Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Metaphysical anthropology'

This thesis proposes that Søren Kierkegaard's thought - in particular, his theological anthropology - is undergirded by an inchoate metaphysics of modality. It focuses on the concept of possibility (Danish: Mulighed), arguing that possibility is a primary ingredient of the Kierkegaardian self and serves as a kind of 'engine' for the development of the individual before God. Accordingly, viewing Kierkegaard's works through the lens of possibility is a fruitful way to gain new insights into his beliefs, and clarifies what he sought to express in his authorship. Kierkegaard, I argue, formulates a multilayered account of possibility that, while not abandoning metaphysics, re-frames possibility existentially, in terms of what the self may actually become, not only in and for itself but also in relation to God. One's selfhood and one's relation to God both require an ontology of possibility. His existential concerns arise from this metaphysical footing. This thesis then considers how possibility is integral to human selfhood. Genuine selfhood is an openness towards God's eternal possibility, rather than the self's attempting to create its own eternal possibilities via some other means of actualization. If the human person, by faith, becomes 'grounded in the absolute', then that person is becoming a self precisely because God is actualizing her possibilities. God is for Kierkegaard the source of all possibility. Theologically, Kierkegaard's conception of possibility presents us with ideas that may be fruitful in further discussion of God's attributes and the ways in which God is understood to relate to the created world. Anthropology, ontology, and theology are thus inextricably linked.

From the book of Genesis the human person is presented as divine image-bearer, a Godlike status that is further explained in terms of the dual constitution of matter and spirit. Natural Law provides a person-centred ethic that draws on a number of human goods that emanate naturally from the human person and lead in practice to human flourishing. This theory empowers towards making ethical decisions in the interest of human persons. Aristotle explained the human being as a substantially existing entity with rational powers. By means of his form-matter scheme he handed on, by way of Boethius, to Aquinas, a ready model for the Christian belief in the dual nature of the human person as an ensouled body or embodied soul. Applying the new scientific method to the question of the human self David Hume concluded that he could neither prove nor disprove her existence. By so reasoning Hume indirectly pointed to the need for other disciplines than empirical science to explain the human person. Emmanuel Levinas has drawn on the metaphysical tradition to draw attention to the social and ethical nature of the human person as she leaves the trace of her passing through the face of the other person who is encountered with an ethical gravitas of absolute demand. The genesis of the human person most naturally begins at conception at which point and onwards the human embryo grows continuously through an internal, animating principle towards a full-grown adult person. The main conclusion is that biblical anthropology and metaphysical philosophy provide the needed structures and concepts to explain adequately the full meaning of the human person and to establish the moral right of the human person at every stage to respect and protection.

Pour Elizabeth Anscombe, tout effort de bonté est indissociablement une quête de vérité. La vigilance morale prend chez elle la forme d’un Daimôn rappelant à chacun la tâche d’examiner sa vie : « Peut-être que d’une manière que je ne vois pas, je me trompe désespérément sur une chose essentielle*. » Cette thèse défend l’idée qu’Anscombe élabore un type original de réalisme moral centré sur la notion d’intégrité et polarisé par une question : comment une personne parvient-elle à saisir, le plus rigoureusement possible, le sens et la gravité de ses actions ? Selon elle, trois conditions sont nécessaires afin d’évaluer correctement le poids de nos actes — elles donnent le plan de notre travail : on a besoin de savoir ce qu’on fait effectivement, on doit avoir une certaine idée des nécessités liées à sa nature d’humain et enfin, on doit reconnaître l’infinie valeur de cette nature.Pour savoir ce qu’elle fait, la personne doit pouvoir identifier les critères de « ce qui compte comme une description pertinente d’une action.» Or c’est précisément ce à quoi s’attèle Anscombe dans son étude de l’intention. Elle montre qu’il est possible d’isoler des types d’actions dont nous savons que, si nous la faisons intentionnellement, nous sommes dans le faux. La catégorie d’« acte intrinsèquement injuste » redevient disponible, offrant ainsi le point de départ d’une épistémologie morale réaliste.Pour être intègre, la personne a, par ailleurs, besoin de justifier ses évaluations en les fondant sur une compréhension approfondie de la forme de vie des humains. Là encore, Anscombe opère un déplacement majeur en donnant une nouvelle consistance au concept de nature humaine. Elle s’appuie sur l’idée que nous apprenons quelque chose sur la sorte d’être que sont les humains en dépliant la forme logique de leurs pratiques linguistiques. Sa méta-éthique gravite autour d’un axe souvent inaperçu, combinant le naturalisme d’Aristote et la grammaire logique de Wittgenstein.Enfin, une action ne sera vraie sur le plan moral qu’à la condition de manifester la valeur « mystique » de la nature humaine. La mise au jour de cet aspect constitue l’apport le plus novateur de cette thèse. L’étude approfondie des textes éthico-religieux permet de dégager le cœur de son anthropologie métaphysique : les humains sont non seulement des animaux rationnels, mais aussi des êtres spirituels, doués d’une dignité que nous pouvons connaître par « connaturalité » ou par « perception mystique ».L’exploration des différentes facettes du réalisme moral anscombéen permet, in fine, de préciser son rôle dans le débat éthique contemporain sur l’absolutisme. Certains actes sont-ils à refuser absolument, quoiqu’il en coûte du bien-être de la personne ou de la situation conséquente ? Pour Anscombe, la réponse est oui. Mais cela ne peut se faire ni au détriment du discernement personnel ni au prix d’une aliénation. Sa manière de concevoir l’humain permet de résoudre la tension en établissant que l’interdit n’a pas besoin d’être décrété par une autorité extérieure pour être absolu. Il peut s’imposer intérieurement à la personne, comme une évidence impérieuse, en raison de sa nature spirituelle.*G.E.M. Anscombe, « La philosophie morale moderne », traduit par G. Ginvert et P. Ducray, Klesis-Revue Philo-sophique. Actualité de la philosophie analytique, 2008, no 9, p. 25.Mots-clés : réalisme moral, intégrité, absolutisme, philosophie de l’action, épistémologie morale, méta-éthique, naturalisme, grammaire logique, perception mystique, connaturalité, anthropologie métaphysique, nature spirituelle
For Elizabeth Anscombe, every effort at goodness is also a quest for truth. Moral vigilance takes the form of a Daimôn reminding each person of the task of examining their life: ‘Perhaps in some way, I can’t see, I may be on a bad path, perhaps I am hopelessly wrong in some essential way*.’ This thesis argues that Anscombe is developing an original type of moral realism centred on the notion of integrity and polarised by one question: how does a person come to grasp, as rigorously as possible, the meaning and gravity of their actions? According to her, three conditions are necessary in order to correctly assess the weight of our actions – they provide the blueprint for our work: we need to know what we are actually doing, we need to have some idea of the necessities of our human nature and, finally, we need to recognise the infinite value of this nature.To know what they are doing, the person must be able to identify the criteria for ‘what counts as a relevant description of an action’. This is precisely what Anscombe sets out to do in her study of intention. She shows that it is possible to isolate types of action which we know that, if we do them intentionally, we are in the wrong. The category of "intrinsically unjust act" becomes available again, providing the starting point for a realist moral epistemology.The person also needs to justify their assessments by basing them on a thorough understanding of the human being. Here again, Anscombe makes a major shift by restoring consistency to the concept of human nature. She relies on the idea that we learn something about the kind of being that humans are by unfolding the logical form of their linguistic practices. Her meta-ethics revolves around an often-unnoticed axis, combining Aristotle’s naturalism and Wittgenstein’s logical grammar.Finally, an action will only be true on a moral level if it manifests the “mystical” value of human nature. Bringing this aspect to light is the most innovative contribution of this thesis. An in-depth study of the ethico-religious texts reveals the core of her metaphysical anthropology: humans are not only rational animals, but also spiritual beings, endowed with a dignity that we can know through “connaturality” or “mystical perception”.By exploring the various facets of Anscombean moral realism, we can ultimately clarify its role in the contemporary ethical debate on absolutism. Are certain acts to be rejected absolutely, whatever the cost to the well-being of the person or the consequent situation? For Anscombe, the answer is yes. But this cannot be done either at the expense of personal discernment or at the cost of alienation. Her way of conceiving the human makes it possible to resolve the tension by establishing that the prohibition does not need to be decreed by an external authority to be absolute. It can be imposed internally on the agent, as compelling evidence, due to their spiritual nature.*G. E. M. Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ in Ethics, Religion and Politics, Collected Philosophical Pa-pers III, Oxford, Blackwell, 1981, p. 37.Keywords: moral realism, integrity, absolutism, philosophy of action, moral epistemology, meta-ethics, naturalism, logical grammar, mystical perception, connaturality, metaphysical anthropology, spiritual nature

