Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Lobbying'

Lobbyists for hire - commercial lobbyists - are a small, distinct,, accepted but minor addition to the dramatis personae of UK public policy-making. Their differentiating feature,, marking them off from other types of lobbyist., is that they are for hire and it is the feature which is the least previously researched. There is little explicit theory of commercial lobbying: it is best accounted for as an implication of neo-pluralism. Through primary fieldwork amongst them and the two groups with whom they interact - clients and decisionmakers - the nature of their hiring is analysed. They are mostly hired by large businesses and less so by public sector interests facing change. Clients show varying propensities to hire and services hired in by clients can be grouped under four headings. Commercial lobbyists are client-led and have no independent political influence. They are businesses seeking market share,, offering only what hirers want. Their work can be viewed through the prism of two ideal types: backgrounder and foregrounder. On balance, they work on the processes of policy-making rather than its contents; are less rather than more visible in the policy process; more reactive than proactive in their client relationships. They have a range of negative and positive relationships with decision-makers, who accept them in terms of supplying information otherwise difficult to access. There is no demonstrated methodology for evaluating their contribution to policy outcomes. The data suggests that this contribution is minor. But this 'minor' conclusion has to be qualified when looked at from the hirers' viewpoint: for them the hiring may help yield competitive advantage. Commercial lobbyists are corporate accessories and the source of any concern about their practices and about asymmetrical access to decision-makers lies in the nature of their relationships with other more substantial players in the UK policy process. Their role will be better understood if this process is more transparent and open.

My dissertation consists of three essays on lobbying activities by special interest groups. The first paper, "Ex Post Lobbying," systematically documents ex post lobbying, the process by which firms allocate resources during the implementation stage after congressional authorization. Previous theories assume all lobbying is done ex ante, where lobbying activities occur before Congress votes. However, my analysis of over 633,731 lobbying reports demonstrates that almost half of lobbying activity from 1998 to 2012, that targeted specific bills, occurred ex post. I argue that the goal of ex post lobbying is to allow firms to bargain over private benefits that will arise from legislation by targeting regulatory rule-making processes that clarify non-specific parts of bills. Ex post lobbying provides a chance for non-participants in the ex ante lobbying stage to claim their share from government policy.

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The structure of protection across sectors is usually interpreted as the result of competition among lobbies to influence politicians, but little attention has been devoted to the importance of individual firms in this process. This paper builds a model incorporating firm heterogeneity into a lobbying setup `a la Grossman and Helpman (1994), in a monopolistic competitive environment. We obtain that increased sectorial dispersion cause a fall in equilibrium tariff provided that the exporter’s cutoff is above the mean of the distribution. Also, higher average productivity brings about a fall in the equilibrium tariff, whereas an increase in export costs cause an increase in the tariff. JEL Classification codes: D43, D7, F12, F13, L11

Diplomová práce se zaměřuje na komunikační techniky společností a jejich strategie při komunikaci s institucemi EU. Na základě teoretických poznatků poskytuje shrnutí a doporučení pro nízkonákladový lobbying malých a středních podniků v České republice.

Det svenska politiska systemet har under de senaste decennierna skiftat från ett korporativistiskt system, där organisationer har bjudits in att delta i det politiska beslutsfattandet, till ett mer pluralistiskt system, där lobbying är en viktig komponent. Lagstiftningen har dock inte följt utvecklingen och idag har Sverige ingen direkt lagstiftning mot lobbying.   Denna studie undersöker huruvida de svenska politikerna och de som påverkar anser att lobbying fungerar demokratiskt i Sverige idag och huruvida en lagstiftning bör instiftas eller inte. En jämförelse görs mellan de två grupperna påverkare och påverkade, för att ta reda på vad dessa respondenter anser om lobbying i Sverige utifrån ett demokratiskt perspektiv.   För att svara på syftet används tre av Robert A. Dahls demokratikriterier. Detta för att nå en förståelse huruvida lobbying fungerar demokratiskt och om en lagstiftning skulle behövas utifrån de svar som ges av de tillfrågade. En jämförelse i lagstiftning görs även med USA, som har utarbetat ett regelverk angående lobbyism. Studiens resultat visar att det finns ett demokratiskt problem med lobbying i Sverige utifrån de tre demokratikriterierna. Transparensen är ett problem samt det faktum att politiker kan gå från en politisk roll direkt till en lobbyverksamhet. En lagstiftning kring karenstid för politiker begränsar detta problem, men övrig lagstiftning, likt den i USA, tros inte ha någon effekt. Istället tros normer, moral och tryck från medborgarna vara mer effektfullt.

Le lobbying consiste pour un intérêt privé à solliciter la protection de la souveraineté étatique. Il entretient à ce titre un rapport étroit avec les institutions et les organes chargés d’élaborer la règle de droit dans l’intérêt public ou général. La légitimité de son exercice, et partant, sa reconnaissance juridique dépend donc de la conception de la souveraineté et du mode de détermination de l’intérêt public qui prévaut dans un Etat donné. Dans les droits nord-américains prévaut une conception utilitariste de l’intérêt public, qui se détermine à partir des intérêts particuliers. Dans cette conception de la souverainete, la reconnaissance du lobbying s’est alors avérée légitime et nécessaire. En conséquence, le lobbying est non seulement accepté comme une liberté publique, mais plus encore, directement réglementé dans son exercice. En droit français, le principe de la souveraineté nationale, le légicentrisme, et la fiction transcendante de l’intérêt général rejettent toute forme de particularité et contribuent à l’illégitimité du lobbying. Les principes fondamentaux issus de la tradition révolutionnaire rendent donc impossible toute reconnaissance juridique du lobbying. En conséquence, le droit actuel n’appréhende le lobbying que lorsqu’il devient corrupteur, ou porte atteinte à l’ordre public. Un tel régime répressif n’est cependant pas adapté à la spécificité du lobbying. Toutefois, l’affaiblissement et l’évolution des choix idéologiques révolutionnaires qui font la singularité du droit français rendent alors possible leur conciliation avec la notion de lobbying. A l’heure où l’Assemblée nationale s’interroge sur une réglementation du lobbying parlementaire sous l’influence du droit communautaire, l’institution érigerait alors la pratique en une notion juridique. Un lobbying encadré permettrait en effet de légitimer son exercice régulier, qui respecterait alors les impératifs constitutionnels du droit français, tout en améliorant son efficacité et son attractivité
Private interests use the mechanism of lobbying in order to gain protection from State sovereignty. Hence, it works in close contact with public institutions and organisations responsible for law making in the interest of the public or in the public interest. Hence, the legitimacy of its exercise and its taken into consideration by law depend on the conception of sovereignty and the determination of the public interest in a State. In the north-Americans legal systems prevails a utilitarianist design of the public interest, which is built with particulars interests. In this conception of sovereignty, recognition of lobbying by law then proved legitimate and necessary. Accordingly, the lobbying is not only accepted as a civil liberty, but more directly regulated in its exercise. In the French legal system, the principle of sovereignty based on the nation, the importance given to the Law, together with the transcendent idea of general interest are opposed to the recognition of lobbying by law. As a consequence, contemporary law in France only comprehends lobbying when its use becomes corruptive or violates some other rule of law. However, such a repressive system is not adapted to the specification of lobbying. The weakening of traditional French revolutionary ideologies and the evolution of the principles based on such ideologies enable their conciliation with lobbying as a notion. At the time the French lower House is considering regulating parliamentary lobbying under the influence of community law, its practice is likely to be established as a legal notion. A legally regulated lobbying would legitimate a practice which already exists. Consequently it would then be in accordance with public constitutionnal law, making it more efficient and attractive

This dissertation consists of three essays in which I study the political economy of trade agreements. Using detailed information from lobbying reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, I systematically explore the role played by both the winners and the losers of globalization. The first chapter focuses on the winners, large multinational firms lobbying in favor of the ratification of free trade agreements. The second chapter looks at these winners when they lose, studying the impact of the non-ratification of a trade agreement on their profits. The last chapter focuses on labor interests and trade unions, the losers of globlalization.The first chapter (joint with Paola Conconi and Mathieu Parenti) is focused on firms. We show that the political economy of free trade agreements (FTAs) is dominated by large firms engaged in international trade that support the ratification of these agreements. We develop a model of endogenous lobbying on FTAs by heterogeneous firms, which can explain why only large pro-FTA firms select into lobbying. The model also delivers predictions on the intensive margin of lobbying. In line with these predictions, we find that larger firms spend more supporting a given FTA, and individual firms spend more supporting FTAs that generate larger gains – i.e. larger improvements in access to foreign consumers and suppliers and smaller increases in domestic competition – and that are more likely to be opposed by politicians.The second chapter (joint with Moritz Hennicke) is an event study on the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and the subsequent shock to U.S. trade policy – the non-ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). We provide empirical evidence that corporate lobbying on trade agreements matters for corporate profits. We find that stock prices of companies that lobbied in favor of the TPP underperformed following Trump’s election. On the intensive margin, we find a strong and positive relationship between the amount spent in lobbying and the cumulative losses of lobbying firms. Finally, by comparing the original TPP agreement with its newer version (CPTPP), without U.S. participation, we provide evidence that firms’ lobbying activity was related to having some specific provisions included in the agreement. In the third chapter, I focus on the role played by trade unions, studying both their lobbying expenditures and their campaign contributions to politicians. I first show that unions are the main opposing force to the ratification of FTAs, and that larger unions, operating in tradable sectors, are more likely to lobby against FTAs. I then study union’s PAC contributions to political parties. During the last three decades, more than 90% of unions’ PAC contributions were directed to Democratic candidates. This has drastically changed when the Republican party took a more protectionist stance under Trump. I find that unions that lobbied against the ratification of FTAs started contributing more to Republican congressmen, particularly those who have taken an anti-trade stance.
Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion
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This dissertation addresses the economic behavior and political influence activities by lobbyists today by examining the existence, mechanisms, and welfare implications of commercial lobbying activities and their optimal regulation. In the second chapter of this dissertation, a novel model of lobbying is presented that explains the behavior of commercial lobbying firms (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D.C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups, commercial lobbying firms represent a variety of clients and are not directly affected by policy outcomes. They are hired by citizens to advocate policy proposals to politicians that are beneficial to the citizens but also have social implications. Using a model with a market for lobbying services and agency relationships between lobbyists and policymakers it can be shown why commercial lobbying firms exist. It can also be shown that self-interested policymakers, who observe lobbying activities, may employ commercial lobbying firms in a socially inefficient manner. In the third chapter of this dissertation, the analysis examines the effective regulation of commercial lobbying activities and focuses on the endogenous choice of regulatory institutions. The analysis uses the model of commercial lobbying presented in the second chapter. I derive the institutional conditions under which a market outcome can be first-best as well as the conditions under which a first-best institution will be self-stable. One result is that current regulations may fail to be effective and cannot limit lobbyists' and policymakers' incentives to substitute financial contributions for the socially beneficial acquisition of information. Additional results explain why endogenous reforms may or may not occur. In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, the analysis uses a dynamic model of commercial lobbying with lobbyists who undertake unobservable investigation efforts and promise financial contributions. It is shown that repeated relationships with lobbyists simplify a policymaker's information and contracting problem and help policymakers to escape a "cheap talk" lobbying game. The welfare implications of these interactions depend on whether the policymakers' information or contracting problem predominates. Further, the policymaker's information problem may actually improve welfare outcomes. Similarly, financial contributions may also improve welfare outcomes. This dissertation includes unpublished co-authored material.

Questa tesi si propone di analizzare, nell’ambito delle strategie di lobbying delle aziende del settore di Internet, quella attuata dalla azienda americana Google inc. nel periodo dal 2003 al 2016, sia negli Stati Uniti che in Europa.

Questa tesi si propone di analizzare quanto l’attività di lobbying di Google Inc. riesca ad influenzare le decisioni del Congresso degli Stati Uniti. In particolare, andremo a studiare le strategie di lobbying di Google Inc. in merito alle proposte di legge nel corso degli anni e cercheremo di capire, per ognuna di esse, gli obiettivi che l’azienda ha cercato di raggiungere e i risultati che è riuscita ad ottenere.

Scopo di questa tesi di laurea è stato quello di analizzare l’attività di lobbying della società Cisco Systems dal 2000 fino al 2020. Dopo aver completato l’attività di trascrizione dei dati raccolti, vi è stata un approfondita analisi di articoli scientifici per studiare le strategie di lobbying di Cisco in merito alle proposte di legge nel corso degli anni e si è cercato di capire, per ognuna di esse, gli obbiettivi che l’azienda ha cercato di raggiungere e i risultati che è riuscita ad ottenere. Cisco Systems Inc. nota semplicemente come Cisco, è una azienda multinazionale specializzata nella fornitura di apparati di networking. Nasce ufficialmente nel dicembre 1984 a San Francisco, California, da Leonard Bosack, responsabile dei computer del dipartimento di informatica della Stanford University, e da sua moglie Sandy Lerner, che gestiva i computer della Graduate School of Business. La produzione di Cisco si è concentrata fortemente su apparati per il funzionamento delle reti LAN, MAN, WAN e WLAN e sul sistema IOS che le pilota. Cisco è presente in molti settori economici. Di rilevante interesse vi sono il settore della sicurezza informatica, con la creazione dei Firewall e VPN, il settore della telefonia mobile, con la creazione delle IP Telephony, nel settore dell’archiviazione con la creazione dello Storage Area Network (SAN) e nel settore del computing con la creazione della piattaforma x86. Le prime attività di lobbying dell’azienda Cisco Systems risalgono al 1998 con una spesa iniziale di 600.000 $. Andando avanti nel tempo, l’investimento in lobbying da parte dell’azienda è cresciuto notevolmente fino ad arrivare ad un picco, nell’anno 2013, con un investimento totale di 3.090.000 $. Tra il 2009 e il 2010, l’azienda ha aumentato le spese in lobbying di oltre il 59%. Tale variazione annuale della spesa è stata il secondo più grande salto tra le prime 15 aziende del settore superata solo dall’aumento del 75% di Hewlett-Packard.

La thèse propose, aussi bien dans le cadre des sciences sociales en général que dans celui de la science politique en particulier, une définition de la théorie du lobbying considéré comme une technique émergente du droit des citoyens, mais aussi des groupes d'intérêt, de participer à la prise de décisions politiques. Les recherches qui ont été conduites, permettent d'affirmer que le lobbying se caractérise par une activité procédurale que l'Etat, dans un souci de bonne "gouvernance", doit observer au croisement des intérêts nationaux, tant au niveau international (l'Etat est un agent du lobbying), qu'au niveau national interne (l'Etat est le destinataire du lobbying). L'existence du lobbying, qui se présente ainsi comme une conséquence de la philosophie de l'administration ouverte, exige que soient définis son statut et son code de procédure, y compris les devoirs de déontologie et d'éthique que doivent respecter les lobbyistes. Le cas portugais, étudié dans le cadre de la Constitution (révision de 1997), présente, d'une façon claire et évidente, ce nouveau domaine de la science politique dans lequel les citoyens et les groupes d'intérêt ont un droit de participation qui va jusqu'à la possibilité de déposer des propositions de loi au parlement. La conclusion débouche d'une part sur le caractère indispensable d'une coopération de la "gouvernance" avec les groupes d'intérêt particuliers en dépassant les aspects corporatistes et néo-corporatistes, et d'autre part sur le rejet, dans un régime d'etat de droit post-moderne, des groupes illégitimes. La thèse comprend un lexique et les dix commandements du lobbying selon la théorisation conceptuelle qui a été développée.

Mestrado em Marketing
A questão do lobbying tem ganho cada vez maior importância na União Europeia. No entanto, e apesar de ser uma atividade legítima continua a ser em Portugal e noutros tantos países um assunto taboo. As sociedades menos abertas a adaptações têm dificuldade em evoluir. As ferramentas que temos ao nosso dispor para gerir a vida democrática são transversais à manifestação humana, e ainda assim, mal compreendidas. A necessidade de transparência subjacente à temática é o que trava a sua regulamentação em Portugal. A palavra-chave que liga os dois conceitos, é pressão. Enraizada na natureza do lobbying e circunscrita ao marketing. O exercício de lobbying é visto como o conjunto de atividades que procuram exercer pressão, direta ou indiretamente, sobre os poderes políticos. O marketing, é visto como uma perigosa tecnologia, tornando possível a venda de algo a uma pessoa que não o queira, e que até possa vir a ser prejudicial para a mesma. Das duas formas, o interesse subentendido na ação de quem exerce o poder é satisfeito através de persuasão. Posto isto, o presente estudo tem como propósito a compreensão do movimento sinérgico entre a áreas de marketing político e lobbying. Para a recolha de dados primários escolheu-se a plataforma digital: páginas web de Jornais Nacionais e Internacionais. Através da construção e análise do case study referente à ascensão do Eng. António Guterres ao cargo de secretário-geral das Nações Unidas e entrevistas em profundidade, os resultados deste estudo comprovam as proposições conjeturadas, e respondem à questão de investigação.
The issue of lobbying is gaining more and more ground in the European Union. However, despite being a legitimate activity, it is still a taboo subject in Portugal and other countries. The truth is, societies that are less open to adaptations have difficulty evolving. The tools we have available to regulate democratic life cut across must human social activities, yet they are often poorly understood or even misunderstood. The need for transparency underlying the theme is what hinders its regulation in Portugal. A keyword that connects the two concepts is pressure. Rooted in the nature of lobbying and circumscribed to marketing. Lobbying is seen as the set of activities that aim to put pressure, directly or indirectly, on political powers. Marketing, viewed as a dangerous technology, makes it possible to sell something to a person who doesn't want it, and that could even become harmful to them. Either way, the implied interest in the action of the power-taker is satisfied through persuasion. That being said, the purpose of this study is to understand the synergic movement between lobbying and political marketing. For the collection of primary data, the digital platform was chosen: national and international newspaper web pages. Through the construction and analysis of the case study regarding the rise of Eng. António Guterres to the post of Secretary-General of the United Nations and in-depth interviews, the results of this study confirm the conjectured propositions and answer the research question.
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The overreaching purpose of this study is to examine in what ways lobbying contributes to democratic policymaking in the European Union. Having limited amount of time, a case study has been conducted with the main purpose to examine what impacts lobbying have on the proposed EU-legislation to lower CO2 emissions from newly produced cars, in terms of democratic policymaking. The lobby groups in this case being ACEA and T&E. In order to fulfill the purpose a comprehensive research question is formulated: What impacts do ACEA and T&E have on the proposed EU-legislation to lower the CO2 emissions from newly produced cars, in terms of democratic policymaking?

The theory and definitions of democratic policymaking were drawn from Rinus van Schendelen´s book “Machiavelli in Brussels; The Art of Lobbying the EU”. Definitions of different components essential to democratic policymaking were given here and used together with the material on ACEA and T&E to answer the research question.

The material was based on documents, press-statements, speeches and publications from the European Union, ACEA and T&E to find out how ACEA and T&E lobbied the proposed legislation.

The study has shown mostly positive impacts from ACEA and T&E on the proposed EU-legislation to lower the CO2 emissions from newly produced cars, in terms of democratic policymaking. For the overreaching purpose the conclusion is that lobbying therefore contributes mostly in a positive way to democratic policymaking in the European Union.

This study can in the future be used in further studies to see what impacts lobby groups have on democratic policymaking in the European Union and also in studies concerning how lobby groups carry out their lobbying.

Typischerweise entstehen Rechnungslegungsnormen im Rahmen eines politischen Prozesse, gleich, ob dieser parlamentarisch oder privatrechtlich organisiert ist. Daher sieht sich der Normentstehungsprozess regelmäßig Lobbyingaktivitäten diverser Interessengruppen ausgesetzt. Die vorliegende Arbeit undersucht in vier Manuskripten verschiedenste Bereiche der Entstehung von Rechnungslegungsnormen, sowohl im Rahmen parlamentarischer wie auch privatrechtlicher Regulierungsstrukturen. Manuskript A. bereitet den theoretischen Hintergrund des Rechnungslegungslobbying auf und identifiziert thematische wie auch methodische Forschungslücken. Manuskript B. entwickelt daraufhin eine neuartige Forschungsmethode für Rechnungslegungslobbying, die Elemente der sozialwissenschaftlichen Inhaltsanalyse mit solchen der Diskursanalyse verbindet. Im Rahmen der Anwendung dieser Methode auf die Entstehung des Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetzes wird gezeigt, dass die Methode in einem parlamentarischen Normentstehungsprozess anwendbar ist. Darüber hinaus werden Potenziale für eine Anwendung auch in privatrechtlich organisierten Rechnungslegungssystemen aufgezeigt. Manuskript C. betrachtet die Rolle der Wissenschaftler in einem deutschen Kontext und verbindet methodisch dabei die Inhaltsanalyse mit historisch-kritischer Forschung. Festgestellt werden kann dabei, dass die Einstellung deutscher Hochschullehrer im Bereich zur Zeitwertbewertung im Rahmen deutscher Rechnungslegung durchaus mit rechnungslegungshistorischen Beobachtungen erklärt werden kann. Manuskript D. widmet sich schließlich der privatrechtlich geprägten Normentstehung auf Ebene des IASV. Mit Hilfe einer interpretativen Inhaltsanalyse und deskriptiv statistischen Verfahren wird gezeigt, dass die Mitarbeiter Numerale im Rahmen bestimmter Dokumente inkonsistent verwenden. Dieses Ergebnis konterkariert die Bemühungen des IASB um Transparenz und lässt Lücken für nicht beobachtbare Einflussnahmen auf die Mitarbeiter des IASB. In ihrer Gesamtheit tragen die vier Manuskripte sowohl methodisch wie auch thematisch zur Fortentwicklung der Forschung im Rechnungslegungslobbying bei. Bislang vernachlässigte Forschungsmethoden werden aufgezeigt, modifiziert und auf eine Vielzahl verschiedener Fragestellungen angewandt. Darüber hinaus untersuchen die Manuskripte insbesondere diejenigen Bereiche des Rechnungslegungslobbying, die bislang von den meisten Forschern in diesem Gebiet vernachlässigt wurden
Typically, accounting standards emerge within a political process, be it that this process is driven by a parliament or a private institution. Consequently, the whole process is subject to lobbying efforts by several interest groups. Four essays examine various parts of processes of emergence of accounting standards in parliamentary as well as private standard setting environments. Essay A. provides the theoretical background concerning lobbying on accounting standards and identifies research potential, in terms of topics as well as methods. Essay B. develops an innovative research method for research of lobbying on accounting standards combining elements of content and discourse analysis. It is proven that this research design is applicable in a parliamentary setting. Moreover potentials for research in private settings are identified. Essay C. focuses on academics in accounting standard setting in a German context and combines a content analysis with historical research. For the attitude of German accounting academics concerning fair value accounting in a German context it is shown that German accounting history may be a source of explanation. Finally, essay D. focuses on a private standard setting institution, namely the IASB. Using a content analysis and descriptive statistics, it is shown that the IASB staff uses quantifiers in certain documents inconsistently. This finding counteracts the IASB’s efforts towards transparency. Through all four essays a contribution to accounting standard lobbying is made. Alternative research methods are introduced, modified and used for a variety of lobbying areas. Moreover, the essays focus on groups in the context of accounting standards lobbying that have not yet been paid attention by most accounting researchers

Cette these est un travail de recherche empirique, a l'articulation du management strategique et de l'analyse des politiques publiques. Son objet est le travail discursif d'influence d'un lobby economique lors du processus de reforme du droit francais de la concurrence, qui a abouti a la loi du 21 juin 1996 sur << la loyaute et l'equilibre des relations commerciales >>. La question de recherche a laquelle elle s'efforce de repondre est : << dans quelle mesure et comment la strategie discursive d'un entrepreneur politique peut-elle influencer un processus de decision publique qui aboutit a un texte de loi? >>. La methodologie adoptee est celle de yin, de l'>>etude de cas comme strategie de recherche >>. En interaction avec l'etude du terrain, sont mobilisees certaines theories appartenant a differents champs de recherche (rhetorique, psychologie cognitive, sciences politiques) et qui reconnaissent a l'acteur plus ou moins de capacite d'influence sur le processus de decision. Le << coeur >> de l'etude de cas est constitue d'une analyse approfondie, menee en temps reel, de la mise en oeuvre de la strategie du lobby, avant de s'interesser a l'evolution d'ensemble du processus de decision publique et de relativiser la place et le role du lobby dans la politique finalement promulguee. A partir de cette double perspective, un modele de << tension entre l'action d'un entrepreneur politique et le processus de decision d'une politique publique >> est propose. Il consiste en une composition originale entre les modeles existants, faisant appel a des concepts transversaux : absence de possibilite de demonstration contraignante, registres d'ignorance, modes et formes de relations. La dialectique entre l'action discursive de l'entrepreneur politique et la dynamique d'ensemble du processus est explicitee, donnant une vision originale du processus de decision publique. Une discussion de l'apport et des limites de ce travail permet d'insister sur le role crucial des interactions discursives, d'en explorer les suites possibles pour la recherche et pour l'action, tant dans le domaine des politiques publiques que dans celui du management strategique.

Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales)
No autorizada por el autor para ser publicada a texto completo
El objeto de estudio en esta Memoria es el lobby, actividad que según la Real Academia de la lengua española significa “grupo de personas influyentes, organizado para presionar en favor de determinados intereses” . El lobby es una actividad de antigua data, muchas veces pre - existente a su regulación, y mediante ella se pueden elevar intereses particulares a las autoridades gubernamentales y/o parlamentarias. Esta Memoria es de índole descriptiva, ya que no se maneja una hipótesis a demostrar, sino que se analizaran legislaciones sobre la materia existentes en el derecho comparado, y el trabajo legislativo que se ha presentado en nuestro país. En un primer capítulo se hace un análisis teórico de la actividad, con el fin de distinguir entre las diferentes aristas, limites y características a la actividad del lobby que se han dado en legislaciones extranjeras. En un segundo capítulo se hace un análisis práctico de la actividad de lobby, y como los diferentes marcos normativos han respondido a ella. En una segunda parte, y a partir de lo concluido en los dos capítulos anteriores, se harán aportes a la regulación de la actividad, desde las normas de derecho privado. El objetivo que nos hemos propuesto en esta investigación, es lograr identificar parámetros comunes y disímiles que existen en las diferentes regulaciones existentes sobre la actividad. Una vez establecidos, se pretende lograr un óptimo en la regulación, mediante el establecimiento de normas que sean estimadas correctas, ya sea porque en su aplicación práctica han demostrado ser eficaces, o por el contenido beneficioso que tienen para el desarrollo de la actividad en un sistema democrático. La importancia de la investigación radica en que al no existir regulación alguna en nuestro país, el analizar la experiencia comparada resulta de gran utilidad para proyectar una correcta aplicación de las normas que se encuentran en proceso de tramitación en nuestro Congreso Nacional

Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Sci. polit.--Nice, 2000. Titre de soutenance : La représentation des intérêts des entreprises françaises auprès des institutions communautaires.
Bibliogr. p. 471-502. Glossaire.

Notre recherche porte sur la façon dont en Europe les groupements des consommateurs cherchent à gagner en pouvoir en développant leurs stratégies d’influence au sein de l’industrie du lobbying. Nous avons aussi cherché à évaluer l’incidence d’Internet sur leur degré de compétitivité et leur capacité d’influence. Nous avons mobilisé des éléments de réflexion théorique utiles à l’analyse du lobbying, tels que le concept d’influence, divers concepts de l’économie industrielle et les groupements de consommateurs. Nous concluons que les groupements de consommateurs lobbyistes sont des stakeholders (Freeman, 1984) à part entière et nous proposons notre propre définition du lobbying, ainsi qu’un enrichissement du lobbying-mix en lien avec Internet. Nous faisons le constat de l’émergence d’une nouvelle force (Porter, 1979, 2008), celle du lobbying, qui innerve de façon larvée l’ensemble de la structure de toute industrie. Notre stratégie d’accès au réel s’est construite autour de deux études de cas et d’une enquête qualitative auprès d’une population d’associations de consommateurs de 31 pays d’Europe, permettant de faire une synthèse exhaustive de l’existant. Nos apports théoriques et méthodologiques comprennent une description et une définition de l’industrie du lobbying. Ils concernent aussi la notion de stratégie d’influence et la recherche sur les groupements de consommateurs. Les apports opérationnels concernent l’analyse et la compréhension du rôle et des stratégies des associations de consommateurs à l’échelle européenne, des interactions entre acteurs de l’industrie du lobbying et de l’impact d’Internet sur les stratégies d’influence des associations de consommateurs
The research focuses on how in Europe consumer groups attempt to increase their power by developing their influence strategies within the lobbying industry. We also try to assess the impact of the Internet on their level of competitiveness and their ability to influence. We have made use of theoretical reflections relevant to analysing the lobbying, such as the concept of influence, various concepts of the industrial economy, and consumer groups. We conclude from our review that lobbying consumer groups are fully-fledged stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). We propose our own definition of lobbying as well as an improved view of the lobbying-mix in conjunction with Internet usages. We observe the emergence of a new force (Porter, 1979, 2008) : the one of lobbying, which innervates in a concealed way the whole structure of any industry. The lobbying industry lives on its highly added value offer of services and has a double tradable asset. Our strategy to confront reality is twofold. We have conducted two case studies as well as a qualitative survey with a population of consumer associations representing 31 European countries, thus enabling us to offer a complete overview of the existing landscape. Our theoretical and methodological contributions include a description and a definition of the lobbying industry. They are also related to the very notion of influence strategy and research on consumer groups. Operational contributions concern the analysis and understanding of the role and strategies of consumer associations at the European level, interactions between actors of the lobbying industry, and the impact of the Internet on the influence strategies of consumer associations

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Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie
Lobbying is an expression constantly associated with the defense of private and specific economic interests of a group and with the adoption of shady practices, influence peddling, corruption and exchange of favors. However, this practice which should not be understood from its pathology but from its physiology has become increasingly common, being used not only as a defense mechanism of an economic group, but also as an instrument to promote overall interests in a society. In this scenario, we also have organizations of the emerging Third Sector figuring as actors adopting lobbying strategies. In Brazil, the regulation of lobbying practice is still pending. However, its physiology has deserved a legal and constitutional treatment in the 1988 Federal Constitution. Its protection is observed with the recognition of citizenship and political pluralism as the foundation of the Democratic State ruled by the Law, as well as from the participatory democratic dimension, expressed by the 88 Constitution. The fundamental status of lobbying in the Third Sector also derives from the recognition of fundamental rights and guarantees, including: (a) freedom of assembly; (b) freedom of association; (c) the right to be informed; (d) the right to information ; (e) the right to freedom of opinion and expression of thought; (f) the freedom of intellectual, scientific expression and others; and (g) the right of petition. As to the limits of this practice, they are perceived in its own constitutional provisions to guarantee such protection. Concerning freedom of assembly and freedom of association, the lobbying carried out by Third Sector organizations is thought to be developed for lawful purposes. As to citizenship understood as a duty of solidarity with other members of society it is understood that the Third Sector, in an act of lobbying, must be aware of social concerns like those expressed among the fundamental objectives of our federal republic. Another limit to the Third Sector lobbying is the political equality to which all are endowed with equal rights and freedom in the development of a political action. Thus, no action developed by lobbying organizations of the Third Sector could be generated so as to eliminate or prevent the participation of other interest groups, opposed or not, because dissension is a vital component of our pluralist democracy.
O lobbying é uma expressão constantemente associada à defesa de interesses econômicos, particularistas e específicos de determinado grupo e à adoção de práticas escusas, tráfico de influência, corrupção e troca de favores. Entretanto, essa prática que não deve ser compreendida a partir de sua patologia, mas sim de sua fisiologia tem se tornado cada vez mais usual, sendo utilizada não só como um mecanismo de incidência política de grupos de natureza econômica, mas também como instrumento na promoção de interesses mais gerais de uma sociedade. Nesse cenário, figuram, ainda, como atores a adotar estratégias lobbying, as organizações do emergente Terceiro Setor. No Brasil, a prática de lobbying apresenta-se pendente de regulamentação. No entanto, sua fisiologia encontra, na Constituição Federal de 1988, tratamento jurídico-constitucional. Sua proteção é observada quando do reconhecimento da cidadania e do pluralismo político como fundamentos do Estado Democrático de Direito, bem como a partir da dimensão democrática participativa, expressa pela CF/88. A fundamentalidade do lobbying do Terceiro Setor decorre, ainda, da afirmação de direitos e garantias fundamentais, entre eles: (a) liberdade de reunião; (b) liberdade de associação; (c) direito de se informar; (d) direito à informação; (e) direito de opinião e liberdade de manifestação de pensamento; (f) liberdade de manifestação de atividade intelectual, científica e outras; e (g) direito de petição. Quanto aos limites a tal prática, eles são percebidos nos próprios dispositivos constitucionais a lhe garantirem a referida proteção. Das liberdades de reunião e associação, deduz-se que o lobbying desenvolvido por organizações do Terceiro Setor deve ser realizado para fins lícitos. Já da cidadania compreendida essa como um dever de solidariedade para com os demais membros da sociedade , decorre o entendimento de que o Terceiro Setor, em uma ação de lobbying, deve estar atento aos anseios da sociedade, como aqueles expressos entre os objetivos fundamentais da nossa república federativa. Outro limite ao lobbying do Terceiro Setor consiste na igualdade política para a qual todos são dotados de iguais direitos e liberdades no desenvolvimento de uma ação política. Assim, nenhuma ação de lobbying desenvolvida por organizações integrantes do Terceiro Setor poderia ser engendrada de maneira a eliminar ou impedir a participação de outros grupos de interesses, contrapostos ou não, pois o dissenso consiste em um elemento essencial da nossa democracia pluralista.

The main purpose of the research was to examine the process of lobbying in the context of the pharmaceutical industry. It sought to explore "why" and "how" multinational companies carried out pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina. The study aimed to build valid substantive theory that could be used to analyse pharmaceutical lobbying from different perspectives and used corporatism and pluralism to explain the relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and government. The application of interest groups formation theory permitted the identification of the pharmaceutical industry as an interest group and the identification of its lobbying style. Lobbying theories based on contribution payments and transmission of information were explored in order to understand the use of these policies in the process of pharmaceutical lobbying. The review of literature on American pharmaceutical lobbying helped in understanding the peculiar instruments and practices present in pharmaceutical lobbying and gave the reader an understanding of the characteristics of this market. The research took a phenomenological methodological approach and the research paradigm was post-positivist and constructivist. The researcher followed the grounded theory methodology approach of Strauss and Corbin. The researcher collected data through in-depth semi-structured interviews and participant observation of in-house and external pharmaceutical lobbyists as well as officials. The study made several contributions. Firstly, it positioned the pharmaceutical industry as an interest group in the pluralism-corporatism axis as a means to provide a framework for the understanding of its lobbying activities. Secondly, the study defined the lobbying style of the pharmaceutical industry in Argentina compared to lobbying performed in the USA and the EU. Thirdly, it provided a pharmaceutical industry basic lobbying model for Argentina that can be tested in other countries. Finally, it provided a model of cooperative or individual lobbying that stated when it was convenient to build coalitions.

Cette thèse est consacrée à l’étude théorique de la formation et des stratégies des groupes d’intérêt, dans des situations d’information asymétrique. Elle se compose de quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre étudie la délégation optimale, par un décideur non informé, de la décision à un bureaucrate lui-même influencé par un groupe d’intérêt. Nous montrons que le lobbyiste fait face à un arbitrage entre influencer le bureaucrate et faciliter la communication entre le décideur et le bureaucrate. Les conséquences de cet arbitrage en terme de choix d’activité, de nomination stratégique, de degré d’information ou de niveau d’activité sont étudiées. Le second chapitre étudie les stratégies d’acquisition d’information par des groupes d’intérêts en compétition. Nous montrons que lorsque les différents paramètres ont un poids similaire dans la décision, les groupes vont se spécialiser chacun dans des dimensions différents, et ce au détriment de leurs intérêts. Le troisième chapitre poursuit l’analyse du deuxième en se penchant sur la nature de l’information acquise par les groupes. Nous montrons que l’organisation optimale du lobbying par le décideur donnera lieu à une situation de polarisation informationnelle, chaque groupe se spécialisant dans une forme de lobbying défensif en développant de l’expertise au sujet de ses point forts. Enfin, le quatrième chapitre de cette thèse s’interroge sur l’efficacité du lobbying. Nous proposons un modèle de compétition entre groupes dans lequel la formation des groupes d’intérêts est endogène. Nous identifions une classe importante de situations pour lesquelles le lobbying est inefficace, et caractérisons l’équilibre du jeu de formation.

Thesis (MPH) -- University of Limpopo, 2011.
Background and aim: The development of vaccines is considered one of the greatest achievements of biomedical science and public health, because it has led to the reduction of the global burden of infectious diseases. However, vaccination has become a victim of its own success, since most parents have not been exposed to epidemics of vaccine-preventable diseases, and now some fear the vaccines more than the diseases that they prevent. Globally, there is a growing number of parents who use the internet to seek advice on vaccination, and unfortunately some of this advice is anti¬vaccination (A V). Some studies have analyzed vaccine criticism on the internet, but none have focused on South Aftica (SA). The purpose of this study was to identify the characteristics of the anti¬vaccination lobby on SA internet sites including blogs using search terms that were specifically aimed at increasing the retrieval of A V sites. Methods: A structured internet search was conducted on SA web pages using Google, Yahoo, and MSN search engines, for keywords "don't vaccinate", "vaccination is harmful", "should not vaccinate", " not vaccinating", "vaccination causes harm", "against vaccines", etc. The words "immunization" and "immunisation" were also substituted for the word "vaccination" in these searches. These A V sites were then extracted for analysis of content and authors. Results: The overall coverage of SA A V websites was 30.2% (19/63), with Google identifying the most A V sites (59.3% [16/27]), compared to 33.3% (9/27) for Yahoo and 7.4% (2/27) for MSN. Of these A V sites 42.1 % (8/19) were identified to be blogging sites. The A V advocates included 36% (5/14) mothers / parents, 26% (4/14) business people, and 21% (3/14) journalists. The main concerns identified included vaccine safety and efficacy, ethical concerns, and claimed financial profit motives. There were 32% (6/19) of the authors who referenced or posted articles written by other A V lobbyists from the USA. Conclusion: The A V advocates on SA internet are individuals who are independently lobbying against child vaccination and not a cohesive A VL group. The concerns they raised are similar to those raised by A VL from the USA. The SA population is therefore exposed to influences on the internet both ftom local and international views. The internet blogs and forums are an important platform for sharing A V views in an informal manner.

This thesis is composed of three chapters on topics of theoretical economics and applied theory. The first chapter analyzes the existence and implementation of a land division rule, defined through two properties: efficiency and equal opportunity equivalence. It is a joint work with Antonio Nicolò and Andrés Perea, and was published in SERIEs (2011), in the special issue in honor of Salvador Barberà, see Nicolò et al. (2012). The second chapter presents a citizen-candidate voting model with lobbying on a multidimensional policy space, with salient issues. The third chapter investigates the strategic behavior of colonizers in state capacity investment in non settlement colonies, giving an explanation also to civil conflict outcomes after independence. Going more in detail, in the first chapter we look for a normative solution to a land division problem that could be applied to different types of disputes when the arbitrator has a very limited information about the agents’ preferences, and market mechanisms are not available. The solution must be fair and efficient under the constraint of the limited information available to the arbitrator. To this scope, we propose to use the concept of equal-opportunity equivalence defined by Thomson (1994). A land division is equal-opportunity equivalent if each agent receives a parcel of the land who makes her indifferent with respect to her best parcel of a given size µ,where the size of the reference set must be the same for both agents. Existence of the land division rule, uniqueness of utility levels are proved, along with a mechanism to implement it, in which the preferences of the agents do not need to be common knowledge. Moreover there is a unique µ for which the rule exists, therefore µ is not a discretionary choice of the arbitrator. The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of a citizen-candidate model on a multidimensional policy space with lobbying, where citizens regard some issues more salient than others. In equilibrium special interest groups that lobby on less salient topics move the implemented policy closer to their preferred policy, compared to the ones that lobby on more salient issues. After introducing two types of citizens, who differ with respect to the salience assigned to issues, pooling equilibria are found, where voters are not able to offset the effect of lobbying on the implemented policy. This result is in sharp contrast with previous work on unidimensional citizen-candidate models that predict the irrelevance of lobbying on the implemented policy, see Besley and Coate (2001). In an extension of the model citizens are provided with the possibility of giving monetary contributions to lobbies in order to increase their power. With more than one lobby per dimension there are two findings. First, under some conditions only the most extreme lobbies receive contributions. Second, the effectiveness of a lobby is maximized when the salience of an issue is low in the population and high for a small group of citizens. The third chapter investigates the determinants of investment in state capacity in non settlement colonies. The results of this analysis overcome the limitations of the framework provided by Acemoglu et al. (2001), whose theory predicts that extractive institutions were set in non settlement colonies, with no explanation for the wide heterogeneity of institutions in those colonies. Roughly half of the colonies that became independent after 1945 suffered costly civil conflicts thereafter. Empirical evidence suggests that the colonizer’s investment in state capacity is one of the determinants of civil conflict in ex colonies. A good state capacity, in the form of an efficient bureaucracy, a working police force, an independent judiciary enforcing the rule of law, fiscal capacity, prevented state failure and civil conflict, once independence was achieved. A theory is developed to study the strategic behavior of colonizers in choosing investment in state capacity in the colony. High state capacity creates a productive gain in the colonial economy, but as side effect it prevents civil conflict in case of independence, and therefore increases the incentive of the colony to fight for it. Colonizers decide to invest in state capacity comparing its productivity gain with the increased military cost of maintaining power when colonies aim at independence. The equilibrium investment in state capacity depends on the matching between the identity of colonizer (a colonizer with a larger colonial empire will have a lower average military cost) and the identity of the colony (the productivity gain depends on the presence of natural resources, distance from the sea). If the colonizer is forced to leave the colony for exogenous events, the lack of state capacity, and the inefficiency of the decolonization process, determine the civil conflict outcome after independence.
Questa tesi è composta di tre capitoli su argomenti di economica teorica e teoria applicata. Il primo capitolo analizza l’esistenza e l’implementazione di una regola per la divisione di terra, definita attraverso due proprietà: efficienza e equivalenza di pari opportunità. E’ un lavoro coautorato con Antonio Nicolò e Andrés Perea, ed è stato pubblicato in SERIEs (2011), in un numero speciale in onore di Salvador Barberà, vedi Nicolò et al. (2012). Il secondo capitolo presenta un modello di voto con citizen-candidate, con lobby su uno spazio politico multidimensionale, con argomenti salienti. Il terzo capitolo studia il comportamento strategico dei colonizzatori nell'investimento in state capacity nelle colonie di non insediamento, dando una spiegazione anche agli effetti sui risultati di conflitto civile dopo l’indipendenza. Andando più in dettaglio, nel primo capitolo cerchiamo una soluzione normativa al problema di divisione di terra, che possa essere applicata a differenti tipi di dispute, quando il negoziatore ha a disposizione informazioni molto limitate sulle preferenze degli agenti, e meccanismi di mercato non sono disponibili. La soluzione deve essere equa ed efficiente, sotto il vincolo dell’informazione limitata disponibile al negoziatore. A questo scopo pro¬poniamo il concetto di equivalenza di pari opportunità, definito da Thomson (1994). Una divisione di terra è equivalente in pari opportunità se ogni agente riceve un pezzo di terra che la rende indifferente rispetto al suo miglior pezzo di una data area µ, dove l’area del pezzo di riferimento deve essere lo stesso per entrambi gli agenti. L’esistenza di una regola per la divisione di terra, l’unicità dei livelli di utilità vengono dimostrate, insieme ad un meccanismo per implementarla, nel quale le preferenze degli agenti non sono informazione comune. Inoltre c’è un unico µ per quale la regola esiste, quindi µ non è una scelta discrezionaria del negoziatore. Il secondo capitolo è dedicato all'analisi di un modello di citizen-candidate su uno spazio politico multidimensionale con lobby, nel quale i cittadini considerano alcuni argomenti più salienti di altri. In equilibrio i gruppi di interesse che fanno lobby sui temi meno salienti riescono a muovere la politica implementata più vicino alla loro politica preferita, rispetto a gruppi che fanno lobby su argomenti più salienti. Dopo aver introdotto due tipi di cittadini, che differiscono per quanto concerne la salienza assegnata agli argomenti, troviamo equilibri pooling, nei quali i votanti non sono in grado di annullare l’effetto dell’attività di lobby sulla politica implementata. Questo è risultato è in forte contrasto con i precedenti lavori su modelli di citizen-candidate unidimensionali che predicono l’irrilevanza dell’attività di lobby sulla politica implementata, vedi Besley and Coate (2001). In una estensione del modello, ai cittadini viene data la possibilità di finanziare le lobby con donazioni monetarie per incrementare il loro potere. Con più di una lobby per argomento ci sono due risultati. Primo, sotto alcune condizioni solo le lobby più estreme ricevono contributi. Secondo, l’effettività di una lobby è massimizzata quando la salienza di un argomento è bassa nella popolazione e alta per un piccolo gruppo di cittadini. Il terzo capitolo si occupa dei determinanti dell’investimento in state capacity nelle colonie di non insediamento. I risultati di questa analisi superano i limiti del framework creato da Acemoglu et al. (2001), la cui teoria afferma solo che istituzioni estrattive sono state promosse nelle colonie di non insediamento, senza dare alcuna spiegazione alla grande eterogeneità di istituzioni in queste colonie. Circa metà delle colonie che diventarono indipendenti dopo il 1945 hanno affrontato costosi conflitti civili successivamente. Evidenze empiriche suggeriscono che l’investimento del colonizzatore in state capacity sia uno dei determinanti del conflitto civile nelle ex colonie. Una buona state capacity, nelle forme di una burocrazia efficiente, una forza di polizia che funziona, un sistema giudiziario indipendente, capacità fiscale, hanno impedito il falli¬mento dello stato e il conflitto civile, una volta che l’indipendenza fu ottenuta. Una teoria è sviluppata per studiare il comportamento strategico dei colonizzatori nello scegliere l’investimento in state capacity nella colonia. Una buona state capacity crea un aumento di produttività nell'economia coloniale, ma come effetto collaterale previene il conflitto civile in caso di indipendenza, e quindi aumenta l’incentivo della colonia di combattere per essa. I colonizza¬tori quindi scelgono il livello di investimento in state capacity comparando l’aumento di produttività con il maggiore costo militare per mantenere il potere quando la colonia punta all’indipendenza. L’investimento in state capacity in equilibrio dipende dal matching tra l’identità del colonizzatore (un colonizzatore con un impero coloniale più vasto avrà un costo militare medio più basso) e l’identità della colonia (l’aumento di produttività dipende dalla presenza di risorse naturali, distanza dal mare). Se il colonizzatore è forzato a lasciare la colonia a causa di eventi esogeni, la mancanza di state capacity, e l’inefficienza del processo di decolonizzazione, determinano la presenza o meno di conflitto civile dopo l’indipendenza.

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Denna uppsats behandlar direkt lobbying mot det internationella standardsättarorganetInternational Accounting Standards Board, IASB. Studien motiveras med att utformandet avIFRS, till följd av en ökad globalisering, fått en allt viktigare roll inom internationellredovisning. Vår empiriska undersökning går ut på att kartlägga avsändare av inskickadecomment letters under perioden 2005 till 2009 till standardsättarorganisationen IASB.Comment letters är kommentarer eller feedback som IASB efterfrågar från allmänhen innanen ny IFRS definitivt bestäms.Vårt resultat visar på att en majoritet av direkt lobbying via comment letters utförs avorganisationer och att Europa utmärker sig som särskilt aktiv när man ser till frekvensen avantalet inskickade kommentarer. Vidare finner vi att endast sex länder världen övertillsammans står för över hälften av kommentarerna. Vi analyserar fram ett flertal tänkbaraförklaringar som kan ligga bakom vårt framtagna resultat, där faktorer som länders storlek,ekonomisk utveckling, kultur och framförallt lagstiftning diskuteras. Våra förklaringar tillresultatet kan inte ses som en uttömmande analys till varför det förehåller sig på det här viset.Resultatet skall snarare ses som en sanningsenlig och aktuell bild av verkligheten som kanverka som språngbräda för framtida forskning, något som tidigare saknas inom området.

Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales)
La práctica del lobby ha tenido varios espacios en el ejercicio democrático de nuestra sociedad. Sin embargo antes de arraigarse como tal, pasó por varias etapas en que se discutía si efectivamente constituía una actividad legítima. La conceptualización del término y el análisis de sus orígenes, permiten comprender el desarrollo de la actividad hoy en día, además de otorgar ciertas luces acerca de su futuro a nivel legislativo. Dentro de este ámbito destaca la figura del lobbysta, el sujeto activo que gestiona e intercede por intereses ajenos(o bien propios) ante una autoridad. Las funciones del lobbysta y cómo estas son esenciales para determinar el verdadero aporte de la actividad a la sociedad, nos indican el grado de legitimidad y transparencia bajo el cual debe ser regulado el ejercicio del lobby. A través de un análisis del derecho comparado respecto al lobby, podremos interpretar su evolución jurídica en el mundo, y comprender las instituciones que crea el proyecto chileno que viene en normar la actividad, de manera de dejar en evidencia la importancia de su regulación, en cuanto 6 a sus aportes, y al mismo tiempo, establecer parámetros críticos que permitan mejorar algunos ámbitos del proyecto.

Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales)
No ha sido fácil elaborar una tesis sobre lobby sin caer en la tentación enciclopédica que caracteriza a los estudiantes de derecho. Sin duda, esas intenciones de abarcarlo todo pueden habernos jugado en contra buena cantidad de veces; máxime un proyecto de ley en ciernes, el cual ya demoraba mucho más que el desarrollo de este trabajo. Fue difícil seguir los tiempos de la legislatura. La bibliografía, abundante en apariencia, carecía de obras de calidad que fueran hechas por especialistas en asuntos de corrupción. Si sirve como primera conclusión, la pobreza de la bibliografía en español sobre los temas de probidad es un mal síntoma para el fortalecimiento del sistema democrático. Entonces, el estudiar un poco más profundamente este tema, respecto del cual poco – por no decir nada - se ha escrito en nuestro país, constituyó un importante desafío, que luego de extensas tertulias decidimos abordar con un poco de temor, al no dar, en un comienzo, con alguien realmente especialista en el tema que nos pudiera orientar en el desarrollo del trabajo. Posteriormente, el compartir visiones e inquietudes con distintos académicos fue enriquecedor y apasionante. Si no fuera por ellos, esta tesis no hubiere visto la luz. Vayan entonces nuestros agradecimientos al Profesor Guía, don Álvaro Tejos, quien nos apoyó en todo término e instante. Por otra parte, al incondicional y gratuito apoyo de Mario Drago, quien facilitándonos abundante bibliografía en inglés y español, nos transmitió una visión pasional y, por otro lado, llena de realidad. Por las conversaciones establecidas con los profesores Patricio Navia, Luis Cordero, Alfredo Rehren, con nuestros superiores en la labor pública y, en fin, por tantos amigos interesados que nos estimularon a seguir, con sus recortes de diarios y sus opiniones en la sobremesa

Goodwill har under en längre tid varit ett av redovisningens stora problemområden. Debatten om redovisning av detta komplexa begrepp har pågått länge. Frågan om tidsperioden för avskrivningar eller om koncernmässig goodwill överhuvudtaget skall skrivas av har varit en av de mest omstridda redovisningsfrågorna.

International Accounting Standards Board är ett oberoende organ vars åtaganden är att fastställa standarder inom redovisning och finansiell rapportering. IFRS är det regelverk som ges ut av IASB. Utvecklandet av IFRS sker genom en internationell process där

alla intressenter (nationella normgivare, utgivare och användare av finansiella rapporter, revisorer mm) som berörs är beviljade att delge sin uppfattning. IASB publicerade under 2004 en ny standard rörande företagsförvärv. IFRS 3 Business Combinations, innehåller stora förändringar som bland annat innebär att Goodwill inte längre skall skrivas av utan vid behov skrivas ned. Under december 2002 utgav IASB ”Exposure Draft 3, Business Combinations” där nämnden bjöd in aktörer till att svara på och kommentera de olika frågorna som ingick i utkastet till IFRS 3.

Syftet med denna uppsats är att försöka öka förståelsen av hur lobbying av denna typ fungerar genom att studera svarsbreven IASB erhållit ifrån de olika aktörerna till fråga 8 i utkastet.

Studien har utgått ifrån ett hermeneutiskt förhållningssätt med en abduktiv ansats. Det empiriska materialet är uppdelat efter hur aktörerna ställt sig till frågan och därefter klassificerat efter vilken grupp intressenterna tillhör. Analysen har genomförts för varje aktörsgrupp separat. Syftet med detta är att försöka urskilja hur varje grupp argumenterat för sin sak för att sedan se om vi kan hitta någonting gemensamt i själva resonemangen som knyter gruppen till en viss ställning. Även argumenten i sig är klassificerade efter syntaktiska, pragmatiska och semantiska resonemang.

Störst i antalet insända svar var producenter av finansiell information. Då nya regler får en direkt påverkan på producenter av finansiell information kan det relativa intresset från denna grupp förklaras med att aktörer söker påverka mot en position som gynnar

den egna verksamheten. Den minsta gruppen utgjordes av statliga institutioner, detta kan förklaras med att utkastet inte medförde eventuella skatteeffekter, då standarden behandlar koncernredovisning.

Innhållet i argumenten var den samma för de flesta aktörer. Samtliga intressenter hade på liknande sätt utgått ifrån IASBs ställningstagande när dessa argumenterade mot utkastet. Aktörerna som var för hade inte sökt stärka sin position i vidare mening. Pragmatiska och semantiska argument var de som förekom mest, syntaktiska argument användes i betydligt lägre utsträckning.

Goodwill has under a significant time been a major dilemma in accounting. The controversy regarding how to recognize this complex concept has been going on for a long period of time. The issue concerning amortisation over the useful life or amortisation of goodwill in general is one of the most disputed accounting subjects.

