Academic literature on the topic 'Market structure'

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Market structure.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Market structure"

1

Lee, In Ho, and Robin Mason. "Market structure in congestible markets." European Economic Review 45, no. 4-6 (May 2001): 809–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00130-1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Aissaoui, Rachida, and Robert R. Wiggins. "Market Structure and Market Growth in Restricted Demand Markets." Academy of Management Proceedings 2012, no. 1 (July 2012): 13997. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2012.13997abstract.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Schmidt, Stephen. "Market structure and market outcomes in deregulated rail freight markets." International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, no. 1-2 (January 2001): 99–131. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(99)00009-0.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Russell, Gary J., and Ruth N. Bolton. "Implications of Market Structure for Elasticity Structure." Journal of Marketing Research 25, no. 3 (August 1988): 229–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002224378802500301.

Full text
Abstract:
Though considerable attention has been given to market structure, little research has been done on the relationship between market structure and elasticity structure. The authors develop and partially test the aggregate constant ratio elasticity pattern (ACREP), a parsimonious marketing mix elasticity model that describes the elasticity structure of submarkets characterized by a proportional-draw market share mechanism. An analysis of the brand price elasticities in nine markets (covering six product categories) suggests that the ACREP model is a robust approach for predicting the elasticity structure of submarkets within a nondurable product class. The underlying ACREP parameters, measuring consumer propensity to switch within and between submarkets, show systematic relationships with structural characteristics of the product markets.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

LIUBKINA, Olena, and Vitalii IHNATIUK. "TRANSACTION COSTS OF TRADING IN ORGANIZED STOCK MARKETS: STRUCTURE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKET EFFICIENCY." Herald of Khmelnytskyi National University. Economic sciences 320, no. 4 (June 29, 2023): 60–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.31891/2307-5740-2023-320-4-9.

Full text
Abstract:
The article substantiates the origin of transaction costs of stock trading from the point of view of the microstructure of the stock market. The article is devoted to the problem of improving the efficiency of decision-making in the field of portfolio investment, in particular in terms of reducing the cost of conducting operations. The object is the microstructure of the stock market, which allows to study in detail the process of making transactions with securities. The origin of transaction costs of stock trading was determined from the point of view of the microstructure of the market: as an appropriate fee for urgency and certainty in the purchase and sale process; as the premium for participation in market trading and conducting the exchange to stimulate potential counterparties; as the result of potential discrepancy in terms of information that the participants of exchange operations have. The classification of transaction costs is systematized according to various criteria: clarity of identification and assessment (explicit – commissions of intermediaries and the stock exchange, taxes, etc.and implicit – costs of spread, timeliness, market impact, missed opportunities); according to the reason for the various transaction costs (taxes, commissions, transaction execution costs and costs of missed opportunities). It is established that implicit costs add a significant level of uncertainty to the investment decision-making process, and therefore their evaluation and control is a priority issue for the investment entity. The main approaches to quantification of implicit transaction costs – missed opportunity costs, spread costs, and market impact costs-are summarized. Prospects for improving the tools for estimating transaction costs of operations in organized stock markets are determined.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Conroy, Robert M., and Robert L. Winkler. "Market structure." Journal of Banking & Finance 10, no. 1 (March 1986): 21–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0378-4266(86)90018-x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Hirschey, Mark. "Market Structure and Market Value." Journal of Business 58, no. 1 (January 1985): 89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/296284.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Francois, Joseph, and Ian Wooton. "Market Structure and Market Access." World Economy 33, no. 7 (June 1, 2010): 873–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2010.01234.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Martin, Stephen. "Market Structure and Market Performance." Review of Industrial Organization 40, no. 2 (February 3, 2012): 87–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-012-9338-8.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Jolly, Curtis M. "Market Structure of Food Markets in Haiti." Journal of Food Products Marketing 5, no. 1 (October 16, 1998): 67–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/j038v05n01_07.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Market structure"

1

Ball, Catherine. "Local Markets : Competition and Market Structure." Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.527635.

