Journal articles on the topic 'Materia troiana'

La presente investigación tiene como finalidad el estudio de los tipos fraseológicos documentados en el testimonio gallego de la materia troyana emanada del Roman de Troie de Benoît de Saint–Maure: la Crónica troiana (c. 1373). A su vez, los resultados se pondrán en contraste con el fragmento del Libro de Alexandre, la Historia troyana polimétrica (c. 1270) y la traducción ordenada por Alfonso XI (c. 1350). Todo ello permitirá describir con mayor profundidad el estadio variacional de las unidades fraseológicas medievales del occidente peninsular propias de una de las ramas procedentes de las traducciones de la materia de Troya.

Formata dal movimento dei ghiacciai quaternari, la Valle di Susa è una valle alpina nel Nord Ovest italiano. Luminoso esempio di “materia narrante”, è anche terreno di scontro tra iniziative conservazionistiche e progetti infrastrutturali transnazionali. Il progetto dell’alta velocità-capacità ferroviaria, o TAV, è stato oggetto di dure critiche. Dagli anni Novanta, grandi mobilitazioni riunite sotto il vessillo No TAV dalla valle si sono estese all’intero territorio nazionale. Parallelamente, il TAV gode l’appoggio bipartisan delle forze politiche. Diversi progetti preliminari sono stati stracciati nel tentativo di sedare un conflitto quasi trentennale con le comunità locali, un conflitto che buona parte della popolazione descrive come “resistenza”, riallacciandosi all’epopea partigiana contro la piaga nazista. Il 28 luglio 2017, il Movimento No TAV ha annunciato il rinvenimento della sgargiante Zerynthia polyxena presso il torrente Clarea. Questa farfalla è inserita nella Direttiva Habitat, adottata dall’Unione europea nel 1992 per promuovere la tutela della biodiversità. Tuttavia, l’area è stata scelta come nuovo sito di cantiere da TELT, Promotore Pubblico responsabile della realizzazione e gestione della sezione transfrontaliera della futura linea Torino-Lyon. La notizia offre una lettura inedita del rapporto fra umano, tecnologia e ambiente in un contesto di altissima tensione economica e sociale quale è la Val di Susa. Nell'Ecuba, Euripide racconta che Polissena, principessa troiana, preferì farsi uccidere piuttosto che diventare schiava. La vicenda di Polissena è il cavallo di legno che introduce nel dibattito sul progetto del TAV l’assunto per cui “la liberazione della natura così ardentemente desiderata dagli ambientalisti non potrà mai essere pienamente ottenuta senza la liberazione della donna” (Gaard). Una nuova possibilità per il Movimento No TAV di far sentire la propria voce sarà illuminando la verità che il corpo della Terra e i corpi delle donne sono un unico corpo soggiogato e subordinato all’uomo, vittime dello stesso pregiudizio, quello di essere predisposti a uno scopo: compiacere, nutrire, servire. Ho ripercorso una china che va da La Dea Bianca di Robert Graves alla stregoneria al fascismo, guidato da alcune eroine letterarie. Coniugando idealmente l’ecofemminismo alla teoria designata da Edward Lorenz, battendo le ali Polissena può davvero scatenare un uragano. Abstract Formed by the movement of large ice sheets during the Quaternary glaciations, the Susa Valley is an alpine site in northwestern Italy. It is a luminous example of “storied matter,” but it is also a battlefield between visions of wild nature and the plans of “crossnational” infrastructures. The planned TAV (Treno Alta Velocità, or high-speed train) line has been the source of heavy criticism: since the 1990s, an intense mobilization has spread from the valley all across Italy under the banner of the “No TAV” movement. The TAV project has since enjoyed unwavering political support from the members of parliament, right-wing and left-wing alike. Several preliminary drafts have been overturned in the attempt to quell a three-decades–long clash with the communities, a clash that most of the local people depict as “resistance,” latching on to the partisans’ epic stories of endurance against the Nazi scourge that took place in the valley. On July 28, 2017, the No TAV movement announced the discovery of the rare and striking butterfly Zerynthia polyxena, among the rare, threatened, or endemic species in the European Union listed in the Habitat Directive adopted in 1992. Yet, the area has been chosen as the new construction site by the company entrusted with the management of the cross-border section of the high-speed railway line between Turin and Lyon (a.k.a. TELT). This piece of news provides an original point of view to address the relationship between human and non-human agencies in a context of economic and social tension such as the Susa Valley. In this paper, I compare contemporary circumstances in the valley to the ancient Greek myth of Polyxena. In the tragedy Hecuba, the dramatist Euripides describes Polyxena as the Trojan princess who prefers to kill herself rather than become a slave. Hence, the butterfly that carries her name might become a Trojan horse enshrining the idea that “the liberation of nature so ardently desired by environmentalists will not be fully effected without the liberation of women” (G. Gaard). Combining various critical strains within the Environmental Humanities–from ecofeminism and biosemiotics to environmental history and new materialism–I suggest that richer, more encompassing narratives will be generated only when the similar fate of subjugation experienced by non-human bodies and the bodies of women will be more widely recognized. I carve a meandering spatio-temporal narrative path that goes from Robert Graves’ The White Goddess to witch trials and fascism, attempting to follow an erratic fluttering pattern amongst the voices of literature. It is the very slanted figure eight pattern that Polyxena makes with its wings, and by which, according to the theory designated by Edward Lorenz, a hurricane could grow, bringing alternative world visions.Resumen Formado por el movimiento de grandes capas de hielo durante las glaciaciones cuaternarias, el valle de Susa es un enclave alpino en el noroeste de Italia. Es un ejemplo luminoso de “materia narrada”, pero también es un campo de batalla entre las visiones de la naturaleza salvaje y los planes de las infraestructuras “transnacionales”. La línea TAV (“Treno Alta Velocità” o tren de alta velocidad) ha sido objeto de fuertes críticas: desde la década de 1990 se ha extendido en toda Italia una intensa movilización bajo el lema del movimiento “No TAV”. Desde entonces, el proyecto TAV ha gozado de un apoyo político inquebrantable por parte de los miembros del parlamento, tanto de derecha como de izquierda. Varios proyectos preliminares han sido revocados en un intento de sofocar un enfrentamiento de tres décadas con las comunidades, un choque que la mayoría de la población local concibe como “resistencia”, con referencia a las épicas historias de resistencia de los partisanos contra el flagelo nazi que tuvo lugar en el valle. El 28 de julio de 2017, el movimiento No TAV anunció el descubrimiento de la sorprendente mariposa Zerynthia polyxena, entre las especies raras, amenazadas o endémicas de la Unión Europea, enumeradas en la Directiva Hábitat adoptada en 1992. Sin embargo, el lugar ha sido elegido como el nuevo sitio de construcción por la empresa encargada de la gestión del tramo transfronterizo de la línea ferroviaria de alta velocidad entre Turín y Lyon (también conocido como TELT). Esta noticia proporciona un punto de vista original para abordar la relación entre los seres humanos y el medio ambiente en un contexto de tensión económica y social como el Valle de Susa. En este artículo, comparo las circunstancias contemporáneas en el valle con el antiguo mito griego de Políxena. En la tragedia Hécuba, el dramaturgo Eurípides describe a Políxena como la princesa troyana que prefiere suicidarse antes que ser una esclava. Por lo tanto, la mariposa que lleva su nombre podría convertirse en un caballo de Troya que consagre la idea de que “la liberación de la naturaleza tan ardientemente deseada por los ecologistas no se realizará completamente sin la liberación de las mujeres” (G. Gaard). Combinando varias tendencias críticas dentro de las ciencias humanas ambientales—desde el ecofeminismo y la biosemiótica hasta la historia ambiental y los nuevos materialismos—sugiero que se generarán narrativas más ricas e incluyentes sólo cuando el destino similar de subyugación experimentado por cuerpos no humanos y cuerpos de mujeres sea más ampliamente reconocido. Trazo una ruta narrativa espacio-temporal serpenteante que va desde La Diosa Blanca de Robert Graves hasta los juicios de brujas y el fascismo, tratando de seguir un patrón de aleteo errático entre las voces de la literatura. Es el patrón inclinado de la figura de ocho que hace Políxena con sus alas, y por obra del cual, de acuerdo con la teoría designada por Edward Lorenz, un huracán podría crecer, trayendo visiones alternativas del mundo.