International Accounting Standards Board is a self governing organizational body whose assignment is to promulgate accounting and financial standards. IFRS is a set of accounting standards that are issued by IASB. The development of IFRS occurs through a process where all interested parties(standard-setter, auditors, publisher and

users of financial reports) whose affected are advised to inform their opinion. In 2004 IASB published a new standard concerning business combinations. IFRS 3 contained amendments proposing that goodwill should not be amortised systematically over its useful life and that goodwill instead should be impaired on indication. During

December 2002 IASB published ”Exposure Draft 3, Business Combinations” where they invited participants to respond and comment on the subject that was included in the exposure draft.

The purpose of this paper to gain understanding and perception of how lobbying of this nature functions by studying and analyzing the comment letters that IASB received on question 8 in the exposure draft.

In This paper we assume a hermeneutic abductiv approach. The empirical data is divided after how the interested has positioned themselves in the question and accordingly to suited groups. The analysis has been executed for every interest group separately. The purpose in doing this is to try to identify how the each group has argued for his matter and afterwards seek to find something general in the groups reasoning for it’s position. The arguments that each respondent group applies are also assorted in three classifications, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic.

Considerable amount of the comment letters were in the group, producers of financial information. When new standards have a direct effect on producers of financial reports, we observed that the interest from this group can be explained by stating that they seek to influence against a position that benefits their financial activities. The minor group constituted of governmental institutions, this can be clarified by noticing that the

exposure draft did not result in any potential tax effects, since the standard only concerned business combinations.

The content of the arguments was similar for the majority of the interested parties. They had all in an equivalent way assumed from the same standing point as IASB, when arguing against the exposure draft. The interest that was for the proposal did not attempt to strengthen their position in an extended meaning. The arguments that aroused mostly were pragmatic and semantic, syntactic arguments were applied in a lower extent.

Titel: Ett komplicerat förhållande - om relationen mellan lobbying och marknadsföring Författare: Pernilla Jansdotter & Emma Josefsson Handledare: Christine Tidåsen Nivå: Kandidatuppsats i Marknadsföring, 15 hp, VT 2011 Nyckelord: Lobbying, PR, marknadsföring, tabu, marknadskommunikation Problemformulering: Hur använder företag lobbying ur ett PR- och marknadsförings-perspektiv och anses det vara en tabubelagd form av marknadskommunikation? Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka och beskriva hur företag kan använda sig av lobbying ur ett PR- och marknadsföringsperspektiv samt hur allmänheten, företag och politiker ser på fenomenet. Metod: Uppsatsen är en kvalitativ studie med en abduktiv ansats. Sex semistrukturerade intervjuer med lobbyister och andra lobbyarbetare har genomförts. Ytterligare 20 mindre intervjuer med allmänheten samt en sekundärempirisk undersökning har utförts. Teoretisk referensram: Kapitlet inleds med en beskrivning av begreppet lobbying, hur kopplingen till PR och marknadsföring ser ut samt hur lobbyarbetet går till. Därefter beskrivs allmänhetens, politikers och företags inställning till lobbying. Empirisk studie: I empirin presenteras materialet från alla våra intervjuer samt vår sekundärempiriska undersökning. Respondenterna ger sin syn på fenomenet lobbying och inställningen till det. Detta presenteras under tre separata delar. Slutsats: Studien leder fram till slutsatsen att kopplingen mellan lobbying, marknadsföring och PR kan ses på flera olika sätt, men att framgångsrik lobbying kan påverka marknaden företag är verksamma på. Vi ser också att politiker och företag är positivt inställda, medan allmänheten har dålig kunskap om fenomenet och en mer negativ inställning till lobbying.
Title: It’s complicated! – The relationship between lobbying and marketing Authors: Pernilla Jansdotter & Emma Josefsson Advisor: Christine Tidåsen Level: Bachelor thesis in marketing (15 Swedish credits), Spring 2011 Keywords: Lobbying, Public Relations, Marketing, Taboo, Marketing communications Question: How is lobbying used by companies from a PR and marketing perspective and is it considered a taboo form of marketing communication? Purpose: The purpose with this thesis is to explore and describe how companies can avail lobbying from a PR and marketing perspective, and how lobbying workers, the general public and politicians perceive the attitude towards the phenomenon. Method: This thesis is a qualitative study with an abductive reasoning. Six semistructured interviews with lobbyists and other people who work with lobbying have been implemented. 20 smaller interviews with the general public and a secondary empirical study have been done. Theoretical framework: The chapter begins with a description of the concept of lobbying, how it links to PR and marketing, and how lobbying is done. After that a description is made of the public, politicians and corporate attitude to lobbying. Empirical studies: The empirical data presents material from all our interviews and our secondary empirical study. The respondents give their version on the phenomena lobbying and the attitude towards it. This is presented in three different sections. Conclusion: Our study leads to the conclusion that the link between lobbying, marketing and PR can be seen in several different ways, but also that successful lobbying may affect the market of a company. We also see that politicians and businesses are more positive, while the public has little knowledge of the phenomenon and a more negative approach to lobbying.

This thesis contains three chapters examining firms’ behaviour and decision making when they seek to influence policies in the US through lobbying activities. The first chapter studies the main trade-off that firms face when they face the decision to integrate or outsource knowledge workers. The chapter proposes a model that predicts that firms requiring large firm-specific skills, or low levels of issue-specific skills, or facing a large number of transactions will integrate as opposed to outsource the service provider. Using a newly collected dataset on the US federal lobbying industry, I conduct firm-fixed effect estimations and I find strong evidence supporting the theoretical predictions. To provide further empirical evidence, I exploit a quasi-experiment that the Oil and Gas industry faced: The BP oil spill. The spill increased the issue-specific skills needed to conduct advocacy activities and in line with the theory developed in the chapter, I show that the affected industry started using more external, as opposed to internal lobbyists after the oil spill. The second chapter studies the effect of a technological upgrade on firms’ vertical integration decision. I use the model proposed in the first chapter to show that a technological shock, introduced by the Open Government Act decreased the cost of acquiring issue-specific skills, which in turn, made firms less likely to outsource. Then, I use structural models to measure the magnitude of this technological effect and conduct counterfactual exercises to study the influence that the regulation had on the industry. The third chapter studies the relationship between lobbying expenditures and market structure. I show that less and no more concentrated industries spend more on lobbying. To explain this empirical puzzle, I propose a theoretical model that includes the level of excludability in the payoffs. I provide empirical evidence that firms in less concentrated industries tend to lobby for more excludable goods and I show that including this dimension can explain the empirical puzzle. To provide causal evidence, I use national-level mergers that change citylevel market structures. Collecting a new data set of city-level lobbying expenditures, I show that controlling for the level of excludability in the payoffs, more concentrated industries spend more on lobbying efforts.

Många PR-konsulter anser att mediebilden av PR och lobbying är negativ och att branschen skildras som manipulativ och dold. Det finns dock en annan uppfattning som går ut på att verksamheterna inte framställs lika negativt som för tio år sen, att de har naturaliserats. Uppfattningarna är motsägelsefulla. Syftet med uppsatsen har varit att undersöka om de stämmer överens med den verkliga mediebilden av PR och lobbying (aktiviteter och utövare), och därmed också få en insikt i om olika aspekter av verksamheterna har naturaliserats. En jämförelse har gjort av DN:s och SvD:s rapportering senhöstarna 2000 och 2010 genom en kvantitativ och kvalitativ innehållsanalys. Resultatet visar att mediebilden är mer negativ 2010 jämfört med 2000. Någon egentlig naturalisering kan inte skönjas. Utrymmet har ökat men artiklarna har inte blivit fler. PR-experter som kommentatorer har inte blivit ett vanligare fenomen, och politiker som går till PR-branschen framställs både kritiskt och okritiskt. PR och lobbying framställs i högre grad som dolda verksamheter. En förklaring till den mer negativa bilden kan vara branschens utveckling på senare år men även journalisternas behov att sätta gränser mot en expanderande PR-industri som de har blivit mer beroende av. Tidningarna har två större granskningar av branschen 2010, varav den ena särskilt tar upp lobbying. I den fokuseras på politikernas ansvar för bristande transparens. PR-branschens ansvar genomlyses inte, vilket skulle kunna tyda på att dess bristande öppenhet ses som något naturligt och därför inte ifrågasätts.

In questa tesi si sono studiate le attività di lobbying americane delle principali aziende che operano su internet. L’attività è iniziata con una grande raccolta dati partendo dal sito che si occupa di raccogliere dati relativi alle attività di lobbying americane: www.Opensecrets.org. Per ogni impresa selezionata sono stati raccolti e suddivisi i dati di tutti i report di lobbying che vanno dall’anno 2008 al 2017. Le imprese prese in considerazione sono state principalmente 5: Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft. Una volta ottenuti i dati di tutti queste aziende si è passati allo studio di questi dati alla ricerca di strategie comuni di lobbying. Un primo studio è stato fatto di anno in anno e si è cercato di mettere in correlazione i principali eventi relativi all’azienda presa in considerazione con le attività di lobbying dell’anno stesso. Una seconda fase dello studio ha cercato una correlazione tra attività di lobbying negli anni che vanno dal 2008 al 2017 e le principali fonti di guadagno. Una terza fase dello studio è partita, invece che dall’impresa, dagli argomenti di lobbying alla ricerca, in presenza di picchi massimi di investimento, un riscontro reale cioè una variazione normativa.

