Academic literature on the topic 'Liberté – Religion'
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Journal articles on the topic "Liberté – Religion":
1
Koubi, Geneviève. "La liberté de religion entre liberté individuelle et revendication collective." Les Cahiers de droit 40, no. 4 (April 12, 2005): 721–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/043575ar.
Abstract:
Une liberté ne se qualifie pas par l'objet qu'elle concerne. L'objet de la présente recherche n'est donc pas de définir le champ d'une liberté religieuse mais de saisir la substance de la liberté de religion. La garantie de la liberté de religion suppose que soit reconnue la liberté de choix, d'option, de sélection, parmi l'éventail des systèmes de croyances ; la notion de liberté religieuse répond à une autre approche des droits et libertés articulée par des autorités morales, religieuses ou idolâtres. La demande de légitimation de la liberté religieuse modifie ainsi les referents, car à la théorie des droits de l'homme est substituée la philosophie des droits de la personne. Or, la combinaison du besoin de reconnaissance des individus et des demandes de reconnaissance des groupes induit l'étude de la distinction entre libertés personnelles et libertés individuelles, droits collectifs et droits communautaires. Dans les sociétés libérales démocratiques, le principe est que seul l'individu est titulaire de droits. Il s'oppose à une réception de la notion de « droits de groupe ». Les « groupes religieux » ne peuvent solliciter pour eux-mêmes la protection de leurs droits en arguant des droits de l'homme. Il existe alors une règle imperative, opposable à tous : « Aucun État, aucun peuple, aucun collectif, aucun groupe ne peut poser le droit, ne peut disposer de droits à l'encontre des droits de l'homme. »
2
Lourenço, Eduardo. "Religion, religions et laïcité." Études Février, no. 2 (January 24, 2017): 53–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/etu.4235.0053.
Abstract:
Avec liberté d’esprit et ampleur de vue, l’essayiste Eduardo Lourenço, éminent spécialiste de Fernando Pessoa et de la saudade (la mélancolie portugaise), grand théoricien de l’Europe et fin observateur du monde, revisite non sans poésie les liens d’interdépendance entre laïcité, christianisme et culture européenne.
3
Robert, Marie-Pierre. "Des crimes religieux : aux confluents du droit pénal et de la liberté de religion." Les Cahiers de droit 50, no. 3-4 (March 4, 2010): 663–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/039337ar.
Abstract:
Le texte qui suit propose une analyse des crimes religieux à la lumière de la protection constitutionnelle de la liberté de religion et du concept de laïcité. Le Code criminel actuel contient toujours des crimes qui ont été adoptés dans le but d’enrayer une pratique religieuse ou antireligieuse. Si le droit pénal peut s’inscrire dans la logique du respect de la liberté de religion, en protégeant les adeptes de toutes les religions, il peut également porter atteinte à la liberté de religion, comme dans le cas de la polygamie ou du libelle blasphématoire. C’est en s’appuyant sur une analyse historique que l’auteure fera le pont entre liberté de religion et crimes religieux.
4
Friedner, Lars. "Liberté de religion." L'Année canonique Tome LI, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 33–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/cano.051.0033.
5
Chélini-Pont, Blandine, Marc Péna, and Emmanuel Tawil. "Liberté d'expression et religion." Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle 23, no. 2007 (2008): 207–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/aijc.2008.2456.
6
CÔTÉ, Pauline. "Religion, Politique et Liberté." Social Compass 49, no. 2 (June 2002): 273–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0037768602049002010.
7
Dijoux, Ruth. "La liberté d’expression face aux sentiments religieux : approche européenne." Les Cahiers de droit 53, no. 4 (November 16, 2012): 861–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1013010ar.
Abstract:
La confrontation de la liberté d’expression et de la liberté religieuse soulève de nombreuses tensions. Pour certains, il convient de favoriser la liberté d’expression, fondement même d’une démocratie. Pour d’autres, au contraire, il convient de protéger la liberté de religion particulièrement contre la liberté d’expression. Afin de solutionner ces oppositions et de trouver un équilibre entre les libertés visées, le choix opéré par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, savoir le contrôle de proportionnalité, apparaît comme une solution efficace.
8
Aguilon, Claire. "Gouvernance de la religion et liberté de conscience." Studia z Prawa Wyznaniowego 20 (December 29, 2017): 135–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.31743/spw.262.
Abstract:
La religion est souvent conçue comme une limite à la liberté de conscience. Cependant, du point de vue de la philosophie de la religion, il est nécessaire de souligner l'importance de l'adoption de la démocratie, qui reconnaît la liberté de conscience comme un moyen mais aussi comme finalité du pouvoir politique, en tant que principe de gouvernement. La limitation de la liberté de conscience par la religion peut être expliquée, sur le plan anthropologique, par la fonction dentitaire assurée par la religion. Néanmoins, la religion, pouvant exister sans être acceptée par tous, n'implique pas en elle-même une telle contrainte. Au-delà de la preuve d'une possible coexistence de la religion et du pluralisme politique, la religion implique intrinsèquement la reconnaissance de la liberté de conscience, résultant de la condition humaine elle-même. En retour, la foi en la valeur égale de la conscience de chaque être humain apparaît comme une motivation de la consécration juridique de la liberté de conscience.
9
Messarra, Antoine. "Les aménagements juridiques des libertés religieuses au Liban." Les Cahiers de droit 40, no. 4 (April 12, 2005): 927–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/043583ar.
Abstract:
Le Liban fournit un exemple normatif quant aux modalités d'aménagement des libertés religieuses en vertu des articles 9, 10, 19 et 95 de la Constitution. Le fédéralisme personnel libanais, qui témoigne du caractère composite de la liberté de religion, constitue un système adapté aux pays où les minorités sont réparties sur tout le territoire national. Dans certains pays arabes se manifestent des cas de discrimination religieuse en ce qui concerne notamment l'aménagement et la restauration des lieux de culte et le statut personnel. La liberté de conscience et de religion implique le droit de changer de religion, l'égalité des statuts personnels en cas de conflit de loi et des mesures jurisprudentielles pour éviter la fraude à la loi dans le passage à une autre religion, surtout en matière de mariage. Dans les autres cas, il faudrait renforcer la dimension individuelle des libertés religieuses et aménager un espace neutre, favorisant les mariages mixtes et la non-appartenance obligatoire à une communauté religieuse. Le Liban est le seul pays arabe sans détermination d'une religion d'Etat et où un système consensuel de gouvernement se propose d'assurer l'égalité, la participation et le libre exercice des croyances religieuses dans une société multicommunautaire.
10
Guichard, Sylvie. "Convictions et croyances : que protège la liberté de conscience ?" Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 48, no. 3 (September 2019): 361–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0008429819855614.