Neste artigo, o objetivo é compreender a política utilizada para a implantação do Sistema Educacional Família e Escola (SEFE), em escolas da rede municipal de ensino de Florianópolis (SC), entre 2009 e 2012. O método utilizado foi observação e participação nos cursos de formação continuada de professores, ministrados pelo SEFE, aplicação de 82 questionários e realização de oito entrevistas com professores de escolas que utilizam o SEFE. Como aportes teóricos, tomamos o conceito de estratégias, de acordo com Michel de Certeau; a produção de subjetividades, na acepção de Michel Foucault; e, a governamentalidade neoliberal, conforme indicado por Karla Saraiva e Alfredo Veiga-Neto. Dentre os resultados, inferimos que o SEFE adota estratégias de governamentalidade com características neoliberais, tais como: estímulo à competição, busca pela eficiência e qualidade, cumprimento de metas e práticas de meritocracia. Além disso, é possível identificar que a utilização do material didático do SEFE propicia a emergência de um profissional que atua de forma mecânica, o que pode conduzir a um paulatino processo de perda da autonomia docente. Palavras-chave: Sistema Educacional Família e Escola. Estratégias. Governamentalidade neoliberal.

La acción diplomática y política de los cardenales Francesco y Troiano Acquaviva d’Aragona se inserta, por su importancia y originalidad, en las relaciones entre el Papado y las monarquías borbónicas de España y Nápoles durante la primera mitad del Setecientos. Cardenales embajadores de Felipe V y Carlos III de Borbón en Roma y protectores de sus coronas en la Santa Sede, desarrollaron al más alto nivel —tanto italiano como europeo— las tradicionales carreras curiales de las familias de potentados meridionales. La obra de ambos purpurados, entrelazada con los intereses de la Iglesia y de la Casa de Borbón, se relacionó estrechamente con la salvaguardia del “Estado de Atri”, en el Abruzzo, uno de los mayores feudos del reino de Nápoles. Esto tuvo lugar merced a la estrecha correspondiencia con sus duques, Giovan Girolano II Acquaviva y Domenico Acquaviva, con lo que pudieron asegurar su titularidad y dominio pese a las problemáticas suscitadas por su posicionamiento filoborbónico tras la muerte de Carlos II de España.

AbstractThe unambiguous identification of closely related species is useful for many practical purposes in forest tree species. For example, international laws require timber identification and the control of the origin of forest reproductive material. In this paper, we present a mitochondrial DNA marker which can be used to differentiate among groups of fir species (Abies spp.). Eight Mediterranean and one North American fir species (used as reference) were analysed at the fourth intron of the NAD subunit 5 gene. A total of six different haplotypes was identified, one in the American Abies concolor, the other five in Mediterranean species. Two different haplotypes were found each in the widespread A. alba and in A. cephalonica, one haplotype being shared among the two species. A single species specific haplotype was found in the near-eastern A. cilicica. The two southwestern species A. pinsapo and A. numidica shared one haplotype. The fifth haplotype was shared by all remaining eastern Mediterranean firs, A. cephalonica, A. bornmuelleriana, A. equi-troiani, and A. nordmanniana. Differences in haplotype sequences were mainly due to large insertions/deletions. Agarose gel electrophoresis thus provides a fast, cheap and reliable diagnosis method for species or species group identification.

The papaya plant has three types of flowering, male flowers, female flowers, and perfect flower (hermaphrodite). The difference in interest affects the shape of the resulting fruit. This study aimed to characterize morphology and cytology of papaya flowers. The study was conducted in Tropical Fruit Research Institute at Solok and Laboratory of SPT at the Biology Department of the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Andalas University, Padang, West Sumatra. The research material uses papaya flowers Merah Delima variety from KP. Aripan Balitbu Troipka. The results showed the male flowers of male plants were smaller than the male flowers of the perfect plant. The difference of hermaphrodite flower of pentandria with hermaphrodite elongata flower, among others, the number of stamens, the length of the stem and the size of the ovary. Hermaphrodite pentandria has a number of stamens 5 while elongata has stamens 10

A separate cultural and chronological Msta-Mologa group of sites of the mid-1st millennium AD was defined through the available archaeological evidence, in the area of the Volga-Baltic watershed. Pottery complexes from two regularly investigated settlement-sites — Troitsa 1 and Ovsishche 1, are the main markers of this group. The mass material is similar to the pottery distributed in the Moshchiny culture and late Dyakovo settlements in the Upper Volga region. The initial territory of the new population, according to the evidence of pottery and other finds, possibly was that of the basin of the Upper Mologa (left tributary of the Volga). The presence of derivatives of the pottery of the Msta- Mologa group in the burial monuments of the culture of Pskov long barrows in this region suggests that the population of the group under consideration dissolved in the massif of that early mediaeval culture.

Abstract The orientation relationship (OR) between fcc and bcc lattices are described by crystallographic fundamentals using the example of Kurdjumov–Sachs (K–S) and Nishiyama–Wassermann (N–W). Complete pole figures containing all variants will be used to distinguish even between slightly different ORs. EBSD on iron meteorites and duplex steel has been used to analyse a large number of crystal orientations with regard to a high statistical significance and a high probability to capture all variants in a single measurement. It is shown that the use of fixed OR models like K–S, N–W, Bain, Pitsch, or Greninger–Troiano does not satisfacturally reflect the observed experimental pole distributions. It is not convenient to use high-indexed lattice planes and directions to describe the small deviations from the given models. The Euler subspace representation offers a readily comprehensible tool to get an idea about the characteristic of the experimentally detected OR.