This thesis provides an original reading of Heidegger's 1929-30 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Currently, the notoriety of FCM stems from controversy surrounding its description of human beings as 'world-forming,' and of animals as comparatively 'poor in world.' These propositions are interpreted within the secondary literature as a reinforcement of ontotheological and humanistic metaphysics. However, this standard interpretation misses the more complex and subtle significance of this material in the broader context of the lectures. I argue that Heidegger's 'comparative examination' forms part of a wider metaphysical project of interrogating a contemporary 'delusion,' a metaphysical division drawn between 'life' and 'spirit' engendered by an 'anthropological' worldview which pictures man as a composite of those two elements. Heidegger traces the manifestations of this delusion in Kulturphilosophie and biology, before attempting to recover a more genuinely metaphysical attitude, one founded not on anthropocentric 'worldviews' but on a direct, courageous 'confrontation' with ourselves. Heidegger argues that this confrontation must take its orientation from Greek thought, in which man is interpreted as that part of physis that apprehends physis as a whole. For Heidegger, this notion of the human as a kind of 'meta-physical' being enables us to grasp the coextensive essence of the human and of metaphysics. I argue that Heidegger's position can be extended and enriched if we consider it in conjunction with what he presents in the lecture course as one of its great adversaries; for the German tradition of philosophical anthropology, rather than being a straightforward articulation of the life-spirit divide that Heidegger wishes to eschew, actually harmonises with and deepens Heidegger's reflections in FCM concerning the nature of the human as a meta-physical being.

Max Scheler développe une phénoménologie de l’affectivité fondée sur l’idée que l’amour est source de toute connaissance. L’amour, défini comme l’acte intentionnel par excellence, est un acte d’essence personnelle. Cette affirmation amène le philosophe à considérer comme une nécessité eidétique l’existence d’une personne infinie divine, un Dieu amour. Cela engendre deux questions : l’essence de la personne divine découle-t-elle de l’expérience intuitive fondée sur l’amour ? Ou bien, au contraire, l’amour ne peut-il être pensé comme fondement de la connaissance que d’après une représentation préalable de Dieu défini comme amour ? Notre recherche propose d’interroger, à partir de la position schelerienne, la possibilité de constituer une phénoménologie absolument neutre de tout présupposé métaphysique. Nous travaillons pour cela avec plusieurs concepts de métaphysique : réalisme ontologique, idéalisme subjectiviste, et Weltanschauung. Nous interrogeons dans un premier temps la pensée schelerienne à travers le prisme du débat généré par le tournant idéaliste de Husserl, en nous demandant si le personnalisme de Scheler peut être qualifié de réalisme et en quel sens. Nous étudions ensuite l’ensemble des axiomes religieux mobilisés par Scheler dans sa phénoménologie afin de mettre en évidence ce que nous appelons une théo-logique de sa conception de la logique phénoménologique. Nous examinons enfin la façon dont Scheler soumet rétrospectivement la phénoménologie à un regard critique, en cherchant à dégager ses présupposés métaphysiques implicites. Cela permet de comprendre pourquoi Scheler, dans la dernière période de ses recherches, abandonne la phénoménologie et considère sa nouvelle pensée comme une métaphysique nouvelle
Max Scheler’s phenomenological thinking is based on the idea that love is the source of all knowledge. Defined as the ultimate intentional act, love is an essentially personal act. This claim drives the philosopher to consider the existence of an infinite personal God – a loving God - as an eidetic necessity. This raises the following questions: does the essence of God arise from an intuitive experience grounded in love? Or is love conceived as the source of all knowledge according to an existing representation of God defined as love? Taking Scheler’s position on the matter as the guiding thread of my research, I examine the possibility of a phenomenology free from any metaphysical presupposition. To this end, several definitions of the term metaphysics will be examined: ontological realism, idealist subjectivism, and theological Weltanschauung. I first question Scheler’s thought through the prism of the debate surrounding Husserl’s idealist turn by asking whether his personalist phenomenology can be described as « realist » and if so, in what sense. Then I examine all the religious axioms that Scheler uses in his phenomenology to highlight what I call a « theo-logic », i.e. an implicit theological conception of phenomenological logic. Finally, I look at how Scheler criticizes phenomenology in the hope of revealing its implicit metaphysical presuppositions. My thesis thus sheds light on why Scheler, at the end of his life, decided to put phenomenology aside and to define his thinking in terms of a new metaphysics

Cette thèse a l’allure d’une géographie de l’historial visant à cartographier le site où la philosophie atteint sa fin. Une telle géographie obéit à, au moins, deux contraintes matricielles. La première contrainte exige de décrire le site en vue de le localiser : notre thèse consistera alors à poser que le site en question ne pourra être occupé que par la finitude infinie car c’est seulement en elle que résiderait son avoir-Lieu matinal ; avoir-Lieu par où la finitude devra pousser son originarité créatrice jusqu’à libérer en elle une infinité affectée en retour d’un sens inédit. La seconde contrainte exige de défricher des territoires textuels permettant d’exhiber le système de coordonnées conceptuelles susceptible de cartographier le site de la FI : notre thèse consistera alors à poser que c’est le territoire élaboré par Derrida qui héberge en lui la cartographie natale de la FI en raison de l’intervention à la fois inaugurale et structurale de la FI sur ce territoire. Dès lors, séjourner dans l’unité articulée de ces deux contraintes exigera d’endurer l’installation spéculative dans la proposition cardinale suivante : la finitude infinie est la déconstruction. Cette endurance se donnera pour tâche de re-Marquer la FI sur le territoire derridien en (re)construisant d’une part le plan d’intelligibilité de la FI à travers l’agencement de ces deux lignes directrices (phénoménologico-Transcendantale et thanatologico-Transcendantale) et d’autre part, en montrant que si la FI confronte le territoire derridien à une charge aporétique opérant comme un pharmakon, cette pharmacologie pourrait libérer des figures inédites de la finitude infinie – figures herméneutiques (Heidegger) et spéculatives (Hegel)
We set out to construct a geography of historical aiming to cartograph the site where philosophy reaches its end. In so doing, two main constraints at least have to be taken into account. We first have to describe the site in order to locate it. We argue that the site in question can only be occupied by infinite finitude, for it is our assumption that only infinite finitude holds its inaugural taking-Place, a taking-Place wherein infinite finitude will have to push its creative originarity so far as to release in itself an infinity that will be affected in return by a novel meaning. Secondly, we have to break new ground in textual territories, which will enable us to uncover the system of conceptual coordinates that will make it possible to cartograph the site of infinite finitude. We argue that it is the territory constructed by Derrida that hosts the native cartography of infinite finitude because of the intervention, both inaugural and structural, of infinite finitude on that territory. It follows that, in order to dwell in the articulated unit of these two constraints, we have to maintain a speculative posture in the following cardinal proposition: infinite finitude IS deconstruction. This posture makes it possible to delineate and re-Inscribe infinite finitude on the Derridean territory by (re)constructing a plane of intelligibility through the combination of both the phenomenologico-Transcendental and thanatologico-Trancendental axes on the one hand; by showing, on the other hand, that if infinite finitude confronts the Derridean territory with an aporetic charge operating as a pharmakon, that pharmacology could release novel figures of infinite finitude - hermeneutic (Heidegger), as well as speculative (Hegel), ones