Abstract:
La liberté de conscience est généralement présentée comme un principe fondamental des sociétés démocratiques. Pourtant, sa définition concrète et ses modalités d’exercice demeurent imprécises et incertaines. Par ailleurs, la protection qu’elle offre aux convictions non-religieuses est bien plus restreinte que celle qu’elle garantit aux croyances religieuses. Ce rapide constat induit plusieurs questions : pourquoi de nombreuses constitutions mentionnent-elles conjointement la liberté de conscience et la liberté de religion ? D’où vient ce couple formé par ces deux libertés ? Que signifie-t-il pour chaque liberté prise séparément ? Que protège spécifiquement la liberté de conscience et quel est son champ d’application ? Afin d’apporter un éclairage à ces questions, cet article propose un argument en trois parties. La première partie observe que la liberté de conscience est entrée dans les textes constitutionnels étroitement liée avec la liberté de religion. Dans de nombreux pays, les constituants ont ainsi introduit la liberté de conscience sans en clarifier le contenu. La deuxième partie met en évidence qu’en se laïcisant, l’idée de conscience a ouvert un champ d’application potentiellement très large avec des limites difficiles à définir. La troisième partie s’intéresse aux conséquences contemporaines de cette évolution : la différence avec laquelle les croyances religieuses et les convictions non-religieuses sont protégées. Cette différence est en effet injustifiable dans les États libéraux contemporains, mais nous n’arrivons pas à nous défaire de cet implicite chrétien selon lequel les croyances religieuses sont « spéciales » et ont droit à une protection particulière par rapport aux convictions non-religieuses.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Liberté – Religion":
1
Lavau, Céline. "Liberté d'expression contre liberté de religion : la problématique du respect des sentiments religieux." Toulouse 1, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011TOU10001.
Abstract:
Deux libertés fondamentales, la liberté d'expression et la liberté de religion, a priori complémentaires, peuvent se réveler antinomiques et ainsi aboutir à une confrontation. Ceux qui expriment publiquement leurs opinions ne peuvent le faire au delà de certaines limites. Le droit permet aux croyants des différentes religions reconnues (monothéistes ou polythéistes) de se défendre contre les attaques les plus graves. Face à un arsenal juridique souvent peu clair et à une matière inévitablement subjective, le juge, "gardien des libertés", n'a pas tâche aisée. De plus, les tentatives de conciliation (recherche d'un équilibre) opérées ne permettent pas de résoudre tous les conflits engendrés par cette confrontation et continuent de susciter de violents passions destructrices, d'autant plus que les phénomènes communautaristes s'alimentent d'un retour du religieux, équivoque dans les motivations et confus sur le plan politico-économique. La tendance est alors la quête, en amon, de solutions permettant de préserver une certaine expression en évitant les terrains offensantsTwo fundamental freedoms, the freedom of expression and the freedom of religion, apparently complementary can reveal to be contradictory and thus lead to confrontation. Those who publicly express their opinions shall not do it beyond certain limits. The law allows followers of aknowledged religions (whether monotheistic or polytheistic) to defend themselves against the most serious offenses. To face an often unclear legal might and an unavoidably subjective topic, the judge, as the "guardian of freedoms", does not have an easy task. Additionnaly, attempts toward conciliation (that is, search for a balance) have not enabled to solve all the conflicts generated by the confrontation and they continue to generate violently destructive passions. The problem is exacerbated by community groups, which with an unclear purpose and confusing political and economical position have been feeding off religious beliefs. As a result, the trend has been to seek solutions upstream to preserve a Freedom of speech and avoid conflicting situations
2
Boutouba, Nadia. "La liberté de religion : Perspectives comparées France-Canada." Thesis, Montpellier, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015MONTD033/document.
Abstract:
En France et au Canada, la liberté de religion constitue une liberté de premier rang protégée par de nombreux textes. Si la France a inscrit dans sa Constitution le principe de laïcité de la République, en revanche, au Canada le droit constitutionnel ne le reconnaît pas mais l'Etat canadien repose en matière religieuse sur le principe de neutralité. Le travail de thèse consistera à comparer notamment les décisions françaises et canadiennes afin de distinguer le raisonnement qui sous-tend chaque approche et ainsi mieux comprendre leur fonctionnement en particulier en ce qui concerne les principes de neutralité (Canada) et de laïcité (France) et leurs conséquences quant à la gestion juridique des revendications religieusesIn France and in Canada, freedom of religious beliefs constitutes a freedom of first rank protected by many texts. If France registered in its Constitution the principle of secularity of the Republic, on the other hand, in Canada the constitutional law does not recognize it but the Canadian State rests out of religious matter on the principle of neutrality. The work of thesis will consist in comparing the French and Canadian decisions in particular in order to distinguish the reasoning which underlies each approach and to thus better understand their operation in particular with regard to the principles of neutrality (Canada and of secularity France) and their consequences on the legal management of the religious claims
3
Sana, Rabah. "La problématique de la liberté de religion en droit algérien : la difficile conciliation entre le confessionalisme politique et la liberté de religion." Toulouse 1, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012TOU10040.
Abstract:
L’Algérie est aujourd’hui affrontée à un double défi, celui du droit universel, fondé sur différents principes proclamés au niveau international, et celui de l’islam qui pose également différents principes à prétention universaliste. Ce combat se polarise au niveau du religieux. Sous le regard du droit universel, tel qu’on, peut le dégager du droit international conventionnel consacré par la République algérienne qui a notamment ratifié le Pacte sur les droits civils et politiques, l’Algérie est un pays à prétention laïque où la liberté religieuse est consacrée. Sous le regard en revanche du droit musulman, tel qu’on peut le dégager de l’islam sunnite, religion officielle de l’État algérien, l’Algérie est un pays confessionnel où la liberté de religion est trop encadrée et insuffisamment protégée. Telle est la problématique sous-tendant cette thèse : la difficile conciliation entre le confessionnalisme politique et la liberté de religion en Algérie. Dans une première partie est analysé le droit à la liberté de religion. Ce droit est appréhendé à un double niveau : celui du statut international et régional de l’Algérie dont les engagements devraient théoriquement lui permettre de devenir une République démocratique et laïque, et celui du droit constitutionnel algérien qui tente de concilier ces deux structures normatives antagonistes : une Algérie qui serait à la fois confessionnelle et laïque. La seconde partie du travail est consacrée au droit algérien dont la minutieuse analyse fait clairement ressortir le « combat » entre ces deux idéaux difficilement conciliables : le respect de l’islam et la déférence à la laïcité. Deux « paramètres » sont successivement étudiés pour peser la liberté religieuse, celui de la liberté cultuelle à travers une analyse du degré d’intervention de l’État, celui très ambigu du droit pénal et du droit de la familleNowadays Algeria is faced to challenge, that of universal legal principles and thought, opposed to Islamic customs and traditions that have also universalistic pretension. This fight is polarized at the religious level. Under the gaze of the universal principles embodied conventional international law, Algeria has ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, being bound by that covenant makes it a country with secular claims where religious freedom is devoted. Under the eyes of Islamic law, Sunni Islam is the official religion of the state, Algeria is a confessional country where the freedom of religion is so much controlled and insufficiently protected. Such is the problematic underlying this thesis: the difficulty of reconciling the political confessionalism and the freedom of religion in Algeria. In the first part the right to freedom of religion is analyzed. Light is thrown on this right at two levels: that of regional and international status of Algeria whose commitments should theoretically allow it to become a democratic and secular republic, and that of the Algerian Constitutional law which attempts to reconcile these two conflicting normative structures: an Algeria that would be both religious and secular. The second part of the research is devoted to the analysis of Algerian laws; it focuses on the opposition between these two ideals which need to be reconciled: the respect for Islam and deference to secularism. Two "parameters" are successively advanced for weighing religious freedom, the freedom of worship through an analysis of the degree of state intervention, and the very ambiguous criminal and family laws related to this matter
4
Destrem, Hélène. "La liberté constitutionnelle de religion en France et aux Etats-Unis." Aix-Marseille 3, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000AIX32069.
