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Journal articles on the topic 'Malaya History Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960'

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Published: 10 December 2022

Last updated: 29 January 2023

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1

Malhi, Amrita. "Race, Space, and the Malayan Emergency: Expelling Malay Muslim Communism and Reconstituting Malaya's Racial State, 1945–1954." Itinerario 45, no. 3 (November 24, 2021): 435–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0165115321000279.

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ABSTRACTThis article analyses the physical and discursive displacement of Malay Muslim advocates of a cosmopolitan and multiracial form of Malayan citizenship from the arena of “legitimate” national politics between the Second World War and the mid-1950s. It discusses the trajectory of the Malayan Left during this period, with a special focus on the work of Abdullah C. D., a Malay Muslim leader of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). Abdullah's work included helping to build the Malay Nationalist Party of Malaya (PKMM) under the MCP's United Front strategy from 1945, creating the MCP's Department of Malay Work in 1946, and establishing the Tenth Regiment of the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) in 1949. This work was essential to the MCP's outreach to Malay Muslims after Malaya's failed national revolution, which collapsed into racial conflict without achieving independence for the British colony. The Malayan Emergency was declared in 1948, and its military and social campaigns eliminated or displaced the MCP's leadership and much of the MNLA, including Abdullah and the rest of the Tenth Regiment, to Thailand by 1954. Despite his continued engagement with political movements in Malaya, Abdullah's vision for a new politics for Malay Muslims was effectively displaced into the realm of nostalgia. His ideas, outlined in MNLA pamphlets and periodicals like Tauladan (Exemplar), never made significant inroads in Malaya, whose racial state the Emergency re-established, using race to manage the threat to its interests posed by leftist politics.

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2

HING, LEE KAM. "A Neglected Story: Christian missionaries, Chinese New Villagers, and Communists in the Battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ in Malaya, 1948–1960." Modern Asian Studies 47, no. 6 (April 22, 2013): 1977–2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x12000741.

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AbstractDuring the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), the colonial authorities resettled an estimated half a million rural dwellers, mainly Chinese, from the fringe of the jungle, to cut them off from contact with armed members of the Malayan Communist Party. The re-location led to political alienation among many resettled in the nearly 500 New Villages. Winning their support against the insurgency therefore was urgent. At this juncture, foreign missionaries were forced to leave China following the communist takeover in October 1949. Many of these missionaries were Chinese-speaking with medical or teaching experience. The High Commissioner of Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney, and his successor, Sir Gerald Templer, invited these and other missionaries to serve in the New Villages. This paper looks at colonial initiatives and mission response amidst the dynamics of domestic politics and a changing international balance of power in the region.

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3

Hack, Karl. "“Iron Claws on Malaya”: The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (March 1999): 99–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463400008043.

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This article addresses the historiography of the Malayan Emergency (1948–60). It does so by challenging two archetypal works on the conflict: those of Anthony Short and Richard Stubbs. These argue the Emergency was locked in stalemate as late as 1951. By then, a “population control” approach had been implemented — the so-called Briggs Plan for resettling 500,000 Chinese squatters. The predominantly Chinese nature of the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) had also ensured that most Malays — who constituted nearly half the 1950 population of five million — opposed the revolt. The several thousand strong Communist-led guerrillas thus laboured under severe limitations.

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4

Deery, Phillip. "Malaya, 1948: Britain's Asian Cold War?" Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 29–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2007.9.1.29.

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In 1948, at a time of severe economic austerity, the British Labour government committed itself to a costly and protracted campaign against a Communist foe in the Far East, despite not having any U.S. support for the endeavor. Clement Attlee's government in Britain argued that the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) was necessary to counter Soviet attempts to use the local Communist party in support of Moscow's expansionist designs. Subsequently, many commentators and historians accepted this judgment, at least to some degree. In reality, the rebellion, far from being carefully coordinated or meticulously organized, was inadequately planned and poorly executed. The 1948 insurrection cannot be understood without recognizing the influence of indigenous pressures and internal developments, which were more crucial than the external Cold War dimension.