The features of α (body-centered cubic) structures were investigated in a low-carbon multicomponent alloy from morphological and crystallographic perspectives. In addition to apparent features of granular bainite and lamellar martensite, a morphological similarity can be found between lath martensite and lath bainite. Therefore, it is of interest to explore possible discrepancies between lath martensite and lath bainite from a crystallographic perspective. These microstructures were obtained by various cooling rates (i.e., water quenching, 5 °C/s, and 0.05 °C/s) and then were characterized by a combination of scanning electron microscopy and electron backscattered diffraction techniques. It is shown that: (1) Lath martensite (LM) formed in the samples that were water-quenched, and a mixture of LM and lath bainite (LB) and granular bainite (GB) formed in the samples cooled at rates of 5 °C/s and 0.05 °C/s, respectively; (2) A Kurdjumov-Sachs relationship was mostly found in as-quenched martensite, while a Greninger-Troiano relationship represented the orientation relationship of LB and GB; (3) As the cooling rate decreased, the dislocation densities in corresponding microstructures were reduced, while the tendency of variant grouping was enhanced.

In the present work, we use an advanced EBSD method to analyze the two prominent types of martensite microstructures that are found in the binary Fe-Ni system, lath martensite (27.5 at.% Ni) and plate martensite (29.5 at.% Ni). We modify, document, and apply an analytical EBSD procedure, which was originally proposed by Yardley and Payton, 2014. It analyzes the distributions of the three KSI-angles (ξ1, ξ2, and ξ3, KSI after Kurdjumov and Sachs), which describe small angular deviations between crystal planes in the unit cells of martensite and austenite—which are related through specific orientation relationships. The analysis of the angular distributions can be exploited to obtain high-resolution, color-coded micrographs of martensitic microstructures, which, for example, visualize the difference between lath and plate martensite and appreciate the microstructural features, like midribs in large plate martensite crystals. The differences between the two types of martensite also manifest themselves in different distributions of the KSI-angles (wider for lath and narrower for plate martensite). Finally, our experimental results prove that local distortions result in scatter, which is larger than the differences between the orientation relationships of Kurdjumov/Sachs, Nishiyama/Wassermann, and Greninger/Troiano.

Abstract. The integration of high-resolution, non-invasive geophysical techniques (such as ground-penetrating radar or GPR) with emerging sensing techniques (acoustics, thermography) can complement limited destructive tests to provide a suitable methodology for a multi-scale assessment of the state of preservation, material and construction components of monuments. This paper presents the results of the application of GPR, infrared thermography (IRT) and ultrasonic tests to the 13th century rose window of Troia Cathedral (Apulia, Italy), affected by widespread decay and instability problems caused by the 1731 earthquake and reactivated by recent seismic activity. This integrated approach provided a wide amount of complementary information at different scales, ranging from the sub-centimetre size of the metallic joints between the various architectural elements, narrow fractures and thin mortar fillings, up to the sub-metre scale of the internal masonry structure of the circular ashlar curb linking the rose window to the façade, which was essential to understand the original building technique and to design an effective restoration strategy.

This work describes experimental results concerning the chemical composition of the alloy patina and inlays from the medieval copper alloy door of the cathedral of Troia (southern Italy), dating back to 1127 CE. The analyses were conducted in situ with no sampling or sample preparation required, using a portable energy-dispersive X-ray fluorescence (ED-XRF) instrument. The compositional results show that the two door leaves were made using a binary alloy of copper and lead, while the nails, lion protomes, and handles have a different chemical composition. Moreover, the analyses revealed uniform concentrations of chlorine, probably due to cleaning treatments during the restoration. It is important to emphasise that the obtained results are the only ones related to this valuable masterpiece analysed.

This piece centres on the vital role intellectuals and think tanks play in US foreign policymaking. Before examining empirical data and original developments, a middle-level theoretical framework is needed to link our data and grand theories in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. We focus on a ‘strategic core force’ troika in the US foreign policymaking system and the significant role it has played in policy transformation. It consists of three key elements—‘policy architect’, ‘expert counsellor’ and ‘policy implementer’. This paper uses a case study from the Asia-Pacific, focusing on the shift of US strategy towards Japan. The post-Cold War period saw increasing uncertainty concerning Japan’s role in US foreign policy and led to a critical examination and restructuring of East Asian policy. Although we focus on the 1990s, there are profound implications for current US policy towards East Asia. The policy shift in the 1990s laid the foundation for Obama’s 2011 ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy, especially as it relates to US security and military operations. It has become increasingly clear that Japan can provide concrete material support in the form of military and financial assistance and as such its importance for US East Asian policy cannot be overstated.

Based on field research in Athens, Greece, this essay considers graffiti as a mode of political response to the material and symbolic violences of neoliberal governmentality. In 2010, the Greek state declared sovereign debt crisis and began to implement an aggressive austerity program in exchange for economic aid from a troika of international lenders. This resulted in the dismantling of public services, tax increases, salary and pension reductions, layoffs, and, generally, the impoverishment of the middle and lower classes. In this work I consider a crew of three young graffiti writers, both before and during the years of the crisis, as they came to realize a fear of becoming integrated into an economized social mainstream and responded by creating street art intended to bolster critical reasoning among Athenians. I argue that fear of abjection and the experience of being at the social margins served as a stimulus of critical agency, and that the crew’s intervention can be considered indirect activism: a mode of resistance whose critical agents attempt to bring about their ambitions and visions by activating other groups to undertake resistance of their own. I show how my interlocutors made political possibility by creating art that lessened the capacity of neoliberal governmentality to manufacture consent, thereby contributing to a thriving ecology of resistance action in Athens.