La philosophie de Kant n’est pas le refus de toute psychologie. Malgré l’incertitude du statut systématique d’une connaissance empirique de l’esprit et l’impossibilité de lui appliquer les mathématiques pour la rendre rigoureusement scientifique, malgré la vacuité d’une déduction a priori des propriétés métaphysiques de l’âme et l’inanité d’une fondation psychologique de la philosophie, de la logique et de la morale, bref, malgré l’antipsychologisme et l’antinaturalisme, les thèmes et les questions psychologiques conservent pour Kant une légitimité et un intérêt. Le chapitre des Paralogismes de la raison pure associé à la Réfutation de l’idéalisme mettent certes fin à la psychologia rationalis issue de la métaphysique de Wolff, mais ils rendent aussi possible une psychologie intégrée à l’anthropologie et suivant le fil directeur de l’expérience. Intimement liée à la philosophie transcendantale, la psychologie selon Kant en sera le complément et l’illustration, par des réflexions sur la genèse de nos connaissances, sur la corrélation de l’intériorité et de l’extériorité, sur l’intensité de la vie consciente et finalement sur le libre usage de nos facultés. La première partie traitera de la difficulté à situer la psychologie par rapport à l’anthropologie et à la philosophie. La seconde, des principales critiques visant la psychologie empirique et la psychologie rationnelle. La dernière, de l’Anthropologie du point du vue pragmatique comme étant la mise en œuvre philosophique d’une théorie inactuelle de l’esprit conforme aux exigences critiques
Kant’s philosophy is not a denial of any form of psychology. Despite the uncertainty of the systematic status concerning the mind’s empirical knowledge and the impossibility to use mathematics to bring this knowledge into the scientific field, despite the vacuity of a deduction about the metaphysical properties of the soul made a priori and the pointlessness of a psychological foundation of both philosophy and logic as well as moral, in brief, despite Kant’s antipsychologism and antinaturalism, themes and psychological issues do remain worthwhile and legitimate in his philosophy. The chapter on “Paralogisms” in the Critique of Pure Reason, associated to the “Refutation of Idealism”, does indeed put an end to the psychologia rationalis -which stems from Wolff’s metaphysics- but yet it makes it possible for psychology to be integrated into anthropology while following the leading thread of experience. Kant’s approach of psychology being intimately related to transcendental philosophy will be both its complement and its illustration through a series of considerations on the genesis of our knowledge, on the connection between interiority and exteriority, the various degrees of consciousness and eventually through considerations on the free use of our mental faculties. The first part will deal with the difficulties to set psychology in relation to Kant’s anthropology and philosophy. The second part will set out the main arguments against empirical and rational psychology. The last part will study Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View as being the philosophical fulfilment of an untimely theory of the mind complying with the demands of criticism

El teòleg jesuïta Karl Rahner, després del Concili Vaticà II, es convertí en el paladí de la nouvelle théologie i en el princeps novorum theologorum mitjançant la proclama del seu gir antropològic. Cal analitzar aquest teòleg de Friburg, per a una comprensió adequada, des dels seus fonaments filosòfics. La metafísica transcendental de Karl Rahner ―expressada en la seva coneguda obra Geist in Welt― està clarament fonamentada en el pensament de l’existencialista Heidegger i en el tomisme transcendental de Maréchal. No obstant això, Rahner es presenta com autèntic intèrpret de sant Tomàs d’Aquino, però, en realitat, tergiversa els texts, contexts i principis de l’Angèlic. El nostre autor, amb la seva Erkenntnismetaphysik, duu fins a les darreres conseqüències el cogito cartesià, identificant en l’home l’ésser, el fet de conèixer i l’objecte conegut, ignorant la distinció que l’Angèlic fa de l’ésser natural i de l’ésser cognoscitiu. Per altra banda, el concepte clau, per entendre la metafísica transcendental del Pare Rahner, és el Vorgriff o anticipació, que és un coneixement apriòric i atemàtic de l’ésser en general. A més a més, Karl Rahner arriba a interpretar la gnoseologia de l’Aquinat identificant ―sic et simpliciter― la conversio ad phantasma, l’abstractio i la reditio in seipsum, sense tenir en compte que sant Tomàs parla d’una unitat dels distints processos cognoscitius, però no els identifica. En conseqüència, Karl Rahner instrumentalitza la metafísica i gnoseologia tomistes pràcticament en la seva totalitat. En definitiva ―seguint Cornelio Fabro―, Rahner “non tam est thomista, quam philosophiae thomisticae depravator”.
El teólogo jesuita Karl Rahner, después del Concilio Vaticano II, se convirtió en el paladín de la nouvelle théologie y en el princeps novorum theologorum mediante la proclama de su giro antropológico. Es menester analizar a este teólogo de Friburgo, para comprenderlo adecuadamente, desde sus fundamentos filosóficos. La metafísica trascendental de Karl Rahner ―expresada en su célebre obra Geist in Welt― está claramente fundamentada en el pensamiento del existencialista Heidegger y en el tomismo trascendental de Maréchal. No obstante, Rahner se presenta como auténtico intérprete de santo Tomás de Aquino, mas, en verdad, tergiversa los mismos textos, contextos y principios del Angélico. Nuestro autor, con su Erkenntnismetaphysik, lleva el cogito cartesiano hasta sus últimas consecuencias, identificando en el hombre el ser, el conocer y el objeto conocido, ignorando la distinción que el Angélico hace del ser natural y del ser cognoscitivo. Por otra parte, el concepto clave, para entender la metafísica trascendental del padre Rahner, es el Vorgriff o anticipación, que es un saber apriórico y atemático del ser en general. Además, Karl Rahner llega a mal interpretar la gnoseología del Aquinate identificando ―sic et simpliciter― la conversio ad phantasma, la abstractio y la reditio in seipsum, sin tener en cuenta que santo Tomás habla de una unidad de los distintos procesos cognoscitivos, pero no los identifica. Por consiguiente, Karl Rahner instrumentaliza la metafísica y la gnoseología tomistas prácticamente en su totalidad. En definitiva ―siguiendo a Cornelio Fabro―, Rahner “non tam est thomista, quam philosophiae thomisticae depravator”.
The Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner, after the Second Vatican Council, became the nouvelle théologie's paladin and princeps novorum theologorum by making an anthropological turn. It is necessary to analyze this theologian from Freiburg from his philosophical foundations to properly understand him. Karl Rahner's transcendental metaphysic ―expressed in his famous work Geist in Welt― is clearly based on both Heidegger's existential thought and Maréchal’s transcendental Thomism. Nevertheless, although Rahner acts as an authentic Saint Thomas of Aquinas interpreter, he distorts Angelic's texts, contexts and principles. Our author, with his Erkenntnismetaphysik, takes the Cartesian cogito to the last consequences, identifying in man the being, knowledge and known object, ignoring the distinction that Angelic makes between natural being and cognitive being. Additionally, the key concept to understand Father Rahner's transcendental metaphysics is Vorgriff or anticipation, which is an aprioric and unthematic knowledge of the being in general. Furthermore, Karl Rahner misunderstands Aquinas’ gnoseology, identifying ―sic et simpliciter― the conversio ad phantasma, abstractio and reditio in seipsum, disregarding that Saint Thomas refers to a unity between different cognitive processes without identifying them. Consequently, Karl Rahner instrumentalizes thomistic metaphysics and gnoseology, almost in its entirety. In short ―as Cornelio Fabro indicates― Rahner “non tam est thomista, quam philosophiae thomisticae depravator”.

Spinoza évaluera la révolution copernicienne et prônera un naturalisme rationaliste et matérialiste contre la tradition onto-théologique, Aristote et Descartes en étant les deux figures clés, sans parler des théologiens et de la Bible. Spinoza interprète l’erreur du géocentrisme comme signalant deux autres erreurs : le dualisme anthropologique classique qui inféodait le corps à l’âme et l’illusion du libre-arbitre. Par la réhabilitation gnoséologique, psychophysique et socio-affective du corps, il prétend conduire l’homme au salut présent, non eschatologique, le réconciliant avec lui-même et avec le Dieu-Nature. La permanence d’une sensibilité anthropologique hébraïque y est prégnante, ce qui n’annule pas des disparités conceptuelles, métaphysiques, sotériologiques et éthiques entre lui et l’Écriture. Ces disparités pourraient rapprocher Spinoza plus d’Aristote que de Descartes. Le projet spinozien tiendra-t-il ses promesses sans retomber dans les travers du mythique et du mystique ?
Spinoza assesses the Copernican revolution and advocates a rationalist and materialistic naturalismagainst the onto-theological tradition, Aristotle and Descartes as the two main figures thereof,theologians and the Bible not to mention. Spinoza interprets the error of geocentrism as indicating twoother errors: classical anthropological dualism which subjugated the body to the soul and the illusion offree-will. By gnoseological, psychophysical and socio-emotional rehabilitation of the body, he claims tolead man to present salvation, not eschatological, reconciling him with himself and with God as Nature.The permanence of Hebraic anthropological sensibility is pregnant, which does not cancel metaphysical,soteriological and ethical disparities between him and the Bible. These disparities could bring Spinozacloser to Aristotle than to Descartes. Will the spinozian project keep its promises without relapsing intothe traps of the mythical and the mystical ?