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5

Deery, Phillip. "The Terminology of Terrorism: Malaya, 1948-52." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 34, no. 2 (June 2003): 231–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463403000225.

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Although Cold War propaganda is now the subject of close scholarly scrutiny, the main method by which it was communicated – language – has been overlooked. The Malayan Emergency illustrates how the British government grappled with the issue of political terminology within the broader context of anti-communist propaganda. This article will analyse the use of political language; the change from ‘bandit’ to ‘communist terrorist’; and the problems of delineating the Malayan from the international audience.

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6

Hack, Karl. "The origins of the Asian Cold War: Malaya 1948." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 40, no. 3 (September 1, 2009): 471–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463409990038.

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From the 1970s most scholars have rejected the Cold War orthodoxy that the Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was a result of instructions from Moscow, translated into action by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). They have instead argued that local factors precipitated violence, and that the MCP was relatively unprepared when the Emergency was declared. This article puts the international element back into the picture. It shows that the change from a ‘united front’ to a ‘two camp’ international communist line from 1947 played a significant role in deciding local debates in favour of revolt. It also demonstrates how the MCP had plans for a graduated build-up to armed revolt before an Emergency was declared. This article therefore offers a model for a dynamic, two-way relationship between the international and local levels of Cold War.

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7

Wilson, Hugh. "Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960, by Richard StubbsHearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960, by Richard Stubbs. Don Mills, Ontario, Oxford University Press, 1989. xiv, 286 pp. $41.95." Canadian Journal of History 25, no. 3 (December 1990): 459–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/cjh.25.3.459.

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8

Fong, Leong Yee. "The Impact of the Cold War on the Development of Trade Unionism in Malaya (1948–57)." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 23, no. 1 (March 1992): 60–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463400011292.

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In the aftermath of World War Two, Malaya saw the emergence of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and its attempt to mobilize labour support against the returning British colonial government. The Pan Malayan General Labour Union (PMGLU), later renamed the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Union (PMFTU), was established as a front organization to harness multiracial labour support and to work in close liaison with other left-wing political groups. Trade unions that mushroomed after the War were invariably dominated by the PMGLU and used as tools for the realization of communist political objectives in Malaya.

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9

De Koninck, Rodolphe. "Wessex Estate: Recollections of British Military and Imperial History in the Heart of Singapore." Asian Journal of Social Science 31, no. 3 (2003): 435–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853103322895333.

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Although the island Republic of Singapore has been submitted to a systematic territorial revolution since the 1960s, some of its urban heritage has been preserved. This is the case with Wessex Estate, a quiet residential neighbourhood located in the low hills extending on the western flank of the central urban area. Made up of less than a dozen bungalows and 26 small blocks of flats, Wessex Estate is of no particular architectural interest, but it does represent a heritage through the names borne by the blocks of flats. Clearly printed on the façades of the 26 blocks of flats, these names all refer to military feats of British history. The study locates and briefly describes these events, several of which took place on European fronts, as far back as the early 18th century (such as Ramilies, Blenheim), others throughout the British Empire, starting from the middle of the same century (such as Plassey, Quebec, Khartoum, Pegu). Built just prior to or just following WWII, it seems that the flats housed non-commissioned British officers during the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960). Their names refer to battles or theatres of war in all of which a given British regiment, the 67th or South Hampshire Regiment, might have been involved. Whatever the case, it remains somewhat remarkable that so many reminders of the colonial past, even a good number with "no natural connection" to Singapore, have remained prominent in this city-state otherwise apparently prone to sever "colonial apron strings".

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10

Kheng, Cheah Boon. "Malaysia - Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960. By Richard Stubbs. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989. Pp. xiv, 286. Map, Bibliography, Index." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 22, no. 2 (September 1991): 427–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463400004185.

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11

Rice, Tom. "Distant Voices of Malaya, Still Colonial Lives." Journal of British Cinema and Television 10, no. 3 (July 2013): 430–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jbctv.2013.0149.