Aim & Objectives: Intramuscular (IM) injections of 1 mL and 3 mL Diclofenac 75 mg are used in the clinic in the management of the pain. The present study was performed with the aim to evaluate muscle injury after IM injection of Diclofenac 75 mg/1 mL (Dynapar AQ ® , Troikaa Pharmaceuticals Limited, India) and Diclofenac injection 75 mg/3 mL (commercially available) in subjects using Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and laboratory blood tests. Material & Methods: Two separate single arm case studies, (each comprising of a single healthy subject) were carried out after Ethics Committee approvals and CTRI Registration. Two subjects who gave written informed consent received either Diclofenac injection 75 mg/1 mL (Dynapar AQ ® , Troikaa Pharmaceuticals Limited, India) OR Diclofenac injection 75 mg/3 mL (commercially available) and the muscle injury was evaluated at different time points up to 14 days. Results: In both the subjects, the intramuscular injury after the injection was reliably documented by MRI and laboratory tests. For the subject who received Diclofenac injection 75 mg/3 mL, there was significant muscle injury observed (T2- weighted magnetic resonance was increased manifold: the volume of muscle injury was 108 mL at 24 hr after injection; 137 mL at 48 hours, and progressive worsening after 48 hours, rising to 271 mL on Day 7 with subsequent normalization at Day 119). However, in the subject who received Diclofenac injection 75 mg/1 mL, muscle injury was relatively minor and reversed quickly at day 7; (T2-weighted magnetic resonance volume of muscle injury was 66 mL at 24 hr after injection, a flatter peak of 69 mL at 48 hours, declining thereafter). In the subject who received 3 mL injection, the CPK levels (Normal range: serum CPK: 39 – 308 U/L by immune assay) were highly increased (from baseline of 47 U/L to 1975 U/L in 8 hours, 1320 U/L at 48 hours, continued elevation after 48 hours: 420 U/L at 7 Days and 267 U/L on Day 119), with prolonged plateau of elevation and gradual decline over weeks indicating significant muscle injury with Diclofenac injection 75 mg/3 mL whereas, in the subjects who received diclofenac injection 75 mg/ 1 mL, there was only minor increase in CPK (from baseline of 93 U/L to 433 U/L in 24 hours) and was normalized to 95 U/L at day 7. In the subject who received Diclofenac injection 75 mg/3 mL, the IL-6 was within the upper range of normal (Normal Range: IL6 0-50 pg/mL by ELISA), and rose from a baseline of < 2 pg/mL to 37.3 pg/mL, but in the subject who received 1 mL IM Diclofenac, values stayed low throughout (<4 pg/mL). Conclusion: There was higher muscle injury following 3 mL Diclofenac intramuscular injection when compared to 1 mL Diclofenac intramuscular injection. This is the first comparative report confirming radiologic and laboratory evidence of muscle injury produced by a 1 mL and 3 mL Diclofenac injection, and opens the door for further research on muscle injury, and focuses our efforts to prevent or minimize the same.

Brassicaceae are promising oil feedstock for cultivation in centralsouthern Italy. Therefore, a two-year investigation on <em>Brassica carinata</em> A. Braun (cv. CT 204) was carried out in three sites of Apulia region [Site 1, Alberobello - Murgia foreland; Site 2, Troia (Foggia) - Daunian sub-Apennines; Site 3, Monteroni (Lecce) - Area of Salento], and in one site of Basilicata region (Site 4, Hill of Matera). The aim was to identify site-specific management practices [by comparing minimum vs conventional tillage, low sowing density vs high sowing density; different levels of nitrogen (N) supply and organic fertilisers] in the four different marginal areas, to achieve optimum yield performance for biodiesel prospective production. The crop showed a good adaptability in the study sites, and the highest N level positively influenced the yield performance in Sites 1, 2 and 3. Moreover, the reduction of mechanical operations (minimum tillage) did not negatively influence crop production and seed oil content. The highest density of sowing tested determined the best crop performance in Site 3, particularly showing the maximum seed oil content with the lowest N supply. Finally, in Site 4 the compost mixed with mineral N fertiliser as well as the sewage sludge from urban wastewater determined productive results comparable to those obtained with mineral fertiliser, evidencing that organic fertilisers could (partially or completely) substitute the mineral one for this crop in the study site. On the whole, seed yield and oil content showed a potential for biodiesel production of <em>Brassica carinata</em> cultivated with site-specific agronomic techniques in four different marginal areas of Southern Italy, suggesting it can be likely achieved the crop environmental adaptation.

Introduction. In the 20th century, Mongolia witnessed the emergence of a number of party activists and statesmen whose formally differing life paths and careers largely resulted in essentially similar repressions experienced. Those included a group of party executives with monastic backgrounds and good command of foreign languages. And it is D. Luvsansharav who had spent twenty years in Mӧrӧn Monastery that attracts special attention. It is unknown what (and whether at all) he had studied at the monastic college ― a largest one in the country ― but his party comrades (and himself) considered him to be an expert in the Lamaist question. On graduation from the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (1928–1929), he begins a political career, the pinnacle of which being his work at the Lamaist Commission that primarily aimed to eradicate reactionist Lamaist elements (i.e., the whole of Buddhist clergy as such), and his participation in the Plenipotentiary Commission (a so called ‘troika’) that put to death hundreds and even thousands of citizens, destroyed some precious items of material and traditional culture. Goals. The paper seeks to reveal the ex-monk’s impact in party arrangements, interpret certain personal motives to have underlain the transformation. Materials. The work analyzes materials stored at the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service and contained in Mongolia in Documents of the Comintern (vols. 1, 2), other scholarly sources. Results. The Mongolian Revolution of 1921 uncovered the lack of competent personnel which lead to a search of ‘individuals suitable for administrative, economic, and military work’ not only among commoners but also monks and nobility, resulting in that the recruited executives differed both in skills and worldviews. The context proved favorable enough to D. Luvsansharav who ― according to archival notes ― was quite an ambiguous and contradictive figure. His party comrades and official secretaries of the Eastern Executive Committee of the Communist International characterized him as a definitely ambitious but short-tempered, awkward, and irresolute person in a supporting role. However, the ex-cleric became a leading party activist, and such a dramatic change in his life and career may have stemmed from religious underachievement, dissatisfaction with the position he had held in the large Mongolian monastery, or some psychological aspects. Still, the harsh and severe period of national history could actually give rise to changes in his ideological views and mentality (when personal benefits and career opportunities were viewed by some as priorities).

The article analyzes the global wines production and consumption in the period from 2000 to 2020. The authors studied the total antioxidant activity of 19 samples of red wine from the Old and New World. They found that in the studied red wine samples, the total antioxidant activity value was in the range from 8,408 to 19,249 mmol-eq/dm3 . In red Old-World wines samples, the total antioxidant activity values were in the range from 10.056 to 19.249 mmol-eq/dm3 , while the highest were in red wines produced in Italy from the grape varieties Nero di Troia, Corvina and Rondinella, as well as in French wines from the varieties Merlot and Cabernet Franc; the smallest antioxidant activity values were in Italian wines produced from varieties Cabernet Sauvignon and Spanish wines from the varieties Tinta Roriz, Turiga Nacional, Turiga Franca. In the studied samples of red New-World wines, the total antioxidant activity values accounted for the range from 8.408 to 16.456 mmol-eq/dm3 , while the highest values were for Australian wines produced from the Shiraz grape variety and American wines from the Merlot variety; the lowest indexes were for American wine produced from the grape variety Pinot Noir. In the red Russian wines samples, the total antioxidant activity values were in the range from 5.903 to 15.566 mmol-eq/dm3 , while the highest indicators were in the wine from the varieties Merlot and Cabernet Sauvignon produced by the manufacturer “Usadba Divnomorskoe”; the lowest figures were for the wine produced from the “Pinot Noir” variety of the same producer. The antioxidant activity of wines varied from 26.3 to 60.1 % of the recommended daily intake in terms of ascorbic acid (ascorbic acid AOA – (32.024 ± 0.350) mmol-eq/dm3 ). The researchers revealed that the antioxidant activity as an identification marker for French wines must be at least (15.0 ± 0.5) mg-eq/dm3 , for Italian wines – at least 16.5 mg-eq/dm3 , for wines from Cabernet Sauvignon grapes, possible deviation was 5 mg-eq/dm3 . For New-World wines and Russian wines, the antioxidant activity must be at least (10.0 ± 0.5) mg-eq/dm3 , for wines from Pinot Noir grapes, possible deviation was 2 mg-eq/dm3 .

