Journal articles: 'Lobby Groups'

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Mendes, Philip. "Welfare lobby groups responding to globalization." International Social Work 49, no. 6 (November 2006): 693–704. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020872806070969.

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English Theories of globalization suggest that national lobby groups continue to exert influence on social policy agendas and outcomes. Yet little has been written about the impact of globalization on the political and ideological context within which pro-welfare state advocacy groups operate. This article explores the response of an Australian welfare lobby group to the challenges posed by globalization. French Les théories de la mondialisation soutiennent que les groupes de pression nationaux continuent d'exercer leur influence sur les projets et les définitions des politiques sociales. Pourtant, on recense peu d'écrits sur la façon dont la mondialisation influence le contexte politique et idéologique dans lequel travaillent les groupes de pression en faveur de l'aide sociale. Cette étude explore la position d'un groupe de pression australien en égard aux défis de la mondialisation. Spanish Las teorías de la globalización sugieren que los grupos nacionales de presión continúan ejerciendo influencia en las agendas y resultados de la política social. Se ha escrito poco sobre el impacto de la globalización en el contexto política social. Se ha escrito poco sobre el impacto de la globalización en el contexto político e ideológico, en el cual operan los grupos que abogan en pro del bienestar. Este artículo explora las respuestas de un grupo australiano de presión por el bienestar, frente a los desafióos que ofrece la globalización.

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Eaton, Lynn. "Antismoking groups lobby against Lords report." BMJ 332, no. 7555 (June 15, 2006): 1410.5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.332.7555.1410-d.

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Damania, Richard, and Per G. Fredriksson. "On the formation of industry lobby groups." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 41, no. 4 (April 2000): 315–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00079-7.

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&NA;. "GROUPS LOBBY AGAINST CUTS IN MEDICARE AND MEDICAID." Journal of Wound, Ostomy and Continence Nursing 14, no. 4 (July 1987): 29A. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00152192-198707000-00009.

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Grafov, D. B. "Comparison of the Influence of the Chinese Lobby and the Israeli Lobby in the United States." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 5(44) (October 28, 2015): 84–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-5-44-84-98.

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The article is about how pro-Israel and pro-China interest groups try to lobby on the ground of Capitol, White House and executive branch. The study of the lobbying results is based on «General theory of action» T. Parsons. It is concluded that for lobbying interests the main point will be the representation of the interests in the political and public spaces and the creating of advocacy and lobbying infrastructure. The ability of the Israeli lobby to achieve the goal can be explained, firstly, by political inclusion in the decision-making process, and, secondly, by almost axiomatic representation Israel interests through the national interests of the United States. The Israeli lobby can be considered as the religious lobby. It can use the possibilities of Jewish religious organizations in grass root action. Also this gives the opportunity to avoid the requirements of the LDA. From the point of view of the theory of Talcott Parsons, the success of the Israeli lobby is the cause of the action of a large number of actors that may form in large groups. Another advantage of the Israeli lobby is the ability of its members to get relevant information about the current situation in different spheres of political life in the U.S. The objective of the present study was to reveal the ways in which China lobby succeeds. The influence of China lobby on decision-making process in the United States can be explained through strong economic ties between American corporations and the Chinese market. When lobbying China uses numerous Chinese Diaspora in many States, as well as trying to interest of the former high-ranking American officials, granting them special privileges for doing business in China. In comparison to the Israeli lobby, the Chinese lobby has weaknesses. Chinese interest groups are not included in the political system of the USA and this is the disadvantage of the Chinese way of lobbying. Unlike Israel lobby Chinese one is external. The interests of the chinese pressure groups do not coincide with American national interests. Their actors are not rooted in the American political system.

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Ovaere, Lotte, Stef Proost, and Sandra Rousseau. "The choice of environmental regulatory enforcement by lobby groups." Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy 2, no. 3 (November 2013): 328–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21606544.2013.836136.

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Puy, M. Socorro. "Lobby Groups and the Financial Support of Election Campaigns." Journal of Public Economic Theory 2, no. 3 (July 2000): 319–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1097-3923.00041.

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Imomova, Yulduzkhan. "INFLUENCE OF LOBBYING ON THE KARABAKH CONFLICT." JOURNAL OF LOOK TO THE PAST 12, no. 3 (December 30, 2020): 48–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.26739/2181-9599-2020-12-7.

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This article examines the role and influence of ethnic lobby groups that exert pressure on decision-making processes regarding the Karabakh conflict. The lobby groups actively operate in democratic states such as the United States, Russia and Turkey and form a political position on the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which in turn may affect the consequences of the conflict

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Shakoori, Marziehe, Davood Kiani, and Masha Allah Heidarpour. "Effect of AIPAC Lobby on America's Foreign Policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran." Journal of Politics and Law 9, no. 6 (July 31, 2016): 129. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v9n6p129.