Questa tesi si propone di analizzare l’associazione tra le attività di lobbying finanziate, o direttamente condotte, da Google, Amazon e Facebook e l’evoluzione della formulazione del regolamento generale sulla protezione dei dati (GDPR), ufficialmente regolamento (UE) n. 2016/679, che è il regolamento dell'Unione europea in materia di trattamento dei dati personali e di privacy entrato in vigore il 25 maggio 2018. Per avere una visione maggiormente chiara del tema trattato, verrà riassunto il procedimento che il GDPR ha seguito prima di diventare ufficiale e il ruolo delle istituzioni che ne sono interessate e si tenterà poi di riassumere le novità principali in materia del trattamento dei dati personali che il Regolamento ha apportato. Si farà riferimento poi all'attività di lobbying generica di Google, Amazon e Facebook e di due organizzazioni di cui queste ultime fanno parte: la Digital Europe e l’American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union (AmCham EU). In riferimento all’attività di lobbying specifica sul GDPR verranno riportate le informazioni di alcuni articoli online e di un portale (LobbyPlag.eu ) che è stato creato appositamente per raccogliere quello che viene definito come “lo scandalo del copia-incolla”, ovvero lo scandalo di alcune proposte dei lobbisti copiate e incollate direttamente dagli eurodeputati come emendamenti del GDPR.

The public has traditionally viewed lobbying with disdain; notions of “back room deals” and “bought politicians” have prevailed in the public discourse of many advanced industrialized democracies. This public attention has resulted in government action to regulate the practice of lobbying in some advanced democracies in the latter half of the twentieth century, with the aim to increase transparency and legitimacy. Research focused on the United States has produced insight into the creation and nature of lobbying regulations within the context of the American state governments. There has been no similar research within the Canadian political context, despite the fact that the Canadian federal government and nine of its ten provinces regulate lobbying to some degree. This study fills the gap in the literature by examining what factors cause lobbying regulations in Canada and its provinces. In order to address this question, this study scored all lobbying regulations at both the provincial and federal level, using an original index. Five potential causal variables were identified, based on findings from the literature: political scandals, political culture, financial resources, legislative tenure, and ideology. A quantitative bivariate analysis employing cross-tabulation was conducted, investigating the relationship between the aforementioned causal variables and lobbying regulations in Canada. Results indicated a statistically significant relationship between the timing and stringency of lobbying regulations and 1) the ideology of the governing party, 2) the occurrence of political scandals at the federal and provincial levels, and 3) the wealth of Canadian polities. These results differ from those reported in the US literature, which identify political culture and legislative tenure as causal variables. Thus, findings from the US literature cannot be generalized to the Canadian political context; potentially, contextual factors such as institutional design, the unique makeup of Canadian political culture, and the nature of the Canadian ideological spectrum may function to explain these differences. More broadly, these results undermine the notion that there are universal determinants of lobbying regulations across polities.
Arts, Faculty of
Political Science, Department of
Graduate

The first essay, co-authored with Sumeet Gulati, estimates the increase in the market share of ENERGY STAR-qualified appliances attributed to utility rebates in the US. Results show that a dollar increase in the rebate leads to a 0.3% increase in the share of ENERGY STAR-qualified clothes washers while the effect is not significant for dishwashers and refrigerators. Assuming a redemption rate of 40%, the cost of a megawatt hour saved is lower than the estimated cost of building and operating an additional power plant and the average on-peak spot price. Therefore, rebate programs for ENERGY STAR clothes washers are a cost-effective way to reduce energy demand. In the second essay I analyse the presence of pollution spillovers by looking at emission levels and changes in emissions. I use a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model with geographic distance and industry distance weight matrices as well as an extension of the SAR model that uses the two weight matrices simultaneously to exploit the variation in the toxicity-weighted emission levels and emission changes in a large sample of manufacturing facilities in Canada. I find that, compared to OLS results, these spatial linkages exist and are stronger for within sector linkages than geographic linkages. In the third essay I use firm-level characteristics to predict the lobbying and abatement decision of firms in a model with two non-cooperating firms. There are three sources of firm heterogeneity, viz. the marginal cost of production, the emission intensity and the marginal cost factor of abatement. The decision to lobby or abate or do both depends on the cost-effectiveness of lobbying against that of abating. I find that a firm will abate and not lobby if its effective marginal abatement cost, which depends on output, is lower than a threshold value.

Bakalauro darbo objektas – visuomenės lobizmo vykdymas. Darbo tikslas – aptarti ir išnagrinėti lobizmą teisiniu požiūriu bei ištirti lobistinę veiklą, kuri yra vykdoma panaudojant visuomenės palaikymo skatinimo priemones. Pagrindiniai darbo uždaviniai: atskleisti lobizmo sampratą, teisinį šios veiklos reguliavimą ir įgyvendinimo procesus; ištirti lobistinę veiklą kaip vieną iš viešųjų ryšių programų; išanalizuoti visuomenės lobizmą kaip veiklą, kuria siekiama daryti įtaką valdžios sprendimams; ištirti, kokios visuomenės lobizmo priemonės yra naudojamos įgyvendinant konkrečias šios veiklos programas Lietuvoje ir palyginti pilietinių ir verslo organizacijų priemonių panaudojimo aktyvumą. Atlikus visuomenės lobizmo priemonių panaudojimo Lietuvoje tyrimą buvo nustatyta, kad tiek pilietinės, tiek verslo organizacijos, vykdydamos visuomenės lobizmą naudojo tokias pirmines visuomenės lobizmo priemones kaip: reklama televizijoje ir radijuje, užsakomieji pranešimai, tyrimų rezultatų paskelbimas, naujų interneto svetainių kūrimas, laiškai redaktoriui. Tyrimas parodė, kad naudotos buvo ir antrinės priemonės – piketai, peticijų pasirašymai, laiškai redaktoriui. Pastebėta, kad pilietinės organizacijos veikė aktyviau, tačiau naudojo mažiau efektyvias priemones, kurios buvo pigesnės. Verslo interesus atstovaujančios organizacijos, turėdamos pakankamus finansinius resursus, išnaudojo tokias priemones kaip reklama radijuje, televizijoje bei reklama dienraščiuose. Magistro darbas bus naudingas... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]
Lobbying includes all attempts to influence legislators and officials, whether by other legislators, constituents or organized groups. The terms lobbying and public affairs are often used interchangeably. Public affairs is a public relations specialism that seeks to influence public policy via lobbying and/or through the media. While public affairs is a specialized part of public relations, it is still closely connected with other parts of the public relations disciplines. For example, issue management, crises management. There is a particular skills set required to do lobbying. The core skills are those of identifying and analyzing issues, building a case in response, getting access to decision makers, aligning private and public interests, persuading officials and politicians in your favour and deciding on private or public routes of influence. Grassroots lobbying is pressure from bottom to top. From a public affairs viewpoint, grassroots lobbying is the mobilization of constituents to demonstrate public support for an organization’s position. Grassroots lobbying consists of three essential steps: constituency building, constituency communication and constituency activation. Constituency building is the process of identifying and recruiting people who are willing to become politically active on behalf of an organization. Constituency communication means that when time permits, recruitment of constituents can be follow up by regular communication about pertinent political... [to full text]

In the U.S. firms spend millions of dollars each year on climate lobbying. Climate lobbying is often seen as “dirty” firms lobbying against environmental regulations; however, my study reveals a subset of major climate lobbying contributors actually have positive environmental performance records. This paper analyzes the relationship between firm-level environmental performance indicators and climate lobbying expenditures. To explore this relationship, I combine a firm level climate lobbying expenditures dataset from the Center for Responsive Politics, financial measures from Compustat and CRSP, and environmental performance indicators from MSCI. My results indicate more climate lobbying among firms that derive substantial revenues from products and services with environmental benefits and those with proactive carbon emission reduction policies/technologies

Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, May, 2020
Cataloged from the official PDF of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 51-53).
I develop a three-period asset pricing model with heterogeneity in firms size and a government that introduces a policy distortion. I find that large firms can better hedge the political uncertainty associated with this policy change through lobbying, which leads them to earn lower expected returns. I provide two strands of empirical evidence consistent with the model predictions. The first one looks at the behavior of a blue versus red industries around the unexpected results of the 2016 US Presidential election. The second one uses portfolio sorting and double-sorting to reach consistent conclusions.
by Pierre Jaffard.
S.M. in Management Research
S.M.inManagementResearch Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management

Purposes: The purposes of this investigation were to identify the use of paid lobbyists within California school districts, to describe the legislative lobbying activities of superintendents, and to compare the perceptions of superintendents and legislators to determine effective lobbying practices.

Establishing a successful European corporate political strategy aims at achieving three major steps: assessing the benefits of such a strategy in terms of information and influence, designing a tailor-made scheme integrating the specifics of the company, and implementing it efficiently through a thorough comprehension of policy-making mechanisms. Though not doctrinal, this paper hints at providing insights about Brussels' competencies and procedures so as for companies to be able to decide upon their course of actions with respect to European matters. We show that firms of all sizes and natures can defend their interests before the EU's authorities, with an economy of resources which does not engage the potential returns of their initiatives. Lobbying in Brussels revolves heavily around expertise, and we assert that "strategic communication of specialised information" can bring useful insights to many a company regardless of overlooked prior concerns.