La presente investigación tiene como finalidad el estudio de los tipos fraseológicos, en especial los circunscritos al ámbito de la paremiología que se documentan en el testimonio gallego de la materia troyana emanada del Roman de Troie de Benoît de Saint–Maure: la Crónica troiana (c. 1373). De esta manera, se da continuidad a otro trabajo en el que se contrastan las unidades fraseológicas de esta obra con otros textos de materia troyana de ámbito peninsular. Todo ello permitirá describir con mayor profundidad el estadio variacional de las expresiones fijas del occidente peninsular reflejadas en una de las líneas traductológicas más fecundas del medioevo

The research was conducted in 2016-2020 in the Ulyanovsk region. The aim was to assess the yield and genotype-environment interaction of varieties and promising lines of spring oats in the Middle Volga region. The source material was 9 varieties and 4 promising lines of oats created in the Ulyanovsk RAS. Contrasting moisture and temperature conditions provided differentiation of the studied material by yield and level of adaptability. Two-factor dispersion analysis revealed significant differences between genotypes in yield, media, and their interaction. The highest average yield among filmy varieties was formed by the Dragun variety (42.7 c/ha), the lowest by Vsadnik (37.0 c/ha). Naked varieties Azil and Griva showed the same yield (24.3 c / ha). The share of influence of environmental conditions (years) was 51.6%, varieties-33.8%. According to GGE biplot analysis, 2016, 2017, and 2020 were characterized by a high differentiating ability, while 2018 was the most representative. A rank assessment based on six adaptive criteria (regression coefficient (bi), stability index (S2 j), coefficient of variation (Vc), Martynov ultrastability (Hi), ultrastability (Hom) and selection value of the variety (Sc) V.V. Khangildin revealed the advantage of Grum (17), Dragun (22), Konkur (18), and Kenter (24) varieties, while Troika (64) had the lowest rank. Evaluation and ranking of genotypes by average yield and stability in different environments using GGE biplot analysis relative to the “ideal” genotype showed that the highest average yield was in the Dragun variety, which also has high stability, and practically corresponds to the «ideal» genotype. Next are the lines 479/11, 549/15, and the varieties Grum and Konkur, which are close to the « ideal» genotype. Less stable is the 537/15 line, which produced yields less than expected in 2016, 2018 and 2019 environments and more in 2017 and 2020. Biplot analysis of the yield of film varieties confirmed the results of the rank assessment for adaptability parameters, adjusting the location in the group of the best varieties.

AbstractLithium-rich materials (LRMs) are among the most promising cathode materials toward next-generation Li-ion batteries due to their extraordinary specific capacity of over 250 mAh g−1 and high energy density of over 1 000 Wh kg−1. The superior capacity of LRMs originates from the activation process of the key active component Li2MnO3. This process can trigger reversible oxygen redox, providing extra charge for more Li-ion extraction. However, such an activation process is kinetically slow with complex phase transformations. To address these issues, tremendous effort has been made to explore the mechanism and origin of activation, yet there are still many controversies. Despite considerable strategies that have been proposed to improve the performance of LRMs, in-depth understanding of the relationship between the LRMs’ preparation and their activation process is limited. To inspire further research on LRMs, this article firstly systematically reviews the progress in mechanism studies and performance improving attempts. Then, guidelines for activation controlling strategies, including composition adjustment, elemental substitution and chemical treatment, are provided for the future design of Li-rich cathode materials. Based on these investigations, recommendations on Li-rich materials with precisely controlled Mn/Ni/Co composition, multi-elemental substitution and oxygen vacancy engineering are proposed for designing high-performance Li-rich cathode materials with fast and stable activation processes. Graphical abstract The “Troika” of composition adjustment, elemental substitution, and chemical treatment can drive the Li-rich cathode towards stabilized and accelerated activation.