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Undoubtedly, no countries have been, by now, the host and under the influence of pressure groups as far America would, the issue make difficult to make a decision in foreign policy affairs, because of the benefits and the valuation system in America. It seems that among the pressure groups in America, the Israel lobby in America has the most influence on the foreign policy-making; accordingly it can be said almost there has been a special relationship between America and Israel after World War II and AIPAC always guarantees this relationship to continue. In shaping the foreign policy of any country, a collection of internally, nationally and internationally different-level factors would contribute that the outcome of the interaction between these factors has been provided as an output and called by "foreign policy". United States of America's foreign policy has been the outcome of such a process, accordingly, on the basis of theories of international relations that the internal level would be the most essential level of the analysis of the foreign policy of the United States of America, which one of its components is to examine the role of pressure groups in shaping this country’s foreign policy, actually in this regard, there is no the most prominent and significant lobby group except Israel lobby in America. So, author intends to investigate the influence of various forms of Israel lobby and this regime position and performance within America’s foreign policy against Iran and thereby, the lobby’s directed activates in the arena of Iran were investigated; followed by the research process, stated that the penetrating element in the decision-making system of the United states of America is undeniably in terms of the Israeli-centered influential lobby groups’ contribution and the unsparing support of the United states for this lobby.

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Smith, V. Kerry. "A Theoretical Analysis of the “Green Lobby”." American Political Science Review 79, no. 1 (March 1985): 132–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1956123.

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The purpose of this article is to develop a theoretical framework for analyzing why individuals support private environmental “public interest” groups. The model attempts to integrate past contributions which have argued that these decisions could be explained by one of several factors, including: bounded rationality and imperfect information (Moe, 1980); the features of the public goods provided (or influenced by) these groups (Mitchell, 1979); the existence of a disequilibrium in households' demands for public goods (Weisbrod, 1977); or as a response to contract failures (Hansmann, 1980). The article uses a theoretical framework originally developed to explain individuals' decisions to join private clubs and specifies the conditions for the efficient provision of access to different types of private, nonprofit groups. By describing the optimal access conditions as if individuals could be coordinated to assure this efficient outcome, the model provides insights into the benefits and costs associated with membership in the environmental groups in practice.

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Mackley, Gordon. "Pressure groups have a right to lobby on assisted dying." Nursing Standard 26, no. 6 (October 12, 2011): 31. http://dx.doi.org/10.7748/ns2011.10.26.6.31.p6622.

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Mackley, Gordon. "Pressure groups have a right to lobby on assisted dying." Nursing Standard 26, no. 6 (October 12, 2011): 31. http://dx.doi.org/10.7748/ns.26.6.31.s44.

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Bwalya, Samuel M., Ezekiel Phiri, and Kelvin Mpembamoto. "How interest groups lobby to influence budget outcomes in Zambia." Journal of International Development 23, no. 3 (March 25, 2011): 420–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jid.1778.

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Ban, Pamela, and Hye Young You. "Presence and influence in lobbying: Evidence from Dodd-Frank." Business and Politics 21, no. 2 (February 14, 2019): 267–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/bap.2018.27.

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AbstractInterest groups face many choices when lobbying: when, who, and how to lobby. We study interest group lobbying across two stages of regulatory policymaking: the congressional and agency rulemaking stages. We investigate how the Securities and Exchange Commission responds to interest groups at the end of these stages using a new, comprehensive lobbying dataset on the Dodd-Frank Act. Our approach examines citations in the SEC's final rules which reference and acknowledge the lobbying activities of specific interest groups. We find that more than 2,900 organizations engaged in different types of lobbying activities either during the congressional bill stage, the agency rulemaking stage, or both. Meetings with the SEC and hiring former SEC employees are strongly associated with the citation of an organization in a final rule. Comments submitted by trade associations and members of Congress are cited more in a final rule compared to other organizations. While there is more variety in the types of organizations who lobby the bureaucracy than those who lobby Congress, presence does not necessarily lead to recognition or influence.

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Kollman, Ken. "Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological Bias, and Congressional Committees." American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 2 (April 1997): 519. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111775.

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McKay, Amy Melissa, and Antal Wozniak. "Opaque: an empirical evaluation of lobbying transparency in the UK." Interest Groups & Advocacy 9, no. 1 (January 20, 2020): 102–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41309-019-00074-9.

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Abstract The government of the UK is reputed to be among the world’s most transparent governments. Yet in comparison with many other countries, its 5-year-old register of lobbyists provides little information about the lobbying activity directed at the British state. Further, its published lists of meetings with government ministers are vague, delayed, and scattered across numerous online locations. Our analysis of more than 72,000 reported ministerial meetings and nearly 1000 lobbying clients and consultants reveals major discrepancies between these two sources of information about lobbying in the UK. Over the same four quarters, we find that only about 29% of clients listed in the lobby register appear in the published record of ministerial meetings with outside groups, and less than 4% of groups disclosed in ministerial meetings records appear in the lobby register. This wide variation between the two sets of data, along with other evidence, contribute to our conclusion that the Government could have made, and still should make, the lobby register more robust.