Abstract:
La religion, notion si essentielle dans la vie de beaucoup d'hommes, ne peut etre juridiquement definie par des criteres objectifs pourtant, l'homme revendique un droit a etre religieusement libre si dans les etats theocratiques il est impossible d'affirmer que la liberte de religion existe reellement, dans les pays ou la religion n'est pas consideree comme un element de la vie de la cite, cette liberte est affirmee et reconnue en france et aux etats- unis, l'etat a choisi de ne pas s'immiscer dans la sphere spirituelle la liberte de religion y est pleine et entiere l'etude des textes constitutionnels francais et americains a revele une absence de consecration explicite de la liberte de religion de cette absence de consecration explicite, il est impossible de deduire l'absence de liberte de religion dans ces pays notre etude tend a demontrer que si aucun des deux textes ne mentionne la liberte de religion explicitement, celle-ci est implicitement protegee en france, par l'affirmation de la liberte de conscience, de la liberte de culte et la laicite, aux etats-unis par le biais du premier amendement le sens de ces notions precise, il est apparu qu'en depit de la diversite des concepts constitutionnels, la liberte de religion pouvait etre definie suivant deux axes la liberte du choix religieux et la liberte d'expression des convictions religieuses ces deux elements constitutifs different de par l'etendue de la garantie qui leur est offerte, ils seront etudies successivement si la liberte de choix religieux est absolue - admettre une quelconque entrave a ce niveau serait la nier totalement - la liberte d'expression des convictions religieuses ne peut etre que relative du fait des exigences de la vie en societe la conclusion de ce travail fait apparaitre la necessite de definir constitutionnellement la liberte de religion pour. Eviter des differences de traitement entre les sujets de droit, du fait de cette absence de consecration constitutionnelle explicite
5
Nadafi, Hamdam. "La liberté de religion dans les Etats de droit musulman." Thesis, Saint-Etienne, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013STETT107/document.
Abstract:
Le système juridique des Etats de droit musulman est composé de règles et de principes hétérogènes. A côté du droit positif codifié, les règles religieuses constituent une source de référence pour le législateur et pour le juge. La constitutionnalisation de l’islam comme religion officielle et comme source de législation dans les Etats de droit musulman, développe ce pluralisme juridique. La coexistence des différentes sources de droit, positive et religieuse, est accentuée par le système de personnalité des lois. Dans ce contexte, l’effectivité de la liberté de religion proclamée par la Constitution des Etats de droit musulman est remise en cause. Le principe d’égalité sans discrimination fondée sur la religion, la liberté de pratiquer librement sa religion ou encore le droit de changer de religion sont encadrés par la législation ou par la jurisprudence. Bien que tous les Etats aient amorcé le processus de constitutionnalisation, les juges constitutionnels peinent à affirmer leur autonomie par rapport au pouvoir exécutif. Le droit musulman est instrumentalisé par les pouvoirs politiques pour asseoir leur autorité sur une légitimité religieuse. Toutefois, la jurisprudence avant-gardiste de la Haute Cour constitutionnelle égyptienne qui a affirmé son indépendance et la jurisprudence civile des tribunaux tunisiens qui ont interprété l’article 1er de la Constitution tunisienne, sont le signe encourageant d’un changement possibleThe legal system in states governed by Islamic law is comprised of a set of heterogeneous rules and principles. Alongside its codified, positive law, religious laws serve as a referential source for the legislature and judiciary. The constitutionalization of Islam as both an official religion and a legislative source in Islamic law states nurtures this legal plurality. The coexistence of these different sources of law, positive and religious respectively, is further accentuated by the subjective variability of law. In this context, the existence of freedom of religion, as enshrined in the constitutions of these Islamic law states, is called into question. The principle of equality without discrimination on grounds of religion; the liberty to freely practice one’s religion; or, indeed, the right to change one’s religion, are framed by legislation or jurisprudence. Although all states have begun the process of constitutionalization, constitutional judges still struggle to assert their autonomy over the executive branch. Islamic law is being exploited by political powers wishing to anchor their authority in religious legitimacy. Nonetheless, encouraging signs of change are evident in the forward-thinking jurisprudence of certain jurisdictions
6
Gonzalez, Gérard. "La convention européenne des droits de l'homme et la liberté de religion." Aix-Marseille 3, 1995. http://www.theses.fr/1995AIX3A001.
7
Seong, Byung-yeul. "La liberté selon Malebranche." Paris 4, 1992. http://www.theses.fr/1992PA040040.
