary objects in the classical limit; second, by lights of a functional realization account, reflecting a conception of artifacts as associated with sortal properties and distinctive functional roles; third, by lights of a determinable-based account, reflecting that ordinary objects have metaphysically indeterminate boundaries, which are best treated by appeal to a determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy. While the Strong emergence of ordinary objects remains an open empirical possibility, the best such case involves artifacts: artifacts might be Strongly emergent, if the states of consciousness that determine what powers are possessed by artifacts are Strongly emergent, as is explored in Chapter 7.
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