Academic literature on the topic 'Macedonian Hegemony'

Summary Scholars have usually understood the epigraphical evidence for an Athenian naval mission led by Diotimos as an example of the treaties in the framework of the Corinthian League and Athens’ role as guarantor of security on the seas. Nevertheless, a close look at the main characters involved in the inscription and the mission of Diotimos, as well as to the historical context and the rise of the Macedonian hegemony, seems to allow a new interpretation of the evidence, in order to shed some light on the nature of Diotimos’ mission.

At the end of the 20th century the SE European region was surviving one of the most difficult periods of changing hegemony and dominance circumstances. The disintegration of the communist world and the collapse of former Yugoslavia, as part of the process, could be considered as the result of the new relations among big powers’ hegemonic systems. The NATO spreads to the European east (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland etc.), which has direct influence on SE Europe. After new countries (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia) had been internationally recognised in 1992, and the loyal Slovenian and Croatian partnership with NATO in the Kosovo action in 1999 was proved, it is obvious that regional hegemony of the Serbia core region does not exist any more. Also Russian (former Soviet) attempts to play the role of the dominant leader in this region have been suppressed to a minimum. The author discusses European Union interests in this zone, and the way European countries include themselves in the process of pacifying and developing the region. After Slovenia joined the European Union in 2004, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia are expected to satisfy the conditions for entering EU in next 3 to five years. In the same time Serbia and Montenegro enters a new, more democratic phase of its development.

The Amphipolis regulation (Amphipolis Museum, L 905 and L 908) reveals numerous clauses ruling the life of the Macedonian army, in the camp and in the field, at the time of the last Antigonids. The second paragraph of first column of fragment B (L 908) is devoted particularly to the management of booty. Study of literary sources (mainly Polybius) permits greater precision of the historical context and a new epigraphical interpretation. All the booty collected by the troops was to be returned to the King. The troops were under strict orders to deliver the whole booty to him under threat of heavy fines for their hegemones.

Over recent decades, Islamic institutions and Muslim communities in the successor nation-states of former Yugoslavia have taken shape against a variegated political and historical topography. In this article, we examine the discourses and politics surrounding Islamic institutions in four post-Yugoslav nation-states: Kosovo, Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia. Our analysis moves in two directions. On the one hand, we illuminate the historical legacies and institutional ties that unite Muslims across these four contexts. As we argue, this institutional history continues to mandate a singular, hegemonic model of Sunni-Hanafi Islam that pre-emptively delegitimizes Muslim communities outside of its orbit. On the other hand, we also attend to the contrasting national politics of Islam in each of our four contexts, ranging from Islamophobic anxiety and suspicion to multiculturalism, from a minority politics of differentiation to hegemonic images of ethno-national religiosity.

Este artículo trata sobre la violencia sexual contra las mujeres en las Historias de Polibio. Los estudios modernos acerca del tema son escasos y no han abordado esta cuestión. Aunque las mujeres no desempeñaron un papel central en los hechos narrados en la obra, algunos pasajes parecen relacionar la violación de mujeres con reflexiones políticas y didácticas concretas. Aquí, se argumenta que Polibio exploró conscientemente las consecuencias de la degradación de las alianzas entre estados y su transformación de la igualdad al gobierno tiránico mediante el uso de una metáfora sexual explícita. En ese sentido, se estudian los ejemplos de Filipo V de Macedonia, los cartagineses en Iberia y Escipión Africano.

The article examines the features of public attitudes, national consciousness and foreign policy of Serbia in the context of its relationship with the countries of the Western Balkans. On the basis of modern Serbian scientific literature and opinion piece, the author analyzes the current crisis state of Serbian society, which was the result of the policy of S. Milošević and the heirs of the ideas of Serbian nationalism. The main attention is paid to Serbia’s relations with the newly formed states after the collapse of the SFRY - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and North Macedonia - from the point of view of the problem of joining of these countries the EU and NATO. The author analyzes the political and psychological atmosphere in Serbian society, the moods and plans of the authorities of modern Serbia, as well as the views of the right-wing nationalist politicians and scientists in relation to neighboring states. The study acquaints the reader with Serbia’s foreign policy plans and their results in the context of the formation of a new national identity based on the «Saint Sava myth», Serbian Orthodoxy and Serbian ethnic nationalism. An important place in the formation of Serbian identity is occupied by the revision of the concept of the history of Yugoslavia, which leads to the deformation of historical consciousness and the dominance of ethno-national identity over all other types of identity, and above all, over civic identity. The author believes that the new identity now being formed in Serbia leads to the rejection of modern reforms based on the rule of law, human rights, pluralism and tolerance. The author concludes that for stabilization in the Balkans it is necessary to find a point of integration common to all peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of their nationality. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a key link in the process of stabilizing the region. But all the other states of the Western Balkans are facing the same task. The researcher examines the role of Russia in the domestic life and foreign policy of Serbia and, in general, in the Western Balkans region, which has not yet resolved the problems of the transition period.