Abstract:
Malebranche est né en 1638 et mort en 1715. Au moment de la découverte de Descartes il y avait la conversion totale à la philosophie en 1664. La liberté, c'est le consentement de notre jugement. Il entre donc dans l'acte libre un mouvement, une inclination générale, des sentiments, des idées et une puissance de fixer tous ces éléments dans une synthèse relativement indéterminée qui constitue l'acte libre. Le principe de notre liberté selon Malebranche, c'est qu'étant faits pour dieu et unis a lui nous pouvons toujours penser au vrai bien ou à d'autres biens qu'à ceux auxquels nous pensons actuellement, c'est que nous pouvons toujours suspendre notre consentement et sérieusement examiner si le bien dont nous jouissons est ou n'est pas le vrai bien. La liberté n'est pas le signe de notre infinitude mais la marque de notre finitude. Quant à la liberté comme pouvoir moral distinct de la volonté, il est vrai que nous l'exprimons par le sentiment intérieur. Ce n'est pas la liberté qui est le principe du péché, c'est la tendance au mal que nous portons tous en la concupiscence. La liberté, principe de bien opposée à la concupiscence, principe du mal, subsiste en nous. Dieu ne peut pas être responsable du péché. Il faut affirmer pourtant que l'homme en s'attachant au souverain bien reste libre d'une liberté entière, complète, féconde, généreuse, c'est la vraie liberté. Cette liberté s'exerce dans l'amour, dans le don soi volontaire, sans trouble, sans inquiétude, c'est la liberté des bienheureux au ciel : ils sont libres de contempler dieu. Leur joie est faite précisément de cet harmonieux mélange de liberté et de nécessitéMalebranche was born in 1638 and died 1715. He became an oratorian in 1660. His most important works are "Recherche de la vérité" (1674) and "Traité de la nature et de la grâce" 1680). Some of his positions derive from St. Augustine and Descartes, but his system is profoundly original. He denies that any action of matter upon mind was possible, and explained sensation as the effect of new creative act in the mental order to correspond with things in the physical creation (occasionalism). His principle of "simplicité des moyens" (that god exhibits his omnipotence by acting always in the simplest way) led him into a form of ontologism, in which god was the immediate cause of all knowledge, and the place of our ideas; consequently, he taught that our first and simplest idea is that of the infinite. However, Malebranche names by the term "will", the inclinations which god incessantly creates the soul. These spiritual movements are of two kinds. Will is divinely inspired inclination toward the god. Liberty is the power by the soul checks this inclination toward the good in general, and fixes it on a particular object. The inclination toward truth and goodness originate in god, not in the soul; but the power by which these inclinations are checked before a perceived idea, is proper to the soul itself
8
Teillot, Line. "Religion et droit pénal." Paris 2, 2002. http://www.theses.fr/2002PA020065.
9
Hardy-Dussault, Marianne. "Le port de signes religieux dans les établissements publics d'enseignement québécois et français : une liberté, deux modèles." Thesis, McGill University, 2007. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=112603.
Abstract:
The present study intends to contribute to the work undertaken in Quebec and in France on religious pluralism in the public sphere. The first section examines the common approach adopted by both States which allowed students to wear religious symbols in public schools. We then highlight the divergent approaches that emerged in 2004 when the French legislature prohibited almost entirely this practice.The second section assesses the capacity of Quebec's and France's legal and political approaches to ensure social cohesion, to protect freedom of religion, the right to equality as well as the rights of the internal minorities who are pressured and constrained by their surroundings. Some considerations related to French universalism might be used to counterbalance the negative effects of the differentialist approach. Nevertheless, this comparative study leads us to conclude that, in Quebec, differentialism remains the path to be followed.
10
Colosimo, Anastasia. "Juger de la religion ? : droit, politique et liberté face au blasphème en démocratie." Thesis, Paris, Institut d'études politiques, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018IEPP0034/document.
Abstract:
Le blasphème est, depuis ses origines, un concept politique qui n’intéresse le religieux que marginalement. Jérusalem, Athènes, Rome, les morts fondatrices de Socrate et de Jésus-Christ, tous deux condamnés à la peine capitale, le premier pour impiété, le second pour blasphème, ainsi que la Torah, l’Évangile et le Coran témoignent que l’histoire de l’interdiction du blasphème est avant tout celle de sa fonction politique, qui est d’éliminer celui qui nuit à la communauté. Avec l’apparition de la modernité, l’invention de la tolérance et la proclamation de la liberté d’expression comme droit fondamental, le blasphème aurait dû disparaître. Il s’est en fait transformé. De Salman Rushdie à Charlie Hebdo, il est même devenu l’enjeu de crises planétaires répétées. Dans le monde musulman, son interdiction est aujourd’hui un outil redoutable de répression des minorités au niveau national et d’accélération de choc des civilisations au niveau international. À ce défi, l’Europe prétend répondre par la liberté d’expression, bien que la majorité des pays occidentaux continue à condamner le blasphème, compris non plus comme une offense à Dieu, mais aux croyants, signe d’une sécularisation dévoyée. C’est particulièrement le cas en France où la prolifération des lois venant limiter la liberté d’expression a fini par réinstaurer un délit de blasphème tout en multipliant les délits d’opinionBlasphemy is since the beginning of its recorded history not only a religious but also a political concept. Jerusalem, Athens, Rome, the founding deaths of Socrates and Jesus Christ, both sentenced to death, the first for impiety, the second for blasphemy, but also the Torah, the Gospel and the Quran show that the prohibition of blasphemy has above all a political function, which is to eliminate whoever harms the community. With modernity, the invention of tolerance and the proclamation of freedom of expression as a fundamental right, blasphemy should have disappeared. Instead, it metamorphosed. From Salman Rushdie to Charlie Hebdo, it became a worldwide issue. In the Muslim world, its prohibition has become a fearsome tool of repression of religious minorities on a national level and of acceleration of a clash of civilizations on an international level. To face this challenge, Europe pretends to answer with freedom of expression, but the majority of European countries still forbid blasphemy, understood no more as an offense to God but an offense to the believers, which is the sign of a rogue secularization. This is especially true in France where the proliferation of laws limiting freedom of expression ended up in a re-introduction of the prohibition of blasphemy and more generally of crimes of opinion
Books on the topic "Liberté – Religion":
1
Maar, Judit. EUROPE, MINORITÉS, LIBERTÉ DE RELIGION. Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 2011.
2
Jean, Desclos, and Malherbe Jean-François 1950-, eds. Croire en liberté. [Saint-Laurent, Québec]: Fides, 1999.
3
Richard, Andréa. Au-delà de la religion: Liberté d'envol. Lac Beauport, Québec: Éditions Arion, 2004.
4
Claire de Beausse de La Hougue. La liberté religieuse en Europe. Lille: Atelier national de reproduction des thèses, 2005.
5
Pietri, Gaston. De Voltaire à la liberté religieuse: De la tolérance à la vraie liberté. Paris: Salvator, 2012.
6
Maclure, Jocelyn. Laïcité et liberté de conscience. Montréal: Boréal, 2010.
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Zundel, Maurice. La liberté de la foi. [La Chapelle Montligeon]: Association des amis de Maurice Zundel, 1986.
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Aveline, Jean-Marc, and Christian Salenson. Éduquer à la liberté religieuse. Marseille (11 Imp. Flammarion, 13001): Publications Chemins de dialogue, 2006.
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Simon, Jules. La liberté de conscience. [France]: Association Corpus/EUD, 2008.
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Jules, Simon. La liberté de conscience. [France]: Association Corpus/EUD, 2008.
Book chapters on the topic "Liberté – Religion":
1
Kadt, Emanuel de. "Liberal religion." In The Routledge Handbook of Religion, Politics and Ideology, 9–22. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780367816230-3.
