Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Market structure'
To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Market structure.
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 dissertations / theses for your research on the topic 'Market structure.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse dissertations / theses on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Ball, Catherine. "Local Markets : Competition and Market Structure." Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.527635.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis examines competition in three local markets: homebuilding, estate agency and groceries. It uses and extends the methodology developed by Bresnahan and Reiss in their seminal work in the 1990s, whereby the relationship between market structure and market size is used to evaluate how competition varies with finn numbers. U sing data from the homebuilding market, the rationale for using the Ordered Probit rather than count data alternatives to estimate these models is explored. Contrary to the existing literature, it is shown that the choice of estimator can significantly affect the results. In addition, several extensions to the Bresnahan and Reiss methodology are proposed. Firstly, the model is generalised to allow analysis of the persistence of certain effects as the number of finns in the market increases. It is shown that estate agents are able to profit from price discrimination and market segmentation, even in relatively unconcentrated markets. Secondly, a methodology is proposed to analyse the effects of competition on market expansion by augmenting the model with sales data. It is shown that increased competition between estate agents leads to a transfer of surplus but no increase in the size of the market. Thirdly, the model is extended in two ways to allow for competition between differentiated finns. When finn level data on differentiation is not available, the effect of the scope for differentiation is analysed. It is shown that markets with greater scope for differentiation are more profitable for estate agents. However, as finns can be identified by type, a more strategic approach is used to analyse the competition between different grocery formats. It is shown that small supermarkets, when located near at least one specialist store (e.g. a butcher or baker), negatively affect the profits of large supermarkets; a result that differs from previous studies by competition authorities.
2
Coronado, Saleh Francisco Javier. "Market structure and regulation in pharmaceutical markets." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7414.
Full textAbstract:
Esta tesis trata sobre la competencia y regulación en mercados farmacéuticos.El primer capítulo presenta un modelo de oligopolio donde se demuestra que la regulación de precios sólo aumenta los beneficios esperados de la entrada de un competidor genérico cuando el tamaño del mercado es pequeño en relación a la eficiencia de un productor incumbente. En el segundo capítulo se estudia empíricamente la interacción entre el efecto de redistribución del poder de mercado debido a los contactos multimercado y la regulación de precios. A bajos niveles de regulación el efecto se incrementa mientras que cuando la regulación es más estricta el efecto desaparece. En el tercer capítulo se estima un modelo estructural de oligopolio en el que se identifican los márgenes de precios de los productores. Se concluye que los márgenes simulados son consistentes con un escenario en el que los productores maximizan beneficios considerando a rivales con los que tienen contacto en otros mercados.
3
Schmidt, David E. "Capital markets and the market structure of foreign investments." Thesis, Aston University, 2010. http://publications.aston.ac.uk/15787/.
Full textAbstract:
Contrary to the long-received theory of FDI, interest rates or rates of return can motivate foreign direct investment (FDI) in concert with the benefits of direct ownership. Thus, access to investor capital and capital markets is a vital component of the multinational’s competitive market structure. Moreover, multinationals can use their superior financial capacity as a competitive advantage in exploiting FDI opportunities in dynamic markets. They can also mitigate higher levels of foreign business risks under dynamic conditions by shifting more financial risk to creditors in the host economy. Furthermore, the investor’s expectation of foreign business risk necessarily commands a risk premium for exposing their equity to foreign market risk. Multinationals can modify the profit maximization strategy of their foreign subsidiaries to maximize growth or profits to generate this risk premium. In this context, we investigate how foreign subsidiaries manage their capital funding, business risk, and profit strategies with a diverse sample of 8,000 matched parents and foreign subsidiary accounts from multiple industries in 38 countries.We find that interest rates, asset prices, and expectations in capital markets have a significant effect on the capital movements of foreign subsidiaries. We also find that foreign subsidiaries mitigate their exposure to foreign business risk by modifying their capital structure and debt maturity. Further, we show how the operating strategy of foreign subsidiaries affects their preference for growth or profit maximization. We further show that superior shareholder value, which is a vital link for access to capital for funding foreign expansion in open market economies, is achieved through maintaining stability in the rate of growth and good asset utilization.
4
Mahoney, Daniel. "Demand, Market Structure, Entry, and Exit in Airline Markets." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/18338.
Full textAbstract:
The airline industry is a major driver of economic activity in the United States, accounting for over $1 trillion annually. In this work, I study the airline industry and analyze several key economic issues facing the industry. I examine the industry from several different angles, looking at consumer behavior, firm behavior, and market performance. The body of the dissertation comprises three essays, with each essay focusing on one of the aforementioned facets of the industry.
The first essay is a study of consumer demand, using aggregate data to estimate consumer utility functions and identify preferences for airports in large, multi-airport markets. Using these utility functions, I produce tables of cross-airline and cross-airport elasticities, measuring how consumers would be expected to substitute between airports in response to airline price increases and substitute between airlines in response to airport price increases. The second essay is a study of market structure and pricing. I look at changes in market structure over a 20 year time period, focusing on the price effects of entry, exit, and mergers. By looking at both the direct effects as well as the subsequent effects on market concentration, I find that there is tremendous heterogeneity in the effects of these events across markets. The final essay is a model of firm entry and exit decisions in a network environment. I use this model to analyze firm decisions in the airline industry. I find that the size and geographic distribution of firms' networks plays an important role in their decision to further expand or contract, as firms with larger networks are more likely to expand, while firms with smaller networks are more likely to contract. Together, this body of work presents an in-depth analysis of the economic issues surrounding the airline industry.
This dissertation includes both previously published and co-authored material.
5
Ruan, Feng. "Essays on market structure." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/6308.