Full text
Abstract:
This thesis examines competition in three local markets: homebuilding, estate agency and groceries. It uses and extends the methodology developed by Bresnahan and Reiss in their seminal work in the 1990s, whereby the relationship between market structure and market size is used to evaluate how competition varies with finn numbers. U sing data from the homebuilding market, the rationale for using the Ordered Probit rather than count data alternatives to estimate these models is explored. Contrary to the existing literature, it is shown that the choice of estimator can significantly affect the results. In addition, several extensions to the Bresnahan and Reiss methodology are proposed. Firstly, the model is generalised to allow analysis of the persistence of certain effects as the number of finns in the market increases. It is shown that estate agents are able to profit from price discrimination and market segmentation, even in relatively unconcentrated markets. Secondly, a methodology is proposed to analyse the effects of competition on market expansion by augmenting the model with sales data. It is shown that increased competition between estate agents leads to a transfer of surplus but no increase in the size of the market. Thirdly, the model is extended in two ways to allow for competition between differentiated finns. When finn level data on differentiation is not available, the effect of the scope for differentiation is analysed. It is shown that markets with greater scope for differentiation are more profitable for estate agents. However, as finns can be identified by type, a more strategic approach is used to analyse the competition between different grocery formats. It is shown that small supermarkets, when located near at least one specialist store (e.g. a butcher or baker), negatively affect the profits of large supermarkets; a result that differs from previous studies by competition authorities.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Coronado, Saleh Francisco Javier. "Market structure and regulation in pharmaceutical markets." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7414.

Full text
Abstract:
Esta tesis trata sobre la competencia y regulación en mercados farmacéuticos.El primer capítulo presenta un modelo de oligopolio donde se demuestra que la regulación de precios sólo aumenta los beneficios esperados de la entrada de un competidor genérico cuando el tamaño del mercado es pequeño en relación a la eficiencia de un productor incumbente. En el segundo capítulo se estudia empíricamente la interacción entre el efecto de redistribución del poder de mercado debido a los contactos multimercado y la regulación de precios. A bajos niveles de regulación el efecto se incrementa mientras que cuando la regulación es más estricta el efecto desaparece. En el tercer capítulo se estima un modelo estructural de oligopolio en el que se identifican los márgenes de precios de los productores. Se concluye que los márgenes simulados son consistentes con un escenario en el que los productores maximizan beneficios considerando a rivales con los que tienen contacto en otros mercados.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Schmidt, David E. "Capital markets and the market structure of foreign investments." Thesis, Aston University, 2010. http://publications.aston.ac.uk/15787/.

Full text
Abstract:
Contrary to the long-received theory of FDI, interest rates or rates of return can motivate foreign direct investment (FDI) in concert with the benefits of direct ownership. Thus, access to investor capital and capital markets is a vital component of the multinational’s competitive market structure. Moreover, multinationals can use their superior financial capacity as a competitive advantage in exploiting FDI opportunities in dynamic markets. They can also mitigate higher levels of foreign business risks under dynamic conditions by shifting more financial risk to creditors in the host economy. Furthermore, the investor’s expectation of foreign business risk necessarily commands a risk premium for exposing their equity to foreign market risk. Multinationals can modify the profit maximization strategy of their foreign subsidiaries to maximize growth or profits to generate this risk premium. In this context, we investigate how foreign subsidiaries manage their capital funding, business risk, and profit strategies with a diverse sample of 8,000 matched parents and foreign subsidiary accounts from multiple industries in 38 countries.We find that interest rates, asset prices, and expectations in capital markets have a significant effect on the capital movements of foreign subsidiaries. We also find that foreign subsidiaries mitigate their exposure to foreign business risk by modifying their capital structure and debt maturity. Further, we show how the operating strategy of foreign subsidiaries affects their preference for growth or profit maximization. We further show that superior shareholder value, which is a vital link for access to capital for funding foreign expansion in open market economies, is achieved through maintaining stability in the rate of growth and good asset utilization.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Mahoney, Daniel. "Demand, Market Structure, Entry, and Exit in Airline Markets." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/18338.

Full text
Abstract:
The airline industry is a major driver of economic activity in the United States, accounting for over $1 trillion annually. In this work, I study the airline industry and analyze several key economic issues facing the industry. I examine the industry from several different angles, looking at consumer behavior, firm behavior, and market performance. The body of the dissertation comprises three essays, with each essay focusing on one of the aforementioned facets of the industry. The first essay is a study of consumer demand, using aggregate data to estimate consumer utility functions and identify preferences for airports in large, multi-airport markets. Using these utility functions, I produce tables of cross-airline and cross-airport elasticities, measuring how consumers would be expected to substitute between airports in response to airline price increases and substitute between airlines in response to airport price increases. The second essay is a study of market structure and pricing. I look at changes in market structure over a 20 year time period, focusing on the price effects of entry, exit, and mergers. By looking at both the direct effects as well as the subsequent effects on market concentration, I find that there is tremendous heterogeneity in the effects of these events across markets. The final essay is a model of firm entry and exit decisions in a network environment. I use this model to analyze firm decisions in the airline industry. I find that the size and geographic distribution of firms' networks plays an important role in their decision to further expand or contract, as firms with larger networks are more likely to expand, while firms with smaller networks are more likely to contract. Together, this body of work presents an in-depth analysis of the economic issues surrounding the airline industry. This dissertation includes both previously published and co-authored material.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Ruan, Feng. "Essays on market structure." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/6308.