2
Mason, Alpheus Thomas, and Donald Grier Stephenson. "Religious Liberty." In American Constitutional Law, 566–80. 18th ed. New York: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003164340-13.
3
Mason, Alpheus Thomas, and Donald Grier Stephenson. "Religious Liberty." In American Constitutional Law, 525–71. Seventeenth edition. | New York, NY : Routledge, 2017.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315394589-13.
4
Fox, Charles James. "‘Religious Liberty’." In Documents on the Nineteenth Century United Kingdom Constitution, 95–96. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780367816148-28.
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de Kadt, Emanuel. "Liberal Judaism." In Liberal Religion, 37–55. New York : Routledge, 2018. | Series: Routledge studies in religion ; 64: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351185639-2.
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de Kadt, Emanuel. "Liberal Protestantism." In Liberal Religion, 56–73. New York : Routledge, 2018. | Series: Routledge studies in religion ; 64: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351185639-3.
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de Kadt, Emanuel. "Liberal Islam." In Liberal Religion, 95–123. New York : Routledge, 2018. | Series: Routledge studies in religion ; 64: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351185639-5.
8
"Liberté de religion et égalité." In La Fonctionnaire et le hijab, 57–76. Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9782760639232-004.
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Durand, Jean-Paul. "Introduction. Épikie catholique, libre examen protestant et liberté religieuse : quelques évocations." In Liberté des consciences et religion, 11–25. Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/books.pur.172468.
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Desmazières, Agnès. "Psychanalyse et confession : le débat américain (1947-1958)." In Liberté des consciences et religion, 275–90. Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/books.pur.172638.
Conference papers on the topic "Liberté – Religion":
1
Khitruk, Ekaterina. "Публичное и частное в философии религии Ричарда Рорти." In The Public/Private in Modern Civilization, the 22nd Russian Scientific-Practical Conference (with international participation) (Yekaterinburg, April 16-17, 2020). Liberal Arts University – University for Humanities, Yekaterinburg, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.35853/ufh-public/private-2020-14.
Abstract:
The article covers the religious conception in the work of the famous American philosopher Richard Rorty. The author emphasises the secular and finalist views of R. Rorty on the nature of religion, and on the philosopher’s gradual perception of the need for their creative reinterpretation due to the actualisation of the role of religion in intellectual and political spheres. The article uncovers two fundamental constituents of Richard Rorty’s religious philosophy. The first of them is associated with R. Rorty’s perception of the ‘weak thinking’ concept in the writings of Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo. R. Rorty holds ‘weak thinking’ and ‘kenosis’ to be the key to understanding the possibility of religion in the postmodern era. The second aspect concerns the existence of religion in the public space. Here the distinction between ‘strong’ narratives and ‘weak’ thinking correlates with the politically significant distinction between ‘strong’ religious institutions and private (parish, community) religious practice. Rorty believes that the activity of ‘strong’ religious structures threatens liberal ‘social hope’ on the gradual democratisation of mankind. The article concludes that Richard Rorty’s philosophy of religion presents an original conception of religion in the context of modern temporal humanism; the concept positively evaluates religious experience to the extent that it does not become a basis for theoretical and political manipulations on the part of ‘strong’ religious institutes.
2
Matic, Andreea Elena, and Florin Tudor. "THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY � BETWEEN LIMITS AND IDEAL." In 9th SWS International Scientific Conferences on SOCIAL SCIENCES - ISCSS 2022. SGEM WORLD SCIENCE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.35603/sws.iscss.2022/s02.019.
Abstract:
The right to liberty is one of the fundamental human rights. Over time, obtaining the right to liberty for people from different social categories (men, women, slaves, etc.) was in many occasions hard and it was achieved at the end of difficult ideological and political struggles. In this article we aim to analyze the equilibrium that exists in contemporary democratic society, between the liberty of each person on the one hand and, on the other hand, the exercise and protection of the other fundamental human rights: the right to life, health, physical and mental integrity and so on. We will analyze aspects related to the individual liberty in the matter of expressing opinions, the freedom in the choices we make, the freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of movement. For example, in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic our liberty has been severely limited in order to protect the right to life and the right to health. We will analyze the concept of liberty in relation to legal and moral norms and taking responsibility for one's own decisions and their consequences. The idea of individual liberty is very important for each person, as it is one of the elements that allow us to think and believe that we are the masters of our lives. The right to liberty and the fundamental freedoms can be limited only in exceptional circumstances established through national and international legal provisions and we will refer to these limitations in our paper. Concluding, it is our opinion that the right to liberty and the fundamental freedoms must be respected for every individual and its restriction have to be seriously weighed.
3
Naka, Tomomi. "What Does it Mean to Give Faithfully in the COVID-19 Pandemic and Polarized America?: A Case Study of Liberal Mennonites." In The Asian Conference on Ethics, Religion & Philosophy 2023. The International Academic Forum(IAFOR), 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.22492/issn.2187-476x.2023.3.
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Weller, Paul. "ROBUSTNESS AND CIVILITY: THEMES FROM FETHULLAH GÜLEN AS RESOURCE AND CHALLENGE FOR GOVERNMENT, MUSLIMS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM." In Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/cdcf7302.
Abstract:
The 7/7 (2005) attack on London Transport by Muslims brought up in the UK shocked the Government, many Muslims, and the wider civil society. Subsequently, the UK’s ‘multi- culturalist’ policy consensus has been subject to intensive questioning. Politicians and some parts of civil society have challenged a perceived ‘separatism’ among Muslims; emphasised a need for shared values and social cohesion; and advocated the promotion of ‘moderate Islam’ and ‘moderate Muslims’. This paper argues that, in legitimising simplistic distinctions between ‘good’ (understood as ‘liberal’ or ‘modernist’) and ‘bad’ or ‘suspect’ (understood as ‘traditionalist’, ‘radical’ or ‘fundamentalist’) Muslims and forms of Islam, there is a risk of eliding the condemnation of terrorist crimes conducted on religious grounds into the criminalisation, or at least social marginalisation, of religious conservatism and/or radicalism. This approach, it is argued, is more likely to undermine the development of inclusive approaches to the common good and that what is needed instead are authentically Islamic approaches that can offer both a resource and a challenge to Government, Muslims and the wider civil society. Finally, it is argued that such resource and challenge can be found in themes from Fethullah Gülen’s teaching. Gülen, on Islamic grounds, condemns terrorism in the name of religion. Further, being rooted in a confident Ottoman Muslim civilisational heritage and having during the period of the Turkish Republic engaged with both ideological ‘secularism’ and political ‘Islamism’, he also offers a critique of the political instrumentalisation of Islam while ar- guing for an active Muslim engagement with the wider (religious and secular) society based on a distinctive Islamic vision characterised by a robustness and civility that could make a positive contribution in the present UK context.