Quando Alexandre subiu ao trono da Macedônia, Demostenes chamou-lhe “garoto inofensivo”. O que e facto e que o jovem rei, em pouco mais de um ano, unificou a Grécia, foi designado hegemon (chefe supremo das forças gregas), iniciou as hostilidades directas com os Persas e, em pouco mais de dois anos (334 a 332 a.C.), realizou uma serie de imparáveis conquistas do Mar Negro até ao Vale do Nilo, retirando inúmeras cidades e regiões do domínio Aquemênida. Mais tarde, com a tomada das capitais reais Babilonia, Susa, Persepolis e Pasargada e consequente recolha das suas inumeras riquezas financeiro-monetarias, Alexandre tornou-se senhor de um vasto imperio. Com a morte de Dario III Codomano, proclama-se herdeiro do império aquemenida, realizando, assim, o evento politico mais importante da historia do Proximo Oriente da sua epoca. Alexandre foi, de facto, o primeiro grande conquistador a unir a Grecia, o Egipto, a Asia Menor e a Asia, dominando um imperio que se estendia do Adriatico ao Indo, do Danubio as cataratas do Nilo, criando um poderoso sincretismo etnico entre os Macedonios e as populações conquistadas (especialmente com os Persas Aquemenidas) e assegurando a expansao das ideias, cultura e mentalidade dos Gregos.

The paper focuses on the events after the Brioni plenum of the Central Committee of the LCY in 1966. The turning point for the development of the national relationships in the Yugoslav federation became namely the Brioni plenim. This plenum and its decisions led to a liberalization of the national relationships in Yugoslavia, thus to the outburst of the Albanian problem, which was severely suppressed to this moment. This is the first major victory for the Albanians in Yugoslavia. In this regard, a movement has begun among the Albanian population in the multinational federation with the main goal of achieving full national recognition, including republican status for Kosovo. This new policy towards the minorities in Yugoslavia was introduced after the middle of the 1960s. Its expression became the new constitutional definition of “Yugoslav peoples and ethnoses”, which had to substitute the term “national minorities”. That led to changes into the rights of Albanians in Yugoslavia, and as a result their socio-political activity drastically aroused. The Yugoslav party leadership started again to look for a solution of the Albanian issue. Significant Yugoslav financial aid and investments were directed towards Kosovo, aiming at a closer incorporation of the Albanians in the Yugoslav federation and an interruption of their connection with Albania. After the Brioni Plenum, the Albanian problem in the Yugoslav Federation entered a qualitatively new state. The events in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and the neighboring Republic of Macedonia at the end of 1968 played an important role in the further development of this problem and in the changes in the constitutional, legal and socio-political development of the Yugoslav Federation. So after the demonstrations of the Albanian population in Kosovo and Macedonia at the end of 1968, a “creeping Albanization” started in Kosovo. The Albanian political elite and intelligencia played the most important role in the imposition of the “Albanization” as a political line at the end of the 1960s. Albanians hold all important posts in administration, culture, education and political life of Kosovo. That led to an increasing mistrust between the Albanian population and the Serbian-Montenegrin minority, and the last was forced to leave its homes and to migrate in other republics and regions. The political leadership in Prishtina insisted the autonomous region to get equal rights with the republics as a federal unit. That is how at the beginning of the 1970s Kosovo issue transferred into a problem of the whole Yugoslav federation, not only a Serbian one. The Albanians in Prishtina were involved into the confrontation Zagreb-Belgrade and acquired a support from the Croatian side, as well as the Slovenian one in the efforts to take their problem out of Serbia and to put it on a federal level at the League Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The processes in the political life of the autonomous region Kosovo were not isolated and were connected with the events in the Yugoslav federation as a whole, and precisely in Croatia at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 70s, which culmination was so-called “Zagreb Spring” in 1971. The Croatian crisis had an important influence on the national relationships in the federation and led to an inflammation of the national disputes. That had a direct impact on the political life of Kosovo. Searching for allies against Serbian hegemony and unitarism, which were the main danger for the Croatian republic, Zagreb’s political leadership supported Kosovo pretensions for the extension of the autonomous rights and the freedoms of the Albanians. The amendments to the federal system of Yugoslavia (1968-1971) and the new Yugoslav constitution from 1974 are reflected in Kosovo, which makes the Albanian problem not only a problem of Serbia, but also a common Yugoslav problem.

As a result of the military reforms of Philip in the IV century BC. The Macedonian kingdom has become a powerful strong state. Subsequently, these legacies, Alexander the Great, in order to achieve world hegemony, received the opportunity of a devastating victory over the strong Persian Empire. In all these battles against the hegemony of Alexander the Great, the Saks participated as allies of the Persians. However, despite the high fighting spirit of the Saks, due to the weakness of Darius III, the Greco-Macedonian army won. Developing military achievements and success, the army of Alexander the Great invaded the Saka possessions. This article tells on the basis of sources about the struggle for freedom of the Saks in opposition to Alexander the Great. The battle of the Saks led by Spitamen with the troops of Alexander the Great is especially thoroughly analyzed.

Introduction: Socialism – from Eternal Reality to Passing DreamThe Year of Revolutions in 1989 presaged the end of the Cold War. For many people, it must have felt like the end of the Twentieth Century, and the 1990s a period of waiting for the Millennium. However, the 1990s was, in fact, a period of profound transformation in the post-Socialist world.In early representations of Socialism’s end, a dominant narrative was that of collapse. Dramatic events, such as the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in Germany enabled representation of the end as an unexpected moment. Senses of unexpectedness rested on erstwhile perceptions of Socialism as eternal.In contrast, the 1990s came to be a decade of revision in which thinking switched from considering Socialism’s persistence to asking, “why it went wrong?” I explore this question in relation to former-Yugoslavia. In brief, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was replaced through the early 1990s by six independent nation states: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Kosovo came much later. In the states that were significantly ethnically mixed, the break-up was accompanied by violence. Bosnia in the 1990s will be remembered for an important contribution to the lexicon of ideas – ethnic cleansing.Revisionist historicising of the former-Yugoslavia in the 1990s was led by the scholarly community. By and large, it discredited the Ancient Ethnic Hatreds (AEH) thesis commonly held by nationalists, simplistic media commentators and many Western politicians. The AEH thesis held that Socialism’s end was a consequence of the up-swelling of primordial (natural) ethnic tensions. Conversely, the scholarly community tended to view Socialism’s failure as an outcome of systemic economic and political deficiencies in the SFRY, and that these deficiencies were also, in fact the root cause of those ethnic tensions. And, it was argued that had such deficiencies been addressed earlier Socialism may have survived and fulfilled its promise of eternity (Verdery).A third significant perspective which emerged through the 1990s was that the collapse of Socialism was an outcome of the up-swelling of, if not primordial ethnic tensions then, at least repressed historical memories of ethnic tensions, especially of the internecine violence engendered locally by Nazi and Italian Fascist forces in WWII. This perspective was particularly en vogue within the unusually rich arts scene in former-Yugoslavia. Its leading exponent was Slovenian avant-garde rock band Laibach.In this article, I consider Laibach’s career and methods. For background the article draws substantially on Alexei Monroe’s excellent biography of Laibach, Interrogation Machine: Laibach and NSK (2005). However, as I indicate below, my interpretation diverges very significantly from Monroe’s. Laibach’s most significant body of work is the cover versions of Western pop songs it recorded in the middle part of its career. Using a technique that has been labelled retroquotation (Monroe), it subtly transforms the lyrical content, and radically transforms the musical arrangement of pop songs, thereby rendering them what might be described as martial anthems. The clearest illustration of the process is Laibach’s version of Opus’s one hit wonder “Live is Life”, which is retitled as “Life is Life” (Laibach 1987).Conventional scholarly interpretations of Laibach’s method (including Monroe’s) present it as entailing the uncovering of repressed forms of individual and collective totalitarian consciousness. I outline these ideas, but supplement them with an alternative interpretation. I argue that in the cover version stage of its career, Laibach switched its attention from seeking to uncover repressed totalitarianism towards uncovering repressed memories of ethnic tension, especially from WWII. Furthermore, I argue that its creative medium of Western pop music is especially important in this regard. On the bases of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Bosnia (University of Melbourne Human Ethics project 1544213.1), and of a reading of SFRY’s geopolitical history, I demonstrate that for many people, Western popular cultural forms came to represent the quintessence of what it was to be Yugoslav. In this context, Laibach’s retroquotation of Western pop music is akin to a broader cultural practice in the post-SFRY era in which symbols of the West were iconoclastically transformed. Such transformation served to reveal a public secret (Taussig) of repressed historic ethnic enmity within the very heart of things that were regarded as quintessentially and pan-ethnically Yugoslav. And, in so doing, this delegitimised memory of SFRY ever having been a properly functioning entity. In this way, Laibach contributed significantly to a broader process in which perceptions of Socialist Yugoslavia came to be rendered less as a reality with the potential for eternity than a passing dream.What Is Laibach and What Does It Do?Originally of the industrial rock genre, Laibach has evolved through numerous other genres including orchestral rock, choral rock and techno. It is not, however, a rock group in any conventional sense. Laibach is the musical section of a tripartite unit named Neue Slowenische Kunst (NSK) which also encompasses the fine arts collective Irwin and a variety of theatre groups.Laibach was the name by which the Slovenian capital Ljubljana was known under the Austrian Habsburg Empire and then Nazi occupation in WWII. The choice of name hints at a central purpose of Laibach and NSK in general, to explore the relationship between art and ideology, especially under conditions of totalitarianism. In what follows, I describe how Laibach go about doing this.Laibach’s central method is eclecticism, by which symbols of the various ideological regimes that are its and the NSK’s subject matter are intentionally juxtaposed. Eclecticism of this kind was characteristic of the postmodern aesthetics typical of the 1990s. Furthermore, and counterintuitively perhaps, postmodernism was as much a condition of the Socialist East as it was the Capitalist West. As Mikhail N. Epstein argues, “Totalitarianism itself may be viewed as a specific postmodern model that came to replace the modernist ideological stance elaborated in earlier Marxism” (102). However, Western and Eastern postmodernisms were fundamentally different. In particular, while the former was largely playful, ironicising and depoliticised, the latter, which Laibach and NSK may be regarded as being illustrative of, involved placing in opposition to one another competing and antithetical aesthetic, political and social regimes, “without the contradictions being fully resolved” (Monroe 54).The performance of unresolved contradictions in Laibach’s work fulfils three principal functions. It works to (1) reveal hidden underlying connections between competing ideological systems, and between art and power more generally. This is evident in Life is Life. The video combines symbols of Slovenian romantic nationalism (stags and majestic rural landscapes) with Nazism and militarism (uniforms, bodily postures and a martial musical arrangement). Furthermore, it presents images of the graves of victims of internecine violence in WWII. The video is a reminder to Slovenian viewers of a discomforting public secret within their nation’s history. While Germany is commonly viewed as a principal oppressor of Slovenian nationalism, the rural peasantry, who are represented as embodying Slovenian nationalism most, were also the most willing collaborators in imperialist processes of Germanicisation. The second purpose of the performance of unresolved contradictions in Laibach’s work is to (2) engender senses of the alienation, especially as experienced by the subjects of totalitarian regimes. Laibach’s approach in this regard is quite different to that of punk, whose concern with alienation - symbolised by safety pins and chains - was largely celebratory of the alienated condition. Rather, Laibach took a lead from seminal industrial rock bands such as Einstürzende Neubauten and Throbbing Gristle (see, for example, Walls of Sound (Throbbing Gristle 2004)), whose sound one fan accurately describes as akin to, “the creation of the universe by an angry titan/God and a machine apocalypse all rolled into one” (rateyourmusic.com). Certainly, Laibach’s shows can be uncomfortable experiences too, involving not only clashing symbols and images, but also the dissonant sounds of, for example, martial music, feedback, recordings of the political speeches of totalitarian leaders and barking dogs, all played at eardrum-breaking high volumes. The purpose of this is to provide, as Laibach state: “a ritualized demonstration of political force” (NSK, Neue Slowenische Kunst 44). In short, more than simply celebrating the experience of totalitarian alienation, Laibach’s intention is to reproduce that very alienation.More than performatively representing tyranny, and thereby senses of totalitarian alienation, Laibach and NSK set out to embody it themselves. In particular, and contra the forms of liberal humanism that were hegemonic at the peak of their career in the 1990s, their organisation was developed as a model of totalitarian collectivism in which the individual is always subjugated. This is illustrated in the Onanigram (NSK, Neue Slowenische Kunst), which, mimicking the complexities of the SFRY in its most totalitarian dispensation, maps out in labyrinthine detail the institutional structure of NSK. Behaviour is governed by a Constitution that states explicitly that NSK is a group in which, “each individual is subordinated to the whole” (NSK, Neue Slowenische Kunst 273). Lest this collectivism be misconceived as little more than a show, the case of Tomaž Hostnik is instructive. The original lead singer of Laibach, Hostnik committed ritual suicide by hanging himself from a hayrack, a key symbol of Slovenian nationalism. Initially, rather than mourning his loss, the other members of Laibach posthumously disenfranchised him (“threw him out of the band”), presumably for his act of individual will that was collectively unsanctioned.Laibach and the NSK’s collectivism also have spiritual overtones. The Onanigram presents an Immanent Consistent Spirit, a kind of geist that holds the collective together. NSK claim: “Only God can subdue LAIBACH. People and things never can” (NSK, Neue Slowenische Kunst 289). Furthermore, such rhetorical bombast was matched in aspiration. Most famously, in one of the first instances of a micro-nation, NSK went on to establish itself as a global and virtual non-territorial state, replete with a recruitment drive, passports and anthem, written and performed by Laibach of course. Laibach’s CareerLaibach’s career can be divided into three overlapping parts. The first is its career as a political provocateur, beginning from the inception of the band in 1980 and continuing through to the present. The band’s performances have touched the raw nerves of several political actors. As suggested above, Laibach offended Slovenian nationalists. The band offended the SFRY, especially when in its stage backdrop it juxtaposed images of a penis with Marshal Josip Broz “Tito”, founding President of the SFRY. Above all, it offended libertarians who viewed the band’s exploitation of totalitarian aesthetics as a route to evoking repressed totalitarian energies in its audiences.In a sense the libertarians were correct, for Laibach were quite explicit in representing a third function of their performance of unresolved contradictions as being to (3) evoke repressed totalitarian energies. However, as Žižek demonstrates in his essay “Why Are Laibach and NSK Not Fascists”, Laibach’s intent in this regard is counter-totalitarian. Laibach engage in what amounts to a “psychoanalytic cure” for totalitarianism, which consists of four envisaged stages. The consumers of Laibach’s works and performances go through a process of over-identification with totalitarianism, leading through the experience of alienation to, in turn, disidentification and an eventual overcoming of that totalitarian alienation. The Žižekian interpretation of the four stages has, however been subjected to critique, particularly by Deleuzian scholars, and especially for its psychoanalytic emphasis on the transformation of individual (un)consciousness (i.e. the cerebral rather than bodily). Instead, such scholars prefer a schizoanalytic interpretation which presents the cure as, respectively collective (Monroe 45-50) and somatic (Goddard). Laibach’s works and pronouncements display, often awareness of such abstract theoretical ideas. However, they also display attentiveness to the concrete realities of socio-political context. This was reflected especially in the 1990s, when its focus seemed to shift from the matter of totalitarianism to the overriding issue of the day in Laibach’s homeland – ethnic conflict. For example, echoing the discourse of Truth and Reconciliation emanating from post-Apartheid South Africa in the early 1990s, Laibach argued that its work is “based on the premise that traumas affecting the present and the future can be healed only by returning to the initial conflicts” (NSK Padiglione).In the early 1990s era of post-socialist violent ethnic nationalism, statements such as this rendered Laibach a darling of anti-nationalism, both within civil society and in what came to be known pejoratively as the Yugonostagic, i.e. pro-SFRY left. Its darling status was cemented further by actions such as performing a concert to celebrate the end of the Bosnian war in 1996, and because its ideological mask began to slip. Most famously, when asked by a music journalist the standard question of what the band’s main influences were, rather than citing other musicians Laibach stated: “Tito, Tito and Tito.” Herein lies the third phase of Laibach’s career, dating from the mid-1990s to the present, which has been marked by critical recognition and mainstream acceptance, and in contrasting domains. Notably, in 2012 Laibach was invited to perform at the Tate Modern in London. Then, entering the belly of what is arguably the most totalitarian of totalitarian beasts in 2015, it became the first rock band to perform live in North Korea.The middle part in Laibach’s career was between 1987 and 1996. This was when its work consisted mostly of covers of mainstream Western pop songs by, amongst others Opus, Queen, The Rolling Stones, and, in The Final Countdown (1986), Swedish ‘big hair’ rockers. It also covered entire albums, including a version of Andrew Lloyd Webber’s rock opera Jesus Christ Superstar. No doubt mindful of John Lennon’s claim that his band was more popular than the Messiah himself, Laibach covered the Beatles’ final album Let It Be (1970). Highlighting the perilous hidden connections between apparently benign and fascistic forms of sedentarism, lead singer Milan Fras’ snarling delivery of the refrain “Get Back to where you once belong” renders the hit single from that album less a story of homecoming than a sinister warning to immigrants and ethnic others who are out of place.This career middle stage invoked critique. However, commonplace suggestions that Laibach could be characterised as embodying Retromania, a derivative musical trend typical of the 1990s that has been lambasted for its de-politicisation and a musical conservatism enabled by new sampling technologies that afforded a forensic documentary precision that prohibits creative distortion (Reynolds), are misplaced. Several scholars highlight Laibach’s ceaseless attention to musical creativity in the pursuit of political subversiveness. For example, for Monroe, the cover version was a means for Laibach to continue its exploration of the connections between art and ideology, of illuminating the connections between competing ideological systems and of evoking repressed totalitarian energies, only now within Western forms of entertainment in which ideological power structures are less visible than in overt totalitarian propaganda. However, what often seems to escape intellectualist interpretations presented by scholars such as Žižek, Goddard and (albeit to a lesser extent) Monroe is the importance of the concrete specificities of the context that Laibach worked in in the 1990s – i.e. homeland ethno-nationalist politics – and, especially, their medium – i.e. Western pop music.The Meaning and Meaningfulness of Western Popular Culture in Former YugoslaviaThe Laibach covers were merely one of many celebrations of Western popular culture that emerged in pre- and post-socialist Yugoslavia. The most curious of these was the building of statues of icons of screen and stage. These include statues of Tarzan, Bob Marley, Rocky Balboa and, most famously, martial arts cinema legend Bruce Lee in the Bosnian city of Mostar.The pop monuments were often erected as symbols of peace in contexts of ethnic-national violence. Each was an ethnic hybrid. With the exception of original Tarzan Johnny Weismuller — an ethnic-German American immigrant from Serbia — none was remotely connected to the competing ethnic-national groups. Thus, it was surprising when these pop monuments became targets for iconoclasm. This was especially surprising because, in contrast, both the new ethnic-national monuments that were built and the old Socialist pan-Yugoslav monuments that remained in all their concrete and steel obduracy in and through the 1990s were left largely untouched.The work of Simon Harrison may give us some insight into this curious situation. Harrison questions the commonplace assumption that the strength of enmity between ethnic groups is related to their cultural dissimilarity — in short, the bigger the difference the bigger the biffo. By that logic, the new ethnic-national monuments erected in the post-SFRY era ought to have been vandalised. Conversely, however, Harrison argues that enmity may be more an outcome of similarity, at least when that similarity is torn asunder by other kinds of division. This is so because ownership of previously shared and precious symbols of identity appears to be seen as subjected to appropriation by ones’ erstwhile comrades who are newly othered in such moments.This is, indeed, exactly what happened in post-socialist former-Yugoslavia. Yugoslavs were rendered now as ethnic-nationals: Bosniaks (Muslims), Croats and Serbs in the case of Bosnia. In the process, the erection of obviously non-ethnic-national monuments by, now inevitably ethnic-national subjects was perceived widely as appropriation – “the Croats [the monument in Mostar was sculpted by Croatian artist Ivan Fijolić] are stealing our Bruce Lee,” as one of my Bosnian-Serb informants exclaimed angrily.However, this begs the question: Why would symbols of Western popular culture evoke the kinds of emotions that result in iconoclasm more so than other ethnically non-reducible ones such as those of the Partisans that are celebrated in the old Socialist pan-Yugoslav monuments? The answer lies in the geopolitical history of the SFRY. The Yugoslav-Soviet Union split in 1956 forced the SFRY to develop ever-stronger ties with the West. The effects of this became quotidian, especially as people travelled more or less freely across international borders and consumed the products of Western Capitalism. Many of the things they consumed became deeply meaningful. Notably, barely anybody above a certain age does not reminisce fondly about the moment when participation in martial arts became a nationwide craze following the success of Bruce Lee’s films in the golden (1970s-80s) years of Western-bankrolled Yugoslav prosperity.Likewise, almost everyone above a certain age recalls the balmy summer of 1985, whose happy zeitgeist seemed to be summed up perfectly by Austrian band Opus’s song “Live is Life” (1985). This tune became popular in Yugoslavia due to its apparently feelgood message about the joys of attending live rock performances. In a sense, these moments and the consumption of things “Western” in general came to symbolise everything that was good about Yugoslavia and, indeed to define what it was to be Yugoslavs, especially in comparison to their isolated and materially deprived socialist comrades in the Warsaw Pact countries.However, iconoclastic acts are more than mere emotional responses to offensive instances of cultural appropriation. As Michael Taussig describes, iconoclasm reveals the public secrets that the monuments it targets conceal. SFRY’s great public secret, known especially to those people old enough to have experienced the inter-ethnic violence of WWII, was ethnic division and the state’s deceit of the historic normalcy of pan-Yugoslav identification. The secret was maintained by a formal state policy of forgetting. For example, the wording on monuments in sites of inter-ethnic violence in WWII is commonly of the variety: “here lie the victims in Yugoslavia’s struggle against imperialist forces and their internal quislings.” Said quislings were, of course, actually Serbs, Croats, and Muslims (i.e. fellow Yugoslavs), but those ethnic nomenclatures were almost never used.In contrast, in a context where Western popular cultural forms came to define the very essence of what it was to be Yugoslav, the iconoclasm of Western pop monuments, and the retroquotation of Western pop songs revealed the repressed deceit and the public secret of the reality of inter-ethnic tension at the heart of that which was regarded as quintessentially Yugoslav. In this way, the memory of Yugoslavia ever having been a properly functioning entity was delegitimised. Consequently, Laibach and their kind served to render the apparent reality of the Yugoslav ideal as little more than a dream. ReferencesEpstein, Mikhail N. After the Future: The Paradoxes of Postmodernism and Contemporary Russian Culture. Amherst: U of Massachusettes P, 1995.Goddard, Michael. “We Are Time: Laibach/NSK, Retro-Avant-Gardism and Machinic Repetition,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 11 (2006): 45-53.Harrison, Simon. “Identity as a Scarce Resource.” Social Anthropology 7 (1999): 239–251.Monroe, Alexei. Interrogation Machine: Laibach and NSK. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005.NSK. Neue Slowenische Kunst. Ljubljana: NSK, 1986.NSK. Padiglione NSK. Ljubljana: Moderna Galerija, 1993.rateyourmusic.com. 2018. 3 Sep. 2018 <https://rateyourmusic.com/artist/throbbing-gristle>.Reynolds, Simon. Retromania: Pop Culture’s Addiction to Its Own Past. London: Faber and Faber, 2011.Taussig, Michael. Defacement: Public Secrecy and the Labor of the Negative. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.Verdery, Katherine. What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Žižek, Slavoj. “Why Are Laibach and NSK Not Fascists?” 3 Sep. 2018 <www.nskstate.com/appendix/articles/why_are_laibach.php.>

The thesis begins with the question of who were those who appealed to Rome in 230 to provide the pretext for the First Illyrian War. This is followed by an analysis of the mechanics of trade and travel to Greece, and the conditions to be encountered there; also of the honorific inscriptions which provide much of the evidence for the presence. This evidence is then assessed for Delphi, the sanctuaries of Asklepios, Aitolia and other less cohesive presences. The conclusions are in terms of Rome's dealings with Greece up to and including the First Illyrian War, as affected by her allies' presence in Greece. There follows an excursus on the development of early Latin literature, its motivations, themes and relevance in historical context. The period of the Second Punic War is then analysed to see if and how traffic continued to frequent Greece, and how Rome's policy developed from the stance which she had taken in 230. This leads to a consideration of the causes of the Second Makedonian War, and of the differing policies of Flamininus and Scipio Africanus as revealed by their honours, dedications and letters in Greece. The subsequent Italian presence in Delphi, Thessaly, Aitolia, Thrace, the Aigæian, Boiotia and elsewhere is then assessed in its historical context. There is then a broad overview of the presence on Delos throughout the period, with the emphasis on the Syro-Aitolian War and the freeing of the port in 166.

After the defeat of the Greek forces in the Lamian War the Athenians agreed to Antipater's demand for unconditional surrender. As result of the terms the Macedonian general demanded Phocion became pre-eminent in Athens for a few years from 322/1 to 319/8 B.C. It is my belief that, although he did not seek to become leader in Athens, Phocion none-the-less accepted his new role out of a sense of duty and a firm belief that he was the only person suited for the job. Here was a man whose logical, pragmatic and unemotional attitude to political and world affairs enabled him to rise above what he believed to be the short-sightedness of his contemporaries and accurately assess the future for Athens and the city-state's place in the new world order. Of course our picture of Phocion is taken, mainly, from Plutarch's encomiastic Life of Phocion. According to his account the Athenian general and statesman did not want war but peace and prosperity. He did not believe the Athenians capable of defeating Macedonia. Instead, he felt that the people should accept their new position in the world and make the best of the situation. It should not be forgotten, however, that Plutarch was writing at a time when Europe was under the yoke of the new superpower: Rome. He saw the benefits of living in Greece at a time when the city-states were no longer continually involved in internecine warfare. It was, perhaps, this appreciation of the state of his own world, gained with the benefit of hindsight, that gave rise to his admiration of (what he perceived to be) Phocion's foresight. Phocion appeared to understand, as Plutarch did, that there was no reason why Athens could not still be prosperous. Plutarch's Phocion saw the city-state's future as no longer being primarily reliant on military preparedness but rather on trade and sound economic policy. With the protection of the powerful Macedonian overlord Athens would be free to enjoy life in relative peace and prosperity. Ultimately, Plutarch has had a significant influence on our understanding and appreciation of Phocion the general, statesman and man. The aim of this paper then is, with the use of other primary and secondary sources, to look beyond Plutarch's encomium and attempt to find the real Phocion. In particular, I will be examining the aging general's role in Athenian affairs after the Lamian War. This pivotal time in Athenian history has received too little attention. Life in Athens changed dramatically after Antipater defeated the Greek forces at the Battle of Crannon. The Athenians lost their freedom and autonomy and were fated never to regain the hegemony of the Greeks. Moreover, they had failed to live up to the glorious deeds of their ancestors. It was Phocion's task to help his people to come to terms with this new state of affairs and to find a place for Athens in the new world order. And so, political life in Athens was turned upside down as democracy was changed to oligarchy.

