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Ghosh, Subhadip, and Shahidul Islam. "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Canada’s Entry for LNG Exports in the Asia-Pacific Market." Commodities 2, no. 2 (June 12, 2023): 169–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/commodities2020011.
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The import demand for energy resources, including liquefied natural gas (LNG), has been steadily increasing in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia, the Middle East (Qatar), the Russian Federation, and the U.S. are the major players who compete strategically to capture this ever-growing market for LNG. The objective of this paper is to examine the potential for Canada’s entry into this market as another LNG exporter and what impact that can have on the existing suppliers. Using a game-theoretic LNG export competition model, we explore the conditions under which Canada can make a profitable entry. We also investigate the effect of Canada’s entry on the profitability of the four incumbent exporters. Employing a multi-leader Stackelberg model, we found that Canada’s entry could be a Pareto superior outcome under certain conditions because it benefits all competing firms and consumers. Further, Canada’s entry into the LNG export market always helps the low-cost incumbent firms by increasing their output and profit. However, the high-cost incumbent firms’ output falls, while their profit may increase or decrease depending on the unit cost and market size parameters. With differential export costs between Canada and the U.S., the latter has an incentive to act strategically to affect the entrance of the former.
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Negoro, Kazuhiro, and Nobuo Matsubayashi. "Game-theoretic analysis of partner selection strategies for market entry in global supply chains." Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 151 (July 2021): 102362. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2021.102362.
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Raturi, Varun, and Ashish Verma. "Analyzing competition between High Speed Rail and Bus mode using market entry game analysis." Transportation Research Procedia 25 (2017): 2373–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2017.05.264.
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Perez-Saiz, Hector, and Hongyu Xiao. "Cultural Affinity, Regulation, and Market Structure: Evidence from the Canadian Retail Banking Industry." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14, no. 1 (February 1, 2022): 451–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180044.
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We estimate a perfect information static entry game to study the effect of cultural entry barriers on entry and competition in the retail banking industry. Canada provides a favorable setting for analysis due to its high linguistic diversity, concentrated market, and regulatory entry barriers. We find that cultural affinity between customers and financial institutions that share a common cultural origin plays an important role in explaining the comparative advantages of these institutions in certain markets. Using several counterfactual experiments and additional empirical evidence, we show that the effectiveness of regulations intended to foster competition is significantly limited by cultural barriers, which is a key determinant that shapes the competitive landscape of the industry. (JEL G21, G28, L13, Z13)
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Han, Jun. "Optimization Analysis of Advertising Information Resource Allocation in View of the Dynamic Game Model." Journal of Mathematics 2022 (April 15, 2022): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/7445124.
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Advertising has become the most important part of emerging advertising media with rich content, vivid form, huge browsing volume, and exponential growth in market share. It brings huge profits to operators and advertisers participating in bidding every year. Formulate reasonable allocation rules and payment rules for advertising resources in advertising space sales. The advertising configuration platform mainly has three functions: the entry function of home page advertising, serving the company’s operation department and storing the advertising information entered by operation, with a large amount of data, involving more than a dozen tables. The advertisement output function outputs the advertisement of the storage layer through the interface in JSON data format. This part of the function serves the downstream systems, such as mobile phone clients and PC. Starting from the requirements’ analysis, this study introduces the platform design and the analysis method logic, shows the implementation of the platform, and then analyzes and describes the test process from the aspects of function and performance. Based on the review and summary of the formation and characteristics of the competitive structure of China’s advertising market and the research results of foreign advertising classification, this study makes a qualitative and quantitative study on the competitive strategy of China’s advertising game by using the principles of service marketing and advertising, the classical model of oligarch competitive structure, game theory, differential game, and dynamic optimization. In terms of qualitative research, this study discusses the impact of advertising on China’s market competition pattern and the advertising game strategy through the comparative study of advertising and the analysis of market characteristics. The study found that due to the high barriers to entry of the advertising market and the intangibility of products, the strategy of putting category advertising and information advertising should be adopted. In quantitative research, based on the Sethi model, this study discusses the advertising game strategy model of the Oligarchic competition structure. The important conclusions include the profitability of enterprises from the market share is the most important factor to determine the market share and advertising expenditure. The impact of advertising on market share is obvious. The role of advertising expenditure has a time lag. Drastic changes in the scale of advertising expenditure will cause long-term fluctuations in the market structure. The research method has a certain universality, so the research results can also be used for reference for the advertising strategy of other industries with oligopoly competition structures.
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Tian, Lin, Baojun Jiang, and Yifan Xu. "Manufacturer’s Entry in the Product-Sharing Market." Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 23, no. 3 (May 2021): 553–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/msom.2020.0919.
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Problem definition : Mobile communications technologies and online platforms have enabled large-scale consumer-to-consumer (C2C) sharing of their underutilized products. This paper studies a manufacturer’s optimal entry strategy in the product-sharing market and the economic implications of its entry. Academic/practical relevance : Sharing of products or services among consumers has experienced dramatic growth in recent years. The impact of C2C sharing on traditional firms can be very significant. In response to C2C product sharing, many manufacturers (e.g., General Motors and BMW) have entered the product-sharing market to provide business-to-consumer (B2C) rental services in addition to outright sales to consumers. Methodology : We employ a game-theoretic analytical model for our analysis. Results : Our analysis shows that when C2C sharing has a low transaction cost and the manufacturer’s marginal cost of production is not very high, the manufacturer will find it not optimal to offer its own rental services to consumers. In contrast, when the C2C sharing transaction cost is high or the manufacturer’s marginal cost of production is high, the manufacturer should offer enough units of the products for rental to squeeze out C2C sharing (in expectation). When the C2C-sharing transaction cost and the manufacturer’s marginal cost are both in the middle ranges, the manufacturer’s rental services and the C2C sharing will coexist, in which case the manufacturer’s entry in the sharing market may reduce the total number of units of the product in the whole market, but increase the consumer surplus and the social welfare. This reduced number of products due to the manufacturer’s B2C rental service also suggests less environmental impact from production. Managerial implications : The production cost and the C2C sharing transaction cost play critical roles in determining the manufacturer’s optimal quantity to use for its B2C rental services and the equilibrium outcome. In some situations, the manufacturer’s entry in the sharing market provides not only economic benefits to the firm and consumers, but also environmental benefits to the society as a whole.