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Rieffer-Flanagan, Barb. "Promoting the Fundamental Human Right of Religious Liberty in US Foreign Policy." In Annual International Conference on Political Science, Sociology and International Relations. Global Science & Technology Forum (GSTF), 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.5176/2251-2403_pssir14.11.
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Haderbache, Ahmed. "Prise de parole et quête de liberté : les espaces de l’eau dans Aïcha de Yamina Benguigui." In XXV Coloquio AFUE. Palabras e imaginarios del agua. Valencia: Universitat Politècnica València, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.4995/xxvcoloquioafue.2016.2998.
Abstract:
Aïcha est une série française de quatre téléfilms de Yamina Benguigui réalisée entre 2008 et 2011. Aïcha est une jeune française d’origine algérienne habitant dans une cité de la banlieue parisienne. Les différents épisodes nous retracent son parcours personnel et sa lutte sociale au quotidien, tout comme ses rêves et ses aspirations, dans une cité où diverses communautés cohabitent sous le regard des autres. Elle cherche son indépendance par le biais d’un positionnement identitaire qui s’oppose aux principes du mariage traditionnel, sans renier pour autant entièrement aux traditions familiales. En effet, cette Shéhérazade des temps modernes du périphérique parisien essaie de faire valoir ses propres normes face à la rigidité des préceptes de la communauté à laquelle elle est appartient. C’est dans des espaces liés aux rituels de l’eau que ces désirs et ces ambitions se rendent visibles. Ainsi, tout au long des quatre épisodes, le hammam devient un lieu de liberté pour Aïcha et toutes ces femmes de tous âges, religions et origines qui tâchent, grâce à une prise de parole au féminin, de résoudre les problèmes des ces êtres oubliés par l’État : le racisme vis-à-vis des jeunes diplômés issus des différentes générations d’immigrés, la sécurité dans les cités ou les mariages mixtes. C’est également au salon de coiffure entre deux shampoings que d’autres conflits interpersonnels et interculturels vont trouver des solutions. Les espaces, liés aux rituels corporels de lavage et de mise en beauté entre femmes où l’eau est un élément central, deviennent de la sorte des lieux privilégiés de prise de parole et de quête de liberté.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4995/XXVColloqueAFUE.2016.2998
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Petrovich, Igor K. "Religious Issue in the Programs of Polish Liberal Political Parties at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century." In Slavic World: Commonality and Diversity. Institute of Slavic Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.31168/2619-0869.2021.1.21.
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Correard, Nicolas. "¿Lazarillo Libertin? Sobre la primera recepción en Europa del Norte: traducciones e inspiraciones anticlericales." In Simposio internacional El Lazarillo y sus continuadores: Facultad de Ciencias de la Educación, 10 y 11 de octubre de 2019, Universidade da Coruña: [Actas]. Servicio de Publicaciones. Universidade da Coruña, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.17979/spudc.9788497497657.29.
Abstract:
It has often been argued that the picaresque genre derived from the Lazarillo castigado, if not from the Guzmán de Alfarache, more than from the original Lazarillo. Such an assumption neglects the fact that the first French and English translations did rely on the 1554 text, whose influence, conveyed by the 1555 sequel also translated in French in 1598, did last until the early 17th century. Probably designed in an Erasmian circle, the anticlerical satire, enhanced by provoking allusions to certain catholic dogmas, did not pass unnoticed: the marginal comments of the translations, for instance, testify for a strong interest for this theme. It is no wonder, therefore, if the first satirical narratives freely inspired by the Lazarillo, such like The Unfortunate Traveller by Nashe, the Euphormio Lusinini Satyricon by Barclay, or the Première journée by Viau, adapted its religious satire to their own actuality: in the context of the rise of libertine thinking, characters of Jesuits and Puritans could become new targets for novelistic scenes based on an obviously “lazarillesque” model.
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Černěnko, Tomáš, and Dana Kuběnková. "A Rose by Another Name Would Smell the Same: Hidden Potential of Antisystem Parties in Slovakia?" In XXV. mezinárodní kolokvium o regionálních vědách. Brno: Masaryk University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/cz.muni.p280-0068-2022-55.
Abstract:
This article aims to identify voter attitudes, based on the results of the 2020 parliamentary elections, towards European integration, religious attitudes in politics, universal left-right integration, the rights of ethnic minorities, the position between cosmopolitan and national sentiments, and political decentralization in favour of regions at the district level of Slovakia, while considering factors that affect voter's selection. In the first step, we calculated the position of the district through the results of individual political parties (district level) in the elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic in 2020 and data from the 2019 Chapel Hill expert survey. In the second step, we used these results as dependent variables for regression analysis, examining their dependence on the variables average wage, unemployment rate, ethnic composition, and time availability of the district's seat from the regional centre and Bratislava (capital). A retrospective analysis of voter attitudes at individual districts has shown that concerns about possible covert support for anti-system parties are warranted. “Negative” results, especially on religious principles in politics, ethnic minority rights, inclination to national values, and centralized power, show that if expectations from standard (or liberal democratic) parties are not met, there is a risk of voters diverting to radical parties.
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Celik, Gurkan, Kate Kirk, and Yusuf Alan. "MODERN IDEALS AND MUSLIM IDENTITY: HARMONY OR CONTRADICTION? - A TEXT LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE GÜLEN TEACHING AND MOVEMENT." In Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/xlue9524.
Abstract:
At the global level there is an urgent need and increasing attention for a new sense of Muslim identity in harmony with modern realities. Fethullah Gülen, an educationalist, a religious guide and a peace maker, is one of the most persuasive and influential Turkish-Muslim voices in the contemporary world putting strong emphasis on peaceful coexistence and the synthesis of faith and reason in Western democracies through spirituality, religious diversity, dialogue and educational initiatives. This paper primarily examines how and to what extent Gülen’s teachings and the world-wide volunteer movement inspired by him are contributing to the dynamic and cheerful coexistence of Muslims and non-Muslims. In order to explore and ana- lyse this coexistence, the seven text linguistic principles (cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality and intertextuality) are applied to Gülen’s teach- ings and his movement as an empirical case. Secondarily, these text linguistic standards are modelled to social sciences as a new theoretical and methodological approach for exploring and analysing social movements and phenomena. The originality of this study is specified as the correlations between a movement and a text, and the processes of cognition, production and reproduction of knowledge and its dissemination and transition in the Muslim world, multicultural societies and liberal democracies. This research’s practical relevance lies in the fact that it helps understand how the Gülen movement has been formed and accomplished, both nationally and internationally. Metaphorically, in this paper Fethullah Gülen has been considered as the writer; by-him-inspired movement refers to the text; and the readers are the transnational community and the whole humanity.
