Journal articles: 'Lying; Truth telling; Deception'

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Desforges, Donna M., and Thomas C. Lee. "Detecting Deception is Not as Easy as it Looks." Teaching of Psychology 22, no. 2 (April 1995): 128–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15328023top2202_10.

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This exercise allows students to experience the difference between cues for perceived and actual deception. Students viewed classmates telling the truth and lying. Students' judgments indicated that deception detection was accurate less than 50% of the time. This discovery allowed for an in-depth discussion of deception, detection, and nonverbal communication.

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ARCIULI, JOANNE, DAVID MALLARD, and GINA VILLAR. "“Um, I can tell you're lying”: Linguistic markers of deception versus truth-telling in speech." Applied Psycholinguistics 31, no. 3 (June 4, 2010): 397–411. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0142716410000044.

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ABSTRACTLying is a deliberate attempt to transmit messages that mislead others. Analysis of language behaviors holds great promise as an objective method of detecting deception. The current study reports on the frequency of use and acoustic nature of “um” and “like” during laboratory-elicited lying versus truth-telling. Results obtained using a within-participants false opinion paradigm showed that instances of “um” occur less frequently and are of shorter duration during lying compared to truth-telling. There were no significant differences in relation to “like.” These findings contribute to our understanding of the linguistic markers of deception behavior. They also assist in our understanding of the role of “um” in communication more generally. Our results suggest that “um” may not be accurately conceptualized as a filled pause/hesitation or speech disfluency/error whose increased usage coincides with increased cognitive load or increased arousal during lying. It may instead carry a lexical status similar to interjections and form an important part of authentic, effortless communication, which is somewhat lacking during lying.

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Al-Simadi, Fayez A. "DETECTION OF DECEPTIVE BEHAVIOR: A CROSS-CULTURAL TEST." Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 28, no. 5 (January 1, 2000): 455–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2000.28.5.455.

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This article reports a cross-cultural test for the detection of deception from behavior. Jordanians and Malaysians were videotaped while lying and telling the truth, and Jordanians and Malaysians judged the resulting tapes for deception. The experiment was conducted at Yarmouk University; the subjects were 40 Jordanian students and 32 Malaysian students. Results show that lies can be detected across cultures from an audiovisual presentation. Ancillary results reveal cross- cultural consensus in judgments of deception from both auditory and visual cues. Discrimination between lies and the truth was clear – and was more accurate for targets who tried to convey, rather than conceal, it.

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Hadar, Aviad A., Avi Lazarovits, and Kielan Yarrow. "Increased Motor Cortex Excitability for Concealed Visual Information." Journal of Psychophysiology 33, no. 4 (October 1, 2019): 286–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/0269-8803/a000230.

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Abstract. Deceptive behavior involves complex neural processes involving the primary motor cortex. The dynamics of this motor cortex excitability prior to lying are still not well understood. We sought to examine whether corticospinal excitability can be used to suggest the presence of deliberately concealed information in a modified version of the guilty knowledge test (GKT). Participants pressed keys to either truthfully or deceitfully indicate their familiarity with a series of faces. Motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) were recorded during response preparation to measure muscle-specific neural excitability. We hypothesized that MEPs would increase during the deceptive condition not only in the lie-telling finger but also in the suppressed truth-telling finger. We report a group-level increase in overall corticospinal excitability 300 ms following stimulus onset during the deceptive condition, without specific activation of the neural representation of the truth-telling finger. We discuss cognitive processes, particularly response conflict and/or automated responses to familiar stimuli, which may drive the observed nonspecific increase of motor excitability in deception.

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Ure, Michael. "Arendt’s Apology." Philosophy Today 62, no. 2 (2018): 419–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday201866219.

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In 1967, Hannah Arendt published an essay with the deceptively simple title “Truth and Politics” (1967). Most scholarly discussions of her essay consider her distinction between a traditional political art of limited, deliberate, strategic lying and modern, organised, global lying and self-deception and then evaluate her qualified defence of the virtues of mendacity. This article suggests, however, that her essay has a much broader ambit: viz., to defend the political value of truth-telling. The main purpose of this article is to demonstrate that she formulates her essay as an apology of the truth-teller in politics and of her own truth-telling in her controversial report of the Eichmann trial. It first surveys the personal motives of Arendt’s political defence of frank speech. It shows that in developing this defence she significantly revises her scepticism about the value of truth-telling in politics. She does so by identifying three different types of truth-teller with distinctive political roles: philosophers who exemplify the truth in their own lives, citizens who see the world from other people’s perspectives, and poets and historians whose stories reconcile citizens to the past. Finally, it argues that the tragic political perspective Arendt sought to revive requires acknowledging value of the emotions in making political judgments.

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Anderson-Gold, Sharon. "Privacy, Respect and the Virtues of Reticence in Kant." Kantian Review 15, no. 2 (July 2010): 28–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400002429.

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At a time when the public is increasingly exposed to public scandals, moral defences of privacy are hard to come by. Privacy, it is argued, is merely a cloak for deception and vice. Since the virtuous have nothing to hide, full disclosure of ourselves to others must be a moral obligation. Given the rigour with which Kant defends the prohibition on lying, many have inferred that Kantian ethics must be equally strict on the necessity of truth telling. Do we in fact owe others the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

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Lee, Chih-Chen, Robert B. Welker, and Marcus D. Odom. "Features of Computer-Mediated, Text-Based Messages that Support Automatable, Linguistics-Based Indicators for Deception Detection." Journal of Information Systems 23, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 5–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jis.2009.23.1.24.

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ABSTRACT: Researchers are assessing the viability of automating deception detection in TAC (text-based, asynchronous, computer-mediated) messages. Viability is conditional on whether deceivers incorporate different features in their TAC messages than truth tellers do and on whether these differentiating features support deception indicators suitable for automation. We propose that deceivers incorporate different features in their messages to realize impression-management goals. They avoid message features people associate with lying (defensive-targeted features) and include message features people associate with truth telling (promotive-targeted features). In a series of three studies, we assessed features that may be part of deceivers' impression-management strategies and then assessed whether deceivers' messages contain different levels of these features than truth tellers' messages. The results show that deceivers construct different messages than truth tellers do and that the differences relate to promotive-targeted features. These findings suggest that researchers look to promotive goals of deceivers for automatable deception indicators in TAC communication.

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Mameli, Francesca, Cristina Scarpazza, Emanuele Tomasini, Roberta Ferrucci, Fabiana Ruggiero, Giuseppe Sartori, and Alberto Priori. "The guilty brain: the utility of neuroimaging and neurostimulation studies in forensic field." Reviews in the Neurosciences 28, no. 2 (February 1, 2017): 161–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/revneuro-2016-0048.

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AbstractSeveral studies have aimed to address the natural inability of humankind to detect deception and accurately discriminate lying from truth in the legal context. To date, it has been well established that telling a lie is a complex mental activity. During deception, many functions of higher cognition are involved: the decision to lie, withholding the truth, fabricating the lie, monitoring whether the receiver believes the lie, and, if necessary, adjusting the fabricated story and maintaining a consistent lie. In the previous 15 years, increasing interest in the neuroscience of deception has resulted in new possibilities to investigate and interfere with the ability to lie directly from the brain. Cognitive psychology, as well as neuroimaging and neurostimulation studies, are increasing the possibility that neuroscience will be useful for lie detection. This paper discusses the scientific validity of the literature on neuroimaging and neurostimulation regarding lie detection to understand whether scientific findings in this field have a role in the forensic setting. We considered how lie detection technology may contribute to addressing the detection of deception in the courtroom and discussed the conditions and limits in which these techniques reliably distinguish whether an individual is lying.

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Dzindolet, Mary T., and Linda G. Pierce. "Using a Linguistic Analysis Tool to Detect Deception." Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 49, no. 3 (September 2005): 563–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/154193120504900374.

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Detecting deception is important, yet accuracy rates remain low (e.g., DePaulo & Friedman, 1998). Pennebaker et al. (2003) suggest a linguistic analysis tool may be able to detect deception because people use a different linguistic style when telling the truth than when lying. For example, the anxiety experienced by liars may “leak” into their words. The cognitive resources devoted to the lie will be taken from the message. Newman et al. (2003) found support for these hypotheses using the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC). Dzindolet and Pierce (2004a) found the LIWC was useful in detecting deception among participants discussing music preferences. This study expands their work to include other topics. Results from the 2 (topic: movie or television) x 2 (topic importance: high or low) x 2 (communication type: lie or truth) design indicated that linguistic analysis tools may be useful in detecting deception across a variety of topics.

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Elaad, Eitan. "Lie-Detection Biases among Male Police Interrogators, Prisoners, and Laypersons." Psychological Reports 105, no. 3_suppl (December 2009): 1047–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.105.f.1047-1056.

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Beliefs of 28 male police interrogators, 30 male prisoners, and 30 male laypersons about their skill in detecting lies and truths told by others, and in telling lies and truths convincingly themselves, were compared. As predicted, police interrogators overestimated their lie-detection skills. In fact, they were affected by stereotypical beliefs about verbal and nonverbal cues to deception. Prisoners were similarly affected by stereotypical misconceptions about deceptive behaviors but were able to identify that lying is related to pupil dilation. They assessed their lie-detection skill as similar to that of laypersons, but less than that of police interrogators. In contrast to interrogators, prisoners tended to rate lower their lie-telling skill than did the other groups. Results were explained in terms of anchoring and self-assessment bias. Practical aspects of the results for criminal interrogation were discussed.

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Bradley, M. T., and M. C. Cullen. "Polygraph Lie Detection on Real Events in a Laboratory Setting." Perceptual and Motor Skills 76, no. 3 (June 1993): 1051–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pms.1993.76.3.1051.

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This laboratory study dealt with real-life intense emotional events. Subjects generated embarrassing stories from their experience, then submitted to polygraph testing and, by lying, denied their stories and, by telling the truth, denied a randomly assigned story. Money was given as an incentive to be judged innocent on each story. An interrogator, blind to the stories, used Control Question Tests and found subjects more deceptive when lying than when truthful. Stories interacted with order such that lying on the second story was more easily detected than lying on the first. Embarrassing stories provide an alternative to the use of mock crimes to study lie detection in the laboratory.

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Ryan, Saskia, Nicole Sherretts, Dominic Willmott, Dara Mojtahedi, and Benjamin M. Baughman. "The missing link in training to detect deception and its implications for justice." Safer Communities 17, no. 1 (January 8, 2018): 33–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/sc-07-2017-0027.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of response bias and target gender on detecting deception. Design/methodology/approach Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: a stereotype condition (bogus training group), a tell-signs condition (empirically tested cues), and a control condition. Participants were required to decide whether eight targets were lying or telling the truth, based upon the information they had been given. Accuracy was measured via a correct or incorrect response to the stimuli. The data were then analyzed using a 2×2×3 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine whether any main or interactional effects were present. Findings Results revealed training condition had no significant effect on accuracy, nor was there a within-subject effect of gender. However, there was a significant main effect of accuracy in detecting truth or lies, and a significant interaction between target gender and detecting truth or lies. Research limitations/implications Future research should seek a larger sample of participants with a more extensive training aspect developed into the study, as the brief training offered here may not be fully reflective of the extent and intensity of training which could be offered to professionals. Originality/value Within the criminal justice system, the need for increased accuracy in detecting deception is of critical importance; not only to detect whether a guilty individual is being deceitful, but also whether someone is making a false confession, both to improve community safety by detaining the correct perpetrator for the crime but also to maintain public trust in the justice system. The present research provides a fresh insight into the importance of training effects in detecting deception.

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Dixon, Paul. "Political Skills or Lying and Manipulation? The Choreography of the Northern Ireland Peace Process." Political Studies 50, no. 4 (September 2002): 725–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00004.

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The ‘real war’ and ‘propaganda war’ fought over Northern Ireland for thirty years polarised party and public opinion. The key dilemma faced by politicians during the recent peace process has been how to wind down the ‘war’ and win sufficient party and public support for an accommodation between unionists and nationalists which falls so far short of previous expectations. Scripts telling contrasting stories have been prepared to convince rival republican and unionist audiences to support the peace process. In addition, the pro-Agreement parties have attempted to shift opinion towards accommodation through a range of political skills and choreography. Key competing parties and governments have sometimes co-operated back stage while front stage they have on occasion ‘play acted’ conflict between each other. The political skills, or lying and manipulation, by which the peace process has been driven forward have been uncovered creating public distrust in the political process. Realists see such political deception as an inevitable part of politics and permissible on the grounds that the ends justify the means. Absolutists attack the ‘spin, lying and manipulation’ of the peace process as an assault on democracy. A third democratic realist position argues that sometimes moral leadership requires doing wrong to do right but the gap between ‘truth’ and ‘spin’ should be narrowed. A more open and honest politics would not only be more accountable and democratic but also effective in advancing the peace process.

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Kassin, Saul M. "Confession Evidence." Criminal Justice and Behavior 35, no. 10 (October 2008): 1309–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0093854808321557.

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Confession evidence is powerful but flawed, often in nonintuitive ways. Contradicting widely held beliefs, research reviewed in this article suggests the following: Despite special training in how to conduct interviews, police cannot distinguish better than the layperson whether suspects are lying or telling the truth. Suspects in custody routinely waive their self-protective rights to silence and to counsel—especially if they are innocent. Certain legal but deceptive interrogation tactics increase the risk that innocents will confess to crimes they did not commit. Judges and juries are easily fooled, unable to distinguish between true and false confessions. Appellate courts cannot be expected to reasonably determine whether the error of admitting a coerced confession at trial was harmless or prejudicial.

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Kassin, Saul M. "False Confessions." Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1, no. 1 (October 2014): 112–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2372732214548678.

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In recent years, DNA exoneration cases have shed light on the problem of false confessions and the wrongful convictions that result. Drawing on basic psychological principles and methods, an extensive body of research has focused on the psychology of confessions. This article describes the processes of interrogation by which police assess whether a suspect is lying or telling the truth and the techniques used to elicit confessions from those deemed deceptive. The problem of false confessions emphasizes personal and situational factors that put innocent people at risk in the interrogation room. Turning from the causes of false confessions to their consequences, research shows that confession evidence can bias juries, judges, lay witnesses, and forensic examiners. Finally, empirically based proposals for the reform of policy and practice include a call for the mandatory video recording of interrogations, blind testing in forensic crime labs, and use of confession experts in court.

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Barabanschikov, V. A., A. V. Zhegallo, Y. G. Khoze, and A. V. Solomonova. "Nonverbal predictors in the estimates of truthful and deceptive statements." Experimental Psychology (Russia) 11, no. 4 (2018): 94–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.17759/exppsy.2018110408.

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A microstructural analysis of perception of a partner in communication was carried out. Mute video recordings of 15 clips of a structured conversation in which communicants expressed true and false judgments, were subjected to complex coding. In each 40 ms frame 51 nonverbal signs/102 binary markers indicating the state of the facial zones, the nature of the movements of the head, hands and body were considered. Based on expert estimates, the proportion of frames was calculated, in which each of the markers is present at selected time intervals. Looking at the video clips, 35 observers intuitively, by external features, determined the fragments when the communicator is telling truth and when lying. The frequency and time of occurrence of markers were analyzed. Frequency regression models of “true” and “false” response of communicants were built. It is shown that the required estimates are performed by the observer 1.5—2 seconds before the answer. High-frequency features form a stable core of the impression of the reliability of the communicator’s judgments, complemented with changeable low-frequency features explaining the growth of explanatory power of regression models. Markers have been identified that contribute to adequate perception of the reliability of information reported. The style of non-verbal behavior of people implementing alternative communication strategies is described.

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Wiegmann, Alex, Jana Samland, and Michael R. Waldmann. "Lying despite telling the truth." Cognition 150 (May 2016): 37–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.017.

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Lee, Chih-Chen, and Robert B. Welker. "Prior Exposure to Interviewee's Truth-Telling (Baselining) and Deception-Detection Accuracy in Interviews." Behavioral Research in Accounting 23, no. 2 (November 1, 2011): 131–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/bria-50019.

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ABSTRACT Professional accounting guidance recommends that interviewers attend to deception detection in audit interviews. Prior studies suggest that interviewers are poor detectors of a stranger's deceptions. This study assesses whether behavioral baselining (acquiring familiarity with truth-telling style prior to initiating an interview of an unfamiliar interviewee), a recommended procedure for investigative interviews, improves the ability to detect the deceptions of an unfamiliar interviewee in accounting interviews. In the present study, interviewers conducted five preliminary interviews of a truth-telling interviewee prior to the focal accounting interview. This exposure to the interviewee's truth telling increased the accuracy of detecting truths as opposed to lies, suggesting that behavioral baselining of truth telling aided the detection of primarily truth telling. These findings suggest that behavioral baselining may not facilitate the auditor's objective, that is, the detection of lies. Data Availability: Confidentiality agreements with participants, written with the assistance of human subjects committees, prevent the sharing of data with others.

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Park, Hee Sun, Hye Jeong Choi, Ju Yeon Oh, and Timothy R. Levine. "Differences and Similarities Between Koreans and Americans in Lying and Truth-Telling." Journal of Language and Social Psychology 37, no. 5 (February 22, 2018): 562–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0261927x18760081.

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Cultures may differ in descriptive and injunctive norms about lying and telling the truth and also in terms of the extent to which individuals intend to tell a lie or the truth when a friend is in trouble. Study 1 ( N = 460) showed that Koreans had stronger intentions to lie for a friend and weaker intentions to tell the truth than Americans. For lying, Americans indicated stronger perceptions of descriptive norms (e.g., many others would lie in this situation) than did Koreans. For truth-telling, Americans perceived stronger injunctive norms (i.e., people approve of truth-telling in this situation) than did Koreans. Study 2 ( N = 207) showed that compared to Koreans, Americans had more favorable impressions about a person who told the truth. Implications of this study’s findings are discussed.

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Lloyd, E. Paige, Kurt Hugenberg, Allen R. McConnell, Jonathan W. Kunstman, and Jason C. Deska. "Black and White Lies: Race-Based Biases in Deception Judgments." Psychological Science 28, no. 8 (June 16, 2017): 1125–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797617705399.

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In six studies ( N = 605), participants made deception judgments about videos of Black and White targets who told truths and lies about interpersonal relationships. In Studies 1a, 1b, 1c, and 2, White participants judged that Black targets were telling the truth more often than they judged that White targets were telling the truth. This truth bias was predicted by Whites’ motivation to respond without prejudice. For Black participants, however, motives to respond without prejudice did not moderate responses (Study 2). In Study 3, we found similar effects with a manipulation of the targets’ apparent race. Finally, in Study 4, we used eye-tracking techniques to demonstrate that Whites’ truth bias for Black targets is likely the result of late-stage correction processes: Despite ultimately judging that Black targets were telling the truth more often than White targets, Whites were faster to fixate on the on-screen “lie” response box when targets were Black than when targets were White. These systematic race-based biases have important theoretical implications (e.g., for lie detection and improving intergroup communication and relations) and practical implications (e.g., for reducing racial bias in law enforcement).

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Jacquemet, Nicolas, Alexander G. James, Stéphane Luchini, James J. Murphy, and Jason F. Shogren. "Do truth-telling oaths improve honesty in crowd-working?" PLOS ONE 16, no. 1 (January 15, 2021): e0244958. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244958.

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This study explores whether an oath to honesty can reduce both shirking and lying among crowd-sourced internet workers. Using a classic coin-flip experiment, we first confirm that a substantial majority of Mechanical Turk workers both shirk and lie when reporting the number of heads flipped. We then demonstrate that lying can be reduced by first asking each worker to swear voluntarily on his or her honor to tell the truth in subsequent economic decisions. Even in this online, purely anonymous environment, the oath significantly reduced the percent of subjects telling “big” lies (by roughly 27%), but did not affect shirking. We also explore whether a truth-telling oath can be used as a screening device if implemented after decisions have been made. Conditional on flipping response, MTurk shirkers and workers who lied were significantly less likely to agree to an ex-post honesty oath. Our results suggest oaths may help elicit more truthful behavior, even in online crowd-sourced environments.

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George, R. "Truth Telling, Deceit and Lying in Cases of Advanced Dementia." End of Life Journal 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 1–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/eoljnl-01-01.5.

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Xu, Fen, Xuehua Bao, Genyue Fu, Victoria Talwar, and Kang Lee. "Lying and Truth-Telling in Children: From Concept to Action." Child Development 81, no. 2 (March 2010): 581–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01417.x.

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Spence, Sean A. "Reading about deception." Psychiatrist 34, no. 4 (April 2010): 146–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/pb.bp.109.027565.

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SummaryDeception is commonplace and a discipline such as psychiatry, so often reliant upon subjective accounts, may be susceptible to its effects (especially in the fields of military, liaison, medico-legal and forensic practice). However, psychiatric trainees receive little formal teaching on the subject of medical deceit. Here, I review some recent books on deception, emphasising those works that cast tangential light upon everyday psychiatric practice. Useful sources of reference include those concerning the philosophy of deceit, the recent rise of political lying and the clinical problem of feigned illness. A clinically helpful distinction emerges: that between truth (accuracy) and truthfulness (sincerity).

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Sutter, Matthias. "Deception Through Telling the Truth?! Experimental Evidence from Individuals and Teams." Economic Journal 119, no. 534 (December 9, 2008): 47–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02205.x.

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Shelton, Miriam. "The dance of deception: Pretending and truth telling in women's lives." New Ideas in Psychology 13, no. 1 (March 1995): 103–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0732-118x(95)90293-e.

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Wandling, Lara J. G., George R. Wandling, Mary Faith Marshall, and Michael S. Lee. "Truth-telling and deception in the management of nonorganic vision loss." Canadian Journal of Ophthalmology 51, no. 5 (October 2016): 390–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcjo.2016.01.002.

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Byrne, Ruth M. J., Simon J. Handley, and Philip N. Johnson-Laird. "Reasoning from Suppositions." Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 48, no. 4 (November 1995): 915–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14640749508401423.

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Two experiments investigated inferences based on suppositions. In Experiment 1, the subjects decided whether suppositions about individuals’ veracity were consistent with their assertions—for example, whether the supposition “Ann is telling the truth and Beth is telling a lie”, is consistent with the premises: “Ann asserts: I am telling the truth and Beth is telling the truth. Beth asserts: Ann is telling the truth”. It showed that these inferences are more difficult than ones based on factual premises: “Ann asserts: I live in Dublin and Beth lives in Dublin”. There was no difference between problems about truthtellers and liars, who always told the truth or always lied, and normals, who sometimes told the truth and sometimes lied. In Experiment 2, the subjects made inferences about factual matters set in three contexts: a truth-inducing context in which friends confided their personality characteristics, a lie-inducing context in which business rivals advertised their products, and a neutral context in which computers printed their program characteristics. Given the supposition that the individuals were lying, it was more difficult to make inferences in a truth-inducing context than in the other two contexts. We discuss the implications of our results for everyday reasoning from suppositions, and for theories of reasoning based on models or inference rules.

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Jenkins, Sarah, and Rick Delbridge. "Exploring Organizational Deception: Organizational Contexts, Social Relations and Types of Lying." Organization Theory 1, no. 2 (April 2020): 263178772091943. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2631787720919436.

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This review paper extends our understanding of organizational deception. We focus specifically on the telling of lies – defined as a false statement with the intent to deceive – as the most common form of deception. We draw new insights from the limited number of existing studies of organizational deception in order to develop a taxonomy of lies and provide an integrative framing for the analysis of lying in organizational contexts. We engage relational sociology to develop this theoretical framing around three key dimensions: organizational context, social relations and actors’ behaviours. From a detailed examination of eleven prior studies, we interrelate these dimensions to identify distinct patterns of lying that are triggered or enabled by social relations or organizational contexts, or both. Based on this theoretical synthesis of prior work, we then demonstrate the utility of the framework in fostering comparative analysis by examining four recent studies of strategic deception in depth. We conclude the paper by discussing the implications of our framework and suggesting an agenda for further research.

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Mahon, James Edwin. "Kant on Lies, Candour and Reticence." Kantian Review 7 (March 2003): 102–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400001758.

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Like several prominent moral philosophers before him, such as St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas, Kant held that it is never morally permissible to tell a lie. Although a great deal has been written on why and how he argued for this conclusion, comparatively little has been written on what, precisely, Kant considered a lie to be, and on how he differentiated between being truthful and being candid, between telling a lie and being reticent, and between telling a lie and other forms of linguistic deception. That is to say, very little has been written on the scope of Kant's prohibition against lying. In this article I will argue that the scope of the prohibition against lying is narrower than it is commonly supposed to be.

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Bussey, Kay, and Elizabeth J. Grimbeek. "Children's conceptions of lying and truth-telling: Implications for child witnesses." Legal and Criminological Psychology 5, no. 2 (September 2000): 187–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/135532500168083.

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George, R. "Exploring in More Depth Issues of Truth Telling, Deceit and Lying." End of Life Journal 1, no. 2 (January 1, 2011): 1–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/eoljnl-01-02.5.

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Xu, Fen, Yang C. Luo, Genyue Fu, and Kang Lee. "Children's and adults' conceptualization and evaluation of lying and truth-telling." Infant and Child Development 18, no. 4 (July 2009): 307–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/icd.631.

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La Caze, Marguerite. "It’s Easier to Lie if You Believe it Yourself: Derrida, Arendt, and the Modern Lie." Law, Culture and the Humanities 13, no. 2 (August 1, 2016): 193–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1743872113485032.

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In ‘‘History of the Lie: Prolegomena’’ (2002) Jacques Derrida examines Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the modern lie in politics in her essays ‘‘Lying in Politics’’ (1972) and ‘‘Truth and Politics’’ (1968/1993). Arendt contrasts the traditional lie, where lies were told and secrets kept for the greater good or to defeat the enemy, with the modern lie, which comprises deception and self-deception on a massive scale. This article investigates the seriousness of different kinds of lies in political life in the light of Arendt and Derrida’s reflections on lying and contemporary lies in politics and shows where concern should focus.

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Yeoh, Gilbert. "J. M. Coetzee and Samuel Beckett: Ethics, Truth-Telling, and Self-Deception." Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction 44, no. 4 (January 2003): 331–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00111610309598888.

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Peeters, Bert. "(White) lies and (pieux) mensonges: ethnolinguistic elaborations on not telling the truth." Etnolingwistyka. Problemy Języka i Kultury 30 (August 17, 2018): 169. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/et.2018.0.169.

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Fakt, iż w większości języków europejskich istnieją słowa podobne do angielskiego lie ‘kłamać’ sugeruje, że jest to uniwersalna kategoria poznawcza. Może się zatem wydawać, że wszyscy ludzie intuicyjnie rozumieją, czym jest lying ‘kłamstwo’ i że wszelkie formy dyskursu, w których ma miejsce mijanie się z prawdą, bez względu na ich pochodzenie, można uznać za formę lying. To jednak mit – różnice istnieją nawet w Europie, a w miarę, jak się od niej oddalamy, stają się coraz wyraźniejsze. Na przykład w opartym na angielszczyźnie melanezyjskim kreolskim języku bislama nie występuje ścisły odpowiednik angielskiego lie – najbliższym słowem jest czasownik giaman, który w przeciwieństwie do lie oznacza dosyć powszechnie akceptowany, czasami wręcz konieczny sposób postępowania. Z drugiej strony, przynajmniej z anglocentrycznego punktu widzenia, chociaż lying najczęściej odbierane jest jako moralnie naganne, istnieją przypadki, gdzie nie jest to oczywiste. Niektóre kłamstwa uznaje się za nie tak złe, jak inne – określa się je jako white lies ‘białe kłamstwa’ (istnieją także inne sformułowania, jednak to jest najczęstsze i najbardziej wyraziste kulturowo). Czy pojęcie to występuje w innych językach, np. we francuskim? W języku tym istnieje wyrażenie pieux mensonge, dosł. ‘pobożne kłamstwo’. W artykule staram się wykazać, iż semantyka wyrażeń white lies i pieux mensonges częściowo się pokrywa, lecz także, że mają one inne konotacje, które opisuję za pomocą Naturalnego Metajęzyka Semantycznego.

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Peeters, Bert. "(White) lies and (pieux) mensonges: ethnolinguistic elaborations on not telling the truth." Etnolingwistyka. Problemy Języka i Kultury 30 (August 17, 2018): 169. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/et.2018.30.169.

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Fakt, iż w większości języków europejskich istnieją słowa podobne do angielskiego lie ‘kłamać’ sugeruje, że jest to uniwersalna kategoria poznawcza. Może się zatem wydawać, że wszyscy ludzie intuicyjnie rozumieją, czym jest lying ‘kłamstwo’ i że wszelkie formy dyskursu, w których ma miejsce mijanie się z prawdą, bez względu na ich pochodzenie, można uznać za formę lying. To jednak mit – różnice istnieją nawet w Europie, a w miarę, jak się od niej oddalamy, stają się coraz wyraźniejsze. Na przykład w opartym na angielszczyźnie melanezyjskim kreolskim języku bislama nie występuje ścisły odpowiednik angielskiego lie – najbliższym słowem jest czasownik giaman, który w przeciwieństwie do lie oznacza dosyć powszechnie akceptowany, czasami wręcz konieczny sposób postępowania. Z drugiej strony, przynajmniej z anglocentrycznego punktu widzenia, chociaż lying najczęściej odbierane jest jako moralnie naganne, istnieją przypadki, gdzie nie jest to oczywiste. Niektóre kłamstwa uznaje się za nie tak złe, jak inne – określa się je jako white lies ‘białe kłamstwa’ (istnieją także inne sformułowania, jednak to jest najczęstsze i najbardziej wyraziste kulturowo). Czy pojęcie to występuje w innych językach, np. we francuskim? W języku tym istnieje wyrażenie pieux mensonge, dosł. ‘pobożne kłamstwo’. W artykule staram się wykazać, iż semantyka wyrażeń white lies i pieux mensonges częściowo się pokrywa, lecz także, że mają one inne konotacje, które opisuję za pomocą Naturalnego Metajęzyka Semantycznego.

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Tuckett, Anthony. "Nursing Practice: compassionate deception and the Good Samaritan." Nursing Ethics 6, no. 5 (September 1999): 383–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/096973309900600504.

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This article reviews the literature on deception to illuminate the phenomenon as a background for an appraisal within nursing. It then describes nursing as a practice of caring. The character of the Good Samaritan is recommended as indicative of the virtue of compassion that ought to underpin caring in nursing practice. Finally, the article concludes that a caring nurse, responding virtuously, acts by being compassionate, for a time recognizing the prima facie nature of the rules or principles of truth telling.

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Tuckett, A. "Bending the truth: professionals narratives about lying and deception in nursing practice." International Journal of Nursing Studies 35, no. 5 (October 1998): 292–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0020-7489(98)00043-1.

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Lee, Seow Ting. "Lying to Tell the Truth: Journalists and the Social Context of Deception." Mass Communication and Society 7, no. 1 (March 2004): 97–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327825mcs0701_7.

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Choi, Hye Jeong, Hee Sun Park, and Ju Yeon Oh. "Cultural differences in how individuals explain their lying and truth-telling tendencies." International Journal of Intercultural Relations 35, no. 6 (November 2011): 749–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2011.08.001.

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Wertz, S. K. "Little White Lies." International Journal of Applied Philosophy 32, no. 1 (2018): 49–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ijap201871999.

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Samuel Johnson has an interesting comment on consequences and the telling of “white lies.” For example “Sick People and Children are often to be deceived for their Good.” David Hume apparently endorses this concept in one of his letters. Both Johnson and Rousseau anticipate Kant’s argument about consequences in that one is to tell the truth under all circumstances. Hume, I argue, would take issue with this claim in that there are cases (like the two above) that warrant telling white lies. Elsewhere (second Enquiry) he speaks about “harmless liars” who indulge in “lying or fiction . . . in humorous stories.” And he says “Noble pride and spirit may openly display itself when one lies under calamity [defamation or slander] or opposition of any kind,” especially if the opposition puts one’s life in grave danger, so one’s self-preservation is threatened. Under situations like these, lying is justified. In regard to fiction, if lying is for the purpose of entertainment and where “truth is not of any importance,” it is permissible. These cases are discussed in some detail, and they offer, along with their analysis, a pragmatic defense of Hume’s position.

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Scheuble, V., and A. Beauducel. "Cognitive processes during deception about attitudes revisited: a replication study." Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 15, no. 8 (August 2020): 839–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsaa107.

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Abstract Event-related potential (ERP) studies about deception often apply recognition tasks. It remains questionable whether reported ERP patterns and cognitive processes can be generalized to other contexts. As the study by Johnson et al. (2008) fills this gap by investigating deception regarding attitudes, we tried to replicate it. Participants (N = 99) were instructed to lie or tell the truth about their attitudes. We obtained the same results as Johnson et al. (2008): lies were accompanied by enhanced medial frontal negativities (MFN) and suppressed late positive components (LPCs) indicating that lying relied on stronger cognitive control processes and response conflicts than being honest. The amplitudes of pre-response positivities (PRP) were reduced for lies implying that lies about attitudes were accompanied by strategic monitoring. MFN amplitudes increased and LPC amplitudes decreased for lies about positively valued items revealing that lying about positively valued items is cognitively more challenging than lying about negatively valued items. As a new finding, MFN, LPC and PRP components were neither moderated by Machiavellianism nor by changes in the attitude ratings. The results indicate that LPC, MFN and PRP components are reliable indicators of the cognitive processes used during deception and that it is worthwhile to investigate them in further deception contexts.

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Lee, Chih-Chen, and Robert B. Welker. "Do Interviewers Actually Know More about Falseness in an Inquiry Than They Communicate in a Direct Lying Assessment?1." Journal of Forensic Accounting Research 4, no. 1 (December 1, 2019): 3–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jfar-52473.

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ABSTRACT Research suggests that interviewers' judgments about an interviewee's truthfulness are too unreliable to be useful for important decisions such as fraud risk assessment. The present study examines whether interviewers can distinguish falsifiers from truth-tellers. In an experiment, accounting students (n = 66) interviewed either a falsifying or truth-telling interviewee. Those who interviewed a falsifier perceived the interviewee as thinking harder and less forthcoming, and the interviewer expressed a stronger belief that the interviewee had lied (Lying). A logistic regression function accurately detected more falsifiers with the interviewee's perceptions of thinking hard and forthcomingness as predictors than with Direct Lying assessments. These findings suggest that interviewers know more about an interviewee's lying than they convey in a direct lying assessment. Hence, interviewers may have insight about an interviewee's appearance that can improve evaluations of audit and fraud risk. Data Availability: Confidentiality agreements with participants, written with the assistance of the Institutional Review Board at the first author's university, prevent the sharing of data with others.

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Carson, Thomas L. "Frankfurt and Cohen on bullshit, bullshiting, deception, lying, and concern with the truth of what one says." New Theoretical Insights into Untruthfulness 23, no. 1 (September 26, 2016): 53–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.23.1.03car.

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This paper addresses the following three claims that Frankfurt makes about the concept of bullshit: 1. Bullshit requires the intention to deceive others. 2. Bullshit does not constitute lying (bullshit is “short of lying”). 3. The essence of bullshit is lack of concern with the truth of what one says. I offer counterexamples to all three claims. By way of defending my counterexamples, I examine Cohen’s distinction between bullshiting and bullshit and argue that my examples are indeed cases of bullshiting that Frankfurt’s analysis is intended to cover. My examples of bullshitters who are very concerned to say only things that are true show that Frankfurt is mistaken in claiming that the “essence” of bullshit is lack of concern with the truth of what one says.

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Parliament, Lisa, and A. Daniel Yarmey. "Deception in Eyewitness Identification." Criminal Justice and Behavior 29, no. 6 (December 2002): 734–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009385402237925.

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One-hundred twenty-eight undergraduates were shown a videotape of a staged crime of a young man abducting a child. Participants were instructed to role-play eyewitness behaviors in which they (a) lied to protect the perpetrator; (b) lied to protect the perpetrator but told the truth about the child; (c) lied to ensure the conviction of the perpetrator; or (d) responded truthfully and accurately to the best of their ability. One week later, participants were given a target-present or target-absent photo lineup of both the perpetrator and the child-victim. Participants instructed to lie to protect the perpetrator consistently stated he was not present as opposed to selecting an innocent person. In addition, participants lying to protect the perpetrator were significantly quicker to make identification decisions than participants attempting to make an accurate identification. There were no significant differences between groups in identification performance or in decision times involving the child lineup.

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Wu, Dingcheng, Ivy Chiu Loke, Fen Xu, and Kang Lee. "Neural correlates of evaluations of lying and truth-telling in different social contexts." Brain Research 1389 (May 2011): 115–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2011.02.084.

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Birmingham, Peg. "Elated Citizenry: Deception and the Democratic Task of Bearing Witness." Research in Phenomenology 38, no. 2 (2008): 198–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156916408x286969.

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AbstractIt has become nearly a truism for contemporary theorists of democracy to understand the democratic space as agonistic and contested. The shadow that haunts thinkers of democracy today, and out of which this assumption emerges, is the specter of totalitarianism with its claims to a totalizing knowledge in the form of ideology and a totalizing power of a sovereign will that claims to be the embodiment of the law. Caught up in these totalizing claims, the citizenry becomes elated. The only remedy to totalitarianism is a democratic space wherein no one can claim to know the truth, no one can claim to occupy the space of power, and no one can claim to embody the law. The problem with this remedy is that it fails entirely to take account of what Arendt understands to be the fundamental condition of totalitarianism, namely, the institution of a "lying world order" whereby reality is replaced with a lie. For Arendt therefore the remedy for totalitarianism and its elated citizenry depends first and foremost upon the existence of factual truth. Following Arendt as well as Shoshana Felman's work on testimony, I argue that bearing witness to factual reality is the ground of the democratic public space and the remedy to an elated citizenry caught up in a lying world order.

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Janezic, Katharina A., and Aina Gallego. "Eliciting preferences for truth-telling in a survey of politicians." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 36 (August 24, 2020): 22002–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2008144117.

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Honesty is one of the most valued traits in politicians. Yet, because lies often remain undiscovered, it is difficult to study if some politicians are more honest than others. This paper examines which individual characteristics are correlated with truth-telling in a controlled setting in a large sample of politicians. We designed and embedded a game that incentivizes lying with a nonmonetary method in a survey answered by 816 Spanish mayors. Mayors were first asked how interested they were in obtaining a detailed report about the survey results, and at the end of the survey, they had to flip a coin to find out whether they would be sent the report. Because the probability of heads is known, we can estimate the proportion of mayors who lied to obtain the report. We find that a large and statistically significant proportion of mayors lied. Mayors that are members of the two major political parties lied significantly more. We further find that women and men were equally likely to lie. Finally, we find a negative relationship between truth-telling and reelection in the next municipal elections, which suggests that dishonesty might help politicians survive in office.

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Sarkadi, Ştefan, Alex Rutherford, Peter McBurney, Simon Parsons, and Iyad Rahwan. "The evolution of deception." Royal Society Open Science 8, no. 9 (September 2021): 201032. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.201032.

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Deception plays a critical role in the dissemination of information, and has important consequences on the functioning of cultural, market-based and democratic institutions. Deception has been widely studied within the fields of philosophy, psychology, economics and political science. Yet, we still lack an understanding of how deception emerges in a society under competitive (evolutionary) pressures. This paper begins to fill this gap by bridging evolutionary models of social good— public goods games (PGGs)—with ideas from interpersonal deception theory (Buller and Burgoon 1996 Commun. Theory 6 , 203–242. ( doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.1996.tb00127.x )) and truth-default theory (Levine 2014 J. Lang. Soc. Psychol. 33 , 378–392. ( doi:10.1177/0261927X14535916 ); Levine 2019 Duped: truth-default theory and the social science of lying and deception . University of Alabama Press). This provides a well-founded analysis of the growth of deception in societies and the effectiveness of several approaches to reducing deception. Assuming that knowledge is a public good, we use extensive simulation studies to explore (i) how deception impacts the sharing and dissemination of knowledge in societies over time, (ii) how different types of knowledge sharing societies are affected by deception and (iii) what type of policing and regulation is needed to reduce the negative effects of deception in knowledge sharing. Our results indicate that cooperation in knowledge sharing can be re-established in systems by introducing institutions that investigate and regulate both defection and deception using a decentralized case-by-case strategy. This provides evidence for the adoption of methods for reducing the use of deception in the world around us in order to avoid a Tragedy of the Digital Commons (Greco and Floridi 2004 Ethics Inf. Technol. 6 , 73–81. ( doi:10.1007/s10676-004-2895-2 )).

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Journal articles on the topic 'Lying; Truth telling; Deception'

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