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Su, Ying Sheng, Jian Fu Li, Jiang Wu, and Peng Fei Ji. "The Designation of Quality and Price Based on Vertical Product Differentiation." Key Engineering Materials 474-476 (April 2011): 2325–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/kem.474-476.2325.
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Different consumer demands different quality, which determines that existence of different quality of the same product is reasonable. The article uses two-stage game of fully non-perfect information. Through two-stage game analysis, the article concludes that whether new entrants should enter the market is not only related with the fixed cost of entry, the number of consumers and the highest taste of consumers, but also related to the quality choices of incumbents; after entrants enter the market, the choices of quality are decided by the quality choices of incumbents.
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Vokony, I., and M. Csete Szalmáné. "Analysis of market entry, restructuring and economic risks at energy companies – literature review." Renewable Energy and Power Quality Journal 21, no. 1 (July 2023): 262–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.24084/repqj21.291.
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The entry of companies dealing with renewable energy sources into the market will be analyzed firstly, in addition to the companies dealing with fossil-based energy production, which are still strongly present. Here the game-theoretic stylization of the competition between two types of companies is in scope, while the incumbents determine the energy prices, and those entering the market can respond with quantitative adjustments. After that, the cyber security issues of the market-leading energy companies are under revision. Nowadays, due to the widespread use of computer control systems, a possible cyber-attack is a big risk for a power plant, as it can result in a complete system shutdown or, in the worst case, even irreparable damage. In light of these, risk networks are analyzed in three layers, reflecting normal and extreme market conditions. Ultimately, we will analyze the strategic steps of companies' restructuring and withdrawal. In the current economic situation, many dominant companies have a diversified portfolio, which on one hand promises beneficial profit opportunities and financial stability due to the parallel presence of diverse investment and production directions, but also makes it necessary to abandon the given route and to reallocate resources to another sector if necessary. Based on these points, by the end of the analysis, we will have a clearer picture of the struggle for market dominance of large energy companies and the steps necessary for success.
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Raturi, Varun, and Ashish Verma. "Competition between High Speed Rail and Conventional Transport Modes: Market Entry Game Analysis on Indian Corridors." Networks and Spatial Economics 19, no. 3 (October 1, 2018): 763–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11067-018-9421-2.
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Hånell, Sara Melén, Emilia Rovira Nordman, Daniel Tolstoy, and Nurgül Özbek. "“It’s a new game out there”: e-commerce in internationalising retail SMEs." International Marketing Review 37, no. 3 (June 13, 2019): 515–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/imr-03-2018-0107.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore how market factors (pertaining to institutions, competition and resources) shape the international strategies of an online retailer. Design/methodology/approach A single qualitative case study research design is employed to conduct in-depth analyses of a Swedish internationalising small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) in the retail business. Findings The findings show that online retailers can use partnerships to tackle industry dynamics and break into foreign markets. This type of “piggy-back internationalisation” can be an effective strategy of handling foreign market dynamics in the entry phase: that is to say, the short term. Reliance upon relationships, however, may paradoxically inhibit retailers’ abilities to stay competitive in the post-entry phase (i.e. the long term) since they become cut-off from the first-hand market learning. Research limitations/implications The authors provide propositions based upon the findings to support further research in the international marketing and international retailing literature. Practical implications The findings enhance the understanding of how electronic commerce affects SME internationalisation. They also generate new insights into the use of possible international expansion strategies for managers in retail SMEs. Originality/value This study introduces a new theoretical perspective to build upon international retail research and contributes to the international retail literature with relevant insights into both advantages and disadvantages of using partnerships to overcome challenges related to international online retailing.
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Tarziján, Jorge. "Limit pricing with complementary goods." Journal of Modelling in Management 6, no. 2 (July 5, 2011): 215–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17465661111149593.
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PurposeThis paper aims to examine the equilibrium limit price charged by a producer trying to deter the entry of a firm that can choose one of the two markets of complementary goods.Design/methodology/approachThe authors model a dynamic game of incomplete information solved using a “perfect Bayesian equilibrium” approach.FindingsIt is shown that an incumbent will be willing to spend more resources – i.e. charge a lower limit price – to deter entry into its market as products become more complementary. This is because additional benefits are gained from entry deterrence by facing a more competitive market in the complementary product. The additional benefits of entry deterrence are shown to be a function of the degree of complementarity between goods.Practical implicationsA managerial implication of this article is that firms are willing to compete more fiercely to send an entrant to the other's incumbent market as the degree of complementarity between goods increases. An interesting conclusion that is derived from the above analysis is that managers should invest to understand the interdependences (e.g. complementarities) of the goods they sell, since the strategic variables chosen to compete may be affected by them, in some cases in a non‐trivial way.Social implicationsFrom a public policy perspective, the main contribution of this paper is to point out that regulators who analyze predatory pricing, or other (probably) illegal “low‐price strategies”, should consider the degree of complementarity between goods and its effect on pricing.Originality/valueAs far as the authors' knowledge goes, there are no other papers that analyze entry decisions involving multiple markets of complementary goods.
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Jiang, Yalei. "Application of Game Theory Analysis in E-commerce Platform Pricing." Frontiers in Business, Economics and Management 7, no. 2 (February 5, 2023): 32–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/fbem.v7i2.4361.