Spinoza évaluera la révolution copernicienne et prônera un naturalisme rationaliste et matérialiste contre la tradition onto-théologique, Aristote et Descartes en étant les deux figures clés, sans parler des théologiens et de la Bible. Spinoza interprète l’erreur du géocentrisme comme signalant deux autres erreurs : le dualisme anthropologique classique qui inféodait le corps à l’âme et l’illusion du libre-arbitre. Par la réhabilitation gnoséologique, psychophysique et socio-affective du corps, il prétend conduire l’homme au salut présent, non eschatologique, le réconciliant avec lui-même et avec le Dieu-Nature. La permanence d’une sensibilité anthropologique hébraïque y est prégnante, ce qui n’annule pas des disparités conceptuelles, métaphysiques, sotériologiques et éthiques entre lui et l’Écriture. Ces disparités pourraient rapprocher Spinoza plus d’Aristote que de Descartes. Le projet spinozien tiendra-t-il ses promesses sans retomber dans les travers du mythique et du mystique ?
Spinoza assesses the Copernican revolution and advocates a rationalist and materialistic naturalismagainst the onto-theological tradition, Aristotle and Descartes as the two main figures thereof,theologians and the Bible not to mention. Spinoza interprets the error of geocentrism as indicating twoother errors: classical anthropological dualism which subjugated the body to the soul and the illusion offree-will. By gnoseological, psychophysical and socio-emotional rehabilitation of the body, he claims tolead man to present salvation, not eschatological, reconciling him with himself and with God as Nature.The permanence of Hebraic anthropological sensibility is pregnant, which does not cancel metaphysical,soteriological and ethical disparities between him and the Bible. These disparities could bring Spinozacloser to Aristotle than to Descartes. Will the spinozian project keep its promises without relapsing intothe traps of the mythical and the mystical ?

The discussion about the extent to which technology structures the human sphere is nowadays severely hampered by the popularization of mythological (Promethean threat, etc.) or narrative analogies (threat of AI, cyborg, etc.). Many authors who have questioned the essence of technology in detail have come to divide it into two categories, roughly summarized as (post)modern technology and ancient technology, thus evacuating the formal quality of technology. The feeling of anxiety that our societies experience in front of the autonomy and empowerment of technology would be explained by the ontological discontinuity of the human-technology relations. Isn't transhumanism, incidentally, the concrete embodiment of this rupture? Our thesis postulates that in order to correctly interpret the emergence of phenomena such as transhumanism, we need a philosophical reading of the phenomenon of technique. Now, a philosophical reading of the technique is only possible by questioning the anthropological and ontological roots of technology itself. Our intention to use philosophy to tackle this complex and highly mediatized issue of transhumanism leads us to reinvest pre-existing and absolutely fundamental metaphysical questions regarding the relationship between technology and human beings. We have chosen to take a phenomenological approach to better understand transhumanism, in order to outline the metaphysical issues at stake in our technical imaginary, as well as to serve as a new entry point to the question of technology itself. The eidetic reduction allows us to identify the internal divergences of transhumanism in order to express a minimal discourse, the desire to improve the human being through technology. This dialogue can from then on be assumed by the philosophy of technology and serve as a revealing phenomenon, while taking part in a major discussion that is still ongoing. In spite of the cultural and anthropological evolution of technology and its objects, we defend the hypothesis that there is no rupture between a modern technology and an ancient one, and that the emergence or the solidification of forms of contemporary technical imaginaries contributes to the ontological sphere of human existence. Our purpose is to return to the questions that technology raises towards the being of the human, instead of staying at the human that raises questions about the impact of science and technology. The transhumanism is considered as a starting point to the question of technology, which allows to reinstate the human-technology relations in the temporality of a continuous evolution, and induces a renewed and plastic adaptation of the human being to his environment. Our first part introduces the conceptual framework of the understanding of the technical object, as an object embedded in human mediations. We question this object from familiar landmarks, between mechanism and finalism, gesture and mediation, organ and tool. This allows us to determine some phenomenological aspects regarding body unity and the relation between "paraphernalia" and technical object. These defining elements are embodied in the analysis of contemporary techno-scientific objects, which determines the convergences and divergences between the mode of existence of technical objects and the one of emerging objects, in order to induce the possibility of a formal continuity in the ontology of the technical object. It is then necessary to question the relationship of the human being to his materiality, and thus his relationship to his milieu and temporality. Our second part aims at revitalizing the phenomenology of the dwelling through anthropology, in order to bring technology into play at the center of the human experience. We put our technical milieu back at the center of an epistemology that focuses on the notions of intention, invention and imagination, in order to reconstruct the relation of technology to human virtuality and to propose an analysis of the evolution of technology outside the ontic framework of human historicity. This apparent independence of technology requires us to question the reasons behind the feeling of threat that contemporary technology gives rise to. Our third part reshapes the rational and irrational dangers of which technique is the scapegoat by placing them outside the essence of technology itself. We start from a metaphysics of the substance of worldly objects which locates these concrete perils within the framework of the anthropological evolution of production modes and technical progress. We present these elements as the symptom of the transition from a humanist imaginary to a form of technical imaginary. This transition participates in a redefinition of the humanism that is able to overcome the technological ban and to testify of the cultural reality of technology. The emblematic example of these new technical imaginaries is the emergence of transhumanism. The fourth part thus extends these concrete questionings by focusing on the way in which transhumanism reclaims the metaphysical stakes of our materiality. It is based on the transhumanist conception of the human body through the difference therapy/enhancement, which reveals the invariant of the body phenomenon and revitalizes the truly disruptive viewpoints of transhumanism on immortality. They contrast with the existential relation of the human to finitude, considered as a structuring horizon of time. The opening of finitude to new temporalities invites us to question the way in which transhumanism brings into play the thought of eschatology and transcendence as a measure of lived time. Therefore, our fifth and last part questions the notion of transhumanist Grand Narrative in the light of emblematic technical myths, in order to unveil the metapoetics of imaginaries that support transhumanist and anti-transhumanist discourses. We locate the mythification of transhumanism in a more general eschatological and temporal process, taking into account the chosen recourse of transhumanist movements to technophilic optimism. These interrogations allow us to reinvest our analyses of the milieu and temporality to synthesize the continuistic evolutionism that makes transhumanism a consistent and metaphysical vector of the technical organization of the human sphere.
Le débat visant à évaluer dans quelle mesure la technique structure la sphère humaine est aujourd’hui grandement bridé par la vulgarisation d’analogies mythologiques (menace prométhéenne, etc.) ou narratives (menace de l’IA, du cyborg, etc.). De nombreux auteurs qui ont questionné en détail l’essence de la technique la scindent aujourd’hui selon deux modalités, résumées schématiquement en une technique (post)moderne et une technique ancienne, en évacuant la quiddité formelle de la technique. Le sentiment d’inquiétude qu’éprouvent nos sociétés face à l’autonomisation et à la puissance technique s’expliquerait par la discontinuité ontologique des relations humain-technique. Le transhumanisme, d’ailleurs, ne se fait-il pas l’incarnation concrète de cette rupture ? Notre thèse postule qu’afin de correctement interpréter l’émergence de phénomènes comme le transhumanisme, nous avons besoin d’une lecture philosophique du phénomène de la technique. Cette lecture philosophique de la technique nécessite de réinterroger les racines anthropologiques et ontologiques de la technique elle-même. Nous adoptons pour cela une approche phénoménologique de l’objet transhumaniste, qui se propose d’esquisser les enjeux métaphysiques propres à nos imaginaires techniques, en plus de servir d’entrée nouvelle à la question de la technique elle-même. La réduction eidétique nous permet de localiser les divergences internes au transhumanisme pour les rendre à l’expression d’un discours minimal, la volonté d’amélioration de l’homme par la technique. Ce discours manifesté et manifestant peut dès lors être pris en charge par la philosophie de la technique et servir de phénomène dévoilant, en prenant part à une discussion majeure et au demeurant largement entamée. Malgré l’évolution culturelle et anthropologique de la technique et de ses objets, nous défendons l’hypothèse qu’il n’y a pas de rupture entre une technique moderne et une technique ancienne, et que l’émergence ou la solidification de formes d’imaginaires techniques contemporains participe ontologiquement de la sphère d’existence humaine, et non accidentellement. Notre intention est donc de revenir aux questions que soulève la technique envers l’être de l’humain, au lieu d’en rester à l’humain comme l’être soulevant des questions sur l’impact de la science et de la technique. Le transhumanisme est pensé comme une porte d’entrée à la question de la technique, permettant de réinscrire les relations humain-technique dans la temporalité d’une évolution continue, induisant l’adaptation renouvelée et plastique de l’homme à son milieu. Notre première partie introduit le cadre conceptuel de la compréhension de l’objet technique, comme objet s’insérant dans les médiations humaines. Nous interrogeons cet objet à partir de points de repères familiers, entre mécanisme et finalisme, geste et médiation, organe et outil. Ces éléments nous permettent de déterminer certains apports phénoménologiques quant à l’unité organique et au rapport entre « util » et objet technique. Ces éléments de définition sont concrétisés dans l’analyse d’objets technoscientifiques contemporains, qui détermine les convergences et divergences entre le mode d’existence des objets techniques et celui des objets émergents, afin d’induire la possibilité d’une continuité formelle dans l’ontologie de l’objet technique. Il devient nécessaire de questionner le rapport de l’humain à l’engagement de sa matérialité, et donc de ses rapports au milieu et à la temporalité. Notre seconde partie cherche à revitaliser la phénoménologie de l’habitat par l’anthropologie, afin de faire jouer la technique au centre de la notion de vécu humain. Nous y replaçons le milieu technique au centre d’une épistémologie faisant travailler les notions d’intention, d’invention et d’imagination, pour reconstruire la relation de la technique à la virtualité humaine et proposer une analyse de l’évolution de la technique et de ses objets hors du cadre ontique de l’historicité humaine. Cette apparente autonomisation de la technique nous enjoint dès lors à questionner les ressorts du sentiment de danger que fait naître la technique contemporaine. Notre troisième partie participe d’une tentative de redéfinition de l’humanisme, apte à dépasser l’interdit technologique et à témoigner de la réalité culturelle de la technique. Elle restructure les dangers rationnels et irrationnels dont la technique se fait le bouc-émissaire en les resituant en dehors de l’essence de la technique elle-même, à partir d’une métaphysique de la substance des objets mondains qui replace ces périls concrets dans le cadre de l’évolution anthropologique de modes de production et de la notion de progrès technique. Nous présentons ces éléments comme le symptôme du passage d’un imaginaire humaniste vers une forme d’imaginaire technique, dont l’exemple emblématique est l’émergence du transhumanisme. La quatrième partie prolonge donc ces questionnements concrets en s’appuyant sur la façon dont le transhumanisme se réapproprie les enjeux métaphysiques de notre matérialité. Elle s’appuie sur la conception transhumaniste du corps humain à travers la différence thérapie/augmentation, qui dévoile l’invariant du phénomène corporel et vient revitaliser l’aspect véritablement rupturel des considérations immortalistes transhumanistes. Celles-ci viennent en contrepoint à la relation existentiale de l’humain à la finitude, considérée comme horizon de structuration du temps et du monde. L’ouverture de la finitude à de nouvelles temporalités nous invite alors à questionner la façon dont le transhumanisme fait jouer une pensée de l’eschatologie et de la transcendance comme mesure d’un temps vécu. Notre cinquième et dernière partie interroge par conséquent la notion de Grand Récit transhumaniste à l’aune de mythes techniques emblématiques, pour dévoiler la métapoétique de l’imaginaire qui sous-tend les discours transhumanistes et anti-transhumanistes. Nous en venons à resituer la mythification du transhumanisme dans un processus eschatologique et temporel plus général, prenant en compte le recours choisi des mouvements transhumanistes à l’optimisme technophile. Ces interrogations nous permettent de réinvestir nos analyses du milieu et de la temporalité pour synthétiser l’évolutionnisme continuiste faisant du transhumanisme un vecteur consistant de la structuration onto-anthropotechnique de la sphère humaine.