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O'SHAUGHNESSY, ANDREW J. "THE FORMATION OF A COMMERCIAL LOBBY: THE WEST INDIA INTEREST, BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION." Historical Journal 40, no. 1 (March 1997): 71–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x9600684x.

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British colonial policy initiatives of the 1760s and the American revolutionary war led to a period of sustained lobbying by the West India interest in Britain; lobbying which developed from an informal body into a more professionally organized lobby, along the lines of modern economic interest groups. The composition of the lobby and its activities during the revolutionary period are examined here. Its considerable influence is also assessed and explained. The article finds that the lobby won major concessions from the British government and vitally affected British policy towards North America. It nevertheless concludes that the lobby enjoyed its greatest influence in the early century when ironically its organization was weaker but its goals coincided more harmoniously with those of British colonial policy. Its later reorganization was a response to the increasing conflicts of interest between the white elites of the British Caribbean and the mother country which intensified during the period of the American revolution and its aftermath.

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Atikcan, Ece Özlem, and Adam William Chalmers. "Choosing lobbying sides: the General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union." Journal of Public Policy 39, no. 4 (September 26, 2018): 543–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x18000223.

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AbstractDespite the impressive amount of empirical research on lobbying, a fundamental question remains overlooked. How do interest groups choose to lobby different sides of an issue? We argue that how groups choose sides is a function of firm-level economic activity. By studying a highly salient regulatory issue, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and using a novel data set of lobbying activities, we reveal that a group’s main economic sector matters most. Firms operating in finance and retail face unique costs and are incentivised to lobby against the GDPR. However, these groups are outgunned by a large, heterogeneous group of firms with superior lobbying firepower on the other side of the issue.

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Abdollahi, Mojtaba. "The Effect of Zionist Lobby on America's Foreign Policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran." Journal of Politics and Law 9, no. 7 (August 30, 2016): 262. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v9n7p262.

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<p>Undoubtedly, no country as America is the host and influenced of pressure groups, and because of the existence of the interests and valuation system in America, this issue has made decision making in foreign policy of this country difficult. Among pressure groups in America, Zionist lobbies seem to have the most influence in America's foreign policy. Based on this, it can be approximately said that America and Israel have had special ties after the World War II and AIPAC Group has always guaranteed the continuation of this relationship. A set of factors play role in forming foreign policy of each country internally, nationally and internationally that the outcome of these factors’ action and reactions will is presented as the outcome and "foreign policy". The United Sates of America’s foreign policy is also the same process, based on this according to the international relationships ideas which of the important levels in analyzing foreign policy of the United States of America is internal level whose one of its components is investigating the role of pressure groups in forming the foreign policy of this country, practically the activity of any groups isn’t as prominent and highlighted as Zionist lobby in this subject.</p>Therefore the author of this research is sought to investigate the effect of different shapes of Zionist lobby and the position and performance of this regime in America’s foreign policy towards Iran, hence the arrow of lobbying activities in the area of Iran is also evaluated; consequently in the process of the research, stating that influential element in the system of decision making in The United States of America about the role of stakeholder groups with a focus on Zionist lobby and the unwavering support of the United States from this lobby is undeniable.

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Klüver, Heike. "The contextual nature of lobbying: Explaining lobbying success in the European Union." European Union Politics 12, no. 4 (July 7, 2011): 483–506. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116511413163.

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Why are some interest groups able to lobby political decisions successfully whereas others are not? This article suggests that the issue context is an important source of variation because it can facilitate or hamper the ability of interest groups to lobby decision-makers successfully. In order to test the effect of issue characteristics, this article draws on a new, unprecedented data set of interest group lobbying in the European Union. Using quantitative text analysis to analyse Commission consultations, this article studies lobbying success across 2696 interest groups and 56 policy issues. The findings indicate that lobbying success indeed varies with the issue context, depending on the relative size of lobbying coalitions and the salience of policy issues, whereas individual group characteristics do not exhibit any systematic effect.

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Hojnacki, Marie, and David C. Kimball. "Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress." American Political Science Review 92, no. 4 (December 1998): 775–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586303.

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In a departure from previous research, we focus on the dyadic relationship between lobbyists and committee members in the House of Representatives in order to test hypotheses about what factors shape the decisions of individual groups to lobby individual committee members. Our primary assumption is that organized interests seek to expand their supportive coalitions and affect the content and fate of bills referred to committees. In order to accomplish these goals, they give highest priority to lobbying their legislative allies in committee; allies may lobby other members of Congress on a group's behalf and shape legislation to conform with a group's preferences. But organizations with access to a strong resource base can move beyond their allies and work directly to expand support among undecided committee members and legislative opponents. Our empirical analysis provides evidence to support our expectations.

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Pritoni, Andrea. "Navigating between ‘friends’ and ‘foes’: the coalition building and networking of Italian interest groups." Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 49, no. 1 (May 16, 2018): 49–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2018.6.