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The impact of pricing strategy on the profitability of e-commerce platform is studied. First of all, based on the e-commerce platform, considering the interests of the platform, the seller and the buyer in the transaction process, it is of practical and theoretical significance to explore the strategic choice of e-commerce platform pricing from the perspective of game theory. Then, through research, it is found that the operation of the e-commerce platform has distinct life cycle characteristics, that is, the initial use of various subsidy strategies to attract the entry of sellers and buyers, and the medium-term use of asymmetric pricing strategies combined with external response and demand elasticity to ensure the effectiveness of the platform. Finally, when formulating pricing strategies, e-commerce platforms should actively implement the strategy of market-oriented operation, reduce the intervention of sellers and buyers, and ensure the stable development of e-commerce platforms.
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Su, Cairui, and Guoshun Ma. "EXPLORING THE STRATEGY CHOICE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING MARKET PARTICIPANTS BASED ON THE PERSPECTIVE OF EVOLUTIONARY GAME." JOURNAL OF QUANTITATIVE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS 4, no. 2 (2022): 213–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.47509/jqfe.2022.v04i02.05.
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The people’s increasing attention to culture and education has caused vicious competition in the education and training industry, and false propaganda has disturbed the market order, and the education and training market is facing the choice of entry and exit. Based on the evolutionary game model, this paper explores the best strategic choice of the three parties involved in the education market by constructing an evolutionary game model of the strategic behavior choice of the regulator, education institutions and students, and using MATLAB simulation analysis to explore the direction of healthy, orderly and scientific development of the education market. The results show that the stronger the supervisory authority rewards (or punishes) the education and training institutions that adopt benign competition with credibility and credit evaluation, the more the education and training institutions tend to choose benign competition. The smaller the extra loss of training for students, the more inclined they are to choose to enroll. The higher the benefit of benign competition (or the cost of vicious competition) for teaching and training institutions, the more inclined they are to choose benign competition.
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Romero, Julián, Angel Sanchis-Cano, and Luis Guijarro. "Dynamic Price Competition between a Macrocell Operator and a Small Cell Operator: A Differential Game Model." Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2018 (2018): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/1012041.
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An economic model was analyzed where a new supplier implements the technology of the small cells and positions itself as an incumbent service provider. This provider performs a dynamic reuse of resources to compete with the macrocells service provider. The model was analyzed using game theory as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the service providers play a Stackelberg differential game where the price is the control variable, the existing provider is the leader, and the new supplier is the follower. In the second stage, users’ behavior is modeled using an evolutionary game that allows predicting the population changes with variable conditions. This paper contributes to the implementation of new technologies in the market of mobile communications through analysis of competition between the new small cell service providers (SSPs) and the existing service providers along with the users’ behavior of mobile communications. The result shows that users get a better service, SSP profits are guaranteed, and SSP entry improves users’ welfare and social welfare.
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Ignatius, Joshua, Tian Siang Tan, Lalitha Dhamotharan, and Mark Goh. "DEREGULATION CONTROL BY MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE AIRLINE INDUSTRY." Technological and Economic Development of Economy 24, no. 6 (December 5, 2018): 2277–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/20294913.2016.1266410.
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The major challenges of deregulation are lax market entry, sudden surge in new market entrants, and the intense price wars that ensue, thus causing major losses for any industry. This paper investigates whether deregulation can be structured through a controlled Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) process by means of government intervention, and how this promotes the performance of the players in the industry. We study this in the context of the Chinese aviation industry as an ideal microcosm of our problem statement. This is because China’s civil aviation industry has witnessed many of the above challenges since its deregulation and economic reforms in 1979, which saw the beginning of a transformation from a fully state-owned machinery to a rent-seeking private sector. The post controlled deregulation process through M&As led to three dominant carriers: Air China Limited (AC), China Southern Airlines (CS), and China Eastern Airlines (CE). Using a 3-player non-cooperative perfect information Cournot oligopoly game model, the strategic efficacy of the government intervention to consolidate the industry based on operating expenses, air passenger revenue, and profit data are investigated respectively. All three airlines are better off after the exercise, with the industry facing a more sustainable growth by the intervention.
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Zandi, Faramak, Madjid Tavana, and Aidan O’Connor. "A STRATEGIC COOPERATIVE GAME-THEORETIC MODEL FOR MARKET SEGMENTATION WITH APPLICATION TO BANKING IN EMERGING ECONOMIES." Technological and Economic Development of Economy 18, no. 3 (October 1, 2012): 389–423. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/20294913.2012.688072.
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Market segmentation is essential to target efficaciously core-segment customers and to obtain a competitive advantage. Firms when confronted by the range of market segments, have difficulty in deciding the core-segment customers who are the most probable purchasers of their product and services. We propose a novel fuzzy group multi-criteria method for market entry and segment evaluation and selection. This proposed method provides a comprehensive and systematic framework that combines bi-level multi-objective optimization with real option analysis (ROA) and fuzzy cooperative n-person game theory. The contribution of the proposed segment evaluation and selection method is fivefold: (1) it addresses the gaps in the marketing literature on the efficacious and effective assessment of market segments; (2) it provides a comprehensive and systematic framework that combines bi-level multi-objective optimization with ROA and fuzzy cooperative n-person game theory; (3) it considers fuzzy logic and fuzzy sets to represent ambiguous, uncertain or imprecise information; (4) it does not insist on consensus but synthesizes a representative outcome based on qualitative judgments and quantitative data; and (5) it is applicable to national and international market segmentation. The practical application of this proposed framework illustrates the efficacy of the procedures and algorithms.
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WiJongHyun and 원은석. "A Case Analysis of Entry in Global Education Market focused on Public Education : The Entry of G-Learning(Game Based Learning) into a Public School System in USA." International Commerce and Information Review 15, no. 2 (June 2013): 109–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.15798/kaici.15.2.201306.109.
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Eberspaecher, Kai C. "The case for shared infrastructure to unlock onshore resources." APPEA Journal 60, no. 2 (2020): 431. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/aj19020.