L'intenzione che sottende il mio progetto di tesi è analizzare alcuni tratti dell'antropologia pedagogica, in particolar modo novecentesca, alla luce di un vettore d'analisi rilevante quale può essere l'agire umano. La ricerca è strutturata in quattro parti. La prima intende porre in risalto alcune connotazioni pedagogiche che emergono dalle proposte attivistiche, richiamando, mediante questa “rivoluzione copernicana dell'educazione”, le implicazioni educative concernenti la riflessione sull'agire dell'educando, alla luce di un innovativo paradigma antropologico. La seconda si prefigge lo scopo di esplorare l'attività come categoria pedagogica in tre autori (Gentile, Dewey e Maritain) fondamentali nella pedagogia novecentesca, secondo il peculiare profilo teoretico di ciascuno. Nella terza parte mi preme mettere a fuoco la delicata interconnessione tra “tecnica” ed “agire” in riferimento all'essere umano, movendo dall'incombente avanzare della tecnica e analizzando le sue ripercussioni sull'antropologia dell'educazione. Infine, nella quarta, la prospettiva che intendo perseguire è una “ricostruzione” dell'antropologia pedagogica d'ispirazione metafisica che ponga in risalto l'agire umano nelle sue implicazioni di senso e significato.
This research project is aimed to analyze some features of pedagogical anthropology - especially XXth century one - in the light of the relevant tool of analysis of human acting. The research is divided into four parts. The first aims to highlight a number of pedagogical connotations that emerge from the activist proposals. Through this “Copernican revolution of education”, it recalls the educational implications concerning the reflection on the educandum's acting, in the light of an innovative anthropological paradigm. The second section provides an exploration of activity as a pedagogical category in three fundamental authors of XXth century pedagogy, namely Gentile, Dewey and Maritain, from the perspective of their peculiar theoretical approaches. In the third part I focus on the delicate interconnection between “techniques” and “acting” in the human being, moving from the impending progress of technics and analyzing its repercussions on anthropology and education. Finally, in the fourth part I intend to pursue a “reconstruction” of pedagogical anthropology of metaphysical inspiration that foregrounds human acting in its sense and meaning implications.

L'intenzione che sottende il mio progetto di tesi è analizzare alcuni tratti dell'antropologia pedagogica, in particolar modo novecentesca, alla luce di un vettore d'analisi rilevante quale può essere l'agire umano. La ricerca è strutturata in quattro parti. La prima intende porre in risalto alcune connotazioni pedagogiche che emergono dalle proposte attivistiche, richiamando, mediante questa “rivoluzione copernicana dell'educazione”, le implicazioni educative concernenti la riflessione sull'agire dell'educando, alla luce di un innovativo paradigma antropologico. La seconda si prefigge lo scopo di esplorare l'attività come categoria pedagogica in tre autori (Gentile, Dewey e Maritain) fondamentali nella pedagogia novecentesca, secondo il peculiare profilo teoretico di ciascuno. Nella terza parte mi preme mettere a fuoco la delicata interconnessione tra “tecnica” ed “agire” in riferimento all'essere umano, movendo dall'incombente avanzare della tecnica e analizzando le sue ripercussioni sull'antropologia dell'educazione. Infine, nella quarta, la prospettiva che intendo perseguire è una “ricostruzione” dell'antropologia pedagogica d'ispirazione metafisica che ponga in risalto l'agire umano nelle sue implicazioni di senso e significato.
This research project is aimed to analyze some features of pedagogical anthropology - especially XXth century one - in the light of the relevant tool of analysis of human acting. The research is divided into four parts. The first aims to highlight a number of pedagogical connotations that emerge from the activist proposals. Through this “Copernican revolution of education”, it recalls the educational implications concerning the reflection on the educandum's acting, in the light of an innovative anthropological paradigm. The second section provides an exploration of activity as a pedagogical category in three fundamental authors of XXth century pedagogy, namely Gentile, Dewey and Maritain, from the perspective of their peculiar theoretical approaches. In the third part I focus on the delicate interconnection between “techniques” and “acting” in the human being, moving from the impending progress of technics and analyzing its repercussions on anthropology and education. Finally, in the fourth part I intend to pursue a “reconstruction” of pedagogical anthropology of metaphysical inspiration that foregrounds human acting in its sense and meaning implications.