A terapia endodôntica consiste em: abertura coronária, modelagem, limpeza, desinfecção, e selamento tridimensional do sistema de canais radiculares. Dentre as etapas constituintes do tratamento, a análise da anatomia interna dos dentes a serem tratados, deve ser cuidadosamente observada e seguir os princípios científicos e biológicos para que sejam minimizadas as possibilidades de falhas e acidentes. Os erros podem ocorrer tanto pela falta de habilidade do profissional, anatomia do elemento a ser tratado ou característica dos instrumentos. Em casos onde há dentes com lesão periapical, por conta de canais calcificados ou obstruídos por instrumentos fraturados, falha do tratamento convencional e impossibilidade de retratamento, é indicada a cirurgia paraendodôntica como opção de tratamento. O objetivo do presente estudo é descrever um relato de caso clínico sobre cirurgia paraendodôntica como tratamento para lesão periapical e manobra cirúrgica para remoção de um instrumento fraturado no terço apical do dente 22. Conclusão: quando o tratamento por via convencional é impossível de ser realizado, a cirurgia paraendodôntica é uma ótima opção de tratamento para dentes com lesões periapicais e para remoção de instrumentos fraturados, sendo uma forma de preservar o órgão dental e evitar extrações preciptadas. No presente estudo foi possível notar radiograficamente a regressão da lesão periapical e clinicamente a ausência de sintomatologia.Descritores: Endodontia; Apicectomia; Periodontite Periapical.ReferênciasSoares I, Goldberg F. Endodontia– Técnica e Fundamentos. Porto Alegre: Artmed; 2001.Bernabé PFE, Holland R. Cirurgia paraendodôntica: como praticá-la com embasamento científico. In: Estrela C. Ciência endodôntica. v.2. São Paulo: Artes Médicas; 2004.Leonardo M, Leal JM. Endodontia: tratamento de canais radiculares. 4. ed. São Paulo: Panamericana; 2005.Gabardo MCL, Dufloth F, Sartoretto J, Hirai V, Oliveira DC, Rosa EAR. Microbiologia do insucesso do tratamento endodôntico. Rev Gestão & Saúde. 2009;1(1):11-7.Alvares S. Resoluções Clínicas: Procedimentos Endodônticos e Cirugico-paraendodôntico. São Paulo: Santos; 1997.Ramos MD. Remoção de instrumento fraturado e prognóstico do tratamento endodôntico após fratura [monografia]. São Paulo: Associação Paulista de Cirugiões Dentista Regional de Santo André; 2009.Leal JM, Bampa JU, Poliseli Neto A. Cirugias paraendodônticas: indicações, contra-indicações, modalidades cirúrgicas. In:Leonardo, M. R. Endodontia- tratamento de canais radiculares: princípios técnicos e biológicos. São Paulo: Artes Médicas; 2005.Rosa RA, Pagliiarin CL, Carvalho MGP, Dotto SR, Flores JA. Apicetomia associada á obturação retrógrada utilizando agregado trióxido mineral (MTA) – relato de caso clínico. Rev Dentística online. 2007;85-92.Leonardo MR, Leal JM. Endodontia: Tratamento de canais radiculares. 3. ed. São Paulo: Panamericana; 1991.Lopes HL, Siqueira Jr JF. Endodontia, biologia e técnica. 3. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan; 2011.Verri A, Aguiar SA. Cirurgias parendodônticas, endodontia. In: Leonardo, MR, Leal JM 2.ed; 1991.Kerekes K, Tronstad L. Morphometric observations on root canals of human molares. J. Endod. 1979;3(3):114-18.Nagai O, Tani N, Kayaba Y, Kodama S, Osada T. Ultrasonic removal of broken instruments in root canais. lnt Endod J. 1986;19(6):298-304.Etevaldo MMF. Fratura de instrumentos endodônticos. RGO P Alegre. 2005;53(4):351-55.Troian CH, SÓ MV, Figueiredo JA, Oliveira EP. Deformation and fracture of RaCe and K3 endodontic instrument according to the number of uses. Int Endod J. 2006;39(8):616-25.Gênova APS, Antonio MPS, Dadidowicz H, Moura AAM. Avaliação do índice de fraturas das limas ProTaper em canais simulados. Rev Inst Ciênc Saúde. 2004;22(1):51-4.Parashos P, Messer H. Rotary NiTi Instrument Fracture and its Consequences. Journal of Endodontic. 2006;32(11):1031-43.Del Rio CE. Manual de cirúrgia paraendodôntica. São Paulo: Santos; 1996.Kuga MC, Tanomaru M. Cirurgia perirradicular. In: Lopes HP, Siqueira Jr JF. Endodontia: biologia e técnica, 2. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan; 2004.Bramante CM, Berbet A. Cirurgia paraendodôntica. São Paulo: Santos; 2000.Winik R, Araki AT, Negrão JAA, Bello-Silva MS, Lage-Marques JL. Sealer penetration and marginal permeability after apicoectomy varying retrocavity preparation and retrofilling material. Braz Dent J. 2006;17(4):323-27.Trope M, Lost C, Schmitz HJ, Friedman S. Healing of apical periodontitis in dogs after apicoectomy and retrofilling with various filling materials. Oral Surg Oral Med Oral Pathol. 1996;81(2):221-28.Navarro JFB, Arashiro FN, Ferreira LC, Tomazinho LF. Tratamento de canais com instrumentos fraturados: relato de casos. Uningá Review. 2013;14(1):79-84.