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This paper outlines the current state of the upstream industry for smaller oil and gas developers in Australia’s mature onshore basins. In particular, a strategic review of the market landscape based on Porter’s Five Forces model is undertaken from a junior exploration company’s perspective with a focus on barriers to market entry, such as access to infrastructure, capital, assets and expertise. In the strategic framework context, the paper examines the opportunities to break down natural monopolistic structures and barriers to entry across incumbent producers, pipeline transportation companies and contractors. It also investigates potential changes in resource policy dealing with access to infrastructure and general development requirements. In its analysis, the importance of junior explorers to extend the longevity of mature basins by looking at other petroleum provinces around the globe is highlighted. Examples in North America (onshore) and the UK (offshore) are used to showcase approaches in assisting smaller companies converting resources into reserves. In its conclusion, the paper demonstrates qualitatively how shared infrastructure, coopetition and incorporating renewables can be game changers for junior explorers in unlocking further resources and new prospects in the Australian onshore hydrocarbon provinces. The paper also calls for further coordination between companies, industry bodies and government under an improvement framework to ensure continued success.
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Ribeiro, Vitor Miguel, Fernando Lobo Pereira, and Rui Gonçalves. "Explaining the definition of wholesale access prices in the Portuguese telecommunications industry." Journal of Dynamics & Games 9, no. 1 (2022): 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021024.
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<p style='text-indent:20px;'>The 2016–2018 triennium was a period marked by a fierce dispute between the European Commission and Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações, Portugal, on the need to regulate wholesale access prices. While the European Commission defended the imposition of Fiber-To-The-x regulation in non-competitive areas, the Portuguese sectoral regulator argued in favor of the persistence of Fiber-To-The-x deregulation. Following a Game Theory approach, the present study demonstrates that the transition from Fiber-To-The-x deregulation to Fiber-To-The-x regulation should only occur when a given territorial unit becomes a competitive area since the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium captures a regulatory framework optimally characterized by the imposition of active access price deregulation (regulation) in non-competitive (competitive) areas, that is, local administrative units characterized by a weak (strong) degree of vertical spillover, respectively. Meanwhile, ducts access regulation must be permanently imposed throughout the national territory, despite it can be relaxed in competitive areas if the regulator imposes intra-flexibility to establish a monopolistic bottleneck to ensure social welfare maximization. Previous conclusions require to introduce both facility-based and service-based competition at the entry stage as well as active and passive obligations at the regulation stage in a multi-stage game with complete information. The present analysis legitimizes the emergence of a new optimization theory in the telecommunications literature, whose modus operandi is contrary to (coincident with) the ladder of investment theory in non-competitive (competitive) areas, respectively. Differently from the view sustained by the ladder of investment theory, which defends that a short-term regulatory touch combined with long-term market deregulation is a socially optimal strategy, the new theory confirms that a regulatory intervention is socially desirable only in the long run. The conceptual refinement is meticulously explained and labeled as the <i>theory of creative creation</i> because, differently from the Schumpeterian gale of creative destruction, whose processes of industrial mutation are permanently market-driven by assumption, a period of regulatory holidays followed by successive regulatory interventions dependent on the degree of vertical spillover observed in the telecommunications industry can effectively promote investment realization that continuously revolutionizes the market structure from within, incessantly destroying the old technology. The theory of creative creation reflects the regulatory framework currently in force in the Portuguese Telecommunications Industry.</p>
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Lin, Ling, Tao Shu, Han Yang, Jun Wang, Jixian Zhou, and Yuxuan Wang. "Consumer-Perceived Risks and Sustainable Development of China’s Online Gaming Market: Analysis Based on Social Media Comments." Sustainability 15, no. 17 (August 24, 2023): 12798. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su151712798.
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Online gaming constitutes an indispensable facet of China’s digital economy, catalyzing consumer discussions on social media platforms. This study employs a comprehensive natural language processing framework, encompassing topic mining, multi-label classification, and sentiment analysis, to evaluate consumers’ psychological perceptions of the risks associated with online games through social media comments. This study identifies 11 distinct perceived risk topics, including “Excessive Temptation”, “Entry Regulation”, and “Culture Implantation”. Numerous comments encompass multiple topics, each infused with diverse emotional inclinations, thus unveiling disparate consumer perspectives. These findings underscore the critical significance of addressing potential perceived risks and mitigating negative consumer emotions for enterprises operating within online gaming. Such measures are pivotal to maintaining a brand image, business reputation, and enduring growth. Furthermore, this study extends valuable insights to regulatory bodies, contributing to enhancing administrative efficiency, safeguarding consumer rights, and fostering a robust and sustainable trajectory within China’s online gaming market.
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Esenduran, Gökçe, Yen-Ting Lin, Wenli Xiao, and Minyue Jin. "Choice of Electronic Waste Recycling Standard Under Recovery Channel Competition." Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 22, no. 3 (May 2020): 495–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/msom.2018.0750.
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Problem definition: We consider two competing electronic waste (e-waste) recovery channels, each of which consists of a collector and a recycler. Collectors obtain donated e-waste and sell the collected items to recyclers or in the secondary market, whereas recyclers process e-waste and sell the recycled material in the commodity market. Each recycler chooses for certification of one of two standards: e-Stewards or Responsible Recycling (R2). E-Stewards requires comparably more responsible handling, thus a higher processing cost, but attracts more e-waste from environmentally conscious donors. Academic/practical relevance: Despite the rapid growth of e-waste, the operations management community still understands little about e-waste processing supply chains. We add to this body of knowledge by capturing three salient features in the e-waste recovery industry: the existence of two recycling standards, the secondary market, and competition both within and between recovery channels. Methodology: We model the problem as a Stackelberg game and characterize the firms’ equilibrium decisions, deriving managerial insights through sensitivity analysis and numerical studies. Results: Competition between recovery channels is a key factor motivating e-Stewards adoption, whereas a recycler always chooses R2 in its absence. Interestingly, when competition exists both within and between recovery channels, recyclers with strong e-waste processing scale economies choose e-Stewards when incurring significantly higher processing costs than with R2. Furthermore, both the total environmental benefit and welfare might be higher when recyclers choose R2. Managerial implications: Policy makers who aim to encourage e-Stewards adoption should (1) lower entry barriers for new recyclers to induce competition, and (2) offer incentive programs to alleviate e-Stewards’ cost disadvantage, though only when recyclers have weak scale economies. Policy makers and nongovernmental organizations, however, should exercise caution in endorsing e-Stewards because R2 actually may generate a higher environmental benefit because of higher recycling volumes.
