Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Market competition'
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Ball, Catherine. "Local Markets : Competition and Market Structure." Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.527635.
Full textKang, Kyeong-Hoon. "Market structures and competition in system markets." College Park, Md. : University of Maryland, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/1698.
Full textThesis research directed by: Economics. Title from t.p. of PDF. Includes bibliographical references. Published by UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Mich. Also available in paper.
Bastos, Paulo R. "Unionised labour markets, product market competition and economic integration." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.444659.
Full textLörtscher, Simon. "Competition between market making intermediaries /." Berlin : dissertation.de, 2006. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/508393108.pdf.
Full textSassi, Syrine. "Essays on production market competition." Thesis, Paris Est, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PESC0125.
Full textThis dissertation investigates the effect of product market competition on corporate decisions and firm valuation. It is a collection of three essays. The first one examines the role of competition in driving the choice of debt source. Using a large sample of U.S. listed firms over the period 2001-2013, we show that product market competitive pressure is negatively associated with bank debt financing. This result is consistent with the view that competition plays an effective governance role that disciplines managers, and hence substitutes for the need to bank strict monitoring. In further analysis, we also show that the negative impact of competition on bank debt financing is stronger for firms with a higher exposure to competition and tighter financial constraints as they are more sensitive to external market discipline.The second essay explores whether product market competition matters for investment decisions, and more specifically labor investment decisions. To test our research hypotheses, we consider a large sample of U.S. listed firms over the 1998-2013 period and provide strong evidence that product market competitive pressure distorts labor investment efficiency. This result highlights the risk-increasing effect of competition. To the extent that firms in competitive industries have lower profit margins and higher bankruptcy risk, they are more willing to under-invest in labor in order to reduce labor costs and avoid further earnings declines. In addition, our cross-sectional tests show that the negative impact of competition on labor investment efficiency is intensified for firms with a higher exposure to competition, tighter financial constraints, and higher labor unionization rates.The third essay further investigates the implications of product market competition by examining its impact on the cost of equity capital which is viewed as one of the key considerations for managers in their investment and financing decisions. We employ a large panel of U.S. listed firms from 1998 to 2013 and find that firms facing intense competitive pressure have a lower cost of equity financing. Additionally, we show that the role of competition in reducing equity financing costs is more pronounced for firms with a higher exposure to competition and firms with poorer governance quality. Taken together, our findings suggest that product market competition serves as an external disciplinary mechanism that improves investors’ beliefs in the stock market, hence leading to a lower cost of equity capital
Blank, Malin, and Anna Maria Persson. "The Swedish food retail market : An econometric analysis of the competition on local food retail markets." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, 2004. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-2521.
Full textThe Swedish food retail market contains of three major actors, ICA, KF and Axfood, all in all dominating 75 percent of the total market shares. The scant number of retailing actors indicates that the Swedish food retail market is a highly concentrated oligopoly, which as a fact has given rise to definite discussions and argumentations concerning the market situation. But is the food retail market imperfect and how do we reach a workable competition? Economic theory does not provide any clear answer on these questions, but is rather divided into two fundamentally different approaches to define competition: the static and the dynamic perspective on competition.
In an attempt to examine the competition on local Swedish retail markets, the purpose of this study is to carry out an econometric model estimating the situation. The model serves to explain the variation of ICA’s achievements measured in terms of turnovers obtained in the company. The explanatory variables composing the model are divided into three separate groupings: degreeof market concentration, storespecific factors and region-specific factors. Furthermore, in order to find out which one of the competitive explanations best fits the reality, the regression results are interpreted from a static and a dynamic perspective of competition. In part, we also aim to compare the results with the outline of the Swedish competition law.
We found that the level of concentration obtained in our material is high and is steadily increasing. We also found that stores do not, in any great extent, use price, service and quality as competitive methods. Thus, to gain competitive advantage, market actors must find other ways to carry out strategic market activities. The region-specific variables had either none or very little influence on ICA’s turnover. According to these findings, neither the static nor the dynamic perspective of competition is solely able to produce an accurate method for reaching a state of a workable competition. Instead, a combination of the static and the dynamic ideas may be regarded as the most advantageous way to generate suitable conditions for competition to be efficient. Therefore, in order to promote workable competition, the Swedish competition law must consist of a balance between the static and the dynamic view of competition.