The term entheogen refers to drugs—including the artificial substances and active principles drawn from them—which are known to produce ecstasy and have been used traditionally in certain religious and shamanic contexts. The entheogenic experiences provoked by entheogens are described by users in myriad ways, including in spiritual, religious, philosophical, and secular contexts. Entheogenic experiences have shown that they can create opportunities for individuals to generate meaning, including novel philosophical insights, which users claim to gain by way of experience. As such, entheogenic experiences exhibit the ability to influence a change in a user’s fundamental philosophical commitments, or live options, including their ethical dispositions. Given that these new live options are rooted in experience, their veracity gains further credence for users than those commitments they have come to hold by way of abstraction. By philosophically investigating the phenomenology of entheogenic experiences, this work argues that entheogens have ethical import

This thesis aims at formulating a human rights justification based on the assumption that disbelief in human rights is found in communicative grounds, rather than some sort of unreasonable evil. I first identify what I believe to be a flaw in the communicative strength of existing human rights justifications in explaining why rights should be. I suggest that there is a gap between the justifications of human rights that contain metaphysical narrative, and the justifications that rely on subjective experience of rights as good. I further explain how this is a gap that political consensus and the idea of Kantian moral reason cannot seem to fill. I subsequently boil this gap down to the concept of value, since the foundation for each justification is based on a type of value. These are categorized as either given value – which applies to all attributes of value that is “given” to us independently of our actions or opinions, or created value – which applies to all attributes of value that stem from social interaction (thus action) and experience. As justifications are funneled into either of these two categories of value, it begins to look like no other type of value exist, and as a result no one looks for it. To respond to this problem, I formulate a philosophical explanation, in Robert Nozicks terms. This explanation shows that there may be other routes to apply to value than sticking to simply given or created value. My explanation utilizes the three theories of philosophical anthropology, internal metaphysical realism and Wittgensteins philosophy of language, and it is based on the result of an analysis of material consisting of human rights justification arguments by Nicholas Wolterstorff, Alasdaire MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty. The actual philosophical explanation I formulate utilizes the metaphysics of Helen Steward to provide a given-value foundation for the primitive reactions of Stefan Eriksson, which creates value through social organization. Overall, I find that there are untried possibilities which may allow for a different type of value to act as the foundation for a human rights justification. My contribution to the field rests in the novelty of the theories used in my explanation, and the angle of the problem formulation.

After a short introduction concerning the problem of "Artificial Intelligence" (AI) the work continues with a summary of the state of the art.Thereafter, it goes on to profile four different basic scientific views of human beings and AI: symbolism, connectionism, biologism and physicalism. The emphasis is on the elucidation of anthropologically relevant statements to intelligence, spirit, thinking, perception, will, consciousness, self-consciousness, feelings and life.It is demonstrated that the basic views referred to represent greatly abbreviated and distorted pictures of human beings. Theories that do not go beyond the quantifiable level cannot adequately encompass the nature of relevant concepts and capabilities. That is above all because of the fact that generally a philosophical materialism is advocated, which considers the existence of intellectual substances impossible. For this reason a philosophical critique is necessary. The position of moderate and critical realism is advocated, whose anthropological statements are secured by epistemological and metaphysical investigations.The work comes to the conclusion that human beings cannot be understood symbolistically, connectionistically, biologistically or physicalistically. Man is a physical-intellectual entity, endowed with reason, a living social being. He is formed and led by his intellectual and therefore immortal soul, which gives him uniqueness, irreplaceability and the value of personhood. He is capable of thinking and thus of objective, abstract perception, and therefore is intelligent. Humans have an unfettered will, which, led by mental perception, is to be directed toward the good. They are moreover, through reflection, self-conscious. Humans live an intellectually determined life, which essentially differs, despite biological similarity, from that of animals and cannot possibly, due to its substantial superiority, have developed from animal life.All substantial anthropological abilities (such as intelligence, will, consciousness etc.) presuppose spirit. Because it is not within the power of human beings to create a simple substance such as spirit, a thinking, perceptive, intelligent, willing, self-conscious, sentient living being can at best be only technically imitated, modelled or simulated but never be reproduced, copied or created. The relationship of humans to AI is thus determined by an insuperable difference between their natures.

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Focusing on the works of the Rumanian philosopher Emil Cioran (1911-1995), this study proposes an anthropological approach in order to elucidate the author s conception regarding human being. Cioran s writings portrait man as an essentially infirm being, idea from which this study takes off so as to explain what lies behind his anthropological pessimism. For such, it takes gathering, analyzing and interpreting the reflections offered by him on human being his origins, condition, history and destiny and that are spread out throughout his books. Besides, some of his critics will contribute to sustain the hypothesis: more than just a philosopher, Cioran is a religious thinker, whose pessimistic conception regarding human condition is rooted in gnostic soil. As it is intended to be demonstrated, his connections with gnosticism go way beyond a mere intellectual affinity, involving as well a kinship with the bogomils, a gnostic sect which settled in the Balkans during the Middle Ages and which is supposed to have had a significant role in shaping Rumania s cultural identity. Furthermore, it intends to argue that the crisis of insomnia endured by Cioran in his youth period has a cognitive and spiritual character allowing her to be interpreted as a gnosis. At last, this study commits itself with sustaining the following thesis: much more than his readings, it is rather his insomniac experience that turns out to be the decisive event responsible to shape his thought from then on, including his world and man view
Tendo a obra do filósofo romeno Emil Cioran (1911-1995) como objeto, este estudo parte de um recorte antropológico cuja intenção é lançar luzes sobre sua concepção de ser humano. Está presente em sua obra a idéia do homem como um animal enfermo por natureza, sendo este o ponto de partida que nos levará à compreensão do que está por trás do seu pessimismo antropológico. Para tanto, busca reunir, analisar e interpretar as diversas reflexões que o autor desenvolve sobre o ser humano sua origem, condição, história e destino e que se encontram espalhadas através de seus livros. Além de contar com alguns comentadores que contribuem para sustentar a hipótese: mais do que um filósofo, Cioran é um pensador de cunho religioso, cuja concepção pessimista acerca da condição humana encontra raízes no pensamento gnóstico. Conforme pretende demonstrar, sua relação com o gnosticismo vai muito além de uma mera afinidade intelectual, envolvendo também um parentesco com os bogomilos, seita gnóstica que habitou os Bálcãs durante a Idade Média e que teria influenciado profundamente a alma romena. Além disso, tentará mostrar que a crise de insônia sofrida por Cioran na juventude possui um sentido cognitivo e espiritual profundo que permite interpretá-la como uma gnose. Por fim, este estudo se compromete a sustentar a seguinte tese central: mais do que suas leituras, é a experiência de insônia o acontecimento decisivo que determinará todo seu pensamento posterior, sua visão de mundo assim como de ser humano

The nature of trials, tests, and temptation in the Epistle of James has been extensively debated in New Testament scholarship. However, scholarship has underexamined the tension between the author’s mitigation of divine agency in testing ( Jas 1:13–14) and the author’s appeal to well-known biblical testing narratives such as the creation account (1:15– 18), the Binding of Isaac ( Jas 2:21–24), and the Trials of Job ( Jas 5:9–11). is juxtaposition between the author’s theological apologetic and his biblical hermeneutic has the potential to reveal either the author’s theological incoherence or his rhetorical and hermeneutical creativity. With these tensions of divine agency and biblical interpretation in mind, this dissertation compares the Epistle of James against other examples of ancient Jewish interpretation, interrogating two points of contact in each Jewish work: their portrayals of the cosmic drama of testing, and their resulting biblical hermeneutic. The dissertation assembles a spectrum of positions on how the divine, satanic, and human roles of testing vary from author to author. These variations of the dramatis personae of the cosmic drama exercise a direct influence on the reception and interpretation of the biblical testing narratives. When the Epistle of James is examined in a similar light, it reveals a cosmic drama especially dependent on the metaphor of the divine law court. Within this cosmic drama, God stands as righteous judge, and in the place of divine prosecutor stand the cosmic forces indicting both divine integrity and human religious loyalty. These cosmic and human roles have a direct impact on James’ reading of biblical testing narratives. Utilising an intra-canonical hermeneutic similar to that found in Rewritten Bible literature, the Epistle appeals to a constructed ‘Jobraham’ narrative in which the Job stories mitigate divine agency in biblical trials such as those of Abraham, and Abraham’s celebrated patience rehabilitates Job’s rebellious response to trial. In conclusion, by closely examining the broader exegetical discourses of ancient Judaism, this project sheds new light on how the Epistle of James responds to theological tensions within its religious community through a hermeneutical application of the dominant biblical narratives of Job’s cosmic framework and Abraham’s human perfection.