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Bolger, Fergus, Briony D. Pulford, and Andrew M. Colman. "Market Entry Decisions." Experimental Psychology 55, no. 2 (January 2008): 113–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169.55.2.113.
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Abstract. In a market entry game, the number of entrants usually approaches game-theoretic equilibrium quickly, but in real-world markets business start-ups typically exceed market capacity, resulting in chronically high failure rates and suboptimal industry profits. Excessive entry has been attributed to overconfidence arising when expected payoffs depend partly on skill. In an experimental test of this hypothesis, 96 participants played 24 rounds of a market entry game, with expected payoffs dependent partly on skill on half the rounds, after their confidence was manipulated and measured. The results provide direct support for the hypothesis that high levels of confidence are largely responsible for excessive entry, and they suggest that absolute confidence, independent of interpersonal comparison, rather than confidence about one's abilities relative to others, drives excessive entry decisions when skill is involved.
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Oliveira, Flávia Alvarenga de. "Playing through metaphors: an analysis of metaphor use in life simulation games / Jogando com metáforas: uma análise do uso de metáforas em jogos de simulação de vida." REVISTA DE ESTUDOS DA LINGUAGEM 28, no. 2 (May 5, 2020): 871. http://dx.doi.org/10.17851/2237-2083.28.2.871-891.
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Abstract: From consistent narratives to cutting-edge graphic design, designers have been investing heavily in making their items competitive in the market. Given the high level of interaction between the players and the games they play, it is to be expected that much of how real-life representations are built in our minds will, in one way or another, influence how we interact with virtual reality, impacting on the playability of a game. Studies on the role of metaphors in (video)games are rather recent and much is yet to be investigated. Through simulations of family life and school routine, for example, these games imply human behavior as systematic and goal-oriented. For this study, we selected popular free life simulation games available at a popular App Store for smartphones. When listing the existing metaphors, we noticed a systematic difference: while conceptual metaphors were multimodal, consisting of a combination of verbal and visual information, primary metaphors showed to be intrinsically monomodal, consisting of visual information. In this study, we argue that metaphors in life simulation games start off as text-dominant, but become image-dominant after some time. That is, players rely on both images and verbal cues while learning how to play the games, but after some time they can just look at the symbolic cues for information. We therefore propose that the classification for metaphors in games should be continuous and as dynamic as the game itself, since there seems to be a movement from text-dominant to visual-dominant metaphors throughout the games.Keywords: metaphor; games; simulation; multimodal metaphors; primary metaphors.Resumo: De narrativas consistentes a design gráfico de ponta, designers têm investido em tornar seus produtos atrativos para o mercado. Dado o alto nível de interação entre jogadores e os jogos que usam, é esperado que muitas das representações das quais fazemos uso na vida real influenciem, até certo ponto, o modo como interagimos com a realidade virtual, o que impacta, portanto, sua jogabilidade. Estudos sobre o papel da metáfora em jogos são bastante recentes e muito ainda precisa ser investigado. Jogos de simulações de vida que envolvem relações familiares e rotinas escolares, por exemplo, parecem sugerir que o comportamento humano seja sistemático e orientado a objetivos específicos. Para o presente estudo, selecionamos jogos de simulação de vida populares em uma App Store para smartphones. Ao listar as metáforas encontradas, notamos uma sistemática diferença: enquanto metáforas conceituais eram multimodais (consistindo de combinações entre informações verbais e visuais), metáforas primárias se mostraram intrinsecamente multimodais (consistindo de informações visuais). Neste estudo, defendemos que metáforas em jogos de simulação de vida começam como texto-dominante, mas, à medida que o jogo se desenrola, tornam-se visualmente dominantes. Ou seja, jogadores dependem de ambos os tipos de informação ao aprender a jogar, mas depois de algum tempo, a informação pode ser obtida ao olhar para os símbolos na tela. Por esta razão, propomos que a classificação de metáforas em jogos se dê de forma contínua, ou seja, que seja tão dinâmica como os próprios jogos, uma vez que o movimento de texto-dominante para imagem-dominante parece se fazer presente no decorrer dos jogos.Palavras-chave: metáfora; jogos; simulação; metáfora multimodal; metáforas primárias.
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De Jorge-Moreno, Justo, and Oscar Rojas Carrasco. "Technical efficiency and its determinants factors in Spanish textiles industry (2002-2009)." Journal of Economic Studies 42, no. 3 (August 10, 2015): 346–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jes-06-2013-0085.
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence about the technical efficiency and its determinants in Spanish textile sector during the period 2002-2009. The empirical results suggest that the effects of trade liberalization have led to higher levels of inefficiency in the Spanish sector, due to the lack of flexibility of firms to adjust to the environment, and perhaps to aggressive competition with fuzzy rules of the game. Controlling for specific factor like age, intensity of capital, salary by worker, regions and market share, the authors have obtained that the interaction between market share and size indicates that as firms have more size are also more inefficient. Design/methodology/approach – In this paper, the stochastic frontier production function is considered, specifically, a panel data version of Battese and Coelli (1995), in which the technical inefficiency is estimated from the stochastic frontier and simultaneously explained by a set of variables. This approach avoids the inconsistency problems of the two-stage approach used in other empirical works when analyzing the inefficiency determinants. Findings – This work provides new evidence about the technical efficiency and its determinants can be due to environmental or firm-specific factors in Spanish textile sector during the period 2002-2009. The authors have estimated the Cobb-Douglass stochastic production frontier following Battese and Coelli (1995) model to analyze an unbalanced panel. Originality/value – The empirical results suggest that the trend of the inefficiency shows a curvilinear behavior in the form of U (turning point third-quarter of 2004). This result is related to the efficiency analysis through Kernel distributions (in static and dynamic form) confirmed a clear process of divergence. In the period 2002-2005 the efficiency of the firms analyzed maintained higher levels than the 2005-2009 period where there is deterioration. This may be related to the increased competition due to the end of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement in January 2005 and the entry of Chinese products in 2004.