Introduction The highly contagious COVID-19 virus has presented particularly difficult public policy challenges. The relatively late emergence of an effective treatments and vaccines, the structural stresses on health care systems, the lockdowns and the economic dislocations, the evident structural inequalities in effected societies, as well as the difficulty of prevention have tested social and political cohesion. Moreover, the intrusive nature of many prophylactic measures have led to individual liberty and human rights concerns. As noted by the Victorian (Australia) Ombudsman Report on the COVID-19 lockdown in Melbourne, we may be tempted, during a crisis, to view human rights as expendable in the pursuit of saving human lives. This thinking can lead to dangerous territory. It is not unlawful to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms when there are compelling reasons for doing so; human rights are inherently and inseparably a consideration of human lives. (5) These difficulties have raised issues about the importance of social or community capital in fighting the pandemic. This article discusses the impacts of social and community capital and other factors on the governmental efforts to combat the spread of infectious disease through the maintenance of social distancing and household ‘bubbles’. It argues that the beneficial effects of social and community capital towards fighting the pandemic, such as mutual respect and empathy, which underpins such public health measures as social distancing, the use of personal protective equipment, and lockdowns in the USA, have been undermined as preventive measures because they have been transmogrified to become a salient aspect of the “culture wars” (Peters). In contrast, states that have relatively lower social capital such a China have been able to more effectively arrest transmission of the disease because the government was been able to generate and personify a nationalist response to the virus and thus generate a more robust social consensus regarding the efforts to combat the disease. Social Capital and Culture Wars The response to COVID-19 required individuals, families, communities, and other types of groups to refrain from extensive interaction – to stay in their bubble. In these situations, especially given the asymptomatic nature of many COVID-19 infections and the serious imposition lockdowns and social distancing and isolation, the temptation for individuals to breach public health rules in high. From the perspective of policymakers, the response to fighting COVID-19 is a collective action problem. In studying collective action problems, scholars have paid much attention on the role of social and community capital (Ostrom and Ahn 17-35). Ostrom and Ahn comment that social capital “provides a synthesizing approach to how cultural, social, and institutional aspects of communities of various sizes jointly affect their capacity of dealing with collective-action problems” (24). Social capital is regarded as an evolving social type of cultural trait (Fukuyama; Guiso et al.). Adger argues that social capital “captures the nature of social relations” and “provides an explanation for how individuals use their relationships to other actors in societies for their own and for the collective good” (387). The most frequently used definition of social capital is the one proffered by Putnam who regards it as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, “Bowling Alone” 65). All these studies suggest that social and community capital has at least two elements: “objective associations” and subjective ties among individuals. Objective associations, or social networks, refer to both formal and informal associations that are formed and engaged in on a voluntary basis by individuals and social groups. Subjective ties or norms, on the other hand, primarily stand for trust and reciprocity (Paxton). High levels of social capital have generally been associated with democratic politics and civil societies whose institutional performance benefits from the coordinated actions and civic culture that has been facilitated by high levels of social capital (Putnam, Democracy 167-9). Alternatively, a “good and fair” state and impartial institutions are important factors in generating and preserving high levels of social capital (Offe 42-87). Yet social capital is not limited to democratic civil societies and research is mixed on whether rising social capital manifests itself in a more vigorous civil society that in turn leads to democratising impulses. Castillo argues that various trust levels for institutions that reinforce submission, hierarchy, and cultural conservatism can be high in authoritarian governments, indicating that high levels of social capital do not necessarily lead to democratic civic societies (Castillo et al.). Roßteutscher concludes after a survey of social capita indicators in authoritarian states that social capital has little effect of democratisation and may in fact reinforce authoritarian rule: in nondemocratic contexts, however, it appears to throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by generating popular support, by suppressing regime threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing undemocratic ideals concerning governance (752). In China, there has been ongoing debate concerning the presence of civil society and the level of social capital found across Chinese society. If one defines civil society as an intermediate associational realm between the state and the family, populated by autonomous organisations which are separate from the state that are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values, it is arguable that the PRC had a significant civil society or social capital in the first few decades after its establishment (White). However, most scholars agree that nascent civil society as well as a more salient social and community capital has emerged in China’s reform era. This was evident after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where the government welcomed community organising and community-driven donation campaigns for a limited period of time, giving the NGO sector and bottom-up social activism a boost, as evidenced in various policy areas such as disaster relief and rural community development (F. Wu 126; Xu 9). Nevertheless, the CCP and the Chinese state have been effective in maintaining significant control over civil society and autonomous groups without attempting to completely eliminate their autonomy or existence. The dramatic economic and social changes that have occurred since the 1978 Opening have unsurprisingly engendered numerous conflicts across the society. In response, the CCP and State have adjusted political economic policies to meet the changing demands of workers, migrants, the unemployed, minorities, farmers, local artisans, entrepreneurs, and the growing middle class. Often the demands arising from these groups have resulted in policy changes, including compensation. In other circumstances, where these groups remain dissatisfied, the government will tolerate them (ignore them but allow them to continue in the advocacy), or, when the need arises, supress the disaffected groups (F. Wu 2). At the same time, social organisations and other groups in civil society have often “refrained from open and broad contestation against the regime”, thereby gaining the space and autonomy to achieve the objectives (F. Wu 2). Studies of Chinese social or community capital suggest that a form of modern social capital has gradually emerged as Chinese society has become increasingly modernised and liberalised (despite being non-democratic), and that this social capital has begun to play an important role in shaping social and economic lives at the local level. However, this more modern form of social capital, arising from developmental and social changes, competes with traditional social values and social capital, which stresses parochial and particularistic feelings among known individuals while modern social capital emphasises general trust and reciprocal feelings among both known and unknown individuals. The objective element of these traditional values are those government-sanctioned, formal mass organisations such as Communist Youth and the All-China Federation of Women's Associations, where members are obliged to obey the organisation leadership. The predominant subjective values are parochial and particularistic feelings among individuals who know one another, such as guanxi and zongzu (Chen and Lu, 426). The concept of social capital emphasises that the underlying cooperative values found in individuals and groups within a culture are an important factor in solving collective problems. In contrast, the notion of “culture war” focusses on those values and differences that divide social and cultural groups. Barry defines culture wars as increases in volatility, expansion of polarisation, and conflict between those who are passionate about religiously motivated politics, traditional morality, and anti-intellectualism, and…those who embrace progressive politics, cultural openness, and scientific and modernist orientations. (90) The contemporary culture wars across the world manifest opposition by various groups in society who hold divergent worldviews and ideological positions. Proponents of culture war understand various issues as part of a broader set of religious, political, and moral/normative positions invoked in opposition to “elite”, “liberal”, or “left” ideologies. Within this Manichean universe opposition to such issues as climate change, Black Lives Matter, same sex rights, prison reform, gun control, and immigration becomes framed in binary terms, and infused with a moral sensibility (Chapman 8-10). In many disputes, the culture war often devolves into an epistemological dispute about the efficacy of scientific knowledge and authority, or a dispute between “practical” and theoretical knowledge. In this environment, even facts can become partisan narratives. For these “cultural” disputes are often how electoral prospects (generally right-wing) are advanced; “not through policies or promises of a better life, but by fostering a sense of threat, a fantasy that something profoundly pure … is constantly at risk of extinction” (Malik). This “zero-sum” social and policy environment that makes it difficult to compromise and has serious consequences for social stability or government policy, especially in a liberal democratic society. Of course, from the perspective of cultural materialism such a reductionist approach to culture and political and social values is not unexpected. “Culture” is one of the many arenas in which dominant social groups seek to express and reproduce their interests and preferences. “Culture” from this sense is “material” and is ultimately connected to the distribution of power, wealth, and resources in society. As such, the various policy areas that are understood as part of the “culture wars” are another domain where various dominant and subordinate groups and interests engaged in conflict express their values and goals. Yet it is unexpected that despite the pervasiveness of information available to individuals the pool of information consumed by individuals who view the “culture wars” as a touchstone for political behaviour and a narrative to categorise events and facts is relatively closed. This lack of balance has been magnified by social media algorithms, conspiracy-laced talk radio, and a media ecosystem that frames and discusses issues in a manner that elides into an easily understood “culture war” narrative. From this perspective, the groups (generally right-wing or traditionalist) exist within an information bubble that reinforces political, social, and cultural predilections. American and Chinese Reponses to COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic first broke out in Wuhan in December 2019. Initially unprepared and unwilling to accept the seriousness of the infection, the Chinese government regrouped from early mistakes and essentially controlled transmission in about three months. This positive outcome has been messaged as an exposition of the superiority of the Chinese governmental system and society both domestically and internationally; a positive, even heroic performance that evidences the populist credentials of the Chinese political leadership and demonstrates national excellence. The