Academic literature on the topic 'Mental causation'

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Journal articles on the topic "Mental causation"

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Moore, Dwayne. "Autonomous Mental Causation and Mental‐Qua‐Mental Causation." Philosophical Forum 50, no. 2 (May 14, 2019): 245–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phil.12219.

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Kroedel, Thomas. "Mental causation as multiple causation." Philosophical Studies 139, no. 1 (May 31, 2007): 125–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9106-z.

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Gibbons, J. "Mental Causation without Downward Causation." Philosophical Review 115, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 79–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-115-1-79.

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Gibbons, John. "Mental Causation without Downward Causation." Philosophical Review 115, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 79–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2005-003.

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Harbecke, Jens. "Counterfactual Causation and Mental Causation." Philosophia 42, no. 2 (October 2, 2013): 363–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9496-4.

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White, Peter A., John Heil, and Alfred Mele. "Mental Causation." American Journal of Psychology 107, no. 4 (1994): 628. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1423006.

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Yablo, Stephen. "Mental Causation." Philosophical Review 101, no. 2 (April 1992): 245. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185535.

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Antony, Louise M., John Heil, and Alfred Mele. "Mental Causation." Philosophical Review 105, no. 4 (October 1996): 564. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2998438.

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Crane, Tim, and Bill Brewer. "Mental Causation." Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69, no. 1 (July 1, 1995): 211–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/69.1.211.

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Bealer, George. "MENTAL CAUSATION." Philosophical Perspectives 21, no. 1 (December 6, 2007): 23–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00119.x.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Mental causation"

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Ignatenko, D. "Mental causation problem solutions." Thesis, Sumy State University, 2017. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/66273.

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Mental causation is the cause and effect relationship of consciousness and the physical world, in particular, the influence of human consciousness on his/her behavior. In everyday life and scientific practice, the interaction between consciousness and the physical world is taken for granted. The influence of mental states and processes on human behavior is recognized as an established fact in everyday psychology, in scientific psychology, and in the philosophy of psychology. At the same time, in the modern philosophy of mind and cognitive science, the problem of mental causation is the subject of extensive discussions.
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Ignatenko, D. "Mental causation problem solutions." Thesis, Sumy State University, 2017. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/65312.

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Mental causation is the cause and effect relationship of consciousness and the physical world, in particular, the influence of human consciousness on his/her behavior. In everyday life and scientific practice, the interaction between consciousness and the physical world is taken for granted. The influence of mental states and processes on human behavior is recognized as an established fact in everyday psychology, in scientific psychology, and in the philosophy of psychology. At the same time, in the modern philosophy of mind and cognitive science, the problem of mental causation is the subject of extensive discussions.
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Laird, Kirstie. "Free will and mental causation." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.365538.

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Gibb, Sophie Catherine. "The metaphysics of mental causation." Thesis, Durham University, 2002. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3863/.

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This thesis argues that the fundamental issues within the mental causation debate are metaphysical ones. Consequently, it is only with metaphysical clarity, that any clarity can be gained in the mental causation debate. In order to provide a successful theory of mental causation one cannot divorce oneself from metaphysics. Neither can one hope to provide a theory of mental causation that is somehow neutral between the various metaphysical systems. Rather, to be plausible, a theory of mental causation must be based within an independently plausible metaphysical framework. I divide the metaphysical issues that are of importance to the mental causation debate into three broad groups. Firstly, what causation is a relation between. Secondly, what the existence and identity conditions for properties are. Thirdly, what the causal relation is. Part One of this thesis is concerned with the first of these issues. The interpretation of the argument from causal over determination, and the possible responses to it, depend upon what causation is a relation between. A belief to the contrary, has led to implausible theories of mental causation and the misrepresentation of those positions within the mental causation debate that are ontologically serious. Part Two is concerned with property analysis. It is suggested that a plausible analysis of properties reveals that the true contenders within the mental causation debate are psychophysical reductionism on the one hand, and interactive mentalism on the other. Part Three is concerned with the causal relation. It is argued that the mental causation debate is affected by what one understands causation to be. In particular, whether a causal closure principle that is strong enough to allow one to advance physicalism can plausibly be advanced, depends upon the theory of causation in which one is embedding psychophysical causation.
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Maiese, Michelle Lynn. "Mental causation, trying, and the emotions." Diss., Connect to online resource, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3178334.

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White, Benjamin G. "Mind-Body Dualism and Mental Causation." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2016. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/390365.

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Philosophy
Ph.D.
The Exclusion Argument for physicalism maintains that since every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, and cases of causal overdetermination (wherein a single effect has more than one sufficient cause) are rare, it follows that if minds cause physical effects as frequently as they seem to, then minds must themselves be physical in nature. I contend that the Exclusion Argument fails to justify the rejection of interactionist dualism (the view that the mind is non-physical but causes physical effects). In support of this contention, I argue that the multiple realizability of mental properties and the phenomenal and intentional features of mental events give us reason to believe that mental properties and their instances are non-physical. I also maintain (a) that depending on how overdetermination is defined, the thesis that causal overdetermination is rare is either dubious or else consistent with interactionist dualism and the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, and (b) that the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause is not clearly supported by current science. The premises of the Exclusion Argument are therefore too weak to justify the view that minds must be physical in order to cause physical effects as frequently as they seem to.
Temple University--Theses
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HOLLANDA, GABRIEL JUCA DE. "MENTAL CAUSATION AND FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY: PHYSICALIST ARGUMENTS." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2011. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=18346@1.

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CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO
O fisicalismo contemporâneo força a filosofia a lidar com o problema da causação mental: Como a mente é causalmente relevante em um mundo físico? Uma das saídas propostas, o epifenomenalismo, é visto por filósofos importantes como uma posição que preserva características essenciais à subjetividade sem contrariar os fatos científicos. No entanto, pode-se argumentar que a epistemologia dos mesmos e o caráter das leis naturais se chocam com as supostas vantagens do epifenomenalismo.
Contemporary physicalism compels philosophy to deal with the problem of mental causation: How is the mind causally relevant in a physical world? A proposed solution, epiphenomenalism, is seen by major philosophers as a position that preserves features that are crucial to subjectivity without clashing with scientific facts. Still, the epistemology of the latter and the character of natural laws arguably contradict the alleged advantages of epiphenomenalism.
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White, Andrea Suzanne. "Mental causation and the metaphysics of action." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2018. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/20501/.

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The subject of this dissertation is the problem of mental causation: the problem of how the mental is able to causally interact with the physical. I show that the problem of mental causation, as it is presented in contemporary philosophy of mind, is a pseudo-problem. My claim is that contemporary philosophy of mind has misidentified what it is about mental causation that we need, but struggle, to understand. This is because contemporary philosophy of mind labours under a misapprehension of what mental causation is supposed to be. In most discussions of the problem of mental causation, mental causation is presented as a cause-effect relation between mental and physical entities. I call this understanding of mental causation the relational understanding of mental causation: Relational understanding of mental causation: mental causation is a matter of mental items (events, processes or states) standing in causal relations to physical events, e.g. bodily movements. The relational understanding of mental causation is widely endorsed largely because it is thought essential to our conception of ourselves as agents who act intentionally and who bear moral responsibility. I argue that while intentional action does entail the existence of causation which involves mentality – something which is worthy of the name ‘mental causation’ – the mental causation intentional action presupposes ought not to be understood in relational terms. When we say that someone acted intentionally because of what she believed, desired or intended, the concepts belief, desire and intention do not refer to items which stand in causal relations to bodily movements. I will defend this thesis by examining metaphysics of action and the nature of agency.
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Pearlberg, Daniel. "Causation, Mechanism and Mind." The Ohio State University, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1430829433.

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De, Anna Gabriele. "Formal causation and mental representation : a Thomistic proposal." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12915.

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In the past years, the relevance of Thomas Aquinas's theory of cognition for contemporary debates on epistemology has been widely discussed. That theory claims that mind and world are formally identical and that this relationship overcomes various problems associated with scepticism concerning mental representation. The proposal, however, is grounded on the idea that the world can act on the mind through a relation of formal causation. This thesis attempts to develop a Thomistic theory of formal causation which may be suitable for a realist account of mental representation and which may meet the requirements prompted by current discussions. The suggested view is grounded on Aquinas's metaphysics, according to which the world is constituted of substances. The claim that change is possible since substances are hylomorphically constituted (viz., metaphysically composed of form and matter) is defended. Aquinas's claim that some substances have forms which may act independently of matter is also supported. The paradigmatic examples are human souls, i.e. the forms of human beings, whose higher cognitive capacity, i.e. thinking, can be in principle carried on without the need of any material organ. A Thomistic theory of causation is subsequently proposed. It is argued that hylomorphism explains the distinction among four species of causes (material, formal, final and efficient). Aquinas's attempt to explain causal relations conditionally is developed along the lines suggested by John Mackie's INUS conditional analysis. Jaegwon Kim's implementation of Mackie's proposal through an object-based metaphysics of events is then adapted to the hylomorphical account of substances. On these grounds, a theory of formal causation can be proposed and applied to Aquinas's theory of mental representation. The ensuing proposal is offered not in the spirit of historical exegesis but as a substantive philosophical account and it is Thomistic only in the broad sense that it is built on Aquinas's metaphysics and is consistent with his claims on causation.
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Books on the topic "Mental causation"

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John, Heil, and Mele Alfred R. 1951-, eds. Mental causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

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Lim, Daniel. God and Mental Causation. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47426-6.

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Mental causation: A nonreductive approach. New York: Peter Lang, 2009.

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Tropes: Properties, objects, and mental causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

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Mental causation: The mind-body problem. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

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Horgan, Terence, Marcelo Sabates, and David Sosa, eds. Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139939539.

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Muijnck, Wim De. Dependencies, connections, and other relations: A theory of mental causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.

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Wim, De Muijnck·. Dependencies· connections· and other relations: A theory of mental causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic·, 2002.

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Muijnck, Wim De. Dependencies, connections, and other relations: A theory of mental causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.

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Dependencies, connections, and other relations: A theory of mental causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.

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Book chapters on the topic "Mental causation"

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Heil, John. "Mental Causation." In The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, 214–34. Malden, MA, USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470998762.ch9.

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Ludwig, David. "Mental Causation." In European Studies in Philosophy of Science, 187–91. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22738-2_10.

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Andersen, Holly. "Mental Causation." In Handbook of Neuroethics, 63–77. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_110.

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Bayne, Tim. "Mental causation." In Philosophy of Mind, 178–95. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003225348-11.

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Robinson, William S. "Mental Causation." In Epiphenomenal Mind, 76–94. 1 [edition]. | New York : Taylor & Francis, 2018. | Series: Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy ; 115: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429435348-5.

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Shields, Christopher. "Hylomorphic Mental Causation." In Encounters with Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind, 307–24. New York, NY : Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003008484-17.

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Heil, John. "Mental Causation and Epiphenomenalism." In A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, 174–81. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444323528.ch23.

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Lim, Daniel. "Exclusion." In God and Mental Causation, 1–19. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47426-6_1.

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Lim, Daniel. "Occasionalism." In God and Mental Causation, 21–45. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47426-6_2.

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Lim, Daniel. "Overdetermination." In God and Mental Causation, 47–72. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47426-6_3.

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