La philosophie de Kant n’est pas le refus de toute psychologie. Malgré l’incertitude du statut systématique d’une connaissance empirique de l’esprit et l’impossibilité de lui appliquer les mathématiques pour la rendre rigoureusement scientifique, malgré la vacuité d’une déduction a priori des propriétés métaphysiques de l’âme et l’inanité d’une fondation psychologique de la philosophie, de la logique et de la morale, bref, malgré l’antipsychologisme et l’antinaturalisme, les thèmes et les questions psychologiques conservent pour Kant une légitimité et un intérêt. Le chapitre des Paralogismes de la raison pure associé à la Réfutation de l’idéalisme mettent certes fin à la psychologia rationalis issue de la métaphysique de Wolff, mais ils rendent aussi possible une psychologie intégrée à l’anthropologie et suivant le fil directeur de l’expérience. Intimement liée à la philosophie transcendantale, la psychologie selon Kant en sera le complément et l’illustration, par des réflexions sur la genèse de nos connaissances, sur la corrélation de l’intériorité et de l’extériorité, sur l’intensité de la vie consciente et finalement sur le libre usage de nos facultés. La première partie traitera de la difficulté à situer la psychologie par rapport à l’anthropologie et à la philosophie. La seconde, des principales critiques visant la psychologie empirique et la psychologie rationnelle. La dernière, de l’Anthropologie du point du vue pragmatique comme étant la mise en œuvre philosophique d’une théorie inactuelle de l’esprit conforme aux exigences critiques
Kant’s philosophy is not a denial of any form of psychology. Despite the uncertainty of the systematic status concerning the mind’s empirical knowledge and the impossibility to use mathematics to bring this knowledge into the scientific field, despite the vacuity of a deduction about the metaphysical properties of the soul made a priori and the pointlessness of a psychological foundation of both philosophy and logic as well as moral, in brief, despite Kant’s antipsychologism and antinaturalism, themes and psychological issues do remain worthwhile and legitimate in his philosophy. The chapter on “Paralogisms” in the Critique of Pure Reason, associated to the “Refutation of Idealism”, does indeed put an end to the psychologia rationalis -which stems from Wolff’s metaphysics- but yet it makes it possible for psychology to be integrated into anthropology while following the leading thread of experience. Kant’s approach of psychology being intimately related to transcendental philosophy will be both its complement and its illustration through a series of considerations on the genesis of our knowledge, on the connection between interiority and exteriority, the various degrees of consciousness and eventually through considerations on the free use of our mental faculties. The first part will deal with the difficulties to set psychology in relation to Kant’s anthropology and philosophy. The second part will set out the main arguments against empirical and rational psychology. The last part will study Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View as being the philosophical fulfilment of an untimely theory of the mind complying with the demands of criticism

Ce doctorat lie les vestiges lithiques fragmentés et dispersés par des décennies de labours des terrasses marines constituant le site de La Martre (Gaspésie, Québec, Canada), pour y dégager certaines limites d’intelligibilité et de perceptibilité, et en tracer de nouvelles. Les labours forment un palimpseste archéologique spécifique : ils ont créé un effet de décontextualisation des pratiques lithiques contenues dans les bords de chaque biface et éclat lorsque les contextes de déposition permettant de rapprocher certains vestiges et d’en éloigner d’autres, et permettant d’exercer un contrôle chronologique sur ces vestiges ont été perturbés. Les seuls repères chronologiques disponibles sont (i.) un plancher d’habitabilité suivant la déglaciation du versant nord de la Gaspésie ; (ii.) l’exondation de terrasses marines dues au retrait de la mer de Goldthwait ; (iii.) des pointes de projectile dites « Plano » ayant permis d’affilier dans des travaux antérieurs une partie de La Martre au « Paléoindien récent » (entre 11 600 à 8000 cal BP dans le Nord-est américain). Conséquemment, les repères chronologiques de La Martre flottent dans une marée lithique mouvante formée de bifaces et d’éclats dans les labours sans le contrôle permis par les contours que des contextes de déposition mieux préservés permettraient. Ce contrôle préalable est indispensable pour pouvoir délimiter les échelles justifiant l’utilisation de certaines théories et méthodes d’analyse. Il est considéré que ces problèmes contextuels ne justifient aucunement l’exclusion des labours d’une narration archéologique, à condition d’opérer un renversement de nos pratiques. Les labours permettent d’exacerber des problèmes théoriques, épistémologiques et méthodologiques, constitutifs de toute pratique archéologique et que des contextes non labourés rendent invisibles. Ces problèmes peuvent être ramenés à celui provoqué par la bifurcation du réel, un geste qui, en séparant l’esprit de la matière, sépare un réel en deux et maintient l’un attaché à ce qui en est déjà connu et en bloque le développement et la transformation. Les labours marquent une première étape d’émancipation de ce réel bifurqué en nous forçant à renverser notre rapport à lui pour partir d’un réel mouvant et dispersé dans lequel une conscience perçoit et pense. Raconter des histoires lithiques dans les labours de La Martre, c’est donc prolonger ce renversement initié par ces labours en suivant ses mouvements constitutifs : ceux d’une conscience, de la taille de la pierre, des labours et de nos descriptions. C’est développer de nouvelles histoires qu’un ancrage dans un réel bifurqué inhibe. Il est proposé ici que ce renversement soit prolongé par un mouvement descriptif par lequel quinze surfaces de dispersion sont progressivement tracées : (i.) des terrasses labourées, les stations 15 et 16 de La Martre ; (ii.) des supports transformés ; (iii.) des chaînes opératoires ; (iv.) un échantillon de 447 supports transformés ; (v.) un continuum de réduction ; (vi) l’intégrité d’un support ; (vii.) les compétences ; (viii.) la matière première ; (ix.) les objectifs de taille ; (x.) les groupes techniques ; (xi.) des flux lithiques ; (xii.) une combinatoire de compétences ; (xiii.) des évolutions possibles ; (xiv.) des lieux ; (xv.) des séquences de production. Ces surfaces permettent de diversifier la taille de la pierre plutôt que de l’épurer ; de changer les conditions dans lesquelles des outils méthodologiques tels que la chaîne opératoire ou les stades d’une séquence de réduction peuvent être utilisés ; de repartir de mouvements et de rapports constitutifs de La Martre plutôt que de groupes ou d’individus préalablement définis ; de différencier les terrasses marines pour circonscrire un lieu, 16-ouest, structuré par des dynamiques socioculturelles d’apprentissage et de distinction dont émergent diverses séquences de production capturant des compétences et des objectifs divers ; de reconnecter La Martre au paysage du Nord- est paléoindien pour en diversifier les histoires lithiques et archéologiques ; de travailler dans un entre-deux : entre deux lieux, entre deux paysages, entre deux formes émergeant de nos histoires sans que ces histoires ne s’y arrêtent. Raconter des histoires lithiques dans les labours de La Martre, c’est donc effectuer un quadruple travail narratif qui ailleurs n’aurait pas eu besoin d’être fait : (i.) explorer les façons dont les tailleurs et tailleuses de La Martre s’engageaient avec leur paysage en taillant la pierre ; (ii.) analyser les conditions permettant de raconter ces histoires anthropologiques ; (iii.) créer de nouvelles conditions permettant de raconter de nouvelles histoires ; et (iv.) raconter ces histoires lithiques.
This thesis binds various lithic remains fragmented and scattered by decades of plowing at La Martre (Gaspé Peninsula, Quebec, Canada). Plowing creates a specific type of archaeological palimpsest. It erases units allowing for: the comparison of lithic practices contained within each biface and flake that make up a context; the chronological control of said units; and using various methods and theories according to an archaeological unit’s appropriate scale. A maximum chronological boundary following the deglaciation of the northern Gaspé Peninsula, the exposure of La Martre’s higher terraces by the receding sea, and the production of Plano projectile points (dated to between 11 600 and 9000 cal BP in northeastern America) provide archaeologists with some chronological control that floats within La Martre’s hundreds of thousands of lithic remains. Yet, it is argued that plowing cannot preclude archaeologists from telling lithic and other stories, provided that some practices and habits are changed. Indeed, plowing points to theoretical, epistemological and methodological problems that elsewhere may have remained invisible. These problems pertain to the bifurcation of reality inhibiting its development by laying down a ready- made and unchanging reality prior to any engagement with it. Plowing requires for this specific engagement with reality to be turned upside down, starting from a moving and dispersed reality that a consciousness perceives and thinks with. Telling lithic stories at La Martre requires that this turn be extended by following its movements: that of a conscience, of knapping and of plowing; thus telling new stories that a bifurcated relationship to reality had inhibited. It is suggested here that this turn be extended using description along fifteen dispersion surfaces: (i.) two plowed terraces, stations 15 and 16; (ii.) shaped blanks; (iii.) chaînes opératoires; (iv.) a sample of 447 shaped blanks; (v.) a reduction continuum; (vi.) shaped blank integrity; (vii.) skill; (viii.) raw material; (ix.) knapping objectives; (x.) technical groups; (xi.) lithic fluxes; (xii.) skill combinatorics; (xiii.) possible evolutions; (xiv.) places; (xv.) production sequences. Such surfaces allow for several things: first, for knapping diversification rather than refining; second, for changing the condition of use of the chaîne opératoire or the reduction sequence; third, for starting from movement and relationships rather than defined groups or individuals; fourth, for differentiating La Martre’s plowed terraces; fifth, for delimiting a place, 16-West, structured by the sociocultural dynamics of learning and distinction; sixth, for growing several production sequences; seventh, for reconnecting La Martre to the northeastern Paleoindian landscape and multiplying its lithic and archaeological stories; and eighth, for working within the “in between” places, landscapes and shapes that grow from such stories. Thus, telling lithic stories within La Martre’s plowed fields is a fourfold narrative: (i.) exploring how past people engaged with their landscape through knapping; (ii.) deconstructing conditions allowing for such an exploration; (iii.) creating new conditions allowing for new stories to be told; and (iv.) telling these new stories.