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This paper focuses on the reasons that Italian interest groups decide to lobby together with like-minded groups (‘friends’), or engage in networking activity with groups that have conflicting interests (‘foes’), in order to influence public policy. How often do Italian interest groups recur to these lobbying strategies? What favours the construction of a coalition of more or less different interest groups lobbying on a particular issue? What, on the contrary, influences the decision to lobby individually? In order to answer these questions, original data coming from a national survey conducted on 1277 Italian interest groups are provided. Empirical results are interesting: from a descriptive point of view, business groups are more likely to engage in joint lobbying than other group types, whereas the same holds true for unions with respect to networking with rival organizations. From an explanatory point of view, groups that perceive themselves to be threatened by rivals’ influence in policymaking, or by environmental challenges, are more likely to work in coalitions and to engage in networking: resources do not matter in ‘absolute’ and ‘objective’ terms, but in ‘relative’ and ‘subjective’ ones.

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Saz-Carranza, Angel, and Adria Albareda. "The Boards of Network Administrative Organizations: A Study of Supranational Lobby Groups." Academy of Management Proceedings 2017, no. 1 (August 2017): 15935. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2017.15935abstract.

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Ward, Stephen, and Philip Lowe. "National environmental groups and Europeanisation: A survey of the British environmental lobby." Environmental Politics 7, no. 4 (December 1998): 155–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644019808414429.

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HAEDER, SIMON F., and SUSAN WEBB YACKEE. "Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President's Office of Management and Budget." American Political Science Review 109, no. 3 (June 29, 2015): 507–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055415000246.

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All administrative processes contain points of entry for politics, and the U.S. president's use of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review government regulations is no exception. Specifically, OMB review can open up a pathway for interest groups to lobby for policy change. We theorize that interest group lobbying can be influential during OMB review, especially when there is consensus across groups. We use a selection model to test our argument with more than 1,500 regulations written by federal agencies that were subjected to OMB review. We find that lobbying is associated with change during OMB review. We also demonstrate that, when only business groups lobby, we are more likely to see rule change; however, the same is not true for public interest groups. We supplement these results with illustrative examples suggesting that interest groups can, at times, use OMB review to influence the content of legally binding government regulations.

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Boehmke, Frederick J., Sean Gailmard, and John W. Patty. "Business as usual: interest group access and representation across policy-making venues." Journal of Public Policy 33, no. 1 (February 26, 2013): 3–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x12000207.

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AbstractWe provide the first comprehensive study of lobbying across venues by studying interest group registrations in both the legislative and administrative branches. We present four major findings based on Federal and state data. Firstly, groups engage in substantial administrative lobbying relative to legislative lobbying. Secondly, the vast majority of groups lobby the legislature, but a large proportion of groups also lobby the bureaucracy. Thirdly, representational biases in legislative lobbying are replicated across venues: business groups dominate administrative lobbying at least as much as they do legislative lobbying. Finally, the level of interest group activity in one venue for a given policy area is strongly related to its level in the other venue. The findings potentially have important implications for the impact of institutional design on both the form and promotion of broad participation in policy-making as well as the ultimate content of policies chosen by democratic governments, broadly construed.

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McKay, Amy Melissa. "Fundraising for Favors? Linking Lobbyist-Hosted Fundraisers to Legislative Benefits." Political Research Quarterly 71, no. 4 (April 24, 2018): 869–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912918771745.

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Do legislators and lobbyists trade favors? This study uses uncommon data sources and plagiarism software to detect a rarely observed relationship between interest group lobbyists and sitting Members of Congress. Comparison of letters to a Senate committee written by lobby groups to legislative amendments introduced by committee members reveals similar and even identical language, providing compelling evidence that groups persuaded legislators to introduce amendments valued by the group. Moreover, the analysis suggests that these language matches are more likely when the requesting lobby group hosts a fundraising event for the senator. The results hold while controlling for ideological agreement between the senator and the group, the group’s campaign contributions to the senator, and the group’s lobbying expenditures, annual revenue, and home-state connections.

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Browarny, Tomasz. "Współczesne problemy krajów Europy Zachodniej z perspektywy teorii Mancura Olsona." Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne 27 (February 20, 2020): 39–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1643-0328.27.3.

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Current problems in West European countries from the perspective of Mancur Olson’s theoryThis paper employs the theory of collective action created by the American economist Mancur Olson, to examine the current problems of Western European countries and their causes. The article focuses on economic and political issues, such as economic stagnation, the inability to introduce reforms and the failure of ambitious European integration projects. The study contains an analysis of economic performances of West European countries in the post-war period and attempts to assess the influence of lobby groups on decision making in the European institutions. It is argued that the growing influence of powerful lobby groups and vested interests can account for the declining economic efficiency and inability of political institutions to solve this problem.

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Vasconcelos, César Ricardo Maia de, and Gabriel Lacerda de Paula. "A PERCEPÇÃO DOS PARLAMENTARES POTIGUARES ACERCA DO LOBBY E DO PODER DE INFLUÊNCIA DOS GRUPOS DE PRESSÃO." Revista Gestão e Desenvolvimento 16, no. 1 (February 13, 2019): 227. http://dx.doi.org/10.25112/rgd.v16i1.1634.

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O presente artigo de discussão teórica tem por finalidade abordar estudos relacionados à atividade de influência proveniente do Lobby e dos Grupos de Pressão. Para tanto, foram analisados, essencialmente, artigos de periódicos clássicos sobre a matéria, com publicações reconhecidas internacionalmente, disponíveis em bases de pesquisas especializadas, ocorridas no período de 1963 a 2016. De paradigma construtivista e associado à abordagem qualitativa, este trabalho, baseado nas investigações iniciais e lastreado por estudos específicos, permite concluir, preliminarmente, que as atividades dos grupos de pressão e de lobby se apresentam como vitais para obter vantagens hipercompetitivas mediante intervenção direta, seja nas decisões dos agentes públicos, seja na elaboração de legislações específicas. Palavras-chave: Lobby. Grupos de Pressão. Poder de Influência. Agentes públicos. Políticas públicas.ABSTRACTThe present article of theoretical discussion has as purpose to approach studies related to influence activity from Lobby and Pressure Groups. In order to do so, we have analyzed, essentially, articles from classic journals on the subject, with internationally recognized publications, available on specialized research bases, from 1963 to 2016. From a constructivist paradigm associated to the qualitative approach, this work, based on the initial investigations and backed up by specific studies, it is possible to conclude preliminarily that lobbying and lobbying activities are vital for obtaining hypercompetitive advantages through direct intervention in the decisions of public agents and in the elaboration of specific legislations.Keywords: Lobby. Power of Influence. Peer Pressure. Public Agents. Public policy.

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Griffiths, Richard T. "Agricultural pressure groups and the origins of the Common Agricultural Policy." European Review 3, no. 3 (July 1995): 233–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1062798700001538.

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Against the background of over a hundred years, during which national farming lobbies became ever more resilient, this article examines the processes leading to the creation of the European Union's common agricultural policy. It demonstrates how, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the agricultural issue acquired an international dimension. It argues further, that this coincided with an increasing penetration of governments by the farming lobby. Finally, it describes the protectionist factors that determined the form of the Rome Treaty's articles on agriculture and the forces that ensured their implementation.

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Ionaşcu, Alexandru. "The lobby regulations caught between public policies and the interest of the groups." Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence 14, no. 1 (July 1, 2020): 1158–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/picbe-2020-0108.

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AbstractThe intensification of integration led to the establishment of supranational structures, which influenced the volume of regulations and interaction between states, interest groups and the will of the people. The European Union is beginning to regulate several areas of public life and is gradually shifting the balance of regulations in relation to internal policies. As a result, the national governments are trapped between the interests of different economic and social groups and domestic politics, which is gradually becoming an element that is no longer representative for nationals. This article proposes a historical analysis of the matter with emphasis on how, the new approach has changed the paradigm of formulating European public policies from a classic method of regulation, in which the Commission collaborated with stakeholders and expert communities in developing regulation, to a subsequent one that embraced the method of policy coordination. The paper also aims to demonstrate the usefulness of transparent legislation in the field of relations between interests and decision-makers, especially in Eastern European states. The analysis was elaborated by researching primary and secondary sources plus the presentation of a representative case study. Lobby regulation is a recent concept in most Member States. Currently, only seven Member States have legislation on lobbying, as well as a mandatory register of interest group representatives. In some countries, there are codes of professional ethics drawn up by public relations and consultancy agencies, but they are not included in any set of laws. Future regulation will have the capability to create the premise of drafting rules between interest groups and state structures? Which are the essential principles that must be respected in the interaction between lobbyists and decision makers? Is the transparency of their efforts essential to legitimate the service of democracy?

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Hawkes, N. "Lobby groups call for closure of "revolving door" between drug regulators and industry." BMJ 343, dec30 2 (December 30, 2011): d8335. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.d8335.

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Fredriksson, PG, and N. Gaston. "Environmental governance in federal systems: the effects of capital competition and lobby groups." Economic Inquiry 38, no. 3 (July 2000): 501–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2000.tb00032.x.

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Klüver, Heike, Christine Mahoney, and Marc Opper. "Framing in context: how interest groups employ framing to lobby the European Commission." Journal of European Public Policy 22, no. 4 (February 12, 2015): 481–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1008550.

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Petronela, Iacob. "Shaping the Political Arena: A Comparative Approach Between American Lobby and Euro-Groups." Transition Studies Review 15, no. 2 (July 10, 2008): 265–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11300-008-0007-4.

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Baron, David P. "Lobbying dynamics." Journal of Theoretical Politics 31, no. 3 (June 16, 2019): 403–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629819850630.