Full text
Abstract:
Some of the most important work in the development of economic theory is associated with the study of market structure. In essence, most markets are two-sided. For example, product markets connect tens of thousands of product brands to tens of millions of consumers; marriage markets couple the single men and women who would otherwise suffer from a lonely heart; and labour markets link the job candidates to their preferred employers and positions. Apart from the two-sidedness, we have explored another important common aspect of these market structures, i.e. interconnection/competition of the segments within one side of the market. Under this common thread, the three essays in this thesis are freshly formulated in a loosely related manner, covering topics in three different areas. Chapter 2 is motivated by strategic transitions of many marketplaces (e.g. Amazon.com). From the perspective of a platform owner, when it owns part of the business on one side of the market, there is no straightforward answer as to whether having the rest of business owned by others is advantageous or not. The argument is that, on the one hand, the platform welcomes more third-party business as it boosts revenue in terms of membership fees; on the other hand the business owned by the platform dislikes the incoming competitors whose participation drives down pro t margins. We propose a novel framework in this chapter to explore the trade-off between the two. Here, the intermediary can decide to be either a "merchant" or a "two-sided platform", or a hybrid one in between. Our analysis shows that in hybrid mode the platform extracts all the surplus from the producers of the merchandised brands, and the merchandised brands always charge a price premium compared to the directly retailed ones. We also show that as the platform absorbs an existing directly retailed brand into the self-brand portfolio, the equilibrium prices of both brand types are increased. We find that only the directly retailed brands dominate the market when the platform s capacity is relatively small; and both brand types coexist in the marketplace when the capacity is relatively large. Furthermore, we find a backward bending proportion plus a vertical proportion of the "contract curve" in comparative statics. That is, the self-brand portfolio always expands while the third-party-brand portfolio shrinks until it reaches a certain level, when the platform increases its capacity. It helps us to gain some ideas on the dynamics of brand portfolio management for the platform. Lastly, taking into account of indirect network effect which is the common feature in the two-sided market, it is shown that the platform is better o¤ when consumers have positive expected surplus. Chapter 3 is much motivated by the Chinese experience. China has witnessed the largest rural to urban labour ow (among which the majority are male) in the world s history over the last three decades. We propose an idea that the grand migration can also be attributed to the unbalanced sex ratio between rural and urban areas. This chapter develops a two-sided matching model of two linked marriage markets with homogeneous agents, non-transferable utility and search friction. We extend the one-market model of the previous literature into a two-market one, allowing the agents to migrate between the markets at a fixed cost. The analysis focuses on the unmatched as well as the migrating population, which is induced by the different sex ratios in the two geographically isolated marriage markets. We find that imperfections in the matching technology leads to the enlarged gap of sex ratio of the unmatched population compared to that of the unbalanced inflows. We are interested in the question of how the migrating costs affect the migration between rural and urban areas, and under what conditions a subsidy covering migrating costs might benefit a party in the marriage markets. We characterise the equilibrium set in the parameter space of migrating costs, and find that a full subsidy of migrating costs does not necessarily benefit those who receive it but always benefits the opposite sex, if they are the short sides of both markets. Chapter 4 explains the migration of labour force from a different angle. Here, the migration is of workers to jobs. Motivated by the distinction of public and private sector, we consider a spatial oligopsony model in which forms (two co-locating small firms with recruiting capacity constraints and a large firm without such limit) are competing for workers along a "strip" market. The capacity issue that is extensively discussed in the Chapter 2 again plays an important role in this model, though in a very different context. It is shown that the recruiting capacity affects the intra-group competition and hence the inter-group competition in wage- posting strategies. Additionally, we show that, as recruiting limits expand, the expected wages offered by the small firms increase while the wage offered by the big firm decreases, which helps to explain the recent trend of the wage disparity between public and private jobs. We also characterise the equilibrium wages and the size (direction) of the migration in the three-stage game (i.e. the workers decide whether to relocate in the first stage, then the big firm decides its wage offer, and lastly, the two co-locating firms simultaneous set wages), which helps us to understand better the inter-sector mobility in a changing environment of economy. We investigate the issues of interconnection and competition in three different markets. It is always of interest for a researcher of economics to have some ideas on the same issue from different perspectives. Remember that whilst this is a collection of essays on economic theory, it is nonetheless compared to empirical observation. And it will surely serve as a starting point for the author to further the research on market structure.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Zou, Ping. "China's stock market : asset pricing and market structure." Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.269976.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Vickers, John. "Patent races and market structure." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9e3df3d2-b58a-48cc-b639-78c7c48bd3cd.