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Through the example of the Crown film Voices of Malaya (1948), this article examines interrelated postwar shifts in colonial history and British documentary cinema. Produced over three tumultuous years (1945–8) – in Malaya and England, with local film-makers and British documentarians – Voices of Malaya is a hybrid text torn between traditions of British documentary cinema and an emerging instructional, colonial cinema; between an international cinema for overseas audiences and a local cinema used within government campaigns and between an earlier ideal of empire and a rapidly changing, late liberal imperialism. The article challenges the traditional decline and fall narrative of the British documentary movement, as I examine the often overlooked ‘movement overseas’ of film-makers, practices and ideologies into the colonies after the war. In charting the emergence of the Malayan Film Unit, I examine the role of the British documentary movement in the formation of local postcolonial cinemas.

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12

Harper, T. N. "The Politics of Disease and Disorder in Post-War Malaya." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 21, no. 1 (March 1990): 88–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463400001971.

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It has become a commonplace of Malayan historiography that the period following the end of the Pacific War witnessed the establishment of a pattern of political life which has persisted in its main features into the present decade. Existing accounts have focused around the restructuring of the British presence in Malaya under a military administration and the introduction of, and opposition to, the Malayan Union scheme in 1946 and the Federal structure which succeeded it in April 1948. These years saw the emergence of an ethnically based nationalist movement and the defeat of a radical challenge to its predominance. The communal and insurrectionary violence which was a feature of the period has been represented as a constraint to subsequent political action — as a limit to what the structure of Malaya's pluralism could tolerate — and the constitutional struggles as a lost opportunity to effect its transformation. Whilst it is hard to exaggerate the importance of these events in shaping the landscape of Malaysian politics, there is a sense in which the sophistication of these political and constitutional preoccupations suggests uneven development within the historical writing as a whole. The social context which stimulated change, and the breadth of the local response which dignified it, has been marginalized in many accounts. There has been a tendency to conceive the state system and the colonial presence in Malaya within the bounds of a paradigm governed by the constitutional settlement, and the various phases of insurrection and political change as primarily the products of the subversive or nationalist imagination.

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13

Walker, Anthony R. "Malaysia - The Importance of the Orang Asli in the Malayan Emergency 1948–1960. By John Leary. Clayton, VIC: Working Paper 56, The Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1989. Pp. ii, 41. Illustrations, Notes." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 22, no. 1 (March 1991): 205–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463400005890.

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14

Comber, Leon. "The Malayan special branch on the Malayan–Thai frontier during the Malayan emergency (1948–60)." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (February 2006): 77–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600568352.

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15

Sulaiman, Nor Ibrahim. "HELICOPTERS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF WAR DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 1948-1960." Journal of Nusantara Studies (JONUS) 2, no. 2 (December 31, 2017): 188. http://dx.doi.org/10.24200/jonus.vol2iss2pp188-197.

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Helicopter as an instrument of war in counter insurgency warfare in Malaysia had its origin during the Malayan emergency 1948-1960. Three helicopters, the Dragonfly, made an entry into Malaya in March 1950 at the request of the Commander-in-Chiefs Committee of the Far East Land Forces on 8 March 1949. The primary role of these helicopters then was for casualty evacuation of wounded troops sustained during operations against the communist terrorists (CTs). Their ability to operate from unprepared areas expanded their roles as an ideal platform for air mobility of troops, supplies, and search and rescue. The flexibility of transporting the troops made the CTs no longer invincible in their own safe havens. More importantly, the morale of the troops was kept high knowing that they would be evacuated fast for medical treatment in the event they were wounded. This article discusses the roles of helicopter during the Malayan emergency. Most of the references are records from the Royal Air Force (RAF), books, and online information. This paper highlights the contributions of helicopters towards the successful ending of the emergency. Keywords: Counter insurgency, Commander-in-Chief of Far East Land Forces, communist terrorists, Malayan emergency, Royal Air Force helicopter squadronsCite as: Sulaiman, N.I. (2017). Helicopters as an instrument of war during the Malayan emergency 1948-1960. Journal of Nusantara Studies, 2(2), 188-197.

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16

Phee, Tan Teng. "Oral History and People’s Memory of the Malayan Emergency (1948–60): The Case of Pulai." Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 27, no. 1 (2012): 84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1355/sj27-1c.

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17

Comber, Leon. "“The weather ... has been horrible”: Malayan communist communications during “the emergency” (1948–60)." Asian Studies Review 19, no. 2 (November 1995): 37–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03147539508713055.

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18

Stubbs, Richard. "The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth's Wars 1948–1966. By Robert Jackson. London: Routledge, 1991. vii, 156 pp. $64.50." Journal of Asian Studies 50, no. 04 (November 1991): 994–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021911800044338.

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19

Hack, Karl. "‘Devils that suck the blood of the Malayan People’: The Case for Post-Revisionist Analysis of Counter-insurgency Violence." War in History 25, no. 2 (April 2018): 202–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0968344516671738.

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This article addresses the ‘revisionist’ case that post-war Western counter-insurgency deployed widespread, exemplary violence in order to discipline and intimidate populations. It does this by using the Malayan Emergency of 1948–60 as a case study in extreme counter-insurgency ‘violence’, defined as high to lethal levels of physical force against non-combatants’ (civilians, detainees, prisoners, and corpses). It confirms high levels of such violence, from sporadic shooting of civilians to the killing of 24 unarmed workers at Batang Kali. Yet it also demonstrates that there were more varieties of and nuances in extreme force than is sometimes realized, for instance with multiple and very different forms of mass population displacement. It also concentrates more effort on explaining how such violence came about, and shows a marked trend over time towards greatly improved targeting, and towards methods that did not cause direct bodily harm. This case study therefore suggests the need for a ‘post-revisionist’ form of counter-insurgency analysis: one that can take into account the lifecycles of multiple types of violence, and of violence-limitation, and emphasize explanation for extreme violence over its mere description. Such a post-revisionist analysis need not necessarily imply that there was more, or less, violence than suggested by previous accounts. Instead, it requires a more nuanced and contextualized account, clearly differentiated by technique, place, and period.

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20

Baughan, Emily. "Rehabilitating an Empire: Humanitarian Collusion with the Colonial State during the Kenyan Emergency, ca. 1954–1960." Journal of British Studies 59, no. 1 (January 2020): 57–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jbr.2019.243.

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AbstractDuring the Kenyan Emergency of 1952–1960, one of the most violent episodes in the history of the British Empire, humanitarian organizations colluded with the colonial state to shore up British power. This article examines how aid agencies that claimed to exemplify the progressive internationalism of the postwar period participated in colonial violence. Far from condemning the brutality of the imprisonment and torture during the Kenyan Emergency, aid organizations were deeply implicated in parallel projects for women and children that sought to achieve the same objectives: the remaking of Kikuyu hearts and minds and the weakening of anticolonial resistance. Far from acting as a check on colonial violence in an era of burgeoning rights discourses in 1950s Kenya, self-proclaimed “impartial” internationalist organizations, while claiming to uphold values of universal humanity, worked as auxiliaries to the colonial counterinsurgency. Taking their cue from military counterinsurgency in 1950s Malaya, humanitarians sought to win “hearts and minds” and undertook material provision for imprisoned anticolonial activists and their families on behalf of the colonial state. They did so by importing new humanitarian expertise developed in wartime Europe and adapting it to fit within racist, colonial norms. In providing this allegedly impartial expertise, humanitarian organizations lent credence to the myth that rehabilitation in Kenya was a progressive program enacted by a liberal empire to modernize its subjects, rather than a ruthless attempt to stymie anticolonial resistance by any means necessary. In this case, postwar humanitarian internationalism did not challenge colonial brutality but enabled it.

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21

Lau, Albert. "Malaysia/Singapore - The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth's War, 1948–1966. By Robert Jackson. New York: Routledge, 1991. Pp. vii, 156. Appendices, Bibliography, Index." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 26, no. 2 (September 1995): 449–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463400007293.

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