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Many if not most government policies, regulations, and laws continue in effect unless changed by the legislature, providing a natural dynamic to the political process. Lobbying is a ubiquitous component of that process and can affect both proposal making and voting. This paper characterizes Markov perfect equilibria of a dynamic legislative bargaining model with stable policies and durable coalitions despite lobbying. Interest groups aligned with challenges to the incumbent coalition have a greater willingness to pay than have the defending interest groups, but the defenders have a legislative incumbency advantage in needing to counter-lobby fewer legislators than the challengers lobby. If legislators are sufficiently patient, equilibria exist such that the defenders of the incumbent coalition are successful. More than a minimal majority may be lobbied by the challengers, and coalitions can be surplus. Lobbying can increase proposal power, resulting in a more unequal distribution within a coalition.

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Polkhova, E. V., and A. A. Sergunin. "The Arctic Lobby in Japan: Structures, Mechanisms of Infl uence and the Role in Developing Cooperation with the Russian Federation." Moscow University Bulletin of World Politics 12, no. 4 (December 20, 2020): 99–130. http://dx.doi.org/10.48015/2076-7404-2020-12-4-99-130.

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Japan’s Arctic strategy, particularly its geopolitical and economic aspects, has been thoroughly reviewed by both Russian and foreign experts. However, the structures and mechanisms behind this strategy remain somewhat obscure. This paper is intended to partially fill this gap by resorting to the study of the Japanese Arctic lobby. The authors identify the key interest groups which stand for an active Arctic policy and for cooperation with the Russian Federation in that regard. These include, in particular, the energy sector representatives that sought to take part in the construction of liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants. The decision of the Japanese government to join the Western anti-Russian sanctions disrupted these plans. However, the adoption of S. Abe’s 8-points plan in 2016 opened up new opportunities for the Russia-Japan Arctic cooperation. Yet another two groups of interest are equally interested in strengthening bilateral relations — shipping and ship-building industries. They also suffered from anti-Russian sanctions but now they are actively engaged in the construction of the LNG jetties near Murmansk and in Kamchatka. There is also a growing interest towards the Arctic region within the fishery industry — a very important sector of Japan’s economy. Cooperation with Russia increases Tokyo’s capacity to participate in the creation of international legal regime of fisheries in the Central Arctic ocean. Finally, the authors identify another important element of the Japanese Arctic lobby — regional elites. In that regard, they examine activities of the Hokkaido prefecture to engage in development of the Northern Sea Route. The paper examines the key mechanisms used by the Arctic lobby to influence the authorities, including sectoral, regional and national business associations, research and educational centers and mass media, as well as ‘built-in lobby’ in relevant ministries and agencies responsible for making and implementing Tokyo’s Arctic policies. The authors conclude that, although the Arctic lobby is unable to persuade the Government to remove anti-Russian sanctions altogether, elaboration of a selective strategy of cooperation with the Japanese business community could strengthen bilateral relations and provide new opportunities for exploiting natural resources of the Far North and developing the Russian Arctic.

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Herdzik, Jerzy. "Chosen threats from wind farms located at sea." AUTOBUSY – Technika, Eksploatacja, Systemy Transportowe 19, no. 10 (October 31, 2018): 57–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.24136/atest.2018.335.

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Paper discussed the problem of threats from wind farm located at sea. It was presented the possibilities (depends on wind energy) of wind energy utilization on the Europe area. It was mentioned the conditions and perspectives of construction the sea wind energy plants in Europe and Poland. It was performed the wind turbines characteristics used on sea shelf. An example of planned investments on Polish economical area and territorial waters was mentioned. It was stayed focused on chosen threats, articulated through groups of people staying in opposite to wind turbine lobby, trying to stem the wind turbine development through localization limitations. The lobby of companies constructed the wind farms (having large funds) and legislation actions e.g. European Union preferring the energy obtained from renewable sources, stands in the opposition of people groups living on the areas in which the wind farms would be located and some groups of ecologists. It is a problem for neutral opinion when the arguments are different from these groups being in accordance with present knowledge and science achievements. Undoubtedly it is a necessary to undertake the compromise actions, allowing for wind power plant development.

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Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær, Darren R. Halpin, and Helene Helboe Pedersen. "From Policy Interest to Media Appearance: Interest Group Activity and Media Bias." International Journal of Press/Politics 25, no. 4 (May 23, 2020): 712–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1940161220916710.

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Media attention is a scarce, yet attractive, resource for interest groups. Existing studies show that media attention is concentrated on a relatively small number of well-resourced groups, often representing economic interests. However, the literature still struggles to disentangle the reasons behind this bias in media attention. Is it explained by media selection practices or uneven interest group activity? We cannot separate these two possible mechanisms by simply studying aggregate levels of media attention. In this study, we therefore compare the set of groups that lobby in specific policy areas with the groups that appear in the news on issues related to those same policy areas. The investigation is based on data from Denmark and the United Kingdom. First, we use survey data to identify the policy areas in which groups actively lobby. Second, we identify groups’ media appearances in news stories related to those same policy areas. Third, we compare diversity among the groups actively lobbying with the groups actually appearing in the news and investigate possible biases. We find that even when the analysis of media appearances is narrowed down to only those groups active in a policy area, the news media allow more access to well-resourced groups. However, in contrast to previous findings, differences in media appearances across interest group types are not reproduced. These results imply that media selection biases are mainly produced by varying lobbying resources rather than discrimination based on the type of interests that groups represent.

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Adrover Orellano, Fernando. "Uruguay’s Stance on the Palestinian Problem at the United Nations and the Creation of the State of Israel." Latin American Perspectives 46, no. 3 (February 15, 2019): 26–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0094582x19831440.

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Examination of documents on the decision-making process that accounts for the pro-Zionist stance of the Uruguayan delegation at the United Nations during the debate on Palestine reveals that the position coincides with the pro-Zionist consensus among local political groups and was influenced by the local Jewish community lobby and its contacts with government representatives. Un examen de los documentos sobre el proceso de toma de decisiones que explica la postura pro-sionista de la delegación uruguaya en las Naciones Unidas durante el debate sobre Palestina revela que la posición coincide con el consenso pro-sionista entre los grupos políticos locales y fue influenciada por el lobby de la comunidad judía local y sus contactos con representantes del gobierno.

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Hunt, Stephen. "‘Saints and Sinners: The Role of Conservative Christian Pressure Groups in the Christian Gay Debate in the UK’." Sociological Research Online 8, no. 4 (November 2003): 176–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5153/sro.854.

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This paper considers the conservative evangelical response to the Gay Christian Movement in the UK. Increasingly the conservative constituency has been forced to reply to the propaganda and highly vociferous Christian gay lobby that has appealed to both church and secular agencies with the language of ‘Rights’. This paper identifies and outlines the strategies undertaken by conservative Christianity anti-gay groups and speculates as to their level of current and future success.

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Dyer, Suzette. "Government, Public Relations, And Lobby Groups: Stimulating Critical Reflections On Information Providers In Society." Journal of Management Education 27, no. 1 (February 2003): 78–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1052562902239249.

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Hunt, Stephen. "A Turn to the Rights: UK Conservative Christian Lobby Groups and the ‘Gay Debate’." Religion & Human Rights 6, no. 3 (March 10, 2011): 291–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187103211x592596.

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The extension of non-heterosexual rights in largely liberal democratic contexts and confirmed in wider international conventions poses a challenge to Christian churches which historically condemned homosexuality and other sexual ‘variations’ on the basis of religious conviction. The stance taken by contemporary churches on these rights issues now diverge considerably. This article, however, considers the entrenched position of conservative Christian factions in the UK that have intensified their levels of political mobilisation at a time when they are drawn into the political arena through the implications of non-heterosexual rights in both the churches and the secular world. The article explores the way in which these cadres are forced to engage with the rhetoric of rights as an integral part of their oppositional stance, while attempting to negate the foundational basis of non-heterosexual rights. It will conclude with a discussion of how such developments connect with human rights theory.

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Tripathi, Micky, Stephen Ansolabehere, and James M. Snyder. "Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act." Business and Politics 4, no. 2 (August 2002): 131–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1034.

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This paper uses newly available data from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act to assess the argument that PAC contributions are used to gain access to legislators. First, we find a much stronger connection between lobbying and campaign contributions than previous statistical research has revealed—groups that have both a lobbyist and a PAC account for 70 percent of all interest group expenditures and 86 percent of all PAC contributions. Second, we find that groups that engage in relatively large amounts of lobbying-and therefore presumably have a high demand for access—allocate their campaign contributions differently than groups that do not. Groups that emphasize lobbying pay more attention to members' positions of power inside Congress, and less attention to members' electoral circumstances, than other groups. Groups that emphasize lobbying also appear to be more bipartisan and less ideological than other groups, giving more equally to both parties and more broadly across the ideological spectrum.

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KANG, HYOUNG-GOO, and THOMAS T. HOLYOKE. "No Exaggeration: Truthfulness in the Lobbying of Government Agencies by Competing Interest Groups." Japanese Journal of Political Science 14, no. 4 (October 30, 2013): 499–520. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109913000248.

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AbstractIntense competition can compel lobbyists to exaggerate the benefits the government would see in tax returns and social welfare if agency officials allocate such resources to the lobbyist's members. This incentive to misrepresent grows when information asymmetry exists between lobbyists and government officials. A large body of literature has investigated how interest groups compete and interact, but it disregards the interdependency of interests between competing groups and associated strategic behaviors of other players. Our signaling model of lobbying reveals ways in which agency officials can compel lobbyists for competing interests to lobby truthfully and what the policy implications of this compulsion can be. We also present case-study evidence of how this works in practice.

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Fenton, Richard. "Demystifying science—communication of complex science to reduce community fear of industry." APPEA Journal 53, no. 1 (2013): 295. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/aj12025.