When we think of ancient Athens, the image invariably coming to mind is of the Classical city, with monuments beautifying everywhere; the Agora swarming with people conducting business and discussing political affairs; and a flourishing intellectual, artistic, and literary life, with life anchored in the ideals of freedom, autonomy, and democracy. But in 338 that forever changed when Philip II of Macedonia defeated a Greek army at Chaeronea to impose Macedonian hegemony over Greece. The Greeks then remained under Macedonian rule until the new power of the Mediterranean world, Rome, annexed Macedonia and Greece into its empire. How did Athens fare in the Hellenistic and Roman periods? What was going on in the city, and how different was it from its Classical predecessor? There is a tendency to think of Athens remaining in decline in these eras, as its democracy was curtailed, the people were forced to suffer periods of autocratic rule, and especially under the Romans enforced building activity turned the city into a provincial one than the “School of Hellas” that Pericles had proudly proclaimed it to be, and the Athenians were forced to adopt the imperial cult and watch Athena share her home, the sacred Acropolis, with the goddess Roma. But this dreary picture of decline and fall belies reality, as my book argues. It helps us appreciate Hellenistic and Roman Athens and to show it was still a vibrant and influential city. A lot was still happening in the city, and its people were always resilient: they fought their Macedonian masters when they could, and later sided with foreign kings against Rome, always in the hope of regaining that most cherished ideal, freedom. Hellenistic Athens is far from being a postscript to its Classical predecessor, as is usually thought. It was simply different. Its rich and varied history continued, albeit in an altered political and military form, and its Classical self-lived on in literature and thought. In fact, it was its status as a cultural and intellectual juggernaut that enticed Romans to the city, some to visit, others to study. The Romans might have been the ones doing the conquering, but in adapting aspects of Hellenism for their own cultural and political needs, they were the ones, as the poet Horace claimed, who ended up being captured.