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Jianya, Zheng, and Li Weigang. "Market Entry Game Application in e-Commerce." Journal of Software 11, no. 6 (June 2016): 589–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.17706/jsw.11.6.589-597.
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Lee, C. B., L. R. Fletcher, J. M. Binner, and W. D. Murphy. "Market share in a post-entry game." Journal of the Operational Research Society 52, no. 5 (May 2001): 503–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jors.2601114.
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Lee, CB, LR Fletcher, JM Binner, and WD Murphy. "Market share in a post-entry game." Journal of the Operational Research Society 52, no. 5 (2001): 503–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/sj.jors.2601114.
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Rapoport, Amnon. "Individual strategies in a market entry game." Group Decision and Negotiation 4, no. 2 (March 1995): 117–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01410098.
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Kamphorst, Jurjen J. A., Bastian Westbrock, and Ewa Mendys-Kamphorst. "Rational Signals of Weakness in a Market Entry Game." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 169, no. 3 (2013): 519. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245613x669439.
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Nti, Kofi O. "Potential competition and coordination in a market-entry game." Journal of Economics 71, no. 2 (June 2000): 149–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01227449.
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Holden, Steinar, and Christian Riis. "Entry into a new market a game of timing." International Journal of Industrial Organization 12, no. 4 (December 1994): 549–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(94)90007-8.
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Zhang, Wen Fen, Min Tu, and Wen Feng Sun. "The Output Competition Game between FDI Port Enterprises and Incumbent Port Enterprises." Applied Mechanics and Materials 565 (June 2014): 205–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.565.205.
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With the opening to the outside world, port market entry and exit become relatively free in China. In this context, there will be a game of market entry and anti-entry between foreign direct investment (FDI) port enterprises and incumbent ones. Cournot and Dixit Model were both used to study the output competition game between above two kinds of enterprises. Cournot equilibrium shows that FDI port enterprises' output falls as the its own marginal cost increases but increases as the competitors' marginal cost increases. In Dixit Model, by researching the reaction function based on the production scale, marginal cost and scale cost, the selection conditions of FDI port enterprises' market entry strategy were studied. Results show that enterprises entry strategy selection is relative to the limitation and equilibrium output.
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Kuzmanovic, Marija, Vera Kovacevic-Vujcic, and Milan Martic. "Three-stage entry game: The strategic effects of advertising." Yugoslav Journal of Operations Research 21, no. 2 (2011): 163–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/yjor1102163k.
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This paper analyzes the effects of investment in advertising in the three-stage entry game model with one incumbent and one potential entrant firm. It is shown that if a game theory is applied, under particular conditions, advertising can be used as a strategic weapon in the market entry game. Depending on the level of the advertising interaction factor, conditions for over-investment in advertising for strategic purposes are given. Furthermore, three specific cases are analyzed: strictly predatory advertising, informative advertising and the case when one firm?s advertising cannot directly influence the other firm's profit. For each of them, depending on the costs of advertising and marginal costs, equilibrium is determined, and conditions under which it is possible to deter the entry are given. It is shown that if the value of the advertising interaction factor increases, power of using advertising as a weapon to deter entry into the market decreases. Thus, in the case of informative advertising, advertising cannot be used as a tool for deterring entry into the market, while in the case of predatory advertising, it can. Also, we have proved that in the case of strictly informative advertising an over-investment never occurs, while in the two other cases, there is always over-investment either to deter or to accommodate the entry.
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Rigopoulos, Georgios, and Nikolaos V. Karadimas. "Simulation Approach for a Two-Player Real Options Signaling Game." WSEAS TRANSACTIONS ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 19 (April 5, 2022): 1000–1007. http://dx.doi.org/10.37394/23207.2022.19.87.
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Situations where hidden information exists among involved parties can be found in a variety of diverse domains, ranging, for example, from market entry to military operations. Game theory provides valuable tools to model and analyze such complex settings, with signaling games being one of the approaches. Entering an existing market poses several challenges for a new player and can be studied from a variety of viewpoints. One way to approach it, is by a real options signaling game, where in the simplest form an entrant and an incumbent firm are participating and hidden information exists. In this paper we focus on the market entry scenario and approach it by means of a real options signaling game. The work builds on previous work and contributes to the limited literature on the domain. We introduce the basic notations and background and describe the game setting. Next, we present a simulation approach demonstrating the basic steps, according to the theory, and present the results of simulation executions. The work aims to build a generic model for such market games on top of a two player setting, but the concept is not limited to market entry only, but further expanded in relevant domains where hidden information exists.
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Park, Kwan-Yong, and Woo-Sung Cho. "A Study on China Market entry of Online Game Industries." E-Business Studies 22, no. 6 (December 31, 2021): 141–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.20462/tebs.2021.12.22.6.141.
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Erev, Ido, and Amnon Rapoport. "Coordination, “Magic,” and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Game." Games and Economic Behavior 23, no. 2 (May 1998): 146–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0619.
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Simon, Jean Paul. "How Europe missed the mobile wave." info 18, no. 4 (June 13, 2016): 12–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/info-02-2016-0006.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide an interpretative framework for the high market capitalisation companies (unicorns) universe, especially with the deployment of the mobile internet. The paper attempts to account for this global trend and to describe its global setting (global data), and its various components. Design/methodology/approach This paper originates from a research meant to document the phenomenon of high market capitalisation companies (unicorns) through the investigation of a qualitative sample of companies. The paper is based on desk research, a review of literature, review of the technical journals and analysis of annual reports. Going beyond the observations gathered from the sample, the research found that the transformations of the mobile communications ecosystem could provide an adequate framework to understand and put in perspective this phenomenon. Findings The paper defined unicorns as information technology (IT)-based (software mostly but hardware as well) start-ups that bridge pent-up demand and supply through innovative services and products mostly rooted in the mobile internet wave and the opportunities it brings along. The paper shows that smartphones as games changers facilitate the entry of new players in the mobile markets coming either from the IT sector or from Asia, much to the detriment of the European Union (EU) industry grappling with legacy business models. These companies derived the most from a mobile-first approach and have an outstanding number of unicorns. The paper identifies a potential telecom policy failure especially in the EU: policies have been tilted towards the supply side, without enough consideration of demand. The paper suggests that the EU, after having lead the previous wave, may have missed the last one (mobile broadband) not only from a policy but also from an industry viewpoint. Research limitations/implications More research should be done to better investigate what might have been the causes of this apparently missed mobile turn in Europe. The paper deals mostly with the cases of Asia and the USA. As the paper concentrates on the issue of unicorns and mobile technology, some other aspects of the mobile markets may not be taken into account. Practical implications The paper suggests reconsidering some policies in the field, to better take into account the role of consumers and to improve the link with other policies like innovation policies. Social implications The paper attempts at giving a better understanding of the evolution of demand and its role in the making of some new services. The paper does not deal with other societal issues like privacy or data. Originality/value The main assumption about the role of the mobile internet can shed some light not only about related developments such as the app economy but also about the business and technological environment of an array of start-ups, some of them having reached impressive market capitalisation. The paper reveals how this mobile wave is reshuffling companies, sectors, and geographies. The paper provides one of the first analysis of the unicorn phenomenon.
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Bergstrom, Theodore, Shane Parendo, and Jon Sonstelie. "Competition and Personality in a Restaurant Entry Game." B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 16, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 411–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0049.
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AbstractWe explore the question of whether personality traits as measured by standard psychological tests are significant explanators of behavior in an entry game. The experimental data and psychological test results come from classroom experiments designed to teach the concepts of short and long run equilibrium in a competitive market. These experiments were conducted in 42 classroom sessions, each with about 35 students.
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Wang, Congcong, Yingxue Zhao, and Rongda Chen. "A Game of Two Elderly Care Facilities: Competition, Mothballing Options, and Policy Implications." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2016 (2016): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/3241973.
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This article develops a model to investigate the entry strategies of private investors to the elderly care service market, with the purpose of explaining the reasons behind dilemma of low signing rate plaguing China’s Public-Private Partnership projects. We focus on the competition between two private investors with or without mothballing options under price uncertainty. After the derivation of equilibria of entry strategies, we employ numerical examples to analyze the dependencies of entry thresholds on market parameters, cost parameters, subsidy, and possession of mothballing option. Conclusions are drawn and some policy implications are given with the intention to alleviate the problem of low signing rate.
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Odhiambo, Edwin, and Jane Wanjira. "Strategic Positioning and Competitive Advantage of Commercial Banks in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya." International Journal of Current Aspects 3, no. II (April 24, 2019): 83–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.35942/ijcab.v3iii.8.
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Strategic positioning has been identified as an important weapon to manage the competition in the business environment. However, despite the use of strategic positions, many banks in the country are facing challenges from the competition destabilizing the position they hold. Thus, the sole reason of the project was to establish how strategic positioning affects competitive advantage of banks in Uasin Gishu County Kenya. The specific objectives were; to examine the effects of mono-segment positioning, multi-segment positioning, standby positioning, adaptive positioning and defensive positioning on competitive advantage of commercial banks in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. The study was guided by Resource-Based-View, The Game Theory, Market Based View Theory and Open Systems Theory. Explanatory research design was used in this study. The unit of analysis was commercial banks in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya and the unit of observation was 748 employees in 25 banks. A stratified random sample was used as a significant blend of categorization and randomization. A sample of 173 employees was selected. Questionnaires were used in collection of data. Descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis were used to analyse data. The study established a positive and significant relationship between mono-segment positioning, multi-segment positioning, standby positioning, adaptive positioning and defensive positioning on organizational competitive advantage. The study concludes that through mono-segment Commercial banks are free to devote all of their resources to attracting a single, narrowly defined type of customer with a specific need it can fulfill better than other companies. Through multi segment Commercial banks can analyze various customer groups and targeting specific products to meet their demands. Through standby positioning, commercial banks can base their strategy completely on a new segment which increases its focus and profitability. Through adaptive the brand loyalty of commercial banks definitely increases and also market segmentation increases competitiveness of a firm from a holistic view and defensive positioning leads to customer retention throughout customer life cycle. The study recommends that commercial banks in Uasin Gishu County implementing mono segment should concentrate all their efforts in a single segment with a single marketing mix so as to avoid confrontation with financial institutions. On multi segment, commercial banks should categorize their customers along demographic, geographic, behavioral, or psychographic lines or a combination of them. This will enable them offer products and services effectively by understanding distinctive needs of the groups. On standby positioning strategy, commercial banks should only opt execute a mono-segment positioning strategy only during unavoidable situations. To minimize response time, the banks should prepares a standby plan that specify the product(s) and their attributes as well as details of the marketing program(s) that would be used to position the new product. On adaptive positioning, commercial banks should aim at changing or reforming a bank’s marketing mix to suit to the particular geography in which the bank is operating. This will enable the banks to effectively tailor their products and service in rapid and unparalleled ways to meet their customers’ interests and needs. On defensive positioning, commercial banks should resort to position defense to ensure a new bank’s market entry does not impact or weaken their brand. They may also opt to preempt competitive strategies by introducing an additional brand in a similar position for the same segment.
This is an open-access article published and distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License of United States unless otherwise stated. Access, citation and distribution of this article is allowed with full recognition of the authors and the source.
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Kim, Young-Han, Praveen Aggarwal, Young-Myung Ha, and Tai Hoon Cha. "Optimal pricing strategy for foreign market entry: a game theoretic approach." Managerial and Decision Economics 27, no. 8 (2006): 643–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.1297.
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O’Connor, Aidan, Francisco J. Santos-Arteaga, and Madjid Tavana. "A game-theoretical model of bank foreign direct investment strategy in emerging market economies." International Journal of Bank Marketing 32, no. 3 (April 28, 2014): 194–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijbm-08-2013-0077.
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to propose a game-theoretical model for commercial bank foreign direct investment strategy, government policy and domestic banking industry interactions in emerging market economies and demonstrate the application of this strategy to the banking system. Government policy and domestic banking industry interactions in emerging market economies and demonstrate the application of this strategy to the banking system. Design/methodology/approach – The paper develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the optimality of the limiting entry strategy followed by a given domestic institutional sector when considering the entry applications of foreign banks in the domestic financial system. The model analyzes the strategic options available to an emerging market country with a relatively underdeveloped banking system when deciding whether or not and to what extent allow for the entrance of better reputed and more technologically advanced foreign banks in its domestic financial system. Findings – The paper shows that the progressive liberalization of entry restrictions would define the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the subsequent set of continuation games and the respective payoffs derived from this liberalization as the domestic economy integrates and competes within the global financial system. Originality/value – Banks operating in the international financial market have incentives to invest directly in emerging market economies and governments have incentives in allowing foreign banks entry to their market. As banking systems in these economies are generally underdeveloped, opening the financial system to foreign competitors could lead to a decrease in the market share of local banks. Eventually foreign banks could control the banking system and could de facto control the money supply.
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Lipman, Barton L. "Delaying or deterring entry A game-theoretic analysis." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 14, no. 3-4 (January 1990): 685–708. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(90)90038-i.
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Liu, Wan Lin, and Lin Xiu Cai. "Study on the Engineering Project Tender Offer Game Type." Advanced Materials Research 860-863 (December 2013): 3049–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.860-863.3049.
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The article analyzed three game types in the process of the project tender offer, such as the static Bayesian game, the construction market entry and the cooperative game, which based on the game theory. And it determined what the methods and measures of tender offer should be taken according to the different kind of game types of bidders, and the research of achievement can provide a reference to enterprises decision-making on tender offer, which have strong operability.
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Guijarro, Luis, Vicent Pla, Jose R. Vidal, and Jorge Martinez-Bauset. "Entry, Competition, and Regulation in Cognitive Radio Scenarios: A Simple Game Theory Model." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2012 (2012): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2012/620972.
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Spectrum management based on private commons is argued to be a realistic scenario for cognitive radio deployment within the current mobile market structure. A scenario is proposed where a secondary entrant operator leases spectrum from a primary incumbent operator. The secondary operator innovates incorporating cognitive radio technology, and it competes in quality of service and price against the primary operator in order to provide service to users. We aim to assess which benefit users get from the entry of secondary operators in the market. A game theory-based model for analyzing both the competition between operators and the subscription decision by users is proposed. We conclude that an entrant operator adopting an innovative technology is better off entering the market, and that a regulatory authority should intervene first allowing the entrant operator to enter the market and then setting a maximum amount of spectrum leased. This regulatory intervention is justified in terms of users utility and social welfare.
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Shackleton, Mark B., Andrianos E. Tsekrekos, and Rafał Wojakowski. "Strategic entry and market leadership in a two-player real options game." Journal of Banking & Finance 28, no. 1 (January 2004): 179–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4266(02)00403-x.
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SUGAWARA, SHINYA, and YASUHIRO OMORI. "DUOPOLY IN THE JAPANESE AIRLINE MARKET: BAYESIAN ESTIMATION FOR THE ENTRY GAME*." Japanese Economic Review 63, no. 3 (October 12, 2011): 310–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2011.00545.x.
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Lindner, Florian. "Decision time and steps of reasoning in a competitive market entry game." Economics Letters 122, no. 1 (January 2014): 7–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.019.
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Pires, Cesaltina Pacheco, and Margarida Catalão-Lopes. "Economies of Scope, Entry Deterrence and Welfare." B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 13, no. 1 (June 4, 2013): 419–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2012-0078.
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Abstract This paper develops a model where the incumbent may expand to a related market to signal economies of scope and deter entry in the former market. We show that the incumbent only expands when scope economies are large enough. Thus expansion is a signal of larger economies of scope and, for certain parameter values, leads to entry deterrence. Although our game is two-period, the expansion strategy creates a long-term advantage. We further investigate the implications of prohibiting an entry-deterrent expansion. A major finding is that, in our model, this prohibition always decreases consumer surplus. In terms of global welfare, the impact is ambiguous but negative for many parameter values.
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Ren, Junqiushi. "Effects of Southwest Airlines on Carrier Profits and Entry Probabilities." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2021 (April 17, 2021): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6625584.
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This paper studies the effects of Southwest Airlines, the largest low-cost carrier (LCC) in the U.S., on other carriers’ payoff functions and entry probabilities. A static entry game model is developed and estimated by viewing entry as an indicator of underlying profitability and making use of Nash Equilibrium. Results indicate that Southwest has a remarkable and negative impact on the payoffs of other carriers. This impact is firm-specific, with LCCs being more affected than full-service carriers (FSCs). Comparing the two service types, the results show that Southwest’s nonstop presence apparently imposes more downward pressure on opponents’ profits than its connecting presence. A counterfactual experiment is then conducted. Once Southwest is counterfactually removed, the probability of each carrier entering a market significantly changes. This paper examines Southwest’s impacts from a new perspective and extends literature on entry game estimation.