recently published White Paper entitled “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” also summarises China’s “strategic achievement” in the simple language of numbers: in a month, the rising spread was contained; in two months, the daily case increase fell to single digits; and in three months, a “decisive victory” was secured in Wuhan City and Hubei Province (Xinhua). This clear articulation of the positive results has rallied political support. Indeed, a recent survey shows that 89 percent of citizens are satisfied with the government’s information dissemination during the pandemic (C Wu). As part of the effort, the government extensively promoted the provision of “political goods”, such as law and order, national unity and pride, and shared values. For example, severe publishments were introduced for violence against medical professionals and police, producing and selling counterfeit medications, raising commodity prices, spreading ‘rumours’, and being uncooperative with quarantine measures (Xu). Additionally, as an extension the popular anti-corruption campaign, many local political leaders were disciplined or received criminal charges for inappropriate behaviour, abuse of power, and corruption during the pandemic (People.cn, 2 Feb. 2020). Chinese state media also described fighting the virus as a global “competition”. In this competition a nation’s “material power” as well as “mental strength”, that calls for the highest level of nation unity and patriotism, is put to the test. This discourse recalled the global competition in light of the national mythology related to the formation of Chinese nation, the historical “hardship”, and the “heroic Chinese people” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). Moreover, as the threat of infection receded, it was emphasised that China “won this competition” and the Chinese people have demonstrated the “great spirit of China” to the world: a result built upon the “heroism of the whole Party, Army, and Chinese people from all ethnic groups” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). In contrast to the Chinese approach of emphasising national public goods as a justification for fighting the virus, the U.S. Trump Administration used nationalism, deflection, and “culture war” discourse to undermine health responses — an unprecedented response in American public health policy. The seriousness of the disease as well as the statistical evidence of its course through the American population was disputed. The President and various supporters raged against the COVID-19 “hoax”, social distancing, and lockdowns, disparaged public health institutions and advice, and encouraged protesters to “liberate” locked-down states (Russonello). “Our federal overlords say ‘no singing’ and ‘no shouting’ on Thanksgiving”, Representative Paul Gosar, a Republican of Arizona, wrote as he retweeted a Centers for Disease Control list of Thanksgiving safety tips (Weiner). People were encouraged, by way of the White House and Republican leadership, to ignore health regulations and not to comply with social distancing measures and the wearing of masks (Tracy). This encouragement led to threats against proponents of face masks such as Dr Anthony Fauci, one of the nation’s foremost experts on infectious diseases, who required bodyguards because of the many threats on his life. Fauci’s critics — including President Trump — countered Fauci’s promotion of mask wearing by stating accusingly that he once said mask-wearing was not necessary for ordinary people (Kelly). Conspiracy theories as to the safety of vaccinations also grew across the course of the year. As the 2020 election approached, the Administration ramped up efforts to downplay the serious of the virus by identifying it with “the media” and illegitimate “partisan” efforts to undermine the Trump presidency. It also ramped up its criticism of China as the source of the infection. This political self-centeredness undermined state and federal efforts to slow transmission (Shear et al.). At the same time, Trump chided health officials for moving too slowly on vaccine approvals, repeated charges that high infection rates were due to increased testing, and argued that COVID-19 deaths were exaggerated by medical providers for political and financial reasons. These claims were amplified by various conservative media personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity and Laura Ingraham of Fox News. The result of this “COVID-19 Denialism” and the alternative narrative of COVID-19 policy told through the lens of culture war has resulted in the United States having the highest number of COVID-19 cases, and the highest number of COVID-19 deaths. At the same time, the underlying social consensus and social capital that have historically assisted in generating positive public health outcomes has been significantly eroded. According to the Pew Research Center, the share of U.S. adults who say public health officials such as those at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are doing an excellent or good job responding to the outbreak decreased from 79% in March to 63% in August, with an especially sharp decrease among Republicans (Pew Research Center 2020). Social Capital and COVID-19 From the perspective of social or community capital, it could be expected that the American response to the Pandemic would be more effective than the Chinese response. Historically, the United States has had high levels of social capital, a highly developed public health system, and strong governmental capacity. In contrast, China has a relatively high level of governmental and public health capacity, but the level of social capital has been lower and there is a significant presence of traditional values which emphasise parochial and particularistic values. Moreover, the antecedent institutions of social capital, such as weak and inefficient formal institutions (Batjargal et al.), environmental turbulence and resource scarcity along with the transactional nature of guanxi (gift-giving and information exchange and relationship dependence) militate against finding a more effective social and community response to the public health emergency. Yet China’s response has been significantly more successful than the Unites States’. Paradoxically, the American response under the Trump Administration and the Chinese response both relied on an externalisation of the both the threat and the justifications for their particular response. In the American case, President Trump, while downplaying the seriousness of the virus, consistently called it the “China virus” in an effort to deflect responsibly as well as a means to avert attention away from the public health impacts. As recently as 3 January 2021, Trump tweeted that the number of “China Virus” cases and deaths in the U.S. were “far exaggerated”, while critically citing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's methodology: “When in doubt, call it COVID-19. Fake News!” (Bacon). The Chinese Government, meanwhile, has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy across the South China Sea, on the frontier in the Indian sub-continent, and against states such as Australia who have criticised the initial Chinese response to COVID-19. To this international criticism, the government reiterated its sovereign rights and emphasised its “victimhood” in the face of “anti-China” foreign forces. Chinese state media also highlighted China as “victim” of the coronavirus, but also as a target of Western “political manoeuvres” when investigating the beginning stages of the pandemic. The major difference, however, is that public health policy in the United States was superimposed on other more fundamental political and cultural cleavages, and part of this externalisation process included the assignation of “otherness” and demonisation of internal political opponents or characterising political opponents as bent on destroying the United States. This assignation of “otherness” to various internal groups is a crucial element in the culture wars. While this may have been inevitable given the increasingly frayed nature of American society post-2008, such a characterisation has been activity pushed by local, state, and national leadership in the Republican Party and the Trump Administration (Vogel et al.). In such circumstances, minimising health risks and highlighting civil rights concerns due to public health measures, along with assigning blame to the democratic opposition and foreign states such as China, can have a major impact of public health responses. The result has been that social trust beyond the bubble of one’s immediate circle or those who share similar beliefs is seriously compromised — and the collective action problem presented by COVID-19 remains unsolved. Daniel Aldrich’s study of disasters in Japan, India, and US demonstrates that pre-existing high levels of social capital would lead to stronger resilience and better recovery (Aldrich). Social capital helps coordinate resources and facilitate the reconstruction collectively and therefore would lead to better recovery (Alesch et al.). Yet there has not been much research on how the pool of social capital first came about and how a disaster may affect the creation and store of social capital. Rebecca Solnit has examined five major disasters and describes that after these events, survivors would reach out and work together to confront the challenges they face, therefore increasing the social capital in the community (Solnit). However, there are studies that have concluded that major disasters can damage the social fabric in local communities (Peacock et al.). The COVID-19 epidemic does not have the intensity and suddenness of other disasters but has had significant knock-on effects in increasing or decreasing social capital, depending on the institutional and social responses to the pandemic. In China, it appears that the positive social capital effects have been partially subsumed into a more generalised patriotic or nationalist affirmation of the government’s policy response. Unlike civil society responses to earlier crises, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, there is less evidence of widespread community organisation and response to combat the epidemic at its initial stages. This suggests better institutional responses to the crisis by the government, but also a high degree of porosity between civil society and a national “imagined community” represented by the national state. The result has been an increased legitimacy for the Chinese government. Alternatively, in the United States the transformation of COVID-19 public health policy into a culture war issue has seriously impeded efforts to combat the epidemic in the short term by undermining the social consensus and social capital necessary to fight such a pandemic. Trust in American institutions is historically low, and President Trump’s untrue contention that President Biden’s election was due to “fraud” has further undermined the legitimacy of the American government, as evidenced by the attacks directed at Congress in the U.S. capital on 6 January 2021. As such, the lingering effects the pandemic will have on social, economic, and political institutions will likely reinforce the deep cultural and political cleavages and weaken interpersonal networks in American society. Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic has devastated global public health and impacted deeply on the world economy. Unsurprisingly, given the serious economic, social, and political consequences, different government responses have been highly politicised. Various quarantine and infection case tracking methods have caused concern over state power intruding into private spheres. The usage of face masks, social distancing rules, and intra-state travel restrictions have aroused passionate debate over public health restrictions, individual liberty, and human rights. Yet underlying public health responses grounded in higher levels of social capital enhance the effectiveness of public health measures. In China, a country that has generally been associated with lower social capital, it is likely that the relatively strong policy response to COVID-19 will both enhance feelings of nationalism and Chinese exceptionalism and help create and increase the store of social capital. 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