This work examines how politicians in late classical Athens made persuasive use of the city’s past when addressing mass citizen audiences, especially in the law courts and Assembly. It focuses on Demosthenes and Aeschines—both prominent statesmen, and bitter rivals—as its case-study orators. Recent scholarly treatments of how the Athenians remembered their past tend to concentrate on collective processes; to complement these, this work looks at the rhetorical strategies devised by individual orators, examining what it meant for Demosthenes or Aeschines to present particular ‘historical’ examples (or paradigms/paradeigmata), arguments, and illustrations in particular contexts. It argues that discussing the Athenian past—and therefore a core aspect of Athenian identity itself—offered Demosthenes and Aeschines (and others) an effective and versatile means both of building and highlighting their own credibility, authority, and commitment to the democracy and its values, and of competing with their rivals, whose own versions and handling of the past they could challenge and undermine as a symbolic attack on those rivals’ wider competence. Recourse to versions of the past also offered orators a way of reflecting on a troubled contemporary geopolitical landscape where Athens first confronted the enterprising Philip II of Macedon and then coped with Macedonian hegemony. The work, which covers all of Demosthenes’ and Aeschines’ surviving public oratory, is constructed round a series of detailed readings of individual speeches and sets of speeches (Chapters 2 to 6), while Chapter 1 offers a series of synoptic surveys of individual topics which inform the main discussion.