Full text
Abstract:
This thesis is a theoretical study of relationships between patent races and market structure. The outcome of a patent race can be an important determinant of market structure. For example, whether or not a new firm enters a market may depend upon its winning a patent race against an incumbent firm already in that market. Moreover, market structure can be a major influence upon competition in a patent race. In the example, the asymmetry between incumbent and potential entrant has an effect upon their respective incentives in the patent race. Chapter I discusses models of R and D with uncertainty. We show that, as the degree of correlation between the uncertainties facing rival firms increases, R and D efforts increase under some, but not all, conditions, and the number of active competitors falls. Chapter II discusses the approach of representing patent races as bidding games. We examine a model in which several incumbent firms compete with a number of potential entrants in a patent race, and ask whether the incumbents have an incentive to form a joint venture to deter entry. They do so if and only if the patent does not offer a major cost improvement. In Chapter III we examine the strategic interactions between competitors during the course of a race, in an attempt to clarify (for different types of race) the idea that a race degenerates when one player becomes 'far enough ahead' of his rivals, in a sense made precise. In Chapter IV we examine the evolution of market structure in a duopoly model when there is a sequence of patent races. The nature of competition in the product market is shown to determine whether one firm becomes increasingly dominant as industry leader, or whether there is 'action - reaction' between firms.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Bäcklund, Elin. "Environmental Policy and Market Structure." Thesis, Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för ekonomi, samhälle och teknik, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mdh:diva-54703.

Full text
Abstract:
The question of how to design efficient environmental policies has become one of the most important questions of our time, but finding the answer it is not easy. Simple models of environmental regulation do not take into account the complexity of real markets. One aspect that is sometimes ignored is the market structure of the regulated industry. This critical review of the literature shows that market structure can both influence and be influenced by environmental regulation and that determining the optimal environmental policy is complicated.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Fosu, Samuel. "Capital structure, product and banking market structure and performance." Thesis, University of Leicester, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2381/28601.

Full text
Abstract:
This thesis consists of three distinct essays on finance, market structure and performance. Paying particular attention to the degree of industry competition, the first essay investigates the relationship between capital structure and firm performance using panel data consisting of 257 South African firms over the period 1998 to 2009. The essay applies a novel measure of competition, the Boone indicator, to the leverage-performance relationship. The results suggest that financial leverage has a positive and significant effect on firm performance. It is also found that product market competition enhances the performance effect of leverage. The results are robust to alternative measures of competition and leverage. The second essay examines the extent of banking competition in African subregional markets. A dynamic version of the Panzar-Rosse model is adopted beside the static model to assess the overall extent of banking competition in each subregional banking market over the period 2002 to 2009. Consistent with other emerging economies, the results suggest that African banks generally demonstrate monopolistic competitive behaviour. Although the evidence suggests that the static Panzar-Rosse H-statistic is downward biased compared to the dynamic version, the competitive nature identified remains robust to alternative estimators. Paying particular attention to the degree of banking market concentration in developing countries, the third essay examines the effect of credit information sharing on bank lending. Using bank-level data from African countries over the period 2004 to 2009 and a dynamic two-step system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation, it is found that credit information sharing increases bank lending. The degree of banking market concentration moderates the effect of credit information sharing on bank lending. The results are robust to controlling for possible interactions between credit information sharing and governance.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Fofana, Abdulai. "Market structure and measuring market power of UK salmon retailers." Thesis, University of Portsmouth, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.438814.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Books on the topic "Market structure"

1

E, Anderson James. Political market structure. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Gatti, Domenico Delli, Mauro Gallegati, and Alan Kirman, eds. Interaction and Market Structure. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57005-6.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

von Stackelberg, Heinrich. Market Structure and Equilibrium. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12586-7.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Market structure and equilibrium. Heidelberg [Germany]: Springer, 2011.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Nocke, Volker. Underinvestment and market structure. London: Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, 1997.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Grossman, Sanford J. Liquidity and market structure. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1988.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Alec, Gee J. M., and Norman George 1946-, eds. Market strategy and structure. New York ; London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Business cycles: Market structure and market interaction. New York: Physica-Verlag, 2000.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