Andree, Kai, and Mike Schwan. "Collusive market sharing with spatial competition." Universität Potsdam, 2012. http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2012/6214/.
Full textHigaki, Yusuke. "Competition in the Japanese potato market." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape10/PQDD_0003/MQ44181.pdf.
Full textHigaki, Yusuke. "Competition in the Japanese potato market." Thesis, McGill University, 1997. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=20571.
Full textIn this thesis, the level of competition in the Japanese Potato market was evaluated employing conjectural variations analysis based on a monthly data for 1989 to 1995 to reveal the nature of the market. Four wholesale markets, in four large consumption areas, and eight production areas in differ ent geographical locations in were analyzed.
The conclusion from the results of the empirical analysis is that, despite the high level of concentration in production, all producing regions including the dominant producer, Hokkaido, seem to have behaved competitively.
One implication for the competitive behavior of these large producers is the imperative to maintain their share in the market against potential competitors, resulting in price setting close to the marginal cost.
Mitchell, Lawrence. "Competition in an evolving stochastic market." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/4352.
Full textYi, Long, and 易龍. "Product market competition and investment efficiency." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10722/206682.
Full textpublished_or_final_version
Economics and Finance
Doctoral
Doctor of Philosophy
Tian, Lin. "Banking market competition and corporate innovation." Thesis, University of Surrey, 2017. http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/841800/.
Full textZaouras, Michalis. "Essays on market structure and competition." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2012. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/57065/.
Full textOlofsson, Elias. "An economic study on forest resource competition : How market imperfections and increased competition affect woody feedstock markets." Licentiate thesis, Luleå tekniska universitet, Samhällsvetenskap, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-68410.
Full textNilsson, Arvid. "Market transparency." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.) (EFI), 2001. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/578.htm.
Full textWegberg, Marcus Jacobus Allegonda Maria van. "Multi-market competition theory a conceptual framework /." Maastricht : Maastricht : Universitaire Pers Maastricht ; University Library, Maastricht University [Host], 1994. http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=6586.
Full textPovel, Paul. "Financial contracts, bankruptcy and product market competition." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1998. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/858/.
Full textLiang, Jia-Wen. "Relative performance evaluation and product market competition /." view abstract or download file of text, 2002. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3061955.
Full textTypescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 75-77). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
Fleitas, Perla Sebastian, and Perla Sebastian Fleitas. "Essays on Inertia, Dynamics and Market Competition." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/625583.
Full textWANG, Yanchen. "Essays on market competition and law enforcement." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2018. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd/37.
Full textWills-Johnson, Nick. "Competition in a spatial retail petroleum market." Thesis, Curtin University, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/197.
Full textBurton, Dawn. "Banks go to market." Thesis, Lancaster University, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.331964.
Full textMastel, Michael Kenneth. "Price competition in the hard spring wheat market: A market specific analysis." Thesis, Montana State University, 2002. http://etd.lib.montana.edu/etd/2002/mastel/MastelM2002.pdf.
Full textGal, Michal S. "Competition policy for small market economies, market conditions under the magnifying glass." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/NQ53773.pdf.
Full textChannagiri, Ajit Tejaswi. "COMPETITION, STATUS AND MARKETS." UKnowledge, 2018. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/management_etds/11.
Full textKallio, A. Maarit I. "Studies on competition in the Finnish wood market /." Helsinki : Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration, 2001. http://aleph.unisg.ch/hsgscan/hm00051872.pdf.
Full textFeleke, Shiferaw Tesfaye. "Global competition for the Japanese fruit juice market." [Gainesville, Fla.] : University of Florida, 2006. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/UFE0014761.
Full textAlmgren, Teresia. "Barriers to market entry and EC Competition law." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, 2004. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-2468.
Full textHinder för marknadstillträde är viktigt i många avseenden. För ett företag som slår sig in på en ny marknad är det viktigt att veta vilka hinder det möter. För konkurrensrättsliga myndigheter är det nödvändigt att veta vilka hinder som existerar för att exempelvis kunna avgöra om ett företag har en dominerande ställning. Det är också nödvändigt att känna till hindren för att säkerställa en fri tillgång till marknaden.
Det saknas dock en generellt accepterad definition av hinder för marknadstillträde. Detta gör det svårare för de olika parterna på marknaden att veta om de handlat på ett otillåtet vis. Saknaden av en generellt accepterad definition och en klar åsikt om vad anses vara otillåtet enligt konkurrensrättsliga regler leder också till komplicerade och tidskrävande rättsliga processer.
Jag presenterar en rad olika definitioner samt en översikt av olika hinder för att klargöra ämnet. Jag diskuterar vilka hinder som är av intresse från ett konkurrensrättsligt perspektiv samt varför de är av intresse.
Jag kommer till slutsatsen att från ett konkurrensrättsligt perspektiv så är det inte definitionen i sig som är viktigast, utan man måste avgöra om ett hinder är otillåtet på individuell basis. Vid avgörande måste hänsyn tas till en rad olika faktorer, expempelvis den relevanta marknaden, vilken sorts hinder det gäller, hindrets effekt på marknaden, om hindret genererar några positiva effekter mm.
Barriers to entry are important from many aspects. For a firm entering a market it is important to know which barriers it is facing. From a competition authority’s perspective it is necessary to know the extent of entry barriers to determine for example if a firm enjoys a dominant position. It is also necessary to know the entry barriers in order to create provisions to ensure free market entry.
However, there is not one generally accepted definition of entry barriers. This makes it difficult for players in the market to assess when they are conducting a prohibited action. The lack of a standard definition and a clear opinion of what constitutes a prohibited barrier according to competition law also result in a more complicated and time-consuming judicial process.
I provide the reader with different definitions in order to clarify the matter. I also present an overview of barriers to entry. I also discuss which barriers are interesting from a competition law perspective and why they are of interest.
I conclude that, from a competition law perspective, it is not the definition of entry barriers that is of most interest. The most important question is without doubt whether the individual barrier constitutes an infringement to EC competition policy. That assessment must be done on an individual basis and it is an assessment that is dependant on many factors, such as the relevant market, the type of barrier, the affect the barrier have on the market, any pro-competitive effects etc.
Spagnolo, Giancarlo. "Essays on managerial incentives and product-market competition." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics [Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.] (EFI), 1999. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/500.htm.
Full textEkelund, Mats. "Competition and innovation in the Swedish pharmaceutical market." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.) (EFI), 2001. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/559.htm.
Full textWes, Marina. "Gains from trade : competition and the factor market." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1996. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1420/.
Full textNier, Erlend Walter. "Financial structure, managerial incentives and product market competition." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1999. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1584/.
Full textDick, Astrid A. (Astrid Andrea) 1972. "Essays on market structure, competition and consumer behavior." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8410.
Full textIncludes bibliographical references.
This thesis is a collection of essays on market structure, competition and consumer behavior. In Chapter 1 I develop and estimate a structural model of demand for commercial bank deposit services, which allows me to analyze consumer response to various bank characteristics, as well as to measure the consumer welfare in light of the responses of banks to the regulatory changes in the period 1993-1999. My main finding is that, while concentration has increased in some banking markets, most experience a slight increase in welfare. I also find that consumers respond to account fees and deposit rates in making their deposit institution choices, and respond positively to the staffing and geographic density of branches, age, size and geographic diversification of banks. In Chapter 2 I study banking market structure and examine the effects of the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act in 1994, which allowed for nationwide branching in the U.S., on various aspects of banking firms and markets, including quality of service. The results suggest that the industrial structure of banking markets can be explained by the endogenous sunk cost model of Sutton (1991). While concentration at the regional level has increased dramatically, deregulation has left almost intact the market structure of MSA markets. A significant portion of the observed increase in bank quality can be traced to the implementation of nationwide branching, with banks offering larger branch networks for consumers.
(cont.) Chapter 3, co-authored with Erik Brynjolfsson and Michael D. Smith, applies a flexible demand model to examine heterogeneous consumer behavior and estimate search benefits and costs across consumers types, based on a unique data set obtained from a major U.S.-based online shopbot. Consumer benefits to search are estimated using a compensating variations approach, by comparing the welfare generated by the first set of offers shown to the consumer in the default screen, and that generated by the entire set of offers. The benefits to searching lower screens are $1.65 for the median consumer, and the cost of carrying an exhaustive search of the offers is a maximum of $1.40 for the median consumer that chooses to search lower screens.
by Astrid A. Dick.
Ph.D.
Doulis, Kimon Theofanis. "Essays on competition, market structures and public goods." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/20459.
Full textLiu, Chung-Shin. "Impact of Product Market Competition on Expected Returns." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/12143.
Full textThis paper examines how competition faced by firms affects asset risk and expected returns. Contrary to Hou and Robinson's (2006) findings, I find that cross-industry variation in competition, as measured by the concentration ratio, is not a robust determinant of unconditional expected stock returns. In contrast, within-industry competition, as measured by relative price markup, is positively related to expected stock returns. Moreover, this relation is not captured by commonly used models of expected returns. When using the Markov regime-switching model advocated by Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000), I test and find support for Aguerrevere's (2009) recent model of competition find risk dynamics. In particular, systematic risk is greater in more competitive industries during bad times and greater in more concentrated industries during good times. In addition, real investment by firms facing greater competition leads real investment by firms facing less competition, supporting Aguerrevere's notion that less competition results in higher growth options and hence higher risk in good times.
Committee in charge: Dr. Roberto Gutierrez, Chair; Dr. Roberto Gutierrez, Advisor; Dr. Diane Del Guercio, Inside Member; Dr. John Chalmers, Inside Member; Dr. Bruce Blonigen, Outside Member
Caldwell, Sydnee Christian. "Essays on imperfect competition in the labor market." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122228.
Full textCataloged from PDF version of thesis. "The second half of TOC page numbers are off by 2 pages"--Disclaimer Notice page.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 309-319).
This thesis consists of three chapters on imperfect competition in the labor market. The first chapter (joint with Nikolaj Harmon) explores the relationship between an individual's wages and the quality of her opportunities at other firms (her outside options). To overcome the fact that many factors that shift an individual's outside opportunities also impact her productivity at her current job, we develop a novel identification strategy that generates within-individual (and within-firm-by-occupation) variation in workers' information about their outside options. This strategy, which we implement using linked employer-employee data from Denmark, exploits the fact that individuals often learn about labor market opportunities through their social networks. We find that increases in labor demand at former coworkers' current firms increases an incumbent worker's job-to-job mobility and wage growth.
Consistent with theory, larger changes are necessary to induce a job-to-job transition than to induce a wage gain. Tests that exploit within-firm or within-firm-and-occupation variation and tests that exploit different subsets of an individual's former coworkers confirm that the results are not driven by unobserved changes in demand for workers' skills. Finally, we use our reduced form moments to identify a structural search model incorporating both posting and bargaining firms. We find that bargaining is more prevalent among high skilled workers. The second chapter (joint with Oren Danieli) investigates the role that cross-sectional differences in individuals' outside options play in generating between-group wage inequality. We use a two-sided matching model to micro-found a measure of workers' outside options, which we call the "Outside Options Index" (001). The index is similar to those used in the industrial organization literature to measure concentration (e.g.
the Herfindal-Hirschman Index, the HHI). We then use German administrative data to estimate this index and use two sources of quasi-random variation: (1) the introduction of high-speed trains and (2) a standard shift-share instrument to identify the elasticity between our index and wages. When we combine these two ingredients, we find that roughly 1/3 of the gender wage gap in Germany can be explained by differences in options, mostly the result of differences in effective labor market size (commuting costs). The third chapter (joint with Emily Oehlsen) asks whether, in the absence of commuting costs, firms with market power have an incentive to pay women less than men. We use data from a series of experiments at Uber where we offered random subsets of male and female drivers higher "wages". Drivers varied both in the size of the wage increase and in whether they could drive for Uber's main competitor, Lyft.
These two sources of variation allow us to experimentally identify: (1) Frisch elasticities and (2) firm substitution elasticities. We find that women have Frisch elasticities double those of men on both the intensive and extensive margin. However, unlike the prior literature, we find that women are not less likely to shift between firms in response to changes in relative wages. The results suggest that, at least in the gig economy, firms have little incentive to wage discriminate between men and women based on their labor supply choices. JEL Codes: JOO, J31, J42
by Sydnee Christian Caldwell.
Ph. D.
Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics
Wang, Yongying. "Corporate governance and product market competition : tree essays." Thesis, Normandie, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017NORMC018/document.
Full textMy thesis entitled « Corporate governance and product market competition : three essays » is a theoretical research in industrial organization. The primary objective is to investigate how product market (competition or collusion) interacts with the top-level design of corporate governance, which concerns specifically the stakeholders' relationships and managerial incentives (static and dynamic) under imperfect information. It is mainly based on three chapters dealing with different subtopics of this theme.The first chapter examines how social concern and product market competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand) may influence the relationships (conflicting or conciliating) between main stakeholders (shareholders, consumers and employees). We consider two identical firms, both taking care of the interests of consumers in their objective functions and allowing their employees' wages be negotiated with labor unions. We show that social concern may reverse the traditional ranking between Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. Our model also shows that price competition (compared to quantity competition) can to some extent attenuate the shareholders' conflicts with both consumers and employees.The second chapter investigates how managerial incentive payment under both adverse selection and moral hazard might interact with product market competition. We consider a Cournot oligopoly market consisting of n identical managerial firms, of which the initial marginal cost is the manager's private information and his unobservable effort indirectly reduces the initial level of marginal cost. We show with this setting that the optimal incentive payment solving informational problems is not necessarily influenced by product market competition.The third chapter studies how the optimal contract between shareholder and manager (solving repeated moral hazard) may influence the stability of a cartel. We consider a cartel consisting of two identical firms, within each a risk neutral shareholder offers a menu of contracts to a risk-averse manager who may shirk in each period. The manager's unobservable effort influences the firm's marginal cost (as in chapter 2). We show in contrary with the benchmark case (under perfect information) that the degree of risk-aversion plays no longer a role upon the stability of collusion: when the managerial compensation is independent of gross profit, the implementation of the optimal long-term contract solves repeated moral hazard but also constrains the manager's discretion over the decision of market conduct (collusion, deviation, or competition)
Lau, Kwai-hin Kenneth. "Competitive marketing behaviour in Hong Kong telecommunications market /." Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1996. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B18003461.
Full textCurtis, Kenneth H. Marko Paul J. Parma John J. "Understanding market segments and competition in the private military industry." Monterey, California : Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/MBAPR/2009/Dec/09Dec%5FCurtis%5FMBA.pdf.
Full textAdvisor(s): Dew, Nicholas ; Hudgens, Bryan J. "December 2009." "MBA Professional report"--Cover. Description based on title screen as viewed on January 27, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Private military contractor (PMC), Private Security Company (PSC), Private Military Firm (PMF), Private Military (PM), Military Contracting, Acquisition, Government-outsourced Services, Industry Landscape, Market Segments, Business Rivalry, Competition. Includes bibliographical references (p. 75-77). Also available in print.
Brisimi, Vasiliki. "The interface between competition and the internal market : market separation under Article 102TFEU." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:10e3935d-ce31-437c-94b6-5d67af5d4e15.
Full textEsmer, Burcu. "Essays in empirical corporate finance: covenant violations, market timing and product market competition." Diss., University of Iowa, 2011. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1219.
Full textBäcklund, Elin. "Environmental Policy and Market Structure." Thesis, Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för ekonomi, samhälle och teknik, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mdh:diva-54703.
Full textFagulha, Bernardo Moura Gonçalves. "Banif Bank: Value creation in the Maltese market." Master's thesis, NSBE - UNL, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/9468.
Full textThe entry in a new market is always a major strategic challenge for a firm: competing in different regions and dealing with the specific conditions. This work project describes the entry of a new bank in the Maltese market, by exploring a new positioning. Through the real case of Banif Bank, this case intends to evaluate the potential of value creation in that industry, by first assessing its attractiveness and profitability. Then, Banif Bank positioning is analized to conclude if it can create a competitive advantage that would be sustainable in the long term.
El, Diri Malek Taisir Mohammed. "Earnings management, management compensation, managerial ability and market competition." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2016. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/15572/.
Full textRen, Qun. "Market share competition in the Chinese online game industry." Thesis, Bournemouth University, 2010. http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/17505/.
Full textMarini, Marco. "Wages determination and firm's behaviour under strategic market competition." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1998. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1472/.
Full textZou, Kailin. "Essays on competition in the Hong Kong banking market." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2014. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/70022/.
Full textDao, Mai TT. "Shareholder Ratification of The Auditor and Audit Market Competition." FIU Digital Commons, 2009. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/84.
Full textRakestraw, Joseph Raymond. "International Evidence on Product Market Competition and Firm Value." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/73029.
Full textPh. D.
Ko, Hin-Cheung Annie. "Product market competition, corporate governance and pay-performance sensitivity." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2009. http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/1063.
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