Reports on the topic "Liberté – Religion":
1
Estelle, Sarah M. Religious Liberty in the States 2022. Center for Religion, Culture & Democracy, September 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.54669/dryp4816.
2
Estelle, Sarah M. Religious Liberty in the States 2023. Center for Religion, Culture & Democracy, November 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.54669/lyvg2975.
3
Hall, Mark David, and Paul D. Mueller. Religious Liberty in the States 2024. Center for Religion, Culture & Democracy, July 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.54669/pnaq6811.
4
Estelle, Sarah M. Religious Liberty in the States 2023: Executive Summary. Center for Religion, Culture & Democracy, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.54669/urju4116.
5
Monette, Barbara. The Anabaptist Contributions to the Idea of Religious Liberty. Portland State University Library, January 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.15760/etd.6936.
6
Morieson, Nicholas, and Ihsan Yilmaz. Is A New Anti-Western Civilizational Populism Emerging? The Turkish, Hungarian and Israeli Cases. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), April 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/pp0032.
Abstract:
While it’s typical to associate right-wing populism in Western Europe with the narrative of Islam versus the Judeo-Christian West, there’s a nuanced and emerging form of civilisationalism that we term "anti-Western civilizational populism." This paper argues that anti-Western civilizational populism is present in the discourse of not only Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan but also Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and may be emerging in Israel under the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The article finds two key features common to these three different expressions of anti-Western populism across three different religions: The blaming of ‘the West’ for domestic problems is often the result of poor domestic governance, and an accompanying authoritarian, anti-liberal turn justified by the necessity of protecting ‘the people’ from the ‘liberal’ Western powers and defending and/or rejuvenating ‘our’ civilization. As liberalism promotes global cosmopolitanism and religious diversity, non-liberal states perceive it as a threat to their sovereignty and traditional values. Consequently, they push back against Western cultural hegemony, potentially forming an anti-liberal, authoritarian discursive bloc.
7
Yilmaz, Ihsan, Raja M. Ali Saleem, Mahmoud Pargoo, Syaza Shukri, Idznursham Ismail, and Kainat Shakil. Religious Populism, Cyberspace and Digital Authoritarianism in Asia: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey. European Center for Populism Studies, January 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/5jchdy.
Abstract:
Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe for the kind of freedoms that liberal democracy can guarantee. However, despite having multi-party electoral systems, these countries have recently moved toward populist authoritarianism. Populism —once considered a distinctively Latin American problem that only seldom reared its head in other parts of the world— has now found a home in almost every corner of the planet. Moreover, it has latched on to religion, which, as history reminds us, has an unparalleled power to mobilize crowds. This report explores the unique nexus between faith and populism in our era and offers an insight into how cyberspace and offline politics have become highly intertwined to create a hyper-reality in which socio-political events are taking place. The report focuses, in particular, on the role of religious populism in digital space as a catalyst for undemocratic politics in the five Asian countries we have selected as our case studies. The focus on the West Asian and South Asian cases is an opportunity to examine authoritarian religious populists in power, whereas the East Asian countries showcase powerful authoritarian religious populist forces outside parliament. This report compares internet governance in each of these countries under three categories: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. These are the digital toolkits that authorities use to govern digital space. Our case selection and research focus have allowed us to undertake a comparative analysis of different types of online restrictions in these countries that constrain space foropposition and democratic voices while simultaneously making room for authoritarian religious populist narratives to arise and flourish. The report finds that surveillance, censorship, disinformation campaigns, internet shutdowns, and cyber-attacks—along with targeted arrests and violence spreading from digital space—are common features of digital authoritarianism. In each case, it is also found that religious populist forces co-opt political actors in their control of cyberspace. The situational analysis from five countries indicates that religion’s role in digital authoritarianism is quite evident, adding to the layer of nationalism. Most of the leaders in power use religious justifications for curbs on the internet. Religious leaders support these laws as a means to restrict “moral ills” such as blasphemy, pornography, and the like. This evident “religious populism” seems to be a major driver of policy changes that are limiting civil liberties in the name of “the people.” In the end, the reasons for restricting digital space are not purely religious but draw on religious themes with populist language in a mixed and hybrid fashion. Some common themes found in all the case studies shed light on the role of digital space in shaping politics and society offline and vice versa. The key findings of our survey are as follows: The future of (especially) fragile democracies is highly intertwined with digital space. There is an undeniable nexus between faith and populism which offers an insight into how cyberspace and politics offline have become highly intertwined. Religion and politics have merged in these five countries to shape cyber governance. The cyber governance policies of populist rulers mirror their undemocratic, repressive, populist, and authoritarian policies offline. As a result, populist authoritarianism in the non-digital world has increasingly come to colonize cyberspace, and events online are more and more playing a role in shaping politics offline. “Morality” is a common theme used to justify the need for increasingly draconian digital laws and the active monopolization of cyberspace by government actors. Islamist and Hindutva trolls feel an unprecedented sense of cyber empowerment, hurling abuse without physically seeing the consequences or experiencing the emotional and psychological damage inflicted on their victims.
8
Yilmaz, Ihsan, Raja M. Ali Saleem, Mahmoud Pargoo, Syaza Shukri, Idznursham Ismail, and Kainat Shakil. Religious Populism, Cyberspace and Digital Authoritarianism in Asia: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), January 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/rp0001.