1957-, Heywood John S., and Peoples James, eds. Product market structure and labor market discrimination. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Markusen, James R. Endogenous market structure and foreign market entry. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Book chapters on the topic "Market structure"

1

Luke, Roice D., and Ramesh K. Shukla. "Market Structure." In Health Informatics, 21–42. New York, NY: Springer New York, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-0519-7_2.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Grant, Sue, and Richard Young. "Market Structure." In Economics a Level, 70–80. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-13606-3_8.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Ralf, Kirsten. "Market structure." In Contributions to Economics, 73–122. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51742-6_5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Ma, Richard T. B. "Market Structure." In Internet Transport Economics, 73–82. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14421-9_7.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Teece, David J. "Market Structure." In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, 1007–10. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-00772-8_764.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Sutton, John. "Market Structure." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 8278–82. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_960.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

D’Agostino, Elena. "Market Structure." In Contracts of Adhesion Between Law and Economics, 23–32. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13114-6_2.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Teece, David J. "Market Structure." In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, 1–4. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_764-1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Scherer, F. M. "Market Structure." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–6. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_960-1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Sutton, John. "Market Structure." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–6. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_960-2.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Conference papers on the topic "Market structure"

1

Muhammad Khalil Shahid, Ren Jie, and Tang Shoulian. "Vertically integrated market structure of communications industry and future horizontal market structure." In 2007 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ieem.2007.4419529.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Sun, Baowen, Wenjun Jing, Xuankai Zhao, and Yi He. "Will the Monopolistic Market Structure Produce Market Power?" In the 2nd International Conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3126973.3126983.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

"Session 09: Structure of electricity, gas and oil markets." In 2011 European Energy Market (EEM). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/eem.2011.5953029.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Melo, Elbia, Evelina Maria Almeida Neves, and Luiz Henrique Alves Pazzini. "Brazilian electricity sector restructuring: From privatization to the new governance structure." In 2011 European Energy Market (EEM). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/eem.2011.5953138.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Wei-hong, Pang, Li Kai, Zhang Lin, Liu Zhi-hui, Liu Xin-yang, and Chen Wei-hua. "Vertical market structure and slotting allowances." In 2013 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2013.6586365.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Shan, Hongmei, Ying Li, Jing Shi, and Chenjing Yao. "Market Structure, Technical Efficiency and Performance." In ICMSS 2020: 2020 4th International Conference on Management Engineering, Software Engineering and Service Sciences. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3380625.3380626.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Wagner, M., and D. L. Jones. "ERCOT nodal: market structure & incentives." In 2006 IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pes.2006.1709429.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Zhenfei Tang. "Power market structure and its equilibrium." In APSCOM 2000 - 5th International Conference on Advances in Power System Control, Operation and Management. IEE, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/cp:20000464.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Wu, Juzhen. "Market Structure of China's Steel Industry." In 6th International Conference on Electronic, Mechanical, Information and Management Society. Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/emim-16.2016.365.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Hadad, Elroi. "INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND DEBT MARKET DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM ISRAEL." In 4th International Conference on Opportunities and Challenges in Management, Economics and Accounting. Acavent, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.33422/4omea.2019.02.05.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Reports on the topic "Market structure"

1

Anderson, James, and Thomas Prusa. Political Market Structure. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w8371.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Fang, Hanming, and Zenan Wu. Multidimensional Private Information, Market Structure and Insurance Markets. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22773.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Markusen, James, and Frank Stähler. Endogenous Market Structure and Foreign Market Entry. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15530.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Grossman, Sanford, and Merton Miller. Liquidity and Market Structure. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2641.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Farboodi, Maryam, Gregor Jarosch, and Robert Shimer. The Emergence of Market Structure. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w23234.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Ma, June, Joshua Gans, and Rabee Tourky. Market Structure in Bitcoin Mining. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24242.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Taft, Jeffrey. Electric Grid Market-Control Structure. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), June 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1644691.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Bresnahan, Timothy, and Jonathan Levin. Vertical Integration and Market Structure. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17889.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Jensen, Richard, Jerry Thursby, and Marie Thursby. Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2630.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Flood, Mark D. Market Structure and Inefficiency in the Foreign Exchange Market. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.20955/wp.1991.001.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography