Journal articles on the topic 'Local Official Turnover'

Under the background of government-oriented environmental governance in China, the environmental effect of local official turnover has become an important issue. How to improve governmental governance is an important issue that profoundly affects local environmental governance. Based on a literature analysis, this paper establishes an environmental-effect identification equation to deeply analyze the environmental effect of local official turnover on private enterprises. Then, this paper empirically analyzes the effect of local personnel turnover on the environmental pollution control of private enterprises and the persistence of this effect. The results show that the turnover of local officials has a positive effect on the pollution control investment of private enterprises, but the effect is not persistent. The interest collusion between local officials and private enterprises tends to be one main reason to explain the environmental effect, and two different types of interest collusions are determined: priority to self-interest and economic development. The reasons why the positive effect cannot last for long may be attributed to a lack of systematic and effective institutions or temporary administrative measures. It is important to make local officials fully realize the “green wealth” value of the ecosystems, to change their economic priorities. Finally, this paper proposes countermeasures for local governments on personnel affairs to promote environmental governance.

Environmental governance is one of the priority tasks that is faced by China in its drive for sustainable social development. Environmental protection necessitates an equal focus on pollution-source control and pollution governance, and it shall be safeguarded with sound local economic-development models and long-term environmental-protection mechanisms. In this study, we investigated the government-official-appointment system and the effects of the personal characteristics of government officials and economic variables on the local water-environment pollution, measured by industrial wastewater discharge, using a dataset of Communist Party of China (CPC) municipal committee secretaries and municipal governors covering the period 2003–2012. We found that some temporal and spatial factors of China’s personnel-management system for government officials are correlated to the environment. More specifically, the turnover and interjurisdictional transfer of municipal governors contribute to long-term environmental protection, longer tenures facilitate better environmental protection, municipal governors who serve in their native provinces but not in their native municipalities facilitate better local environment protection, and officials may take different approaches towards environmental maintenance and governance.

The assessment of current transparency introduction practice by Federal Service for Surveillance in Healthcare and its local authorities within implemented in Russia concept of federal executive authority’s transparency. Information data from official site of Federal Service for Surveillance in Healthcare and local authorities was studied. The correspondence between the outcomes of supervisory measures to protect the rights of legal entities and the principles of individual entrepreneurs under state supervision is analyzed. The information openness monitoring of Federal Service for Surveillance in Healthcare and its80 local authorities was performed. It is shown that the existing mechanisms (tools) of openness are not fully consistent with accepted in Russian principles, aims and objectives of transparency. The completeness, clarity and availability of information by Federal Service for Surveillance in Healthcare and its local authorities about control and supervisory activities that are to be disclosed are not ensured. It is concluded that there are shortcomings in the procedure of forming the state information resource containing information about the results of verification activities conducted by Federal Service for Surveillance in Healthcare and local authorities. It is still necessary to detail the mechanisms in the field of ensuring openness and transparency of the information provided in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Federal Service for Surveillance in Healthcare and its local bodies.

This study will contribute towards the evaluation of the effects of the investment project "Supporting production businesses", in Shtime, as part of the local economic development strategy. For the study were used primary data (Interview) and secondary data (official document and relevant reports) based on identified indicators, as: 1)Type of support (value of money, number of donation, surface offered on m2, location, number of training offered); 2) number of businesses, number new job created, number of taxpayers, number of new investment and 3) number of new products, new market, new technology, increase in turnover / profit, or changes in business organization. As a result of the support provided, these enterprises continue to develop their business successfully. The project has had a positive impact on local economic development in the municipality of Shtime, contributing to employment growth, increasing the number of taxpayers as well as improving the business structure in favour of processing enterprises. Furthermore, as a result of this project, these enterprises have recorded an increase in turnover and profit, as well as expanding their market with new products. This research shows the impact of the public investment in local economic development in particular with the small production companies.

The article is devoted to the study of the directions of use of regional property in the Udmurt Republic. Optimization of the composition of the republican property complex and bringing it into line with the powers of the Udmurt Republic is one of the priority tasks of regional government bodies. The author identifies priority decisions on property management in the region in accordance with the State Program of the Udmurt Republic "State Property Management". The article presents data on the number of objects of the Udmurt Republic, in respect of which decisions on the creation, reorganization, liquidation were made, and a conclusion on the reduction of the number of such objects is formulated. Based on official data, the dynamics of changes in the number of business entities whose shares are owned by the Udmurt Republic is shown. Based on the comparison of the corresponding indicators, it was found that the number of business entities whose shares are owned by the Udmurt Republic significantly decreased during the period under review. During the analysis, the author revealed a persistent tendency to reduce the number of transferred objects between different levels of management. Using the data of the "Road Map", the article formulates problems in the implementation of the powers to involve real estate objects, including land plots, in economic turnover by the executive bodies of state power of the Udmurt Republic and local self-government bodies of the Udmurt Republic, defines measures for the rational use of real estate objects and land plots that are the property of the Udmurt Republic.

Abstract This study explores how local political turnover affects corporate R&D investment and innovation performance in an emerging economy like China. Based on the panel data of 956 listed firms in China, we found that local officials’ turnover has a direct negative effect on both R&D investment leap and corporate innovation performance. Furthermore, local officials’ turnover inhibits innovation performance provided the new officials are transferred from other places but improves innovation performance provided the old officials are dismissed for corruption or other violations. Finally, R&D investment leap positively moderate the relationship between local officials’ turnover and corporate innovation performance. These findings contribute to the literature on how political uncertainty at the regional level affects R&D and innovation activities at the firm level and provide significant guidance for both the government and manufacturers in China.

Objectives: When epidemiologic data on cardiovascular disease (CVD) mortality rates in different Swedish regions were published in the early 1980s, there was great concern about the high CVD incidence in the northernmost counties of Sweden, namely Västerbotten and Norrbotten. This paper describe the development of a Northern Sweden community intervention programme for the prevention of CVD. Methods: As there were no Swedish prototypes, the programme was designed by drawing on experiences from other community interventions. One unique emphasis of the Norsjö intervention programme was to combine a population strategy with efforts to contact each person individually when they became 30, 40, 50, and 60 years of age (the primary care approach). Using the primary care system as part of the community intervention, systematic risk factor screening and counselling by family medicine providers were carried out at the same time as the community intervention programme invoked other efforts to raise public awareness. Results: During the first 10 years of the programme >90% of those invited participated in the individual health screening and counselling. A new food labelling system was introduced in the grocery stores, which after a few years became the official Swedish food labelling system. Sales statistics regarding dairy products showed a significant turnover of low fat products. According to public opinion, the health screening and counselling were reported to be the most infl uential factors supporting lifestyle changes. Conclusions: It was possible in Norsjö to create a local health promotion collaboration between healthcare providers, grocery stores, schools, municipal authorities, and the public in order to develop a Swedish model for community intervention. The different programme components were well received by the public.

This study examines theoretical and applied problems of the influence of monetary policy on the modern mechanisms of tax regulation. The goal of the study is to determine the connection between the instruments, channels, mechanisms and regimes of the monetary policy of the National Bank of Ukraine and the instruments and mechanisms of the tax regulation, their monetary transmission influence on the budget architectonics. Methods of the study. In order to achieve the goals specified in the academic article a systemic approach has been used to determine the connection between the instruments, channels, mechanisms and regimes of the monetary policy of the National Bank of Ukraine and the instruments and mechanisms of the tax regulation, their monetary transmission influence on the profitable part of the state and local budgets of the country. Study results: the study has shown the influence of instruments of the monetary policy of the National Bank of Ukraine (official exchange rate, bank rate), emission channel of the national currency of Ukraine, organization mechanism of cash and noncash money turnover and the regime of inflation targeting on the tax regulation mechanisms (planning, forecasting, accounting, control, administration) and their elements (taxpayers, taxation basis, tax rates, process of tax calculation, tax payment procedure) which on the whole determine their influence on the budget architectonics (correlation of the profitable part of the state and local budgets) over a short period of time through the mechanism of impulse transmission. Application area of results: organizing and conducting scientific research and ensuring the coordination in the sphere of tax, budget and monetary policy. Conclusion. The results of the study show that the monetary policy of the National Bank of Ukraine, by implementing monetary transmission mechanism as a process of transmitting changes in the use of its instruments, has a significant influence on certain mechanisms and elements of the tax regulation at the first stage of its implementation, and at the second stage the changes in the tax regulation are introduced into the budget regulation and influence the budget architectonics. The whole correlation between the profitable part of the state and the local budgets is the result of influence of the totality of instruments, channels, mechanisms and regimes of the monetary policy of the National Bank of Ukraine on the instruments and mechanisms of the tax regulation at the first stage of implementation of the monetary transmission mechanism.

Public health officials played a critical role in COVID-19 mitigation and response efforts. In Kansas, 51 local health department (LHD) administrators and/or local health officers left their positions due to the pandemic between 15 March 2020 and 31 August 2021. The purpose of this study was to identify factors that led to turnover of Kansas local public health officials during the COVID-19 pandemic. Those eligible to participate in this study included former LHD administrators and/or health officers who were employed at or contracted by a Kansas LHD on 15 March 2020 and resigned, retired, or were asked to resign prior to 31 August 2021. Researchers used a demographic survey, a focus group, and key informant interviews to collect data. Twelve former LHD leaders participated in this study. Four themes emerged from phenomenological analysis: politicization of public health; a perceived lack of support; stress and burnout; and the public health infrastructure not working. The findings of this study can guide the Kansas public health system to address the issues leading to turnover of leadership and prevent future turnover. Future research must explore strategies for mitigating leadership turnover and identify alternative public health structures that could be more effective.

This paper shows that the body of appointed officials that a new democracy inherits from the previous regime is a key determinant of the extent of electoral fraud and clientelistic spending in new democracies. I develop a model that predicts that appointed officials have stronger incentives to influence voters during national level elections because of their career concerns. I test the implications of the model using data from Indonesia's transition to democracy. Both the pattern of alignment of electoral results between village and district levels and the pattern of subsequent turnover of appointed village heads corroborate the predictions of the model. ( JEL D72, H77, H83, O17, O18)

AbstractChina's national leaders see restructuring and diversification away from resource-based, energy intensive industries as central goals in the coming years. On the basis of extensive fieldwork in China between 2010 and 2012, we suggest that the high turnover of leading cadres at the local level may hinder state-led greening growth initiatives. Frequent cadre turnover is intended primarily to keep local Party secretaries and mayors on the move in order to promote the implementation of central directives. While rotation does seem to aid implementation by reducing coordination problems, there are also significant downsides to local leaders changing office every three to four years. Officials with short time horizons are likely to choose the path of least resistance in selecting quick, low-quality approaches to the implementation of environmental policies. We conclude that the perverse effects of local officials’ short time horizons give reason to doubt the more optimistic claims about the advantages of China's model of environmental authoritarianism.

Abstract Tropical deforestation accounts for almost one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions and threatens the world’s most diverse ecosystems. Much of this deforestation is driven by illegal logging. We use novel satellite data that tracks annual deforestation across eight years of Indonesian institutional change to examine how local officials’ incentives affect deforestation. Increases in the number of political jurisdictions lead to increased deforestation and lower timber prices, consistent with Cournot competition between jurisdictions. Illegal logging and local oil and gas rents are short-run substitutes, but this effect disappears over time with political turnover. The results illustrate how local officials’ incentives affect deforestation and show how standard economic theories can explain illegal behavior.

Using data of Chinese listed companies and local officials’ turnover, this paper examines the impact of political uncertainty on corporate investment in China. Results show that during the change of officials, companies will significantly reduce investment, despite the different measures of political uncertainty. This situation is more obvious for external appointment, state-owned enterprises and capitalintensive firms. Moreover, this paper creatively finds that this influence of provincial political uncertainty is more pronounced than that of municipal political uncertainty. Besides, the volatility of corporate investment increase with political uncertainty.

ABSTRACT In China's political selection system, officials capable of growing local economies are rewarded with promotions. Eager to demonstrate economic achievements, newly appointed local leaders may raise tax revenues to expand fiscal expenditures on infrastructure projects. Against this backdrop, we study how political appointments influence local firms' tax planning. Based on a sample of locally administered state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we find that firms decrease their tax avoidance after new leaders take office. The political-turnover effect on these firms' tax positions is more evident when the incoming leaders have more political clout over SOE managers, the incentives to divert resources are stronger, or politician-manager networks are present, and subsides following the launch of the anticorruption campaign. Furthermore, firms with higher post-turnover tax payments subsequently receive more government contracts or subsidies. Overall, our findings suggest political incentives shape the tax-planning activities of SOE managers in a “two-way favor exchange” manner. JEL Classifications: H26; E32; P26; G30.

Promotion is argued to be the primary working incentive for Chinese officials. Different from previous studies that focus on the provincial governors and party secretaries, this paper makes the first attempt to examine whether the career turnover of China's provincial environmental agency heads (PEAHs) is affected by the environmental performance within their jurisdictions. The results show that the performance in reducing nationally targeted pollutants—i.e., sulfur dioxide (SO2) and chemical oxygen demand (COD)—is not necessarily correlated with political turnover, which only depends on political factors such as the age when assuming office, tenure of the office, and if they are local people. Therefore, a lack of promotion incentive is found among China's PEAHs in local environmental management. Their working incentive is straightforward top-down control, making them merely the implementers of economy-dominated local public policy. A more robust and transparent performance management system, to connect the provincial environmental performance with the PEAH's political career, is supposed to be beneficial for China's environmental management.

The use of post-disaster mitigation strategies such as buyouts and home elevations as climate change adaptation and risk reduction strategies has become increasingly common. Little research to-date, however, has examined the experience of local administrators of these programs, despite the critical role they play as on-the-ground implementers. We interviewed 18 county and town officials from North Carolina who administered the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) following Hurricane Matthew in 2016. Our goal was to better understand the difficulties local administrators face in program implementation and the complexities of their relationship with other program stakeholders. We identified several recurring challenges facing these officials, including limited capacity; staff turnover, program delays; and a lack of flexibility, clarity, and communication. These issues make implementation challenging for administrators and strain their relationships with program participants and higher levels of government, in turn reducing program success and credibility. These results provide valuable insight into the perspective and experience of local administrators as HMGP implementers.

AbstrakKelompok usaha POC Rajawali Desa Wunduwatu merupak kelompok usaha yang mengolah urin manusia dari warga sekitar sejak tahun 2017. Pengumpulan urin dilakukan dengan cara mengharapkan warga sekitar datang menukarkan urinnya dilokasi usaha ini. Kelompok Rajawali masih menggunakan cara-cara yang konvensional sederhana sehingga tahapan proses produksi belum optimal, demikian pula metode pemasaran masih dari mulut ke mulut warga. Tujuan pendampingan ini guna meningkatkan produktifitas POC dan meningkatkan keuntungan usaha melalui strategi pemasaran yang efektif. Metode pendampingan dilaksanakan melalui pelatihan selama 2 (dua) hari) pada aspek peningkatan produksi dengan metode pembuatan mikroba khusus campuran urin manusia, melalui dan pembuatan 200 buah wadah penyimpanan urin kapasitas 1 liter dan mengurangi waktu penghancuran sabuk kelapa (80%). Pada kegiatan pelatihan teknologi produksi yakni mengurangi waktu produksi melalui penghancuran sabuk kelapa menggunakan mesin parut sabut kelapa. Selanjutnya dilakukan pendampingan modal produksi yakni inisiasi kerjasama donatur keuangan pengembangan modal kerjasama dengan Bank Bahteramas Provinsi Sulawesi Tenggara Cabang Unaaha. Sedangkan pada aspek pemasaran dilakukan pelatihan pendampingan promosi produk, menjajakan langsung produk didistributor/Toko pertanian, pasar tradisional walaupun penjualan dilakukan tidak resmi oleh karena produk ini belum mengantongi ijin edar. Hasil kegiatan pendampingan menunjukkan peningkatan produksi stok urin naik 200 liter/hari) atau naik 40%, kemudian peningkatan produksi POC 600 liter/6 hari atau naik 25% serta hasil kegiatan pendampingan pemasaran keuntungan usaha awalnya omset ini 4-5 juta/bulan setelah kegiatan pendampingan omset meningkat 9 juta/bulan. Hasil kegiatan pendampingan ini mampu pula mengurangi jumlah pengangguran disekitar lokasi mampu menyerap pekerja baru khususnya dari kalangan ibu rumah tangga.. Kata Kunci : Pendampingan, Pelatihan Produksi, Pemasaran, POC. AbstractThe POC Rajawali business group in Wunduwatu Village is a business group that has been processing human urine from local residents since 2017. Urine collection is done by expecting local residents to exchange their urine at this business location. The Rajawali group still uses conventional methods so that the stages of the production process are not optimal, as well as marketing methods are still word of mouth. The purpose of this assistance is to increase POC productivity and increase profits through effective marketing strategies. The mentoring method is carried out through training for 2 (two) days on the aspect of increasing production with the method of making special microbes mixed with human urine, through and making 200 urine storage units with a capacity of 1 liter and reducing coconut belt time (80%). In production technology activities, namely reducing production time through a coconut belt using a coconut grater machine. Furthermore, production capital assistance was carried out, namely the initiation of cooperation with donors for the development of cooperative capital with Bank Bahteramas, Southeast Sulawesi Province, Unaaha Branch. Meanwhile, in the marketing aspect, training on product promotion assistance is carried out, direct selling of products to agricultural distributors/shops, traditional markets even though sales are not official because this product has not yet obtained a distribution permit. The results of the activity show an increase in urine stock production (200 liters/day) or up 40%, then an increase in POC production of 600 liters/6 days or an increase of 25% and the results of this initial marketing assistance activity turn out 4-5 million/month after the mentoring activity increased turnover. 9 million/month. The results of this mentoring activity were able to reduce the number of movements around the location and were able to absorb new workers, especially from housewives.Keywords: Assistance, Production Training, Marketing, POC.

Purpose Due to environmental externalities, micro-enterprises with profit-seeking features do not develop sufficient motivation for environmental governance. In a fiscally decentralized system, local environmental protection authorities perform environmental supervision, and the intensity of the regulations that they implement has an important influence on corporate environmental governance. Based on the promotion tournament framework, this paper aims to discuss the driving mechanism of corporate environmental governance using turnover of environmental protection department directors (EPDDs) as an indicator. Design/methodology/approach Using samples of A-share companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges from 2007 to 2014, this paper examines the impact of EPDD turnover on corporate environmental governance and its underlying mechanism. Findings The results show that corporate environmental governance exhibits a political periodicity that changes with the turnover of the EPDD, and the periodicity remains after controlling for the influence of changes in provincial party secretary and governor. Internal mechanisms analysis indicates that, without financial independence, local environmental protection departments rely on increasing sewage charges, not environmental protection subsidies, to promote corporate environmental governance. Further, considering heterogeneity among officials, it finds that the younger a new EPDD is, the more pronounced the periodicity of corporate environmental governance. However, there is no significant difference between in-system and out-system turnover. Originality/value In general, this paper describes the mechanisms of corporate environmental governance from the perspective of political economics, and the results have implications for the potential improvement of the government’s environmental supervision functions and the development of ecological civilization in China.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between voluntary and involuntary turnover and officers’ salaries. Design/methodology/approach Using data from the 2013 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey, Poisson regression was used to test hypotheses about the effect of pay and other economic incentives on turnover, while controlling for previously identified influential organizational and community factors, such as crime, community disorganization, geographic region, policing philosophy, collective bargaining, the utilization of body-worn cameras, and workforce diversity. Findings Higher salaries were significantly associated with lower voluntary and involuntary turnover rates. In addition, other economic incentives and participation in a defined benefits retirement plan were related to voluntary separations but not dismissals. Consistent with prior research, southern agencies and sheriff’s departments reported higher turnover rates than local police agencies and departments operating in other areas of the USA. The effects of workforce diversity were mixed, while collective bargaining was associated with lower rates of voluntary turnover, and the utilization of body-worn cameras was associated with higher rates. Originality/value In addition to contributing to the theoretical literature on antecedents of turnover, this research has practical implications by helping law enforcement officials estimate how changes in the compensation structure affect their ability to retain qualified personnel. Due to the complexities of modern law enforcement, maintaining a strong and stable workforce is becoming a greater challenge, and more research is needed to understand which incentives are crucial in recruiting and retaining the most effective policing personnel.

This article uses archival evidence to reexamine the relationship between Stalin and the secretaries of local party organizations during the nep. The orthodox view holds that after April 1922 Stalin installed individuals personally loyal to him as secretaries throughout the party’s network of territorial committees. Stalin used these supporters to manipulate the selection of delegates to the Twelfth Party Congress, which allowed him to fabricate majorities in the Central Committee and Politburo. Using operational records generated in the Central Committee Secretariat to examine patterns of secretarial office holding, this article shows that no fewer than 490 officials served as party secretaries during Stalin’s first five years as General Secretary and that rates of turnover among local party secretaries remained persistently high. These findings suggest that Stalin did not construct a stable network of clients among the secretaries of local party organizations prior to the Fifteenth Party Congress.

Audits are a standard mechanism for reducing corruption in government investments. The quality of audits themselves, however, may be affected by relationships between auditor and target. We study whether provincial chief auditors in China show greater leniency in evaluating prefecture governments in their hometowns. In city-fixed-effect specifications—in which the role of shared background is identified from auditor turnover—we show that hometown auditors find 38 percent less in questionable monies. This hometown effect is similar throughout the auditor’s tenure and is diminished for audits ordered by the provincial Organization Department as a result of the departure of top city officials. We argue that our findings are most readily explained by leniency toward local officials rather than an endogenous response to concerns of better enforcement by hometown auditors. We complement these city-level findings with firm-level analyses of earnings manipulation by state-owned enterprises (SOE) via real activity manipulation (a standard measure from the accounting literature), which we show is higher under hometown auditors. (JEL D73, H54, H83, L32, M42, O18, P25)

Economic statistics inform citizens of general conditions, while central leaders use them to evaluate local officials. Are economic data systematically manipulated? After establishing discrepancies in economic data series cross-nationally, this article examines Chinese sub-national growth data. It leverages variation in the likelihood of manipulation over two dimensions, arguing that politically sensitivedataare more likely to be manipulated at politically sensitivetimes. Gross domestic product (GDP) releases generate headlines, while highly correlated electricity production and consumption data are relatively unnoticed. In Chinese provinces, the difference between GDP and electricity growth increases in years with leadership turnover, which is consistent with juking the stats for political reasons. The analysis points to the political role of information and the limits of non-electoral accountability mechanisms in authoritarian regimes.

This article uses an investigation-trigger framework to explain the process that stimulates investigations of corruption in China, which has been treated more as a black box in the past. Reviewing China’s current anticorruption system, we argue that local party leaders’ decisions directly trigger corruption investigations, and that power competition between political elites is a major catalyst of the trigger. Moreover, drawing upon rarely accessible documentation and interviews addressing the successive downfall of two public security bureau chiefs in City H, we identify two channels through which the investigation-trigger catalyst works: the diminished patronage of corrupt officials after patron turnovers, and government insiders’ unconventional provocation of political opponents. The cases analyzed in this article also show that outside intervention may rupture the local protection of corruption and facilitate investigations. This finding supports the 2012 reform of China’s corruption control system.

The public policies implemented in order to contain the spread of COVID-19 in the community have created issues both in the internal and the external environments of the Greek rural healthcare enterprises. This study aimed to investigate the full extent of the issues (internal and external) caused by the public policies. Regarding the external factors, we examined the state, the local authorities, the financial institutions, the social stakeholders and the citizens. Regarding the internal factors, we focused on turnover, liquidity, working conditions, internal changes related to patient care and the implementation of protective measures. A qualitative research was conducted among twelve rural healthcare business owners in the form of semi-structured interviews. The research was conducted in the fall of 2020 during the second phase of COVID-19. The research showed that these enterprises were severely impacted by the government’s public policies. Local authorities were not involved due to lack of competence. The business owners were unwilling to support their enterprises via bank lending. During the first phase of COVID-19, citizens postponed nonessential medical examinations, causing a reduction in these enterprises’ turnover. As a result, in the following periods, these enterprises faced liquidity problems. However, they developed social objectives and implemented protective measures for their employees and patients. The present study contributes to the mapping of the factors affecting the internal and external environments of rural healthcare enterprises along with the public policies developed in times of prolonged crisis. These kinds of data are crucial to the business world and government officials voting on social policies. One cannot rule out the possibility of a new financial or health crisis; the findings of this study can prove to be a useful tool in the process of decision making.

Background: Malnutrition among Filipino children persists; underscoring the value of nutritional assessment procedures. In the Philippines, this is carried out at the local level in its annual Operation Timbang [weigh] (OPT or OPT Plus). Local government unit officials observed higher malnutrition prevalence rates in nutrition survey reports of the Department of Science and Technology’s Food and Nutrition Research Institute (DOST-FNRI) compared with its OPT. A revisit of the OPT provided evidence on the comparability of the two data sets and sources of variance analyzed. Objectives: 1) describe municipal level assessment of OPT in 10 barangays of Abra de Ilog municipality; 2) identify facilitating and hindering factors in OPT; and 3) compare OPT results with DOST-FNRI local nutrition survey in Abra de Ilog and identify potential sources of variance therefrom. Methods: Primary data were collected using focus group discussions and key informant interviews. Height and weight data were collected using standard methods of anthropometry. Results: The OPT/OPT Plus is the mass weighing of 0-71 months old children, including height measurements conducted during the first and fourth quarter of the year in Abra de Ilog. It was found that facilitating factors were availability of calibrated equipment, latest master list, local government support and budget. Lack of manpower, work overload, low honoraria, low work commitment, uncooperative mothers and high turnover of barangay [village] nutrition scholars hindered OPT implementation. The Abra de Ilog 2016 OPT Plus and the 4th quarter “OPT” reported lower malnutrition prevalence rates than the DOST-FNRI local survey. Conclusions: Significant differences in the two data sets could misguide program implementation. As an outcome of Sustainable Development Goal No. 2 of Zero Hunger, potential misclassification of nutritional status and misreporting of malnutrition prevalence rates have implications for the mapping of malnutrition, hence delivery of targeted nutrition intervention packages.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the temporary disbandment of a gang unit on collecting gang intelligence and arresting gang members in one of the Los Angeles Police Department’s Community Policing Areas. Design/methodology/approach – An interrupted time series methodology (ARIMA) is utilised to examine 1,429 field interview cards and 1,174 arrests of gang members that occurred from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2011 within one police division. Findings – Results indicated that the dismantling of the gang unit negatively impacted the collection of intelligence on gang members by officers, regardless of whether the officers were officially serving in the gang unit. Suppression efforts by gang unit officers also resulted in a sustained decline. Originality/value – Given that many urban centres have specialised gang units, this study demonstrates how organisational turnover or disbandment of a gang unit negatively impacts a department’s ability to deal with local gang issues. Furthermore, these finding suggest that police organisations should consider such ramifications on intelligence-based policing activities.

AbstractWhat precipitated the 2003–06 “high tide” of petitioning Beijing and why did the tide wane? Interviews and archival sources suggest that a marked increase in petitioners coming to the capital was at least in part a response to encouraging signals that emerged when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao adopted a more populist leadership style. Because the presence of tens of thousands of petitioners helped expose policy failures of the previous leadership team, the Hu-Wen leadership appeared reasonably accommodating when petitioners arriveden massein Beijing. Soon, however, the authorities shifted towards control and suppression, partly because frustrated petitioners employed disruptive tactics to draw attention from the Centre. In response to pressure from above, local authorities, especially county leaders, turned to coercion to contain assertive petitioners and used bribery to coax officials in the State Bureau of Letters and Visits to delete petition registrations. The high tide receded in late 2006 and was largely over by 2008. This article suggests that a high tide is more likely after a central leadership change, especially if a populist programme strikes a chord with the population and elite turnover augments confidence in the Centre and heightens expectations that it will be responsive to popular demands.

Makassar community is divided into sub-district, urban village, hamlet, and neighborhood unit with all its issues. One of the problems is in the Sambung Jawa, Mamajang Sub-district where there is still lack of interest and awareness to understand the importance of knowledge about the rights and obligations of a trading business (legal entity). On the other hand, there are some people who have succeeded, but are more concerned with pursuing profits to meet their needs than caring about legal issues. The solution to these problems is providing legal assistance and socialization regarding the establishment of a business entity (formerly home industry) carried out in the communities of RW 6, 7, 8, and 9 who have business activities in clothing, crafts and food industry as UMK (Micro and Small Enterprises) entrepreneurs, procedures and terms of submission of brands, as well as providing information about brand rights.The aim of this activity is to increase legal awareness and provide legal protection by continuous (periodically) mentoring both during service and afterwards. The method that used are direct meeting with servants and local officials / community leaders and discussions with partners as well as with women's organizations which resulted in an agreement that counseling and assistance will be provided by the servant. The results of the implementation of community service provide a positive value for UMK entrepreneurs with very satisfying indicators of success. Public information about brand rights was received enthusiastically by the community and provided a great motivation to increase industrial business skills so that the turnover can increase even more.

The changes of political borders between Poland and the Soviet Union in 1944–1945 were accompanied by a relocation campaign lasting until autumn 1946 and affecting the Polish and Jewish populations of Eastern Galicia, Volhynia and Northern Bukovina. An agreement for mutual resettlement of Poles, Jews and Ukrainians, formally referred to as evacuation, was concluded on 9th September 1944 in Lublin between the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The organisation of the relocation was entrusted to a special apparatus subordinated to evacuation representatives of both sides. The Chief Representative for the evacuation of the Polish and Jewish population from the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was based in Lutsk. Initially, he oversaw seventeen and then eighteen regional representatives in larger cities located in the so-called western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR. Together with representatives of the Ukrainian side they were to carry out a registration campaign and organise transport for the relocated population and its possessions. The relocation apparatus began to be organised by a group of employees who arrived in Lutsk from Lublin in October 1944 with the first Representative, Stanisław Pizło. The process was viewed with distrust and hostility by the Poles, who were reluctant to leave their homeland. The several hundred staff of the resettlement apparatus struggled, similarly to the local population, with numerous problems relating to provisions and subsistence. The Soviet security services saw many officials working for the Representative as individuals hostile to the Soviet authorities. Consequently, Polish officials were quite often arrested, having been accused of collaborating with the Polish independence underground and of sabotaging the resettlement campaign. A lack of a sense of security led to a considerable staff turnover among the resettlement staff. As most of the people entitled to be evacuated from the various resettlement regions left, from the second half of 1945 the staff working for the evacuation apparatus were gradually dismissed. The transfer of population ended in November 1946 and the final protocol closing the post-war resettlements under the agreement of 9th September 1944 concluded between the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the government of the Ukrainian SSR was signed in May 1947.

Purpose: The study's goal was to identify the key characteristics that drive the establishment of efficient and effective derivative markets in Tanzania. Methodology: The study employed a descriptive research approach. As a consequence of the deliberate non-probability selection approach, the population for the census was taken from the Dodoma Securities Exchange brokers, financial/investment advisors, and senior officials from the Capital Markets Authority of Tanzania. We used both primary and secondary data. The acquired data was checked, corrected, and coded before being analyzed with the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software. To summarize the data, descriptive statistics such as percentages and frequencies were employed. Tables, charts, and diagrams are used to present data. Findings: It was stated that because demand for derivatives is anticipated to be low, derivatives instruments would be scarce for hedging in the local market. Derivatives trading will increase market turnover in the underlying markets while also increasing the country's GDP. The performance of Tanzania's derivatives markets will be heavily impacted by the political climate, derivatives expertise, participant attitude, financial infrastructure, and overseas competition. It was determined that the central government's assistance in the development of derivatives markets could be assessed as reasonable, but investor knowledge of derivatives instruments was rated as poor. Conclusion: According to the research findings, government expenditure on financial infrastructure is insufficient for effective derivatives markets, and taxes impedes derivatives market growth. Recommendations: As a result, the report suggests that the government enhance its intervention by increasing expenditure on financial infrastructure and enacting tax policies that do not hinder derivative trading. Sensitization should also be carried out to raise public knowledge about the function of derivatives trading.

OBJECTIVE To analyze the regional governance of the health systemin relation to management strategies and disputes.METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES A qualitative study with health managers from 19 municipalities in the health region of Bahia, Northeastern Brazil. Data were drawn from 17 semi-structured interviews of state, regional, and municipal health policymakers and managers; a focus group; observations of the regional interagency committee; and documents in 2012. The political-institutional and the organizational components were analyzed in the light of dialectical hermeneutics.RESULTS The regional interagency committee is the chief regional governance strategy/component and functions as a strategic tool for strengthening governance. It brings together a diversity of members responsible for decision making in the healthcare territories, who need to negotiate the allocation of funding and the distribution of facilities for common use in the region. The high turnover of health secretaries, their lack of autonomy from the local executive decisions, inadequate technical training to exercise their function, and the influence of party politics on decision making stand as obstacles to the regional interagency committee’s permeability to social demands. Funding is insufficient to enable the fulfillment of the officially integrated agreed-upon program or to boost public supply by the system, requiring that public managers procure services from the private market at values higher than the national health service price schedule (Brazilian Unified Health System Table). The study determined that “facilitators” under contract to health departments accelerated access to specialized (diagnostic, therapeutic and/or surgical) services in other municipalities by direct payment to physicians for procedure costs already covered by the Brazilian Unified Health System.CONCLUSIONS The characteristics identified a regionalized system with a conflictive pattern of governance and intermediate institutionalism. The regional interagency committee’s managerial routine needs to incorporate more democratic devices for connecting with educational institutions, devices that are more permeable to social demands relating to regional policy making.

Abstract. Electronic Commerce (E-Commerce) is a marketing system using electronic media. E-commerce is an alternative choice for buyers during the pandemic because apart from being easy to use, buyers and sellers do not need to make direct contact. Aldiva Sponge Slippers UMKM located in Karangrejo Village, Gempol District, Pasuruan Regency is one of the UMKM that has not used E-Commerce. Partners have limitations in the marketing sector, namely they still do not have Human Resources (HR) in charge of marketing. Partners also do not have specific marketing media, especially online media, so sales are not maximized. The implementation of the service aims to overcome the problems faced by partners in details, namely the team developing e-commerce websites for partners, holding training on the operation of e-commerce websites, filling out e-commerce website content, and continuing with assistance. The implementation method used during the training was that the team invited all employees of the Aldiva Sponge Sandal SMEs and local village officials to take part in the training delivered by competent speakers in the field of digital marketing. The result of the activity is that the training participants benefit from the training held and are motivated to explore e-commerce. Partners already have new media for sales so that turnover increases. Abstrak. Electronic Commerce (E-Commerce) adalah sistem pemasaran menggunakan media elekronik. E-commerce menjadi alternatif pilihan pembeli di masa pandemi karena selain penggunaannya yang mudah, pembeli dan penjual tidak perlu melakukan kontak langsung. UMKM sandal spon Aldiva yang berlokasi di Desa Karangrejo Kecamatan Gempol Kabupaten Pasuruan merupakan salah satu UMKM yang belum menggunakan E-Commerce. Mitra memiliki keterbatasan pada sektor pemasaran yaitu masih belum memiliki Sumber Daya Manusia (SDM) yang bertugas di bidang pemasaran. Mitra juga belum memiliki media pemasaran yang spesifik khususnya media online sehingga penjualan belum maksimal. Pelaksanaan pengabdian bertujuan untuk mengatasi masalah yang dihadapi mitra dengan rincian yaitu tim membuatkan website e-commerce untuk mitra, mengadakan pelatihan tentang pengoperasian website e-commerce, melakukan pengisian konten website e-commerce, dan dilanjutkan dengan pendampingan. Metode pelaksanaan yang digunakan selama pelatihan adalah tim mengundang seluruh karyawan UMKM sandal Spon Aldiva dan perangkat desa setempat untuk mengikuti pelatihan yang disampaikan oleh pemateri yang kompeten dibidang pemasaran digital. Hasil dari kegiatan yaitu peserta pelatihan memperoleh manfaat dari pelatihan yang diadakan dan termotivasi mendalami e-commerce. Mitra sudah mempunyai media baru untuk penjualan sehingga omset meningkat.

Metal products are one of the superior products of Bogor Regency, which is located in Pasirmukti Village, Sukahati, and Tarikolot, Citeureup District. The local government of Bogor Regency has made the icons in these villages a thematic village that will be used as an integrated training center for marketing the products of the metal and body industry. The area of ​​Citereup District is because the area has also produced metal industries since the 1980s, and has survived to this day, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) are the main supporter of the economy of the residents of Citeureup District. "The majority of the population is SMEs, there are few civil servants and farmers, and some work as service providers", the name "Kampung Kaleng" was given because all the craftsmen in Kampung Dukuh make products made from cans. “Kaleng Kaleng officially existed in 2012, but the craftsmen themselves have existed for a long time and have been passed down from generation to generation.” This Kampung Kaleng resident has marketed his products to other islands such as Kalimantan, Makassar, and other areas in Indonesia through online media and exhibitions he participated in. Previously, craftsmen were only able to sell their products to the Greater Jakarta area. The manufacturing process from raw materials to finished products is carried out directly by the residents of Kampung Dukuh. Raw materials are obtained from existing distributors in the Citeureup area itself. Product prices in Kampung Kaleng are quite diverse depending on the type of goods and their size. The range starts from IDR 15 thousand for a can of mini crackers to IDR 700 thousand for the price of an oven. "The turnover for craftsmen is around IDR 500,000 thousand to IDR 1,000,000 per day". The profit that the craftsmen take is about 10% to 20% of the sales turnover. The competence of the metal industry IKM Manager in Bogor Regency is still low. The problem of competence and performance of human resources related to the opportunity for industrial development in producing standardized product quality is a problem for the metal industry SMEs. The improvement strategy that can be carried out is conducting training and continuous development regarding knowledge, certified skills, and motives supported by the Bogor Regency Cooperatives and SMEs Office as well as government regulations that support IKM in increasing competitiveness which has an impact on sustainable business. Small and medium industries for the metal industry are centered in Citeureup District with a total of 194 business units spread across several villages. SMEs have been proven to make a significant positive contribution to efforts to overcome economic problems. The metal industry can also create jobs and reduce unemployment, expand employment and provide economic services. However, in reality, there is a gap faced by metal SMEs today. The purpose of this community service is to find out how the production function of metal crafts is in controlling product quality, secondly to determine the effect of Physical Facilities in Metal Workshops on product quality control, thirdly to find out how to Inspect Product Quality Control, and fourthly how to influence the production function and physical facilities of the workshop. to control checks on product quality.

PurposeThe aim of this study is to investigate the impact of local political uncertainty on the asymmetric cost behavior (i.e. cost stickiness) for listed firms in China.Design/methodology/approachIn this study, the authors manually collect the turnover data of prefecture-city officials as a measure of exogenous fluctuations in political uncertainty and obtain firm-level financial information from the China Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. To perform the analysis, the authors augment the traditional cost stickiness model by including the interaction terms of the prefecture-city official turnover, and firm-level and prefecture-city level control variables.FindingsThe authors find that political turnover leads to a higher degree of cost stickiness, implying that firms retain slack resources when political uncertainty is high. Moreover, the effect of political turnover on cost stickiness is more pronounced for firms residing in regions with weaker institutional environments, and firms that are privately owned and with smaller size. The authors further provide evidence that policy uncertainty and the threat of losing political connection are two underlying channels. Overall, this study documents that the local political process is an important channel that influences corporate operational decisions.Originality/valueThis study provides the first piece of evidence on the relation between political uncertainty and cost stickiness at the local government level. Moreover, the authors propose and demonstrate two underlying channels through which political uncertainty affects firms' asymmetric cost behavior.

O artigo questiona três concepções de políticas públicas que se apresentam hoje como propostas alternativas ao paradigma econômico neoliberal e à precarização do mercado laboral que veio em sua esteira: desenvolvimento local, empreendedorismo e governança urbana, tendo como objeto as empresas que compõem o Arranjo Produtivo Local de Tecnologia de Informação da região de Londrina (PR) , o qual se insere dentro das políticas públicas aqui problematizadas. Os dados coletados do MTE demonstram que essas empresas tendem a aportar as atividades rotineiras presentes nas cadeias de valor das grandes transnacionais do ramo, que são mais sujeitas às vulnerabilidades laborais postas pela mobilidade que o capital ganhou com a globalização da economia. Assim, diferente da perspectiva oficial que orienta essas políticas, os resultados remetem a indicadores de precarização já consensuais na literatura especializada sobre o tema: baixo grau (relativo) de escolaridade, salários em torno de 0,5 a um salário mínimo, e alto índice de rotatividade. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Desenvolvimento local. Empreendedorismo. Governança urbana. Arranjos Produtivos Locais. Precarização do trabalho.LOCAL DEVELOPMENT, ENTREPREUNERISM AND URBAN “GOVERNANCE”: where is labor inserted within this context? Simone Wolff This paper questions three concepts of public policies presented nowadays as alternatives to the neoliberal economic paradigm and to the precarization of the labor market that has come in its wake: local development, entrepreneurism and urban governance. As their object are the companies that form the Productive Local Arrangement of Information Technology in the region of Londrina, Paraná, inserted within the public policies here problematized. Data collected from the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE) show that these companies tend to provide the routine activities present in the chains of value of the sector’s large transnational corporations, which are more susceptible to the labor vulnerabilities imposed by the mobility that capital has acquired with economic globalization. Thus, different from the official perspective that guides these policies, the results refer to precarization indicators that are a consensus in specialized literature on the topic: lower schooling grade, salaries around 0.5 to one minimum wage and high turnover level. KEY WORDS: Local Development. Entrepreneurism. Urban governance. Local productive arrangements. Labor precarization.DÉVELOPPEMENT LOCAL, ENTREPRENEURIAT ET “GOUVERNANCE” URBAINE: quelle est la place du travail dans ce contexte? Simone Wolff On s’interroge sur trois conceptions de politiques publiques présentées aujourd’hui comme des propositions alternatives pour le paradigme économique néo-libéral et la précarisation du marché du travail qui l’a accompagné: le développement local, l’entrepreuneuriat et la gouvernance urbaine ayant pour objet les entreprises qui font partie de l’Arrangement Productif Local de Technologie de l’Information de la Région de Londrina (PR), et qui s’insère dans les politiques publiques ici problématisées. Les données recueillies auprès du MTE démontrent que les entreprises ont tendance à faire l’apport des activités courantes présentes dans les chaînes de valeur des grandes entreprises transnationales du secteur, qu’elles sont plus sujettes aux vulnérabilités de la main-d’oeuvre à cause de la mobilité du capital due à la mondialisation de l’économie. Ainsi, à l’oposé de la perspective officielle qui oriente ces politiques, les résultats renvoient à des indicateurs de précarisation, fruits d’un consensus dans la littérature spécialisée sur le sujet: bas niveau (relatif) de scolarité, salaires d’environ 0,5 à 1 salaire minimum et un indice de rotativité très élevé. MOTS-CLÉS: Développement local. Entreprenariat. Gouvernance urbaine. Arrangements Productifs Locaux. Précarisation du travail. Publicação Online do Caderno CRH no Scielo: http://www.scielo.br/ccrh Publicação Online do Caderno CRH: http://www.cadernocrh.ufba.br

PurposeThe political influence on the determinants of capital structure has been under-researched for a long time. Taking the turnover of secretary of municipal committee as a political factor in China, this paper studies the effect of local government officials' turnover on firm's capital structure.Design/methodology/approachStarting with all A-shares listed firms in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2001 to 2018, this paper implements the OLS estimation, staggered difference-in-difference approach to investigate the effects of political turnover on the choice of capital structure.FindingsThe results show that, driven by government officials' turnover, firms will significantly reduce their leverage. When comparing between formal finance (bank loans) and informal finance (payables), the reduction of capital structure is mainly driven by banks, not by suppliers. Furthermore, two possible channels have been investigated. First, the reduction effects are mainly driven by the SOEs when classifying the types of corporate ownership into SOEs and non-SOEs. Second, the reduction effects exist in areas with the more intense government intervention when considering the heterogeneity of the development of institutional environment in provinces.Originality/valueThis paper first contributes to the literature on the determinants of corporate choice on capital structure. Second, this paper enriches the studies on the economic consequences of local government officials' turnover.

This paper describes how urban resilience governance is structured and coordinated in 20 North American cities (19 US and one Canadian) based on interviews with city officials. This co-produced research evolved out of conversations with city officials in Portland, Oregon, who were interested to learn how other cities were organising resilience work. Interviews focused on emerging definitions, organisational structures, internal and external coordination efforts, and practitioners’ insights. The paper includes a descriptive summary of how cities are structuring and coordinating resilience efforts. Additionally, we discuss how current trends in resilience coordination can inform future directions for urban resilience scholarship. We compare what practitioners view as key success factors against six commonly theorised characteristics for effective resilience governance. Overall, we find considerable overlap in lessons from theory and practice, including the benefits of a systems approach, the need for a clear definition of resilience, strong leadership, and stakeholder engagement. Practitioners use resilience to diagnose the overall health of their cities. Additionally, practice tends to emphasise limitations such as political turnover, trade-offs between centralised and dispersed organisation, and the need to carefully diagnose and scope resilience work, whereas the academic literature calls for multi-level and cross-scale governance and feedbacks and more transformative action. Given these insights, we highlight opportunities for new resilience scholarship, including analysing the benefits of the diagnostic phase of resilience planning, evaluating resilience goals to determine the best departmental fit, and understanding local barriers and trade-offs to adopting a broad systems approach.

Abstract Background Guinea undertook health workforce reform in 2016 following the Ebola outbreak to overcome decades-long shortages and maldistribution of healthcare workers (HCWs). Specifically, over 5000 HCWs were recruited and deployed to rural health districts and with a signed 5-year commitment for rural medical practice. Governance structures were also established to improve the supervision of these HCWs. This study assessed the effects of this programme on local health systems and its influence on HCWs turnover in rural Guinea. Methods An exploratory study design using a mixed-method approach was conducted in five rural health districts. Data were collected through semi-structured questionnaires, in-depth interview guides, and documentary reviews. Results Of the 611 HCWs officially deployed to the selected districts, 600 (98%) took up duties. Female HCWs (64%), assistant nurses (39%), nurses (26%), and medical doctors (20%) represented the majority. Findings showed that 69% of HCWs were posted in health centres and the remaining in district hospitals and the health office (directorate); the majority of which were medical doctors, nurses, and midwives. The deployment has reportedly enhanced quality and timely data reporting. However, challenges were faced by local health authorities in the posting of HCWs including the unfamiliarity of some with primary healthcare delivery, collaboration conflicts between HCWs, and high feminization of the recruitment. One year after their deployment, 31% of the HCWs were absent from their posts. This included 59% nurses, 29% medical doctors, and 11% midwives. The main reasons for absenteeism were unknown (51%), continuing training (12%), illness (10%), and maternity leave (9%). Findings showed a confusion of roles and responsibilities between national and local actors in the management of HCWs, which was accentuated by a lack of policy documents. Conclusion The post-Ebola healthcare workers policy appears to have been successfully positive in the redistribution of HCWs, quality improvement of staffing levels in peripheral healthcare facilities, and enhancement of district health office capacities. However, greater attention should be given to the development of policy guidance documents with the full participation of all actors and a clear distinction of their roles and responsibilities for improved implementation and efficacy of this programme.

In the West Cameroon region, agri-food establishments: bakeries, fishmongers and restaurants contribute to three quarters (3/4) of employment in the towns, turnover and added value of regional businesses. These are also the sectors that consume the most electrical energy; between them, these establishments account for more than 50% of the electrical energy consumption in the entire Western region of the country. For six months, we conducted the study in (5the) major towns of West Cameroon chosen at random (Mifi, Menoua, Bamboutos, Nde and Haut-Nkam). Field observations of recurrent power cuts and surveys of local policy makers were also conducted on the supply of electricity, which remains problematic throughout the country. Our results show that the average electricity consumption per establishment is particularly high in bakeries, at around 1441.67 KWh, compared to 1295.45 KWh for fishmongers and 371.21 KWh for restaurants. Electricity is mainly used as a driving force for thermodynamic purposes (cold rooms, deep-freezing and air-conditioning of engines in bakeries, etc.). On the other hand, it should be noted that this sector of activity faces enormous difficulties, including the inadequacy of electrical energy in terms of supply, access and quality. The electricity supplied by The Energy of Cameroon (Eneo) is still very inadequate given the high demand. It is precarious and characterised by untimely power cuts. In fact, the average power cut in the cities studied is 24 days and 20 minutes, for a period of six months. We have come to the effective conclusion that recurrent power cuts are the result of a poor electricity supply and have a significant impact on the agri-food activity, due to their dependence on this source of energy. All these problems in West Cameroon indicate that energy demand will have to increase considerably in the coming years due to population growth (+7.8%) and socio-economic development. Therefore, we believe that policy makers should turn to renewable energies which are natural energy sources such as solar and wind power. In addition, local elected officials should think about building more mini hydroelectric dams in villages to reinforce urban areas with electrical energy.

Referring to two tobacco books stored in the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts for Kursk (1720) and Vyazma (1725), the author examines the legal trade in tobacco in these cities. The article provides general information about the total legislative ban on tobacco trade in the seventeenth century and the measures taken in the 1690s to legalise the spread and use of tobacco. The history of the tobacco trade in Russia at the initial stage of its existence remains very poorly studied. The author emphasises the importance of tobacco books of the eighteenth century in the study of domestic tobacco trade. The article presents data on the quantitative and geographical composition of documents found in various funds of the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, providing a detailed source characterisation of the Kursk and Vyazma tobacco books (including their volume, structure, and forms of individual articles). The author analyses the volume and turnover of the state-owned tobacco trade in Kursk and Vyazma, determines the assortment of tobacco products sold, traces seasonal fluctuations in the sale of tobacco, and makes conclusions about the amount of income received by the treasury. Additionally, the author carries out a comparative analysis of retail prices for tobacco sold in Kursk and Vyazma, demonstrating the dependence of this indicator on the distance from the main areas of wholesale purchases. Furthermore, he considers the manufacture of snuff, providing information on the ratio of smoking and snuff tobacco in the Russian tobacco market in different historical periods. Based on information about the number of the townspeople of Kursk and Vyazma according to the first revision of 1719 and data on the volume of state tobacco trade in these cities, an attempt is made to determine the level of tobacco consumption among the local population. The article provides information on the structure of state expenditures made over the year to ensure the tobacco trade in Vyazma and demonstrates the share of state tobacco profits in the general structure of state revenues (customs, liquor, etc.) in Kursk. Finally, the article provides information on the personnel and social status of the officials responsible for the receipt of state tobacco revenues in Kursk and Vyazma in the indicated years.

The first two months of 2021 saw Google and Facebook ‘go dark’ in terms of news content on the Australia versions of their platforms. In January, Google ran a so-called “experiment” which removed or demoted current news in the search results available to a segment of Australian users. While Google was only darkened for some, in February news on Facebook went completely dark, with the company banning all news content and news sharing for users within Australian. Both of these instances of going dark occurred because of the imminent threat these platforms faced from the News Media Bargaining Code legislation that was due to be finalised by the Australian parliament. This article examines how both Google and Facebook responded to the draft Code, focussing on their threats to go dark, and the extent to which those threats were carried out. After exploring the context which produced the threats of going dark, this article looks at their impact, and how the Code was reshaped in light of those threats before it was finally legislated in early March 2021. Most importantly, this article outlines why Google and Facebook were prepared to go dark in Australia, and whether they succeeded in trying to prevent Australia setting the precedent of national governments dictating the terms by which digital platforms should pay for news content. From the Digital Platforms Inquiry to the Draft Code In July 2019, the Australian Treasurer released the Digital Platforms Inquiry Final Report which had been prepared by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). It outlined a range of areas where Australian law, policies and practices were not keeping pace with the realities of a digital world of search giants, social networks, and streaming media. Analysis of the submissions made as part of the Digital Platforms Inquiry found that the final report was “primarily framed around the concerns of media companies, particularly News Corp Australia, about the impact of platform companies’ market dominance of content distribution and advertising share, leading to unequal economic bargaining relationships and the gradual disappearance of journalism jobs and news media publishers” (Flew et al. 13). As such, one of the most provocative recommendations made was the establishment of a new code that would “address the imbalance in the bargaining relationship between leading digital platforms and news media businesses” (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Digital Platforms Inquiry 16). The ACCC suggested such a code would assist Australian news organisations of any size in negotiating with Facebook, Google and others for some form of payment for news content. The report was released at a time when there was a greatly increased global appetite for regulating digital platforms. Thus the battle over the Code was watched across the world as legislation that had the potential to open the door for similar laws in other countries (Flew and Wilding). Initially the report suggested that the digital giants should be asked to develop their own codes of conduct for negotiating with news organisations. These codes would have then been enforced within Australia if suitably robust. However, after months of the big digital platforms failing to produce meaningful codes of their own, the Australian government decided to commission their own rules in this arena. The ACCC thus prepared the draft legislation that was tabled in July 2020 as the Australian News Media Bargaining Code. According to the ACCC the Code, in essence, tried to create a level playing field where Australian news companies could force Google and Facebook to negotiate a ‘fair’ payment for linking to, or showing previews of, their news content. Of course, many commentators, and the platforms themselves, retorted that they already bring significant value to news companies by referring readers to news websites. While there were earlier examples of Google and Facebook paying for news, these were largely framed as philanthropy: benevolent digital giants supporting journalism for the good of democracy. News companies and the ACCC argued this approach completely ignored the fact that Google and Facebook commanded more than 80% of the online advertising market in Australia at that time (Meade, “Google, Facebook and YouTube”). Nor did the digital giants acknowledge their disruptive power given the bulk of that advertising revenue used to flow to news companies. Some of the key features of this draft of the Code included (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, “News Media Bargaining Code”): Facebook and Google would be the (only) companies initially ‘designated’ by the Code (i.e. specific companies that must abide by the Code), with Instagram included as part of Facebook. The Code applied to all Australian news organisations, and specifically mentioned how small, regional, and rural news media would now be able to meaningfully bargain with digital platforms. Platforms would have 11 weeks after first being contacted by a news organisation to reach a mutually negotiated agreement. Failure to reach agreements would result in arbitration (using a style of arbitration called final party arbitration which has both parties present a final offer or position, with an Australian arbiter simply choosing between the two offers in most cases). Platforms were required to give 28 days notice of any change to their algorithms that would impact on the ways Australian news was ranked and appeared on their platform. Penalties for not following the Code could be ten million dollars, or 10% of the platform’s annual turnover in Australia (whichever was greater). Unsurprisingly, Facebook, Google and a number of other platforms and companies reacted very negatively to the draft Code, with their formal submissions arguing: that the algorithm change notifications would give certain news companies an unfair advantage while disrupting the platforms’ core business; that charging for linking would break the underlying free nature of the internet; that the Code overstated the importance and reach of news on each platform; and many other objections were presented, including strong rejections of the proposed model of arbitration which, they argued, completely favoured news companies without providing any real or reasonable limit on how much news organisations could ask to be paid (Google; Facebook). Google extended their argument by making a second submission in the form of a report with the title ‘The Financial Woes of News Publishers in Australia’ (Shapiro et al.) that argued Australian journalism and news was financially unsustainable long before digital platforms came along. However, in stark contrast the Digital News Report: Australia 2020 found that Google and Facebook were where many Australians found their news; in 2020, 52% of Australians accessed news on social media (up from 46% the year before), with 39% of Australians getting news from Facebook, and that number jumping to 49% when specifically focusing on news seeking during the first COVID-19 pandemic peak in April 2021 (Park et al.). The same report highlighted that 43% of people distrust news found on social media (with a further 29% neutral, and only 28% of people explicitly trusting news found via social media). Moreover, 64% of Australians were concerned about misinformation online, and of all the platforms mentioned in the survey, respondents were most concerned about Facebook as a source of misinformation, with 36% explicitly indicating this was the place they were most concerned about encountering ‘fake news’. In this context Facebook and Google battled the Code by launching a public relations campaigns, appealing directly to Australian consumers. Google Drives a Bus Across Australia Google’s initial response to the draft Code was a substantial public relations campaign which saw the technology company advocating against the Code but not necessarily the ideas behind it. Google instead posited their own alternative way of paying for journalism in Australia. On the main Google search landing page, the usually very white surrounds of the search bar included the text “Supporting Australian journalism: a constructive path forward” which linked to a Google page outlining their version of a ‘Fair Code’. Popup windows appeared across many of Google’s services and apps, noting Google “are willing to pay to support journalism”, with a button labelled ‘Hear our proposal’. Figure 1: Popup notification on Google Australia directing users to Google’s ‘A Fair Code’ proposal rebutting the draft Code. (Screen capture by author, 29 January 2021) Google’s popups and landing page links were visible for more than six months as the Code was debated. In September 2020, a Google blog post about the Code was accompanied by a YouTube video campaign featuring Australia comedian Greta Lee Jackson (Google Australia, Google Explains Arbitration). Jackson used the analogy of Google as a bus driver, who is forced to pay restaurants for delivering customers to them, and then pay part of the running costs of restaurants, too. The video reinforced Google’s argument that the draft Code was asking digital platforms to pay potentially enormous costs for news content without acknowledging the value of Google bringing readers to the news sites. However, the video opened with the line that “proposed laws can be confusing, so I'll use an analogy to break it down”, setting a tone that would seem patronising to many people. Moreover, the video, and Google’s main argument, completely ignored the personal data Google receives every time a user searches for, or clicks on, a news story via Google Search or any other Google service. If Google’s analogy was accurate, then the bus driver would be going through every passenger’s bag while they were on the bus, taking copies of all their documents from drivers licenses to loyalty cards, keeping a record of every time they use the bus, and then using this information to get advertisers to pay for a tailored advertisement on the back of the seat in front of every passenger, every time they rode the bus. Notably, by the end of March 2021, the video had only received 10,399 views, which suggests relatively few people actually clicked on it to watch. In early January 2021, at the height of the debate about the Code, Google ran what they called “an experiment” which saw around 1% of Australian users suddenly only receive “older or less relevant content” when searching for news (Barnet, “Google’s ‘Experiment’”). While ostensibly about testing options for when the Code became law, the unannounced experiment also served as a warning shot. Google very effectively reminded users and politicians about their important role in determining which news Australian users find, and what might happen if Google darkened what they returned as news results. On 21 January 2021, Mel Silva, the Managing Director and public face of Google in Australia and New Zealand gave public testimony about the company’s position before a Senate inquiry. Silva confirmed that Google were indeed considering removing Google Search in Australia altogether if the draft Code was not amended to address their key concerns (Silva, “Supporting Australian Journalism: A Constructive Path Forward An Update on the News Media Bargaining Code”). Google’s seemingly sudden escalation in their threat to go dark led to articles such as a New York Times piece entitled ‘An Australia with No Google? The Bitter Fight behind a Drastic Threat’ (Cave). Google also greatly amplified their appeal to the Australian public, with a video featuring Mel Silva appearing frequently on all Google sites in Australia to argue their position (Google Australia, An Update). By the end of March 2021, Silva’s video had been watched more than 2.2 million times on YouTube. Silva’s testimony, video and related posts from Google all characterised the Code as: breaking “how Google search works in Australia”; creating a world where links online are paid for and thus both breaking Google and “undermin[ing] how the web works”; and saw Google offer their News Showcase as a viable alternative that, in Google’s view, was “a fair one” (Silva, “Supporting Australian Journalism”). Google emphasised submissions about the Code which backed their position, including World Wide Web inventor Tim Berners-Lee who agreed that the idea of charging for links could have a more wide-reaching impact, challenging the idea of a free web (Leaver). Google also continued to release their News Showcase product in other parts of the world. They emphasised that there were existing arrangements for Showcase in Australia, but the current regulatory uncertainty meant it was paused in Australia until the debates about the Code were resolved. In the interim, news media across Australia, and the globe, were filled with stories speculating what an Australia would look like if Google went completely dark (e.g. Cave; Smyth). Even Microsoft weighed in to supporting the Code and offer their search engine Bing as a viable alternative to fill the void if Google really did go dark (Meade, “Microsoft’s Bing”). In mid-February, the draft Code was tabled in Australian parliament. Many politicians jumped at the chance to sing the Code’s praises and lament the power that Google and Facebook have across various spheres of Australian life. Yet as these speeches were happening, the Australian Treasurer Josh Frydenberg was holding weekend meetings with executives from Google and Facebook, trying to smooth the path toward the Code (Massola). In these meetings, a number of amendments were agreed to, including the Code more clearly taking in to account any existing deals already on the table before it became law. In these meetings the Treasurer made in clear to Google that if the deals done prior to the Code were big enough, he would consider not designating Google under the Code, which in effect would mean Google is not immediately subject to it (Samios and Visentin). With that concession in hand Google swiftly signed deals with over 50 Australian news publishers, including Seven West Media, Nine, News Corp, The Guardian, the ABC, and some smaller publishers such as Junkee Media (Taylor; Meade, “ABC Journalism”). While the specific details of these deals were not made public, the deals with Seven West Media and Nine were both reported to be worth around $30 million Australian dollars (Dudley-Nicholson). In reacting to Google's deals Frydenberg described them as “generous deals, these are fair deals, these are good deals for the Australian media businesses, deals that they are making off their own bat with the digital giants” (Snape, “‘These Are Good Deals’”). During the debates about the Code, Google had ultimately ensured that every Australian user was well aware that Google was, in their words, asking for a “fair” Code, and before the Code became law even the Treasurer was conceding that Google’s was offering a “fair deal” to Australian news companies. Facebook Goes Dark on News While Google never followed through on their threat to go completely dark, Facebook took a very different path, with a lot less warning. Facebook’s threat to remove all news from the platform for users in Australia was not made explicit in their formal submissions the draft of the Code. However, to be fair, Facebook’s Managing Director in Australia and New Zealand Will Easton did make a blog post at the end of August 2020 in which he clearly stated: “assuming this draft code becomes law, we will reluctantly stop allowing publishers and people in Australia from sharing local and international news on Facebook and Instagram” (Easton). During the negotiations in late 2020 Instagram was removed as an initial target of the Code (just as YouTube was not included as part of Google) along with a number of other concessions, but Facebook were not sated. Yet Easton’s post about removing news received very little attention after it was made, and certainly Facebook made no obvious attempt to inform their millions of Australian users that news might be completely blocked. Hence most Australians were shocked when that was exactly what Facebook did. Facebook’s power has, in many ways, always been exercised by what the platform’s algorithms display to users, what content is most visible and equally what content is made invisible (Bucher). The morning of Wednesday, 17 February 2021, Australian Facebook users awoke to find that all traditional news and journalism had been removed from the platform. Almost all pages associated with news organisations were similarly either disabled or wiped clean, and that any attempt to share links to news stories was met with a notification: “this post can’t be shared”. The Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison reacted angrily, publicly lamenting Facebook’s choice to “unfriend Australia”, adding their actions were “as arrogant as they were disappointing”, vowing that Australia would “not be intimidated by big tech” (Snape, “Facebook Unrepentant”). Figure 2: Facebook notification appearing when Australians attempted to share news articles on the platform. (Screen capture by author, 20 February 2021) Facebook’s news ban in Australia was not limited to official news pages and news content. Instead, their ban initially included a range of pages and services such as the Australian Bureau of Meteorology, emergency services pages, health care pages, hospital pages, services providing vital information about the COVID-19 pandemic, and so forth. The breadth of the ban may have been purposeful, as one of Facebook’s biggest complaints was that the Code defined news too broadly (Facebook). Yet in the Australian context, where the country was wrestling with periodic lockdowns and the Coronavirus pandemic on one hand, and bushfires and floods on the other, the removal of these vital sources of information showed a complete lack of care or interest in Australian Facebook users. Beyond the immediate inconvenience of not being able to read or share news on Facebook, there were a range of other, immediate, consequences. As Barnet, amongst others, warned, a Facebook with all credible journalism banned would almost certainly open the floodgates to a tide of misinformation, with nothing left to fill the void; it made Facebook’s “public commitment to fighting misinformation look farcical” (Barnet, “Blocking Australian News”). Moreover, Bossio noted, “reputational damage from blocking important sites that serve Australia’s public interest overnight – and yet taking years to get on top of user privacy breaches and misinformation – undermines the legitimacy of the platform and its claimed civic intentions” (Bossio). If going dark and turning off news in Australia was supposed to win the sympathy of Australian Facebook users, then the plan largely backfired. Yet as with Google, the Australian Treasurer was meeting with Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook executives behind closed doors, which did eventually lead to changes before the Code was finally legislated (Massola). Facebook gained a number of concessions, including: a longer warning period before a Facebook could be designated by the Code; a longer period before news organisations would be able to expect negotiations to be concluded; an acknowledgement that existing deals would be taken in to account during negotiations; and, most importantly, a clarification that if Facebook was to once again block news this would both prevent them being subject to the Code and was not be something the platform could be punished for. Like Google, though, Facebook’s biggest gain was again the Treasurer making it clear that by making deals in advance on the Code becoming law, it was likely that Facebook would not be designated, and thus not subject to the Code at all (Samios and Visentin). After these concessions the news standoff ended and on 23 February the Australian Treasurer declared that after tense negotiations Facebook had “refriended Australia”; the company had “committed to entering into good-faith negotiations with Australian news media businesses and seeking to reach agreements to pay for content” (Visentin). Over the next month there were some concerns voiced about slow progress, but then major deals were announced between Facebook and News Corp Australia, and with Nine, with other deals following closely (Meade, “Rupert Murdoch”). Just over a week after the ban began, Facebook returned news to their platform in Australia. Facebook obviously felt they had won the battle, but Australia Facebook users were clearly cannon fodder, with their interests and wellbeing ignored. Who Won? The Immediate Aftermath of the Code After the showdowns with Google and Facebook, the final amendments to the Code were made and it was legislated as the News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code (Australian Treasury), going into effect on 2 March 2021. However, when it became legally binding, not one single company was ‘designated’, meaning that the Code did not immediately apply to anyone. Yet deals had been struck, money would flow to Australian news companies, and Facebook had returned news to its platform in Australia. At the outset, Google, Facebook, news companies in Australia and the Australian government all claimed to have won the battle over the Code. Having talked up their tough stance on big tech platforms when the Digital Platforms Inquiry landed in 2019, the Australian Government was under public pressure to deliver on that rhetoric. The debates and media coverage surrounding the Code involved a great deal of political posturing and gained much public attention. The Treasurer was delighted to see deals being struck that meant Facebook and Google would pay Australian news companies. He actively portrayed this as the government protecting Australia’s interest and democracy. The fact that the Code was leveraged as a threat does mean that the nuances of the Code are unlikely to be tested in a courtroom in the near future. Yet as a threat it was an effective one, and it does remain in the Treasurer’s toolkit, with the potential to be deployed in the future. While mostly outside the scope of this article, it should definitely be noted that the biggest winner in the Code debate was Rupert Murdoch, executive chairman of News Corp. They were the strongest advocates of regulation forcing the digital giants to pay for news in the first place, and had the most to gain and least to lose in the process. Most large news organisations in Australia have fared well, too, with new revenue flowing in from Google and Facebook. However, one of the most important facets of the Code was the inclusion of mechanisms to ensure that regional and small news publishers in Australia would be able to negotiate with Facebook and Google. While some might be able to band together and strike terms (and some already have) it is likely that many smaller news companies in Australia will miss out, since the deals being struck with the bigger news companies appear to be big enough to ensure they are not designated, and thus not subject to the Code (Purtill). A few weeks after the Code became law ACCC Chair Rod Sims stated that the “problem we’re addressing with the news media code is simply that we wanted to arrest the decline in money going to journalism” (Kohler). On that front the Code succeeded. However, there is no guarantee the deals will mean money will support actual journalists, rather than disappearing as extra corporate profits. Nor is there any onus on Facebook or Google to inform news organisations about changes to their algorithms that might impact on news rankings. Also, as many Australia news companies are now receiving payments from Google and Facebook, there is a danger the news media will become dependent on that revenue, which may make it harder for journalists to report on the big tech giants without some perceptions of a conflict of interest. In a diplomatic post about the Code, Google thanked everyone who had voiced concerns with the initial drafts of the legislation, thanked Australian users, and celebrated that their newly launched Google News Showcase had “two million views of content” with more than 70 news partners signed up within Australia (Silva, “An Update”). Given that News Showcase had already begun rolling out elsewhere in the world, it is likely Google were already aware they were going to have to contribute to the production of journalism across the globe. The cost of paying for news in Australia may well have fallen within the parameters Google had already decided were acceptable and inevitable before the debate about the Code even began (Purtill). In the aftermath of the Code becoming legislation, Google also posted a cutting critique of Microsoft, arguing they were “making self-serving claims and are even willing to break the way the open web works in an effort to undercut a rival” (Walker). In doing so, Google implicitly claimed that the concessions and changes to the Code they had managed to negotiate effectively positioned them as having championed the free and open web. At the end of February 2021, in a much more self-congratulatory post-mortem of the Code entitled “The Real Story of What Happened with News on Facebook in Australia”, Facebook reiterated their assertion that they bring significant value to news publishers and that the platform receives no real value in return, stating that in 2020 Facebook provided “approximately 5.1 billion free referrals to Australian publishers worth an estimated AU$407 million to the news industry” (Clegg). Deploying one last confused metaphor, Facebook argued the original draft of the Code was “like forcing car makers to fund radio stations because people might listen to them in the car — and letting the stations set the price.” Of course, there was no mention that following that metaphor, Facebook would have bugged the car and used that information to plaster the internal surfaces with personalised advertising. Facebook also touted the success of their Facebook News product in the UK, albeit without setting a date for the rollout of the product in Australia. While Facebook did concede that “the decision to stop the sharing of news in Australia appeared to come out of nowhere”, what the company failed to do was apologise to Australian Facebook users for the confusion and inconvenience they experienced. Nevertheless, on Facebook’s own terms, they certainly positioned themselves as having come out winners. Future research will need to determine whether Facebook’s actions damaged their reputation or encouraged significant numbers of Australians to leave the platform permanently, but in the wake of a number of high-profile scandals, including Cambridge Analytica (Vaidhyanathan), it is hard to see how Facebook’s actions would not have further undermined consumer trust in the company and their main platform (Park et al.). In fighting the Code, Google and Facebook were not just battling the Australian government, but also the implication that if they paid for news in Australia, they likely would also have to do so in other countries. The Code was thus seen as a dangerous precedent far more than just a mechanism to compel payment in Australia. Since both companies ensured they made deals prior to the Code becoming law, neither was initially ‘designated’, and thus neither were actually subject to the Code at the time of writing. The value of the Code has been as a threat and a means to force action from the digital giants. How effective it is as a piece of legislation remains to be seen in the future if, indeed, any company is ever designated. For other countries, the exact wording of the Code might not be as useful as a template, but its utility to force action has surely been noted. Like the inquiry which initiated it, the Code set “the largest digital platforms, Google and Facebook, up against the giants of traditional media, most notably Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation” (Flew and Wilding 50). Yet in a relatively unusual turn of events, both sides of that battle claim to have won. At the same time, EU legislators watched the battle closely as they considered an “Australian-style code” of their own (Dillon). Moreover, in the month immediately following the Code being legislated, both the US and Canada were actively pursuing similar regulation (Baier) with Facebook already threatening to remove news and go dark for Canadian Facebook users (van Boom). For Facebook, and Google, the battle continues, but fighting the Code has meant the genie of paying for news content is well and truly out of the bottle. References Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. 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