Abstract:
Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe for the kind of freedoms that liberal democracy can guarantee. However, despite having multi-party electoral systems, these countries have recently moved toward populist authoritarianism. Populism —once considered a distinctively Latin American problem that only seldom reared its head in other parts of the world— has now found a home in almost every corner of the planet. Moreover, it has latched on to religion, which, as history reminds us, has an unparalleled power to mobilize crowds. This report explores the unique nexus between faith and populism in our era and offers an insight into how cyberspace and offline politics have become highly intertwined to create a hyper-reality in which socio-political events are taking place. The report focuses, in particular, on the role of religious populism in digital space as a catalyst for undemocratic politics in the five Asian countries we have selected as our case studies. The focus on the West Asian and South Asian cases is an opportunity to examine authoritarian religious populists in power, whereas the East Asian countries showcase powerful authoritarian religious populist forces outside parliament. This report compares internet governance in each of these countries under three categories: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. These are the digital toolkits that authorities use to govern digital space. Our case selection and research focus have allowed us to undertake a comparative analysis of different types of online restrictions in these countries that constrain space foropposition and democratic voices while simultaneously making room for authoritarian religious populist narratives to arise and flourish. The report finds that surveillance, censorship, disinformation campaigns, internet shutdowns, and cyber-attacks—along with targeted arrests and violence spreading from digital space—are common features of digital authoritarianism. In each case, it is also found that religious populist forces co-opt political actors in their control of cyberspace. The situational analysis from five countries indicates that religion’s role in digital authoritarianism is quite evident, adding to the layer of nationalism. Most of the leaders in power use religious justifications for curbs on the internet. Religious leaders support these laws as a means to restrict “moral ills” such as blasphemy, pornography, and the like. This evident “religious populism” seems to be a major driver of policy changes that are limiting civil liberties in the name of “the people.” In the end, the reasons for restricting digital space are not purely religious but draw on religious themes with populist language in a mixed and hybrid fashion. Some common themes found in all the case studies shed light on the role of digital space in shaping politics and society offline and vice versa. The key findings of our survey are as follows: The future of (especially) fragile democracies is highly intertwined with digital space. There is an undeniable nexus between faith and populism which offers an insight into how cyberspace and politics offline have become highly intertwined. Religion and politics have merged in these five countries to shape cyber governance. The cyber governance policies of populist rulers mirror their undemocratic, repressive, populist, and authoritarian policies offline. As a result, populist authoritarianism in the non-digital world has increasingly come to colonize cyberspace, and events online are more and more playing a role in shaping politics offline. “Morality” is a common theme used to justify the need for increasingly draconian digital laws and the active monopolization of cyberspace by government actors. Islamist and Hindutva trolls feel an unprecedented sense of cyber empowerment, hurling abuse without physically seeing the consequences or experiencing the emotional and psychological damage inflicted on their victims.
9
Yilmaz, Ihsan, and Nicholas Morieson. Nationalism, Religion, and Archaeology: The Civilizational Populism of Benjamin Netanyahu and Likud. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), October 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/pp0015.
Abstract:
This paper examines civilizational populism in Israel and focuses on the largest and most powerful party in Israel since the 1980s, National Liberal Movement (Likud), and its most significant leader of the past twenty years, the populist politician Benjamin Netanyahu. We show how Netanyahu incorporates ‘civilizationism’ into his populist discourses by, first, using the notion that Jewish civilization predates all others in the region to establish the legitimacy of the state of Israel, the hegemony of Jewish culture within Israel, and at times his own political decisions. Second, through his portrayal of the Arab-Muslim world as an antisemitic and barbaric bloc that, far from being a civilization, threatens Western civilization through its barbarism. Equally, this paper shows how Netanyahu argues that Israel is akin to protective wall that protects Western Civilization from the Islamist barbarians who wish to destroy it, and therefore on this basis calls for Europeans and North Americans to support Israel in its battle for civilization and against “the forces of barbarism.”
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Szałańska, Justyna, Justyna Gać, Ewa Jastrzębska, Paweł Kubicki, Paulina Legutko-Kobus, Marta Pachocka, Joanna Zuzanna Popławska, and Dominik Wach. Country report: Poland. Welcoming spaces in relation to social wellbeing, economic viability and political stability in shrinking regions. Welcoming Spaces Consortium, December 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.33119/welcoming_spaces_2022.
Abstract:
This report aims to present findings of the research conducted in Poland within the Work Package 1 of the Welcoming Spaces project, namely “Welcoming spaces” in relation to economic viability, social wellbeing and political stability in shrinking regions. The main aim of the mentioned research was to examine how welcoming initiatives are organised and implemented in the selected shrinking localities in Poland. In particular, the creation of welcoming initiatives concerning social wellbeing, economic viability and political stability was assessed. To accomplish this objective, five localities were selected purposefully, namely Łomża (city with powiat status) and Zambrów (urban commune) in Podlaskie Voivodeship and Łuków (town), Wohyń (rural commune) and Zalesie (rural commune) in Lubelskie Voivodeship. Within these localities, 23 welcoming initiatives were identified, out of which 12 were chosen for in-depth research. The field research was conducted in all five localities between March and December 2021. During this period, the SGH Warsaw School of Economics team conducted 43 interviews with institutional stakeholders (representatives of local governments, schools, non-governmental organisations – NGOs, religious organisations and private companies) and individuals (both migrant newcomers and native residents). In addition, local government representatives were surveyed to compare their policies, measures and stances toward migrant inhabitants and local development. The research was also complemented with the literature review, policy documents analysis, and local media outlets discourse analysis. Until February 2022 and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, welcoming spaces in Poland were scarce and spatially limited to the big cities like Warsaw, Cracow, Wrocław, Gdańsk, Lublin or Białystok, governed by liberal mayors and city councils open to accept migrants and treat them as a valuable human asset of the city community. However, in smaller cities, towns and rural areas, especially in shrinking regions, welcoming spaces have been highly conditioned by welcoming initiatives carried out mainly by civil society organisations (CSOs). It is very likely that the war in Ukraine will completely change the situation we write about in this country report. However, this crisis and its consequences were not the subjects of our desk research and fieldwork in Poland, which ended in December 2021. As of late July 2022, the number of border crossings from Ukraine to Poland is almost 5 million and the number of forced migrants registered for temporary protection or similar national protection scheme concern 1.3 million people (UNHCR 2022). However, the number of those who have decided to stay in Poland is estimated at around 1.5 million (Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk 2022). Such a large influx of forced migrants from Ukraine within five months already affects the demographic situation in the country and access to public services, mainly in large and medium-size cities1 . Depending on the development of events in Ukraine and the number of migrants who will decide to stay in Poland in the following months, the functioning of the domestic labour market, education, health service, and social assistance may significantly change. The following months may also bring new changes in the law relating to foreigners, aimed at their easier integration in the country. Access to housing in cities is already a considerable challenge, which may result in measures to encourage foreigners to settle in smaller towns and rural areas. Given these dynamic changes in the migration situation of the country, as well as in the area of admission and integration activities, Poland seems to be slowly becoming one great welcoming space. It is worth mentioning that the main institutional actors in this area have been NGOs and local governments since the beginning of the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. An important supporting and coordinating role has also been played by international organisations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which launched its inter-agency Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) in early spring to address the most urgent needs of the population of forced migrants and their host countries in this part of Europe (UNHCR 2022a; UNHCR 2022b; UNHCR 2022c). Based on the number of newly emerged welcoming initiatives and the pace of this emergence, they will soon become an everyday reality for every municipality in Poland. Therefore, it is difficult to find more up-todate circumstances for the “Welcoming Spaces” project objective, which is “to rethink ways forward in creating inclusive space in such a way that it will contribute firstly to the successful integration of migrants in demographically and economically shrinking areas and simultaneously to the revitalization of these places”. Furthermore, the initiatives we selected as case studies for our research should be widely promoted and treated as a model of migrants’ inclusion into the new communities. On the other hand, we need to emphasize here that the empirical material was collected between March and December 2021, before the outbreak of war in Ukraine. As such, it does not reflect the new reality in Poland