Rozprawa niniejsza poświęcona jest analizie myśli Maksyma Wyznawcy, najwybitniejszego siódmowiecznego przedstawiciela patrystyki greckiej, a nawet (stosując określenie H.-G. Becka) „najbardziej uniwersalnego umysłu” tego stulecia. Wychodząc od paralelnych poszukiwań kontekstu historycznego, biograficznego i doktrynalnego, rozważam jego poglądy pod kątem ich wewnętrznej ewolucji, a także późniejszego oddziaływania. W części pierwszej, zatytułowanej Dziedzictwo, splatam ze sobą analizę wybranych wątków recepcji Maksymowego dorobku w tradycji średniowiecznej (bizantyjskiej oraz łacińskiej) z wybranymi wątkami recepcji dwudziestowiecznej (przyjmując jako swoisty paradygmat współczesnych sporów badawczych głośną polemikę pomiędzy H. U. von Balthasarem i P. Sherwoodem wokół Balthasarowskiego dzieła Kosmische Liturgie). Czynię to z zamiarem ukazania trwałości dziedzictwa Wyznawcy, a zarazem po to, by zilustrować genezę współczesnych sporów badawczych wokół tegoż dziedzictwa. Część pierwszą zamykam metodologicznym wstępem do dalszego ciągu rozprawy. Część druga, zatytułowana Twórczość Maksyma na tle jego żywota, stanowi trzon pracy. Kluczem tematycznym, który ma ułatwić równoległe śledzenie itinerarium vitae i itinerarium mentis myśliciela są jego wędrówki po rozległych obszarach greckiego Wschodu i łacińskiego Zachodu. Rozpoczynając podróż od Palestyny, prawdopodobnego miejsca narodzin i wczesnych lat monastycznej formacji Wyznawcy, stawiam pytanie o jego pierwotne środowisko intelektualne i o źródłową doktrynalną tożsamość (rozdziały pierwszy i drugi części drugiej). Określiwszy zasadniczą przynależność Maksyma do chrystologicznego stronnictwa „neochalcedońskiego”, pytam następnie o stosunek Wyznawcy do tradycji orygenistycznych. Sytuowanie tego ostatniego zagadnienia w kontekście palestyńskim podyktowane jest nie tyle samą chronologią (najważniejsze antyorygenistyczne utwory pisarza powstały w okresie już po opuszczeniu przez niego ojczyzny), ile próbą wpisania owego zagadnienia w sekwencję odzwierciedlającą rozwój myśliciela. W takiej to logice ujmuję następnie Maksymowe zaangażowanie w dyskusje chrystologiczne: nad interpretacją Dionizjańskiego wyrażenia „jedna/nowa teandryczna energia”, nad interpretacją pojęcia woli i wreszcie – źródłowego dla tamtych dwóch – zagadnienia Chrystusowych natur. Owa pierwsza kwestia, związana z działaniem bogoludzkim, która historycznie wywołała spór monoenergetyczny, w sensie geograficznym została po raz pierwszy (w wieku VII) postawiona w związku z próbą zjednoczenia w Aleksandrii współistniejących dwóch hierarchii kościelnych – chalcedońskiej i miafizyckiej. Ów wątek aleksandryjski jest dla mnie przyczynkiem do zbadania ewentualnej obecności i dalszych związków Wyznawcy z tym miastem (rozdział trzeci części drugiej). Analizuję ten biograficzny problem z zamiarem ukazania możliwości kształcenia myśliciela właśnie w Aleksandrii i to kształcenia filozoficznego, kontynuującego w pewnym zakresie tradycję tamtejszej słynnej neoplatońskiej „szkoły”. Wreszcie, odnosząc się do wieloletniego pobytu Maksyma w Afryce Prokonsularnej, wskazuję na jego prawdopodobne kontakty ze szkołą w Nisibis (wynikające z faktu, iż syryjscy mnisi znajdowali w tym regionie azyl) oraz z tradycją łacińską, przede wszystkim Augustyńską (rozdział czwarty części drugiej). Te poszukiwania prowadzą mnie ku analizie późnych losów Wyznawcy: ostatecznego wygnania i męczeństwa, które później – w sposób przedstawiony w pracy w części pierwszej – wpłynęły na kształt recepcji także i jego dziedzictwa intelektualnego. Ten skomplikowany związek wyznania jako męczeństwa i jako konfesji filozoficzno-teologicznej skłania mnie do postawienia w zakończeniu rozprawy pytania o problem przeznaczenia człowieka i myśliciela.
This dissertation is dedicated to the analysis of the thought of Maximus the Confessor, the most important representative of the seventh-century Greek patristics or even, as H.-G. Beck once remarked, «the most universal mind» of that century. Originating from parallel research of the historical, biographical and doctrinal context, I consider his views, their inner evolution, as well as their influence to come. In the first part, entitled The Legacy, I combine the analysis of selected threads of Maximus‘ output in Byzantine and Latin medieval tradition with selected trains of reception in the twentieth century (acknowledging the famous polemic between H. U. von Balthasar and P. Sherwood on Balthasar’s work, Kosmische Liturgie, as a kind of a paradigm in contemporary scholar dispute). This is aimed at emphasizing the durability of Maximus’ legacy, but also to illustrate the genesis of modern day scientific dispute concerning this heritage. A methodological preface of the later course of the thesis encloses the first part. The second part, entitled The work and life of Maximus, constitutes the main part of the dissertation. The philosopher’s journeys through distant areas of Greek East and Latin West serve as a thematic key allowing to trace and simultaneously investigate both his itinerarium vitae and itinerarium mentis. Setting out in Palestine, the probable place of the Confessors’ birth and monastic formation, I raise the question of his original intellectual environment and source doctrinal identity (chapters I and II of the second part). Having determined Maximus’ fundamental affiliation with the christological «neo-Chalcedonian» party, I inquire about his attitude towards various origenist traditions. Location of the last issue in Palestinian context is not dictated by sole chronology (since the most remarkable antiorigenist works of the writter came into being in a period after he departed from his homeland), but rather by an attempt to inscribe that very issue in the thinker’s development sequency. Such logic allows me to carry on by presenting Maximus’ engagement in christological discussions: on interpretation of the Dionisian term « one/ new theandric energy », on the interpretation of the notion of will and finally, the primary for these two - the issue of Christ’s natures. The first question, connected with God-human activity, which