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There are many claims made by those in opposition to CSG that the science behind this industry is not yet known, despite the fact that comprehensive environmental impact statements have been prepared and approved by both the state and federal governments, for three of the four major Queensland CSG-LNG projects. Those in opposition to the CSG industry, whether individuals or organised groups (the anti-CSG lobby), use self-generated online, newsprint and TV media to promote highly emotive messages to gain broader community support for their desire to stop the development of the CSG industry. Many of the claims made by the anti-CSG lobby are based on anecdotal evidence, untested hypothesis and incomplete scientific analysis, and are more specifically designed to evoke fear of the industry. Seldom have anti-CSG groups provided a true and balanced view of the likelihood of the risk, as to allow critical thinking or true debate of their claims. This paper describes the impact of the conformational bias, whereby anti-CSG groups have created their own interpretation of the science associated with CSG extraction. This interpretation of the science has been built into to the community’s understanding of the industry. The major issue with confirmatory bias is: the more evidence on the safety of the industry that the government and industry provides to the community, the more defiant the anti-CSG groups become. This is referred to in the paper as the backfire effect. This paper also looks at the methods used by the anti-CSG lobby to convey the risk associated with the industry, and makes the recommendation that to counteract the deliberately exaggerated consequences of the risks presented, the industry needs to respond with a balanced argument based on the risks’ likelihood—demonstrating through simple scientific language—that in most cases, the community should have a no rational reason to fear this growth and economically rewarding industry.

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KONOLD, DIETER. "Farm Interests as Bargaining Chips: France in the EU-Mercosur Free Trade Negotiations." Journal of Public Policy 30, no. 3 (November 4, 2010): 321–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x10000139.

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AbstractIn trade policy France ranks as one of the most protectionist countries in the European Union. From an outside perspective, the French attitude is usually explained as a consequence of the strength and influence of the agrarian lobby. The article argues that farm groups in France have lost their formerly privileged position and the power to pursue their interests politically. A closer look at domestic politics shows that agricultural reforms were successfully implemented against the opposition of the farm lobby during the last ten years. But at the same time, French policy-makers were keen to create the impression that they were unable to make concessions in international trade talks due to the resistance of the agricultural sector. The EU-Mercosur negotiations demonstrate how the French government fended off demands for liberalization using farm interests as bargaining chips.

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Davidson, Lawrence. "Islamophobia, the Israel Lobby and American Paranoia: Letter from America." Holy Land Studies 10, no. 1 (May 2011): 87–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/hls.2011.0005.

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The phenomenon of Islamophobia has now surfaced as a factor in American politics. While disturbing and damaging of people's lives and reputations, the phenomenon is not unique. It can be seen as but the latest eruption of paranoid political thinking that periodically arises in American history. In turn, seeing the fate of the nation threatened by conspiracies and anti-American elements is made easier and more destructive by high levels of ignorance and insularity among large numbers of Americans. This latest round of paranoid politics, coming now in the form of Islamophobia, was triggered by the attacks of 11 September 2001 and quickly exacerbated by American Zionist groups, both Jewish and Christian, whose dislike of Muslims also has a long history.

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Dellis, Arnaud, and Mandar Oak. "Informational Lobbying and Pareto-Improving Agenda Constraint." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 35, no. 3 (April 1, 2019): 579–618. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewz002.

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Abstract Interest groups (IGs) lobby policymaker (PM) by offering verifiable, policy-relevant information. The PM is limited in (1) his ability to verify the information offered by the IGs (access constraint) and (2) the number of issues he can implement reform on (agenda constraint). We show that when there exists an access constraint but no agenda constraint, the equilibrium exhibits “overlobbying,” that is, an IG with unfavorable information may lobby hoping that, the PM, unable to verify the information, may take the costly act of lobbying as a signal of favorable information and therefore implement reform on its issue. We then show that the presence of an agenda constraint can improve information transmission by curbing overlobbying. We identify circumstances under which an agenda constraint improves the ex ante expected welfare of both the PM and of each IG, thereby generating a Pareto improvement. (JEL D72, D78, D83)

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Niehina, Vlada, and Oleksandr Vysotskyi. "APPLICATION OF ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH THE PRO-ISRAEL LOBBY IN THE UNITED STATES." Politology bulletin, no. 84 (2020): 203–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2415-881x.2020.84.203-217.

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Israeli-American relations are based on common democratic values. The pro-Israel lobby is considered one of the most powerful, well-funded, and has ties to American politicians it supports during the election campaign. But lobbyists are faced with the task of obtaining pro-Israel support in important issues for the Jewish state: security, the status of Jewish settlements, Iran’s nuclear program, financial support under the «Memorandum of understanding on military assistance» and improving relations with the Arab world through the mediation of the United States. Since the lobby consists of various organizations and groups, there are certain contradictions in views between them. Special attention is paid to the implementation of the foreign policy of the Jewish state by AIPAC and J-Street organizations, as the largest and most influential in the United States. The technologies of Israel’s foreign policy through lobbying pro-Israel groups in the United States are: financial support for congressmen and senators, organizing trips to the Jewish state, initiating and holding discussions of problems in Congress and the Senate, organizing annual congresses with the participation of American and Israeli officials.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Lobby Groups'

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