Full textAbstract:
Some of the most important work in the development of economic theory is associated with the study of market structure. In essence, most markets are two-sided. For example, product markets connect tens of thousands of product brands to tens of millions of consumers; marriage markets couple the single men and women who would otherwise suffer from a lonely heart; and labour markets link the job candidates to their preferred employers and positions. Apart from the two-sidedness, we have explored another important common aspect of these market structures, i.e. interconnection/competition of the segments within one side of the market. Under this common thread, the three essays in this thesis are freshly formulated in a loosely related manner, covering topics in three different areas. Chapter 2 is motivated by strategic transitions of many marketplaces (e.g. Amazon.com). From the perspective of a platform owner, when it owns part of the business on one side of the market, there is no straightforward answer as to whether having the rest of business owned by others is advantageous or not. The argument is that, on the one hand, the platform welcomes more third-party business as it boosts revenue in terms of membership fees; on the other hand the business owned by the platform dislikes the incoming competitors whose participation drives down pro t margins. We propose a novel framework in this chapter to explore the trade-off between the two. Here, the intermediary can decide to be either a "merchant" or a "two-sided platform", or a hybrid one in between. Our analysis shows that in hybrid mode the platform extracts all the surplus from the producers of the merchandised brands, and the merchandised brands always charge a price premium compared to the directly retailed ones. We also show that as the platform absorbs an existing directly retailed brand into the self-brand portfolio, the equilibrium prices of both brand types are increased. We find that only the directly retailed brands dominate the market when the platform s capacity is relatively small; and both brand types coexist in the marketplace when the capacity is relatively large. Furthermore, we find a backward bending proportion plus a vertical proportion of the "contract curve" in comparative statics. That is, the self-brand portfolio always expands while the third-party-brand portfolio shrinks until it reaches a certain level, when the platform increases its capacity. It helps us to gain some ideas on the dynamics of brand portfolio management for the platform. Lastly, taking into account of indirect network effect which is the common feature in the two-sided market, it is shown that the platform is better o¤ when consumers have positive expected surplus. Chapter 3 is much motivated by the Chinese experience. China has witnessed the largest rural to urban labour ow (among which the majority are male) in the world s history over the last three decades. We propose an idea that the grand migration can also be attributed to the unbalanced sex ratio between rural and urban areas. This chapter develops a two-sided matching model of two linked marriage markets with homogeneous agents, non-transferable utility and search friction. We extend the one-market model of the previous literature into a two-market one, allowing the agents to migrate between the markets at a fixed cost. The analysis focuses on the unmatched as well as the migrating population, which is induced by the different sex ratios in the two geographically isolated marriage markets. We find that imperfections in the matching technology leads to the enlarged gap of sex ratio of the unmatched population compared to that of the unbalanced inflows. We are interested in the question of how the migrating costs affect the migration between rural and urban areas, and under what conditions a subsidy covering migrating costs might benefit a party in the marriage markets. We characterise the equilibrium set in the parameter space of migrating costs, and find that a full subsidy of migrating costs does not necessarily benefit those who receive it but always benefits the opposite sex, if they are the short sides of both markets. Chapter 4 explains the migration of labour force from a different angle. Here, the migration is of workers to jobs. Motivated by the distinction of public and private sector, we consider a spatial oligopsony model in which forms (two co-locating small firms with recruiting capacity constraints and a large firm without such limit) are competing for workers along a "strip" market. The capacity issue that is extensively discussed in the Chapter 2 again plays an important role in this model, though in a very different context. It is shown that the recruiting capacity affects the intra-group competition and hence the inter-group competition in wage- posting strategies. Additionally, we show that, as recruiting limits expand, the expected wages offered by the small firms increase while the wage offered by the big firm decreases, which helps to explain the recent trend of the wage disparity between public and private jobs. We also characterise the equilibrium wages and the size (direction) of the migration in the three-stage game (i.e. the workers decide whether to relocate in the first stage, then the big firm decides its wage offer, and lastly, the two co-locating firms simultaneous set wages), which helps us to understand better the inter-sector mobility in a changing environment of economy. We investigate the issues of interconnection and competition in three different markets. It is always of interest for a researcher of economics to have some ideas on the same issue from different perspectives. Remember that whilst this is a collection of essays on economic theory, it is nonetheless compared to empirical observation. And it will surely serve as a starting point for the author to further the research on market structure.
6
Zou, Ping. "China's stock market : asset pricing and market structure." Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.269976.
Full text
7
Vickers, John. "Patent races and market structure." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9e3df3d2-b58a-48cc-b639-78c7c48bd3cd.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis is a theoretical study of relationships between patent races and market structure. The outcome of a patent race can be an important determinant of market structure. For example, whether or not a new firm enters a market may depend upon its winning a patent race against an incumbent firm already in that market. Moreover, market structure can be a major influence upon competition in a patent race. In the example, the asymmetry between incumbent and potential entrant has an effect upon their respective incentives in the patent race. Chapter I discusses models of R and D with uncertainty. We show that, as the degree of correlation between the uncertainties facing rival firms increases, R and D efforts increase under some, but not all, conditions, and the number of active competitors falls. Chapter II discusses the approach of representing patent races as bidding games. We examine a model in which several incumbent firms compete with a number of potential entrants in a patent race, and ask whether the incumbents have an incentive to form a joint venture to deter entry. They do so if and only if the patent does not offer a major cost improvement. In Chapter III we examine the strategic interactions between competitors during the course of a race, in an attempt to clarify (for different types of race) the idea that a race degenerates when one player becomes 'far enough ahead' of his rivals, in a sense made precise. In Chapter IV we examine the evolution of market structure in a duopoly model when there is a sequence of patent races. The nature of competition in the product market is shown to determine whether one firm becomes increasingly dominant as industry leader, or whether there is 'action - reaction' between firms.
8
Bäcklund, Elin. "Environmental Policy and Market Structure." Thesis, Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för ekonomi, samhälle och teknik, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mdh:diva-54703.
Full textAbstract:
The question of how to design efficient environmental policies has become one of the most important questions of our time, but finding the answer it is not easy. Simple models of environmental regulation do not take into account the complexity of real markets. One aspect that is sometimes ignored is the market structure of the regulated industry. This critical review of the literature shows that market structure can both influence and be influenced by environmental regulation and that determining the optimal environmental policy is complicated.
9
Fosu, Samuel. "Capital structure, product and banking market structure and performance." Thesis, University of Leicester, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2381/28601.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis consists of three distinct essays on finance, market structure and performance. Paying particular attention to the degree of industry competition, the first essay investigates the relationship between capital structure and firm performance using panel data consisting of 257 South African firms over the period 1998 to 2009. The essay applies a novel measure of competition, the Boone indicator, to the leverage-performance relationship. The results suggest that financial leverage has a positive and significant effect on firm performance. It is also found that product market competition enhances the performance effect of leverage. The results are robust to alternative measures of competition and leverage. The second essay examines the extent of banking competition in African subregional markets. A dynamic version of the Panzar-Rosse model is adopted beside the static model to assess the overall extent of banking competition in each subregional banking market over the period 2002 to 2009. Consistent with other emerging economies, the results suggest that African banks generally demonstrate monopolistic competitive behaviour. Although the evidence suggests that the static Panzar-Rosse H-statistic is downward biased compared to the dynamic version, the competitive nature identified remains robust to alternative estimators. Paying particular attention to the degree of banking market concentration in developing countries, the third essay examines the effect of credit information sharing on bank lending. Using bank-level data from African countries over the period 2004 to 2009 and a dynamic two-step system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation, it is found that credit information sharing increases bank lending. The degree of banking market concentration moderates the effect of credit information sharing on bank lending. The results are robust to controlling for possible interactions between credit information sharing and governance.
10
Fofana, Abdulai. "Market structure and measuring market power of UK salmon retailers." Thesis, University of Portsmouth, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.438814.
Full text
11
Schmidt-Ehmcke, Jens. "Technology, firm performance and market structure." kostenfrei, 2009. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=urn:nbn:de:kobv:521-opus-313.
Full text
12
Iyalla, Apiribo Joe. "Market structure induced trade and development." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.386482.
Full text
13
Ueno, Yuko. "Vacancy market structure and directed search." Thesis, University of Essex, 2012. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.571500.
Full textAbstract:
This paper analyzes labor market frictions caused by heterogeneity among traders on the demand side (firms). Vacancy numbers per firm created at once can vary, and this heterogeneity affects the application probability of workers through the wage settings of firms, which determines the overall matching efficiency. I formulate a matching function that reflects vacancy concentration level in its efficiency parameter, and verify that concentration improves matching efficiency when its level is not so high, and such positive impacts can peak at an intermediate concentration level for the period of 1996-2005 in the Japanese regional labor markets (Chapter 1). In the following chapters, I examine whether this result fits the theoretical prediction. For this aim, I present a directed search model in which vacancy distribution among firms is asymmetric, in order to investigate matching efficiency and equilibrium wage levels. In Chapter 2, the model considers a monopsony market with two firms that have multiple vacancies each, while in Chapter 3 I extend the model to allow wage competition among more than two firms, using the framework of a dominant firm and competitive fringe firms. The models indicate that the derived equilibrium is generally not constrained efficient, and that matching efficiency can deteriorate with concentration, depending on the concentration level and worker-vacancy ratio. These results are consistent with my empirical findings of regional labor markets in Chapter 1. In the model of Chapter 3, the gap between the maximized output level in an efficient market and the level of the equilibrium is minimized in the case of intermediate concentration. Further, positive wage differentials are usually not obtained, but are obtained under certain market parameters.
14
Walker, Richard Ernest Hugh. "Macroeconomic policy and labour market structure." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2002. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1677/.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis comprises three chapters. Each considers a particular manner in which policy choice and labour market structure interact to determine macroeconomic performance. The first chapter argues that employment protection legislation can significantly reduce equihbrium employment. It considers the impact of firing costs on the pricing behaviour of intermediate-good firms facing idiosyncratic productivity shocks. It is shown that, since they might work against existing market distortions, such costs can lead to either more or less efficient labour allocations. Simulations indicate that the magnitude of their effects is potentially much greater than is found in standard, representative-firm models, particularly when they act to reduce employment. The second chapter links the decentralisation of wage-bargaining in industrialised countries over the last twenty years to the more anti-inflationary macroeconomic regimes also in evidence. It presents a monetary policy game in which, prior to the central bank choosing inflation, wages are set by coalitions of unions. Unions are assumed to anticipate central bank behaviour when forming these coalitions. Using both cooperative and non-cooperative theories of coalition stability and formation, it is shown that highly conservative central banks are associated with decentralised patterns of wage-setting. The third chapter considers the effect of spatial unemployment dispersion on inflationary pressure in the aggregate. It reviews the theoretical rationales for any such effect, and argues that some previous studies have been overly restrictive in their assumption of homogeneous disaggregate Phillips curves. A theoretical rationale for disaggregate heterogeneity is provided and aggregate and regional Phillips curves estimated. Statistics on the spatial unemployment distribution are found to explain a significant part of the variation of the GB NAIRU over time.
15
Zaouras, Michalis. "Essays on market structure and competition." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2012. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/57065/.
Full textAbstract:
My thesis consists of two relatively independent topics. In the first topic I empirically inves- tigate the factors that determine the presence of the independent coffee shops in the market of Central London. In the second topic I present a theory of cartel detection. The common feature of these topics is that I investigate the demand side effects on market structure and its impact on competition. To be more specific, in the first topic I build a simple theoretical model of product differentiation in adjacent markets, based on Mazzeo (2002). For the empirical estimation I have constructed a unique dataset of coffee shops in Central London. I further manage to identify differences on demand characteristics across markets by utilizing data on people’s mo- bility from the tube stations and provide evidence for the existence of product differentiation. It is found that residential areas with high employment, areas with small business density and leisure areas increase the profitability of the independent coffee shops. A counterfactual analysis is also presented. In the second topic I investigate the cartel’s strategies and likelihood of collusion when the buyers of the cartel are able to report its existence to the anti-trust authority. I char- acterize the cartel’s optimal behavior when the buyers are actively monitoring the cartel’s members and are able to report a cartel to an anti-trust authority1. I present a simple static model and I show that the likelihood of collusion increases as the willingness of the buyers to report increases (cost of reporting decreases). Furthermore, it is shown that it is optimal for an anti-trust authority to decrease the cost of reporting (a trade-off between price reductions in existing cartels and increased likelihood of cartel formation is identified). Finally, alterna- tive cartel strategies are also explored in this topic. As for the last point, I show that the threat of exclusion (foreclosure) and price discrimination are robust strategies that prevent buyers from reporting.
16
Ecchia, Giulio. "Managerial incentives, market structure and regulation." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.363515.
Full text
17
Böhnlein, Barbara. "Multimarket contact, collusion and market structure /." San Domenico : European university institute, 1994. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37164944t.
Full text
18
Sacco, Alexander David. "Order submission strategy and market structure." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/12930.
Full textAbstract:
This dissertation investigates the impact of market structure developments on order submission strategies and market quality. The importance of these issues is underscored by the increasing prevalence of algorithmic trading in domestic and international equities markets over the past decade, as technological advances and market structures change the way market participants, exchanges, and regulators behave and interact. Algorithmic traders are becoming an increasingly significant liquidity demanding and supplying market participant, whose growing prevalence can be attributed to the increasing speed at which they can interact with a market and/or web of interlinked markets. Each essay addresses a research question and set of testable hypotheses that are underscored by scarce or conflicting prior research findings regarding the impact of contemporary market structure developments on order submission strategies and market quality. The first essay investigates the trading performance and price impact of algorithmic traders relative to the other market participants. Results indicate that algorithmic traders trade at less favourable prices than human traders when initiating trades. Algorithmic traders also position their limit orders closer to the best bid and ask quotes compared to human traders. The second essay computes queue time as the time (seconds and milliseconds) that a passive resting order remains at the best bid (buy) or offer (sell) before it interacts with a marketable counterparty trade. This essay offers an empirical examination of waiting costs which are analysed in a range of theoretical literature. The final essay examines the relationship between cost recovery and fee models that charge brokers for market participation with respect to message traffic and trading activity, and high frequency trading and market quality.
19
Koh, Sung Soo. "The Korean stock market : structure, behaviour and test of market efficiency." Thesis, City University London, 1989. http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/8245/.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis evaluates the Korean capital market internationalisation and examines the efficiency of the Korean stock market comprehensively. For this purpose this study is concentrated onthree main areas as follows. First, this thesis evaluates the capital market liberalisation by examining the internal market mechanism and conducting geographical comparisons. The general structure of the Korean securities market and disclosure system are described, and the development of the capital market is reviewed. The liberalisation plan is examined. It is found that the internationalisation plan of the Korean capital market should be gradual and balanced with general economic conditions. Several measures are recommended to enhance the functions of the domestic capital markets. Also comparative characteristics of capital market in the Far East are described, including equity market, bond market, money market, and foreign exchange market. Second, this thesis examines the relationship between the macro economic activities and the capital market in Korea. Using the interest rate model for 14.5 years, the expected inflation is uniformly positively related to inflation. The relations between stock returns and expected inflation, and between stock returns and unexpected inflation showed negative. Thus, the common stocks in Korea are found not hedging against inflation. And real variables influence to real stock returns as fundamental determinants of equity values. However, these real stock return inflation relations are found varying over time. The results of the recent five and half years period showed positive relation or no relation between real stock return and inflation. Third, this thesis examines the efficiency of the Korean stock market at three different levels. In the weak form empirical tests, the results manifest mixed behavior across samples. But the average results by serial correlation analysis, runs analysis, and spectral analysis do not show random walk behavior. In the frequency distribution model, the average results indicate relatively fat tails. In the semi-strong form test, the valuation effects of bonus stock issue announcements are found to react to share prices in a relatively short period. Investors on average cannot get significant abnormal returns. In the strong form test, the excess returns from following the 467 recommendations made by the four Korean stockbrokers turned out to be significant before deducting transactions costs. But considering transactions costs, the abnormal gain is close to zero. In summary, the results show that the Korean stock market in its early stages did not have the ability to help investors to 'relatively correctly price' the shares. More recent evidence shows improved efficiency which is likely to continue as the capital market expands.
20
Koh, Sung Soo. "The Korean stock market structure, behavior, and test of market efficiency /." Online version, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did=1&uin=uk.bl.ethos.352906.
Full text
21
Amidu, Mohammed. "Banking market structure and bank intermediation strategies in emerging markets : three essays." Thesis, University of Southampton, 2011. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/188777/.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis focuses on bank market structure and the effect of changes to this structure on intermediation strategies using a dataset that covers many regions of the world. Employing different estimation techniques and methodologies, and using a novel approach to each line of research, this thesis provides the following robust results: first, increase banking competition weakens the effectiveness of monetary policy. This is because an increase in the degree of market power increases the response of bank lending to the monetary policy stance. Second, competition increases stability as banks diversify across and within their business activities. Third, the high net-interest margin and relatively low insolvency risk among banks in developing countries could be attributed to a high degree of market power and the use of internal capital financing. The thesis makes the following contributions to the literature: first, in order to gain new insights and provide new dimensions to the existing literature, each of the three core chapters employs an estimation strategy that is new in the literature and which offers more scope for investigation. For instance, the positive influence of revenue diversification on the competition-stability nexus is new in the literature. Second, this thesis is first in considering how various measures of market power and a variety of bank funding strategies impact on banks performance. Furthermore, considering the banking structure-risk-lending channel hypothesis in assessing banks’ response to monetary shocks is also new in the monetary policy transmission literature. In conclusion, this thesis gives rise to important public policy recommendations. First, the strong link between market imperfections and the effectiveness of monetary policy indicators requires regulation that can resolve and offset the adverse effects of further increases in the degree of bank market power on the effectiveness of monetary transmission. Second, given the results of the role of diversification on the competition-stability relationship, there is no evidence to support regulatory initiative that restricts banks diversification activities. The third and final recommendation is on the concept of market power: bank market power in itself is not detrimental to banking activities, but the level and the application of it could negatively affect bankinsolvency risk. Therefore, supervisory, regulatory and competition authorities should coordinate to put in place a comprehensive framework that allows banks to have a considerable amount of market power that is robust and consistent with any competition policy
22
Costa, Magali Pedro. "How does product market structure influence financial structure and bankruptcy risk?" Master's thesis, Universidade de Évora, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10174/12087.
Full textAbstract:
The decision-making process is crucial to the success or failure of an organization. We can analyze financial decisions (particularly decisions regarding capital structure) and/or operational decisions (quantities and prices to be charged). These decisions are influenced by the dynamic economic and competitive environment in which firms live. The dissertation aims, using a game theoretical framework, to examine how market structure influences financial and product market decisions and consequently the bankruptcy risk .It analyzes the impact of changes at the level of demand uncertainty, in the degree of product differentiation and the asymmetry in marginal production costs on the risk of bankruptcy. The analysis is performed assuming a duopoly market where there is uncertainty in demand and where firms compete in quantities; ### Resumo:
O processo de tomada de decisão é crucial para o sucesso ou insucesso de uma organização. Pode-se falar em decisões financeiras (particularmente decisões quanto à estrutura de capital) e/ou em decisões operacionais (quantidades e preços ótimos a praticar). Estas decisões são influenciadas pelo contexto económico e concorrencial dinâmico em que as empresas vivem.
Esta dissertação pretende, utilizando o enquadramento da teoria dos jogos, analisar como é que a estrutura de mercado influencia as decisões financeiras e do mercado do produto e consequentemente o risco de falência. É analisado o impacto de mudanças no nível de incerteza na procura, no grau de diferenciação do produto e na assimetria nos custos de produção sobre o risco de falência. A análise será feita assumindo um mercado duopólio onde existe incerteza na procura e onde as empresas competem em quantidades.
23
Bergman, Mats. "Market structure and market power : the case of the Swedish forest sector." Doctoral thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för nationalekonomi, 1993. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-100717.
Full textAbstract:
The Swedish forest sector is analyzed, using methods drawing on traditional (forest) market analysis and industrial organization literature. Models based on economic theory are tested empirically with time-6eries data. Paper [1] deals with how the pulp and paper industry manages wood supply risk. It appears as if the import of wood is not counter-cyclical to the domestic supplies of wood. Instead, the inventory is used to absorb unexpected shifts in supply. In paper [2], the supply behaviour is compared between different categories of forest owners. The supply elasticities with respect to prices are found to be much smaller in this study, which is based on quantities of thinning wood and final felling wood, than in other studies using pulpwood and sawtimber quantities. Only small differences are found between owner categories. Paper [3] attempts to estimate parametrically the market power (the ‘markdown’) of the assumedlv monopsonistic pulp and paper industry, using a restricted Generalized Leontief (GL) profit function to model the production structure. The hypothesis of a competitive market can be rejected, when the alternative hypothesis is a variable degree of market power. Paper [4] clarifies some notions raised by the use of the restricted GL profit function. A specification of the profit fuction is proposed, where linear homogeneity in the fixed factor is nested in the non-homogeneous case. The final paper [5] explores the weakening of a natural resource monopsony’s market power, if time-consistency (or subgame-perfection) is required in a two- period model. The analysis resembles that of a monopoly selling a durable good (Coase conjecture). The monopsony does loose market power, but its position is strengthened if the resource is renewable or if it grows between periods.Diss. (sammanfattning) Umeå : Umeå universitet, 1993, härtill 5 uppsatser
digitalisering@umu
24
Ma, Daw. "Market structure in the semiconductor industry : the case of the DRAM market." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.417060.
Full text
25
Mazanec, Josef. "Exploratory market structure analysis. Topology-sensitive methodology." SFB Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 1999. http://epub.wu.ac.at/928/1/document.pdf.
Full textAbstract:
Given the recent abundance of brand choice data from scanner panels market researchers have neglected the measurement and analysis of perceptions. Heterogeneity of perceptions is still a largely unexplored issue in market structure and segmentation studies. Over the last decade various parametric approaches toward modelling segmented perception-preference structures such as combined MDS and Latent Class procedures have been introduced. These methods, however, are not taylored for qualitative data describing consumers' redundant and fuzzy perceptions of brand images. A completely different method is based on topology-sensitive vector quantization (VQ) for consumers-by-brands-by-attributes data. It maps the segment-specific perceptual structures into bubble-pie-bar charts with multiple brand positions demonstrating perceptual distinctiveness or similarity. Though the analysis proceeds without any distributional assumptions it allows for significance testing. The application of exploratory and inferential data processing steps to the same data base is statistically sound and particularly attractive for market structure analysts. A brief outline of the VQ method is followed by a sample study with travel market data which proved to be particularly troublesome for conventional processing tools. (author's abstract)Series: Report Series SFB "Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science"
26
Nielsen, Abigail. "Market structure, auditor independence and auditor turnover." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/24403.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis examines some of the relationships between the market structure of public auditing, auditor independence, and the rate of auditor changes over time. The first section of this thesis examines the relationship between market structure and auditor independence with a summary and extension of a recent paper written in collaboration with two other researchers. We concluded that competitive pricing will lead to auditor independence, whereas the existence of economic rents resulting from non-competitive pricing allows for the possibility of non-independence. We also concluded that if a non-competitive market for audits changes to a more competitive state, then a period of disequilibrium occurs where independence may be compromised until the competitive equilibrium is achieved.
The second section of this thesis examines the effects of such a disequilibrium period on auditor independence, auditor fees, and in particular, the rate of auditor turnover. During the disequilibrium, price rivalry should drive auditor fees down to the competitive equilibrium. Incumbent auditors will either reduce fees to match the lower bids of their competitors, or client companies will change to non-incumbent auditors offering identical- audit services at a lower price. A third possibility is that independence may be compromised if incumbents maintain higher fee structures in exchange for non-independent actions. However, as not all auditors will be willing to risk
non-independent action, an empirical implication would be that price rivalry not only lowers fees but, ceteris paribus, also increases auditor turnover.
The empirical portion of this thesis examines the effect of increased rivalry on auditor turnover. After a review of the existing literature on auditor changes, an empirical study of auditor changes between 1969 and 1983 was performed for a random sample of OTC firms. Assuming that the recent removal of AICPA prohibitions on competitive bidding, advertising and direct solicitation have acted as invitations for increased price rivalry, then we would expect to observe an increase in auditor turnover during the period examined. Annual turnover rates were computed, and a series of regression tests were performed using the Michigan Data Analysis System (MIDAS). The results of these tests failed to reject the hypothesis of no change in auditor turnover over the fifteen year period examined. Further market segmentation for changes within Big Eight auditors and for changes within non-Big Eight auditors did not alter the basic result of relatively constant auditor changes over time. Only the changes from non-Big Eight to Big Eight auditors indicated any statistically significant relationship to time. A number of potential explanations as to why this study did not produce the expected results of increased auditor turnover are examined, and areas for future research are discussed.Business, Sauder School of
Graduate
27
Sawler, James H. "Strategic alliances, market structure, conduct and antitrust." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2001. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp05/NQ66675.pdf.
Full text
28
Tonin, Mirco. "Essays on labour market structure and policies /." Stockholm : Institute for International Economic Studies, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-6975.
Full text
29
Minniti, Antonio. "Essays on market structure, location and growth /." Louvain-la-Neuve : Presses Univ. de Louvain, 2007. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/560234023.pdf.
Full text
30
Uthemann, A. "Essays in information economics and market structure." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2015. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1468998/.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis analyses three distinct economic problems through the common lens of informational asymmetries. In each chapter we show how market behaviour is best understood as the outcome of differentially informed market participants interacting with each other within the rules specified by the respective market under consideration. Chapter 2 provides an explanation for the variety of contracts offered by competitive firms for seemingly identical products or services, e.g. in mobile communication or personal banking. We show that firms’ menu of tariffs can be understood as screening devices for consumers with mistaken beliefs about their future demand. We furthermore show that while competition between firms prevents firms from exploiting their customers’ limited cognitive ability, competition is not able to correct the inefficiency caused by customers making suboptimal choices. Chapter 3 studies the effect of a financial transaction tax on the trading of a security. We construct a market microstructure model and estimate it using intraday transaction data for a stock traded on the NYSE (Ashland Inc.). The estimates are then used to simulate how a financial transaction tax would impact volume, spreads and informational efficiency in the asset market under consideration. Chapter 4 constructs a model of observational learning with payoff externalities that provides a justification for the use of short term debt in the financing of investment projects. While financing with debt that is subject to roll over risk is often seen as a source of instability, potentially triggering investor runs on financially sound institutions, we show that it can play an important role in facilitating the revelation of privately held information about future performance of the investment.
31
Anderson, Benjamin Christopher. "Essays on Market Structure and Technological Innovation." The Ohio State University, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1312540016.
Full text
32
Bakhtiari, Sasan. "Productivity dispersion, plant size, and market structure." College Park, Md.: University of Maryland, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/8516.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Maryland, College Park, 2008.Thesis research directed by: Dept. of Economics. Title from t.p. of PDF. Includes bibliographical references. Published by UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Mich. Also available in paper.
33
Tahir, Izah Mohd. "Market structure and efficiency in ASEAN banking." Thesis, Bangor University, 1999. https://research.bangor.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/market-structure-and-efficiency-in-asean-banking(808c7a5c-8340-430c-860c-011138c7fe6a).html.
Full textAbstract:
The increasing importance of the relationship between market structure and bank performance in general, together with the lack of empirical research on this relationship in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) banking markets, provide the main motivation for this study. Many researchers have sought to estimate the relationship between aspects of market structure such as concentration and market share, and indicators of bank performance such as profitability and prices. However, there is still no consensus with regard to the most appropriate theory in the light of the empirical data. In this study, the possible relationships between market structure and bank performance suggested by prior research are examined for the five main banking markets in ASEAN, i.e. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, for the period 1991 to 1995. This relationship is tested using pooled and cross sectional estimate, as well as on a country by country and year by year basis. This is the first study in which data for all five ASEAN countries has been analysed. The database which has been constructed for the present study has been obtained from a variety of primary sources, supplemented by commercial data services, thus providing the cross-national set of comparable data needed for the modelling of bank efficiency that is reported in this thesis. The study uses two measures of efficiency; (i) the standard accounting approach, i.e., the cost-toincome ratio, and (ii) the stochastic X-efficiency measure. Using the cost-to-income ratio as a proxy for efficiency, generally the pooled results suggest that both the Relative Market Power and the Relative Efficiency hypotheses may explain the profit-structure relationship in ASEAN banking markets. That is, firstly, market share appears to reflect market power, the larger firms in the market gaining higher profits; secondly, banks operating at higher levels of efficiency are also able to gain higher profits. Using the stochastic X-efficiency measure, the pooled results also provide support for both the Relative Market Power and Relative Efficiency hypotheses. In addition, we find that, overall, government ownership and market demand conditions are negatively related to bank profitability, whilst the level of risk capital is positively related. The individual country estimates suggest that Relative Market Power is supported only in the Philippines using the cost-to-income ratio and in the Philippines and Indonesia using the stochastic X-efficiency measure. Moreover, Relative Efficiency is also supported only in the Philippines and Indonesia using stochastic X-efficiency. In contrast, using the cost-to-income ratio, the Relative Efficiency hypothesis is supported in all five ASEAN countries which would imply that, in the region as a whole, bank efficiency is the primary driver of higher profits.
34
Buia, Raluca Elena <1975>. "Four essays on market structure under corruption." Doctoral thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/392.
Full text
35
Vitale, Paolo. "Essays in the theory of market micro structure." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.242586.
Full text
36
Livaic, Zelko F., of Western Sydney Nepean University, and Faculty of Business. "Privatisation and market structure : a game theoretic approach." THESIS_FB_XXX_Livaic_Z.xml, 2000. http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/348.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis focuses on the impacts of privatisation on the relevant industrial structure of the economy. Standard tools of industrial organisation theory are applied to examine these impacts and, thereby, shed light on relevant welfare issues. The focus of this thesis is to examine the ramifications of privatisation in imperfectly competitive markets. Simple Cournot-Nash types of games have been developed, where the market is a duopoly containing a privatised firm with the other firm being a new entrant. These games examine the efficacy and impacts of privatisation, and the role of government in this duopoly. The thesis endrogenously derives multiple equilibria in the duopolistic market; examines decontrolling/deregulating a vertical market; looks at the potential competition in vertical markets and examines potential collusion among existing firms to forestall entry; and addresses issues of privatisation in successive duopolies with cooperative investments. Results show that whether privatisation is beneficial to the community will rely on the astute role of government intervention.Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
37
Livaic, Zelko Francis. "Privatisation and market structure : a game theoretic approach /." View thesis, 2000. http://library.uws.edu.au/adt-NUWS/public/adt-NUWS20030723.135753/index.html.
Full text
38
Islyami, Aidan [Verfasser]. "Trade in Services and Market Structure / Aidan Islyami." Kiel : Universitätsbibliothek Kiel, 2012. http://d-nb.info/1023249545/34.
Full text
39
Panetta, Fabio. "The factor structure of the Italian stock market." Thesis, London Business School (University of London), 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.263809.
Full text
40
Toth, Aron. "Essays on moral hazard, reputation and market structure." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2008. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/2384/.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis is comprised of three pieces of research on moral hazard, reputation and market structure. In particular, following an opening discussion of previous literature, I explore the dynamic interaction between moral hazard and market structure in two distinct game theoretic settings and empirically test a fundamental assumption of these models concerning consumer rationality. In the first Chapter, I survey the studies which shed light on some dimension of the relationship between asymmetric information and market structure and identify the gap in the literature that my research aims to fill. The mechanism of reputation has been primarily investigated in the setting of perfect competition; however, this setting is ill suited for uncovering the rich set of relations between asymmetric information and market structure. Only a handful of articles departed from the perfect competition framework and only few of those introduced strategic interaction among firms, a fundamental ingredient of my research interest. The models which do include strategic interaction have, however, ignored some important dynamics in the interaction of asymmetric information and market structure. Therefore in Chapter II, I develop a model in which market structure affects moral hazard while, in turn, moral hazard fuels market structure dynamics. The model is very general allowing for all kinds of strategic interaction among firms usually considered in the literature. I identify and analyse an important driving force -a survival contest - which has so far been overlooked. The main conclusion is that market concentration in and of itself reduces moral hazard and moral hazard drives the market towards concentration through the survival contest. The model is suitable to explain the puzzling market transformation of important industries such as banking, audit and health care. In Chapter III, I extend the model of Chapter 11 by introducing stochastic entry. First, I demonstrate that my results in the previous Chapter are robust to the entry process. Second, stochastic entry allows me to derive a non-degenerate steady state distribution which exhibits a very intuitive dynamics. Finally, although the complex nature of the dynamics prevents a detailed comparative static analysis of this distribution, it displays two well known empirical regularities. In particular, my model shows that the presence of moral hazard in and of itself produces shake-outs in the market from time to time and also correlated exit and entry rates. The reputation mechanisms in general and in the models of Chapter II and III in particular crucially depend on consumers' ability and willingness to develop an understanding of imperfect information on quality. In order to make reputation an effective disciplinary force, consumers must be strongly rational so that they read and understand imperfect quality indicators. In Chapter IV, this basic assumption on consumer rationality is tested empirically in discrete choice settings in the audit market. I find robust empirical evidence that if consumers are firms rather than individuals, they are strongly rational.
41
Nier, Erlend Walter. "Financial structure, managerial incentives and product market competition." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1999. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1584/.
Full textAbstract:
This dissertation provides a contribution to the understanding of the interactions between the firm's financial structure and its operating decisions. The main idea is that financial structure impacts the payoff to the firm's decision-maker and that this impact on the managerial payoff will in turn affect his optimal response when confronted with different possible operating decisions. A particular focus is on the case where the manager's optimisation problem arises in a strategic environment in which the firm competes with rival firms in a product market. The first main chapter reconsiders the strategic effect of debt, as first analysed by Brander and Lewis (1986), under the novel assumption that quantity choices are made by managers whose objective is to avoid bankruptcy. The basic result is that quantity choices, which are strategic substitutes under profit maximisation, may turn into strategic complements when the quantity choice is made by managers. This reversal in the nature of competition arises under reasonable assumptions on the firm's profit function. It allows debt to be used to sustain more collusive product market outcomes than in the benchmark case where firms maximise profits, thereby avoiding, and indeed reversing, the pro-competitive limited liability effect of debt, as described by Brander and Lewis (1986). Delegation of the quantity choice to a bankruptcy-averse manager is shown to occur in a dominant strategy equilibrium. The next chapter analyses the effect of asymmetric information between a firm and its outside investors on the firm's competitive position in a model where first-period competition is followed by a financing stage a la Myers and Majluf (1984). Interim profit generated by the competition stage takes the role of financial slack and determines the extent to which external equity finance is required for a new investment opportunity. The full set of equilibria of the financing game is characterised and financial slack is formally analysed as a comparative statics variable. Using this the firm's first period objective is derived from first principles. In contrast to models of predatory behaviour, one finds that in the presence of an adverse selection problem the need to finance externally may provide a strategic benefit rather than a strategic disadvantage. The reason is that the adverse selection problem may induce speculative behaviour, which will make the firm more aggressive vis a vis its rival. The last main chapter analyses a model where the firm's manager is asked to make an informed investment decision after evaluating the prospects of an investment project. In this model, which exhibits both moral hazard and hidden information on the part of the manager, different remuneration schemes are discussed and the optimal contract between financial investor and manager is derived. Assuming the manager is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability, a benefit from diversification is shown to exist, in that the right incentives can be provided more cheaply when the manager is supervising more than one project. This occurs even though the projects are technologically unrelated and choices made on one project do not constrain the choices on any other project.
42
Matraves, Catherine. "The determinants of market structure in manufacturing industry." Thesis, University of East Anglia, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.320835.
Full text
43
Orleans-Lindsay, Kofi L. "Market structure, competitive strategy and performance in banking." Thesis, Cranfield University, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.282408.
Full text
44
Dick, Astrid A. (Astrid Andrea) 1972. "Essays on market structure, competition and consumer behavior." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8410.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2002.Includes bibliographical references.
This thesis is a collection of essays on market structure, competition and consumer behavior. In Chapter 1 I develop and estimate a structural model of demand for commercial bank deposit services, which allows me to analyze consumer response to various bank characteristics, as well as to measure the consumer welfare in light of the responses of banks to the regulatory changes in the period 1993-1999. My main finding is that, while concentration has increased in some banking markets, most experience a slight increase in welfare. I also find that consumers respond to account fees and deposit rates in making their deposit institution choices, and respond positively to the staffing and geographic density of branches, age, size and geographic diversification of banks. In Chapter 2 I study banking market structure and examine the effects of the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act in 1994, which allowed for nationwide branching in the U.S., on various aspects of banking firms and markets, including quality of service. The results suggest that the industrial structure of banking markets can be explained by the endogenous sunk cost model of Sutton (1991). While concentration at the regional level has increased dramatically, deregulation has left almost intact the market structure of MSA markets. A significant portion of the observed increase in bank quality can be traced to the implementation of nationwide branching, with banks offering larger branch networks for consumers.
(cont.) Chapter 3, co-authored with Erik Brynjolfsson and Michael D. Smith, applies a flexible demand model to examine heterogeneous consumer behavior and estimate search benefits and costs across consumers types, based on a unique data set obtained from a major U.S.-based online shopbot. Consumer benefits to search are estimated using a compensating variations approach, by comparing the welfare generated by the first set of offers shown to the consumer in the default screen, and that generated by the entire set of offers. The benefits to searching lower screens are $1.65 for the median consumer, and the cost of carrying an exhaustive search of the offers is a maximum of $1.40 for the median consumer that chooses to search lower screens.
by Astrid A. Dick.
Ph.D.
45
Wright, Pamela A. "Perceived structure of the environmental/conservation organization market /." The Ohio State University, 1992. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487760357823173.
Full text
46
Rafiquzzaman, Mohamed Carleton University Dissertation Economics. "Market structure, risk and the optimal patent term." Ottawa, 1985.
Find full text
47
Tong, Jian. "Technology, industrial structure, financial institutions and economic growth." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2001. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1676/.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis studies the relationship between technology and industrial structure in the context of a growing market economy. Chapters 2 and 5 develop some general equilibrium models which permit a study of the relationship between quality competition, market structure and growth. Both market structure and the rate of growth are determined endogenously as functions of underlying parameters describing the pattern of technology and tastes, and the institutional environment. It is argued that quality competition constitutes an economic mechanism of primary importance, which provides essential incentives for innovation at the industry level, while also contributing to aggregate technological progress by way of R&D spillover effects. A related theme of the thesis is that constraints on quality competition are detrimental to growth. Chapter 3 presents a theoretical model which explains certain statistical regularities regarding cohort survival patterns, the persistence of firm turnover, and the appearance of shakeouts during an industry life cycle. By treating the market as comprising a number of strategically independent submarkets, this analysis separates the strategic interaction effects which occur at the submarket level, from the independence effects which operate across submarkets. Chapter 4 studies competition between two cohorts of radically different but substitutable technologies. By analyzing the entry of new-technology- based firms, the exit of incumbents and subsequent quality competition, this chapter explores the impact of a radical innovation on market structure and on the turnover of firms. Two critical levels of the parameter which measures the efficiency of the new technology are identified: the first must be attained for 'creative destruction' to take place, while the second must be attained for this 'creative destruction' process to take a 'drastic' form which involves the complete replacement of currently active firms by a wave of new entrants.
48
Lagace, Vincent. "Financing rural producer organizations: Assessing market innovations." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/28895.
Full textAbstract:
Rural producer organizations are being increasingly recognized for their efforts in improving the livelihoods of small farmers across the developing world. Caught between microfinance and commercial banks, these organizations however often struggle to access the necessary funds to bring their product to market or finance much-needed infrastructure.
In recent years, a growing recognition of the problem has led to the emergence of a new generation of specialized financial institutions (commonly called alternative lenders). Using innovative supply-chain oriented strategies such as reverse factoring, these lenders aim to catalyze the emergence of local financial markets that meet the needs of rural producer organizations. This thesis evaluates the need for these financial innovations, their impact as well as the business case for lending to rural producer organizations. This assessment is achieved through documentary research, literature review and three case studies of coffee rural producer organizations in the Mexican states of Oaxaca, Veracruz and Chiapas.
This thesis concludes that although a RPO financing gap was indeed identified in Mexico in the early 2000s, this gap was found to be receding in recent years due to the Mexican government's success in encouraging commercial lending to the sector through FIRA, a second-tier development bank, and changes in the financial regulatory framework allowing the rise of two categories of non-bank financial institutions, the SOFOL and SOFOM.
The study also found a business case for profitable lending to rural producer organizations. All three studied organizations, despite their challenges, were found to be dynamic businesses with financing needs undoubtedly beyond what the microfinance market has to offer. This thesis however identifies several risk factors for potential lenders: vulnerability to price fluctuations and local competition, the politicized nature of RPOs, dependence on public and private subsidies as well as low internal capacity in financial management and accounting.
This thesis evaluated the impact of recent financial innovations to be moderately positive at worst and transformational at best on rural producer organizations. The loans provided by alternative lenders allowed the organizations to gain precious credit experience while capitalizing on market opportunities that could have otherwise been out of reach.
Finally, this thesis concluded by suggesting a few strategies that could be used by alternative lenders to maximize their impact, including adjusting their interest rates to market conditions, working with local financial institutions, diversifying their client base, taking more risks, strengthening RPO capacity through capacity-building programs and leveraging RPO internal credit funds to unlock underserved rural microfinance markets.
49
Doh, Bo-Eun. "Information externality, bank structure, and growth." Diss., Texas A&M University, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/265.
Full textAbstract:
This dissertation addresses the question of whether a monopolistic banking system can lead to a higher steady state level of capital stock. Specifically, this research analyzes the comparative advantage of a monopoly banking system. By doing that, it examines factors that contribute to the promotion of economic growth that come from a concentrated banking system. There is substantial evidence of a positive relationship between financial markets development and long term output growth. Little is known, however, about the role played by the market structure of the banking sector on growth. Moreover, little work, if any, has attempted to analyze how the degree of information externality affects the relative performance of a monopoly and competitive banks. I find that a monopoly banking system might perform better in accumulating capital under both low information externality and high information externality under certain conditions. In addition, this paper shows that developing countries as well as industrial countries may benefit from a concentrated banking system. This result is not found in the existing literature, which has only shown that developing countries may benefit from a monopoly banking system. This result can be interpreted as follows: (i) for the developing countries, as the proportion of high quality firms is relatively low, the loss in output associated with lending capital to lower quality firms is relatively high. In this case, the screening technology has enough value-added to compensate for the loss in output associated with the typical rent extraction activity of the monopolist. (ii) for the industrial countries, a monopoly banking system can overcome inefficiency from free riding problem associated with the information externality. This analysis provides an alternative explanation of the recent deregulation and resulting trends in mergers and acquisitions. This supports governments' policy changes from restricting merger and acquisition activity to allowing or even promoting merger and acquisition activity.
50
Foster, Mark David. "Characteristics of capital structure differences in emerging market firms." Diss., Mississippi State : Mississippi State University, 2004. http://library.msstate.edu/etd/show.asp?etd=etd-11152004-140407.
Full text