After a survey of Athens at the height of its power in the Classical period, the chapter focuses on the rise to power of Philip II of Macedonia, how he expanded his kingdom, his relations with Athens, and his eventual military establishment of hegemony over Greece. Conditions in the city, especially during the Lycurgan era, are covered. On Philip’s death, that hegemony continued under his son, Alexander the Great. When Alexander died, the Greeks, led by Athens, revolted against Macedonian rule in what is called the Lamian War. The Macedonian general Antipater re-established Macedonian control, and punished Athens, including installing a garrison in the city, curtailing democracy, and reducing the number of citizens. This was the start of the Hellenistic era, commonly seen as a slump in Athens’ fortunes.

The chapter breaks from the main narrative to discuss and explain various key political and civic institutions, shedding light on how different Athens was politically in the Hellenistic period. There is a survey of Classical Athenian radical democracy to show what the constitution used to be like, followed by a consideration of the restrictions on the constitution and political participation under Macedonian hegemony and Roman rule. There is also a discussion of two major civic institutions: the ephebeia and the guilds.

Chapter 6 discusses the ‘Crown trial’ of 330 BC, the other major court clash between Aeschines (prosecutor) and Demosthenes (defending his associate Ctesiphon) for which we have extant speech texts from each side. The chapter shows that part of the success of On the Crown lies in Demosthenes’ ability to find ways to capitalize on the strategic error Aeschines had made in assuming that reviving the modes of accusation used in the Embassy trial could work in a context where the direction Demosthenes helped take Athens in nearly a decade earlier still apparently commanded broad popular approval, despite the fact that it had led to Macedonian hegemony. Demosthenes builds on this in On the Crown with an optimistic strategy—in which historical material plays a crucial role—which gives his audience much better versions of their past, present, and future to believe in than those assumed by Aeschines. After an introduction and overview in Chapter 6.1, which includes an assessment of the nature of our speech texts and some contextualization of Demosthenes’ strategies within those of his political group (especially Hyperides), Chapters 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 show Demosthenes confronting Aeschines’ historically related set pieces with a series of set pieces of his own which cover the same thematic ground and act as persuasive usurpations of the originals, seeking to upstage them. Chapter 6.5 offers a succinct conclusion.

The attack by the United States on Iraq in March 2003 was atypical of contemporary conflicts. While the attempt to kill Saddam Hussein on March 19 marked the opening of hostilities and was broadcast worldwide instantaneously, a much more destructive conflict that had raged for five years in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to receive hardly any notice. The war to depose the Hussein regime resulted in fewer than 12,000 dead (122 U.S. and U.K. troops, 6,000–7,000 civilians, and about 5,000 Iraqi military casualties). The civil wars in the Congo (formerly Zaire) since 1998 have resulted in 3.1 to 4.7 million dead, with 250,000 killed in the fighting near Bunia (eastern Congo) in 2002–2003. Conflict directly caused 300,000 deaths worldwide in 2000, more than half of them in Africa. Conflict directly accounts for 0.5% of all global deaths; the indirect effects are significantly larger. These gruesome comparative statistics on casualties illustrate well the main themes of this chapter about post–Cold War conflicts. First, contemporary wars are disproportionately civil conflicts; only a handful of interstate wars have occurred in the last decade. Second, the United States has been disproportionately involved in both interstate and civil wars, either directly by attacking another country (Panama in 1989, Iraq in 1991, Yugoslavia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003) or indirectly by supporting governments that are under pressure from rebels (e.g., Haiti, Pakistan, Colombia, Israel, Turkey, the Philippines, Macedonia, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia). Third, civil wars are lasting longer than ever before; the average length is now eight years. Fourth, civil wars are much more destructive of life and property than interstate wars, partly because international structures and rules are either unavailable or ignored. More mechanisms exist to resolve interstate disputes. Fifth, overwhelming U.S. military power and a growing disparity with its opponents have resulted increasingly in asymmetric use of force and “risk-transfer wars.” Tiny U.S. casualties stand in sharp contrast to large numbers of civilian and military deaths in the countries under attack. The gap is expected to grow as U.S. military expenditures soon equal those of all other countries combined and new high-tech weaponry is rushed into production.